Lots More with Brad Setser

1 Dec 2023 · 32 min

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Podcast Summary: Odd Lots - Lots More with Brad Setser

Episode Overview In this episode of the Odd Lots podcast, hosts Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway engage with Brad Setser, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. They discuss the economic situation in Argentina following the election of Javier Milei, who proposes radical changes, including dollarization and potential dismantling of the central bank, to combat rampant inflation. Setser provides insights into Argentina's persistent economic challenges and the feasibility of Milei's proposals.

Key Concepts and Discussions

  1. Argentina's Economic Background
  2. Historical Context: Argentina has a long history of economic instability characterized by defaults, high inflation, and reliance on external borrowing.
  3. Current President: Javier Milei's election has intensified discussions about Argentina's future economic direction, given his radical libertarian views.
  1. Key Economic Challenges
  2. Inflation and Default:
  3. Argentina experiences cyclical inflation accompanied by regular defaults.
  4. Setser outlines that Argentina's economy is characterized by a small banking system, difficulties in financing fiscal deficits domestically, and a history of overborrowing.
  • Peronism: The hosts and Setser explore the complexities of Peronism and its impacts on Argentina's economic policy.
  1. Javier Milei's Proposals
  2. Dollarization:
  3. Setser explains dollarization as replacing the local currency with the U.S. dollar, which aims to stabilize the economy by eliminating the capacity to print money.
  4. Challenges to dollarization include the lack of dollars in Argentina's central bank and the need for significant external financing.
  • Central Bank Dismantling: Milei's proposal to eliminate the central bank raises concerns about financial stability and the viability of fiscal management.
  1. Historical Comparisons
  2. Ecuador and Panama: The episode examines past dollarization efforts in these countries. While Ecuador has maintained dollarization, it has not led to rapid economic growth, mirroring some of the risks Argentina faces.
  1. Financial Strategies and Future Outlook
  2. Fiscal Consolidation: Setser emphasizes the need for strict fiscal discipline and potential restructuring of Argentina's sovereign debt to regain stability.
  3. Realistic Path Forward: Setser outlines that without substantial dollar reserves and a reliable restructuring plan, immediate dollarization is impractical.
  1. Challenges Ahead
  2. Market Perception: The episode touches on the irony of continued lending to Argentina despite its track record, highlighting a cyclical tendency for investor optimism.
  3. Potential Restructuring Needs: Setser suggests a preemptive restructuring of Argentina's international bonds may be necessary given the unsustainable debt levels.

Conclusion The conversation concludes with Setser providing advice that emphasizes the importance of fiscal consolidation, restructuring the central bank's balance sheet, and the need for realistic expectations regarding dollarization. The episode offers a comprehensive view of the complexities surrounding Argentina's economic challenges and the implications of Milei's proposed reforms.

Key Takeaways

  • Argentina's economic issues are deeply rooted in its history of inflation, default, and reliance on external borrowing.
  • Milei's proposals for dollarization and dismantling the central bank could face significant practical challenges.
  • Fiscal discipline and restructuring are crucial for any potential recovery of the Argentine economy.
  • Historical examples from countries like Ecuador and Panama provide context but also caution against simplistic solutions to complex economic challenges.

Listeners are encouraged to consider the multifaceted nature of Argentina's economic issues and the potential paths forward as the new administration takes shape.

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Transcript

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0:00You're being sold an AI future where you're obsolete or irrelevant. That vision is wrong. At Palantir, they're building AI that helps workers and unlocks their full potential. American workers are our nation's greatest strength. AI shouldn't eliminate them. It should elevate them. Palantir is here to tell their stories. From factories to hospitals, AI is freeing people from drudgery, letting them do what humans do best. Create. Solve. Build. Palantir, making Americans irreplaceable.

1:01Acrobat Studio. Learn more at adobe.com slash do that with Acrobat. Hey Brad. I didn't realize you were going to be in person. I didn't realize you were going to be in person. I thought you were like. And normally we're just disembodied voices. Singing country tunes from some undisclosed Texas location. I wish. Oh my God. I did a deadlift. One, two, three. Hegemony. Okay, go. Hegemony. Barges. This is an after-school special, except... I've decided I'm going to base my entire personality going forward on campaigning for a strategic pork reserve in the U.S. Where's the best squid ink pasta? These are the important questions.

