Jeffrey Gundlach Says Almost All Financial Assets Are Now Overvalued

27:50And of course, gold has been the top performing asset for the year, certainly for the last 12 months. And so I think investors, I was at one point advocating 25 percent of a portfolio in gold like things, real assets, high quality land, gold, you know, high value assets. I think that's too high right now because I think that trade has played out so very well. And gold seems to have stalled out in the last month or so at a very high level. So it's consolidating its gains. I think it goes higher. But for the time being, I'd probably be more like at 15 percent or something like that. And the rest, I think I would be in cash because I think valuations are just incredibly high.

28:32And the health of the equity market in the United States is it's among the least healthy in my entire career in terms of the P-E ratio, the CAPE ratio. All the classic valuation metrics are off the charts. And of course, the market is incredibly speculative and speculative markets always go to insanely high levels. It happens every time. This is not, you know, obviously it happened in the dot coms. It happened in the financials, part of the GFC. It's happening now in the AI and data centers and all that stuff. And, you know, it's interesting. Probably the biggest thing that changed the economy and the world in the last, I don't know, 150 years was electricity.

29:17Electricity being put into people's homes was probably one of the biggest changes of all time. And, of course, around 1900, people realized that electricity to homes was coming. And so electricity stocks were in a huge mania, and they did incredibly well. But the relative performance of electricity relative to the entire stock market in the U.S., excluding electricity, so everything else but electricity, the electricity outperformance peaked in 1911. Houses weren't even broadly electrified by 1911. You had to be a very rich person to have electricity in 1911. but yet that was that was the outperformance and so it all gets priced in very quickly and excessively because people love to look at the benefits of these transformative technologies and they are transformative i mean look at what happened to some of the internet stocks they dropped 80 80 90 percent in the early 00s but there are many many multiples of what their peak was at that time.

30:21But it gets priced in very, very early. So I think that one has to be very careful about momentum investing during mania periods. And I feel like that's where we are right now. I just don't think there's any argument against the fact that we're in a mania. I want to go back to something you said just then about how investors should be reducing their dollar exposure. So this is, you know, the sell America thesis that was very popular at the beginning of the year and, per your comments, is still very popular with some people. But we have seen, in general, a little bit of a strengthening in the dollar.

30:58Ten-year Treasury yields have been going down compared to where they were earlier. What accounts for, I guess, the stickiness of U.S. assets in the global financial system and in investors' portfolios, even when I think we can all agree that there are challenges ahead for U.S. government debt and assets in the form of high deficits and spending and maybe political stasis and things like that? Habit. People are reluctant to make changes to long-standing paradigms. One of the hardest things to do in the investment business is to significantly change your allocations after you've been right. That's counterintuitive to a lot of people, but trust me, as someone that's done this for a very long time, that's the hardest thing to do.

31:48Because when you do something and it works really well, it gives you satisfaction on every level, an economic level, an emotional level, psychological level. It helps you to have happy meetings with your clients. Just imagine if you bought Apple at, I don't know,$5 a share, and it went up to, I don't know,$700. And so you get to go to your review with your client and you say, let's take a look at your portfolio. Look at this, cost five, last price, 700. I am working for you. I've done a good job for you. Well, when you sell Apple at 700, you no longer have that line item. And so you can't point to this great thing that you did for that client.

32:33And so people like to project the past, successes of the past. They They like to hang on to them or even project them into the future. And that's a dangerous thing to do. But when you check, I was 100 percent dollar. I owned no foreign currencies for decades. And then starting about 18 months ago, I had to pull the trigger. I had to say, you know what? I don't think this paradigm is intact any longer. And I think you're going to lose money by betting on the dollar as a dominant asset. And it's a scary thing to do because you wake up in the morning and you look in the mirror and say, I'm looking at a strong dollar guy.

33:16And then all of a sudden, the next day, you're saying, I'm looking at a guy that's no longer confident in a strong dollar. Pointing at the mirror and going, who am I? I wonder why I should have to pay taxes, quite frankly. When I look in the mirror, I don't identify as a billionaire. I identify as a homeless 80-year-old guy. Why should I have to pay taxes when I identify as a destitute elderly man? I don't understand. Yeah, I think other people might identify you differently. I want to go back to the rates question. Self-identification. As you mentioned, it's sort of historically unusual that we've seen this period of the Fed cutting rates for the last 13 months and very little downward action in the long end of the curve.

