Is Australian housing really a ‘Ponzi’? June 16, 2023

16 Jun 2023 · 1 h 22 min

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Podcast Notes: Motley Fool Money

Episode Title

Is Australian housing really a ‘Ponzi’? Date: June 16, 2023 Hosts: Scott Phillips & Andrew Page

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Episode Overview In this episode, the hosts discuss several significant financial topics, focusing on the current state of the Australian housing market and the implications of recent economic indicators, including interest rates and consumer spending patterns. They delve into the concept of whether the Australian housing market resembles a 'Ponzi scheme' and what that means for investors and the broader economy.

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Key Topics Discussed

  1. Interest Rates and the US Federal Reserve
  2. The US Federal Reserve paused interest rate hikes for the first time in over a year, keeping rates between 5% and 5.25%.
  3. Jerome Powell's Statement: While pausing, he indicated that more hikes might be on the horizon, showcasing a cautious approach to economic changes.
  4. The hosts compare this strategy to adjusting the temperature in a shower, suggesting a gradual approach to avoid shocking the economy.
  1. Consumer Spending Trends
  2. Recent data indicates that consumer spending may have peaked, impacting the housing market.
  3. Notable declines in sectors like entertainment, clothing, and travel were highlighted, suggesting consumers are tightening their belts amid rising costs and economic uncertainty.
  1. The Concept of a 'Ponzi' Housing Market
  2. The hosts grapple with the idea that the Australian housing market could be seen as a Ponzi scheme due to its reliance on new debt and money entering the system to sustain high prices.
  3. They discuss how this dynamic can lead to inflated prices that don’t necessarily correlate with intrinsic economic growth or productivity.
  1. Current State of the New Zealand Economy
  2. New Zealand has entered a technical recession, with two consecutive quarters of negative growth.
  3. Housing prices have dropped significantly, indicating a potential trend for Australia to follow.
  1. Demographics and Housing Affordability
  2. The discussion touches on how different generations experience the housing market, with older generations potentially benefiting from property appreciation while younger generations struggle with affordability.
  3. There’s an examination of how income distribution and economic policies shape these experiences, leading to differing impacts on various demographic groups.
  1. Market Expectations and Economic Cycles
  2. The hosts emphasize that market behaviors are heavily influenced by expectations rather than absolute changes, likening it to the psychological aspects of investing.
  3. They express skepticism over the reliability of forecasts from central banks and the complexities of managing economic policy in a dynamic environment.

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Key Takeaways

  • Interest Rate Dynamics: The Federal Reserve's cautious approach reflects a balance between inflation control and economic stability. Investors should watch for future rate changes and their implications on markets.
  • Consumer Sentiment: Decreased spending in discretionary categories may signal broader economic challenges, affecting housing demand and prices moving forward.
  • Housing Market Concerns: The potential characterization of the housing market as a Ponzi scheme reflects underlying vulnerabilities in the economy, as reliance on new money creates instability.
  • Generational Divide: The disparity in housing affordability and wealth accumulation between generations poses significant social and economic challenges.
  • Skepticism of Forecasting: Market behavior is often driven by expectations rather than fundamentals, and predictions about economic performance can be misleading.

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Conclusion The discussion raises important questions about the sustainability of the current housing market and the effectiveness of economic policies. The hosts encourage listeners to approach investment decisions with caution, being mindful of the broader economic trends and their potential implications for both the housing market and overall financial stability.

For further insights and updates, listeners are encouraged to subscribe to the Motley Fool newsletter at [fool.com.au/LiSTNR](https://fool.com.au/LiSTNR).

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Disclaimer: The Motley Fool and individuals in this podcast may hold positions in the companies mentioned. This is general advice only and listeners should consult with financial professionals for personalized guidance.

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Transcript

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0:07Welcome to Motley Fool Money, the podcast that places a premium on keeping expectations low. I'm Scott Phillips from The Motley Fool He is Andrew Page from strawman.com Mr. Page, g'day How are ya? Mate, I'm exceptionally well Oh, can I tell you, it's freezing at my place just quietly You are in a t-shirt, by the way Well, yeah, what you can't see is the aircon on behind me But outside, it was 4 degrees this morning And with the wind chill, it felt like minus 1.2 It was a cold way to take the dog out of the toilet, put it that way Yes Freezing, but the sun is out So it's kind of a beautiful winter's day, which is probably what we should expect.

0:47How about your good self? Yeah. Yeah. Also cold. Pretty good. Yeah. Pretty good. Otherwise, no complaints. Yeah. Very good. Very good. Mates, how's straw man going? It's going okay. Yeah. We only accept new members twice a year. So in between, it's just trying to sort of make sure we deliver value. And so, yeah, we've - Keeping the dream alive. I was saying to you before off air, we've just lined up a talk with Matt Barry, the CEO of Freelancer, who's a very, very interesting character. How much are you set aside for that? As much as he wants. As much as he wants. For those, if you haven't seen it, YouTube Sydney SMH 2050 conference, he gave the keynote address.

1:32and it's a blistering attack on particularly Sydney and housing. Whatever your opinion is, I think you'll get a reaction. Yes. If nothing else, Matt Barry provokes reactions that much. He's absolutely true. Speaking of which, what is strongman.com? It's a private online investment club. Is it really? It is. It is. As I said, one of the top two finance-related websites in the country. Of course, the Motley Fool at fool.com.au. I have to put a plug in for my own business, otherwise the boss asks me what I'm doing. No, he doesn't. I'm actually not convinced the boss listens, but that's okay. In fact, it's probably almost certain, because otherwise I probably still wouldn't be doing the podcast.

2:15So there you go. Get ahead of him if you're listening. Mate, let's get into the news of the week. I am going to make something of a large-ish call. I reckon this is going to be one of the more, what's the right word, impactful, symbolic, important weeks of 2023. There's been a lot going on locally and overseas. Let's start with the biggest of the big macros, mate, which is Wall Street, or in particular the US Federal Reserve, which for the first time in over a year on Thursday morning, our time left interest rates on hold at between five and five and a quarter. They have this range rather than a rather specific number between five and five and a quarter percent is their interest rate has been obviously last month for the first time in more than a year kept rates on hold at the same time.

3:10Jerome Powell saying, but there's going to be more and things are going through. The economy is too strong. And it was almost like a Clayton's pause. and i i kind of i've i've thought this about the rba as well i have a feeling that in their in their kind of bureaucratic minds in their kind of you know econometric views of the world you do something at half a percent for a while then you go to a quarter of a percent and then you kind of go to a quarter percent every second month because that averages out to a little bit less if you're kind of drawing this you went into mathematicians and economists like graphs and curves and relationships and stuff if you're going to draw that out it just feels to me this is their version of deceleration.

3:44Just ever so, bit by bit, every second month, then it might be every third month, then all of a sudden they'll just stop dead and that'll be done. And I don't know if that's too simplistic or not, but it just strikes me that when you say on one hand, yeah, we're going to wait a little bit longer to see what's going on, but there'll be two more. I mean, plenty of people say, well, just do the two and get over and over, then at least we can get on with it. My sense is they just believe that A, there's some sort of deceleration in the way they're doing it, the pattern of increases, but also at some level at least they believe that longevity matters that the more the longer this kind of impact lingers in people's minds potential and real impact the more likely it is to change behaviors rather than one and done then we go oh that hurts okay let's go back to spending again there's something i think i'm speculating i don't know i have no basis for it other than my own speculation but it just strikes me that seems to be the way they think about this kind of approach that you need to kind of draw it out to make sure it has a long enough impact over enough time so that we don't just snap back to higher inflation, but also this deceleration trend.

4:46Does any of those ring true to you or am I completely off the tree? Yeah. I mean, it's a bit like trying to adjust the temperature in the shower, right? You crank the hot water tap. That's a good point. And then there's a series of adjustments as you sort of zero in on that lovely one. The perfect temperature. But, you know, and there's a lag, you know, and all of the rest of which is really hard. It's always like, you know, compared to like trying to turn the Titanic or, you know, a massive ship. It's just going to take a long time to do. That's true. Even if you're moving in the right direction.

5:23I think the other thing that we've got to remember is that a very important tool of central banks generally is what they call the jawbone. The jawbone. In other words, you know, he is using, he's employing a tool by saying, okay, so the official decision was we're not raising rates. But he essentially said, I think he almost specifically said, we're going to increase it by another half a percent before the end of the year. Yeah, yeah. And so what, I mean, so the markets, you would think on one hand, oh my gosh, they've paused. Fantastic. We're off to the races again. And if he had said we've paused and we'll just sort of see how it goes.

6:02But he didn't. He said, we're pausing, but don't get too excited. We're going to be doing more. He really said that very, very deliberately. And that's a massively important tool because everything's set on expectations. I mean, I'll make a slightly perhaps controversial statement. I think the impact of these interest rates to the level of activity and lending aren't as direct or as important as a lot of us think. Let me fill that in. Where does the money come from? Not in the real economy. It comes from bank lending, right? So you can give, you can, the federal funds rate or the RBA official rate is the amount that banks get or pay for short-term overnight loans held at the Fed.

