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Podcast Summary: Radical with Amol Rajan - "Digital Dominance: How to Limit the Power of Big Tech" featuring Sir Nick Clegg
Episode Overview In this episode, Amol Rajan engages in a thought-provoking conversation with Sir Nick Clegg, the former UK Deputy Prime Minister and ex-President of Global Affairs at Meta. They delve into the complexities of balancing innovation, power, and accountability in the digital age, particularly focusing on the influence and responsibility of big tech companies.
Key Themes and Discussions
- The Power and Responsibility of Big Tech
- Regulation vs. Breakup:
- Clegg argues that merely breaking up tech giants won't address the issues of their dominance; rather, there needs to be a push for stronger regulation and greater user control.
- Advocates for giving users more rights and transparency regarding their experiences on these platforms.
- Impacts of Technology on Youth
- Smartphone Usage:
- Clegg discusses the implications of smartphones and social media on young people's social lives and mental health.
- He emphasizes the need for age-appropriate safeguards and considers the merits of phone-free schools.
- The Role of AI and Synthetic Intelligence
- Concerns about AI:
- Clegg expresses concern over the rapid influx of synthetic intelligence and warns against moral panic while advocating for careful regulation.
- Highlights the "power paradox," where technology empowers individuals but simultaneously concentrates wealth and power among a few tech leaders.
- Political Polarization and Social Media
- Echo Chambers:
- Clegg examines the relationship between social media and political polarization, noting that polarization existed prior to social media's prominence.
- Discusses the nuanced effects of social media in shaping political discourse, including instances where it can serve to broaden perspectives rather than limit them.
- Insights into Silicon Valley
- Clegg's Experience:
- Offers candid insights into the inner workings of Silicon Valley, describing some key figures including Mark Zuckerberg and how the tech culture operates.
- Reflects on the distinction between the moral ambitions of tech leaders and the reality of business-focused motivations.
- Future of Technology
- AI Supremacy:
- Clegg addresses the ongoing race for AI supremacy between the US and China, suggesting that collaboration among democratic nations could be crucial in establishing ethical standards and competitive advantages.
- Reflection on Liberalism
- Enduring Value of Liberalism:
- Clegg discusses the importance of liberal principles, emphasizing reason and evidence over emotion in a polarized world.
- Argues that liberalism can still provide effective solutions if it adapts to the changing political landscape.
Key Takeaways
- Need for Regulation: Emphasis on regulation over breakup of tech giants to ensure user control and transparency.
- Youth and Technology: Call for stronger safeguards regarding mobile and social media usage among children.
- AI's Impact: Recognition of both the potential benefits and risks associated with synthetic intelligence.
- Political Discourse: Importance of understanding the complexities of social media's role in political polarization.
- Liberalism's Future: A reaffirmation of the value of liberalism in navigating modern societal challenges.
Conclusion The episode provides a nuanced exploration of the digital landscape, the power dynamics within big tech, and the implications of these technologies on society and politics. Clegg’s unique insights, drawn from his experiences in both politics and Silicon Valley, offer listeners a grounded perspective in an era increasingly dominated by digital innovation and its challenges.
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Contact Information
- WhatsApp: 0330 123 9480
- Email: radical@bbc.co.uk
Additional Resources
- [Listen to Radical with Amol Rajan on BBC Sounds](https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/brand/p04z203l)
- [Watch episodes on BBC iPlayer](https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episodes/m002f1d0/radical-with-amol-rajan)
Release Schedule: New episodes are published every Thursday.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00This BBC podcast is supported by ads outside the UK. If journalism is the first draft of history, what happens if that draft is flawed? In 1999, four Russian apartment buildings were bombed, hundreds killed. But even now, we still don't know for sure who did it. It's a mystery that sparked chilling theories. I'm Helena Merriman, and in a new BBC series, I'm talking to the reporters who first covered this story. What did they miss the first time? The History Bureau, Putin and the Apartment Bombs. Listen on BBC.com or wherever you get your podcasts. Thank you so much for getting in touch with your questions for the farmer and author James Rebanks.
0:46He's going to be our first guest to do this extra Q &A episode with us. Remember, this is an experimental second episode where you get to put your questions to our brilliant guests and I really pursue answers on your behalf. You're going to be able to hear the one with James Rebanks very soon And the next person that we would love to have your questions for is the magnificent novelist Naomi Alderman. She has just released her first nonfiction book. It's called Don't Burn Anyone at the Stake Today. It's inspired by a Radio 4 series that she made about the way that new technologies open up new ways of thinking, which, as you can imagine, is quite a good fit for this podcast.
1:24So if you're interested in the huge technological shift that we're living through, which you're about to hear me discuss in this episode with Sir Nick Clegg. And if you want some answers about how to understand that shift or deal with it or what you need to do to prepare your family for it, please send us your questions for Naomi. Of course, you can just send us your questions for Naomi Alderman if you're a big fan of her books, and there are a lot of fans of her books. Her first one was called Disobedience out in 2006. Ten years later, she wrote The Power, of course, which was turned into a big series.
1:54So she's a huge, internationally acclaimed author. And if you just love her books and want to ask her about being a writer, that's also fine. We're really keen to get all of your questions for Naomi Alderman. Send those questions as a voice note on WhatsApp to 0330 123 9480. 0330 123 9480. Or email radical at bbc.co.uk. This is exciting, isn't it? Right, here's this week's episode. Hello, it's Amol here and welcome to Radical, conversations about the deep global trends changing our world and some radical ideas for the future. One of the fundamental and often debated questions of our time, which we've talked about a fair bit on this podcast already, is really about how comfortable we are, you are, with so much power, so much wealth, being in the hands of just a few big tech companies.
2:47earlier this year sir nick clegg left his job as president of global affairs at facebook's parent company meta where he was effectively number two and he has now written a book called how to save the internet and when we spoke he told me about his concerns about what he described as the flood of synthetic intelligence in this new world of ai that we're stumbling into and also how we haven't really learned the lessons of the last 15 years or so this is a frank and revealing conversation with somebody who used to be at the top of British politics as Deputy Prime Minister to David Cameron in the coalition government and then spent seven years at the top of Silicon Valley as Deputy to Mark Zuckerberg.
3:29Which one of those positions gave him more power? Listen to this and you might just find out.
3:48Welcome to the Radical Studio. You've done us the great honour whilst walking here from London's Waterloo of listening to a previous episode with Dario Amadei. Tell me, what did you make of what you heard? Oh, I know Dario a bit and I thought it was great. It was a great interview. For anyone who's interested in this whole debate around the risks of AI, are they real, are they not real, what can you do about it? I would urge, I'm advertising for you already, I would urge people to listen to it. Dario, so there's interesting history. Dario was at OpenAI, spun off purportedly because he was concerned that not enough work was being done about safety.
4:23And he's considered by the sort of the kind of the zeitgeist in Silicon Valley at the moment is implacably opposed to all regulation. Anyone who expresses any concerns about AI are doomsters and predicting the apocalypse. It's never going to happen and so on and so forth. And so he's often quite repeatedly vilified in Silicon Valley for overstating the risks. And I have to say, I think he has been guilty of that. I think he has leapt well ahead of the technology and some of the predictions he's made. But his fundamental assertion, and you can then have a whole debate about how powerful and versatile you think this technology is.
5:01But his fundamental assertion that you should try at every step of the way, stress test what the possible downsides should be. And he was very clear in his interview with you. You can't eliminate risk, but you should try and do your best to try and anticipate it. And you can't do that without the help and cooperation of governments. I think it was a message that used to be listened to and is now sort of poo-pooed in this great get-together with the tech bros and the Trump administration. But it's a thought process and an assertion which will return. It has to return. Funny enough, I hope he and indeed Demis don't mind me saying this.
