MI Rewind: Investing for Outsized Performance w/ Jeremy Deal

25:24I've been putting a lot of thought into this accounting idea where earnings are essentially understated because the company is simply reinvesting back into the business, and that is being shown as an expense on the income statement. Are a lot of the businesses you're invested in using this playbook where they aren't really optimizing for earnings today. So no matter how you look at it, they aren't going to look cheap using traditional metrics. Well, it's an opportunity to consumer tech businesses that really fit that bucket. And I know they're kind of the topic of people love to talk about technology in general, but I'm not a technologist per se.

26:01I'm interested in value situations where I believe the potential of the business or the earning power is dramatically misunderstood, whether it's because the addressable market is misunderstood and the competitive advantage or the competitive advantage is misunderstood in a business or both. And I can figure it out. I can clearly see, and it just kind of hits me over the head. Like, wow, that's obvious. It's sort of already happened, but we're just now in the business, in the harvesting phase. And yeah, of course it's not going to be in the numbers. Why would that company pay tax when the opportunity to reinvest is so high?

26:29So I think if you go back in time, some of the best performing companies, you know, companies that I admire, a company like J.B. Hunt, which is an old trucking company. It's been an incredible compounder. It's something like more than 20 ,000 % return, including dividends since the mid 80s. Or Danaher, which most value investors are largely familiar with. Companies are going through a transition like that. They're making a shift where they have an opportunity to invest in a way that's non-traditional. Domino's Pizza is another example. The beginning of the dot-com boom, when the internet came out, they were the first company pizza business to say, wow, what an opportunity to be able to sell pizza online.

27:05And I think the retail food analysts were probably really skeptical of that and said, well, you're just, they had a view on Domino's based on the price of cheese and the consumption of pizza and the market share over Pizza Hut or something. But, and maybe the tech guys that looked at Domino's said, wow, this is just a pizza company. But in reality, it was led by a team that was willing to be on the forefront of the internet revolution and basically be the first company that allowed one of the, at least that I know of at scale, that was able to kind of set up the first online pizza delivery, you could pay for a pizza with a credit card online.

27:36And being the first to do that, being a market leaders in that and leveraging technology at the time to be more than just a pizza company, but to enhance the experience and make it a better experience for the consumer in a way that made them better. And that wasn't going to be reflected in the income statement necessarily, but you would have seen a lot of debt that the company had at the time. And yeah, they didn't prioritize paying out a dividend or something. I mean, They used that money to invest in new things and be on the forefront. And it paid off. And to own Domino's at that time. And the current company has been public since the early 2000s.

28:11But whether the private equity fund or whatnot, the history of Domino's is somewhat checkered as far as the original ownership. And then it was backed by private equity. And it was taken public. And it may have been public more than once. I'm not sure. But again, not a company I own. And I'm not an expert in that. Just sort of read a few articles on it. But the story resonates with me that why they've been so successful. I mean, the stock is up over 6 ,000 % since 2004, I believe. Why they've been able to outperform. And it's because they had a reinvestment opportunity that was unique and they were willing to invest in that even if it took three, four, five years for the return to make itself apparent in an after-tax, you know, kind of the income statement.

28:51So I think that's critical if you're going to buy and hold a business that it has a long runway to reinvest in itself. And at the end of the day, there's only a few things you can do. When a board has a bunch of cash, you can either return it to shareholders, right? You can do a buyback or you can do a dividend, or you can look up and say, wow, we have this really interesting, unique opportunity in our business that we've either pioneered or it's just a happenstance. We can reinvest in that. And if that reinvestment is in the form of people, which in a modern business, that's really what's the driver of a lot of value.

29:25So if you look up and say, wow, we have this incredible opportunity, we need to hire another two or 300 engineers over the next five years. And those two or 300 engineers are hundreds of thousands of dollars a piece because they're best in breed or whatever the case, yeah, it's going to show up as an expense and it's going to look kind of ugly on the income statement until that producer returns. You need to, again, you need to have a framework. One would need to have a framework around investing in that particular company to be able to understand it beyond just cracking open the 10Q and scanning the results and saying yay or nay.

29:57I love that answer. And another idea I've heard repeatedly is that the future is really unknowable. And part of your investment philosophy is identifying businesses with significant competitive advantages that have a larger total addressable market than what the market gives them credit for. So I'm curious, how are you able to develop conviction on the long-term total addressable market of a business with accuracy if the future is just so hard to predict? And I agree with that. Let's just back up a minute. When you make an investment in any business, you are investing in the future. You're not investing in the past.