6:59So it's all, this is partly what central - Or an outcast to the RBA, yes. This is what central banks are there for. Sort of this lender of last resort is sort of like, you know, I'm CBA, don't have quite enough liquidity that I need for these current week's operations. I'm going to borrow it from Westpac that has a little bit more. or I can borrow it direct in some cases from the central bank itself. They're the interest rates that are actually being influenced here. And the hope is the indirect transfer mechanism is it's just like, well, if I'm CBA, I'm having to pay a little bit more. And they don't always need it, by the way.

7:29And on average, over time, you would sort of say they don't if the entire system is sort of liquid and solvent. But it's really about it makes it a little bit harder for me so I'm going to write less loans. And so when a bank creates a loan, so you go to the bank, say, Mr. Bank Manager, can I borrow a million dollars? Yes, here you go. A few strokes of the keyboard and a number appears there. That money was literally just created. On the double entry accounting, right? So they've now got an asset, which is the IOU that you owe them. And you've got cash. Probably back to the house, but yes, exactly.

8:07That's right. That cash didn't exist before, right? I mean, I'm not that controversial. It's just fractional reserve banking. it sort of how it all works. So we actually saw this in previous, and actually lots of times throughout history where interest rates change, but the banks are still very nervous. I mean, look at after 2008, the crisis there. So lots of liquidity pumped into the system. You know, banks recapitalized and the rest of it, we just never saw any inflation. It's because the banks were much more prudent. They didn't actually create a lot of extra loans. The money all stayed within the financial system, which is why we perhaps had asset price inflation, which is a very, very, very different thing.

8:42So all of this is just coming back to this idea of the jawbone here. This is what Powell is trying to do. You know, things are a little bit too hot on the inflation front. It's still double what their target is, right? So it's come back a bit, but it's still double. And he wants less money out there. And he's kind of signaling to the banks, well, we're going to charge you or you're going to be charged more within the reserve system. but you know we hope that you're a little bit more prudent on your lending as well because that's ultimately what needs to happen i suspect especially what's happened in the u.s banking sector that the banks are probably already doing that we're saying i was just saying to you before was it citigroup's laying off a whole bunch of uh expenses a lot of uh staff a lot of banks are sort of doing the same i think a lot of them sort of see the all the same headlines that we're seeing and probably a little bit more restrained in their lending anyway.

9:36So I think this is why you didn't see markets react that significantly afterwards. It's not as you might expect if this was a very genuine belief that the worst is over. Yeah, I think that's right. There was a small stutter in the market, ended up actually closing higher than before Powell made the announcement. People tried to read the tea list. It's also a slither higher. Yeah, yeah. it's it's one of those it's one of those things i think that probably i i would argue just take that to its nth degree or form you know uh probably reasonable conclusion which is the market should just pull itself out its head over its backside and say actually it doesn't matter that much anyway because the reality is you know whatever expectations you had and this is what we'll get to expectations in a minute but it's not it's always it's a funny learning curve when you when you think about the way markets operate right because they never really respond to the news they respond to the way the news is different to what they already expected the news would be.

10:33Right? Which is kind of, it is turtles all the way down to some degree. But if you expect the Fed to increase rates, you should have in theory already priced that into the price you're prepared to pay for your shares and the future you think those businesses have. And if you're a decent forward-thinking analyst, that you've already done. So when the Fed says, yep, I'm going to do what you thought I was going to do, you go, okay, cool. Well, I've already allowed for that. So there's no need to change. And that can be in any direction, up, down, sideways. Again, we'll talk about expectation in a minute.

10:57But it's important that we think about that because that's why I call earnings season an expectation season, right? Because it's not really how well did the company do versus, or in absolute terms, or even versus last year, but versus what the market thought was going to happen. And then, to your point about what Powell then said was, it's not just about now, it's also about what is he expecting to do. And this is the, frankly, stupidity of, every now and again, I jump on Twitter and I talk about the stupidity of trying to forecast stuff, right? And people whose jobs are to be professional forecasters always have a go at me.

11:26um i said i've said many times the rba should stop giving interest rate forecasts and people come back and say well what what should we use to then work out what's going to happen it's like well if you don't know and they don't know what's the point of pretending that we both know so that we can put something in a spreadsheet it's it's it's literally self-delusion it's the emperor's no clothes you know not wearing clothes problem um and yet we just all kind of well not we i don't i don't think you do the the commentariat and the prognosticators kind of collude loosely and not actually formally collude but just that idea of like i'll make prediction and you report the prediction use that prediction for something else when i change the prediction i'll let you know so people say well the iba should tell us what they're planning to do so well okay as soon as they do you've then factored that in so the power of that next action is moot because you've already allowed for it the very nature of uncertainty allows the iba to have an impact if they said over the next 24 months here's what we're going to do they might say oh good we don't worry about for 24 months then in which case it's already internalized all of those forecasts all of those planned actions and it's just a completely useless process and then by the way when they get it wrong like lo did saying he didn't think there was going to be rate rises until 2024 it was oh you got it wrong what what did you people expect i know you use the example of you know for me nine times ask me a tenth um you know it's it's just it's just a crazy crazy system i think the idea of asking central bankers to forecast uh and and then try to rely on those published forecasts again you know with the rba board change plenty of people said oh they should they should have press conferences explain themselves and tell us what they're going to do next and as soon as you do that it's only the changes to expectations that the rba has an impact by definition yeah that's the only way they can actually influence the market over and above what the market's already thinking because the market's already priced in its own thinking so you can only change things on the margin where you are giving something different normally surprisingly to what the market was expected to have an impact which is what you're trying to do to either stimulate or it's hard economic activity and so it's kind of just it just drives me bananas mate the lack of i don't know if it's lack of awareness i don't think it is i think it's just pure self-interest honestly and probably some degree of institutional capture where everyone thinks that's what they have to do and so if you're a professional economist then you do the thing because that's the thing you have to do it just you know when no one's asking the question no one's thinking the great uh philosopher mike tyson was once said noted philosophy the noted philosophers So everyone's got a plan until you get a punch in the face.

13:46Actually, that was Muhammad Ali. Was it? It was one of the two. No, Tyson. It was Tyson. Was it Tyson? Okay. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Great line though, right? And this is almost, you know, why it is reckless to some extent to say, we're going to do this over the next two years or four years because you don't know what's going to unfold over that time. So I actually, I take a slightly different view. I'm given the importance of these unelected officials and the influence that they have on all of us and the economy. I don't want a specific forecast from Lowe or the Fed chief. You know, what I want is a lot of clarity around how you think about these things, what you think are important.

14:33So I say the same of CEOs. I don't want to forecast for your earnings per share next year. What I want is this is our strategy. these are the things that are important to us these are the things we're going to look for 100 yeah that's that is much more of a realistic kind of stance and we'll look we'll operate within that framework uh as according to the information that comes to light and as events unfold and that's i think that is the best that you you can kind of do correct um which is actually by the way what lo said and this is the other thing is he said exactly that he said we won't increase rates until wage wages or prices go up and we don't think that'll be until 2024 and of course the media just takes the first two words the last two words and says low promise not to and then everyone says really low promise low bastard he promised not to it's like no i mean it was never a promise it was an indication of a condition that would be met and a guess as to when that condition we met now he's horribly wrong with these guesses to when it would happen which is almost to my point though i know you disagree um but but it was it's also you know he did exactly that here's here's what i'm focused on here's when i'll move rates okay cool thanks phil yeah and then it just gets completely blown out of the water yep yep it's all it's all very interesting um yeah now wait let's go to something else interesting because new zealand you told me just before you came on air breaking news uh won't be by the time this podcast goes to air but we're pre-recording this on thursday morning the 15th of june uh new zealand is in a now i'm not gonna all right the headline is new zealand is a technical recession uh one of my other bugbears there's nothing technical about a recession there's no official definition of one that actually matters other than words we choose to use to apply to certain things like a 10 % fall in the share markets of a technical correction.

16:14Is it? Why is it a technical correction? Well, that's because we all agree that's what we'd call it. It's all a little bit silly. But the key thing here is the economy in New Zealand has shrunk. I also love negative growth. Two quarters of negative growth. Don't you mean two quarters of contraction? Yeah, yeah, that, that, that. So it's shrunk for two quarters in a row. It's in what they believe, what we consider a recession? Yeah, doing it pretty tough over there, 0.1 % and the most recent read down, that was after a 0.7 % contraction in the fourth quarter. So there you go, there's the two quarters of negative growth.