5:44I remember the three of us were chatting in the margins of the, do you remember the AI safety summit? I interviewed you at Bletchley Park. Oh, sorry. How did you forget? How did you forget? How did you forget? The high point, indeed. Your day began. I remember. In a shed. In a shed. In a shed. It was Alan Turing's shed at Bletchley Park. You came in. Correct. And we had a Today programme-style interview, which had a bit of friction in it. Yes, how could you forget? Anyway, you were talking in the margins. After that, and I remember saying to, um to dario because he once again given a very sweeping and somewhat unqualified statements about all the and i remember saying to him and to demis i said look i'm not technologists like you i'm just an ex-politician but you've got to understand if you keep telling the political class that the the thing you're working on is going to end humanity at some point they're going to turn around to you and say well stop working on it it sort of and i remember him sort of looking at me a bit and demis said yeah absolutely we should so we should we should be careful about how we frame the risks and i think to be fair to everybody involved in this debate and this is totally normal with new technology is you go through these quite big gyrations of different mood swings so and again this is this you had this when the radio is invented when the bicycle is invented in fact i've described some of this in the book how after almost any new technology our societal our sort of anthropological reaction is one of fear moral panic and so on and then And it swings off in the other way, which is clearly what's happening in the US now against any sort of expression of concern about the downsides of AI.
7:19And it's only over time that you start getting a sort of balanced. It sounds very Lib Dem this, doesn't it? But a very third way. But it does take time. And I think we're not there yet. I think we've gone from somewhat overstated sort of doomerism to something now definitely a sort of overstated. any work on risk is somehow inhibiting the greatness of America and so on, which is certainly the California view. I think it'll even out. You sort of put in your book, which is called How to Save the Internet, puts the internet and puts AI in the context of those previous technological panics. You accept that this time is different in certain ways.
7:54And it's different because... For AI or... For AI, for tech these days, compared to previous technologies, compared to knives and forks or kettles or washing machines. and AI is different partly because AI is a different kind of technology to previous technologies. It's dual use but it does its own sort of thinking in one sense in that it sort of comes up with new ideas and makes its own decisions. But quite a big chunk of the book, in fact one of the chapters is about the paradox of power associated with AI and I think in a way that's a good place to start because the power paradox as you describe it is the extraordinary capacity of modern technology, smartphones and social media to disseminate and spread power, to give the Guatemalan farmer, the fishermen from Equatorial Guinea, the chance to kind of display their wares to an audience of billions.
8:40But there's also been this extraordinary concentration of power. Yeah, that's right. Can you have one without the other? That's a very interesting question. It relates slightly to this technical but important concept of network effects. The more human beings use them, the more useful they are. It's more and more useful to you and me. We've communicated with each other about WhatsApp. It's a great service for us. It's certainly owned by Meta, certainly free because of the advertising model that pays Meta's bills. But why it's really useful for us is because we're pretty sure that lots and lots of people use it.
9:19So that's what these network effects do. So this idea that you can have a sort of fragmented landscape tends not to pan out like that when people, when human beings start using new communication tools at scale. And so I think there is something in those network effects that lends itself to that power paradox where you have this great empowering of us as individual citizens. As you say, it doesn't matter whether you're rich, poor, whether you're a poper or pauper, it doesn't matter where you live. It has a great democratising effect. It empowers people in an unprecedented way to express themselves, to share views, to say what they like, regardless of what the powers that be, wherever they live, religious, tribal, political or otherwise, think.
10:04And at the same time, it aggregates this astonishing amount of power and wealth in the hands of, as it happens, a small number of men in Silicon Valley. And I think these will become household names, a very small number of captains of Chinese industry who also run these great big juggernauts, which are in size now. They really do rival the Californian juggernauts. But does the old economic liberal in you think that there is a very strong theoretical case, the practicalities are different, we'll come to this, but a strong theoretical case for doing more to try and break up these concentrations of power?
10:38I like to think, and of course, I'm sure I've drunk the Kool-Aid a bit when I was in Silicon Valley and so on. I think that's kind of inevitable. But I like to think that I've kept an independent enough mind that if I really felt that breaking these entities up would lead to a far greater dispersal of power and so on. I just think because of the network effect, it's quite difficult to look at the way that these apps develop and say that new market entrants are blocked. I mean, look at TikTok. It just grew explosively almost out of nowhere. If Instagram or Pinterest or X were that good, there wouldn't have been any space for TikTok.
11:20But they came up with a new algorithmic way of curating these short form videos. And again, the network effects kicked in. So my own view has come around to don't rely on this idea that you can sort of chop them up into nice, neat little bits and they'll sort of stay like that. It's such a liquid, fast-moving technology. I just don't think that would work. But I do think there's always more that can be done to give users more rights over their own experience, to give all of us more transparency over how these systems work, to make sure that there isn't sort of price gouging going on in the way that the actual businesses are run.
11:57So I think it's more about control and transparency rather than breakup if you want to square that circle. But, yeah, the fact remains you do end up with an enormous amount of power aggregated in the hands of a very small number of people. And just to push back on it for a moment, one thing, I mean, TikTok is very rare and very exceptional in that there aren't that many others that came through to rival them, to rival kind of Instagram and Snapchat in as quick a way as TikTok did. TikTok produced an extraordinary service that a lot of people liked. But they're an exception rather than the norm.
12:31And the other thing is, there is a very active effort, isn't there, within these giant companies to defeat competition by buying them. I mean, you know, Facebook bought Instagram, bought WhatsApp. You know, Google many, many years ago. YouTube wasn't always owned by Google. You know, there is an attempt, you know, I mean, Marxists, if they were sat over there, would say that it's intrinsic to the capitalist method to try to destroy competition and that you need very effective democratic intervention of a kind we've not had in recent years. So I know the practicality of breaking out Facebook and Instagram is very difficult.
12:58I agree with the theory. I mean, who wouldn't agree with the theory? It's just when theory collides with modern technology where this gets tricky. As it happens, since you mentioned it, what Zuckerberg did at the time, which of course was very prescient, I mean, he was widely mocked when he bought. Everyone's forgotten this. Everyone literally couldn't believe how much money he was spending to buy these relatively small apps called WhatsApp. No one had heard of WhatsApp. It's true to say that Instagram, for instance, which I think now has over 800 million or 900 million followers. Is it over a billion?
13:30Yeah, over a billion. But it was much smaller before we bought it. It was tiny. Both of them were tiny by comparison. So then this whole thing, does that mean that if you basically stop large companies buying smaller companies on the basis that those larger companies are not somehow are sort of forbidden from allowing those smaller companies to grow, well, then the whole ecosystem by which small companies come into being in the first place would suddenly be destroyed because a lot of small companies, particularly in technology, actually, you know, get going in the hope that they might be. So that's quite complicated.
14:02I think the Europeans are doing something interesting, which everyone hates in Silicon Valley. They say, okay, traditional antitrust, and what's that, you know, that's what it's called in the jargon, you know, break them up approach doesn't work. Trustbusters. Yeah. So they passed this law. It's called the Digital Markets Act. And it's based on a theory, which I actually have a lot of sympathy with. I think the way that they've administered it and the fine details and so on have gone a bit astray. But the theory, they say, is, look, traditional competition approach or traditional antitrust policy doesn't work when you're dealing with data and when you're dealing with the aggregators of vast amounts of data.
14:42If you hold a huge amount of data, that itself can have an anti-competitive effect. That's the sort of central thesis. So they say if you're a gatekeeper of vast amounts of data, you should be subject to a whole range of new provisions from greater transparency, user control, and so on and so forth, opening your platform to other service providers on an equal basis, and so on and so forth. And I actually think that that theory is a good one. I think it's a good one to say in a data-driven economy where data, the analogies around data are always so misleading. Data is not like oil. It's totally unlike oil.
15:20The whole point about data and oil. When you read in The Economist data is the new oil, you know the economist has gone stupid. And The Economist is quite good. Data is not oil because the whole point about oil is it derives its value from scarcity. That's right. And the whole point about data is it's super abundant. Oil is controlled by the people who build wells above it. The whole point about data is it's your data and mine. And oil can't be reused, whereas data, the same email address, Nick Clegg. Infinitely replenishable. Can be used on Spotify, can be used on Facebook, can be used on Instagram.