34:07We know everyone can sort of look at the same math that you look at in terms of interest expense. We know that the long end of curve is very sensitive for housing, and that's something that's very important to the US economy. I mean, we know that President Trump would like to see the long end of the curve go down, perhaps because he has deep familiarity with it from his real estate days. Do you think at some point in the sort of medium term future, we're going to see the return of proper yield curve control that we're going to see the Fed cut rates and not get the response desired at the long end?

34:40And then more drastic action is going to come such that actual steps are taken to suppress that long end. That's my base case. And I've been talking about this now for nearly two years, that we cannot afford the market to set interest rates if the deficit spending continues. It won't be tenable. So what has to happen is going to be some sort of drastic measures. And I'm not exactly sure what those drastic measures are going to be. There's a number of candidates for them. We could do what we did from after World War II until the mid-50s when inflation was rising and we had significantly negative real yields.

35:23And we had inflation go up to around 8 percent. And the yield curve was kept, the long bonds were kept at 2.5 percent. So you can absolutely manipulate the yield curve. Japan did that for decades. For decades, they kept rates at zero, even though there was no demand. And I actually had a meeting with the guy that ran the biggest pension plan in the world. It was one of the Japanese public pension plans. And I was really anxious to sit down with him. And I said, I really want to ask you this question. Do you actually own these negative yielding JGBs? And he actually laughed out loud when I asked him that question.

36:00He said, of course not. Nobody owns them except the Bank of Japan and the institutions that are forced to buy them by the Bank of Japan. So it's a real thing. We did in the United States for a decade. They did in Japan for decades. And Secretary Besant has alluded to the fact that maybe that's on the table, some sort of interest rate manipulation. So what this leads to is a really interesting dilemma, because what I think is my roadmap for the future, and of course, there's many variations that one could use, but the starting point for me is that interest rates will rise until such time as they're uncomfortably high for the Treasury Department.

36:41What is that? Where is that? 5%, 6 %? My guess is 6 % is the highest. It would be full-on uncomfortable, full-on at 6 % on the long end. So what happens is you want to avoid long bonds while the market forces are in play. And Joel, you said that long rates aren't down very much since the Fed started cutting. No, no, they're up a lot. long rates are up a lot since the Fed started cutting. This is the first time it's ever happened. They're up by almost 100 basis points with the Fed cutting. That's never happened before. But with interest rates rising as the Fed is cutting at the long end, what's going to happen is they'll get to a point where all of a sudden it's too uncomfortable.

37:27And then something dramatic will happen. Something dramatic could that simply be the government, the Treasury Department buys the treasuries. And if they announce that they're going to buy treasuries and control long-term interest rates, you would have a 30-point rally in the long bond in a week. So there's a very, very sensitive strategy here where you have to be very negative over the normal course of things. And then once the intervention comes in, there's going to be a significant step function lower in yields. And so you have to try to figure out how you're going to do that pivot. That's what I spend most of my time thinking about when it comes to the treasury market these days.

38:09Although for now, it's way too early for them to panic and start manipulating the rates. What they might manipulate are mortgage rates. They could absolutely buy Ginny Mays, Fannie Mays, Freddie Max, the government guaranteed mortgages, and drive those yields down much closer to where treasury's yields are. And there's no rule that says they can't go through treasury yields. I mean, there are instances where non-treasury yields are lower than treasury yields of the same maturity. Just earlier this year, there was a corporate bond that was lower yielding than the same maturity treasury bond. That also happened in the early 80s when IBM bonds traded a lower yield than treasury bonds of the same maturity because investors had greater confidence in the payback of IBM than they did in what they thought was a bad strategy under Reaganomics.

38:59And that has begun to enter the picture here in 2025 with corporate bonds periodically, not only the very best ones, of course, but like Microsoft or something like that trading through treasuries. And so that's a tell that something is up here. The other thing that they might do, and there was a white paper written about this just about a year ago now, that said, maybe we should restructure the treasuries held by foreigners, which is a very strange thing to say. This is the Mar-a-Lago Accord, right? Yeah, yes, it is. I don't know how you define what a foreigner is. Foreigners can hide behind entities.