16:51Overall on an annual basis, still going ahead, 2.2%. There's that. Look, they had a few sort of issues there. I think it was a cyclone, teacher strikes, a few sort of – but this is the thing, right? There's always – this is just the normal situation we sort of find ourselves in. And by the way, if it had been plus 0.01, it wouldn't have been a technical recession. It's minus 0.1. So those two numbers are largely indistinguishable, but we get to put the capital R word on the front page of a newspaper and get lots of clicks on an article about New Zealand recession. Yeah. Recession if you're in New Zealand anyway.

17:25But they're doing it tough. I think, I'm not sure if this is Auckland or the country at large. Kiwi listeners can clue me in. But I believe the house prices are now down 20 % there as well. I think you've had no idea when you told me that this morning. Yeah, yeah. And they got to pretty extreme levels as well as we are. But so anyway, it is what it is. They've also been raising rates pretty aggressively. I think even more aggressively than the RBA. okay yeah so i mean but this is this is kind of the design right this is this is what this was the goal of aggressive interest rate policy so we can't be oh no this happened what did i know you wanted to take the heat out of the economy you kind of tend to do it until something breaks everyone sort of take well you know certain segments take a real hit and inflation comes down job done right so this is this is this is where the u.s is headed i would say that this is where we're headed to and it's a guess let me let me catch all of this by saying it's a guess it's the best it can be but whether you look at yield curves or just all the boffins talk i think there's a pretty there's a majority consensus that that's where we're sort of headed and and again by by design so might be a bit of a a bit of a um glimpse to the future for ourselves it's gonna be hard to avoid mate i i still speculate will be just okay on a gdp level if i was gonna i don't do predictions because it's not worth it i've just railed about that i would i would speculate if you asked me to then i reckon we're probably more likely not to have one than to have one but not by a whole lot it's probably 60 40 right now um partly by the way because we're taking in so many bloody people which we're taking a million and a half odd people or whatever the number is over over a couple of years which frankly if you can't grow by you know growing the population that significantly you're not really trying we've got much bigger issues if we end up with a recession with that sort of population growth actually matt barry was talking exactly i was thinking about you when i was watching as he's he was railing exactly about that as well yeah it's easy to do right so it's a it's a yeah it's a slight of hand hey yeah we're all we're all a bit poorer but overall we're all richer together so that's okay isn't it so well it's how many of us there are it's a bit of It's a bit of madness, yeah.

19:41It is a bit of madness. But interesting nonetheless, to your point, Matt, I think, let me put one point of optimism before returning to pessimism again. US inflation is down to 4%, I think, from memory. From 9 point something. Right? Yeah. I don't really claim to know with any degree of expertise the transmission mechanisms globally for inflation. We know there are global commodities. We know there's global trade. But the US had inflation, what was it, three or four months before us it's kind of kicked in um i absolutely remember tweeting back in december 2021 i think um something like you know maybe we may be watching our own movie in advance you know we're getting a preview here if this happens here we'll be sorry now it did and you know i'm again i'm no expert i didn't say it was going to i just you looked at us and went well i don't think it's like it's going to just stay there but you know maybe we're getting a glimpse of what we what we're in for i'm kind of hopeful speaking of optimism that maybe we're seeing the same thing on the way down that if there is some delay mechanism somehow between the us and australia um again not directly a whole lot of indirect reasons nothing nothing planned about it obviously but it's possible hopeful uh that we actually are starting to see some some you know much much lower inflation prices are going up by the way nothing nothing's deflating it's just not inflating as quickly um that'd be a pretty right that'd be that'd be a pretty good thing so i am I am hopeful, mate.

21:02I am hopeful that we've seen this movie before. And if we have got reason to believe there is some sort of just general delay in transmission, then we hopefully are seeing our future in the US experience. Now, if we get down to, gee, four, four and a half percent over the next 12 months, that'd be a spectacularly good result. So I'm optimistic slash hopeful that maybe that's the future for us. Yeah, I mean, 5 % would be nice. You're only losing close to a fifth of your purchasing power over three or four years. I think it'll, I think, you know, we should actually, we should make a formal bet of this, but I am more hopeful than you are that inflation will come down further.

21:38I think, I still expect we tend to, to target ban one way or the other and one way or the other might include a recession, by the way. So you want to be careful what you wish for. I think we are past the peak. I mean, I've said that before. My, again, this is all guesses, but I do think we stay a bit above range for longer. Just because of the very fine balancing act that we sort of have to trade here. because as I said, while we do want the economy to sort of slow, that's the exact intent. You don't want to push that too far. Recessions is a broad term, right? You can have what New Zealand has had was down 0.7, down 0.1, or you could have down three and then down five.

22:17And it could last for like 10 quarters or it could last for two quarters, right? And by the way, you can have a 5 % growth and then a recession or 1 % growth and then no recession. and while there's dislocating factors in the sizes of those movements, economically, if you go grow at five then backwards at one or you go up one percent then one percent, you'd rather the former every time except that it would put people out of work and businesses fail. So it's not, there's some value in slower and smoother. Don't get me wrong. But over time, we're talking about with share prices, right? But we get the long-term returns with some really hairy volatility.

22:53We've talked about that before. But that's kind of the same with the economy too. Yes, you'd always want to avoid a recession if you can, because why would you choose to go backwards? But you're also going to be a little bit mindful of, and we saw this with COVID. Well, actually, let's go to retail sales now, because we saw during COVID some really stunningly massive swings in business fortunes. We saw online retailers. Let's start with physical retailers, right? During COVID, sales through the floor, those eight brands had to restructure. Lots of businesses doing it tough. Then the year after that, hey, we're all geniuses.

23:26Look how fast sales are growing. And I was like, well, of course they were, guys. You just came out of lockdown. Like people were allowed back in the shops. What did you think would happen? The same is true of online retailers in reverse, which is COVID happens. Everyone goes, well, I guess I'll buy online then. The year after, you've had the biggest spike you will ever have economically by definition with online sales anyway, right? Yep. That's exactly what it is. It is the base of it. So it's, what did you start with? And overall, the question is, and this is where it's been really tough slash interesting for analysts like us is you're going to go back to 2019.

23:57I know I've said this before, but the fiscal year 2019 is the last time we had a clean year. That ended June 30, 2019. Even this financial year is not a clean year. Think about what we had. The rebound, as you've just talked about, is happening in both directions for online and offline retailers. So probably fiscal year 2024 is going to be the first year. So it's another 12 months from now to hit the end of that. We can compare that with 2019 to the last five years of deliverance. It's a big, big, big span of time where you've kind of got to suck a thumb a little bit and go, well, I think the line looks roughly this shape.

24:32It's really hard to do. Yeah, it is. It's extremely hard to do. Yeah, I mean, what's to say? I think you have to tease apart a lot of these things. In all things economic, they're usually multifactorial in nature. It's not this X plus Y equals Z kind of thing. Exactly. It's like X plus 2Y divided by the derivative of, you know. Actually, even that doesn't exist, right? There's a fallacy that you can even do that, right? So it's a dynamically chaotic system. And then, because the X at the end is sentiment slash behavior. Yes, exactly. So for all the economic, you know, even if you had every single piece of history, and then you said, okay, well, when this thing's happened, that thing happens.

25:18It's like, yeah, but it depends how people are feeling at the time. For all of that, it's literally a case of that happened and I felt good. The same thing happened and I felt bad. Okay, different results. Try to factor that into your models. Yeah. And coming back to the inflation sort of angle here, because it all sort of ties together. I mean, we talk about inflation, but there's more to it than that. There's supply-side inflation. There's demand-side inflation. There's monetary inflation. There's asset price inflation. And they're all acting in concert. And, you know, at the end of the day, you look at the price of a box of cornflakes and a whole bunch of that is sort of factored into it.

25:53So we had this big supply shock with the war in Ukraine, really, which, my, hasn't that dropped out of the headlines? But anyway, that's... Well, it's close to that with COVID, Finland. So it's even, I mean, even the container shipments and supply chains, the car industry is still not back to normal after three plus years of COVID. My brother and his wife took two years to get the car that they bought a new one. Gee, I hope they liked the one they bought. Yeah, exactly. I said, I hope they gave you the new model too. Just cheap shortages and all of this kind of stuff. So that's kind of rolling over a little bit because container volume, prices are coming down, commodity prices have been coming down for the most part from some of those sort of supply, which we're always going to because that's what happens with commodities when supply gets restrained, prices go up.

26:40when it comes back on, they come back down. So that's, but then within that, you've also got not just this sentiment around what happened with the reopening, just back to retailers and what people were doing there, but we all just got free money on top of that, right? And so that was washing through at the same time. And now we sort of look at whether it's DJs or the Visa or any, you know, all of these retailers, Adair's, you know, coming out and saying how tough it kind of is. you've kind of got that base effect. You've kind of got that initial splurge out of the way, but you've also got, well, the stimulus isn't there anymore as well.

