In short
Odd Lots Podcast Episode Summary
Episode Title
How Oaktree's Head of Sourcing Finds the Next Great Deal
Episode Overview This episode features Milwood Hobbs, Managing Director and Head of Sourcing & Origination at Oaktree Capital Management. Hosted by Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway, the conversation delves into the complexities of sourcing private credit deals, the evolution of the capital markets, and Hobbs' personal journey in finance.
Key Themes and Concepts
- The Art of Deal Sourcing
- Importance of Relationships: Hobbs emphasizes that getting the initial call about a deal often hinges on relationships built with various counterparties, which is crucial in the private credit market.
- Negotiation Dynamics: The discussion highlights the balance between satisfying investor expectations and maintaining relationships with sponsors. Hobbs notes, “the goal is no one really should win; both parties should be just mildly annoyed.”
- Evolution of Private Credit
- Pre vs. Post-Dodd Frank: Hobbs discusses how the private credit market has evolved significantly since the implementation of Dodd-Frank, leading to the creation of more robust capital markets and the emergence of capital solutions providers.
- Market Liquidity Changes: He explains how reduced bank leverage post-2008 financial crisis has shifted more risk to the private markets and how public securities can reprice risk more rapidly than private securities.
- Hobbs' Background and Career Path
- Early Experiences: Hobbs shares his journey from a scholarship at Rutgers to public accounting and finally to investment banking roles at companies like Nations Bank and Deutsche Bank before joining Goldman Sachs and, eventually, Oaktree.
- Strategic Evolution at Oaktree: The creation of the sourcing group within Oaktree in 2020 was to foster better communication and collaboration among internal strategies, adapting to an evolving market landscape.
- Understanding Credit Markets
- Credit Structures and Covenants: The episode addresses the significance of covenants and how the absence of them (covenant-lite deals) can lead to potential oversights in risk management.
- Adbacks and Adjusted Earnings: Hobbs discusses the complexities of adjusting earnings reports and the risks associated with relying on continuously adjusted EBITDA figures.
Key Takeaways
- Sourcing Success: Developing relationships and understanding market dynamics are crucial for successful deal sourcing in private credit.
- Navigating Tensions: Balancing the differing interests of investors and sponsors requires careful negotiation and relationship management.
- Adapting to Market Changes: The evolving landscape of private credit necessitates firms to adapt their strategies and operational structures to remain competitive.
Conclusion The episode provides insights into the intricate world of private credit deal sourcing, highlighting the blend of analytical skill and interpersonal relationship management required in finance. Hobbs' candid reflections on his career and the dynamics of the capital markets offer valuable lessons for both seasoned professionals and newcomers to the field.
Additional Resources
- For more on this topic and additional episodes, visit [Bloomberg Odd Lots](https://www.bloomberg.com/oddlots).
- Engage with the Odd Lots community on Discord: [discord.gg/oddlots](https://discord.gg/oddlots).
Listen to the full episode to gain a deeper understanding of the private credit landscape and the importance of relationship-driven finance.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Your best bottling plant employs 3 ,300 people. How do you get 3 ,300 people working at peak efficiency? Your best store has reduced waste, water, and energy usage. How do you make every store like your best store? Your best property has every guest raving. How do you make every property like your best property? The answer is Ecolab. Better performance, better outcomes, better impact. Ecolab. Now every location is your best location. For enterprise organizations, managing all your food needs is a tall order. But with EasyCater, you get a single workplace food vendor with the tools and resources to make it easy.
0:40Giving teams across your organization an easy way to order from a huge variety of restaurants, all on one platform. All while consolidating your corporate food spend so you can control costs, streamline billing and payment, and simplify reporting. EasyCater, your business tool for food. To learn more, visit easycater.com slash podcast.
1:05Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts. Radio. News.
1:22Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. Joe, do you remember deal toys? Did you ever see those? I never got a deal. I do know what they exist. Well, you wouldn't get a deal toy unless you were working on something. So I'm aware that they existed, but I never saw one. I used to be slightly obsessed with them. So were they toys or were they those sort of Lucite? Yeah, that's pretty much it. So if you are working in capital markets or in mergers and acquisitions and you completed a deal, you would mark the end of that transaction by, you know, getting some sort of swag, I guess.
2:04And it could be really boring. It could just be a Lucite block or something like that. But some of them were really interesting and fun. And one of the ones I remember seeing was someone, it must have been working in like capital markets. It was a little toggle, like an actual, like think of like a railroad kind of toggle. And it was to celebrate the first ever pick toggle transaction. So can I say something? First of all, it's amazing. Second of all, we talk to a lot of investors on the podcast. We talk to a lot of people whose job in some way resembles our job, which is looking at screens all day or maybe looking at data.
2:45I think if I ever had gone into finance, I would have some job that involved a lot of looking at screens and a lot of maybe looking at data, but mostly just looking at screens. We don't often talk to a lot of people who are in the world of actually talking to other people about making things happen. I never think I'd be good at that. No one wants to hang out with me, you know, stuff like that. And so I want to learn and talk to more people about how actually things in finance, whether we're talking about a deal, whether we're talking about a new issuance, et cetera, how that actually happens, how an instrument or security actually comes into the world.