15:50So data is much more like sunlight. Yeah, or I don't know, like water. Anyway, I don't know what the best analogy is. But my point is, I think what the Europeans are doing, and it's very interesting to see that the real focus of the ire of both Silicon Valley and the Trump administration, as they've sort of deepened their embrace with each other, is actually to kind of unite in their animus against European regulators who are imposing these rules. Now, to your point, the sort of philosophical question about how do you apply the spirit of small-l liberal competition, probably dispersing power and so on, in an age of massive data aggregators, these huge platforms, I think they're onto something by saying you probably need new laws that recognise that holding vast amounts of data has a sort of ricochet effect on market power in a way that is somewhat different to holding market power when you were buying and selling widgets and needs new legal provisions.
16:52A couple of other things in your book which struck me as not as much Lib Dem, but as sort of hesitations you have about the way in which popular ideas around technology are discussed in the mainstream. One is about the impact of social media and smartphones on kids. And you get into this in the book and you're very much at pains to cite lots and lots of academic papers, including from people at the Oxford Internet Institute, which I've been up to and reported from at length. and it is worth saying and I'd say this honestly it's my judgment having read Jonathan Haidt's book and having four kids as I do and being quite obsessed with this subject that the evidence connecting smartphone use to a deterioration in teenage mental health in particular is at the very least messy of its nature it struggles to be definitive because we haven't had many many years of it and it's not it's not an emphatic thing one way or another and yet you still have some strong views on it Can you just take us what you read to be your dispassionate reading of the evidence around smartphones and kids?
17:55Yeah. So what I try and do in the book, this is such an emotive issue, you know, particularly if you're a parent. I'm a parent of three kids. I mean, two grownups, but a teenager, you know, like any parent, you kind of constantly worry about what are they experiencing online and so on and so forth. So it's very emotive. And we're in a sort of moment in time where we're just more and more proposals being put forward to kind of just strip away the threat of technology almost generically from our children's lives. And so what I try and do in the book, rather than insert myself, I just try and present as much evidence as I could find from rigorous, credible analysts and researchers.
18:34And as you say, at a societal level, I'm not talking individually at a societal level, it is exceptionally difficult to assert with, you know, with real clarity and confidence that there is a causal link between the use of social media or indeed screen time and mental well-being. And not least because it just doesn't seem to operate across countries. I mean, the Jonathan Haidt stuff is interesting. I know Jonathan. He's written this great book. It's certainly called The Anxious Generation. But even he is, for people who want to hear Nick Clegg giving a really hard time because their kids are addicted to smartphones, I just want to be clear about what we're trying to do in this podcast.
19:13Because I've read these books and I've looked at them closely and I do actually care for nuance. And if you look at Jonathan Haidt, even Jonathan Haidt, in that book is clear to say that based on early evidence, there's a correlation between rising, particularly among teenage girls in America, which is where he had the studies from, the use of Instagram, particularly after 2014, and rising rates of depression and anxiety amongst teenage girls. In that book, he says, there seems to be such a strong correlation and there might not be any other explanation other than social media. Since then, Jonathan Haidt has gone a little bit further and he does suggest that there are academic studies now suggesting there is stronger evidence for a cause of link, but even he hedges it, whilst campaigning vigorously for a position which you seem to endorse, which is that smartphones don't belong in schools.
19:54I can't want to come to that in a minute because I actually net out in roughly the same place as Jonathan. That's the interesting thing, yeah. But can I just, let me just unpack it a bit. Having looked at all of that evidence, harbouring, as I do, quite a lot of scepticism about some of the sweeping claims made, particularly when I see how very useful and positive many online experiences were for kids during the pandemic, during the whole period of the lockdown, and when I think it's just obvious that as kids are finding their own identity through their teen years being able to communicate with others find other find interests find communities that they feel a part of is incredibly important and and and positive and so on um so i thought to myself that all being the case i think you want to avoid throwing the baby out of the bath water which is where i think quite all the debate's heading now it's like you know get rid of technology altogether from our from our from sort of teen uh lives but i do think that big companies need to be put under far, far greater pressure to build what are called age-appropriate experiences.
21:00You can decide whether the age-appropriate threshold should be 14, 15, 13. It tends to be 13 in many places, but sometimes it varies. But you need to put much more pressure on the companies to do that. I think I've got no problem with the idea, as Jonathan Haidt and others have recommended, that schools should basically be phone-free zones. They shouldn't be technology-free zones. I think technology is incredibly powerful. Of course. If you don't have a projector, you might have a... No, but this is where I hope we sort of end up sort of trying to draw distinctions and try and introduce a bit of nuance in a debate that's very difficult to introduce nuance because it's so emotive.
21:35What do you think about what they're doing in Australia? Which is a social media ban. Social media ban. Look, here's the thing. In Australia, they've passed a law which says under the age of 16, I think it is, you cannot use social media, right? um my personal view is that saying to 15 year olds that you cannot use instagram you cannot use snap you can use tiktok i mean i i find that i i'll be surprised if that is going to be sustainable over time having said that as long as they apply it um comprehensively because at the beginning they said we'll apply to all those apps but not to youtube and i remember thinking that's bizarre because I know, as anyone knows with kids, that the great giant in all of this debate, often actually rather quietly, is YouTube.
22:25YouTube isn't, honestly, in a land of giants, YouTube is the biggest giant of all. It's used on such a vast scale. I think they then changed tack and said, no, we're going to apply it to YouTube as well. If that's what they've decided democratically, fine. And, you know, at the end of the day, that's not a judgment that the technology should take. But my own hunch would be, if you're going to do something like that, I probably would pick a slightly lower age. 14 or something like that. 16 seems, just intuitively, seems quite... I mean, I wonder whether they'll stick with that. There's a lot of academic research cited in your book about social media and smartphones and kids.
23:04There's another area where you're keen on the academic research, and I think, again, you try and present it at a slight distance, which is the connection between social media and political polarisation. You know, it's interesting. I tried when I was the media editor of the BBC to introduce a bit of nuance in this. I went up to the Oxford Internet Institute. And it is true to say that the connection between social media and the idea that we're all living in echo chambers, which you hear all the time, is messy and nuanced. Because there is some evidence that A, political polarisation was rising sharply before the advent of social media, might have been fuelled by it.
23:39and b there's also some evidence that actually one of the points of social media is that you encounter views outside of your echo chamber if i look at twitter x now which i try to do not very often at all um it's very very right leaning verging on beyond that and um so i look at it partly because i actively being the kind of wreathian chap i am want to engage with people who are at sometimes the fringes of politics so just on that as well it is messy and it's nuanced there are some people for whom social media is an echo chamber but there are lots of people around the world outside of sw1 and california for whom it's something quite different yeah i mean again sorry i'm sort of flogging my book but i i would urge people who are interested in this to try and you know just spend a bit of time delving into the evidence because it's not only what you suggest that um over time polarization spiked actually before or increased rapidly before social media was introduced it's actually polarization as it's measured it's called affective polarization in the jargon sometimes appears to be greatest amongst people, particularly the elderly people, elderly people without, as they call it in America, without college education, who use social media least.
24:48Across countries, there are countries where as social media use has gone up, polarization has gone down. So again, the evidence is very mixed. And there's a very practical reason for some of this um um if you're on facebook uh you might have i don't know actually i don't know what the average number of friends are people call them friends not really friends are they but it's what's that's what facebook calls well okay yeah but what i mean is that they're not friends in the way that you and i would sort of talk about it because it it'll be it'll be the colleague that you you know shared off an office desk with 10 years ago is rather sort of irritating and still keeps in touch with you it's the ex-girlfriend it's the ex-boyfriend And it's the person you met at the school reunion.