27:18So again, you sort of have these factors all sort of, sometimes they push against each other. Sometimes they both move in the same direction. You know, it's like two sine waves, you know, different frequencies. At points, the peaks just and the troughs line up together. And that's when you tend to see the really big moves. And I feel as though that's a little bit - And frankly, that's actually the best definition of economic cycles broadly. Yes, yeah. Because when things move a little bit off kilter and they kind of cancel the other way, not much happens. When you get the big peaks and the big troughs just happen to align, that's exactly when you do have those big economic shocks.

27:48They just will at certain points, right? So, yeah, I think as we've sort of said, there is – I don't think it's going out on a limb to say there's going to probably be more pain to come for a lot of retailers. there's probably there's as I've often said you've got to as an investor look at whether this is what you would consider structural or cyclical guess what retail is hyper cyclical kind of industry anyone who's worked and you know owned a business and that knows it very well doesn't matter how great an operator you are you know you can be Sam Walton Walton thank you at Walmart you know or any other famed sort of retailer And you're going to go through tough periods.

28:33And that's part of the expectation, right? It just sort of happens. And I suspect there's going to be some babies thrown out with the bathwater amongst all of this. And you've got to be careful with saying things like this because things can always get worse before they get better. And it might be sort of like five years before sort of the value that may be around for some retailers is really sort of seen as apparent. And we look back at, oh, man, look, if only I had done that at this point in time. But it is getting very interesting. thing it is getting very interesting because you you have some very big name very entrenched very established very strong balance sheet sort of retailers um that are profitable and paying a dip not as profitable not the dividends probably won't be as sort of good but they're trading on single digit pcs and maybe if you want to be aggressive in some of the forward assumptions maybe the forward pcs are uh you know still low double digits it doesn't seem it doesn't seem uh expensive.

29:30I think that's right. I think if we... So let's go into that retail environment, mate, because I kind of inferred at the beginning, I am at a point now where I think, without making forecasts, I think it's reasonable to believe the RBA has finally had its way with the economy. Over the past three or four weeks, I can't remember exactly, we've had four big bits of information the first one was baby bunting with a disappointing sales update the second was adares the homewares retailer with a disappointing sales update the third actually i'll come back to the third the fourth was david jones this week some leaked information given to the australian newspaper uh the sales over the last couple of months are down more than 10 percent in some stores down as much as 38 percent gosh that is massive and actually there's five bits of data The fourth one is Commonwealth Bank, then the day after that, released their household spending indicator, where household spending was up 3.1%, but entertainment, clothing, and travel were all down, and entertainment and travel were down 6 % and 8 % respectively.

30:38I can't remember which way around. It might be the other way around, but either way, 6 % and 8%. Now, so spending's up three, but those discretionary categories, let's travel a bit less, let's go out a bit less, let's buy a few fewer pairs of jeans because money's a bit tight. That is absolutely happening. And the reason I think, I don't know if I mentioned this last week, mate, if I have my apologies to listeners. Did we talk about the GDP household savings ratio last week? I can't remember. I can't remember. Let me do it again. I'm a goldfish, mate. I can barely remember what I had for breakfast.

31:03I can't remember what you had for breakfast. So here's the thing. GDP was up, which is always good. We just talked about New Zealand's GDP being down. So we'll take up rather than down. But the household spending ratio, household saving ratio, I should say, fell to less than 4 % of income. Now, you talked about the handouts in COVID, mate, and stimulus. It was 20%. We saved 20 % of our incomes when much of the country was locked down. Why? Because we were locked down. We had more money and less to spend it on. We weren't traveling. We weren't buying a lot of stuff. We were buying some things online.

31:31So we saved 20 % of our income. And by the way, we were scared. So what do you do? You kind of hoard money just in case you need it later. This time around, people might still be as scared, but interest rates and mortgage reframents continue to take more and more and more out of the economy. And by the way, so there's inflation. So everything's more expensive. And that household savings ratio over, it's been a while. it's been two years probably since those numbers were hit their peak um we're now down to less than four percent and if you kind of triangulate all that stuff and you don't even need to try very hard because they all point exactly the same direction there's no fancy thinking here with algebra to work this out i i reckon the gdp number is the big one mate as much as the other ones will get more coverage because they are air quotes real spending and they are the the reality is the RBA had to start from a very long way back.

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32:18If you're trying to stop people spending and they're already saving 20 % of their income, they'll save 19%, then 18%, then 17%, then 15%, then 13%, 12%, and 5 % on the way to where we are now. And they'll absorb all of those interest rate increases in inflation by saving a little bit less until you can't save any less because there are no savings to be had. And then, only then, economically, and some people already in this space, some people listening will say, hang on, I've been cutting back for 12 months and again, I'm not suggesting there is any way, not everyone is average and I'm not suggesting it's not impacting anybody, but at an economic level, it really just, that number really stuck out to me, mate, as now stuff is getting real.

32:57This is the RBA spent, I think it's fair to say, people can disagree, they should have gone harder and earlier. So we should have been at this point more quickly, maybe even six or seven months ago. But I feel like we're now at the point where the RBA has finally got to where they wanted to get, which is we can now fine tune a little bit because we've taken all that excess saving out, we've taken all that excess spending out, now actually can have the impact we've been trying to have for more than 12 months. Yeah, I think that's all fair. And you're right with certain things, at least for a time, masking what else is going on.

33:32You know what I always find interesting too is sort of the demographic angle here because we have a pretty sizable chunk of the population. I'm going to generalize here. You'll guess which generation in a minute. Oh, God, here we go. But largely debt-free, essentially debt-free, with the beneficiaries of decades of aggressive asset price appreciation. And if you're traveling around the country in a caravan, visiting your various investment properties... You're a cynical, cynical man. But my point is, I mean, I saw a really great tweet the other day I was hoping up the Gold Coast, just like boomers, boomers everywhere, spending like crazy.

34:15And I'm not having a go at the generation. I mean, you play the cards you're dealt, right? And put on you, right? I would have done the same thing. You worked hard, you saved hard, you bought your house, and then all these structural factors just made you asset millionaires. Very large, significant sums. People in just very ordinary, average-paying jobs from 30 years ago are probably millionaires if they paid off their house, which when you're buying your house for four times average income wasn't that sort of hard to do. And this is what, again, makes it so extraordinarily difficult from a high-level policy perspective because who cares if the interest rates are up a quarter of a percent more, right?

34:57Like it doesn't matter. You know, maybe my returns aren't as good. I'll do some rent increases or something like that. But there are people out there, I think it was the stat is 70 % of renters are in stress. Something like 48 % of mortgagees are in stress as defined by, I think it's once you hit a certain threshold of disposable income going to service that. And then you've got a whole other segment and it's just like, we're doing fine, thanks. Properties at record levels. We've never been richer. I've got no debt, so I don't really care. In fact, interest rates going up means my term deposits and my cash investments are actually doing better for me.

35:39But they also are the households that aren't forming new households. So you're probably less – it is – they're going to be – I would suggest something like an Adairs probably is going – all those Temple and Websters, all those that are very much predicate on new family homes and stuff coming up, people needing to furnish those, is probably going to be more impacted than, stupid example, caravan sales. Yeah, anyway. So is there a fair point to be made in that, in looking at different segments? Because I think we're always, any commentator is always, and I'm guilty, more guilty than anyone, of contextualizing everything through your own lens.

36:28or this is how it impacts me. This is what my peer group is experiencing and seeing. Therefore, that's the reality of it all. Exactly. That's right. And I've got some younger friends who are in, you know, more the millennial sort of generation, and they've got very different take. And then I've got, you know, people who are, you know, plus 55, a completely different take. Yeah. Yeah. Motley Fool Money. For more, subscribe to the free newsletter at fool.com.au forward slash listener. i think what we're experiencing mate is a more more extreme sounds too extreme in itself so i'm trying to find a better way to phrase it i think the distributions are widening can i say that using some economic jargon without and i say that to not sound jargony and like i'm trying to bs anyone or you know sound smart but i'm trying to use the right language kind of moderate what i'm trying to say i don't you know the i think the the range of experiences we're having is getting broader now you know i am very aware that when i was when i was a kid uh mum and dad mum worked dad worked two jobs we had seagrass matting on the floor and flannelette sheets for curtains right you know and it's not to say that you know we did it tough or they did it tough or the strip shop having the smashed hours or any of that sort of stuff i guess i just want to make the point that back then i think the same when when rates were at 18 in the 1990s early 90s there were people who owned their homes then who had who would you know we could have had the same conversations just change the change the generational labels back one or two notches and we're having the same conversations right the boomers are in trouble the silent generation are fine you know gen x is the kids and you know it's that there is something of an echo i think um that goes through these economic cycles we talked about cycles cycles have always happened and they've always been winners and losers different parts of the cycle and you're always better off having no debt than debt unless by the way you're in a highly inflationary time and you've got a wage increase which are hard to come by um so but you know and those things are true i've spoken to you know people who invested in either their own or investment property during that period and so i just i just bunkered down and got through it and i'm glad i did because look what's happened to prices since and now whether that's good luck or good management we can argue about or maybe we wouldn't even argue probably agree on it but um i think it's so i guess i'm just saying it's always been it's always been hard there's always been your home ownership hasn't changed dramatically in proportional terms um roughly a third renting roughly a third only roughly a third paying a mortgage is not that dissimilar um home ownership broadly hasn't yeah there's a couple of percentage points moving that's big on a population level of 27 million people so it's not nothing um so i think i think the patterns are similar i think what i what i think we know is that the the as i said the distribution is widening there are maybe because there's simply more boomers populated in terms of heads of population because of the boom There's more of them.