3:20Well, I am very pleased to say, Joe, that we do, in fact, have the perfect guest for this topic. We're going to be speaking to someone whose day-to-day business is talking to people, sourcing and finding deals. Bringing things into the world. And someone who also knows exactly about that PickToggle deal toy that I mentioned earlier. So I'm very excited. We're going to be talking. We're going to try to thread the needle between sourcing deals and also something else we've been interested in lately, which is private credit. That's right. All right. So without further ado, we're speaking with Millwood Hobbs.
3:51He leads Oak Trees Sourcing and Originations Group. So really, again, the perfect person. Millwood, thank you so much for coming on All Thoughts. Thank you for having me. So I'm right, right? About the PickToggle toy. You've seen this toy. Yes, I've seen it. My favorite deal toys, there's two that stick out. When Ford spun out Hertz in 2005, I was part of that transaction. And so I have a set of car keys. Oh, amazing. Yeah, from Hertz. And they're called Lucites. Yeah. And then the other one, which was pretty cool, I did the Mars Wrigley deal with Byron Trott. And so I have two M &M guys that sort of – they lay out the transaction.
4:32Do you have a room in your house that's sort of like I'm imagining high school athletes with all their trophies, et cetera? Do you have them all together? So, you know, I have – we moved during COVID in 2020 and we bought a house and now I have like a real library. And in that library, there are two things from investment banking that I have. I have bank books from deals. We used to go to a printer and we used to draft. Oh, like the pitch deck kind of? Well, it's like an actual – it's a glossy picture book of the deal, the transaction. It goes through transaction overview. It goes through company.
5:06It goes through business. And that was what folks used to actually underwrite deals back in early 2000. Yeah. And then I have Lucite. So I have a lot of Lucite. So the unit that you're leading at Oak Tree, that was created I think relatively recently in like 2020. 2020. What was the thinking behind that? So the market private credit in origination and financing of deals has evolved quite a bit. If you just go back to kind of pre-Dodd Frank, most private equity firms didn't have what we call capital markets professionals. And post-Dodd Frank in the migration and creation of a robust private credit market, most of the private equity firms have capital markets professionals who really spend time drafting, creating, structuring, financings for the private equity buyout.
5:56And what we figured out, Oak Tree, we were founded in 1995. We managed a couple hundred billion dollars. What we were figuring out when I first started in 2013, every strategy within Oak Tree kind of did its own thing. So if a deal came into one strategy and it didn't work, it just kind of died in that strategy. So what we decided as the market evolved and moved towards capital solution provider versus this fund does this and this fund does that, we created my group with the real purpose of a couple things. Number one is making sure we were focused on providing capital solutions versus trying to figure out what fit a particular strategy.
6:34Oh, I see. Yeah. And then the second reason we really did it is that capital is the commodity in our business. Everyone has a lot of money. but how do you get the first call and the last call? And that's the relationship. So my team is meant to really spend time and develop relationships with the counterparties because look, the reality of it is we shouldn't, we're not agreeing on, we have different investors. So the private equity firm has a different investor base than we have. And so the goal in my group is to one, make sure the entire firm sees a transaction and two, we're involved in the art of the deal, right?
7:10And so the goal is no one really should win. Both parties should be just mildly annoyed. And how do you do that? How do you do that? And the way you do it is through a relationship. That's funny because we say that in journalism sometimes. Like the goal is for everyone to be like slightly dissatisfied with the story. Because if everyone's happy, then you basically put out a press release. Somebody's wrong. If one side is really happy, the other side is probably wrong. I know Tracy already more or less asked this question, but I'll just put it in a different way. Why don't you just give us a sort of brief overview?
7:42If someone says, what do you do and how did you get here? Yeah. What did you do and how did you get here? Yeah. So you don't want my full background, do you? Oh, I actually do because you've been in the market for a really long time. Yeah, yeah. You don't have to take us from childhood. Okay, okay. I'll start from – so look, my dad was in public accounting. And originally – so I got a full academic scholarship to Rutgers to go to law school. I sat in political science and I would fall asleep and wake up and they were talking about the same thing. So I said, I don't think I can do four years of political science.
8:12So I switched to accounting because my generation, you did what the adult said to do. And so I switched to public into accounting. And my dad said, don't do public accounting, do banking. So I started out at a firm called Nations Bank, which is now it's a predecessor to Bank of America. And the most interesting job I had at Nations Bank, I was a controller for leveraged finance. I was the controller and the youngest controller in the firm. And I said, I want to be a leveraged finance banker. And the reason why it sounds silly when you're at my age, but they wore a nice tie, they wore a nice shoes.
8:49They were big in finance. And at that time, Nations Bank was a pretty big terminal B lender. And so the head of the group basically said, look, right now you're just an accountant. He said, go get a sales job and then go to business school. So again, I went to GE Capital and I financed commercial equipment. So rolling stock assets, cars, trucks, forklifts. Did that for one year to the day and then went to Columbia Business School. I summered at first Boston. And I summered in asset backs and leveraged finance. And then joined Georgia Bank in 2000 full time. And during that time period, I structured a lot of LBOs.
9:26SunGuard, Neiman Marcus, U.S. Foods, Ceridian First. Neiman Marcus being the first ever pick toggle deal. Yes. And so you had that deal toy. I have it. You know, I'll be honest with you. I think I gave it to someone more senior. Should have given it to me. I would appreciate it. I know somebody who has one. And then in 2007, I left Deutsche Bank. And really, you sort of say, why would you leave Deutsche Bank? And if you go back to 2007, the market was very concentrated. So versus today, there were eight underwriters who owned all the leverage finance risk. Oh, interesting. So you could see the market.