30:36So I think it's an enormous risk, an enormous risk to just assume that whatever happened in the past will happen in the future. Because what we know for sure is the future will be different than the past. So when I started out, I did a lot of mean reversion investing. And then I gravitate, I was really gravitating towards distressed investing early in my career, because it was a way like I could get kind of ahead of the market and invest in things. I think we're uninvestable by the average investor, because we could get an advantage through a lot of research. And through that experience, through investing in upside down balance sheets or really big transitions that the market mispriced or just couldn't invest in because they felt less certain.

31:17What I learned is that it doesn't really matter what you invest in. You don't know the future. So you may really believe that you have insight. You may have talked to every single customer. You may have talked to every single supplier. You may have talked to every single kind of ex-employee or whatever. You read all the transcripts or you did a ton of interviews, expert network interviews. All it means is you have like a picture. You're always sort of feeling around in the dark. But I think when you're investing family capital, multi-generational family capital, and it is harder to take market trading oriented risks.

31:48It's harder, at least for me to say, hey, I think that the price of XYZ company or this sector is a good sector bet for the quarter or for the year. I think that that's dangerous because you're now betting on market sentiment. So if you're not doing that and you know that the future is going to be different from the past. And that's the beginning of all investing. And you're going to buy something and hold it. What I think you have to do is to be able to divide it out into some period of time and have a framework for monitoring that investment. So what you're not doing is saying, well, I'm just going to go away for five years and go travel for five years and come back and let's see what happens.

32:24You have to develop a framework to say, okay, what do we know? What is knowable? Well, there's certain things that are knowable about a sector. You know, I don't think you could have gone back to Starbucks in 1992 and projected that it would be common for Americans to drink coffee at Starbucks, you know, at a coffee shop. Most Americans consume coffee at home and it was Folgers and a coffee pot. Like I grew up going to my grandma's house. There'd always be a half burned pot of coffee, maybe pot number three. And it had that kind of burned coffee smell. And she'd be like, oh, grab yourself a cup, grab another cup of coffee.

32:56That's how Americans consume coffee. And Howard Schwartz said, we're going to change that. He went to Italy and he said, I think that we can create a coffee shop with flavor drinks or different kinds of drinks that will resonate with Americans. And fast forward, we can't imagine life without our Starbucks now. I mean, the kind of average middle American that probably wouldn't have gone out to a coffee shop and spent$2 or$3 on a cup of coffee in the Midwest in the early 90s or the 80s, wouldn't have imagined that this is a normal part of a society, your daily routine to go get maybe a frappuccino or something.

33:26And so you wouldn't have been able to say in 1982, look forward to, hey, in 20 years, this is how it's going to be. And I think that's what's misunderstood about investing. We're not just taking a bet that the world will look a certain way in 20 years, but it's about looking at what's happening in the business. It's about going and visiting a store. I wasn't investing in 1982, but I imagine you could, just going back and reading some of the earlier annual reports of Starbucks when they went public and looking at the vision, what was Howard's vision for Starbucks? And you could measure it. You could say, wow, this is what they're doing.

33:57You could go visit a store and see, I mean, even 10 years ago or 15 years, 20 years ago, you could go into a store and see that it was crowded, a Starbucks store and see it was crowded. And you could take that into consideration. You could sense some change that maybe, you know, maybe your aunt who never had been to a coffee shop or never thought it was worth paying two or three dollars for a flavored drink is now all of a sudden go buying one or two things. You can see that change and you can measure on a quarterly or half year or annual basis. And you can look at the way a company's investing.

34:26And they say, wow, you know, this concept was successful. This store in this city was successful. And now they want to make that three stores. And you can say, well, is that a good idea? Well, probably because the first store worked in this location and the next three stores are in this neighboring location. There's a high probability that those work. And then you can monitor those stores and wow, those are working too. And now they want to grow this by 10 more stores in an adjacent city or to a city with similar demographics. And I think it's a slow process or while they made a mistake moving too quickly into this international market where they don't appreciate the style yet.