39:12And they've been very fortunate over the last 40 years to be the recipients of some meaningfully changing demographics, including second incomes, lower rates, higher LVRs, lots of things that have worked in their favor. So I think they're more fortunate than their parents would have been in this same circumstance. I think their kids are less fortunate than they were in the same circumstance. I'm not sure the shape of the distribution is that different. Probably fatter tails, right? the kind of idea of you know we're just stretching things out a little bit more there's less of a bump in the middle i think the challenge for me is we are we are the other thing i don't get back in population for the sake of it but you know we it was easier to live in the cheaper suburbs 40 years ago because the cheaper suburbs were 25 30 kilometers close than they are today because the sydney population the mobile population the adelaide population chusha city has just exploded since then right um again sweet my mum and dad's place they bought it was 45 minutes drive from the city now the same place with the same circumstances probably now an hour and a half from the cbd and so you know yes the the boomers were like well just move out to the suburbs we had to do the same thing i just i just feel like the i feel like the the to use one of your favorite metaphors the rubber band just being stretched a little bit further yeah it doesn't mean it's going to snap i don't think it's at an extreme i don't think it's going to snap i don't think we're necessarily in for anything bad it's always possible but not very likely in my view but i think that's the challenge economically is just thinking about where you could have the impact and because of that that stretching if you like there's more money being spent and wealth being created at those ends i guess one in particular as you say the retirees are simply i'm sure the boomers are richer today than their parents were at the same age oh you know x years earlier i'm a question yes as a proportion of economic activity and spending and whatever they are just a larger chunk of that and it does mean that i guess then by definition for the rba to have the impact it wants to have it has to go harder at the pieces of pie it can control which is in this case is mortgage lending and business lending uh you know it has to do relatively more in that group to have the same sized impact than if the population had been distributed differently as it was 30 years earlier yeah but that's what's so brutally unfair about it right now it's always been i guess my point too though i guess i'm making that point that we say it's unfair and it is and it's probably less fair than it was or more unfair yeah that's that's my point i guess the shape the shape is not that different it was the boomers who paid 98 back in the day would have been unfair relative to their parents who paid nothing there's always someone who gets whacked and it's always the mortgage payers at whatever generation yeah i think it i think it's it's definitely more extreme it's it there is as i again having a chat off air i just there there is a certain reality mathematical reality to these kinds of things.

42:01So the average house in Sydney is 1.2 million today. The average income in Sydney is$92 ,000. That's 13x, right? So let's say I just graduated from university or whatever and I get my first job and I'm right on. I'm just straight away. I'm out the door. I'm on 92K a year, which is a really good outcome for a graduate. I was going to say, mate, I think it averages averages, right? So half of the incomes are below that number. Yes. And that's for everyone, not just graduates, right? So I wanted to make the generational point here and just contrast it with what had happened in previous generations.

42:35So anyway, I've done brilliantly well. I've studied really hard. I've landed a fantastic job first day out of uni and boom, almost 100 grand a year. Now, I've got to rent somewhere, right? I've got to live. I've got to eat food. I've got to do it. Probably I want to not just eat two-minute noodles. So I want to have a little bit of joy in my life as well. But think about living in Sydney where you're probably for an average two-bedroom unit anywhere, you know, is going to be somewhere around, depending where you are, but anywhere between$600 and$800 and could be a lot more than that, by the way.

43:09So if I want to save a deposit, a 20 % deposit, so I avoid the mortgage insurance, usually it's traditionally considered, you know, about the minimum that you'd want. That's changed a little bit. But that means I've got to save up$240 ,000 on$96 ,000 a year. So that means that if I can somehow be really disciplined, and I listen to my elders and I don't eat avocado on toast, and I'm going to take 10 years to save up$240 ,000. Now, let's not even factor in inflation. Let's just say there's zero inflation. So that$24 ,000 in purchasing power is unchanged. I've now got$240 ,000 after 10 years. right?

43:50So now I'm probably in my early 30s and I'm in a position to finally do this. Now, you've also got to factor in, well, prices will probably move. If you want to take some people's heuristic, you know, property doubles every seven years, apparently, which is just absolute bubkis. But let's say it even grows at, you know, two or 3%, sort of more in line with longer term traditional averages. That actual, that path gets stretched out even longer because the 10 % is now much more than$240 ,000. Anyway, maybe I finally get there in my mid-30s, just working my butt off, found a partner, they've worked their butt off, we've pulled it all together.

44:29And now I've still got 20 to 25 years of repayments ahead of me, just before I can finally own it, before I get out of the workforce and not long after that, maybe drop off the... It is a brutally impossible situation, right? And then you've got to factor in, well, how many people are on$92 ,000, right? I just think the maths is very clear on this. It is diabolically sort of difficult to sort of say, well, it's the average and we just have to do it. And there'll be this big chunk of the population, which is a slight annoyance for another part that's just going to like grind their faces into the dirt, you know?

45:11And then the government sort of sits there going, oh, yeah, he's not a very nice guy, Mr. Lowe. It drives me insane. I agree with that too. You know, where it's kind of like there is a job, I suppose, for interest rate policy trying to affect all of these things. But again, the fiscal side of things is the elephant in the room that virtually no one seems to speak about. And it's incredibly frustrating. Yeah. And we've done that before a lot. I'm 100 % with you, mate, that using only one single policy tool when there are dozens and dozens and dozens available for any government who seeks to find them is absolutely maddening, as you say.

45:49I want to throw you, we're way off topic, but that's what we do here. I want to throw you a challenge because I don't know the answer. And that is that what we have in Australia, around the world, but more in Australia, it seems, than anywhere, is what is effectively a slow-moving perpetual auction of property, housing, land, the property market, right? The property ladder, as you like to call it, for those long-term listeners. It happens regularly, right? And every time we... And we've kind of talked about this a little bit before. Every time we buy or sell a property, we sell to the highest bidder because we're bound not to and the highest bidder gets it because they want it more than i do and they can afford it more than i do so they get it more before rather than me and that sets my expectations of the other properties and then around and around and around and around we go on one level mate this is this is pure capitalism it's pure markets doing what markets do now interest rates aside and we shouldn't just put them aside let me explain why i'm going to put them aside for a second interest rates aside the market decides what it wants to pay for housing what it thinks housing is worth and we all sit around and go, I'll pay that, I'll pay that, I'll pay that, I'll pay a little bit more.

47:07Honey, you've got to go out to work because the housing is that expensive now. We can't afford you not to work. Okay, cool. I'll go and work. Great. Now we can bid$1.4 million for that house. We'll mob down the road again, bid$1.45 million. Okay, now here we go again. Around and around we go. There is some crazy mixed up, screwed up, and I use other words if this wasn't a pg podcast logic where we all screw each other over and it's no one's fault because we all do it and we'd all do if we had the choice if we were the underbidder and we won because the the hybrid or we'd happily screw up the next guy and he'd screw over the guy after that not not deliberately because we're trying to screw them over just because we want the house and we can afford it so we do at some at some level that's just what the um economists call is it um express choice price discovery or no that's demonstrated preference so yeah you can sound on a sheet i think how things do with x your demonstrated preference is what you actually pay what you actually do right and so at some level let's say interest rates didn't exist or let's say they were 25 the market at some level is going to say i will i am prepared to pay x percent of my income combined household income by the way to buy the house because i just want it and that's I'm going to forego the car or the holiday or the whatever or the Twinkies to buy the house because that's the thing I'm prioritizing.

48:28At some level, even with all the fiscal policy in the world, and yes, we can argue the interest rates, the interest money is dead money, but that aside, let's almost assume rates didn't exist. I am not so sure we wouldn't collectively just bid up prices to the level they are now anyway because we could. If rates are zero, I can afford to borrow even more and pay the same amount of my income off because i've already decided i'm happy to pay whatever it is a month to to you know i mean my wife can afford this much per month what can i buy for that much i can buy that house there okay you do the same you can buy that house too so okay we bid against other someone eventually gives up i don't know how you fix the house i guess i'm saying i don't know how you fix the market because i don't think it's i don't think it's an interest rate problem i think using rates to cool the economy is a separate question and it's a very good question that's what i've talked about before and i completely agree with you but even if we say we're going to cool the economy some other way and rates as a result therefore are lower excuse me there's a large portion of the population goes great i can now pay more which is exactly what we did during 2021 when we all was a 22 whichever year it was when house prices went up 24 because we all went beauty we can go and borrow more let's do that there is something just i don't know i don't know the i genuinely don't know the answer man you can you try and cap loans at a certain proportion of income but then you know to artificially hold prices down but all you then do is prioritize and preference the cash buyers i just i don't know how i would change housing prices because affordability is a function of price and price is a function of affordability if i can afford to pay more i will you can too so we all do and so here's don't we just end up in the same place i i don't know how to fix it is my is my quandary no i've got i don't pretend to have the answers but i i would say that macro prudential tools are you know vastly underused so what do you come back to first we'll start at the beginning what do we want here as a country you know well we we'd like increasing prosperity generally you know that requires security of housing and affordability of houses as a base layer really for everything that comes after that it's very hard to be a productive member of society when you're when you're living in your car right or under incredible rental stress or whatever it is um so we so we want that We want sort of, I guess, rates of borrowing to be at a level which is encouraging of new business creation and job creation and all of these kinds of things.