10:02You know, when I got a call to say, hey, what leverage would you provide on a deal? I'd ask the private equity firm, well, what do you think the business is worth? And they'd say, well, it's based on, you know, leverage. And so you could see that coming to a head. So in 2007, I went to Goldman Sachs. I did LBOs at Goldman Sachs and also did high yield sales and joined Oak Tree in 2013. It's always interesting to hear someone's background, but I like how this dovetails with the actual development of the industry itself and this idea that at one point there were just a handful of very small or a handful of banks that ran leverage finance.
10:35And then, of course, we know about the proliferation of all that. So it's very useful to get that background. Well, why don't we dive into that a little bit more? So talk to us about how the credit market, the capital market has evolved over the course of your career. Yeah. So look, when I first started, covenants were pretty standard. Amendments to deals were actually fairly standard. And as you moved forward by 2007, the majority market was cove light. The one interesting thing about pre-Dodd-Frank was in the credit agreement, which is a document that sort of governs the loan, if you will, you had to hedge 50 % of your floating rate risk.
11:15And so going into the cycle, two things that made sense then is one, folks were hedged 50%. And then the other thing is LIBOR, if you remember, back in 2007 was at 5%. So the spread to deals was 200 to 50 to get to that 7.5 % average LBO. Well, what happened at when Dodd-Frank, when the markets cried the world in the global financial crisis, rates went to zero, right? So companies actually generated cash flow in that cycle. The challenge or difference we have today is we've been in a no-rate environment. So no one really hedged, one. And then, two, because there was 0 % base rates, the spread on deals was much higher.
12:01Instead of 200, 250, you had 450, 500, 600. So when 22, when rates started to move up, you actually had a situation where a lot of companies couldn't support the cash flows because no one predicted that race would move. And most folks were not hedged like they were in 2007.
12:37Your best bottling plant employs 3 ,300 people. How do you get 3 ,300 people working at peak efficiency? Your best store has reduced waste, water, and energy usage. How do you make every store like your best store? Your best property has every guest raving. How do you make every property like your best property? The answer is Ecolab. Better performance, better outcomes, better impact. Ecolab. Now every location is your best location. For enterprise organizations, managing all your food needs is a tall order. But with Easy Cater, you get a single workplace food vendor with the tools and resources to make it easy, giving teams across your organization an easy way to order from a huge variety of restaurants, all on one platform, all while consolidating your corporate food spend so you can control costs, streamline billing and payment, and simplify reporting.
13:33Easy Cater, your business tool for food. To learn more, visit easycater.com slash podcast. Can you talk a little bit – it's a theme that obviously comes up in every private credit but also other episodes as well. Talk to us a little bit more about the passage of Dodd-Frank and how it's set in to people's brains, that this is going to restructure the financial industry, that there are going to be various activities, whether we're talking about trading, whether we're talking about lending, et cetera. These are not going to be part of the banks anymore. Right. Talk to us a little bit about those sort of early post, you know, and we're talking 2009, 2010, those initial conversations that people were having about something new, new opportunities are going to emerge from that.
14:18Right. Well, well, if you go back to 2007, when a portfolio manager on a public side was selling risk in the market, the banks were the shock absorber to that risk. Yeah. Right. So, you know, when I was sitting at Goldman Sachs, it wasn't unusual for us to buy$200 million of an issue. And it'd be on your balance sheet. And it'd be on our balance sheet. Right. Post what Dodd-Frank did effectively is said, OK, if you go back to the leverage, and I hope I'm not being too technical, but. No, that's great. Banks were levered roughly 30 times pre-global financial crisis. Post, they're 15 times levered, right?
14:57So once you shrunk that liquidity or capital out of the banks, they can no longer absorb the deals. And so what happens is, and this is why liquidity is really an important phenomenon. So when a PM calls the desk and says, hey, I have to move 5, 10, 15 million, you're not really sure what their real size is because they know the market's not liquid. When I was in sales and trading, PIMCO or somebody would call and say, hey, I've got several million to move. And I'd say, well, this is your first call or last call. And they laugh and they say, why? I said, because I give you two different prices.
15:33And so what happens in a market that's less liquid is as they're trying to sell, they call different banks. And every time they make a call, a bank then assumes that there's more behind that to go. And so they re-rack the pricing. And so in a public security, which is different than private, a public security can actually move pricing-wise without anything really trading, but on the anticipation that there's supply out there. And so that created, you know, and if you go back to 2009, private credit market was like$300 billion, right? Most of that was more MEZ or off the run, not what we call our regular way direct lending, private credit, which we were active in, but we're doing it more on the distress or opportunistic credit side.
16:22And over time, because of the liquidity and capital requirements of banks, more of that has just migrated to the private credit market, supplemented by the fact that there are these private equity professionals who are very efficient at looking at both markets and figuring out where they should play or where they should place their credit or their deals. I'm getting a lot of flashbacks to writing about corporate bond inventories at the dealers around 2012. So just on this note, is the pitch from private credit, is it basically execution? Like you don't need to worry about us actually being able to do or complete this deal.