34:56You know, they're not ready. People are still drinking coffee in a different way. And okay, they made a mistake in that country. So they're pulling back. Oh, wow. That's interesting that they learned from that mistake. They're going to reallocate in this way. So it's just like owning anything. It's unknowable, but you can develop a framework for measuring short-term success and short-term wins against a long-term goal. And that's what we're trying to do. And I think that's what any real business investor is doing, whether you're in public markets or private markets. Hey, what is a long-term goal and what's a dream?

35:26And that's great, but how does that look next quarter? Maybe not necessarily in after-tax earnings, but if we're creating a new category, do people like it? How is it being accepted? And finding a way to measure it that's maybe outside just the typical consensus gap earnings matrix. And by the way, I think that's the same, you know, like I said, you would want to do in anything you were trying to get ahead and trying to understand something beyond just what's happening today. That's how you would, you know, if you're going to make an investment in a home, for example, and you saw that everybody in the town was leaving the town and even, you know, the last McDonald's left the town because there were just no people left.

36:04And but boy, that house is super cheap and you can buy it for$20 a square foot and only 500 miles away. And this XYZ major city, things are selling for$500 a foot. Well, you don't have to be a genius to look up and say, well, what's really the bet here? If you're the last person in the town, there's only 10 people left in the town. And it used to be this hustling, bustling town. And that's the reason you're getting the price you're getting. there's a high probability that that probably won't change in the next five or 10 years or so. You're just looking at business for what it is. It's a daily grind.

36:38It's messy. Are they making progress? Is there business progress? Is there fundamental progress? And absolutely, you can have fundamental progress without showing gap after tax earnings in a business that's not just fully mature. Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors. Hey, it's Sean O'Malley, just popping in with a quick message. If you like this podcast, well, I've got great news for you. We've got a handful of other shows for you to explore, from learning about Bitcoin to embracing a richer, wiser, happier lifestyle. Just go into your podcast app and type in We Study Billionaires to find our collection of shows.

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40:18All right, back to the show. Relating to the gap accounting piece, I think a lot of investors are stuck looking at what used to work. Value investors always used to look for those stable companies with high free cash flows. Well, that method of investing might not be as effective anymore, at least as it used to be. And a lot of these technology businesses are just being valued in a completely different way. They are, you know, and that's an opportunity and that's an enormous opportunity. I mean, if you think about the number of people in finance that can read a basic income statement or a basic balance sheet is pretty high, right?

40:54It's kind of like accounting 101, but the number of people that can do research and look at something a little more in depth is less. The amount of people that can spend full time on a handful of businesses that they can get to know better than the average investor is even smaller. The number of investors that can not only marry that with a long-term time horizon is even smaller than that. So I think it's an enormous advantage to have businesses that are asset light, that are difficult to account for change in the business or where accounting methods make it where traditional accounting covers up a lot of progress, it's an enormous advantage to be able to do that.

41:36And so I have a friend, Jeff Hendrickson, that runs a fund called Thorpe Abbott's Capital. And I don't want to put words in his mouth, but he has a really interesting framework of looking at the opportunity that a business has to reinvest in itself. And I really resonate with this. And he talks about One of his earliest letters, he talked about Amazon and showed in a graph. And if anybody knows who he is and wants to Google him, it's a really interesting framework for looking at this. One of the things he looks for is the change in gross profit. And so the ability of the business to reinvest its internally generated cash flow, netting out any money received in the sale of assets or the sale of stock or whatever, and how that changes and the growth of gross profit.

42:18And he has a really interesting chart in this letter that shows how they deconstructed the value creation that was happening at Amazon for many, many years and how the market missed it. And then all of a sudden, the market just caught up with it and just basically reverted back to reflect the intrinsic value that was being created at Amazon. And I'm not saying a lot of people say, oh, it couldn't have been known. What was happening at AWS wasn't knowable and all that. And maybe that's true, depending on how far back, you know, Nick Sleep talked about, you know, his insight into owning Amazon, which I think is very profound and widely discussed today, which was the idea of scaled economics shared, something like that.

42:56And Costco has similar economics. He also owned Costco. And there's different ways to look at a business. It's not just producing gap earnings, but the idea of kind of looking at a business and saying, wow, is it not paying tax because it has the opportunity to reinvest at incrementally higher rates of return? or is it not producing cashflow because it's just burning money, hoping that someday, you know, the business makes sense and the business will work. And so there obviously are those businesses out there and several of them are public where, you know, you could argue that, God, they could spend money till now to eternity and maybe never get traction.

