MI377: How Aswath Damodaran Invests Across The Corporate Lifecycle w/ Shawn O’Malley

23:38What these distinct businesses have in common is that they're all in the later portion of the corporate lifecycle, and their stock prices have been feeling the pressure from that lately. Walgreens is closing hundreds of stores, while Intel's stock has collapsed 60 % this year, and Starbucks recently ousted its CEO due to underperformance. Market perceptions have turned against each of them, though Starbucks has had some positive momentum again after announcing that they poached Chipotle's CEO to now lead the company. All three were superstar companies at one point though, and all three have seen that luster fade.

24:11Whether that decline is permanent remains to be seen. Walgreens is likely the furthest along in its decline, where the odds of reversal are the lowest and the prognosis is the most severe. All kinds of new competitors are disrupting the pharmacy space from Amazon to Mark Cuban's Cost Plus Drugs company. After going public in 1927, Walgreens has aged slowly over time with pockets of growth spurts along the way before more recently falling into a pattern that is hard to label as anything besides decline. Where annual revenue growth was in the double digits from 1994 through 2011, growth got cut in half over the next decade.

24:48And over the last three years, its revenues have only risen 3 % per year. Meanwhile, over those three decades, its gross margins have declined eight percentage points, and its operating margins have fallen from over 5 % to under 2%. Those slim operating margins make it almost impossible for there to be really any meat left on the bone for shareholders after paying interest expenses and taxes. What's worse for Walgreens is their competition isn't doing much better either. While CVS has outperformed Walgreens, its market value is still down since mid-2022. Walgreens' collapse has been more precipitous though.

25:21In 2016, Walgreens is worth more than CVS, and today its market cap is about one-tenth of CVS's valuation. Despite the clear signs of decline setting in, Walgreens brought in a new CEO in 2021 who promptly made a$5.2 billion acquisition of Village MD, which is a chain of doctor's offices and clinics. As Aswath explains, Walgreens' options are just simply dwindling. To survive, it'll need to shrink its presence down to only its most productive stores and shed the rest to reduce costs. But the company is potentially one big macroeconomic shock away from slipping into bankruptcy if it is unable to refinance its debts.

26:00For each of the three companies, he prepares a scenario analysis showing a rough estimate of intrinsic value based on changes to their operating profit margins and revenue growth rates. For Walgreens, he projects that the company's shares will be worthless unless it can double its profit margins. Yet that is probably unrealistic given the rise in competition that Walgreens faces. Of the three, Walgreens is by far the best candidate for gracefully accepting decline and allowing the company to shrink in a way that preserves as much capital as possible for shareholders. Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

26:34Hey, it's Sean O'Malley, just popping in with a quick message. If you like this podcast, well, I've got great news for you. We've got a handful of other shows for you to explore, from learning about Bitcoin to embracing a richer, wiser, happier lifestyle. Just go into your podcast app and type in We Study Billionaires to find our collection of shows. We Study Billionaires is our flagship podcast, and we've made a name for ourselves over the years by interviewing the best investors in the world, including Ray Dalio, Howard Marks, Joel Greenblatt, and many, many more. My colleagues Stig Brodersen, Clay Fink, Kyle Greve, Preston Pysh, and William Green each host their own We Study Billionaires episodes and bring their own unique perspectives.

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29:48That's theinvestorspodcast.com slash tip-finance. All right, back to the show. When it comes to Intel, the picture has looked pretty bleak as well. While the company stayed at the top of its industry far longer than most of its tech focused peers, it's seemingly safe to say that its best days of growth are about three decades behind in the rearview mirror. In the world of computer chips, Taiwan Semiconductor is by far the leader in producing them, and NVIDIA is the leader in designing the most valuable high-end chips for artificial intelligence and gaming. Rather than specializing in manufacturing or design, as Taiwan Semiconductor and NVIDIA have done, respectively, Intel has tried to compete with both of them.

30:30Over the past year, though, investors have only realized that doing so has left them far behind both. Whereas revenue grew at almost 15 % a year from 1994 to 2001, it declined 11.31 % per year over the past three years. The company is quite literally contracting, and even worse is that its margins are falling too. Gross margins are down from 55 % to 41 % over the last three decades, and its operating profit margin fell from a very healthy 31 % to an anemic 1.69 % more recently. DeModern describes this as essentially a textbook example of the corporate lifecycle. It went from clear periods of growth to stability to a very clear and sharp decline.