17:03Whereas at a bank, you know, they're taking into account leverage considerations, regulatory requirements, and all of that. Right, right, right. So what a proper deal should be, right, if you're sitting in private equity, your job is to find the most efficient best price capital for your deal, right? The public market, what they're very good at doing is saying, here is the indicative rate for a deal. And let's just say the indicative on a term loan is sulfur plus 400, right? Then the private equity firm comes to us and says, where will you actually own that risk, right? So they get a level where we're owning, which won't be the indicative because remember the banks are marketing, hey, we can get you the best rate and best execution.
17:49We're in the storage business, the banks are in the moving business. So they're trying to move the risk and we own the risk. And So we price the risk where we'll hold it. And if those two are not aligned, then and then what you add to that 400 is you add what we call flex. So if you take the indicative plus flex, that gives you an idea of what the banks are willing to say that this debt will price. So let's say the flex is 150 basis points. So they know on the private equity side, they know worst case, the banks will own it at SOFR 550, which the banks have gotten that sort of flex number based on their discussions with us to know where we would actually own that risk.
18:29Oh, I see. Yeah. So the process is how do you create an efficient auction to have the debt in the right market at the right pricing with the right structure? OK, so here's my other question. When you are about to do a deal or when you find a deal, who are you actually talking to? Is it the banks or is it like the companies that are borrowing in the market? But so generally in a – Who are most of your meetings with on a daily basis? Oh, wow. Sorry. Answer a Tracy's question, but I'm just sort of like how I would have phrased the question. I'm talking to both, right? Okay, okay. Everyone is my friend.
19:05And the goal is the more conversations I have, the more informed I am of where the market is, right? The interesting thing about public markets is that market reprices risk faster than private credit because there's a secondary market. Private credit doesn't really have a secondary market. So what we're always trying to make sure we're understanding is relative value between public and private. And so my conversation, let's say XYZ sponsor wants to buy a business, right? And let's say it's a public company. The first call I'll get is from that sponsor and say, hey, Millwood, we'd like you guys to look at a financing opportunity for a public company we're looking to buy.
19:44I'm like, great. I say, look, I'll put my compliance on the email and we'll do a conflicts checks on that business because we don't know if we own the stock or there's existing debt outstanding. So it goes through a process where that company is actually vetted from a conflicts perspective. Once it's vetted and that clears the process, then we get initial information on an LBO. And that information could be a selling memoranda. It could be an initial model. And so then we start the process. And what the sponsor wants to be able to do is from the preliminary information is get a sense for do you like the asset or not?
20:21Do you want to finance it? Where do you want to finance it at? And what's your leverage and what's your pricing? So there's some high-level indication that they get from us to determine if we should move forward with a more robust diligence process. So that's how it starts. And then at that point, we do a due diligence process on the asset. So we may have – we may call third-party consultants. We may do some background on it. We have a call with a sponsor. We understand their investment thesis, like why are they making the investment. And then we talk internally and we have an investment committee and we discuss it.
20:58And then we'll iterate with the sponsor on diligence questions. And then at that point, it becomes are you in or are you out? And so then once the sponsor kind of has a sense for who's in and who's out, Now their goal is to get the right terms. And so there's a process around sending us their thoughts on the terms, right? And our job is to figure out which of those we want to negotiate and which are we fine with. First of all, this is fantastic stuff. I want to talk more about, you know, what it takes to be the first call. Because you said that's important. And I'm like curious, like, you know, Tracy and I are competitors.
21:37How does one of us get the first call or not? But even before we get into that question, and it occurs to me that because you work for Oak Tree and there are multiple strategies within it, and you work, I assume, with different people on different committees and different funds, et cetera. Is there ever tension that arises between your recognition of the need to get that first call versus what people on investment committees see as the fair price, right? Because if the investor is always trying to get every penny, right, then at some point I'm going to stop calling Millwood. 100%. Talk to us about reconciling that.
22:17And I also have to imagine just to sort of add on a part, be to this question, you know, it would be one thing if like it was a small shop and one strategy. Right. But you're looking at this holistically. Correct. Whereas the investor who's running a specific fund, there cares about their returns and doesn't care so much about the returns of the other fund or just the general. So talk to us about reconciling some of these tensions. Right. So the biggest tension is, like I said earlier, we don't necessarily agree on price, structure, leverage, right? But what we're doing is I'm talking to that sponsor or that client or that company all the time.
22:54Hey, how's your family? I know where they go to school. I may do Zooms with their kids. So there really is a part about being a nice guy to talk to. Hey, Milwood, I want to go to Ocean Prime. I know you know the manager. I'm bringing my family. Oh, so this is real stuff. Let me call. Yeah. Oh, cool. So, yeah. So we are full service here. And again, like I said, the relationship is getting the first call and the last call. And by the way, out of 20 deals, I only care about the last two. So how do I pass 18 times so I can see the last two? So it really is a form of art, if you will. And what we're trying to do is demystify the negotiation.
23:31And we're institutionalizing relationships. So if XYZ sponsors in LA, they'll call me and say, hey, Millwood, who should I talk to? Okay, let me give you a list of folks. Because the more that that private equity firm or that sponsor or whatever client it is feels like they understand our firm, the better the relationship. So we spend time making sure that they know who our CEO Armin is or Bob O 'Leary, that they know the PMs at the different strategies. So it's not a scary monster. You know, when I joined and originally Oak Tree, remember, we were more opportunistic. And as the market has evolved and as we have evolved as a firm, we're sort of private credit and opportunistic.