39:36And so it looks like they're not owned by foreigners. So I'm not exactly sure what foreigners mean. But why put the word foreigners in there? Why not just say we're going to restructure the treasury debt full stop? What does that mean? Well, one way to save on interest expense, to get it back down from$1.5 trillion to the$300 billion it was a couple of years ago, why don't you just say all the treasuries that exist today were changing their coupons. The ones that have a coupon above one, the coupon is now one. The ones that have a coupon less than one, the coupon stays the same. That would save a tremendous amount of interest expense.

40:12Of course, it would cause a disastrous, tumultuous time in the government bond market. But people say to me, you're always talking about this debt problem. What's the solution? The solution is get to a point where people won't lend the government money anymore, that the government can't borrow any money. So that if you restructure treasuries that way, there'll be a couple of generations that government won't be able to borrow any money anymore. And that would actually put us in a better place than where we are today.

40:59We'll see you next time.

41:12to smooth high-quality streaming with Intel Wi-Fi 6E and maximize game performance with enhanced overclocking. Win the tech search. Power up at Lenovo.com. Lenovo, Lenovo. This is Steve Covino from Covino & Rich. Here to tell you, Toyota's legacy has been standing tall for generations. From pioneering hybrid technology to redefining the standards of safety and efficiency. With each innovation, a commitment to progress, And with the legendary lineup of in-stock trucks, including the ultra-rugged new Tacoma and heavy-duty half-ton Tundra, you can experience the legacy of Toyota for yourself. Visit buyatoyota.com, the official website for deals, to find out more.

41:54Toyota, let's go places. Wells Fargo announced a new$20 million program in 2025, teaming up with nonprofits to support small business owners. That's how Wells Fargo is helping strengthen small businesses and communities. Wells Fargo, the bank of doing. Learn more at wellsfargo.com slash say do. I want to ask another question about private credit. But just before I do, I'm curious, do you ever talk to Besant about your ideas for how to fix the U.S. Treasury market, basically, or voice your concerns? I think he watches my CNBC segment after the press conference. All right. Let's go back to private credit for a second, because that's obviously the topic du jour.

42:38And as Joe pointed out, one of the things that has really grown exponentially over the past 10 years, you've said you said on the podcast just now and you've said it before that you think private credit is the candidate for another financial crisis. And I understand the marking issue. I understand the liquidity mismatch. But when I look at private credit, maybe what's missing in terms of some of our more recent financial crises is that leverage built on top of leverage aspect. Can you give... Well, that's private credit. That is private credit. It's leverage upon leverage. Yeah. Okay. Explain that.

43:16Explain that. Because as far as I know, we're not seeing the scale of stuff getting re-bundled as we saw, for instance, in the financial crisis. Well, that's true. You're not getting the re-bundling, but you are having... There's a lot of leverage and the firms, they leverage... They're raising money and then they're borrowing money to buy more private credit. It's absolutely leverage upon leverage. And the other thing, while they're not bundling, like putting, you know, the thing about the gold financial crisis is you took triple B rated, and it's questionable whether they even deserve a triple B rated thing, and creating triple A rated securities out of them.

43:56I mean, just that alone should make you just stopped even thinking about investing in it. Suddenly, a triple B has turned into a triple A. But one thing they are doing is issuing public traded vehicles, daily NAV vehicles, to allow Main Street America, mom and pop investors, to avail themselves of this wonderful, fantastic opportunity of private credit, which is totally a liquidity mismatch. You've got daily NAV funds investing in things that don't trade at all. And so once there's a run on those vehicles, and I don't know how popular they've been, but they've certainly been touted. But if they become popular in any way, you're going to have the catalyst for a tremendous selling deluge because there is no, people will want to redeem and they won't be able to get their money out.

44:58And once you get that, once people, the trouble always comes in financial markets when people buy something they think is safe, it's sold to them as safe, but it's not safe. You buy a AAA rated subprime mortgage pool. You think it's safe because it's AAA rated, But it's not safe. It's extremely dangerous. You buy CDO equity. You buy CDO squared equity back before the whole financial crisis. And there isn't any real equity. It's I buy your equity, you buy my equity. It's just a game that's being played to make an illusion of liquidity. That's where private credit is right now. It's an illusion.