31:11The bottom has fallen out of Intel's business with its revenue and margins falling off a cliff. Although you might think Intel is further along in its decline than Walgreens, Intel's advantage is that its industry is still quite vibrant. Its direct competitors like Nvidia are doing phenomenally well, which provides at least some hope that Intel can rejuvenate itself and maybe slow its decline. With Walgreens, its peers, CBS, and Rite Aid aren't doing well though, and the retail pharmacy model seems really destined to be disrupted. So even though Intel has seen an even sharper decline than Walgreens, there's at least more reason for optimism that Intel can have a longer runway remaining in its corporate lifecycle.

31:48That could even present a good buying opportunity if the market thinks the company is doomed for imminent death and it can, in fact, hold on profitably for longer than expected. Meanwhile, like so many declining companies, Intel is resisting its decline aggressively. Arguably too aggressively, according to Demodaran. Intel has splurged on its chip manufacturing business with its Intel Foundry in hopes of competing with Taiwan Semiconductor while also trying to launch a new generation of AI chips who compete with NVIDIA. As he puts it, Intel's problems stem largely from aspiring for growth levels that they cannot reach.

32:21Its competitors have clear leads, yet the industry is big enough that if it can accept its subordinate role to its peers, Intel could find enough growth to stay alive. Because sentiment is so poor for Intel and the bar has been set so low with its stock price, DeModerin's scenario analysis paints a considerably rosier picture than Walgreens because even just modest improvements in profit margins and revenue growth would mean the stock is undervalued today at less than$20 per share. Demodaran actually discloses that the stock is so attractively priced that he's buying Intel, so clearly he believes the company can have some success in managing its decline, especially relative to the market's current perceptions of it.

32:58And at the time of recording, it does appear that there are some rumors floating around that Qualcomm may be interested in acquiring Intel, which has given the stock a modest boost. Still, nothing has been made formal, at least not yet. The third case study is on Starbucks, the company where a double shot Venti caramel macchiato isn't only a normal thing to order, but the staple of many people's morning routines. Howard Schultz nursed the company from a single store to its worldwide presence after taking over as CEO in 1986. He retired in 2000, only to return again between 2008 and 2017 to guide the company after the great financial crisis, and returned again briefly as an interim CEO for a year in 2022.

33:38Starbucks is the least clearly declining company of the three, I'd say. Yes, it's not growing at the 40 % annual revenue growth rates it saw in the 90s, but it still has seen very solid revenue growth of 8 % per year over the last three years. Meanwhile, its operating profit margins have actually grown over the past three decades from 9 % to 15%. So its revenues are still growing meaningfully, and for every additional dollar of revenue, it's converting a higher percentage into profits than it did in the past. Based on the numbers, you might argue that Starbucks isn't even a company in the decline phase of its corporate life cycle at all.

34:11Instead, these numbers probably better resemble a late-stage growth company or a mature company. But the reason Aswath argues that Starbucks could be considered a decline is because it has no story underpinning its valuation. There is no compelling narrative that's exciting investors and giving them something to latch onto to justify optimistic projections about the future. Investors who had been hoping the company would return to double-digit growth rates by expanding internationally, particularly in China and India, are probably poised for disappointment, according to Demotoran. Lower price competitors and governmental restrictions in both markets have handicapped Starbucks' growth.

34:45Additionally, inflation and input costs and demands for higher employee compensation are a real threat to its profit margins going forward. So there's just not a clear storyline to be told for how Starbucks can not only preserve its profitability, but also grow aggressively enough to justify a rising stock price. Storytelling requires vision, not just from investors, but from management too. The stock has jumped on hopes that Brian Nickel, Chipotle's ex-CEO who recently joined Starbucks, can provide that magic. But I'm skeptical because, well, Nickel is planning to be at the corporate headquarters only part-time as he commutes back and forth between California and Seattle on a private jet paid for by the company.

35:23It doesn't really sound like the type of person devoted to cutting costs and turning the company around with an imaginative vision for the future. So you might say Starbucks is in decline in a different way than Walgreens and Intel are with a younger biological clock, but it's sitting at a key inflection point in its life cycle. It will either get a second wind or in a decade from now, we'll point to this moment as when its slow decline began. Going through these case studies here, I found it immensely helpful to think through where a company is in its life cycle and whether it's at a key inflection point.