1:46Is it robots taking over the world? No, I think that, like, in a couple of years, the AI will do a really good job of making the Odlots podcast. and people are like, I don't really need to listen to Joe and Tracy anymore. We do have the perfect guest. Until then, this is lots more. A weekly chat about whatever's on our minds. And we really do have the perfect guest.

2:14Do you recall the first time we talked about Argentina? Yes. Worst decision of my life. No, not at all. The worst, without a question, the worst interview I've done as being interviewed. The biggest bomb I've ever had. Will you tell me the story? Yes. So it was 2006, probably, maybe 2007, 2006. I think it was 2005. Maybe it was 2005. I was living in New York. I was more or less unemployed. I think I was doing, like, you know, temp work or something like that. And I saw an ad online, I forget where, that the Rubini Global Economics was hiring for someone to do economic analysis. And I was like, I need a job and I'm kind of interested in economics.

3:01I just stopped a job that I had working for a small portfolio management company. And so I sent an email and I'm like, I think I've studied a little economics and maybe I could do this. And I went to an office on the lower west side. I think it was Tribeca. Was that where it was, Brad? Somewhere around there. It was north of Tribeca. Okay. There's a warehouse. It's off to the west of Soho. I met with Brad. I was applying for the job. I met with Brad. I knew actually in advance of this interview that Brad was interested in Argentina specifically and all the problems that it had. And I tried to cram the day before to learn something about Argentina.

3:42and I think the first question Brad asked me something about how you know what would some policy prescription I'd have for that and you know that experience like if you're trying to speak a foreign language that you used to know 15 years ago and you think maybe you know it and your mouth opens but nothing comes out that was me I also know the experience of like having a bad interview in real time and you realize that it's going terribly oh it's just like the mouth opens and it's like no words came out and I'm like well I guess I'm gonna do something else. Anyway, it worked out. We should have hired you on the strength of your blog alone.

4:17Anyway. Bad business model. Anyway. We should have recognized we should have moved to meet the talent where the talent was. 18 years later, here we are. 17 years later, here we are. And people are still talking about Argentina. Yeah. Well, we are here with Brad Setzer, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's been on the show multiple times. Many times. He's got to be he might be the number one now. I don't know. I'm sure I've been eclipsed. I was out of commission for two years. Yeah, that's true. When Brad was at Treasury, there were a couple years where we didn't get a chance to speak to him, but it's been a lot now.

4:58But, to your point, Joe, it always feels like deja vu with Argentina. It's either they've just defaulted on bonds because someone decided to give them money again for reasons I don't understand, or something kind of crazy is happening. Like with Argentina, it just feels like the craziest outcome is like the one that tends to happen. And the thing is, too, Tracy, is that all these years later, I actually still have no conceptual understanding of what's actually the problem with the Argentine economy. I don't understand why, you know, several years ago, I think they elected some pretty like normie, reasonably centrist, neoliberal president.

5:39And I was like, oh, he's going to shake hands with Wall Street and here. And it didn't work. And, you know, and so I don't really understand. I don't know what Peronism is exactly. I'm not sure anyone totally does. I don't know why there's this perpetual seeming basket case that has rapid inflation. After all these years, I would bomb another interview if I were being asked any Argentina question. And I've gotten good at BSing on other topics. But even though I can't even begin to BS on Argentina. Brad, what's your summation of the Argentine economy? Like if Joe was interviewing you for a job, what would you say?

6:14Oh, well, I have a thesis. It may be a wrong thesis, but it is it's an economy with a very small banking system. So it has difficulty financing fiscal deficits domestically. It tends, therefore, to try to borrow a lot externally. And it has a relatively small export sector, very ag-based, with a lot of volatile export revenues. And it tends to overborrow relative to its export capacity. And when you can't borrow externally, it tends to print money. So you get this combination of default inflation and periods of stability. And all of that definitely makes sense when you spell it out like that. But it also seems like, doesn't that apply to a bunch of countries, like, you know, not a very depthful domestic financial system, commodity exporters, so obviously exposed to very volatile.