45:37They don't even claim it's liquidity. But if you package it into a publicly traded vehicle that trades on a daily basis, you have the perfect mismatch of no liquidity with a vehicle that promises liquidity. It looks like it's safe because you could sell it any day, but it's not safe because the price at which you sell it will be gapping lower, gapping lower, island gapping lower, day after day after day. And so that's where the risk rise. But these things go on forever. One of the things about the investment business is it's difficult enough to be so-called right about the direction of things we're going, but it's impossible to be both right on the direction and correct on the timing.

46:20Even if you're right on the direction, it's going to take a lot longer than you think. I turned negative on the package mortgage, non-guaranteed mortgage market in 2004. It took three years for it to even start to decay. So these things take forever, and it goes on much longer than you think. You know, remember, I turned negative on the NASDAQ, maximum negative, September 30th of 1999. I looked like a moron three months later because the NASDAQ went up 80 % in the fourth quarter of 1999. But if you had gone short the NASDAQ, September 30th of 1999, 18 months later, you had a profit of 64%. Even though it went up 80 % in the first three months, it dropped so much in the ensuing 15 months that the short would have made you a profit of a very handsome profit in a very difficult market.

47:18Of course, you've been out of business. Sorry. But out of business, you were making people's money. Yes, slight problem there. But just very quickly, are you betting against private credit now? I have no way to do that. I don't really short bonds. Shorting high yielding bonds is a really difficult thing because the cost of carry is just brutal. Every day that it doesn't it doesn't decline, you're paying out a very high rate. And so you're losing money all the time. So I don't really do that. what I do is I just don't allocate to it. I allocate to things that will do better, you know, that will be immune, relatively immune or fully immune from the knock-on effects of deterioration in private credit.

48:08So that would mean higher, you know, higher credit things, you know, using foreign currencies more than typically. But no, I don't think you can really short private credit. What have you learned in your career about longevity and drawdowns or underperformance? Because as you mentioned, you can be right or you can correctly identify a medium or long-term trend, but it sometimes takes a while to play out. Whether it's the case from September 99 to the peak, that's not actually that long. That was closer to six months or being bearish on some of the housing assets starting in 2005. That took a little bit longer.

48:47How do you survive as a portfolio manager and be willing to take time where you're just and accept that you're going to underperform for a while? Well, you have to think very carefully about your time horizon. When I started in this industry, one of the first things I was tasked to do was to do a study on what would happen if you had perfect foresight in financial markets, perfect foresight. And of course, you can do a study like that by using historical data. So you take stocks, bonds, real estate, commodities, every asset class, and you just look at the historical returns. And you can say, let's say at the beginning of every year, I invest with a five-year horizon, and I pick the asset class that I know with metaphysical certitude is going to have the highest return for those five years, because I'm looking at historical data.

49:43I came to the conclusion that if you had a five-year horizon, you would go out of business, even if you with metaphysical certitude would have the highest performing asset class. And that's because so often the first two years of the five years, that best performing asset class was not a good performer at all. It was very frequently back end loaded. So I said we cannot invest other people's money with a five-year horizon. I think that most people that invest other people's money use too short of a horizon. However, a lot of investment managers talk about they have they're constantly reallocating.

50:21They're constantly read. You know, they have a one week horizon, a weekly meeting and the change. That's not going to work. It's not going to work because the chance of you being right in a week is very low. Even if you're going to be right for over a two year period, your chance of being right in a week is very low. So I kept modulating time horizon and I came to the conclusion that the sweet spot was between 18 months and two years for a time horizon. And what I've learned is that having done that, I have a 70 percent hit rate. I've got a long enough career in enough strategies where it's statistically significant.

50:59And I have a 70 percent hit rate, which means I'm right 70 percent of the time, which means I'm wrong 30 percent of the time. So I've been at this for over 40 years. So I've been wrong for more than 12 years. Right. But thank God they haven't been in a row because what you can't do is really three years is when everyone pulls the plug. If you're if you're wrong, if you're going to perform year one, year two and year three, you're gone. You know, if you're if you're wrong five years in a row, they shut your Janus Unconstrained Bond Fund because you can't have sequential years of outperformance like that.

