Iran ... Um, How Does This End?

18:59And once he gets there, he refuses to meet with the Palestinian president, saying that he doesn't trust him and that the Palestinian president - So he doesn't meet with Yasser Arafat when they're there. He meets him maybe once, but then he refuses for the rest of the summit. So it was a very, that's why I say it was strange because we didn't really know how to deal with a summit of leaders where the leaders are not even meeting.

19:18Nayeema Raza:Yeah, it seems like dysfunctional. Do you feel like your job is more like a marriage therapist, a hostage negotiator, or a plumber? Definitely not a plumber. No, you're like figuring out how to make a thing work. Very different if you're mediating, which we were doing between Israelis and Palestinians. A marriage therapist, although I wouldn't like a marriage therapist that is so close to one of the two spouses. So I'm not sure that you could be very effective in that sense. But that's very different from the Iran talks when we were— That's, of course, a comment on the Americans' proximity to the Israelis.

19:48Nayeema Raza:Yes. Yes, I thought that went without saying that. You're right to say it. I was just making it explicit, yes. Whereas the negotiations with Iran, it was the U.S. negotiating with Iran. So in some ways that is more—you control everything. Whereas with the Israeli-Palestinians, we didn't control what was going on. We didn't control the positions of the two sides. And so we were just, as I say, mediators who were siding with the stronger of the two sides. There's like so much lore around the Camp David summit in July of 2000. And there's this like this, this read of that, a popular read of what happens there.

20:21Nayeema Raza:This mythology that, that, you know, there was this great deal presented to Yasser Arafat back in the day. And if he had only taken this deal, that would have given him like what, 92, 95, whatever percentage of the West Bank, then this would all be over. We would never be in the place that we are in today. You have pushed back against that story. I think you did it originally in like 2001. And you continue to, including in this book, reiterate that it wasn't that the Palestinians walked away from this awesome deal. Can you just explain that? Yeah, so the narrative that emerged after Camp David was that it failed because of one person, the Arafat, and one side, the Palestinians.

20:58that everyone else was guilt-free, if you will, and the responsibility, the sole responsibility was on our front. And so you had this, I think people who, some journalists just, the words came in automatically, the most generous offer ever that the Palestinians had rejected. That's how I put it, generous offer. That was the description of what had happened. And our view, Hussein and I, because we wrote the article together in 2001, was that's, to say overly simplistic would be a euphemism. I mean, all sides, in our view, carried a lot of blame for what had gone wrong. And the danger of demonizing the Palestinians, demonizing their leader, was that it led, in fact, to the extinction of the Israeli peace camps and to this narrative that exists to this day, that the Palestinians don't want peace, they're the ones who don't want a two-state solution, which is so extraordinary when you think that we've not had a succession of Israeli governments, none of whose members agree to a two-state solution, and yet that narrative still prevails today.

22:03And it got revived after October 7th. So number one, even if it was a Palestinian's fault in 2000, I really resent the implication that therefore what's happening today is their fault. They're not responsible for the slaughter that Israel inflicted upon them. But that's not even an accurate description of history, This is not in any way trying to justify the massacres of October 7th. But you can't go draw a line from the failure of Camp David, say it's the Palestinians' responsibility, and then everything that happened to them since is therefore their fault.

22:33Nayeema Raza:Yeah. One of the things I found really powerful about this book, it is about the Israel-Palestine negotiation. But really the protagonist of it, in a lot of ways, is a third party in the relationship, which is the United States. And that's not a protagonist from the culpability side or the catalyst side. but just in terms of the party with the most leverage that doesn't seem to live. I think we quote Princess Diana who says there was always a third person in our marriage. Yes, exactly. And the third person there was the U.S., yeah. And it was. And we'll come back to that. But back to the negotiating table.

23:02Nayeema Raza:By the way, is it always a table? Is there always a table in the negotiating table? I don't know how else you would do it. I guess you could stand up. I don't know. If you're like doing in the Middle East, I feel like you should have some pillows on the ground. There should be some chai. No, but Camp David, there were things like at some point, so we went bowling. they watched movies together they played golf was it you watched really yeah and then that was the teams because the leaders were not doing that yeah not the leaders although you could like Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat could have seen a movie without talking to one another they could have I don't think they were at the movies they didn't bowl together definitely not I have a great picture in my mind now of Yasser Arafat bowling with you could make a movie out of that but yeah I mean listen many of the Palestinians knew the Israelis because they'd been in Israeli jail for a long time so they spoke Hebrew so you know you get to know the other side in all kinds of ways.

23:49Very different Americans and Iranians. They knew each other because -

23:52Nayeema Raza:Where we had decades of not speaking to one another. Therefore, there was a long time where it was hard to find Farsi speakers in the State Department. Yeah, exactly. Whereas here, as I said, most of the Palestinians, not all, but some of the spoke Hebrew. Some of the Israelis spoke Arabic. Yeah. They recognized each other from, I mean, they'd fought against each other, had been detained by one or the other, by the Israeli side. So there was a, I don't know about camaraderie, but in some cases there actually was. And so I'm so curious how you, like how individuals who are at the table either, because at the table or the bowling alley, either as mediators or as negotiators, know what their positions are and who their client is.

24:30Nayeema Raza:Because like I feel like there could be this real principal agent or this kind of adverse selection problem of like your client is the person who is the president versus your client is the national interest of the state. One would like to think the two things are identical, but no, your client is the president of the United States. And that's my role. The role of the people at the White House is to serve the president just as people of the State Department is to serve the secretary and through him the president. So yeah, you could never say, Mr. President, I'm sorry, I didn't actually argue your case.

25:00I argued a case that I thought was superior because it was more reflective of the national interest. You could disagree with the president, in which case you have to decide either you shut up or you leave. I mean, you express your view. And then if you lose the debate, you could resign or you could stay. And, you know, sometimes I think it would be better to resign. In other cases, it would be better to stay.

25:21Nayeema Raza:Did you ever, in working with either President Obama or President Clinton, have like a moment where you really disagreed with them and then you took it to them? So before Camp David, President Clinton had had to persuade Arifat. He didn't want to go. I mean, Arifat had said, this is going to be a train wreck. We're not ready. The positions of the two parties are not close enough. We need to have more preparation. But as I said, Barack was insistent. And so Clinton said, he made a number of commitments. And one of the commitments was, if the summit fails, I won't blame you. As the person working at the White House, when the summit was teetering towards collapse, I was asked to write a statement.

