How to Save the Supreme Court From Itself

22:49What is this? The envelope's a little light here. Okay, so, but the Supreme Court has said, this seems to be actually a matter of principle for them, that corruption can be over-prosecuted. And that antedates Trump. How dangerous is that, and what are the implications of that? Yeah, so that's the case involving former Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell, but there's also the case involving Governor, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, and the so-called Bridgegate scandal, which resulted in some criminal prosecutions like closing the lanes on the GW Bridge. That's not a corruption, that's an abuse of power.

23:22So the statutes are all different. So they're all different federal statutes. But I view Kelly, which is the Bridgegate case, and McDonnell, and a case called Percoco, and a whole bunch of cases all involving slightly different federal statutes. But I think all about abuse of power, whether for personal financial gain or political advantage. I think those cases are all in the same line, basically. I mean, we could disagree about that. But I think they're all conceptually pretty connected. And kind of importantly, the Supreme Court and all of them has overturned these convictions and has held exactly as you suggested, that these prosecutions were sort of overzealous, that they ran the risk of criminalizing kind of the ordinary sort of give and take and rough and tumble of American politics.

24:03And I don't want to understate the danger of aggressive prosecutors. Obviously, we are seeing extreme danger in the second Trump era. And all of this kind of predates that. So I think the court is not wrong to be concerned about, you know, federal prosecutors standing up and saying, just trust us, we're not going to overuse these statutes. But I also think the court has badly undervalued the sort of other side of the balance, which is actually disincentivizing and punishing where appropriate really extreme abuse of public office for private gain, whether that's financial gain or political gain.

24:36And I think the court has sort of, you know, done this kind of, these have all been read as, these have been decided as statutory cases. They haven't said you have a constitutional right to kind of engage in sort of borderline corrupt activity. But I think there's this constitutional overlay, which is just kind of the vision of office holding and of politics that the court holds that they have sort of channeled through reading these statutes very narrowly. But it is a bunch of cases at this point. And has it contributed to sort of a generally cynical view of kind of the connection between corruption and self-dealing and public office holding in the minds of the sort of the people?

25:10Maybe. Is it like causally connected to the corruption that we have seen on display in the Trump White House? I don't think so. But I also think it might be connected to, you know, the kind of concern about over criminalization of, you know, successive presidents that is also part of the kind of reasoning in the Trump versus United States immunity case. They're concerned about presidents prosecuting their predecessors. And that's part of the justification for finding immunity. And so I think that is connected to the line of cases we're talking about. So let me ask, you have written and had dialogues and both in scholarly formats and in more accessible formats, but what you think should be done about these various problems.

25:46So give me some reform, your reform program. Well, I think sort of first, I think that just kind of acknowledging that there is a problem, that this is not just the ordinary liberals are unhappy when there's a conservative Supreme Court handing down conservative decisions and vice versa. I think that no one can deny that we're going to feel differently about some of the substantive decisions that the court renders based on our sort of ideological priors. But I also think that there is something deeply systemically wrong with the way the Supreme Court is functioning right now. And I do think that transcends partisanship and ideology in politics.

26:17So kind of acknowledging the problem and also having kind of democratic leadership really focus on institutional reform and the Supreme Court, I think, is critical sort of right now and in the kind of years to come. Okay, so I don't want to filibuster in terms of what specifically. I mean, there's a kind of a handful of options. So there are structural reforms to the Supreme Court that could take the form of things like term limits, which are actually really popular, have super majority support, even have majority Republican support, according to some recent Brennan Center polling. But something like 70 percent of the American public would support, say, 18 year term limits for the justices.

26:53So that, I think, is one fairly straightforward and kind of easy to galvanize public support for kind of reform. You'd have to figure out how exactly to design it because the Supreme Court justices have always been understood to hold their offices for life. Wouldn't that take a constitutional amendment to change? I don't think so. It depends on how you structure it. So if you basically said you get to stay a justice for life, but after 18 years, you become a senior justice. So you don't sit and hear every single case the courtiers argued. You keep your salary. You keep your justice title. But you can sit if there's a recusal and they need a different justice, you can sit.