43:32And we don't know, but I think you can find businesses that just have an enormous opportunity to reinvest capital at incrementally higher rates return. And that runway is so significant that even in rising interest rate environment, that it just doesn't matter because the opportunity is just there. And they have that competitive advantage to hold the line, to be able to make those returns and finding a framework like Jeff talked about in the case of Amazon back in time to seeing the change in gross profit and netting out. And change in gross profit as produced with internally generated cash flow and finding a way to measure that as a return is, you know, looking at it through historical lens was absolutely spot on for approximating or finding a way as one of the approaches as a pure financial, pure kind of spreadsheet type of perspective without digging into the value of AWS, which would have been a different route or Nick Sleep's view on the Amazon business in general of the opportunity of taking scaled economics and sharing them.

44:29But from a pure financial perspective, I think there are ways to see that. You just have to be able to do more than just take a very basic look at after-tax earnings or free cash flow. You need to be able to have a major get say, what are the unit economics happening? What is happening in this business? And can they fund it themselves? And how does this return on investment look like? And for all of our businesses, we build a model and we say, well, what do we think they're earning on incremental investment? And we obviously believe that the money is much better spent reinvesting in itself because it has the opportunity than it is being returned to shareholders.

45:04But as a small fund, meaning a fund with less than maybe$10 billion to deploy, there's just so much opportunity to find a handful of businesses that you could get comfortable with as a small fund that do have a really interesting opportunity to reinvest. Because as businesses become more mature, the opportunity for them to reinvest declines. So I won't name individual companies. But there are many old, old economy businesses out there that are maybe well-known consumer brands, food brands, whatever. They can't really invest more than X. They make$100 and the maximum they can invest in CapEx is to maintain their market position is$20.

45:43And then they pay out 75 % of that in a dividend or there's a buyback. And so kind of the most you could hope for as the stock declines a little bit, 20 or 30%, and then they can do a buyback maybe with that, or maybe they don't do a buyback at all. But if you go back in time, those businesses at one point in their history had an opportunity to reinvest 100 % of their gross profit or the earnings of the business, the cashflow generated in the business, whether it was... I mean, all the great businesses have had that opportunity in the past where they would be like, yeah, we have this opportunity to build another, to expand another 20 countries.

46:18I mean, look at Coca-Cola, for example, and I'm not saying that they've run their course by any means, but Coca-Cola back in the 80s when Buffett invested, had an enormous opportunity internationally, for example, to invest. And I don't know how he got comfortable with Coca-Cola's ability with all the local knockoff soda brands in emerging market countries back then. But I have a sense he loved the product and he saw how unique the experience of drinking Coke was compared to the competition and how the taste resonated in the palate and didn't leave an aftertaste that allowed you to go back and have another one.

46:53And it was just a very drinkable product. And the company was so well-run and at a scale where it could expand internationally. And so looking back, I would imagine the opportunity was, wow, the opportunity is huge internationally, but it's the opportunity to invest in those emerging markets and internationally and expand and not just return 100 % of the capital to shareholders. I mean, if Coca-Cola had looked up in 1985 and said, no, we're done. We're just going to return all of the cashflow we earn and just one big dividend every year. Now they may have had some dividend. They had a small dividend at the time or whatever, but if they just said, we're done, we just want to get our stock price up.

47:30So we're just going to return all the capital. Well, they wouldn't be who they are today. Having the opportunity to reinvest at incrementally higher rates return, or at least a rate of return that's very attractive relative to interest rates and where interest rates are going is a critical piece to buying a company to investing in a company that you think could not only survive, but thrive for many years. How concentrated do you want your portfolio to be? And how did you land on that level of concentration? You mentioned earlier, you want to own a handful of businesses. So I'm curious what your thoughts are around this.

48:03We have around 10 positions because investing is hard. And the more companies you have in your portfolio, the less you're going to get to know those companies. There's only so many great ideas you have. There's these sayings that your 15th best idea is not as good as your sixth best idea. And that makes sense. I don't think there's any right recipe. I mean, what makes sense to me is to focus on a handful of businesses that you can develop the confidence in to own when it's hard to own them, because it's going to be hard to own any stock at some point in its history. So all the people today that are piling into the trade of the day, the reason they won't probably be in that stock or that sector in three years from now, let's say, or even six months from now is because the confidence, they don't have the confidence necessarily to hold that business for a long period of time.