7:02Like, aren't a lot of countries in this predicament? And why does it seem like Argentina specifically, people think it theoretically can get out of it, but it just can't? Why is it? It seems to just keep tripping over itself. Well, I think actually compared to most other commodity exporters, like commodity exports as a share of GDP aren't all that high. It's just there's very few manufactured exports. So it's a relatively low level of commodity exports relative to the size of the economy. And I think people tend to think that because it's a relatively big economy, it can support more debt than it can given these constraints.

7:43So that's kind of my thesis. But, you know, there are countries around it that have commodity-dependent economies. More mining, less ag. Like Chile. Like Chile, copper. But a much more stable. But a much bigger export base and less debt. And they've built up over time monetary policy credibility in a way that, you know, boringly in Argentina has not very clearly. OK, so this feeds into my big question here. Why do people keep giving Argentina money? Because this is like a joke in the market. And I think I tweeted this once. but the distracted boyfriend meme, you know, turning away from defaulted Argentina bonds and looking at more Argentina bonds.

8:25And also, I didn't realize this, but Argentina is the IMF's biggest creditor now, which. Well, they owe more to the IMF. Let me restay that. If they were the IMF's biggest creditor, we'd be in a very different situation. The biggest debtor. But you know what they say about debtors? If you're big enough, you kind of. They're not big enough, I guess. They're plenty big enough. Okay, so why do they keep getting money? Well, actually, Argentina didn't get money for a long time after their 2001-2002 default. They did eventually do a restructuring. It took a while. And then after they did the restructuring, there were a lot of holdouts.

9:03And they really didn't regain market access for a long period. And then, you know, Joe's right. I mean, a centrist, relatively center-right, really, maybe more right than center-right. President was elected, President Macri. He brought in a bunch of Wall Street bankers to run his economic team. And they had a clear theory of the case that Argentina had underborrowed. They would settle with the holdouts. They would go out and raise a certain amount of bonds that would cover fiscal deficits associated with tax cuts, like a very conventional center-right to right agenda. finance with external foreign currency borrowing.

9:42And they went out and they did a lot of that. But apart from that one borrowing spree, which was big, like$40,$50 billion and maybe more in two years, Argentina really hasn't had access to external bond markets. But then, you know, the IMF saw a group of non-Paranist reformers struggling and it gave them a... Structural reform. They were, you know, they were backing certain structural reforms. Macri was friends with Donald J. Trump. They came from real estate development families. He got a big IMF loan. But then the current government, the previous government had borrowed so much from the IMF, they've not had access to new money.

10:22They clearly don't have access to the bond market. Their bonds have been trading in between 20 and 40 cents on the dollar ever since the 2020 restructuring. So obviously, we want to talk about the theoretical economic agenda of the president-elect and his talk about dollarization. But just real quickly, before we sort of get to the present moment, what failed about the mockery plan? Like when he, you know, as you said, it sounded sort of normal on paper and standard, maybe, you know, conservative government staffed with Wall Street friendly types. Why didn't that put the country on a new path?

10:56I think he just borrowed too much. So it's just a conservative version of the same old problem. I mean, I think if you were going to fund a big tax cut, you know, his thesis was you would, you know, provide the sugar before you do the tough structural reform. The sugar was a round of tax cuts and they were going to slowly phase in spending, protecting social spending. So the first effect was a bigger deficit, fully financed by external foreign currency borrowing and the market. And I guess the Macri government overestimated their capacity to sustain a higher level of external debt. And sort of things went downhill.

11:34There was, you know, the standard cyclical fluctuations, which made it hard to bring the fiscal deficit back down. And they were reluctant to do brutal cuts because they thought they would lose the election. And if they lost the election, we'd be back in Peronism. We would surely have a default. But it ended up adding clearly like$100 billion to Argentina's external debt in a four-year period. I shouldn't laugh, but it's something grim about it. I mean, it was a stunning spree of external borrowing. And, you know, they didn't want to let the currency weaken too much because they were worried about inflation.