27:28Otherwise, you can sit by designation on the courts of appeals. You can write circuit. So again, you get the things the Constitution has been understood to guarantee you. The Constitution actually doesn't say life tenure. It just says they hold their offices during good behavior, which has always been understood to mean life tenure. But there are, I think, different ways to give that life tenure. It doesn't need to be you stay on the court until you decide to leave or you pass away, which has happened with a lot of justices. So that's, I think, one possibility. And I don't think it would require a constitutional amendment.

27:55I think a statute would be enough if you structured it kind of carefully. you know, you could increase the size of the Supreme Court. There's nothing in the Constitution that sets the size of the Supreme Court. So it was six. It's been bigger before. It's been smaller before. It's been six. It's been seven. It's been 10. It's been nine for about 150 years. But, you know, the last sort of major effort to threaten and pursue court expansion was FDR. And that would have been an expansion of the court up to six additional justices. So it would have been up to 15. Obviously, that proposal never passed, but arguably Roosevelt's sort of threats to increase the size of the court had their intended effect, which is that the Supreme Court stopped striking down all this New Deal legislation.

28:35And so, you know, it a little bit mooted the need to do court expansion. So that's another possibility. Grow the size of the court, again, could happen definitely by statute. That for sure wouldn't require a constitutional amendment. What about ethics reforms? What would you recommend? That all seems so straightforward and also, you know, has extremely broad support. I mean, And the Supreme Court is essentially a self-regulating body. Just kind of actually subjecting the Supreme Court in a mandatory binding way to the same code of conduct that governs other federal judges seems like a no-brainer.

29:05And at the moment, we don't have it. And the justices have, at least some of them, publicly voiced some skepticism about Congress's ability even to, by statute, regulate things like their ethics. Alito gave an interview to the Wall Street Journal in 2023, I think, in which he basically said there's nothing in the Constitution that gives Congress the power to regulate us, which is just wrong. The Constitution explicitly gives the power to Congress to regulate the Supreme Court. But I think that that kind of sort of kind of hubris, that kind of comment, I think, evinces is emblematic of, I think, a lot of the way the Supreme Court seems to conceive of itself sort of outside of and not kind of an active participant in our system of separated powers.

29:44Okay, so what would the code of conduct include? Mandatory gift and disclosure rules, clear recusal standards, maybe a requirement of reason giving around recusals, maybe some kind of enforcement body, an inspector general for the Supreme Court is something that Congressman Raskin has talked about and others have as well. So some kind of, you know, entity that has a little bit of critical distance from the justices that actually enforces compliance with a binding code of ethics, I think, seems like it would be a really positive development. So I think I would support all of that. Well, let me give you my concern about the term limit and tell me how you would overcome this or if you think I'm unrealistic.

30:24So you're on the court for 18 years and you're appointed in your 50s. You are going to probably these days, mercifully, this is a great achievement of science and technology, but you'll live into your 80s or even your 90s. You come off the court in your early 70s. And at that point, you come off active duty, as you say. At that point, you discover a lot of interesting opportunities. And depending on how you've ruled, the opportunities might be more interesting or the opportunities might be less interesting. You know, if you've come through for Google, you're on the Google board. If you haven't come through for Google, you're not on the Google board.

30:57You're of counsel at a million dollars a year or you're of counsel at$100 ,000 a year. So how would you overcome that sense that you've seen in some other peer democracies that have these kinds of effective rule limits on their term limits that you invite judges to think about this is not your last job. Actually, your most lucrative job is the one you get after the Supreme Court. So, yes, I mean, that's certainly an objection that gets raised. I would say a couple of things in response. One, in some ways right now, we have like the worst of all possible worlds, which is you can get you can reap some of these benefits not sitting on boards, but, you know, having billionaire benefactors while you continue to enjoy the sort of power and prestige and, you know, kind of intellectual feast, et cetera, of being a Supreme Court justice.

31:40So kind of an unregulated life tenure system doesn't seem to be, to my mind, at least a perfect kind of guard against the possibility of corruption. But right, the fact or the idea that these justices would always be looking for their next opportunity and that that would sort of color their decision making. I mean, I think maybe that's really a couple of a couple of answers. One, I think that if we're talking about an 18 year limit, the incentive for presidents to nominate younger and younger justices would sort of no longer be particularly relevant. So I think you probably would have a slightly older cadre of nominees, which I think would probably be to the good.