24:13And by the way, the client will say, Milwitt, I don't really care about one side of the house versus the other. You're Oak Tree. Right, right, right. So we have to sort of – And you're Oak Tree. I'm Oak Tree, right? Yeah. And so I have to go to the market as one firm. Wait, talk to us a little bit more about what negotiations are actually like. Because I will say we just had Sujit Indap on, who wrote a great book about the Caesar's Palace LBO. Yeah, we're in that. Yeah, you're in that. No, it's not in that. Not you specifically, but Oak Tree certainly is. And there's certainly like, there are some very dramatic negotiations that take place in that world.
24:51Sure. Oh, yeah. I mean, look, sometimes you just, you get up, you throw your pencil in there and you walk out of the room sometimes, you know. So, you know, the art of negotiation is what I say to my team is it's not the negotiating point you're discussing at the moment. It's the points that are coming two points later, right? You're always thinking ahead on the negotiation. You know, we did a deal for a business that wasn't really loved in the leveraged finance market. And I knew that type of business because I had done an LBO and the market really didn't understand it. but it was a great management team.
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25:27Sometimes, sometimes deals do well because the management team is very good and very articulate. And I knew this deal would struggle at a bank. And so when it was hung, which means the bank had to fund it. They got stuck with it. They got stuck with it. I called in and I said, hey, sorry, but I'll buy 50 million at 90. Okay. Right? Oh, gosh, no, at 90. Wow, that's a deep discount. Da, da, da, da, da. I said, well, you know, I think as you now realize that business is not, It's a little tricky business. And it was a public to a private. So a private equity firm was taking a public company and making it private.
26:03And even though it was a declining margin business, there was a view that the public company expenses were high. So you could sort of map a scenario where over 12 months, they were going to cut some of the public company costs and create a more efficient, which would create more EBITDA. Yeah. Right? So they sold it to us. So now I'm a top five lender, right? With the right response or you have the right relationship, right? Well, sponsor, which, you know, they're meant to be opportunistic too. Cap structure, EBITDA grew, cap structure looked good. So they wanted to do a dividend. Now, again, in a negotiation, if you're doing a dividend, that means you're putting more debt on my capital structure.
26:46Yeah. Right? That's money that could go to you. That's money that could go to anybody but them, right? Yeah. And so, you know, the job of a sponsor at that moment is to call the top five lenders and say, hey, I'm doing a dividend deal. And they take me from violently upset to mildly annoyed. That's the job. Yeah. So this sponsor did not call us on that dividend deal. And so now I have a I'm in a unique situation. They went to other lenders and got the 51 percent to do the deal. And I felt some kind of way about that. Some kind of way. Some kind of way. And so I proceeded to try to figure out why folks would agree to this dividend deal.
27:24And so I called the market and the sponsor sort of said, you know, he calls me and he says, Millwood, I hear you're working against me on my dividend deal. I said, well, that's not actually true because you didn't call me when you launched it. So he said, but I thought we had a good relationship. I said, we do. I thought so too. But you didn't call me. All right. And so long story short, the dividend didn't go through. Right. And so then we changed the structure of the dividend to allow we shrunk the size of the dividend. We changed the original issue discount. And I told the sponsor, I said, look, unfortunately, I'm going to sell the position when this closes.
28:02And the point of that story is sometimes it's life's too short and not all not all relationships are meant to go on forever. We still talk. I'm still a good friend. He's still a good friend. But we haven't done a lot together since then because sometimes, you know, in a negotiation, if you don't see eye to eye and that deal worked out, what happens if it doesn't work out? Yeah. Right? So sometimes you're managing relationships to keep and sometimes you're managing relationships to not do on a business side. But you always want to be friendly in this market because you're usually one person away from somebody that matters in the business.
28:41Actually, since we're on this point, that strikes me as very savvy and very wise and like probably a lesson many of us should learn in many realms that sometimes it's OK to take the L or let a proposal fall apart because life is long and other things happen at some point. And we have listeners who are in college or young and they think about, you know, career trajectories, et cetera. I'm curious just from your perspective, this is probably a sort of attitude that you would hope the people who work for you cultivate, internalize, so to speak. How do you recognize who has that? And like when you think about like people that you want on your team, are you able to sort of like build intuitions about, you know, the people who can think that way?
29:27Yeah. So good question. So I would say on my team, everyone is uniquely different and everyone is exceptional at something and very good at everything else. And I think where you make a mistake in building teams, especially in our business, is you try to find someone who can be exceptional in more than one thing. So I'll tell you a good story. So when I was first starting out, I would fly to Dallas, Texas, and I would meet with folks in Texas. And I thought I was a pretty charming, knowledgeable person on the markets. And everyone in Texas was friendly. But what I figured out was by the time the deals made it to me in New York, everyone in Texas had already passed.
30:06So it was almost like wrong-way risk. And so – Explain that. Yeah. Why was that happening? Well, because you're in Texas, right? It's a different culture, different market in New York. And in some markets, folks want to do business with folks they may see on the weekend or see in the gym or, you know. And so it's more of a that person sits in New York. They don't really know me, right? Yeah, yeah. So but if people in Texas didn't really like the deal, then you call the people in New York. Oh. So I decided that I needed to put someone in Texas. So how do you hire people, right? So this is for your young audience.