25:31It's what sociologists call weak. I think they call weak social links or something. That's actually what makes up your, what they call in social media or traditional social media, your social graph, the web of people you're connected with. and um the way that those social media apps uh certainly worked it's mutating quite a lot now with ai and synthetic content and so on is that the thing that um you would see most prominently on your feed would be things that had been recommended to you by your friends or groups which you're a part of or content that you've engaged with in other words your link your links with your mad uncle, your ex-flame, that irritating former colleague of you, is actually the ingredient which drives the content that you see.
26:20So by sort of technical necessity, the menu of content you see, certainly when it comes to politics, which let's remember is a tiny minority of actually what people consume on social media, is quite mixed because your ex-colleague you haven't seen for 10 years, whose stuff suddenly pops up in Facebook, might have some mad idea that the world is flat. Your uncle might have an idea that Brexit is brilliant and you don't think it is, whatever. Whereas if you're reading the Daily Mail every day or if you're looking at Fox News every day, you have a much narrower menu of ideological content. It's a steady drumbeat of or if you only read The Guardian and so on.
26:54So I think the reason why the academic research doesn't bear out the assertion, interestingly, often made in the publishing industry, that the publishing industry is the tribune of a sort of diverse, balanced menu of ideas. You can use industry. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Publish content, right. It's actually, in practical reality, certainly in the past, has been confounded by the evidence. And so I've come away thinking these technologies are very important, but we have a tendency to exaggerate, to almost become techno-determinist in our view that the technology does things to us and we're sort of haplessly passive in response to them.
27:35But I wonder if really what you're, the implication of what you're saying is that the journalists covering this come to it, not necessarily with political or ideological baggage, but with a set of experiences which might inhibit correct understanding. What I mean by that is, one of the weird things you must have discovered in politics is that when you're in politics, you think everyone's thinking about politics all the time. You think that, you know, in Scunthorpe, in the pub, they turn up and they go, what do you think about tapered tax relief? Well, you know, they go to the pub in Rochdale and they think, you know, the triple lock, you know, Is it costing more than it used to?
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28:07And actually, most people don't give a... They hugely care about politics, but they're not thinking about the triple lock. Similarly, in news, if you're a newsy person, you assume that everyone's consuming the news all the time. That's right. And you follow people on Facebook or on WhatsApp or on Instagram who are kind of newsy people with opinions about Trump. And actually, most people, and I mean this in a positive way, I mean this as a compliment, most people live in Hartlepool, watch strictly, are intelligent about the world and care about their future and what's going on with their family, but they're not news and politics obsessives.
28:38But most of the coverage of these companies comes from people who are news and politics obsessives. Has that created problems in the public understanding, do you think? Yeah, well, of course it has. Because, again, I'm sure I won't be thanked for it, but I've always had a somewhat mixed relationship with the sort of vested interest, certainly in the British press. They're vested interests. They're not philosopher kings. They're not handing down objectivity from some mountaintop. These are industries themselves, and they have their own commercial interests, and they feel deeply aggrieved by the way in which particularly Google and Facebook over the last 10, 15 years have significantly altered their fundamental business model.
29:21When they say, let me put their argument to them because I used to work in newspapers, they say companies like Facebook have stolen their content and have got super rich by basically pilfering the stuff that they have to pay for and you distribute it for free. Yeah, and it's nonsense on stilts. I mean, it's almost an inversion of the truth. It's a very polite way of putting it. And I'll tell you why. I think, I need to check now, but I think 95 % or thereabouts of the news links you will find on social media, guess who puts them there? The publishers put them there. Because they want their eyeballs.
29:50Yes, so they use social media themselves to actually attract. And then these platforms, by the way, build for these publishers, build all sorts of ways in which they can then monetize that. In other words, they can then, if you click onto that link, then it goes, you know, I've done this countless times. Then you go to a paywall and they say, oh no, you can now subscribe now. You get five free articles or whatever. We've been through all of these flows and that's how they make money. So this idea that their content is being stolen when these platforms have no interest, largely speaking, because it's not actually why people use Instagram or Facebook.
30:23And Facebook relegated news, didn't they? I think was it under your watch? Well, news is not the most important thing on our feed. People mostly want pictures of their community. Well, yeah, it's a rather sort of unedifying standoff happened, actually, in Australia. You mentioned Australia again, where the Murdoch Press and others started spinning this yarn. And honestly, it's just a yarn to the Australian government at the time that somehow their content was being stolen and so on and so forth. So companies like Facebook turned around and said, well, we don't want this. We don't need it. We don't want it.
30:51And by the way, without getting into the sort of, again, the weeds of this, that's somewhat different to if you're running a search engine like Google, where you have to scrape news because you need to come up with these little snippets that every time we search something. But if you're a social media app, you don't need news. Most people don't. As you said earlier, most people are watching Strictly or watching football. They're not people are people. The vast majority of people are not actually very interested in seeing stuff about news and politics on their on their social media feeds. They want to hear about their friends, their family.
31:23They want to be entertained and so on. And so I think that sort of the relationship, if I can put it like that, between the publishers and social media has always been quite checkered. By the way, it doesn't mean that the social media companies have behaved, you know, behaved perfectly. I think they've sometimes chopped and changed their algorithms, chopped and changed their systems without, you know, without consulting anyone, without announcing anything. And that's, you know, that's aggrieved the industry. And I would stress, I actually think the debate, in as much as the social, in as much as the publishers feel they have an axe to grind, I think they have more reason in an age of AI than they did in the age of sort of old-fashioned social media.
32:03Well, because I think... I want to put you there too, because there is an argument out there, often advanced by people who don't like what these big companies are doing, and they might well be right, that AI is theft. Because AI is built on the mass exploitation of other people's work, essentially. Is there some merit to that argument? I think there can be some merit in that, which is why I have much more sympathy with some of the kind of special pleading, if I could put it like that, from some of the content producers than I did from the Murdochs and others in social media, one in the way that I described, because if these AI machines, and they are vast, when you train what is called a foundation model, which is the base layer upon which you then build the AI applications, that is the bit where you need huge amounts of data, you need huge amounts of energy, you need huge amounts of GPUs, you need to build all these data centers and so on.
32:58GPUs are general processing units. So, yeah, so compute capacity. It's the thing that... Okay, called compute, yeah. Yeah, and it's the thing that... It's why NVIDIA is now the most valued company in the world because they've got a bit of a grip on that market at the moment, though I suspect that will change over time. But here's the thing. I think the companies that build these foundation models have every right to use data that's just out there on the internet, that's just been put out there, that's publicly out there. You can't expect these companies to, you know, everything that's just been publicly and freely circulating on the internet to go to every single person who's, you know, posted anything and said, you know, can we ingest that in our training data?
33:39But stuff that has clear copyright protection, that clearly, whether it's by book publishers or others, specifies that they shouldn't be used without permission, then clearly the AI training model developers, the big hyperscalers, should respect that. And if they want to, and that's increasingly happening, they should, of course, be encouraged to license content that they think is particularly useful to their models. so I think this is going to evolve I think as ever a balance will need to be struck if you ask these AI model developers to you know seek to seek permission for stuff that's been out there and it's been out there for ages and be used multiple times well AI would grind to a halt overnight but equally I think content providers and content creators have every right to be very very clear that if they don't want their content included in these vast training models they should have the ability to withhold their consent and only to grant it on terms which they accede to absolutely what's mark zuckerberg like really he's um he's an engineer he's he's sort of very techie he's very immersed in engineering he's like a lot of those people who excel in that world he's very gets very very immersed in in things he's got this extraordinary ability to focus he's remorselessly competitive i'll tell you one thing that i liked about him which somewhat surprised me i kind of thought if you're one of the richest people on the planet and you've been living this abnormal life completely abnormal i mean films were made about him when he was like 21 yeah you know he's never led a normal life and it's the one thing that surprised me was he retains which is quite unusual he retains an unusual ability to listen and doesn't mean he's not very assertive when he's made up his mind doesn't mean he's very stubborn which he can be when he's made up his mind but he has this sort of very sort of technologist view if he doesn't understand something he needs to learn all about it he needs to talk to the people who do know about it and and sort of suck suck up all their knowledge and then come to a view and he and he does that very very rigorously and methodically so i like the way and of course when i came on board in a sense i the reason sheryl sandberg and mark zuckerberg reached out to me was precisely because they felt well we're not politicians we've got ourselves into all sorts of trouble you know you can then argue whether it was by sins of commission or omission in the wake of cambridge analytica the 2016 election they i think rightly identified at the time that a lot of new regulation would emanate from europe and they said look we need someone who just knows much more about the world of politics and government and so on.