32:10I mean, these are hard jobs and you do want people deeply experienced, ideally with a few different time in the executive branch, maybe in the legislative branch, maybe on the bench in a private practice, so that they're not going to leave with like decades yet of kind of law practice ahead of them. So I think that's kind of one answer. And two, there's not really anything stopping the scenario you're describing from happening right now. They can leave voluntarily if they want and take up a lucrative post in the private sector at a law firm or elsewhere. So I'm just not sure that the system we have right now really guards against all of those possibilities to the extent that they're so concerning if we were to implement the sort of change that an 18-year limit would reflect.

32:47What would you do about changing the attitude of judges toward their easygoing attitude toward corruption? Is that something that the statutes may not pass constitutional muster? Maybe they'll be more tolerant of congressional statutes than they are of state statutes, but maybe not. How do you make the Supreme Court say, you know what, we actually, this is one of those moments that occurs at intervals. There's one of the 70s. There was one of the 1910s. When American society decides, you know what, we want politics to be a little cleaner than it was in the previous generation. I mean, I think you're right, that's hard.

33:18None of these reform measures that we're talking about necessarily sort of speak directly to this. I think that there are proposals out there. This is a slightly different kind of category of reform proposal, but a proposal that would require not just a simple majority, but a super majority vote of the justices to, say, strike down an act of Congress. So that, to the extent that we're talking about federal statutes, that I think could matter, right? So now some of these anti-corruption measures have been invalidated unanimously, like in the Virginia case, McDonald was a unanimous opinion. So that, you know, that doesn't change the outcome there.

33:53But I do think that that's both as to these kind of public corruption questions, but also kind of more broadly to the court's sort of eagerness to impose its own vision on the country, regardless of what the elected representatives have chosen. That could make a difference. So some state Supreme Courts have these. And again, there are scholars like Daphna Renan and Nico Bowie at Harvard who proposed statutorily requiring what they call consensus, or you can think of a supermajority requirement. So if you're going to strike down act of Congress passed by the legislature, signed by a president, it doesn't just take five, but six or seven or eight justices consensus to do that.

34:25And that, I think, again, would maybe speak to the specific anti-corruption question, but also more broadly to the court's eagerness to invalidate, you know, enactments of the elected branches. One more hypothesis. Maybe the true villains of the story here, from your point of view, are Democratic voters. Republican voters have regarded the court as issue number one and have made a lot of compromises. That was the big argument. If you were a reluctant Republican in 2016 to vote for Trump is, well, you get the justices you want. And enough people seemingly accepted that as a good enough reason to overcome qualms.

35:00Democratic voters have not made the court an issue. Hillary Clinton and her supporters didn't argue that very hard in 2016 at a time when it really might have made a difference. And Democratic voters are also don't seem willing to reinvent, to think about their party in a way. How do we get enough majority in the Senate, given the way this, the lopsidedness of the state balance in the country, you can't run very liberal senators all the time and expect that you'll have the kind of majority in the Senate to confirm or block Supreme Court justices. I think I would probably put more fault at the feet of Democratic politicians than Democratic voters.

35:33But obviously, you're identifying a really important phenomenon. There has been this asymmetry and the kind of degree to which Republican voters have kind of centered the Supreme Court and their kind of voting lives and the kind of complete disinterest. And again, Democratic elected officials, and I think Democratic voters in doing the same with the Supreme Court. I mean, I think there's something kind of there is something sort of principled kind of that is at the root of this, which is that I think that, you know, using the courts to do policymaking is not something that Democratic officials are that enthusiastic about.

35:59And I think that's because courts are not supposed to be doing policymaking. But I think that, you know, in this period, sort of the post-Roe period in which it felt like the courts were going to be sort of more within reach than, you know, the House of Representatives, which was like, you know, sort of viewed as essentially Democratic forever. And, you know, the presidency was sort of maybe switched back and forth. But you also had a lot of kind of progressive legislation from the 60s and the 70s. Courts felt like the place that you could actually go and win. And I mean, the Senate as well. And so I just think that there was a sort of strategic focus on the Supreme Court on the right in a way that they're just, that the left is very, very far kind of behind in.