35:52That alone wouldn't tell you whether or not to invest in a stock since a declining company like Intel can still offer good value while a healthier company like Starbucks may look expensively priced relative to the range of likely possible outcomes before it, but it enables you to build a framework for your valuation, especially as you compare your perception of where a company is in its lifecycle versus what the market seems to think. With Intel, the market seems to be saying that Intel's expiration date is quickly approaching, and if that's not true, as government subsidy programs like the CHIPS Act funnel money to the company that helps keep it alive, then its shares might actually offer good value.

36:27Meanwhile, the market is quite optimistic that Brian Nickel will lead a turnaround for Starbucks, yet he has articulated no clear story for how he will do that, which should at least raise some skepticism for you as an investor as you consider where Starbucks is in its lifecycle. Thinking about corporate life cycles more broadly, DeModerin says, quote, a healthy economy will encourage entrepreneurship, providing risk capital and not tilting the playing field towards established players. It remains the strongest advantage that the United States has over much of the rest of the world. He adds, quote, If capitalism is all about creative destruction, it follows that companies, which are after all legal entities that operate businesses, should fade away as the reasons for their existence fade.

37:06That is one reason I critique the entire notion of corporate sustainability as opposed to planet sustainability since keeping declining companies alive and supplying them with additional capital redirects capital away from firms that could do far more good with that capital. The subtext here is that we need a healthier framing of corporate decline in society. All companies will face decline, even once great ones like Starbucks, Intel, and Walgreens, and we ought to celebrate the CEOs who can preside over declining firms in a way that preserves order and value for shareholders. So much attention goes to companies in the first half of their life cycle since this is where the most exciting ideas and growth are, but that leads to declining companies being overlooked.

37:45For investors, value often comes relative to expectations, and using Intel as an example again, Demoderen thinks the company offers great value despite being in decline. To invest in a declining company, you'd want to be confident that not only is the stock priced attractively relative to current overly pessimistic expectations about the future, but also that the right management team is in place to gracefully embrace the company's decline, or if there is an opportunity to rejuvenate it, do so effectively, which I'll say again is rare. Decline is arguably the most difficult phase in a company's life cycle because it leaves management with just no good choices.

38:19Bootstrapping a young business is incredibly hard, but at least promising opportunities can be found there. Declining companies are really left with a menu of unappetizing choices. Declining companies' decision-making becomes destructive when decline leaves management in denial, desperation, or in a survive-at-all-cost mode. More constructively, the signs of a declining business that will handle its aging well are acceptance from management, which may mean divesting poorly performing assets and spinning off better performing ones, renewals and revamps, which might mean sprucing up existing product lines to reach broader markets, or rebirths, where a new market or product can be found that resets its corporate life cycle.

38:58Rebirths are the most uncommon and typically involve a strong element of luck. Between that range of destructive and constructive outcomes for declining companies is a more middle-of-the-road response that Demotorin calls me-tooism. That is, management begins by acknowledging that their existing business model is running out of fuel, but they believe that a pathway exists to bring the company back to health and even growth. They end up chasing strategies that have worked for competitors, but this rarely works since they're late to the party and earlier companies have already built up moats. Only for a few companies will imitation offer a pathway back to growth.

39:33So a company may have strengths that can signal how it should manage its decline. Intel still has technological advantages from its experienced employees and patents that may be underutilized, which if used more effectively could create value. And with Starbucks, given its ubiquitous brand recognition, even without a story to tell going forward, there are plenty of advantages it can lean on during this transition period. Walgreens, however, has almost no differentiating advantages, making it an ideal candidate for embracing decline rather than resisting it. Intel may not be far off from reaching a similar point, but for the moment, at least, there is reason for optimism that it can renew and revamp itself, though a total rebirth is unlikely.

40:12Starbucks is not only best positioned to be renewed and revamped, but it has more flexibility to explore rebirthing itself too. This is also why its stock is the most expensively priced of the three, because there is that optimism about the future that can still be really spun into an attractive narrative, though as we've discussed, that narrative remains to really be clearly articulated. I hope these examples were helpful in thinking through how decline can look differently for different companies and in understanding why it is so hard for companies to age constructively. Decline is a misunderstood and ignored part of the corporate life cycle, which is why I wanted to spend some extra time looking at it, but there's certainly more to be said about the corporate life cycle that we can continue to build on here.