26:01And I wrote a draft, but the statement they wanted was one that would blame, or that the president wanted, was one that would blame Arafat. and I was as you can imagine extremely uncomfortable I pushed back maybe not directly to the president but to others and they did soften it, it was a softening that wasn't really that much softer and 24 hours, 48 hours later it was clear the American position was saying it was all Arafat's fault but there were other cases that I disagreed and you know it's always a question when should the disagreement lead you to resign? I never did and sometimes I wonder because there's some things Did you want to?

26:37I never, I mean, it's a hard decision. You know, we could talk about why more people didn't resign during the Gaza War. I was not part of the administration then.

26:45Nayeema Raza:Had you been there, would you have resigned? So my answer, I try to give an honest answer. I sure hope I would have. You never know because when you're there, there's loyalty. There's, do you really want to be the person? And then you always think to yourself, if I stay, I can make a difference, which a lot of people do. I think at some point, enough lines are crossed that you should tell you that. So I would like to think that I'm the kind of person who would have resigned. You would have resigned because? I would have resigned because I thought that the U.S. position towards the war was enabling, whether you call it a genocide or not, something that I thought was unconscionable.

27:17And I thought that the U.S. position of saying we're fighting day and night for a ceasefire while you're arming the party that is allowing the fire to continue just was illogical. But I understand why some people didn't resign.

27:29Nayeema Raza:Nowadays, we live in a world where red lines are maybe not just communicated to a negotiator and a principal, but through social media. Right. So like all of a sudden we're seeing a flood of messages from the president. I'll just read a couple of them. So April 5th, President Trump says, Tuesday will be power plant day and bridge day all wrapped up in one in Iran. There will be nothing like it. Open the fucking straight, you crazy bastards, or you will be living in hell. Just watch. Praise be to Allah, President Donald Trump. April 7th, a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.

28:07Nayeema Raza:I don't want that to happen, but it probably will. However, now that we have complete and total regime change, we're different, smarter, and less radicalized minds prevail. He seems to be trying to entice them to do something. Maybe something revolutionarily wonderful can happen. Who knows? We will find out tonight. He goes on. God bless the great people of Iran. Then April 20th, just a day before we're taping this, we're offering a very fair and reasonable deal. And I hope they'll take it because if they don't, the U.S. will knock out every single power line and every single bridge in Iran. He signs it.

28:41Nayeema Raza:No more Mr. Nice Guy. like for Steve Whitcoff and Jared Kushner who are the lean team headed there or for Vice President Vance how does this make their life more difficult more easy I think it makes it impossible I mean first I want to say two things about those comments the first is I'm going to recommend something that I can't do which is we just ignore what the president says because it's every day something different it's dream of consciousness it's and so if we could culture or the people are negotiating? People listening to us. Oh, got it, okay. We should just ignore it. I can't. I'm addicted to every utterance coming from a man whose utterances bear no relationship to reality and none even to what his thought might be an hour from the moment he says.

29:24And you just read a whole example of them. The second point I'd make, which is a little bit contradictory, is we just can't accept and normalize statements that threaten a civilization, threaten to take out power plants and bridges and all. And unfortunately, he has this ability of making us immune to the most outrageous things. But as a negotiator, I mean, I'm not saying this is the reason why there's no deal between Iran and the U.S., but imagine if you're the Iranians and you're sitting there and this is what you hear. Why would you even be negotiating with a party whose leader says things that are so antithetical to human norms, to legal norms, to anything?

30:07And doing it in the middle of a negotiation, which is a way of telling the Iranians, A, you better accept this or else. Which is, I don't even think of this as an Iranian culture. Nobody likes to make a concession under visible duress. You never want to say. so you always have to avoid that in a negotiation which is making the other one maybe how they may feel but you don't want to say you know this is your last chance or else and the or else is terrible and therefore you're going to have to make a concession which will look to yourself and to your people your constituents as if you did it because you had a gun to your head

30:39Nayeema Raza:and I totally hear you and certainly I found it hard to even read some of these things out loud and that's not a partisan take that's just a sentiment of like humanity. I'm sorry if I sound partisan, because I usually try not to, but I can't, this is not, it's against sort of the utterances and the actions that. Yeah, or the values. I mean, my dad was at the World Bank. I know your father was a journalist for a long time in Africa. So we grew up in a kind of maybe different sense of the world than what's thrown around. And so you see this kind of playing out in the public theater. So you guys just like, this is very different to 2015.

31:12Yeah.

31:12Nayeema Raza:This is not that different to 2021 to 2023, except I would say that Trump governs in public and Biden definitely governed in private to an extent that, you know, we as the press found very difficult at the time. But how does that, like when the, all of a sudden the back channel feels like the front channel? The evolution, because when I started off, which was in the nineties, there was no social media. The negotiations at Camp David were completely closed to press. So there may have been some leaks, but there was very, very little public expression of what was going on during those two weeks. It was sort of in a closed environment.

31:46more or less. The 2015, as you say, there was a, there's always a battle of narratives, even while you're going on. So we would say things, they would say things, but it was not certainly nothing compared to now. During the Biden years, it was mainly the Iranians who would make, who would leak information. It's a bit what the Trump administration is doing now. And I think they were doing it to project false optimism to help their currency. I mean, it's really the reverse image of, so every now and then there'd be a leak from the Iranian side. were on the verge of a deal and we're like, what deal?

32:14And it was to, we thought, to boost their currency because they were under pressure. I'm being biased here, but I think the Iranians played the media in a more surreptitious, dishonest way, whatever. Now what we're seeing is there's all these allegations, I can't prove it, that a lot of the utterances by the president are designed to affect the market in order to help people who are placing great bets and making fortunes on that? I don't know. And then, but just in the terms of the battle of narratives, if there's one side that's winning and the other side that's losing, there's no doubt right now that the Iranians are complete masters of social media.

32:52I don't know if you watch some of what they do with these Lego-like characters.

32:55Nayeema Raza:Yeah, the Lego movies are kind of wild. It is pretty brilliant, I must say. And you have a president who cares what people think. You have a president who pays attention to the media. And the tone of his tweets or social, truth social, will always express the frustration when he thinks that people are saying that he's being weak or... There's this theory. I think Nixon popularized it, the mad men theory of international negotiations. Can you explain what that theory is and then explain if you think Donald Trump is doing that or good cop, bad cop or what he's doing? So the theory, which was, as you say, popularized under Nixon was you, there's somebody there, the president, who threatens or you believe could do something completely crazy, which is supposed to deter, intimidate, and then lead the other side to make concessions.