36:36But I'm hopeful that that tide is turning a bit. So if I've got your full list of proposed reforms, I hope I haven't missed one. If I miss one, please fill it in. What do you want to conserve? You're a liberal-minded person, but lawyers are a pretty conservative profession. even the teaching part of the legal profession with an eye of how easily things could be worse rather than better. What is important not to change? Well, let me just say one thing that we haven't talked about in terms of reforms, if that's okay, which is shadow docket reforms. So the court, in addition to the way that the court ordinarily decides cases, which is the parties file briefs, there's oral arguments, the justices deliberate, and they write usually a long opinion, and there's a dissent, and the public can read the opinion and understand the reasoning of the justices for ruling for one party versus the other.

37:19There is this other way that the court does its business, which is on what we talk about or refer to as either the shadow docket or the emergency docket, something that has existed for a long time, but that has gotten far more use in the last year and change since Trump took office for the second time than it ever had before. And that is these kind of emergency appeals that head to the Supreme Court directly from a lower court opinion and ask the court to essentially intervene and to block whatever lower court ruling has gone into effect, at least temporarily while the full litigation plays out.

37:49And that used to be something that was very rarely sought and even more rarely granted. And Trump has, with his Justice Department, gone again and again to the Supreme Court on the shadow docket since last January and has over two dozen times won in these very high-stakes cases involving the ability to kick every trans member out of the military, to render individuals to third countries, so countries they don't have any connection to if they are to be deported. But where is the question has allowed these roving immigration patrols to engage in these sort of suspicionless detentions in Los Angeles.

38:25So that's three examples of cases the court weighed in after a lower court had ruled that the administration's action was unlawful. The Supreme Court weighed in and allowed the administration to go forward with its action without giving one word of explanation as to why. And that's happened many, many times. And that's something I think the court should not be permitted to do. It should have to give reasons if it's going to block or stay what a lower court has done, especially if the lower court has given reasons for what it is concluded. So that's the last thing. So, okay, what to preserve? I mean, look, I do think the court, when it's functioning properly, plays an important but limited role.

39:01So I do think the kind of ensuring that democracy functions so people can translate preferences to policy is critical. And the court hasn't done that. But I would like to preserve a Supreme Court that is able to because, you know, the political process is not particularly good at self-regulating, right? The beneficiaries of any kind of set of rules governing politics, sometimes they do self-denying things, right? Like Congress passing campaign finance regulation actually is like a pretty self-denying thing Congress has done. But typically legislative bodies are not, you know, the best at self-regulating.

39:31Maybe nobody is great at self-regulating. But that I think is one thing that courts critically are for. But they're also, I think, about protecting core individual rights. especially the kinds of rights that are underprotected by a majoritarian political process. And obviously, we might disagree about what those rights are, but the court, I think, has overprotected rights that actually have a lot of popular support. So all of these cases in which it has weighed in on the side of religious liberty to invalidate democratically chosen either laws or school board policies in favor of objecting kind of Christian, typically parents, in a majority Christian nation is just an odd exercise of the judicial power, right?

40:12You're protecting a majority even when the majority has decided to regulate the majority. And it is underprotected vulnerable minorities. And so I'd like to see it sort of, you know, kind of essentially right that ship of protecting underprotected rights and not overprotecting those that the polity has decided to restrict because of important countervailing interests like the separation of church and state. Isn't one of the central questions about the Supreme Court dating back to the beginning of the Republic. Why should anybody listen to you? And that has a question that has often haunted the court.

40:42It's there in Marbury versus Madison, the case that established judicial review, and they established judicial review by refusing to do an action, not trying to do one. And the answer to the question, why should anybody listen to you, has often rested on kind of myth-making. The robes, the aura of impersonality, that the lack of attention we pay to who these people are. I mean, even the fact that when you see an opinion, we don't use first names. It's, you know, Kavanaugh Jay. The first name is Justice. Yeah. Exactly. Exactly. And one of the questions I wonder about is in the present mood among liberal-minded people of disgust with the court, whether that mood of disgust then breaches the myth-making, which is myth.

41:28It's myth, admittedly myth, but then leaves the court ultimately indefensible because what have they got if they don't have their myth? Yeah. And I mean, I think there are some people on the left who would say, yes, like, let's accelerate that process because at this point, like, there's not much worth preserving. And I don't count myself in that category. I do think that they are in danger. You mentioned, you know, Marbury versus Madison, 1803, which announces the power to say what the law is. But the court is very kind of judicious in its deployment of that power for most of its history. So it's 1803.