50:46So rather than this one blunt tool, I would just sort of say, well, listen, there are restrictions on how much you can borrow. There are buffers above official interest rates. There are certain things. So what we do here is we stop inflating these asset bubbles, yet we still can have an impact in the areas that are more – it's just being more targeted. So there's no perfect answer here. I'm just sort of saying we've got this sledgehammer on one hand of our tool belt, and on the other we've got these more surgical instruments. And it still depends on how you apply them. But I guess I would very much sort of start from that standpoint.

51:26What do we want and what's the best way to sort of go about it? The thing that always I think is really a sign of something broken is that the thing that we're talking about here, it's not that every Australian is wanting a quantum computer or a probe that will go to Mars. We want a patch of dirt that has some bricks, timber and steel on it, right? That's what we want. We've had this technology for 5 ,000 years, right? You know, why in an increasingly prosperous, rich society is the most basic of goods, really? You know, since Fred Flintstone and Barney Rubble were around, I mean, you know, they had a TV.

52:16They had a roof over there. So this is not complicated stuff. Listeners, how do I tell Andrew that Barney Rubble and Fred Flintstone aren't real? That's my Quanji right now. I'm not sure what I say. I'm not sure how I have this conversation with him. No, I agree. I guess my point though, mate, is that that's true in a utopian communist assumption. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. I'm sorry. You were taking the free market angle. Like if markets were left to do what they want. So this is a stupid example, but just to take it to the extreme. Absolutely no regulation. I mean, 100 % brutal free market capitalism.

52:47Find a patch of dirt, you go for it. You build whatever you want there, however you want. I would imagine you're going to see houses pop up everywhere. Now, this would be a terrible policy, of course, but I'm just trying to use a ridiculous example. You would find supply radically improving because that's what free markets do. They respond to these kinds of things. Massive demand. Are we wrong to demand that? No, we're not. It's absolutely a fundamental human right to demand a reasonable place to live in safety and security. and you would find that builders, developers and the rest of it would just come to the party.

53:25So on top of all of these other issues that we sort of talk about, we have sort of, it's a whole other topic, but we have sort of zoning regulations. We have, you know, there's just these, I'm saying, talk to a builder, right? There's a thousand of them. They're doing pretty well because there's a lot of wind in their sails. There's a very strong tailwind there, but still like the margins are fantastic in this industry. And interestingly enough, when you look at the cost of building new property in Australia, it's very high compared to other places of the world. So again, what I'm saying is, is that it needs an intelligent look at things.

53:57What are all the different causes here? What can we target more specifically? What are going to achieve the kind of end goals that we want rather than let's just keep inflating this massive Ponzi and doing everything we can because we've now built the entire foundation of our economy on this you know the end of the day that's the we that's the we problem i have made is i don't i don't think it's i don't think it's a we because i don't think it's policy like that that's that's that's almost the right no it's it's a policy because people are going to rightly i think to some extent i want a house and that is a very normal and respectful thing to sort of want i want to raise a family i just i want a house right i just want actually i just wanted security of of sort of of tendency and why is it so impossible to sort of say okay we can do that for you we can reduce the barriers to get into that without having to bludgeon everything else in the process I'm not explaining myself well no you are I guess it's the we thing that I guess I don't know how we solve because the way as you rightly point out regularly the economy is not one thing it's lots of little things and i guess the lots of little things at the moment say i think housing is worth spending x percent of my income on oh that's right because that's yeah that's how much i that's how much i want to spend and i i could choose not to buy the house right every one of us could you not to buy the house most of us should actually decide to actually work a little bit less spend a little bit less and go and live in the country and have a healthier happier life but we don't because the rat race is the rat race and we all feel like we that's the race we have to run because you win In the rat race, you're still a rat.

55:38That's the problem. Exactly. And that's a whole different conversation as well, but one worth having. I just, I still, you know what I mean? Like I think the express preference, the reveal preference is, I will spend this much on a house because I can. And I just, I think if we said to people, let's drop rates and let's use other fiscal policies to restrain the economy, that would be fairer and better and more appropriate and I would be all for it. And I think as a result, we would actually see house prices increase because people go, beauty, rates are now 3 % again rather than 5 % so I can now and I think we would go straight back to that I guess that's my point is our reveal preference is you know it's not rates themselves out of the problem it's us and on one hand I'm saying maybe that's okay frankly on the other hand I'm saying I don't know how we resolve something when you and I might say if we designed a society from scratch we would have people behave a certain way the reveal preference is we choose to behave this way we choose to prioritize housing we choose to bid it up because we can therefore you know So if we change the rate settings, we still have the same problem with house affordability, I guess.

56:39Yeah, you're 100 % right. I had a brain snap before. Let me come at it again. Stop it. The preference that people have is absolutely fine. It's not a question of what they want to do, but it's a question of what they can do. And that's where the system settings are important. And I am very firmly of the view that what most of us tend to do is we say, I want a house. Really good starting point. Go to the bank. Mrs. or Mr. Bank Manager, how much can I borrow? You can borrow this much. Great. That's what I'm going to go out and do. Oh, Mr. Politician, I can access my super? Fantastic. Oh, you're going to give me a first home owner grant?

57:17Fantastic. So we're coming at it from the right place. And yes, people are going to bid to what they're able to do, but we have given them the capacity through system settings to bid much more than they would otherwise be able to. CBA is bigger than Goldman Sachs, right? 70 % – they are a – for a country of, what did you say, 27 million people, they are a monster. And then when you look at the oligopoly, which is a very deliberate term because it's what it is, right? It is, right? The oligopoly of the big four banks and maybe five if you throw in Macquarie, they are just trillions of dollars in assets, right?

58:00And 70 % of CBA's loan book is residential property. And that wasn't always the case. I think back in the day, it was more like 30 % or something like that. So what we have done, not deliberately, but it's just the way things have rolled out. Usually with politicians with good intentions, we want to help Australians get their home. We've got to deregulate finance. We've got to do this. We've got to do that. Very kind of you, but let's go with that assumption. Do you know what I mean? Like they have, we have unintentionally fostered conditions where we have allowed people to spend far more than they otherwise would have want to.

58:36So I'm not blaming people for doing what they've done, right? Like they have come from a very sensible starting point. But we've sort of engineered the system in such a way that it's just, I used the term before you offer that anti-fragile kind of thing. We are very fragile. that we're walking through a tinder dry forest that hasn't had rain in like two years and you know we're smoking cigarettes it's it seems it seems like that it's that it's and and it and we are now in a situation where it's kind of like oh okay well things have probably got a bit too crazy we need to fix our housing affordability it's like okay how do we fix housing affordability i don't know but we definitely don't but we definitely don't want houses to get cheaper We want it more affordable, but we definitely don't want house prices to go down.

59:24Now, if that blows, doesn't blow your brain when you really think about it, I don't know what to tell you. And that's the impossible situation that we're trying to sort of wrestle with. Let's keep house prices from falling. In fact, let's keep them rising. We don't want them to go sideways, right? But let's increase your housing affordability. Go. I agree with you. politics aside i guess i'm wondering i guess my point is i'm not sure you could like i well i'm not sure how you would so so let's say we want to improve affordability and including including maybe house prices dropping right what what are you going to do to me to stop me paying as much or more for the house when i get a auction next weekend i mean short of sort of you know command and control economy stuff of show me your passport i'll give you 15 housing stamps you know use those number of stamps on something we could absolutely impose price caps and whatever else if he chose to i suppose yeah but if you said to me you know you can't you can't bid more than x for that house i'd say well how how do you how do you suggest that in a democratic society where i mean you could you could just say well screw it i'm happy to repeal that part of democracy and say you know i'm gonna have the state set housing prices yep but short of that like i'll tell you what i'll do if i'm prepared to pay if i'm prepared to pay 40 percent of my income in house price for the house for a house yeah you set rates at one percent or a hundred percent i will still spend 40 percent of my income the amount of house i buy is probably different and we might all bid the house price down based on higher rates, but the amount of income I still choose to allocate to housing, that's the key one, right?