51:35That's a very specific example, Jeff. I wonder where that came from. Well, yeah. So really it comes down to about having the sweet spot on not being overly, overly active and not being overly fixated on your long-term idea. And I've managed to do that. I've never really had three years in a row of underperformance. So that's been a good thing. I call myself, is it Uncas or Chenichguk, who's the last of the Mohicans, and John Fenmore Cooper. I'm the last man standing. When I started in this, every single person of significance that's been in the business since I started my career, they're all retired or gone.

52:21I'm the last one standing. Dana Emery was the only one left, and she was at Dodge and Cox, but she retired at the end of June. So I'm Uncas, the last of the Mohicans. Jeff Gunkus? Does that work? Jeff Gunkus? Kind of. Very quickly, you know, again, we're sort of, we're being very introspective and retrospective on the show. But over the past 10 years, what's been the thing that surprised you most, either in terms of the markets or the financial industry itself?

52:56I think the thing that's surprising and as equally distressing as surprising is the magnitude of money printing that occurred in 2020, 2021, 2022. I just the fact that the Federal Reserve broke the law and bought corporate bonds surprised me. It probably shouldn't have surprised me because they broke they broke the law when they modified mortgages during the global financial crisis. That was that was not allowed for the prospectuses of trillions of dollars of securities, but they did it anyway. And so what I've learned is that the rules can be changed in spite of the fact that they seem to be set in stone.

53:47And that's why I say, and when I say this, people really act very in a shocked type of reaction. They don't believe that they can restructure the Treasury debt. But yes, they can. They can restructure the Treasury debt. And I think that that sort of has to happen in some fashion. whether it's the coupon adjustment that I talked about, whether it's doing the yield curve control that Joel brought up earlier, I think something like that has got to happen. Because when something is impossible and paying our interest back in today's buying power dollar is impossible to pay off our debt, it's impossible, then you have to open up your mind to a radical change in the rule system.

54:34And of course, that is happening on every level. I mean, you talk to, you look at surveys of people that are, say, 35 and younger, they don't believe in the institutions of this country at all. They don't believe in the Constitution. They don't believe in religion. They don't believe in anything. People need something to believe in. And that's what has to replace the system, a system that people can believe in. And what's being floated now just blows my mind. And that is that we're going to, because we have tariffs that are raising a few hundred billion dollars a year if they stay in place. Well, that means that we should give$2 ,000 to everybody as a tariff dividend.

55:14We don't have any money. We're borrowing$2 trillion. We don't have$2 ,000 to throw away at people again. Didn't we learn that in 2020 to 2022, that giving money to people causes inflation? Remember people talking about modern monetary theory? What a joke. You never hear anybody talking about that anymore because by modern monetary theory, Joe, how come no one talks about that anymore? Because inflation went to 9.1%. Can I ask one last question? Are you like, it seemed like, you know, you mentioned Trump floating the idea of a$2 ,000 tariff dividend to the public. It's a bribe. But do you like, are you, was there an opportunity in your view for Trump to have changed the status quo?

55:58Like, are you disappointed that someone with sort of Trump's persona energy, sort of perceived outsider status, has not done anything that actually changes some of the fiscal or economic trajectory? He can't. The problem is, look at this government shutdown. What is going on here? Why do we have to pay taxes if the government is shut? Shouldn't taxes not be charged for 41 days? Shouldn't you have like an 11 % tax rebate? Because what's going on? Well, it's just because there's this massive entrenched interest that is kind of the uniparty government that will fight tooth and nail. Just look at all the lawfare.

56:51Look at all of the indictments, all this stuff. I mean, they'll do anything they can to hold on to power until such time as the people that vote these people in say no mas, no more of this. And that began with Trump. It's been furthered just this month with Mamdani. Mamdani won because people do not believe, it's a little bit different. Trump was more like the lower middle class. They felt that nobody was listening to them. Now it's just young people, just broadly. People under, I don't know, 35 years old, people that lost three years of education with lockdowns and all of these policies, they feel like they have no chance of ever having the life experience that the baby boomers had.