36:24So from my point of view, the division of Labour was great because he didn't want to deal with that kind of stuff. And one of the things I found hardest to deal with when I moved, when Miriam and I moved with the kids to Silicon Valley and I started working in these gleaming, I mean, you've been there, these gleaming sort of glass and steel contraptions draped along these motorways in Silicon Valley.
36:50Sure, it was the sort of technological side and i immersed myself in in in the sort of technology of it to understand that it was the language it i just i realized immediately that i there was i coming from a world of assertion and and a sort of this very british westminster thing of sort of sarcasm humor charm menace all that kind of stuff all the kind of pontification of the floor of the house of commons the cut and thrust of television in political debates and i came to a place where And none of that worked. Because if you didn't have the data and you couldn't show the system and you couldn't show the before and after stats, you didn't get anywhere.
37:28So I had to really rewire the way I kind of expressed myself in order to prevail in the, like any large organization, you only prevail by persuading other people of your point of view. And it took me a while to do that. Even though you're making arguments about politics and things like regulation. Can I just push back on one aspect of Zuckerberg? I know he's a friend of yours and, you know, he can, in the end, he can defend himself. But there's just one thing which is, again, a common sort of a motif about him, which is that basically in his pivot to Trump, you see someone who's put the pursuit of power and pragmatism above principle.
38:03They look at this guy who's taken up jiu-jitsu. They look at this guy who goes on Joe Rogan's podcast and says he likes the odd bit of masculine energy. They look at your departure from the company. They look at the appointment of Dana White, who's this kind of kingpin of UFC ultimate fighting in America. And they say, hang on a second, Mark, you were this Harvard liberal. You were this kind of open up the world, connect everyone type when that was the right way to go in the age of Obama. And now there's something about his pivot to Trump. And they find it a little bit, not just tone deaf, but a little bit sickening, actually.
38:37Yeah. I mean, look, two things I'd say. Firstly, don't be surprised that the people, and it's not just Mark Zuckerberg, Tim Cook at Apple, Sergey Brin, for heaven's sake, who used to be an absolutely prominent progressive Democrat. But all of these people, they're business people. They're running businesses. We shouldn't imagine that these people, they might claim that they are. They're not. They're not philosopher kings. They're not moral leaders. Don't look to them for that. But they've asserted themselves missionaries. And that I've always disliked. And it was one of the first things I said when I arrived.
39:13I said, stop all this crap of somehow pretending that, you know, that Silicon Valley and the Britons are moral. They want to connect the world. They want to spread power. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I couldn't bear all of that because it's so it's obviously not true. They are great technologists. They're great innovators. They're great builders. but I wouldn't look to them which is why I remain firmly with the view that governments should remain absolutely in the driving seat on the big judgments about the trade-offs that technologies like this bring when they're when they're taken up at such huge scale in society and I just would I don't and I don't actually think many of them would take this as a critique they're defending their businesses they're ferociously competitive with each other their first duty they think to themselves to their employees to their shareholders is that their company should prevail and that's what they care about that's what they think about every waking minute and i i if if the implied critique i totally agree with that i thought this early frothy stuff in silicon valley where they pretended that somehow i mean i i'll give you a amusing anecdote just to illustrate the point So in autumn of 2018, I went along to the, it was a two-day induction for new employees at Facebook at the time.
40:25And I was probably by quite some way. The ex-Liberal Democrat leader and Deputy Prime Minister Vignes there with his notepad. I was. I was there with my notepad and I did all the role-playing things. I was probably by quite a long short and the most senior person there. But I wanted to go through what everyone else did. And everyone from literally new recruits from the catering department to the engineering department were there. and I remember Sheryl Sandberg asking me afterwards after two days what did you think of the induction and I said I think it's ridiculous because I spent two days in this induction in one of the most in a company that's making fatter profit margins than almost any other company on the planet and not once did anyone explain to me how you make money and this was the phase in Silicon Valley where they almost pretended they weren't money-making entities and I think in a weird kind of way with all of the events since then there's a sort of slightly more I think the I think a lot of the I think a lot of the blather around um around these technologies has been somewhat stripped away by controversy or by choice or by politics they're businesses I think they're very important businesses I had a wonderful time working there I was very proud of a lot of the work that I did and it's not just a Zuckerberg thing that's a Silicon Valley thing where oddly enough in seeking to compete with China.
41:40Silicon Valley and DC are behaving in a very Chinese way because, of course, the great critique in America about China was always that technology was too close to government. The business was too close. Anyway, but back to my point, it was amazing. So when I arrived in 2018, they almost wouldn't admit to their own newly freshly minted employees that they made a lot of money and that they were a very successful business. I think all of that has changed. I and much less idealistic. I certainly, even in my time that I was there, I saw quite a lot of people leave because they'd come to Silicon Valley almost imagining that these big tech companies were going to be like, I don't know, working for an NGO.
42:18Why did you want to leave? Was it because the atmospherics were changing? Was it because you'd done your time? Was it because you felt out of sync with the new vibe? Why did you want to go? Yeah, all of those above. Yeah, a mix of all of those things. Yeah. Look, here's the irony. In the many, many debates over many years that we would have internally in a company like that, with the board, with Mark Zuckerberg and so on. I was the only person who'd actually been elected to anything. And I was always, and I was always noted, but here's the thing. I was always the most prominent voice saying, listen, you need to rebuild relationships with governments.
42:50You can't just be at war with them all the time. That was partly my, that was a big bit of my day job. But, you know, I always say there's only one thing worse in a sort of capitalist economy than having big businesses and governments at each other's throats. It's having them in each other's pockets. you've got to strike again a bit of a third way I know you've got to strike the right balance and I was always the advocate of you've got to you know you've got to have some a bit of an arm's length relationship I argued for many years ago I didn't didn't prevail I actually argued even that getting out of the business of running political ads on Facebook altogether globally because I just I just thought it was I just I just thought the more we could get out of politics the better so so obviously when the decision was and it wasn't a decision as such it wasn't sort of you don't wake up one morning and decide this it was a massive vibe shift which really brewed from from 2020 onwards uh the polarization around the lockdown and the 2020 election and so on and then of course the takeover twitter by Elon Musk that really moved the Overton window in a big time in a big time in Silicon Valley when I saw the whole of Silicon Valley it wasn't the company I worked for we're just going to go really go massively into politics when I'd always kind And I said, I think, and I still remain of that view.
44:03I remain of the view that private sector enterprise and innovation flourishes best when it's at a respectable distance from political power.
44:15Really hope you're enjoying this conversation with Nick Clegg. If you are, then please do subscribe to this podcast, as a lot of other people are doing, on BBC Sounds. And that way you won't miss future episodes. And if you do subscribe, make sure you've got your push notifications turned on. That way you will get an alert whenever we publish a new episode and you'll never miss out. Thank you so much. And now back to Nick Clegg. If journalism is the first draft of history, what happens if that draft is flawed? In 1999, four Russian apartment buildings were bombed, hundreds killed. But even now, we still don't know for sure who did it.
44:55It's a mystery that sparked chilling theories. I'm Helena Merriman, and in a new BBC series, I'm talking to the reporters who first covered this story. What did they miss the first time? The History Bureau, Putin and the apartment bombs. Listen on bbc.com or wherever you get your podcasts.