33:39So during Vietnam, there was this thought, maybe the president will just bomb the hell out of North Vietnam, Cambodia, whatever. And that was supposed, it didn't really work, but it was supposed to lead the Vietnamese to be more flexible in their position. So it can work. I never worked for a president who indulged in that, and I'm not saying it's a good or bad thing. I've never worked for president who sort of wanted it to be known that maybe people had to restrain him because he was going to do something crazy. That's kind of the image that comes to mind. The problem with Trump is we don't know if it's a tactic.

34:18I'm not a psychologist, psychoanalyst, so I'm not sure why he's doing these things. But I think at this point, it has detrimental value. There may have been a time early on where the Iranians were like, you know, this guy actually could go to war with us. And so we have to be more careful. So when he was elected, my prediction was that he was going to, it would be easier for him to reach a deal than for President Biden. I could give a number of reasons. When he was elected the second time around. Second time. When your deal was off the table and a new deal has to be done. I actually thought he could reach a deal for many reasons.

34:49One of them was because I felt the Iranians didn't know if they made a deal with Biden, whether Biden, whether the next president would respect it. Whereas if you do a deal with Trump, who's going to tear it up? But also because I think they were more intimidated and more scared of the president. But now I think it has the exact opposite effect because they think he is, if not really mad, he's somebody whose word is completely untrustworthy and that he's trying to paint this picture that he can force them into concessions. And I think that's only prompting them to be even more resilient, even more resistant to pressure.

35:24Nayeema Raza:I mean, there's something very different happening here also. It's just this has become existential. This is not a deal about whether or not you're going to enrich your uranium to like 6 % or 20%. This is a deal about like, are we going to assassinate your next leader? Yeah. Which has led to the Iranians. You know, the madman theory works when you think there's some logic to it, even beyond the madness. It can't work when you're in the middle of negotiations and President Trump strikes Iran and kills their leaders. So because then you think any concession is just giving in to somebody who the next day may strike us again.

35:59Nayeema Raza:But Rob, isn't that the Iranians' whole problem with the Americans in the first place? Because they feel like they negotiated this accord, not signed treaty, with the Americans that you helped negotiate in 2015. And they felt like they had kept up their end of the bargain. And in 2018, that is yanked off the table. And all of a sudden, they're like, whatever, madman or not, this country is wild. this country and its democratic whims and its swinging between parties, you know, we can't trust somebody to uphold their side of the bargain for more than the four years they're in power. So don't the Iranians already have that point of view of the Americans?

36:33Nayeema Raza:Like, they're not trustworthy partners. And again, you know, having been someone who comes from Pakistan would say like the long history of American foreign policy would suggest that they're not really reliable partners. So, but I think there's degrees of unreliability, right? And so, So, you know, one of the things - Yes, I date in New York, so I know how they go. So I think when we were negotiating a return to the deal under President Biden in 2021, the one thing the Iranians kept telling us is, how do you guarantee that this deal is not going to be torn up, either by you or by the next president?

37:03And we would tell them, we can't. You know, we can't guarantee it. That's not how our system works. We can't bind the hands of the next president. But if we violate the deal, you could resume your nuclear program, and that's why we're back at the table. So there's mutual assured pain, if not destruction. I'm not sure they bought it, but you're right. But imagine that and then compounded by not once, but twice the Iranians are in the middle of negotiations with the Americans. And in the middle of those talks, the US orders strikes. So you're right that it becomes, I mean, it was always been in the background that we don't trust the Iranians, they don't trust us, and there's no reason to trust one another.

37:38But now they can't even trust that a deal that is agreed, you shake hands today whether it's going to be, it's still going to be viable tomorrow. And you can't trust whether if you're in the middle of negotiations, whether they're going to kill your leaders.

37:53Nayeema Raza:You know, this is not the first time the Iranians have been attacked by Israel or by the United States. I mean, obviously there was the 12 day war in 2025, there are other occasions, but they have not previously closed the state of Hormuz. They also previously haven't, you know, attacked Gulf countries. So is that the nuclear option for Iran? You know, Pardon the pun. And what made them do that this time? You answered the question earlier. It was existential. The 12-day war was not existential. I mean, because they know that if they respond in the way that they did, by closing the Strait of Hormuz, by striking Israel, the U.S., and the GCC Gulf countries, they know they're going to be hit back even harder, which they don't want to do when they think, okay, the goal was to go after our nuclear facilities.

38:36That's done. We're going to respond in a more symbolic way. They struck our American base in Qatar, but it had been evacuated beforehand.

38:45Nayeema Raza:This time, they think this is for keeps. If they allow this to go without a response that's going to deter further attacks, the regime could be at play or the existence could be at play. So I think they had decided already that if they were attacked once again, this time, and if it was more than sort of a pinprick or a symbolic or one-day attack, I think they had already preordained what their answer would be. And it would be attack American bases throughout the region and even attack economic infrastructure in our neighbors because we want to externalize the cost of this war. But you have a sense that this was a plug and play.

39:22Nayeema Raza:Like if Kamini is killed, we will do X, Y, and Z. Like this is a written, you believe. I'll tell you why I believe that, not that I have any inside information. It's because the speed with which they responded and the fact that they continued to respond after the leadership had been decapitated and after they were able really to communicate with one another. Because, I mean, imagine why you can't have three Iranian leaders in the same room without the risk of them being struck. So they could really not communicate. They couldn't use electronic communications. So I think they decentralized decision making and said, if this happens, you go.

39:54And they told all the local commanders, here's your orders. You go out. You strike. American bases, economic infrastructure, Israel, until we tell you to stop.

40:06Nayeema Raza:But have they exhausted their options at this point? No. I mean, there's at least one big option that remains, which is the Houthis, the group in Yemen, that could try to close the other, the Bab al-Mendeb, the other strait through which oil and gas go through. And then the cost of the world economy is going to be even greater. They could also attack more infrastructure in their neighbors, right? So, no, they have more that they can do. And they have said they would do it if, in fact, President Trump, you know, carried out his threat of trying to extinguish Iran's civilization. Do you feel, if he becomes no more Mr.

40:39Nayeema Raza:Nice Guy, as he puts it? He has been nice guy so far. So is there like a running clock on this current situation in Iran? Like, if you're a negotiator, you have presumably a clock you're working against. In the case of the U.S., we have the elections coming up, midterm elections in 2026, which could cost President Trump the kind of trifecta of the executive house and Senate that he currently holds. You have the clock on oil prices and how long the economy can endure this, even with a strategic oil reserve, et cetera, which we talked to Dan Yorgin about. And then there's the ceasefire clock. Like what clock are people actually paying attention to right now?