57:41Home prices are more affordable, less affordable than they've ever been. People have educations that aren't worth anything. Jobs aren't available. Nobody's hiring. They feel like there's no future for them that looks anything like what they look at Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer and Mitch McConnell and all these other people had. They don't have it. And so they are not going to go along with this. And so that's why Mount Dami won. It's just like, I don't have a shot here in New York City as a young person. And that's what's taking over. And so Trump can't do it himself. He caught on to something that was obviously kind of hibernating within the psyche of part of the population, but it's now become a generational thing.

58:28I wouldn't be surprised, talk about another crazy gun lock idea. I wouldn't be surprised if they start putting in place an age tax, not a wealth tax, which they're doing to a certain extent through electricity bills and stuff like that these days already, but you could put it together an age tax that if you're over age 55, you have a surtax based upon you had a better environment to accumulate wealth than the subsequent generations have. And so you should give some of that back. I think that might actually happen. That would be a popular platform with certainly a specific demographic. Are you going to run, Jeff?

59:07Absolutely. Positively, no. No chance. All right. Absolutely no chance. All right. We shall leave it there. Jeff, thank you so much for coming on All Thoughts. Really appreciate it. Well, thanks for having me on. I'm sure we're kind of all over the map today, but I hope your audience enjoys it.

59:33Clearly a lot to unpack there, Joe. One of the things, actually, this was towards the end, so that's why it's in my mind. But you know, when he was talking about the Fed buying corporate bonds in 2020. I really think that was an underappreciated moment in financial markets because I remember, again, we're being very introspective here. I remember writing pieces about the corporate bond market being problematic in like circa 2015. And I used to have commenters who were like, OK, so what's the worst case scenario? And the most extreme scenario that we used to talk about was, well, what if the Fed has to come in and buy corporate bonds?

1:00:10That was the extreme scenario. And that's what happened in 2020. So I kind of I take his point about how quickly these things can change and you can deviate from norms. Totally. Remember, we interviewed Bill Gross on the beach a couple of years ago and he called out Jeff for like being the pretend bond king. Anyway, I liked Jeff returning the favor by pointing out the short lived the short lived Janice Unconstrained fund that Bill ran after having left PIMCO. So I see that the rivalry continues. The rivalry continues. Yeah. We should have them both on and just let them duke it out. Just let them duke it out.

1:00:46Seriously. It's like, just do it. Yeah. Just both come on. People would love that. Oh, I'm sure. I'm sure. That would - Raise some money for charity or something like that. Oh, yeah. That'd be great. Okay. Jeff, if you are still listening, and Bill, if you are listening, we should put pretend Bond King in the headline and maybe lure him on. Yeah. Um, open invitation to come on all thoughts and debate. But on a serious note, more serious note, the other thing I was thinking about was, uh, when it comes to private credit, I thought the point about how everyone's been piling into private credit because it's outperformed public credit that is changing now, you know, empirically that has changed this year.

1:01:24But then secondly, everyone's been piling into private credit because of that low volatility pitch, which is one that we've heard a number of times on the podcast. now, this idea that, well, you don't have to market to market, and that's actually a big strength. That sales pitch starts to lose a lot of power and conviction when you're going from 100 to zero in the space of a month. I don't like how there are new ones every day. Yeah. You know what I'm saying? It's like each one of these little credit cockroaches are pretty small in the grand scheme of things. But two things, A, they're small, and yet they seem to be touching a wide number of firms, which I don't love.

1:02:00And I don't like how they keep popping out. I'm a little anxious. Right, because you think the scale is small but then it just keeps going. They keep new stories popping out. This is also why the cockroach analogy is so perfect. Because if you see one, you know you have more than one. I once read an entire book about cockroaches just because I figured, like, know your enemy in New York. And it was actually really interesting. Shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. Okay. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal.

1:02:32You can follow me at The Stalwart. Follow our guest, Jeffrey Gundlach. He's at Truth Gundlach. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at CarmenArmand, Dashiell Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. For more OddLots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash OddLots for the daily newsletter and all of our episodes. And you can chat about all of these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash oddlots. And if you enjoy Oddlots, if you want Jeff Gundlach and Bill Gross to duke it out on the podcast, then I should say proverbially, not literally, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform.

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