12:07Right. So the current account was not helping them. And so, you know, I think they just borrowed too much, to be honest. You can fund tax cuts if you can fund them domestically, but funding them with external dollars when you're a dollar-constrained economy is risky.

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13:18Support for the show comes from public.com. You're thoughtful about where your money goes. You've got your core holdings, some recurring crypto buys, maybe even a few strategic option plays on the side. The point is you're engaged with your investments and public gets that. That's why they built an investing platform for those who take it seriously. On public, you can put together a multi-asset portfolio for the long haul. Stocks, bonds, options, crypto, it's all there. Plus an industry leading 3.6 % APY, high yield cash account. Switch to the platform built for those who take investing seriously.

13:51Go to public.com slash market and earn an uncapped 1 % bonus when you transfer your portfolio. That's public.com slash market. Paid for by Public Investing. All investing involves the risk of loss, including loss of principal. Brokered services for U.S.-listed registered securities, options, and bonds in a self-directed account are offered by Public Investing, Inc., member FINRA, and SIPC. Crypto trading provided by XeroHash. Complete disclosures available at public.com slash disclosures. We're recording this on November 29th, and I feel like I have to caveat the conversation with the exact date because things move fast in Argentina.

14:27And in fact, I'm looking on the Bloomberg terminal now, and it looks like the new president, Javier Millet, has just picked his economy czar. And it's someone who I think wasn't the frontrunner like a week or two ago. Anyway, we wanted to talk to Brad about dollarization. and I don't know much about this process. I am very willing to admit. I think it's happened in like Panama and Ecuador, but can you talk generally to begin with, like what does dollarization actually mean? I think you can think of dollarization as two things. One, it's just a buyback of your own currency. People have currency in circulation bills.

15:13You buy them back and you give them dollars. Euro-ization in the euro area becomes the legal currency that settles all transactions. If the dollar is the legal currency settling all transactions, then debts that were previously in your local currency also have to be re-denominated into dollars. So the second component is a re-denomination of debt into dollars. And so you combine those two things. Dollars have replaced currency in circulation. Dollars are legal tender. and your debts are in dollars. You've dollarized. What's the problem that you're actually trying to solve? Usually you're trying to solve a problem of inflation that you're trying, you basically need to tie your hands.

15:55It's like Odysseus going through the straits with the sirens, you know, lashing himself to the mass and will not be tempted to print money. You have no capacity to print money. So if you want to spend money, you got to raise money. You know, you have to raise hard dollars to fund domestic spending. It sounds like you need money to do this as well, though. Like the idea of replacing your existing currency, so I guess in this case, the Argentine peso with the dollar, you would need dollars in order to do that. That is a very important insight, Tracy. Thank you. That is one of the problems that Argentina faces.

16:36They're trying to dollarize, and the central bank is out of dollars, which is an interesting theoretical problem. So this new incoming president, Javier Mille, he said he wants to dollarize. He's also talked about getting rid of the central bank. Of course, we don't know what he's going to do. And it's possible that he sort of ends up governing the country as a sort of standard. Well, he's kind of going back and forth. Yeah, conservative, you know, center right, Latin American president, as, you know, often countries go back and forth between left and right. Like, I get that impulse, actually, which is that, you know, if your country has a pattern of just printing too much money historically, then you solve the problem by essentially throwing away the printing press.

17:16There's literally no way Argentina can print dollars, dollars are pretty stable. Is there a path to doing that given the lack of dollars? Not unless a generous benefactor were willing to lend Argentina a bunch of dollars. Is it the IMF again? Sorry. Well, I don't think the IMF is actually willing to provide the dollars. I mean, I think the IMF believes that it needs to finally get a little money back. But, you know, conceptually, it could be the IMF. It could be the United States. It could be private Argentines who have a lot of dollars offshore who band together and provide a generous loan. But Argentina doesn't actually have the capacity to pay very much interest on the dollars it borrows, given how much it's paying on this existing dollar debt.

18:00So there are some real challenges coming up with the dollars, which is probably why Malay is at least, you know, the last I had read, he said that dollarization is a goal. He said it's something that doesn't need to be accomplished on day one. They're not going to, in the first instance, shut down the central bank. And their first move, supposedly, last I saw, was going to be, as Joe suggested, a sort of standard but harsh fiscal consolidation, budget tightening, which is also just a reflection of reality at this point. Argentina cannot finance its fiscal deficits right now. Brad, you know, you mentioned earlier that the Argentina economy is sort of characterized by a small banking system.