41:15Now, there are objective clocks, some of the clocks that you mentioned, but then there's a subjective clock. And I think that's the one that, again, there's a variable here which I had underestimated, which is President Trump. Like, you would think that he would be sensitized to the clocks you're mentioning.

41:30Nayeema Raza:Yeah. When oil reaches the price of the gas pump or when oil reaches 150 or whatever it is, when the stock market or when the polls show the Republicans and he himself are losing, that he would look at that and say, okay, I got to reverse course. I got to end this. he seems impervious. He seems not to care. He's not on the ballot. I think the only ballot he thinks he's on is the history's ballot. And he thinks that he could be the president who changed the regime in Venezuela, changed the regime in Iran and tomorrow in Cuba. And in some ways, his instability, his unpredictability has helped that sense of dominance, but also scared American allies, et cetera.

42:07I mean, I think net-net, it's negative, but you're right.

42:10Nayeema Raza:But I think he might have achieved this goal, but in the long term had a terrible... And he has a different scale. I think his scale is the deployment of raw US power, not allies, soft power, whatever. For him, it's what can we destroy? And we can destroy a lot. So I actually think he doesn't understand why Iran has not surrendered. I genuinely think that for him, it's a matter of total incomprehension. Because if you live in a world where if you're hit and you don't surrender, you're hit harder, you then surrender, you're bullied, you have to give in. If that's the world that you imagine, and then there's this smaller country, weaker country that doesn't have a hundredth of the power that the US has, but is still fighting, I think for him, that's partly what explains, I think, his screeds because he's frustrated.

42:58Nayeema Raza:Yeah, I think he's certainly perplexed. And I imagine that, like you intimated at the beginning of this conversation, if he probably, I imagine, this is me speculating, that he thinks if he could just get into a room with the new leader of Iran, that he could work it out. I do want to say that I think that his unpredictability has increased American dominance, which may be his objective, but hurt American foreign policy and international relations long-term. That would be my take. It depends how you define dominance. I think countries are afraid of what the U.S. will do. Yeah, countries are afraid of the U.S.

43:29now. You call that dominance? Yeah, I don't know. I don't know if I can use that term. But yeah, I think he has shown a willingness to use military force and not just military force, tariffs and threats and all those things. I think it makes America weaker, but I take your point that just, again, if you look at it from his perspective, he would say the U.S. is more respected. I think they're more feared. Feared. But he would say both.

43:56Nayeema Raza:Feared and hated. I mean, you could probably put in a lot of words there, but I would say also it was a low bar also for the last 20 years maybe. Well, we don't have much insight into the president's mind at this moment as things change. But he did write a book. Like you, he wrote a book. Or maybe a ghostwriter wrote a book. I don't know. It's called The Art of the Deal. Have you read it? No. Okay. Myself either. I have to disclose. I probably should. Actually, now that you say it, it probably would be a good thing to do. Okay. But I have a CliffsNotes of the 11 tactics he lays out in The Art of the Deal.

44:27Nayeema Raza:And I'm going to read them to you. And I wonder if you would apply them to what he's doing now. And basically assess whether or not it's a good rule of thumb. try to split the character from the recommendation and assess whether that's a good negotiating tactic or deal-making tactic. And second, if you can, if it strikes you, see how it's being used in Iran today. The first one is to think big. So kind of aiming for the best outcome. And even if you fall short, you'll get something good. So is it a good tactic? I think it's good to think big.

45:05I don't prepared to settle for something less. The better can't be the enemy or the good, or whatever the expression is. Does he apply it? I think in some ways he does think big. I think he would want to have zero enrichment, or a completely transformed relationship with Iran, in which we'd be, but he has zero way of getting there. But no, I do think he -

45:29Nayeema Raza:We have 10 more lessons to get through. Okay, so let's go. So that was a first. Okay, I'm sorry. He might get there, but we might see inside his mind. Okay. The second is to maximize your options, to always have these alternatives ready so that you're never going to appear or be desperate or thirsty. Good advice. Good advice. Good advice. Do you think that he's maximizing his options currently? I don't know. I mean, he certainly has many options, but we never know whether any of them is serious. I mean, he's gone from saying, we want regime change, we don't want regime change, we want the Strait of our Moves opened, we don't care if it's opened.

46:02So maybe he's giving himself flexibility.

46:05Nayeema Raza:Maximum optionality. So, you know, okay, maybe. Maybe. Okay. The third is to know your market, to be well-informed about the world in which you're operating. So you definitely need that. He definitely doesn't have it. Yeah, I think that's tough. And Americans don't have it deeply when it comes to Iran or the Middle East, maybe, but this administration. I think in general, the U.S. has Americans, I mean, they haven't invested enough in understanding other cultures. Yeah. In Iran, it's both that and it's hard on culture to understand. But I think what cognitive empathy is not always our strength.

46:38Nayeema Raza:Yes. Cliffhanger, we'll be right back. Guys, today's sponsor, Dumb Question, is from me. I'm going to take the next minute to tell you a little bit about Smart Girl Dumb Questions and to ask you for your help in continuing to make independent, fact-based, and curious journalism. No, I'm not going to ask you for money. Here's what I need. I would love you to tell 10 of your friends about the show or 100. I don't know. Blast that reunion group that you muted. And definitely tell your mom. And tell your mom to tell her friends, too. Even if you don't like the show and you're just like hate watching it or listening to it, tell 10 of your friends to hate watch it, too.

47:12Nayeema Raza:Numbers are numbers, people.

47:16Nayeema Raza:Use leverage. So, again, I think this is a quote from the book. The worst thing you can do in a deal is seem desperate to make it. Yeah. So use leverage. Yeah, I'm not sure that one follows the other. But, yeah, you got to use leverage. I'm counted among my colleagues as sometimes a skeptic when people say you need leverage, and so you have to impose sanctions of leverage, or you need to... Because I think ultimately a deal is going to be made if both sides believe that their core interests are being met. Yes, you need leverage so that they understand that if there's no deal, maybe they'll pay a bigger price, but I'm not quite as enamored with that concept for various reasons.

47:55I think there are ways of conducting a negotiation in which you try to, the other side sees that it's in its benefit to get a deal. Does this administration have used leverage? I mean, yes. I mean, the leverage is bombing the country. It's maximum pressure. Has it succeeded? I mean, I think this is really a case where you see, you can't think of more leverage than what the president has applied. And you could barely think of a more negative result than it has achieved. I think a negotiation succeeds when you can make the case to the other side that this is a deal that is in their interest. Not simply it's in your interest because if you don't make the deal, you're going to be destroyed.