30:47So I went to a conference, and he was kind of managing the room really nicely. So I gave him my business card. I said, hey, we'd love to spend some time with you. So I called him, and we set up two days of meetings. Well, he didn't realize I was actually interviewing him for two days because everyone says they have great relationships, right? Everyone says, oh, yeah, I've got the best relationship, da-da-da-da-da. But how do you actually test that? So I spent two days with this person. And look, high school football matters in Texas. I didn't play high school football. I played high school baseball.
31:16This person plays high school football. And so you put someone in that territory that understands the local culture. And what we're trying to do is have a hub-and-spoke origination model where we have a global firm, but we try to talk on a more regional and local level. and that's what I think makes our sourcing origination a little bit different and again people matter in this business and again the goal is to get the first call and the last call that person may spend a lot of time you know going to events spending time with the families yeah and and ultimately what you want folks to do is to show you deals because they trust you and it's still a trust me business
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33:35Paid for by Public Investing. All investing involves the risk of loss, including loss of principal. Brokerage services for U.S.-listed registered securities, options and bonds, and a self-directed account are offered by Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA and SIPC. Crypto trading provided by Backed Crypto Solutions, LLC. Complete disclosures available at public.com. slash disclosure. One thing I wanted to ask you, just going back to something you said about the management of a particular company being good. In credit, we've spoken about this on the podcast before, but we tend to think about it as avoiding losers, right?
34:05Whereas equities are more about finding the winners. How would love you said that? So I guess my question is like, when you're looking at a particular deal, do you feel that you're making a bet on that business? Or is it just about looking at the numbers and making sure that you're not going to lose out? They're unlikely to screw it up. Yeah. So interesting enough, what we're trying to do in a diligence process is figure out where there may be holes in that investment. We did one deal with a counterparty that we required them to switch to CFO. Just because the questions, it took too long to answer.
34:41Like if I ask you, how many days does it take you to close your books? What percentage of that is manual versus automated? What do your management letters say in the auditor? You know, those types of questions, if you have to think about them or you say, I'll come back to you as a CFO, that would be concerning. So, you know, our job is to protect our investors. That's our job. And what we're trying to do is make sure we understand the investment and no one bats a thousand, right? If you look at the top 10 hitters in Major League Baseball, they strike out as much as they hit. So, you know, our job is to avoid losers, like you said, and we have to manage that through a process.
35:19Can you say actually a little more? I thought that was really interesting about some of the questions that you asked and the idea like why can't the CFO just quickly answer how long it takes to lose their – You would think that would be an easy – yeah. I'm always surprised also just generally there's a bit of a tangent that even in 2024 with like all the computer and accounting systems that like fraud still happens, that there are still ways – or companies like we have a material weakness and we're going to have to – I'm always a little surprised that that can even still happen. I'm curious like how you like – this world of things just being wrong are ambiguous at companies.
35:50I'd love to hear you talk more about that. When you buy a business as a platform and then you then buy successive businesses, more than likely they didn't have all the same financial system. Oh, yeah, yeah. And the integration process, depending on how quickly you want to grow it, drives how long you actually integrate. And so what happens sometimes is you don't fully integrate these businesses and systems. If you go back to failures of businesses in our market, SAP integration is a big sort of point of contention. And so businesses, you focus on risk that you see time and time. So fraud, fraud, you know, there was a water business that was, you know, that was fraud, fraudulent that, you know, some banks lost a lot of money.
36:34You know, if you go back to like Collins and Aikman, which was an LBO a long time ago, there was some fraud. And you could see what you what you're doing in a diligence process. You are looking for sort of what I call inherent weaknesses in the information you get back. And management letters, which the auditors produce, is a good document that sort of highlights the risk of accounting systems, financial systems. And that's a pretty – systems tends to be a big driver of sort of integration issues. So this isn't necessarily fraud, but you just reminded me of ad backs and deals and adjusted earnings and things that can be inflated to make a transaction look a lot better than it actually is.
37:17Yeah. The last time I remember writing about this was, I guess, gosh, five or six years ago. And the feeling back then was that there was more sketchy stuff happening on the valuation side of credit deals. Is that still the case or has that been your observation over the years? Well, so the add backs, it's an assumption and it's an ask to get credit for something that may happen in the future. Right. Or it's saying something's happened previously that hasn't fully been flown through the financial statements and we want to get credit or we don't want it to affect our earnings. Every deal has adjustments.
37:54OK, so just start with the premise that adjusted EBITDA will exist. And part of our job is to trust our partners that they're adjusting the right things. What happens is if you watch the financial statements over time, sometimes the adjustments never go away. right and then you start to say okay this is recurring non-recurring right we we did a deal for a sponsor and we were and it was near year end and the sponsor is going through each line item of what they wanted to add back and you know what i said wow we could we could go through this for three days right explaining why they had that i said you know what you can add back five million call it whatever you want right yeah so at the end of the day what we're trying to do is understand in the rationale for the ad back.
38:42In a market like today, the problem is the rationale isn't fully explained all the time. And the amount of time you want to add it back is kind of almost infinite. So you start to say, okay, and the sponsor's perspective would be I'm paying for that, right? Because I'm paying off that adjusted EBITDA, so you should leverage against that. The counter would be I'm capped upside, right? I'm capped at par. And if you go back to 07, a lot of the ad bags in some of the large LBOs never truly came to fruition. So if you take cap structures that were leveraged seven times, if you're adding back 100 million, that's 700 million more debt that if the 100 million never comes through, at some level you could be over levered.