41:56The court, you know, declares it gets to say what the law is, but actually doesn't do anything with that power in 1803. In 1857, so it's, you know, it's Dred Scott versus Sanford is the next case the Supreme Court actually uses this power of judicial review to invalidate federal statute. That's, you know, half a century, over half a century later in this, you know, critically important case that is part of the kind of march toward the Civil War. But the court is just, for most of its history, very, very sparing in its deployment of this awesome power to invalidate things that the, you know, democratic, process has produced.

42:31And I just don't think we have seen any of that kind of forbearance, restraint on the part of this Supreme Court. And I do think that that does put us in a position of kind of the court's legitimacy being jeopardized. And not just Jack Balkan at Yale talks about this kind of, you know, partisan support for the court sort of waxes and wanes depending on sort of who controls the court and what kinds of decisions it's handing down. But this sort of diffuse support for the court has really cratered in the last couple of decades of people who don't pay that much attention. And that, I think, is a genuine, potentially existential threat to the court and its legitimacy.

43:06And if you think that it plays, again, as I think it does, a limited, but when operating properly, important role in our system, that's dangerous. Because I think you sort of look around at the kind of political branches of government at the moment and the idea of not having a referee or an umpire who actually stands in some sense outside of that process to sort of get things back on track when they've gone so badly sort of off track, I think is actually really scary. But I think that's where we are. That's why the proposal to make the court bigger seems to me of all the proposals the most dangerous because why is the court nine?

43:43You know it doesn't have to be. You know it didn't used to be. Sometimes there's more, sometimes there's less. I think most people think it has to be nine the way a baseball team has to be nine. That's just the way it is. And once you introduce the idea, it could be 11, it could be seven. Then people say, well, then you can do anything. And we are watching across the border in Mexico as the Supreme Court be reinvented by an authoritarian presidency. And the presidency had some gripes. I think they're not valid, but it had gripes with the Supreme Court. And it has done that and has responded to that by reinventing the Supreme Court, making it much more partisan.

44:15In a way, this completely destroyed the authority of the Supreme Court and left the Mexicans with no political resource other than the presidency itself in an intense battle for control of the presidency. I worry so much about piercing the myth of the Supreme Court and then discovering we did need it. And now we've lost it and it can't be recovered again. Yep. Yes. I mean, I think those are valid concerns and fears. And I mean, switching to a judicial election system, as I did in Mexico, I think it's not on the table here, right? So, but I think the kind of larger politicization point is a real one.

44:43I mean, I think there's also the possibility this just inaugurates an era of kind of, you know, sort of tit for tat in terms of court expansion. But you're right, it could be court expansion, It could be shrinking if the size of the court is all of a sudden up for grabs. And you're right, 150 years of settled practice is significant. Once upon a time, we used to say, well, that's kind of a settlement that everybody has agreed upon. And if it's not constitutionally mandated at this point, it's at least, again, constitutionally settled. And we don't unsettle things sort of lightly when they're that established and settled.

45:10And the problem is that the court itself has shown itself so willing to unsettle settled institutional arrangements, right? It's going to rule for despite the tariffs opinion that you mentioned. It's going to and it's probably going to rule against Trump in the Fed case, but it's going to give him virtually unlimited power to fire the heads of independent agencies. And maybe that's going to go deeper into the federal government and have implications for things like the civil service. And so the court is very willing to unsettle these kind of, you know, entrenched, established institutional arrangements and dynamics.

45:38And it just may be that the court doesn't quite realize that it is setting in motion something that it itself is going to be vulnerable to. But I think that the court has sort of set us on this path. And that doesn't mean we have to go all the way down it. But it does mean that it bears a heavy responsibility for the fact that we are kind of this far down it at all. So maybe we can't save them if they won't save themselves? Something like that. Okay, Shaw, thank you so much for making time for me today. Again, with your busy schedule, it's very appreciated. Thanks for joining the David Frum Show.

46:04Yeah, thank you so much for having me, David.

46:12A few months ago, I invited Atlantic staff writer Charlie Warzel onto the David Frum Show. As podcast hosts, we talked about the pressures and temptations of the medium. Outrage often gets rewarded. Nuance does not. Charlie doesn't take that bait. On his show Galaxy Brain, he covers the ways technology is changing how we think and how we live. Not just the obvious stuff, but the subtle ways it shapes what we believe, how we talk to each other, how we see ourselves and our neighbors. If you've ever wondered how smart people end up believing implausible things online, Galaxy Brain is worth your time.