1:00:50How much are you going to allocate to housing? That is the thing that changes house prices far more than anything else or repayments more than anything else, I should say. Again, macroeprudential controls. And we're not doing it as a command and control kind of thing. Remember, these things were introduced to ensure economic stability because let run rampant, you introduce all kinds of fragilities into the system, which can bring us all down look at what happened in the u.s what re-watch the big short right that's that's why we have these things and and and so it's not a matter of saying you can't pay more than 1.13 million dollars for a house in this suburb it's not that's stupid i i disagree with as a renter i disagree with the greens policy of rent caps and the rest of it like it's it it doesn't it good intention but it doesn't it doesn't make sense so it's not about it's about sort of saying we want a robust system.

1:01:39And people can spend, if you want to spend 40 % of your money on your house, absolutely have at it. It's your choice to do it. And I'm not going to question your desire not to do it. But to ensure broader economic stability and longer term prosperity, I probably would say that I think we should have a three to 4 % buffer on current interest rates to ensure that we protect people and the system for unexpected rapid increases in interest rates. Because guess what? That happens from time to time as we're relearning. I would probably ensure that But there is a certain, we use whatever benchmark you want, price to income or debt to income or whatever.

1:02:13Something that just helps keep things, just put certain guardrails up to allow consumers to do whatever they want. But they operate within that context. Not because we have to say from up on high that this is as much as a house should be worth. But to sort of say we want structural strength within our system. And then let the free market have at it. But what we do is we give free money to first home buyers, which just ends up going into the pockets of vendors. I agree with that. We allow people to tap into their super. We reduce the serviceability buffers. We reduce lending. I mean, that is the dumb part of all of this, all at the same time of increasing interest rates.

1:02:53I mean, we're pulling in opposite directions here. If that's not madness, I don't know what is. No, I'm not defending any of the past policies. We've both been pretty vocal on that debacle in the past. I guess my thought though, mate, broadly is we talked about the widening extremes or the growing distribution, how we want to define that thing, right? If I'm a cash buyer, if I'm a boomer who's driving the caravan in the Lankras around the country, I don't have any lending constraints if I want to sell a house and buy another one. Yeah. my concern is that that policy as proposed if i'm willing to spend 40 of my income on repayments or whatever the number is you you might only be able to borrow a certain amount but that's that almost makes the the first home buyers problem worse rather than better because you say to them you know nuts to you you can only borrow 90 of the house price or x times your income or combined income or whatever the numbers are okay cool well it turns out i'm actually now 45 i already own i have equity of half a million dollars in my house so i'm going to use that i'm going to borrow 90 of the next house and so i can buy i can pay more for that house at some at some market level i don't know and maybe i'm maybe i'm worrying too much about a smaller issue but it just strikes me that all that does is penalizes borrowers even more against those with cash who are the very group we're saying need most help because those with cash have already got too much of the economy that's where i worry about those lending uh criteria being artificially applied to a a group and another group because i don't need it and again i'm not saying we should restrict the other group either and we're both you know we're unity ticking on price caps that's the bit i don't i just i i'm not saying targeting group i'm saying across the board but it does target the group because by definition what you're saying to the first group is i'm going to limit how much you can buy for your first house because you're you've got a small deposit you're desperately saving for it you're doing your best once i've got some equity i get i get to leapfrog over all those people because they're restricted ah i can only borrow i can borrow you know uh whatever buffer you apply eight percent buffer yeah i can i've got a larger income already i already have half a million dollars of equity in my house so when i borrow at an eight percent buffer for the next place i only need to borrow 70 of the property price because i've got already some money great now i can borrow buy two million dollar house and the poor first-time buyers even further screwed because we're artificially constrained.

1:05:13They could pay more. We won't let them pay more, but we'll let the cash buyer, because we should let the cash buyer pay whatever they want with their cash. It makes the whole dynamic worse. Now, what you're forgetting, I hear what you're saying, but I think what you're forgetting here, let's do a thought experiment, right? So let's take every single potential buyer out of the market. Yes. And we'll just leave those that are debt-free or at least with huge amounts of equity in the system. So they own a house and they probably own multiple houses. Yes. Right? And so the market is for you guys, right?

1:05:40There's no new money coming into the system. Now, again, free market dynamics would suggest at a point that just caps out because it's sort of like, well, we're just flipping it to each other here. We're both in the same situation here. So you need fresh money to sort of come in to sort of elevate those things. So I would imagine under that scenario, you actually would see prices stabilize much more and certainly stop running away at these rampant rates. And you might say, well, okay, well, I'll just buy up all the properties and I'll just lift the rent up all the time. But again, with rent, you run into very, very real affordability issues.

1:06:15It might say on your spreadsheet, if I just increase rent by 15%, it's fine. Well, guess what? 70 % of people can't afford the rent that they're already on, okay? So I don't know what the magic number is. It gets to a point where it's just like, I have the desire to rent this house. I just don't have the capacity to rent this place, which is underpinning the cash flows of these other parties. So this is where I think it does have an impact is that and this is what sort of propagates the ponzi to some extent is that we need to keep ensuring all of this fresh new money coming in whether that be credit or whether that we're accessing other government money or our own money in super or whatever it is we're putting new money into the system which keeps that's what a ponzi is it only goes when new money comes into the system right and i think that i can't let you call the housing market a ponzi unchallenged come I think it's got a lot of elements to it in the sense that people who make money today are dependent on new money coming in.

1:07:15If you're wanting to talk about But that's always been, but that's, Ponzi loses its, I mean, if that is true, sure, but then everything's a Ponzi because the economy's a Ponzi because you need new money coming in. At some point, the term loses its, it loses its, you know, meaning other than some generic slander, right? Like it's, you know, Hasn't housing always been that case? If you want the price of any asset, share prices, that must be a Ponzi because of new money coming in. Someone's got to buy the shares if I'm going to sell them. I mean, at some point, doesn't that just simply lose its official use?

1:07:47It's a hyperbolic term, I grant you. But I would say the difference with companies or the economy at large is that we're actually making more stuff. Extra value is being created. No value is being created for anyone. If my house goes, I don't have a house. If someone's house goes up by a million dollars, what value has been created for the economy? None. It's been created for me personally because new money has come in, but no money has been – Now, if a share market over long periods of time tends to go up, it's because all these businesses are far more productive. That is the true source of the wealth generation within that.

1:08:23What makes it more – and I do grant you it is a hyperbolic term, but where I think – I had to at least say something. You did. You did. But I think the distinction here is that this is a nonproductive asset, right? Yeah, right. And in terms of people coming to the expectation of doubling every seven years, that is only possible. Either the economy is growing at an incredible rate, you know, to sort of justify the affordability, or something else is going on there that relies on fresh new money. Where did the fresh new money come from over the last few decades? Well, we now had two income earners.

1:08:57That's a big pile of fresh new money. Yep. We now had better lending standards, lower rates, lots of new money coming in. Higher LVRs. That's what put it up, right? All within a context of diminishing, like the rate of supply was nowhere near the rate of demand growth just through population. So these are the Ponzi-ish elements of it. So is property a Ponzi? No, it's just a bit of land with some bricks on it. It's what we make it and it's what our expectations have become. and we've just got to think okay that's fine if that is your expectation but i would say for anyone with very bullish sort of expectations on capital gains growth is like where's the money come from and and i i am a hundred percent with you i have i think i think you know i don't expect horrible things and i'm not particularly anti-property but i i think that maths is or absolutely right i remember this a few years ago i should dig it up somewhere um if you look at what has driven the increase in house prices i did the numbers i kind of worked it backwards looked at average incomes like you had a second average income to a household you can afford to pay a certain amount more rates go from seven percent to three percent you can afford to borrow pay a certain amount more you can almost literally i mean you can't we said earlier in the podcast you can't do the algebra of a plus b plus c equals it doesn't work that way but you can kind of work that backwards and look at exactly the sorts of impacts those things had and diagnose i think it's you know and then it's almost in a funny way it goes back to my original point which is what we chose to do as a society is take earnings power and turn that into a slow running perpetual auction for shelter which is what we did right but as you say that has a natural the the rate the pace of growth of house prices reflects the changing inputs and demographics far more than does the asset class itself.

1:10:47It could have been cars. It could have been shares. It could be anything else. If we'd all chosen to throw our monies at Beanie Babies or footy cards, you would have seen the same thing happen, right? We've got more money to spend on footy cards and no more footy cards being released. Therefore, the price of footy cards goes up. Does it always go up every seven years? No, but it went up because we all had more money. We all cared more. We all put the money into the footy cards. That's what we wanted to do. There's nothing fundamental about the asset class in itself, which is your point. It's absolutely simply about the dynamics in the broader economy that allowed those things to be possible and drove that meaningful change.