39:28So that's why you have to look at ad bags. And in the one notion, folks say documents are loose. Well, I would argue it's about asset selection, right? A document is not going to help you if you just underwrote the wrong asset. At the same time, a document, if you're doing well and I'm not letting you lend more, what do you think I'm going to do if you're doing well? I'm probably going to figure out a way to fix the document to allow you to lend more. So I think part of our business, you're right on at-bats. But, you know, CovLite, the market is mostly CovLite. And even when you think about structures with a covenant, a lot of times if you actually hit that covenant, it's unclear the business is a going concern at that point.
40:13If you need the document to save you, then you've already got a problem. Yeah. Well, since we're actually talking about documents and we have done a recent episode about so-called creditor on creditor violence and how that works, et cetera. One thing that came up with that and I'm also curious about is like legal expenses and detail, you know, every comma and all that stuff in these documents. I'm just curious, like over the course of your career, how much have you seen, perhaps to the point that it changes your expected return on investment, legal costs and the sort of rising lawyer fees, et cetera, to check those documents, regardless of how many covenants they have in them?
41:01And have you seen an evolution over time since you've just been in the business of how much of a deal resources end up going to the legal side? Yeah. How much do the lawyers bill you every year? And what have you seen? So while I said I'm going to now counter myself. OK. While I said the document won't save you in a deal, it's very important you have a document that sort of expressly documents what it is, the intentions of the transaction. Yeah. And it's very good to have governance in the document, right? So if you just think about public versus private markets, in a public market situation, you're given two to three days to review a 300-pay legal document.
41:42Now, if the deal is going very, very well, arguably there isn't a lot of opportunity for you to push back on the document, right? So you kind of take the document as is in the public market. And the issue with that, there's a lot of, and you said credit and credit balance, but there are a lot of opportunities for you to take assets out of a restricted group, create new co and lend against that and take value away from existing lenders. I think one thing that private credit is very good at and is focused on that part of the document, we've been very firm on making sure that the ability to take assets out and create new assets or new financing or new capital, we've limited that quite a bit in private credit.
42:23But I will tell you, lawyers would argue inflation is real for them too, right? Yeah, sure, sure. So, you know, and a lot of that deal cost gets kind of, you know, born at the beginning. But yeah, lawyers, but you need lawyers, right? You need them. You know, there's two reasons why a deal usually gets hung up. It's usually a legal or tax reason on the M &A side, on the financing side. And so lawyers are an important part of of our process. And we spend a lot of time making sure we have the right counsel who can understand and be able to move with us. If this goes sideways, we want to make sure your bankruptcy and attorneys are really good.
43:01We want to make sure that you are put, you know, if you're thinking about biotech or something where IP is important, how do we make sure that IP, you can't over-license it? There's a lot of nuances in the document that we find lawyers are very valuable in our process. So I just have one more question. But, you know, you've had such a long history in this market and you've worked on so many interesting transactions. What deal are you most proud of? hmm so when i was doing lbo's it's almost like you're watching the company and the sponsor get married and you sit in the middle of that marriage and you're kind of playing consultant and all of my deals i still talk to the ceos of those deals because you get to know these people you're on planes with them for 10 days you know i know some of the quirks of some ceos you know You just get to know people.
43:54When I was doing the buyout, when Hughes spun out DirecTV, Roxanne Austin was a rock star, a female CEO running DirecTV, a very profitable business, and really get to know interesting people. So I would tell you all the deals I'm pretty proud of. There's probably one that was a bit of a disaster that we used to say if you made one bond payment. Wait. Tell us about the deal that you're least proud of. Yeah. So that was probably the deal. It's actually just a more interesting question, but nobody really wants to ask that first. Yeah. That's the more interesting question. That deal was hard. That deal was hard.
44:26It made one coupon payment and filed. Are you going to tell us what it is? No. Okay. I want to protect those involved. Okay. Yeah. But good question. Okay. And I think, you know, so I've done a lot of deals and most of them I'm pretty happy about. All right. I think you mentioned you take, all right, you want to be the first call. Yes. And to some extent being the first call is some combination of the ability to give decent pricing and also just being a likable guy that people want to talk to about their family. But I think you said you take 20 calls and you maybe take – So what you're saying – what I'm saying is out of 20 calls I get, the last two are the most interesting.
45:07So how do you actually engage 18 times and it goes nowhere? Yeah. But like is there a minimum – like you have to say yes to – you can't say no forever. Otherwise, at some point, you'll no longer be the first call, right? Yeah. I might like talking to Tracy a lot. But if she never like in the end wants to consummate the deal, eventually she's no longer going to be my first call. Well, it's how you say no. OK. So talk to us about saying no but still maintaining the first call. Sometimes we don't say no. We say here's how we can get to a yes. OK. Right? So sometimes you give a path to a yes. All right.
45:38Sometimes in a market like we're in today, it's not clear that someone takes my no offensively. There's a lot of capital. So it's easier to say no in this market than a market where there's not a lot of capital. And generally, we may say no. It may be a concentration issue. Maybe we feel like we have too much of that type of risk on our books. It could be an attachment issue, like leverage or attachment could be a problem. It could be that we had an issue with a similar business and maybe our LPs are fatigued in that type of space and we don't want to sort of bring it up again. There are a host of reasons why we may say no.