46:49It's thoughtful, surprising, and a little unsettling in the very best way. Find it wherever you listen or watch.

47:24with one another. New episodes of How to Touch Grass come out every Monday. Subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Thanks so much to Professor Kate Shaw for joining me today on The David From Show. As I mentioned at the top of the show, my literary item this week is not a book. In fact, it's just a word. This is graduation season, and I'm interested in the word graduation because I've noticed a linguistic change that has occurred over my lifetime. I got interested in reading about it, to understand it better. And to me, it casts some interesting light on the way American culture has changed.

47:57So the word. The word is graduation or graduate. When I completed my studies in the 1980s, it would have been natural for me and my friends to say, I graduated from fill in name of university here. Or I graduated from college. I graduated from university. Or I graduated from high school. I've noticed as time has passed that younger people are increasingly prone to say, I graduated just directly. I graduated name of school. I graduated college. I graduated high school. It's very normal for those of us who grew up speaking one way to assume that we are right and those who come later are wrong. So I got interested in the question of who's right, who's wrong?

48:34Which is it? Graduated from or just simply graduated? And reading about this and through the etymology of words, I think tells us something about the way a lot of our ideas have changed, and not just about education, but about our role in society. So the word graduate comes from the Latin word gratis, meaning step. When universities began to be organized in medieval Europe and began to grant degrees, they conceptualized those degrees as steps. And it was very important to make these steps. There was great formality and dignity. The steps decreed what clothes a person could wear, what cap they could wear, whether they could wear a hood, whether they could wear fur.

49:12And of course, they also determined whether or not a member of the university community could charge fees for listening to that person's instruction or lectures. If you had a certain degree, you could charge fees. If you didn't have the degree, you couldn't charge fees. So moving up those steps of from bachelor to master to doctor, that was a very important thing attended with great formality. So it was very important to note who had been raised up a step and who had not. The Latin word graduatus was coined to describe the person who had been raised up a step or a grade. And the word graduatus is a Latin word, is a past passive participle, and it literally translates as one who has been raised up a step.

49:51Now, the passive part of this is important. The person who did the raising or the thing that did the raising was the university. The person who got the degree was the person who had been raised. And that's the origin of the older form that some of you may remember reading or hearing that he is a graduate of such and such a place, or he was graduated from such and such a place. When I was a younger person, that memory of that passive sense was still retained enough that we didn't anymore say he was graduated from, or he is a graduate of, but we did say I graduated from because our conception of what it meant to be a graduate was shifting.

50:28The star of the show was no longer of the university, it was the individual. And as our conception of life and education became more individualistic, it became natural to shift the attention from the university that granted the degree to the person who, as we thought, earned the degree. I did it. I graduated. I graduated from. And unsurprisingly, over time, that sense of individual accomplishment has only intensified. So not only did I graduate from this place, I graduated. I did it. It's me. It's my story. My cap, my gown, my parents, my photographic ceremony, my cake, my accomplishment. I did it.

51:06And what we are seeing in this shift of language is a shift of conception in which the individual becomes much more the center of individual life and much more the center of education. Now, that has some negative consequences. The student begins to think like a consumer. The student begins to make demands. It has some positive consequences as well of a person feeling more efficacious, more in charge of his or her own life. In the American story, the individual is always the hero, not the institution. And as the individual is the hero, so we can trace the change from graduated by, graduated from, graduated simply put.

51:42To all the graduates out there of the class of 2026, my congratulations to you, my congratulations to your parents. May you embark on fruitful postgraduate careers. Thanks so much to everyone for joining me today on The David Frum Show, for watching and for listening. I hope you will share and like this program on whatever social media platform you receive us on. If you are minded to support the work of this program, please consider subscribing to The Atlantic. That's the best way to support the work of all of my colleagues here at The Atlantic. Thanks for watching and for listening. See you next week on The David Fromm Show.

52:15Bye-bye.

52:40This episode of The David Fromm Show was produced by Nathaniel Fromm and edited by Andrea Valdez. It was engineered by Dave Grein. Our theme is by Andrew Edwards. Claudine Abad is the executive producer of Atlantic Audio and Andrea Baldez is our managing editor.

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