48:55So there's probably people that are a lot smarter than me that can develop that confidence over 25 or 30 or 50 companies. But because we're not using the stock market as a way to buy and sell and trade our way to a return, we're looking to earn that return to the fundamental appreciation of a business. It's just difficult to have a diversified portfolio. I think that's why Buffett always had such a concentrated portfolio. I mean, going back to the original, you know, back when he took over Berkshire Hathaway, I think if you look at the original portfolio of the first insurance company he bought, which was national indemnity, the exposure he had to Geico was quite large and to maybe two or three other positions was quite large.

49:34And it's because that's where he had conviction. And that's where he felt like he had a competitive advantage in making, whether I think it was a combination of stock and the preferreds at the time, 20 plus percent of national indemnities portfolio. So in those early days, and I think to gain that kind of confidence to own something when it is out of favor, because it will be out of favor. And our companies in our funds presentation, we say we expect everything we own to decline by at least 50 % one time or more during the time we own it. And that's because if you're going to buy something and hold it, it's going to decline.

50:09It's not going to, it doesn't live perpetually in favor. It will go through periods of time. Like we have part of our portfolio today is really in favor. And that part of our portfolio was really out of favor for the first year and a half, two years that we made particularly one investment, large investment. And then we have another part of the portfolio that you can imagine that the consumer tech portfolio is two positions that are out of favor. And those were very much in favor a couple of years ago. I mean, we made the investment before then, but there'll be a period when they're back in favor.

50:41And so you have to be able to develop that confidence to buy and hold something that you believe that in our case that can survive and thrive. And it's hard to do that with 30 companies. I really respect that high level of concentration as it obviously requires high levels of conviction in each position. And back to another Buffett idea, he has that punch card idea where you only have 10 punches, you'll think about investing a little bit differently rather than thinking, hey, I'll just throw money in this company just because it's going up. To transition a little bit, I'm curious, how often have you decided that you were wrong about an investment thesis?

51:19And maybe talk about what that experience was like and how you came about those conclusions. It's a great topic because I don't think people talk about their losers enough. I'd say that the lens that I use to look at a business today and investment today is absolutely a derivative of all the mistakes that I've made. as a manager and even in my private investing prior to that. And it's a combination of mistakes that were made even after the framework was put into place. And so, yeah, I've had many, many, many mistakes, but kind of at the highest level, I did this exercise maybe three years ago where I looked at every investment the fund has made in the last 11 years, which hasn't been that many, but what the portfolio, what those companies look like if we would just continue to hold them.

52:05And the first thing that popped out is, wow, the lower quality businesses that were traded cheap are actually still cheap today. Maybe they popped quick and we had the chance to kind of sell the hot potato, to pass the hot potato on to the next guy. But the higher quality companies continue to compound and outperformed not only the index, but even our fund quite substantially. So buying low quality businesses just because they were cheap and chasing them probably was the mistakes of a mission. And then that along with selling high quality businesses and missing out on the bulk of the return, knowing that we had the investment thesis right.

52:41That's the worst part. Knowing you had the investment thesis right, but selling it because you felt the valuation was quote unquote full. That's painful. So, you know, not waking up in the business had totally shifted gears and like, oh God, if we would have just held it, but that was unknowable. I'm talking about selling something that was knowable at least, or was part of the original investment thesis, but selling it just purely based on valuation, not being just overly attractive. That was a series of continuous mistakes. And those added up over time were by far the biggest, I guess, if you had to bucket them into mistakes since inception.

53:14But there have been several home run mistakes, if you will. And the real big mistakes are compounded by other mistakes. So it's not just buying the wrong business, it's finding a way to continue to hold that wrong business or justify holding onto it. And so I'd say the biggest mistake I've ever made was a company that was also very public about owning it. And I just had felt pressure to come up with a presentation or a deck to showcase our research to potential investors. And I had a lot of conviction around a business that felt somewhat mediocre or even low quality or commodity. But at the end of the day, it was operating in a it was a duopoly and almost a monopoly in its situation.