45:21Based on everything you've seen in Seneca Valley and before that in politics, can you just give our listeners a sense of where you think all of this is going? It has concentrations of power. It has what they need to do now to get ahead of these trends and to not lose out in a world that seems to be being remade around them by these very powerful people. The first thing I'd say, and I worry about this, is what we experience online is a very great speed mutating from something that was driven by humans. It was content that humans would generate, good, bad, lovely, ugly. to content that is synthetically generated and algorithmically recommended to you.
46:03So these great platforms, which is actually one of the reasons I was always, if unfashionably, defenders of them, they were platforms for human expression, human content, human connection, will increasingly become pipelines for algorithmically recommended entertainment content, where we as humans become, if you like, more passive recipients of both synthetically generated content, which is then automatically recommended to us. This is my profound concern. You know, I've got a great phrase for this, to paraphrase Grace Jones, which is, I think we're becoming slave to the algorithm. Yeah, and here's the irony of ironies.
46:46I think a lot of the critique of what I call social media one was wrong and was wider than Mark because I think it underestimated how much agency humans had. But weirdly enough, it's a critique that I think is coming into its own or will do as we move into a more synthetic environment. That's so annoying. That was supposed to be my critique. Damn. No, but well, so I, and I, and here's the thing to your point about power. And I think this trend of what I call in the book, the power paradox that these technologies empower us, but aggregate and concentrate so much power into the hands of the people who run these industries.
47:23I think that's going to happen with Nobson because we're all going to, certainly if that's, you listen to anyone really from Dario Amadei to Elon Musk, it doesn't matter what sort of spectrum they come from in terms of the debate around AI, they're all aiming for the same thing, which is that we all end up becoming very dependent on agentic AI, on AIs that do everything from help us cook, plan our holiday to share our deepest, darkest fears and thoughts and so on. Agents or assistants. Correct. And so you're going to have a level of personalized dependency on AI entities, which are synthetic entities, which is quite, quite different to being connected with another human being via Facebook, you know, circa five years ago, which is certainly the industry I worked in at that time.
48:12And yet at the same time, of course, that the underlying physics that produces that very personal feel, you know, that very personal agentic AI, call them Bob, call them Susan, who may even appear in very realistic sort of avatar form to us soon, will be based on a technology which is very, very centralising at its source. To build these foundation models in the first place is only something that very, very small number of private sector entities, I mean, it's worth dwelling on this. The UK government, if it wanted to, would not be able to spend the money that one, never mind all of them collectively, that one of these American companies is spending every year at the moment.
48:50Can I put some numbers, just to really spell out for people? Microsoft, which is currently worth, I think, around about market cap up or down, around$3 trillion, will say we're going to spend$40 billion. I'm making this number up. Okay,$100 billion. $100 billion on an energy. This is very energy-intensive stuff. And meanwhile, you've got the UK government that can't find$5 billion of welfare savings. What we're talking about here is an extraordinary financial power of those building this technology, which is a corporate power, a company power, an institutional, private sector power, which is partly about, by the way, infrastructure, energy consumption, about how you generate that energy, where does it come from, versus governments that can't find, which is skin.
49:30Correct. But my point is that the expense of building what I call the base layer exacerbates the power paradox we talked about earlier. If only a very small number of very, very wealthy entities can build the stuff in the first place. And they're also the entities that then deliver your Bob or your Susan in sort of almost imposter human form. this this this bifurcation of power where we become ever more personal or more and more reliant on this technology in a highly personalized way um which i think as i describe in the book begs particularly difficult questions for kids so that debate will i think only get bigger over time vulnerable adults and so on and at the same time it can only be delivered to us through the deep deep pocketed, you know, entities in China and the US.
50:24So I think all of that is a concoction, which is going to create ethical, moral and political dilemmas, which make the kind of people who will do my job that I did for a while in Silicon Valley, you can call it interesting, but also very, very challenging. And now all of this, of course, is taking place, since you asked for big trends in the context in which the American sort of techno-political establishment, which is really now congealed under Trump too, believes, as far as I can make out from what I've heard privately and what you read publicly, believe that they can deliver a knockout blow against China, that this existential race for AI supremacy is akin to outspending the Soviets.
51:12And there'll be a sort of Berlin Wall moment when one of these big American entities, Meta, Google, Microsoft, Anthropic, will suddenly deliver AGI, artificial general intelligence, or superhuman intelligence. They'll somehow then be able to put that technology in a box, lock it and say, you know, we are going to prevail forever and on. I think that's nonsense. I don't think that's going to happen. I just don't think America is going to beat China like that. I don't think there will be a knockout blow. If you look at the way the Chinese are already actually leading, here's the irony, in open source technology, which is democratizing the technology for free around the world.
51:51Here's the irony. So you've got the world's greatest autocracy that is, oddly enough, in its competition against the world's greatest democracy, America, doing more to democratize the technology that they're competing over. And so I think, amongst other things, in terms of big trends, and that's really the subject of the last third of my book, at some point, the American political and economic establishment will realize that they're not going to win. They're not going to win on this current trajectory. And if they want to win, they're going to have to relearn something they've clearly lost under these last few months under Trump.
52:26They're going to have to relearn working in partnership, leadership through partnership, particularly with the Indians and the Europeans. You call for a kind of union of tech democracies. So India is sort of this triumvirate of India as the world's biggest democracy, America and the European Union. And I know that that's partly what you think Donald Trump gets wrong about America first, isn't it? Completely. Yeah, that he thinks it is. Partly. I mean, you're not exactly going to get these partners to help you out against China if you spent all your time clobbering them with tariffs and demeaning them and insulting them.
52:56What do the people listening to you now and watching you now, other than understanding these issues, other than seeing these trends and thinking about them, what do they need to do to win in this future? There's a sort of, I infer from what you're saying that we need to prize human connection while we can, which is what makes being alive wonderful. You know, how two sapiens or groups of sapiens connect with each other. That connection is going to become more and more valuable as agentic AI takes over. But how can we prepare for this new world and win in it? I'd say two things. One, play around with the technology a lot.
53:31Just really just play around with the technology. Use the different, use the different, use Claude, just get, feel comfortable with them. The amount of ink that is spilt, I read it almost every day in our newspapers about people condemning these technologies without actually using them is quite remarkable. Use it first. And then secondly, and I think we need to inculcate this in a big way in our kids be very very skeptical about what you see online because there's just going to be vast amounts of synthetic slop and then i think the i think governments and others need to step in big time to work out what you do with people who for mental health or other reasons or for and certainly of course for kids just can't be expected to act with that degree of sort of deliberate agency.
54:21And that's, I think, one of the most difficult and interesting new challenges that we face. That's very clear. I want to end, you've been very generous through the time, I want to end with a couple of reflections on British politics. You were standing as a sort of anti-politics candidate as a kind of radical liberal in the centre ground. These days, anti-politics is not coming from people in the centre. It's coming from people at the edges or the fringes. Why did that happen, do you think? Well, I think I'm, in a sense i'm the textbook example of how difficult it is to be anti-establishment and then be part of the establishment it's just like it's a it's a transition which clearly i didn't successfully navigate i i i um i made a set of assumptions which clearly you know were wrong i i i thought it was obvious that no one had won the election so you kind of had to share power if you're going to have a government i just was that wrong well no sorry it's not factually wrong it factually correct but I had not I had not understood how quickly what I consider to be inevitable compromise gets branded instead as betrayal and you know I just it's human nature although if you fight three elections to the left of this yeah this is Tony Blair's argument if you fought three yeah to the left of labor and then you get into government the Tories then at birth the coalition was yeah it's gonna maybe exactly listen I got I'm not in a sense this will play I mean, whilst I think actually the government that we ran for those five years between 2010 and 2015, I think indisputably is the best government this country's had in a decade and a half, if not more.