48:32The deal itself has to be. Yeah.

48:33Nayeema Raza:It's interesting that you said that because when I read through these, I think it's like 10 or 11 items, I did find it striking that they are largely about yourself despite know your market. There's not a lot of kind of other side of that deal. Without knowing them, I'm sure that's right. So there's also one, enhance your location, your position, which is like promoting the value of what you have. I'm going to bundle these and get the word out. Use media and publicity to your advantage. He definitely uses media and publicity. I question whether it's his advantage. One called fight back. So it's basically like stand firm, don't concede.

49:13Again, with him, I don't know because we don't have a deal yet. so we'll see whether he's conceded or not if he ever gets a deal.

49:19Nayeema Raza:He's certainly come around to other world leaders quickly enough. Yeah, like on trade, on tariffs and everything. Just like hanging out with them. He hates them, then he likes them. We talked about Zeran Mamadani, who's not a world leader, the New York mayor, but there's a flip-flop. I'm not talking about Javi on this. My footnote to that is, yes, stand firm, but on interests that matter, not simply on principle. Then deliver the goods, follow through on the promises that you... Oh, very important. And he gets an F on that one. An F. Okay. Contain the costs, which is like not, basically it's like don't spend so much that you can't keep the negotiation going.

49:57That's what he means by that? Don't spend?

49:59Nayeema Raza:Keep your expenses under control. Yeah. Again, I'm not sure that he's doing it, but I could see why he would say that. Yeah. It seems like an expensive war. Exactly. A very expensive war for, so far, pretty minimal return. For an American taxpayer. This one, I think he might be getting an A on, although the rest of us certainly aren't. Have fun. If you're not enjoying it, what's the point? Is he having fun? I thought he was having fun. When he writes long, long, this is my pop psychology, which I should never do, but when he writes these long screeds on Truth Social, it doesn't sound to me like he's having fun.

50:35It sounds to me like he's in the middle of the night and he's frustrated because people are saying that he's not doing well enough. But for the most part, I think he, yeah, He probably tries to have fun.

50:43Nayeema Raza:What I appreciate is when he thanks us for our attention to the matter at the end. I appreciate that. He does have a sense of humor, I must say. And I have often thought that he's quite a funny guy. I wish that he was in a different line of work. I would like to see him in the Greg Gutfeld slot. Actually, that's an interesting thought. Think big again. Oh, he ends with think big? I like thinking big. If you're going to be thinking anyways, you might as well think big. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. I mean, listen, and that's why I had greater, again, not the guy I voted for, but I had greater faith when he was elected a second time.

51:17I thought maybe he's going to try to make, big idea of make peace with Iran. You know, first term he said he wanted the mother of all negotiations, a deal between Israelis and Palestinians. I was more skeptical, but, you know, he has one advantage, which he doesn't mention here, which I really think is one that I thought would get him farther in terms of where I wanted him to go. He's immune to the laws of politics. He believes he's immune to most laws, but he's definitely immune to the laws of politics. So he could say things about, say, Israel that none of his predecessors would have dreamt of saying.

51:54Never. And he could do something like, for example, open up a discussion with Hamas, the organization that is on our list of terrorist organizations. I think that was the right thing to do. None of his presidents would have done it.

52:06Nayeema Raza:Yeah, you've long advocated for this. I mean, I've advocated engaging with them, at least I engaged with them as a non-official when I was at the crisis group, and I was pilloried for that. But I don't understand how if you're in a conflict and you want to resolve it, you're not going to talk to them on the partisan conflict. But that's a different matter. But he can do it because he doesn't care about the political blowback. And that's quite remarkable. I think if we had a president who combined his imperviousness to the day-to-day political cost, with a vision, morals, ethics, you'd have a winning ticket.

52:37He's missing one of those two.

52:39Nayeema Raza:Do you ever imagine, I mean, the US and Israel have long enjoyed a special relationship. Marco Rubio, of course, came out at the beginning of this Iran war saying something that was hard to imagine, which is that the US had known that Bibi Netanyahu was going to go to war with Iran anyways, and knowing that they decided they should act first. I mean, lots of abdication of America's own agency. in that? Yeah, why don't you buy it? No, I don't think that that's why we went to war. I think actually they were looking for a reason and for some reason they thought that was a good one because Secretary Rubio's argument was, we knew Israel was going to go to war.

53:16We knew that Iran would retaliate and they would retaliate against us and then people would criticize us if we had, more than criticize us if we had lost American lives because, now the easy answer to that is the U.S. could have told Israel you're not going to strike. And believe me, Prime Minister Netanyahu would have listened to President Trump. That's another strength that President Trump has is that when he says something to Netanyahu, he listens.

53:36Nayeema Raza:Has any other U.S. president had the power over Bibi Netanyahu that Donald Trump does? Without a doubt. Without a doubt. And does Donald Trump have sufficient power over Bibi Netanyahu to really change his actions? I believe that if tomorrow President Trump said the war in Iran is over, the war in Lebanon is over, whatever he says, I think Netanyahu would acquiesce. There may be some things he wouldn't. if he told them tomorrow you have to withdraw from all of the West Bank and Gaza and accept the Palestinian state, I think Netanyahu would say, no, thank you. But things like this, I genuinely think the president could make it happen.

54:12Again, I wish that he would use that influence to better ends.

54:16Nayeema Raza:The US and Israel have long enjoyed a special relationship with a big blank check, maybe bigger depending on who's in power, but big blank check. Do you ever see that changing? So if you'd asked me a few years ago, I'd say, you know, definitely not in my lifetime. I'm too much of a cynic to see that happening right now, given the polling numbers among young Americans, even just changes about what elected officials are saying. I mean, to hear politicians now running away from AIPAC, the - They don't want to take AIPAC money for the pro-Israel lobby, yeah. 40 senators voting against an arms, you know, one arms deal, arms sale to Israel.

55:00It's just, there's been a shift. The public opinion polling, yeah. There's been a shift. How, you know, there's always a bit of a lag between public sentiment and Congress and administration and the executive branch, but it's moving much faster than I would have expected. I think there have been several accelerants. It's demographic, but one was the war in Gaza and what number, you know, what Americans saw. And then this Iran war in some ways is a greater political accelerant because a number of elected officials are viewing this as a time when we're in the wrong war propelled by the actor that we are subsidizing.