40:53To dive even deeper, I want to turn to a recent paper from Michael Movison and Dan Callahan of Morgan Stanley. As they put it, understanding where a company is and its life cycle is helpful for addressing capital allocation, costs of financing, governance, and valuation. The way to manage and evaluate a new company that is expanding rapidly is very different than it is for an old company that serves a mature and saturated market. In their paper, they lead off with an alternative portrayal of the corporate life cycle based on companies' returns on capital relative to their weighted average cost of capital.

41:25If you're not familiar with the term weighted average cost of capital, in short, it's a measure of how much it costs a company to raise financing from either debt or equity based on the company's mix of debt and equity in its capital structure. Debt costs are easy to estimate, but equity costs are more subjective and reflect the returns a company needs to generate for shareholders to justify keeping their equity capital in the business. So if a company has a blend of 50 % debt and 50 % equity and can borrow at 8 % per year, while the cost of issuing equity is estimated at roughly 12 % per year, then the weighted average cost of capital would be 10%.

41:58If the company had more equity on its balance sheet, the WAC, which is an acronym for weighted average cost of capital, would be higher. And if it had more debt, then the WAC would be lower. At the beginning of the company lifecycle, returns in capital net of WAC are negative because early stage companies need to raise outside financing to sustain their yet to be profitable businesses. As the company grows and matures, the chart rises and then plateaus, rising as young growth companies scale and build up advantages that allow them to earn returns above their cost of capital. Then, as the business matures, its ability to earn these abnormal profits diminishes.

42:34Again, debt costs are relatively easy to estimate because they're based on interest rates and are contractually fixed. In contrast, the cost of equity is more subjective and reflects the returns investors expect to justify their ongoing investment in the company. If a company's cost of capital is 8 % and it only returns 6 % per year, then that 2 % gap in financing costs versus returns reflects a destruction of value for shareholders. Value is a bit of an intangible thing in this case, but the takeaway is that as companies age, they lose their competitive advantages and with that, they lose the ability to earn returns above their cost of capital.

43:09Declining companies that can't earn returns above their cost of capital are not worthwhile given the opportunity costs and therefore should wind down their operations. How they define competitive advantage is also interesting here. Mobison and Callahan say that the magnitude and sustainability of the spread between returns on capital and cost of capital are the defining features of what makes a competitive advantage. So you can assess where a company is in its lifecycle by calculating the spread and mapping it out over time. You should be able to determine whether it is roughly trending upwards, plateauing, or declining.

43:41They also identify some flaws in pinpointing where companies are in the lifecycle. As we talked about when going over Aswath Demodaran's work, a company's age and years does correlate with its biological age in terms of its trajectory in earning returns above the cost of capital, but it's not perfect since companies age differently. Additionally, we cannot simply say that all small companies are earlier in their life cycle while bigger ones are older. Relatively small companies can be mature and relatively big companies can be young because they simply have addressable markets of vastly different sizes.

44:12They measure age based in a company's spread between its returns and cost of capital. Tracking companies that had IPO'd from 1990 to 2022 in the Russell 3000 index, excluding those in the financial and real estate sectors, they were expecting the full lifecycle to play out where companies started with negative spreads that rose, peaked, and declined back down over time. Instead, they actually found the opposite. Companies tended to have the highest spreads at the time they IPO'd, which declined and then stabilized at around year five. My first conclusion here, which you may or may not find surprising, is that companies that list on public stock markets are considerably far along in their lifecycle.

44:49Rather than truly being early stage, many companies that are being listed in the stock market tend to be much closer to the middle of their biological clock. Secondly, the process of decline isn't completely smooth either. Rather than going in a straight line from peak to trough, companies can endure long periods where they're still earning returns above their cost of capital, but that spread remains mostly flat after the company has exited its growth phase. Modest competitive advantages can seemingly remain intact for longer periods of time than might be theoretically expected. Pulling the thread a little more on the Morgan Stanley study's findings, the median company had a negative 7.6 % return in its earliest phases, with a peak median return of 11.2 % per year in its growth stage.