18:46Would dollarization help with expanding the financial system in the sense that like maybe you're encouraging more faith in the money and that would translate into more willingness to actually put money into bank deposits and then banks would be able to lend more? So there are two, I think, offsetting effects. One is, at least in theory, there are a lot of dollars in circulation in Argentina, a lot of dollars locked up in safe deposit box. The black market. Well, it's black market plus, you know, some wealthy Argentines, just rather than trusting the banking system, you know, have a certain number of dollars in Miami and a certain number of dollars under the mattress.

19:29So there are dollars in circulation, the black market. there are dollars under the mattress, and then there are offshore dollars in the offshore banking system. Conceptually, some of those dollars could migrate into the domestic banking system, which would expand the deposit base, allow the banks to lend more. They have to lend more in dollars, and they could conceivably provide more dollar financing to the government. So that's kind of effect A. Effect B is that you really don't have a lender of last resort. So banks are in the business of maturity transformation, particularly if you don't have a printing press, if you don't have your own central bank.

20:13So if depositors ever want their deposits back, you have to provide them with dollars cash. So either you get those dollars from your central bank, again, the central bank doesn't have dollars, or you have to hold as assets a lot of offshore dollars. So it tends to have offsetting effects. If it worked, it could bring money into the banking system. If it doesn't work, you will have converted a bunch of peso deposits into dollars. people will show up and ask for their dollars back and the banks will be unable to honor those dollar promises and you'll end up with a frozen banking system. Are there other ways besides dollarization in which, I mean, because you're trying to solve an institutional problem and, you know, I love the analogy of tying yourself to the mast and so you don't have the temptation to do anything.

21:08Are there other examples either historically or around the world where countries solve the institutional problem of essentially self-constrained other than sort of dollarization, which seems kind of off the table without the dollars. So you can do various forms of pegs, which are just sort of softer. Yeah. But you know. But you can always break a peg. You can always break a peg. You can do various, you know. I guess you can always undollarize too. It's hard to, it's harder to undollarize. But you know, it is conceptually, I mean, remember Argentina got off a currency board. Right. Which was supposed to be the.

21:42Is a board and a peg basically the same thing? A board is you fully back all currency in circulation with dollars or whatever you're pegged to. So anyone who has a peso could get a dollar, and those dollars are available at the central bank. Now, it doesn't solve the problem of a lender of last resort to the government or to the banking system, but it means every peso is backed by a dollar at the central bank. So it is more constraining in that respect. You know, a peg is a function of credibility. Yeah. And if you're really, really, really committed to the peg, and if you have a really tight budget, you could conceivably make it work.

22:19But it's basically, ultimately, it hinges on fiscal discipline. I mean, this kind of goes back to being boring. Tracy, I'm just looking on the terminal. You know, you mentioned the new finance minister. The title, our colleague Sebastian Boyd, who outwrote it, one of our great colleagues, Millet picks architect of Argentine borrowing boom to run economy. And then Caputo was the finance minister for Mauricio Macri and ran the negotiations with bondholders that paved the way for a return to international markets in 2016. So this just proves my point that like the craziest outcome is always like what's going to happen with Argentina.

22:55What's the scorecard for dollarization in places where it's actually happened? So I mentioned Ecuador and Panama, and I see like different interpretations of the success of those programs. So some people look at Ecuador and say, well, Ecuador growth is still relatively sluggish, whereas Panama has boomed. But with Panama, it's hard to kind of disentangle the factor of the Panama Canal and having like an offshore financial center and things like that. So how would you evaluate the success of previous dollarization programs? So, yeah, I've spent more time thinking about Ecuador than Panama. I would tend to think that Panama's success is a function, probably less of the canal and more of being an offshore financial center and the Panama Papers and a set of less savory aspects of contemporary globalization, which are probably they are facilitated by doing business in dollars.