46:16We may not get there fast enough. That happens in this market. But generally, I think we're a pretty quick study and what we are very good at is we do exactly what we say we're going to do. So if we put something on paper, we're going to stand by that. And I think that goes a long ways. And I think if people say, well, why do they call Oaktree? I think we price risk, right? So in some markets, that's a real big competitive advantage. And I think we don't BS people. We say what we can do. We do what we say. And that's it. And so sometimes our answer is, yeah, we like it, but we don't love it. But if the sponsor or somebody is able to say, well, Oaktree's involved, right?
46:56That gives credibility to the deal. and we can help them get it done by saying we're involved, but we may not be the anchor. We may not lead it. And when you're managing a size capital, we need to write$300 million to$500 million checks on most situations. So we're always looking at the biggest deals with the largest sponsors. Generally, those are safer plays than the lower middle markets. So we think there's less competition when there's only seven of us that can write large checks versus in smaller deals, Hundreds of folks can write small tax. I have one more question, actually. I just remembered.
47:33But you mentioned earlier that you want to be friendly with everyone, including the banks that you're ostensibly in competition with. One thing that's been happening recently, it seems, is that a lot of deals that were originally done in the private credit market are getting refinanced in the public market by banks. Yeah. So first of all, why is that happening? And then secondly, like, is that a concern for someone like Oaktree? That is great. Like if we can be on two or three year interim capital in most situations, that's good. The reason why they're going back to the public market is there's a spread between public and private.
48:11So there's a cost reduction element. And then for the sponsor is more flexibility. Private credit is not meant to be the most flexible. It's the most efficient, but it's not necessarily the most flexible. And if I can create and institutionalize and have a broader investor base, right, sometimes I can get more things done if a lot more people own it at very small sizes versus five or six owning at a chunky size. So it's actually you want a healthy market, public and private, right? And when most folks say, oh, you're losing deals to public, I'm like, well, I probably should have gone to public market anyway, right?
48:48It's rated. It's an existing issuer. It's been in the public markets. It's just staying in public markets. You know, if you think about the private credit market, we're$1.7,$1.8 trillion going to probably$3 trillion. There's ABF, asset-based finance, which is a new phenomenon, which isn't really new, right? GE Capital was a large ABF lender. But there's$3 trillion of dry powder at private equity firms. There's enough for us all to do and be happy. All right, Millwood Hobbs, thank you so much for coming on All Thoughts. That was fantastic. That was so good. Thank you. Thank you so much. I'm so glad we made this happen.
49:36Joe, that was so much fun. That was an unusually fun and good episode, even though all of our guests are the perfect guests. But, you know, I really like and I think we should do more about talking with the people whose job it is to be nice to people and hang out with people. Yeah, because that's like an element. We could learn a lot. Yeah, we could. But that's like an element in finance that's still, you know, like I said, we talk to a lot of screen people and I'm a screen people. I'm glad that there are still parts of the industry where there's a big role for likable people who can maintain relationships and stuff like that.
50:11And play golf. But that's part of being human, right? Don't you have a whole song with the title, like, All My Friends Are Online or something like that? Yeah, All My Friends Are On My Phone. Yeah. Yeah, like, I want to know more people who have friends who aren't on their phone. Who have friends IRL. Yeah. All right. There's a lot to pull out of that. I did think, like, Millwood's early point about banks being in the business of, like, pricing and moving risk very quickly was a good one. Because I think like that's kind of a fundamental difference with private credit. That was really interesting.
50:46I also it was really interesting hearing him talk about the tensions that emerge because you want to be the first call and you want to have a reputation for at least saying yes 10 percent of the time or something like that. Yeah. With the demands of the actual PM who doesn't care about all the times you have to say no. So, you know, I think this is probably a sort of asymmetry that comes up in a lot of sales based businesses, right? Where you have some salesperson and their job is to hit a commission or something like that. And then you have like a product manager who's like, no, you can't price it at this or we can't move the product this fast.
51:22This is just sort of like an interesting dynamic that emerges in all businesses. And I really enjoyed hearing him describe how he negotiates that implicitly and explicitly. Negotiations, because a lot of these deals involve like so many different entities who are all coming at it from a different angle with a different incentive. Yeah, so much there. We'll have to talk to Melody. Yeah, we should. All right. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the Odd Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy Allaway. You can follow me at Tracy Allaway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart.
51:53Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armin, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. Thank you to our producer, Moses Andam. For more OddLots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash OddLots. We have transcripts, a blog, and a daily newsletter. You can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash OddLots. And if you enjoy OddLots, if you like it when we talk about how to source deals in the private credit market, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, in addition to getting our daily newsletter, you can also listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad-free.
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From the publisher
When it comes to credit investing (or really any investing), there's an analytic art in deciding the right price to pay for a security. But often that's only part of the challenge. First you need someone to want to sell it to you. In something like public-market equity, this usually isn't hard. Liquidity is deep, and the "ask" price is well known. In something like private credit, it's much trickier. Someone has to sell you the deal. Someone has to call you about it and tell you about it. So how do you get the call? And how do you know when to say yes? On this episode, we speak with Milwood Hobbs, the Managing Director and Head of Sourcing & Origination at Oaktree. Prior to this role, he was at Goldman Sachs, also in leveraged finance origination and sales. So he's been involved in numerous credit deals in his career. On this episode, he talks us through his role, what's involved in it, how he gets offered deals, and how he determines what opportunities are better or worse.
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