55:53Clearly, the political kind of consequences for the reasons you describe and others didn't work out. And I think it's the really enduring question of our times. Voters here in this country and elsewhere, as you say, this is now 16 years ago, have been saying over and over and over again, no, we want something different. No, we want something different. No, we want something different. And every time something different is delivered to them, they say, no, that's not different enough. They want something else. What is interesting about the new populism is how they appear sometimes to be able to go from the kind of anti-establishment politics of opposition and into government.
56:35And they continue to become the kind of anti-establishment voice in government. And they can govern very, very badly, but still paper over the cracks by just constantly. And so I think that I think for liberals, small old liberals, there's this kind of assumption that populists get found out when they get into government. And actually they can continue running against things. So Donald Trump is running against universities, running against the media, the fake news media. But you say small liberals. One of the themes is this wonderfully, if I may say humbly, this successful podcast the first three months is that people both on the left, like Ash Sarkar, who's a Marxist, and on the right, like James Zaw, who's a national conservative, big influence on reform.
57:19have said that basically the thing that everyone needs to wake up to is that we're living in a post-liberal moment, that we are all post-liberals now. And actually in that context, I want to ask you a question that I asked James Orr. I asked him whether what liberalism got wrong is that it has no values or that it has the wrong values. And this is what James Orr said. I think the problem with liberalism is not that it's got no values, but that it gets values in the wrong order. Conservatives and liberals care equally about freedom They just have a different account of where it should be ranked And I think crudely liberals want to see freedom as upstream of everything The organising horizon of everything And conservatives will say, no, that kind of freedom is a licence for anarchy What do you make of that criticism of liberalism?
58:14I from a tiny excerpt by the way he's a very sophisticated thinker so I don't much though I might not agree with him I don't want to take it out of context I think he's almost referring to libertarianism more than liberalism is what I can make up I think he thinks that we're living in the end of equals at the twilight of liberalism whether you go back to 1945 or 1789 or 1776 but basically this idea that freedom was the supreme goal of politics maybe that is more of a libertarian idea but I think he means liberalism more broadly and I think he thinks that liberals and he does mean liberals not libertarians here i think he would say liberals not you specifically are weak and they're weak because on issues that really matter it's like david frum would say the liberals don't enforce borders fascist wills yeah of course liberals should enforce borders and yet it's under liberals that immigration under biden or the tories whatever um liberals are weak about the collapse of the family in large parts of urban america britain or the fact that many kids are growing up without fathers and they think that liberals have the wrong priorities and are too weak to assert common sense requirements of being human?
59:14So I don't actually think liberalism, the sort of, dare I say, right back to the Gladstonian liberalism that I sort of, and British, the long, proud tradition of British liberalism that I certainly have always espoused myself and sought to always try and follow myself. I don't think it's weak at all. But here's the big but. It's based on a bunch of, at the moment, fairly unfashionable concepts. Firstly, that you always prioritize reason over prejudice and assertion. It seeks to prioritize the brain over the heart when actually so much political behavior is driven by the heart rather than the brain.
59:56So you're colliding. It is true. Liberals do. They will cogitate rather than agitate. They will look at evidence rather than rely on emotion. I remain of the view that the liberalism is, in a sense, the sort of political expression of an enlightenment tradition, which believes in science, believes in the sort of method of reason and science and argument and weighing them up and then deciding. And that, of course, can come across, I think, is very equivocal in a political environment where people just want a spasm. They don't want a solution. They want a spasm. and we live in a in a in a world of emotion of politics at least where emotional spasms do much better than the reason and i think the trick politically is to make reason look strong and deliberate and not weak and indecisive and i think what accompanies that if you believe in reason you also believe in openness you have to and i mean openness in the greatest sense of the word you have to be open to other people's ideas you have to be open to the idea that you're wrong you have to be open to challenge you have to be open to a mixture of inputs and i think again one of the things that happens in society when people are feeling anxious about their own well-being about whether they're going to hold down a job whether their pay is going to go up whether they're going to be able to give their kids the holiday that they want whether they're going to be able to pay for the for the extension to their to the house or whatever is that um far from being open you quite understandably just become more and more focused on your own needs and i think in our country we've been battered over and over and over again pretty well non-stop since 2008 by a series of things that have really just made us more and more insecure and anxious wholly predictably as a country is it any wonder that in that environment people are less interested in the politics that says well hang on a minute i want to kind of look at the evidence here and are instead much more attracted to someone who just says, I'm going to end the small boats in, what is it, 13 days, 12 days, whatever nonsense that he spouts.
1:02:08No, it doesn't surprise me at all. Does it mean that liberalism is wrong? No. Does it mean that liberalism can't make a comeback? No. Does it mean that liberalism doesn't actually, is actually, in my view, remains best equipped to provide us with the best answers? I definitely think it is. But it requires, it does require politicians of real genius and talent to take that alchemy of reason and of openness and insert it into the much, much more lurid, bite-sized politics that we now inhabit than I certainly did at the time when I was on that television debate 16 years ago. Final thought. What's next for you?
1:02:46Every time you're written about in the newspapers, people keep referring to your wife's political ambitions. Yes. And she's, just to be clear about this, she set up a political movement. Yeah, my next chapter might be as a political spouse. There you go. You're going to be the first gentleman of Spain. That's what it's going to be. Primero señor. You speak Spanish, don't you? Because your wife, Miriam, has set up a kind of political organisation there. Yeah. Is that a big part of your future? Well, it's certainly a big part of her, and therefore it's a very big part of mine. So she set up something which is, I suppose it's loosely analogous to what Emmanuel Macron set up, you know, before it turned into a political party.
1:03:23Or Marsh. Do you remember? Actually, I don't think this was deliberate. It's actually got the same acronym. It's called España Mejor, Better Spain. And it's like a nationwide civic movement. I'm sounding like my wife's press officer here. As Miriam has said, and I think people are really paying attention to what she's saying, what her team are doing in Spain, because there's no civic movement like this, that if they can't, through that sort of civic activism, get some of the changes that they want, then of course, maybe entry into politics is what they'll need to do. And we'll see what happens there.
1:03:58For me, I'll tell you something that I feel really, really strongly about where I'd love to try and play a role, however small or insignificant, but some role is there was I at Meta in Silicon Valley. I was whatever you call me, number two, three of the company, whatever. I was very senior in the company. I was European. The COO after Sheryl Sandberg was European. The CMO is European. The chief data scientist is European. The head of cyber is European. The head of the Facebook app, a wonderful French lady, friend of mine, who's now become number two to Sam Altman, was European. So why are all these Europeans running these great American companies?
1:04:39Why can't we do it in our own neck of the woods? Why can't all these great innovative technologists here in London, who come out of all of our great universities and set up great tech startups, why do they immediately get snapped up by American companies? I mean, I think... Because those companies are rich and offer them a lot of money. Yeah, exactly. And so I think one of the biggest challenges we have as America and Europe decoupled, and let's be real, that's happening. And this is going to persist beyond Trump too. This sort of deconstruction of the post-war and Cold War settlement definitely is leading to the Atlantic getting wider and wider and wider.
1:05:22I've become more and more French in my thinking about this. I think the friendship for accidental reasons. I'm sure they'd be overjoyed as they often are by the things I have to say. But we have to learn to stand on our own two feet more. We can't continue to rely on Uncle Sam to do everything for us. I think it's seriously getting out of hand. All of us, I bet you everybody involved in the production of this podcast is using American hardware, is looking at American software. And then the moment we come up with a good idea, I mean, Demis, as I was, is a good example. I think for very good reasons he sold to Google.
1:05:57But the moment we come up with a good idea and these companies start developing any scale, they get funded by VCs in Sandhill Road in Palo Alto, who then tell them to relocate to California. And before you know it, they're listed publicly on NASDAQ and they're basically American. So we're not only importing their technology, we're exporting all our good people and our ideas. I would love to play some role, and I have some ideas about how this could happen, to just give some of those European innovators a shouting chance of remaining European as they get bigger. Nick Clegg, it's great to see you.