23:51I mean, presumably some Argentines have their offshore dollars in banks in Panama. With Ecuador, look, Ecuador has stuck by dollarization. So in that narrow sense, it is worked. The banking system has not imploded. There have not been runs. Ecuador has not grown especially rapidly compared to its Andean peers that have not dollarized. Colombia, Peru, Chile have generally outperformed Ecuador. And Ecuador, rather clearly, and this is, I think, an important principle, dollarization doesn't end the risk of default. And when oil prices go down, Ecuador still regularly defaults. So there have been multiple defaults after Ecuador dollarized.

24:34So I think the record is a little bit mixed. Certainly, if you can pull it off, having your own stable currency, which you can use to denominate bank accounts and most of your own borrowing, is a better, clearer path to stability, particularly if you have a limited export base. Thank you.

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27:21It seems tricky. So, yeah, there's the blue dollar, which is the black market rate, which is, I think it's about at 1 ,000. The official rate's 350. So a little bit of a gap. And then there are special rates. So Argentina has this problem that exporters would like to convert their soybean exports into pesos at the black market rate. Right. They are unwilling to convert at the official rate. So at various points in time, Argentina gets desperate for dollars. And it basically gives a special rate to various sectors of the economy to try to pull money in. But the two key rates are the black market rate, the blue peso, blue dollar, and the official rate.

28:08I think at the official rate, getting rid of the monetary base, which is probably insufficient, that leaves you no dollars to back the banks, no dollars to cover your dollar debts. The central bank actually has a lot of short-term peso bills, which are a really big problem no matter what, but particularly if you dollarize at a too high of a rate, but you could take out the monetary base with about$20 billion. Now you do have the problem that at the current exchange rate, the short-term financial liabilities of the central bank are like$60 billion. And so it's, you know, you would probably be unable to pay the central bank's liabilities.

28:49And so you would have to restructure there. If you devalued, you can kind of lower that cost a bit. But again, you need extra dollars beyond what it takes to get rid of the monetary base because the government has to pay all of its domestic debts in dollars. The government has to manage fluctuations in monthly revenues in dollars. The banks have to handle demand for, if anyone wants to pull money out of the bank. They have to have dollars available. So it becomes, you need a buffer. And so I think realistically, you need more like 50. 50 billion. And something like that. Wait, so I know we've been talking about - 50 billion and a debt restructuring.

29:33And a debt restructuring. Got it. Well, without the debt restructuring, it was really realistic anyway. No. I know we've been talking about dollarization, but could you get a situation where like there's UN-ization? Do you do that? Well, Malay is so keen, so fond of the Chinese. I mean, he is kissing and making nice. But sure, I mean, Argentina has an$18 billion swap line with the PBOC. I think they've used at least five. Maybe, you know, I think maybe that's gone up in the past few weeks. We don't know. So if the PBOC were willing to extend that swap line, you know, a swap line is, you know, Argentina puts pesos on deposit in China.

30:14The PBOC puts yuan in the bank account of the Central Bank of Argentina. You could provide enough yuan to allow yuanization, if you so desired. You would have to yuanize all of the debts, not dollarize them. And then, you know, Argentina would still owe a lot of dollar debts on its external bonds. It would owe SDRs back to the IMF. So not all of its liability structure would be yuanized. but it is possible um it would be slightly strange because you know the yuan is not freely convertible in china but if you have enough yuan in argentina you can solve that problem so i just want to say thank you for coming in and i do think now i could at least bs my way for about 10 minutes and in argentina you would have been hired you would have been hired stroke my chin and say things like well you know dollarization has been no panacea for ecuador And things like that.

31:11And I sound very wise. And he's like, oh, you know, and of course, we must remember that there are two exchange rates in Argentina and all these great things like that. So I will just finish this up, my last question, with the question that you asked me like 17 years ago. And so you get the call from Javier Millet and says, Brad, you've been studying our economy for probably 20 plus years. you know more about dollarization and international capital flows than anyone else in the world. Please join my government as the new special advisor. What would you tell him in terms of a policy approach? Well, I think I would tell him three or four big things.