53:58And it was enormously undervalued. And that valuation, all I saw was, wow, the valuation is here. And if it was fully valued, that's a 10X or whatever above what we paid. And that lens caused me to ignore the warning signs that so many people that also had owned the stock and saw this presentation that we did, it was very public, would email me and say, yeah, but what about this controlling shareholder? I think that they're not aligned at all with the minority holders here. And I think that they don't have your back. I think this is, I would look out below, oh, no, no, no, no, no. Because when something is cheap and you're trying to convince yourself to own it, and you've also become very public about it and you've talked about it, it is harder to change your mind.

54:42And so I'd say this was one of our biggest mistakes. Not only was it a large position, but in fact, it was very cheap. And it did have the characteristics that we thought it had as far as its market position made it almost a monopoly. And it was a duopoly kind of business. But the fourth criteria of our survivor and thriver framework today is a significant alignment of interest between the controlling shareholder management and the minority holders. And we absolutely did not have that. And in the end, the controlling shareholder, we felt, took advantage of minority holders and actually forced a buyout of the business at a very, very distressed price.

55:17And I don't want to go into it too much because the past, the past. But not only was the mistake hard to swallow because we had become so public about it, we'd actually even attracted capital because the idea just looked so incredible. And our research really was good. It was very unique research, but it wasn't enough to overcome the fact that there was zero alignment between minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder who found an opportunity through the structure, through the unique ownership structure of the business to take advantage of the price of the time and force a buyout. So the repercussions of that were, you know, we had a horrible, horrible year.

55:55We actually didn't lose very much money on the investment, but people started associating us with this company. And we ultimately had to sue the company. And as a result of that, we got it. We did get a higher price than the buyout, but it was just a horrific experience. It sucked up all of my time and then some for many, many months. And it's just something I'd never want to repeat again. So even though we did have this survivor and thriver framework, we didn't talk about it as openly, but part of that experience caused us to really dig into the framework and go public with it and really talk about it openly and say, look, we need to have some bumpers to make sure that this doesn't happen again.

56:35It doesn't mean that we won't make mistakes again, but we don't want to make mistakes that could be prevented for some very obvious things. And for example, a company being very, very over leveraged or mismatched balance sheet, upside down balance sheet, we've invested in those things in our prior life and done well in some, and some we just totally lost out. And looking back, it was somewhat stupid. We had part of the thesis right, but we missed something that was right in front of our face, which was, yeah, yeah, you're right. They do have this awesome opportunity if the balance sheet looked a little different and you can't overlook that.

57:07In the case of our biggest mistake in the last few years, it was the misalignment of interest between the controlling shareholder and the minority holders. So yeah, I mean, it happens. And we probably have mistakes today in the portfolio. We have something today that I kind of was thinking, well, we probably had too much of it. Went down a lot, not just because of valuation, but just for other reasons specific to that company. But yeah, there's going to be mistakes, but we have gotten better, I think, at managing those mistakes through understanding why they were a mistake, looking back and saying, could this have been prevented by making sure that whatever investment really met our criteria?

57:45And I feel like we've gotten better, but that doesn't mean that there's not probably embedded mistakes today or more mistakes on the horizon. Yeah. And part of your mission is to embrace mistakes and continually improve. And that's just timeless advice and something I find a lot of value in. Jeremy, thank you so much for coming onto the podcast. Before we close out the episode, where can the audience go to connect with you and JDP Capital Management? Yeah, jdpcap.com is our website and you can fill in your information and get our updates. So we do two letters a year. And if you're interested in more than that, I think it's a fit.

58:24I mean, our fun presentation is available on the website. If you're interested in more information than that, you can send me an email. So the information's there. But jdpcap.com and And yeah, I appreciate the time. And thanks again for having me. All right. I hope you enjoyed today's episode. Please go ahead and follow us on your favorite podcast app so you can get these episodes delivered automatically. If you've been enjoying the podcast, we would really appreciate it if you left us a rating or review on the podcast app you're on. This will really help us in the search algorithm so others can discover the show as well.

58:54And if you haven't already done so, be sure to check out our website, theinvestorspodcast.com. There you will find all of our episodes, some educational resources, as well as our TIP finance tool that Robert and I use to manage our own stock portfolios. And with that, we'll see you again next time.

59:28our show notes, transcripts, or courses, go to theinvestorspodcast.com. This show is for entertainment purposes only. Before making any decision, consult a professional. This show is copyrighted by The Investor's Podcast Network. Written permission must be granted before syndication or rebroadcasting.