55:33And so they say, so whether that's true or not, and I actually, I take the view that this is President Trump's war, it's not Netanyahu's war, but I think there's this image or this concept that he pushed us into this at the expense of our national interests, and we cannot continue to subsidize. And then the other reasons, you know, Israel is a wealthy country. Why should the U.S. be giving them assistance? So I do think the debate is shifting in ways that I never would have recognized. And as I say, I teach and I see young Americans and the kind of debates they're having. They're not all on one side, but it is light years away from my, I was on the same campus 40 years ago, and it's a completely different discussion.

56:13Nayeema Raza:Dave Chappelle, someone I don't think you thought I was going to ask you about. You seem surprised. It was 2024 November comedy special. I went to go see a Madison Square Garden, tells the story of a school shooting. And he says, you know, there's this guy who was bullying this other guy, and the kid shoots that kid. Maybe we'll play a clip of the joke. But he says, and then this kid brings a gun to school, shoots another kid who was bullying him. And what the state decided to do was to press charges against the dad. because the dad had the gun and had given basically the kid the access to the gun.

56:49Nayeema Raza:You see where this is going. So the metaphor, then he draws the conclusion that, or he draws the logic in his joke that in the story, Palestine is the bully that got shot in the face. Israel is a shooter and America's daddy. Do you think that's a fair metaphor? You'd have to watch it to comment on it. So I don't want to say because I may get in trouble. You might. So I don't know. But I mean, it's a point I made earlier that I think there was something. So I think every generation, yours, mine, whatever, there's a moment in which they awaken to foreign policy. And for me, it was two things. One, when I was quite young, my parents were talking about Vietnam.

57:34And I grew up with a certain image of American foreign policy and the use of military power. And then later, the Iraq War, the second Iraq War. And so I have my certain vision of the use of American power, the misuse of American power. I think this generation is going to grow up with the marker for them is going to be Gaza and the role the U.S. played and didn't play in enabling and not stopping the war. And it goes to this point. I mean, of all the things the Biden administration said, and, you know, some things they did that are better or worse than others, but when they said we're working tirelessly for a ceasefire.

58:11It just, that was a completely implausible statement when they were continuing to arm the side that was firing. It just, those two things. And I think for so many young Americans, when they heard that, it just, something went off and they said, our country can't be doing this. And I think, so when you asked me, do I think that there's going to be a change? I think there'll be a change because that generation, when they come, when they're going to be the next - They're going to make decisions. Yeah. Yeah, exactly.

58:38Nayeema Raza:They're going to be running the world one day. One day. And they're going to have different perspectives on this. You've written this book, Tomorrow's Yesterday, and again, the subtitle is Life, Death, and the Pursuit of Peace in Israel and Palestine. Many people will die before there is probably peace in Israel and Palestine. But this is about the pursuit. This is about the pursuit, which you are deep in. Why the title, Tomorrow's Yesterday? I mean, for a very simple reason. We are living today not a rupture from the past. October 7th was not a rupture. Israel's slaughter that follows was not a rupture.

59:08America's enabling and impotence and hypocrisy was not a rupture. They're reenactments of the past. And in fact, if you look at where Israelis and Palestinians are today, they're back to where they were decades ago. Palestinians adrift, lost without a leadership. Israelis conquering but not sure what to do with their victory. Increasingly isolated worldwide. So there's so much in what we're seeing today that is a reenactment of what we saw in the past, which the second, you know, the corollary to that is that the years of the peace process in which Hussein and I participated were evanescent. They were almost meaningless.

59:48If you, after all that time, we're back where we were in terms of the raw emotions that are animating this conflict. And our message is, if you don't want tomorrow to be yesterday, you have to understand what this conflict was really about. And it's not about what Americans thought it was about.

1:00:00Nayeema Raza:I remember studying in Nick Burns' class, like one of, I think it was Nick Burns, or maybe it was Professor Mandel, but one of my professors at the Kennedy School of Government, spoke about this conflict between Israel and Palestine is irreconcilable because of two issues. You can never square the math on settlements and the right to return. There just isn't enough land to make this equation work. I'll try to remember who said that. That's quite perceptive. I'm not saying that it's irreconcilable. Yeah, yeah. I don't think you're saying that. But I think the two-state solution, as it was conceived at Camp David and afterwards, is too narrow a confine to fit the history, the emotions, the fears, the yearnings of both sides, which go well beyond an issue of where's the border of 67, where are you going to draw the line?

1:00:41I mean, you know, Jews have this well-founded fear of extermination and of having been persecuted. And so they want sort of something that is akin to absolute security, which is hard to distinguish from absolute supremacy. And Palestinians have this yearning for return, justice, redemption, recovery of what they lost, which is very hard to reconcile with the current reality. And so I think that we have to think about the conflict in a different way if it's going to be resolved.

1:01:08Nayeema Raza:Yeah, and one of the things that you really kind of like pull apart in this is that our reliance on this, like it sounds like it's almost like platitude at this point, a two-state solution, a two-state equal solution, an egalitarian solution between two states. And you're like, that is not - It's rhetoric that hides impotence and that hides passivity and allowing the status quo to get worse and worse and worse, even as you continue to recite that term. There's a quote that you use in the book, which I did write down and I want to read, which is you quote I.F. Stone. And he wrote something in the New Yorker Review of Books, I think.

1:01:40Nayeema Raza:He said, Both Israelis and Arabs feel that only force can shore justice. On this they agree, and this sets them on a collision course. And reading that, I thought, wow, that was written 50 years ago. It feels still— I mean, his piece was extraordinarily prescient, if you go back to it. Yeah, and he had his own— So I.F. Stone was a remarkable journalist who had, an investigative journalist, I think, who had his own kind of evolution on the theory. He played a big role in Hussein Agha's education, as we say. Oh, really? I didn't know that. Just because he met him and opened his eyes to all kinds of what Judaism could be and what it meant to be somebody who's fighting for peace.

1:02:19So, yeah.

1:02:19Nayeema Raza:I thought that was a remarkable quote because I was thinking what would make it not true. And I think this kind of links back to that first question about, and really how I interpreted the book. and I have to confess I'm not done with it. I'm like 67 % of the way through the book. It's much more optimistic at the end. Is what is needed for violence to not be the only kind of agreeable zone that these two communities live in for the US to kind of retreat from its position or evolve its position or, you know, what is it? You talk about a negotiation between two unequal parties mediated by a powerful third who sides with the stronger of them.

1:02:54Nayeema Raza:Yeah. And so this, and you mentioned that earlier too, but like, is that what's going to be the unlock or what is the unlock? I mean, so the real unlock has to be between Israelis and Palestinians. It's their conflict. They're going to have to find a way to coexist. But I do think if you take a step back and think what impact did the U.S. have over these years, it's hard to think of an impact that was positive. I mean, and we go through the list of things that the U.S. interference with the relationship between the two sides has actually made things worse. So as a thought experiment, we invite readers to think, what would it look like if the U.S.