31:52Okay. The first big thing is you really don't have an option to dollarize. The first item is your agenda is impossible. Well, I think that's pretty much what Caputo told him as well. I mean, it really is impossible to dollarize when you don't have dollars at the central bank. I mean, technically, there are a few dollars against the mandatory reserves of the banks, but those are not realistically usable dollars. And you have no prospect, no real prospect of borrowing the dollar. So dollarization is not a realistic goal. Second is, you know, you have to do what you want to do, which is tighten Argentine fiscal policy.

32:32You're going to have to cut the fiscal deficit. I think Caputo wants to go to a 2 % of GDP primary surplus next year. Good. I think that is necessary. I don't think you can do that fiscal consolidation and also cut the size of government in half, which has been his other proposal. I think you have to be realistic about how much consolidation, how much shock therapy the economy can take. But clearly, directionally, you need to have a big upfront fiscal consolidation, get rid of some of the subsidies, rein in spending, whatever tax breaks that the last government provided at the end of its term that you're willing to roll back, even though you want tax cuts over time, you want to shrink the state.

33:17I mean, in the short run, don't do tax cuts, but execute on tight spending. And then you have to restructure third the balance sheet of the central bank. My friend Chris Marsh, who writes blogs, tweets as the general theorist, has a great blog on this. The central bank has a horrible balance sheet, like really horrible. It has these long-term, non-traded, low-interest rate dollar bonds that are called non-transferable treasury securities. But basically, they're dollar bonds, so consequence of loans to the government, that pay a very low interest rate. That's their main asset. Their net foreign asset position is now negative.

33:58They've borrowed more in foreign currency than they hold in foreign currency. Their main asset are these foreign currency denominated low interest rate government of Argentina securities. And then they borrowed a ton or issued a ton of short term peso bills that pay these incredibly high interest rates. So they are hemorrhaging cash is this backdoor fiscal deficit. So you have to do a restructuring no matter whether you want to dollarize or just have normal functioning central bank. You have to swap out the zero or low interest rate, non-transferable treasury securities for something that pays a real interest rate.

34:37So there's income coming in and you have to probably restructure these short-term bills. And so you have to kind of change a situation where the central bank has no income, but it's paying like a hundred percent interest. And you probably can't just do that with credibility and we're going to bring the interest rate down, you probably need to do a pretty hard restructuring. Fourth component, the bonds are trading. They've rallied a little, maybe too much. Bonds have been trading under 40 ever since they were issued in the restructuring. They're really starting to amortize in 2025. These are bonds that Argentina clearly can't pay.

35:16And I would say you need to organize over the next year a preemptive restructuring of your 65 to 70 billion in international sovereign bonds. You will not be able to pay them when they come due in 2025, nor should you want to. So that would be my agenda. What number of restructuring would that be? This is going to be the last restructuring, though. They're really going to do it this time. Well, yeah. I think Argentina and these smart bond investors realize that the 2020 restructuring was built around the wrong premise. It was built around the premise that U.S. Treasury rates were going to be 2 % forever.

35:49And so therefore, a 5 % interest rate for Argentina would have been a reasonable rate. That is not the case right now. So the bondholders wanted to preserve the face value of the bonds and were willing to accept a low coupon back in 2020. And then they wanted relatively short amortization. So the bonds started to amortize after five years and you just have this steady wall of amortizations for the next 10 years. What you need to do is you need to do cut face, raise coupon, give Argentina another five to 10 years before they have to amortize. Hard deal, but it's doable.

36:30Lots More is produced by Carmen Rodriguez and Dashiell Bennett with help from Moses Andam. Our sound engineer is Blake Maples. Sage Bauman is our head of podcasts. Catch you next time for lots more. Thanks for listening.

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From the publisher

Argentina has always been interesting from an economic and financial markets perspective, to put it mildly. And it's gotten even more interesting following the recent election of Javier Milei as the country's next president. Milei, whose policies could be described as radically libertarian, has floated a bunch of new ideas including getting rid of the central bank and dollarizing Argentina's economy in order to finally put an end to rampant inflation. But how realistic is this path for a nation which has spent decades burning through loans from external creditors? This week on Lots More, we chat with Brad Setser, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, about why Argentina's issues persist and what options it has going forward.

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