1:11:23It doesn't necessarily mean, by the way, it needs to be reversed, in my view. It doesn't mean it needs to crash or go backwards. It just means that the growth that was exhibited over the last 40 years is very clearly in my mind, and I'm just reiterating your point, very clearly in my mind, just the net result of decisions made based on changing economic circumstances. Yep. Mean reversion is a really powerful concept. And so let's not, I don't know, I'm so critical of property. I do apologize for it. It's a point in time critique. It's not a general critique. But to make it fairer, let's look at the share mark.

1:12:00quickly to you actually on behalf of you it's your your critique as much as we're about property broadly your critique is almost always i'm put words in your mouth but almost always about the you're critiquing the expectations of those who believe there's something inherent about the gains available from property yeah not property in asset class not something to own not necessarily something not to invest in if as long as you're aware of what the returns are likely to be just the idea of the past being somehow predictive because of some immutable law that seems to exist Is that fair to say? Yeah, you're 100 % right.

1:12:29Take the word property out of it. So now it's asset X, some magical quantity, magic. Footy cards. Yeah, footy cards. You know, it doesn't really matter what it is, but am I going to buy a footy card for 50 times what I'm able to generate an income off that a year through a leveraged 10 to 1 position? I mean, I'm not. I'm not going to do it. Now, it happens that that sort of scenario applies to property today, and there's the criticism, right? And too many times I speak to people and just sort of seems this religious cult at this point. It's just like these things are said as fact when every little bit of evidence from history and reason suggests that that is not true.

1:13:09And so what I was going to say is it's the same. There are regularly times on the share market where the same can be true, right? We were just talking about retailers before, you know, wow, 30 % growth from last year and this and that. and it's like that's great but don't expect don't mathematically don't expect that to happen every year because if you extrapolate that forward long enough you know it becomes bigger than the gdp of planet earth like it just it just cannot do it same thing 1999 people got excited about well even i mean even some of the frankly tech shares in the last 18 24 months yeah they go up because they go up because they go up because they go up because they go up until they don't you believe you start to believe that the rationale might must be true you try and here's the other It doesn't mean you hate shares, by the way, when that happens, right?

1:13:55Big fan of shares, but it's bringing those expectations back and understanding what represents fundamental value versus what is just a speculation on this will always happen because, look, it happened recently. And I think the other thing, what I think about the dot-com crash and then take it to the last 24 months in tech shares and then take it to property and any other asset class is the temptation for humans. You know I love my behavioral psychology. The temptation for humans to convince themselves that there must be a pattern. The pattern must be observable. And once you observed the template, therefore you must be able to, on an ongoing basis, assume that will always be true.

1:14:29So the best example on the tech space is paying 20 times sales, right? Because everyone pays 20 times sales. Therefore, if a company sells at 15 times sales, it's actually cheap because the rest of them are 20 times sales. And once you start to do stuff like that, and your point about property is the same thing. It's gone up at double every 70 years for the last 45 years. Well, okay, that must be because that's just what it does because, you know, therefore I should expect this yield. Therefore, if the yield is less than that, it should be more coming because it must be, you know, it's going to catch up to that rate of growth at some point.

1:14:58So look at which I'm going to be when it does. It's the same thing of saying I can pay 15 times sales or a P of 1 ,084 because everybody else is. So as long as it's relatively, you know, attractive, therefore it must be attractive. It's again, the emperor's not wearing any clothes problem of actually it turns out 20 times sales was never reasonable for any company. so comparing your very very very overvalued business against some extremely overvalued business is just yeah it's it's an exercise in futility yeah the same is true if you look at for example and we think that's true of house price over the last 40 odd years you say well if you literally mathematically work it out work backwards and say here's how we got to this point what are the things that happened how do those things continue well they can't can they continue okay yeah well let's see so if they can't then the logical thing is therefore the rate of growth must be different in the future because there'll be different inputs yeah there will okay now we're having a real conversation yep that breach 100 amen that that is that is exactly it in a nutshell and it comes back full circle to the idea of how do you fix this you know is it in interest rates it plays a part sure but it's the other it's the other aspects of that not to be draconian not to be command economy just to ensure stability so it's this conversation the reason we so unintentionally It really is, listeners, unintentionally always come back to properties because you can't have the conversation without that because it's not just in isolation looking at it as an asset class and comparing it against fundamentals and what be reasonable, which is all true in all a very valid conversation.

1:16:29But it's far, far more significant in the sense that it impacts everything because we are all tied to this asset class. So where we have painted ourselves into a corner And the way the Ponzi is so precarious now is that if, because we have put all of our wealth into it and borrowed up to the eyeballs to do it, incredibly lucky that this massive growing economy demands, you know, 34 % of our exports are rocks that go to China, right? Like, thank you. That was really nice. That came along. What do we do with that? Let's all bid up property. And it's now systemically important. So when you start talking, as we have, about inflation and interest, you land logically back on property.

1:17:13Now, different periods of time, it was tulips. Other periods of time, it was shares in the South Sea Company. It just happens that it's property right now. And you find me a random person on the street, even if they don't own any property, it's like they're impacted by it because they're renting, right? Which means that they're impacted. whether you're talking about a retail it comes back to property because the reason people aren't spending on retail is because they're servicing a higher mortgage or a higher rent the reason that we're talking about any xyz it just comes back to property because that's the structure of the system it's sort of like the thing that underpins so much of it and wealth is uh you know it's a subjective kind of term but it impacts our confidence it impacts our propensity to spend it It impacts our capacity to spend.

1:18:00And so it's just so much bigger a conversation than just the property and the yield and this and that and the rest of it, which is why it's very hard to get away from. And I just make the point that without trying to make any predictions, because who knows what can happen? Because cans can always be kicked down the road and good things can always happen unexpectedly. But I really think we are walking through the tinder dry forest smoking cigarettes. You know, it's not a guarantee outcome for a recipe for disaster, but it's not exactly the safest thing to do. Yeah, although... We should have done some backburning maybe along the way.

1:18:41Well, that metaphor, though, does suggest that... I mean, that's a pretty dire one. It is. That is an inevitable inferno. Not inevitable, but just a risky scenario. But Tinder, drive fire, smoke cigarettes. I'm only, the only reason I raise it is because it's worth talking about how likely you think that range of scenarios are. You know, if you walked far enough and long enough through a tinder off-fire smoking cigarettes, eventually you would start a bushfire. It's almost inevitable. Is that the approach? Is that the view you have of the situation? Or is it just one way of illustrating the sorts of risks we might be taking?

1:19:16I think it's very, so many people make this mistake. They sort of observe, again, no forecast. This is where we are. Very dry, cigarettes burning brightly, ashing all over the place. That's just sort of where we are. So it's not a question of therefore this and therefore by this much and therefore by this date. And so I'm not silly enough to do that. But I just think logically, to your point, the longer I do that, the greater my chances are of something happening. So it's not a – I've always said investing is a probabilistic game and there's always a range of outcomes. You can't predict the future, but you can sort of make educated guesses at various scenarios.

1:19:57And I just get to the point now where we are, where it's sort of like, well, everything is fine. We avoid a recession. Interest rates don't go up too much more. I mean, all these big structural factors have, you know, they've done whatever they're able to do. So maybe we get 3 % or 4 % compound growth in property going forward. Okay, that's cool. A scenario A, you know, maybe it's 5%. I doubt it, but maybe it's that over a long enough sort of timeframe. Now, let's contrast that with what could happen if the cigarette does sort of touch a dry leaf or something like that. It could be 20%, 25 % down.

1:20:33It needs to be kind of that if you want to improve affordability to some extent. New Zealand's just gone down 20%, right? Go back not that long ago in the US and Ireland and Spain and Portugal and, you know, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. These are scenarios that aren't inevitable. And that's the mistake I think people make. And I hope I don't make that. But I just, and so I'm not ringing, I'm not crying chicken little. It's all about to end. I'm just saying, put the cigarette out. Can we maybe water some of this land here a little bit? It is by definition a risky proposition. and if all we do whenever we face this same conundrum is is do more of the same in the past which has only made it worse we're just making the forest dryer and the cigarette burn brighter and and so it's i know it's a subtle hopefully it's a subtle point but people get get the difference here not this will happen but it is more likely to happen and and and given the ramifications more broad for anything that's just well beyond prop just the our prosperity as a nation.

1:21:42It just, it concerns me. It does. I think that's very, very fair, mate. I think it's very fair. Hey, we're probably out of time. Will you join me on Sunday for a Malvo? You know I will. I will hope there are no property or Bitcoin. I've got to say. No promises, but yeah. Until next Sunday, in two days' time, full on. Cheers. The Motley Fool and people appearing in this program may have positions in the companies mentioned. General advice only. Please speak to your financial professional to understand how it may pertain to your situation. Subscribe to the free newsletter at fool.com.au forward slash listener.

1:22:19The Motley Fool operates under Financial Services Licence 400691.

From the publisher

– US rates pause & NZ in recession

– Consumer spending tips past a peak?

– What does it mean for housing?

– Is Australian housing really a ‘Ponzi’?

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