1:03:27had never been involved? Now, what does that mean? Does it mean no arms sales? Does it mean no votes at the Security Council? What does non-involvement mean? But in so many ways, the U.S. has warped the playing field. And actually, so warped the playing field in terms of the asymmetry of power between the two, in terms of allowing Israel to not have to pay any price for the continued occupation. But also on the Palestinian side, We created a culture of dependency on the part of the Palestinian Authority and making them, they could stay in power through American diplomatic and economic support.

1:04:00So it has had a whole series, and the U.S. has excluded other third parties, Arab parties, others. So it's had a whole series of negative effects. Changing that would be a real plus, but ultimately Israelis and Palestinians are going to have to find a way.

1:04:13Nayeema Raza:Who's the right negotiator, mediator, if not the Americans? Is it the Jordanians? I mean, it's hard to think. Today, it's hard to think of anyone else because Israel is not going to listen to anyone else. And if Israel is not going to listen, then where are you going to go? So I'm not sure that there is—I'm not searching for that third party that is not America. But there are other parties that could make their influence felt. One thing President Obama said to us as we were leaving the administration, which is, I think, a lesson that everyone should take to heart. He said, you know, people always say Netanyahu is being irrational.

1:04:50He is leading Israel to perdition. It's either going to be Jewish or democratic. It can't be both. We have to shake them out of their rationality. And what the president said was, after having been in office for eight years.

1:05:02Nayeema Raza:And hot mic to on Bibi Netanyahu once. Right. Were you there for that? No. Okay. And he said, Bibi is not being irrational. We're the ones who are rational. We, the ones who say he's irrational, who think that he's going to change course simply because we tell him to do so, if he's not paying any price for the course he's on, Israel is doing what anyone would do under the conditions when there's no price to be paid for the perpetuation of the status quo. So either we change the cost-benefit for them, or this is going to continue. Now, even if you change the cost-benefit, as I said, I think Israelis and Palestinians are going to have to go through the hard work because I don't, you know, we offer some ideas about how that land could be a land of coexistence rather than a land of conflict.

1:05:41But it's not easy.

1:05:42Nayeema Raza:I haven't finished the whole book, but I don't think you have the answer. No, no. And we say very openly, this is not a time for blueprint or for answers. It's a time for, because some of ours yesterday, going back and restarting the path. Assessing. Yeah. Yeah. Usually I like to read people their bad reviews. I like print them out and then read people their bad reviews. But I didn't. Yeah. People quite enjoy it. Like, you know, bizarrely people enjoy it. Because they've read them themselves. They would like a chance to overbought. But in this case, I mean, I think one of the critiques of the book is like, you don't have a solution, but you don't.

1:06:10I plead guilty. Yeah. Absolutely. I mean, for two reasons. One, we were associated with an idea that failed. So why would anyone trust us to say we now have the right answer? But second, today is not the moment for a ready-made solution. It would be completely absurd for somebody to say, this is how it's going to end. When they're in the midst, when they're not even, they're not talking to each other. They don't have a shared vision of what the complex is about, how it's going to end. So this is going to take time.

1:06:37Nayeema Raza:Totally. I do want to ask you as we go out, just two little sections and we'll let you go. I want to run down tactics and you can tell us, you know, just explain what the tactic is. You can give an example of when it's been used in negotiation. I'm going to ask you some advice for the rest of us in our own lives. So those of us who don't sit down and, you know, negotiate deals between heads of state. I could give good advice on life issues. I don't know. We'll see. It's not you. It's whether or not these tactics will work in our personal lives. Okay. So strategic ambiguity. Define it. And maybe either using Israel, Palestine, or using Iran.

1:07:12Nayeema Raza:Give an example of strategic ambiguity. Okay. Good example. The Oslo Agreement. Never says whether there's going to be a state or not, a Palestinian state. It leaves that vague. That's strategic ambiguity. And the goal was that's the way you get both sides to reach agreement. because one side could believe it says a state and the other side could say it doesn't. Did it work in the Israeli-Palestinian case? Absolutely not. But does it work in personal relations? I wouldn't be a big fan. I'm not a big fan. Yeah, I don't think you should be going home to your partner. No, and if she listens to this song, telling her I definitely disagree with it, I reject it absolutely.

1:07:50Nayeema Raza:Exactly. What about deadlines? Or in relationships, we call these ultimatums. We've read several from Truth Social here today.

1:08:02Only if you absolutely mean it and believe it and will live up to it. Because the first deadline that you ignore, as President Trump did, means that the next deadline, which may be the right one, will lose credibility because nobody's going to believe it. Now, I've done this so if my kids are listening to this, I would tell them, if you're not in bed by 7 o 'clock, you're not going to have dessert for the rest of your life. What kind of authoritarian are you? No, I'm talking when they were, whatever time. Yeah. And so I'd give them those ultimatums. The first time I ignored, I violated my own ultimatum, they never believed me again.

1:08:35So ultimatums only when they are absolutely serious.

1:08:39Nayeema Raza:We just have two more. One is traveling light. So like this is, you know, just sending Kushner and Wittkopf because you just have a small stealth team show up for the deal? Because it kind of, I believe, shows that these people can do what they need to do in the room. That they're empowered. They're empowered. So I think at the beginning of a negotiation, this is what happened with Obama in 20... This was before I was there. Jake Sullivan and Bill Burns both went to Oman for secret talks. Just the two, maybe they were accompanied by one or two other people. That was to break the ice and to see, do we even have the possibility of a deal?

1:09:14Once you break the back and you sort of discover the DNA of the deal, then the big teams could come. But I wouldn't start with a big team.

1:09:23Nayeema Raza:What about walking away? That's the last one. Everyone does it, right? I mean, Secretary Kerry walked away. Zarif walked away. You pack your bags. We did that. These Israelis did it at Camp David. They pack their bags. Again, you could use it. It's like anybody who's had a relationship remembers being on a holiday with someone and packing a suitcase. Yeah, but I don't think people do it in a relationship. Do you do it as a tactic? It's bad if you do it. But usually you mean it, right? Esther Perel would say bad idea, I think. Yeah, but I think you mean it then. I think to use it as a tactic...