1:06:31Thanks for coming. Thank you. Lovely to see you.
1:06:35Well, just to start almost at the end of that conversation with Nick Clegg, which I really enjoyed. I mean, yes, I've known him for a long time. We've had some pretty fractious interviews when he's come on the Today programme in the past. And I hope that conversation brought out a different side to him and was quite revealing. But when he spoke at the end about the power of reason, when he made a defence of cogitation, not agitation, when he talked about the power of deliberation over the politics of emotion, you know, it did feel slightly like I was talking to a politician from a very, very different era.
1:07:09It is just true to say that in the era of Trump and populism, national populism in particular, the politics of emotion is very much in the ascendant. It's at the forefront of our public life and the politics of reason, which looks for the messy compromise and talks about the tradeoffs, feels somewhat in retreat. And the irony, of course, is one of the reasons that the politics of emotion has trumped the politics of reason is because of the power of social media. So there was a sort of strange irony in what Nick Clegg was saying because he seemed to pine almost for an era of politics before social media had changed politics so fundamentally.
1:07:46I thought what he said about synthetic intelligence was so important and profound, not necessarily original. Lots of other people on this podcast, from Carlo Rovelli to Dario Amadei, the boss of Anthropic, the AI giant, have said the same thing. But when you hear someone like Nick Clegg, who's been working at the very top of a major tech power in Meta, say that what has been loosed upon the world, what's been unleashed, is a massive, massive, almost incalculable volume of synthetic intelligence that will rival human intelligence. It sort of makes you just pause for a moment and think, wow, we have reached a very particular moment in human history.
1:08:25Human history was defined by the application of human intelligence. History was driven by the fact that human intelligence, when it created technologies that changed what it was to relate to the environment, basically drove history forward. And now, out there in the world, through computing, through artificial intelligence, is a rival form of intelligence, which could soon be more intelligent and more capable than humans at some tasks. That's a really extraordinary moment in the history of our species. And I think what he talked about, about this coming flood, this coming avalanche, really, of synthetic intelligence should make us all take pause as to whether or not we actually want that.
1:09:01I think there was a bit of an inconsistency, perhaps a tension, you might call it, not to say an internal conflict or contradiction. On the one hand, saying, as Nick Clegg did, that he's concerned about excessive concentrations of power. I think that was the implication of what he was saying in terms of how the criticisms of the first, if you like, round of the internet over the past 15 years weren't valid then, but might be valid now. But on the other hand, he's saying that it doesn't necessarily work to go into these companies, these monopolies, as they often are, and break them up. And I just wonder whether or not the Nick Clegg that was entering Parliament in the early noughties, the Nick Clegg that was Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government and leader of the Liberal Democrats would sometimes say to the Nick Clegg that was just being sat in this room and having that conversation on this podcast, would sometimes say, you know what, the obvious answer is you do need to break up those companies.
1:09:52I'm not necessarily saying that that's my view. And the answer, the argument that Nick Clegg came up with was actually, it's not very obvious how you would do that or what the benefit would be. But he seemed very uncomfortable with the concentrations of power, which he has for the past seven years, been a fundamental part of. And by the way, wasn't it so interesting? Isn't it so fascinating about all these people that worked in Silicon Valley that they are somewhat skeptical about giving kids access to screen time? I remember talking to him about this a few years ago and I got the strong impression that he and his wife Miriam were trying to restrict screen time for their children.
1:10:28And my experience of years of covering tech firms and being in Silicon Valley a fair bit was that the most powerful people in the world of tech are keeping their kids away from that tech. And I think there's a lesson in that for all of us.
1:10:45Now, remember, if you like that conversation with Sir Nick Clegg and if you've got questions about how to navigate this era of AI, please send us your questions for Naomi Alderman the brilliant writer and novelist who's just written her first non-fiction book about this very subject it's called Don't Burn Anyone at the Stake Today she's been searching for lessons from previous information revolutions like the invention of writing and later the printing presses to really try and make sense of the times that we are living through and therefore she's a rather good fit for this podcast if you've got questions for her Please WhatsApp us on 0330 123 94 80.
1:11:23That's 0330 123 94 80. Or you can email radical at BBC dot co dot UK. And we will try to put those questions to her in one of our extra Q &A episodes, which we're doing in a kind of experimental way with our guests over the next few weeks. And I should say that Naomi Alderman has sold a lot of copies of her books, whether it's Disobedience or The Power or the other books that she's written, which have been turned into TV series as well. If you just want to ask a question of Naomi Alderman about those books or about her career in writing or maybe about her experience as someone who grew up Jewish but then rejected her life as a practising Jew, do get in touch with us via WhatsApp or email.
1:12:08And that's it for this episode. By the way, this week on Political Thinking, Nick is chatting to the leader of Plaid Cymru. That's Rune Ap Yorwuth. off the back of a big win for him and his party. They saw a reform in an election in Labour's Welsh heartland just a few weeks ago. And in six months, he could be First Minister of Wales. In the meantime, he tells Nick what Welshness means to him and also how the death of his mother led to him abandoning his BBC career in pursuit of politics. You can get that on BBC Sounds on Friday, which is obviously where you can also subscribe to Radical with Amol Rajan.
1:12:43That's me. And remember, you can also watch episodes of Radical with Amol Rajan. That's still me on the BBC iPlayer. Speak to you next week. Goodbye.
1:13:13Now, we still don't know for sure who did it. It's a mystery that sparked chilling theories. I'm Helena Merriman, and in a new BBC series, I'm talking to the reporters who first covered this story. What did they miss the first time? The History Bureau, Putin and the apartment bombs. Listen on bbc.com or wherever you get your podcasts.
From the publisher
How should we balance innovation, power and accountability in the digital age? This week, Amol speaks to Sir Nick Clegg — former UK deputy prime minister and former president of global affairs at Meta — about the power and responsibility of big tech companies. Sir Nick argues that breaking them up won’t solve the problem of their digital dominance, calling instead for greater regulation and user control.
He discusses how technology shapes young people’s lives, warning against moral panic whilst calling for stronger age-appropriate safeguards and phone-free schools. And with rare candour, Sir Nick offers an insider’s perspective on how Silicon Valley really works — and why governments, not tech CEOs like Mark Zuckerberg, must ultimately set the rules.
He also talks about politics and philosophy, arguing that true liberalism — rooted in reason, openness, and the belief in evidence over emotion — remains vital in an increasingly polarised world.
(00:03:20) Concerns about the impact of AI
(00:07:00) The power paradox and network effects
(00:06:11) Children and smartphones
(00:22:17) Social media and political polarisation
(00:34:00) What’s Mark Zuckerberg really like?
(00:37:56) Why tech bosses are not moral leaders
(00:41:36) Why he left Meta
(00:44:10) The future of technology and power
(00:49:26) The race for AI ‘supremacy’ between the US and China
(00:52:00) Preparing for this new digital world
(00:53:11) Why has politics changed so much since he was deputy prime minister?
(00:57:55) Is liberalism weak?
(01:01:20) What’s next for Sir Nick Clegg?
(01:05:16) Amol’s reflections
GET IN TOUCH * WhatsApp: 0330 123 9480 * Email: radical@bbc.co.uk Episodes of Radical with Amol Rajan are released every Thursday and you can also watch them on BBC iPlayer: https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episodes/m002f1d0/radical-with-amol-rajan Amol Rajan is a presenter of the Today programme on BBC Radio 4. He is also the host of University Challenge on BBC One. Before that, Amol was media editor at the BBC and editor at The Independent.
Radical with Amol Rajan is a Today Podcast. It was made by Lewis Vickers with Anna Budd. Digital production was by Gabriel Purcell-Davis. Technical production was by Jonny Hall and Ben Andrews. The editor is Sam Bonham. The executive producer is Owenna Griffiths.