1:09:52Nayeema Raza:Oh, it was complete theater when people would do it. But that's what they did. When the suitcases are out, it's just projected to the other side and prepared to leave. I think if you really are prepared to leave, yeah, sure, but some of this gamesmanship, you could do it once, maybe twice, and then it loses all credibility. What is the one thing you've learned in over 30 years of this, like a negotiation tactic or principle that you would advise everyone to use in their marriages or life relationships or with their kids? Put yourself in the other person's shoes. Yeah. Yeah. That's the one I would apply in political negotiations, in life, anything.

1:10:31Yeah.

1:10:32Nayeema Raza:There is a sense right now that the world is in a very different position than it was 5, 10, 15 years ago. Mark Carney, of course, the Prime Minister of Canada, alluded to this in his speech at the World Economic Forum. I think like having read your biography, you were born to parents who your father was a journalist. Egyptian. Egyptian journalist. Your mother is Jewish? They both are Jewish. Okay, but you grew up with a kind of international family where Jewish parents, Egyptian father, who spent much of his life thinking about Africa. You grew up in New York and Paris. I grew up in Asia, Africa, and D.C.

1:11:06Nayeema Raza:I think we're both, technical term might be globo trash. Do you think that that - It was your trash when I was growing up. Your trash. Well, mine was in Asia and Africa, so it had to be more expansive than your title. I just, like I look at the world. I'm curious how you look at this world and if you agree with Mark Carney's assessment of the international rules-based order. Do you think it ever existed? Do you think it's a… So I take a slightly more jaundiced view, but even he is quite jaundiced. He says it was never a perfectly fair world, but at least it had some rules that you could apply.

1:11:45Footnote, I would have more respect for what he said as soon as the Iran war was launched, only two weeks, I think, after the World Economic Forum. he didn't side with, or if he had condemned the war as a violation of international law, I would have respected that position more. I think he since has corrected, but there was a real, I think for people in the global South, they heard Carney, they said, oh, here's somebody who's going to stand on principle. And the first opportunity that came was a completely unlawful, illegal war waged by the US and Canada expressed understanding for the US. But put that aside, I don't -

1:12:18Nayeema Raza:It doesn't sound like you have, but yes, continue. No, I'm saying you could put it aside. Yeah, I could put it aside, yes. You know, I did grow up in a world and a background where I did see this, you know, from the perspective of my parents and everything, that this notion that we were abiding by rules-based, international rules-based order, liberal order, I think a lot of that was fantasy. and so in some respect to have people calling a spade a spade and saying now we're living in this world where we could see that there are no norms and no rules and we have to invent a world in which the norms are going to be universally applied if it can be so there's something about that now i wouldn't say that what we're living today is not worse than what we were living in the past i mean in terms of the complete erosion of norms in terms of the laws of war in terms of humanitarian law.

1:13:06I mean, now everything goes. It's a free-for-all. But I don't think, I'm not as nostalgic as others are for the era of sort of unipolarity or the era where the U.S. was supposedly making rules that it applied in a very, very selective way. So I'm somewhere in between. I think, let's not be overly nostalgic, but at the same time, it does mean that I celebrate where we are today.

1:13:33Nayeema Raza:So you said at the top of this conversation that it was a fruitless labor in the last 30 years. Would you keep doing it? Say the Democrats are back in power or another Republican may be back in power in two or three years? I think there are many ways to do it without being in government. I have no idea what my future is. I'm pretty doubtful that I'll go back, but it depends. If there's a president who I really admire and who likes me and who is prepared to take whatever risk, because there's always risk, I come with some baggage, then who knows? But I think there are many ways to make a difference that don't entail public service.

1:14:13Nayeema Raza:Do you think it'll be solved in your lifetime, the Israel-Palestine conflict? Not solved. I think we might be in a different state of resolution, but I don't think it's going to be solved. In your kid's lifetime? I hope. Yeah. Yeah. All right. Thank you so much, Robert Malley, for joining us today. Thank you. Okay, but you didn't... I was warned that you were going to ask me a question, but you didn't ask me, which I'm fine not answering. Which is the question? Oh, fuck. I didn't ask the last dumb question. Guys, I was warned. Wait, thank God that Rob is producing the fucking podcast. Okay. Rob, I end every episode of Smart Girl Dumb Questions asking my guests who are so knowledgeable about their own worlds what is something that they are really dumb about, a dumb question that you've been kind of embarrassed to ask out loud.

1:14:55there's one that's been torturing me forever why do people cry more when they watch movies on a plane

1:15:02Nayeema Raza:oh you don't know the answer I don't know the answer I feel like I do does anyone know I feel like I've read this you feel like you do that doesn't help I know it doesn't help either we're not going to look it up we're going to wait until it comes into our consciousness and I definitely do you do what's the last movie you cried during it doesn't matter any movie but just say which one you flew today didn't you no but it was from California you don't cry sentimental value but that one was a sad one But sometimes I'm not sad at all. And I come home and I tell my family, you've got to watch it. Is it tearjerker?

1:15:28Not at all. But anyway, so if you have the answer, let me know.

1:15:30Nayeema Raza:It's something physiological, I believe. About the plane? About like your, I think it's like hydration. I don't know. I'm not going to spread misinformation about this podcast. No, you just have. Exactly. I'll see. All right. Thank you so much, Ron. Thank you. Appreciate you.

1:15:46Nayeema Raza:I'm so glad Robert Malley made the time for that conversation because I don't think we often get that insider's view into the negotiation kind of pulled out of the news of the moment. So I appreciated hearing his stories. It broke my heart when he said that the work had been fruitless over decades because obviously, yeah, I just want to believe that there's hope and there's like a product of all the effort to get to peace in a world where that seems very far away right now. I have a lot to think about, unpack around kind of where we go from here. I asked Rob on his way out what to look out for in these negotiations.

1:16:21Nayeema Raza:By the time you guys are hearing this six days after we tape it, I don't even know if these things will apply, but he said one of the main indicators is whether or not a ceasefire will be extended or back on the table, which would suggest that something is happening. Anyways, I don't know what is happening with the world these days, but I'm glad now we have a little bit more insight into how it happens, how it could happen, and the art of this particular deal or two. I want to know what you think. As always, drop me a note. I'm Naima Raza 101 at gmail.com. You should leave us a comment below or at Smart Girl Dumb Questions.

1:16:53Nayeema Raza:Please share the show with friends, the people you would like to negotiate against and not use these tactics with, your mom, whomever. This episode was produced with Desta Wunderad and Sennan Nigam. It was engineered by Colin Lee, edited by Davy Chin, and mixed by the great Johnny Simon. I'll see you next week for an all-new Smart Girl Dumb Questions.

1:17:27Thank you.