45:31Also interesting, the median publicly traded US company that IPO'd from 1990 to 2022 entered decline just 10 years after its first listing. If you're surprised by that, I'll say that the median is brought down here because many relatively young companies transition quickly into decline, especially in the tech sector. We mentioned it a bit before, but companies are not guaranteed to progress through each stage incrementally either. They may skip phases straight to decline or failure. For example, Mobison's research with Morgan Stanley suggests that only 38 % of companies in the growth stage in a given year end up in the maturity stage three years later.

46:05And as we've discussed, the progression isn't perfectly linear. Five out of 10 companies in the shakeout stage, as Mobison refers to it, which is between maturity and decline, move backward in the lifecycle to re-enter the maturity stage rather than sinking further into decline. Using Amazon as an example, from 1998 to 2022, the company has spent most of its time in the growth phase, but has at various points slipped into maturity and even briefly into decline before returning back to growth. Netflix's journey has been similarly dynamic. Starting in 2002, it has gone from growth to maturity, back to growth, to even earlier stages of growth and then back to maturity again.

46:42These are somewhat biased examples since they're arguably among the most dynamic companies and markets, but the point remains. My takeaway is that Mobison and his colleague Dan Callahan really did find that the corporate lifecycle can be quite dynamic. Broadly speaking, the lifecycle is a helpful framework, but companies like Amazon show that it is by no means rigid either. There can be a lot of back and forth between what resembles growth and what resembles maturity, and that's to be expected since these are sort of arbitrarily defined. Obviously, there isn't some objective law of nature that draws a line between growth stages and maturity.

47:15To make the point on why diversification is necessary across the corporate lifecycle, I'll just share the study's findings on how total returns to shareholders vary at each point in the lifecycle. Whereas early-stage companies had the highest mortality rates, leading to average annualized returns of almost negative 10 % over three years, companies in the maturity stage in any given year delivered returns of about 9 % per year over the subsequent three-year period. Mature companies are the most likely to deliver positive returns to shareholders in any given year, but they also have a more limited lifespan ahead of them.

47:47While many younger companies will fail and destroy investors' capital, they have the potential to turn to growth and mature companies that deliver solid returns for many more years to come. So the risks and returns looking forward differ meaningfully at different stages in the lifecycle. One particularly effective but difficult investing strategy that the report identifies is to seek companies that are transitioning to growth and maturity, either moving forward as a young company or backward as a declining company in the life cycle. That is to say, the best returns came from companies at transition points, specifically companies transitioning into periods of growth or maturity.

48:22For instance, a portfolio of stocks of companies that started in the decline stage but ended up in the growth stage three years later would generate an average annual total return of 20 % and 16 % for those that return to the maturity stage. While companies that moved into the decline stage generated returns ranging from negative 17 % to negative 3%, depending on which stage they started in. A simpler way to say that is investing in companies with rising returns in capital over a three-year period is conducive to earning better returns, and investing in companies with declining returns in capital is likely to result in worse returns.

48:57Similar to the example with Starbucks and Intel, both of these companies are at transition points, and if you think they can rejuvenate their businesses and increase their returns on capital over the next three years, then they should make for great investments as they reverse their biological age. If you don't have a credible story in mind for how they might do this, then you'd want to avoid them, of course. It is easier said than done to identify companies that will increase their returns on capital over a multi-year period and move toward the most profitable stages of the business lifecycle.

49:25But that begins with finding companies at clear transition points, as I made the case for with Intel and Starbucks, and determining for yourself whether that transition will mark a return to growth and increasing profitability or an advance into further decline, similar to where Walgreens is in its corporate lifecycle. Another point to consider about valuation and the corporate lifecycle is on duration. Duration, simply put, measures the weighted average time investors expect to wait before they receive cash flows. It's a concept primarily used in fixed income investing. And as an example, if a bond is set to be repaid in 30 years and it pays no coupons in the meantime and repays the entire bond at the end of those 30 years, then the bond's duration is pretty straightforward.

50:05It's just 30 years. If it made payments monthly over that 30-year period, instead then the duration would be much shorter. The concept applies to stocks too. Earlier stage companies have longer durations because the payoffs they generate for investors are further into the future, while companies in decline have shorter durations since they're more likely to be liquidating their assets to repay investors today. Higher duration assets then tend to fluctuate more because they're more sensitive to opportunity costs, as measured usually by changes in interest rates, since their payouts are much more in the distant future.

50:37So by buying a portfolio of earlier stage companies, you're taking on more volatility with your portfolio as the valuations for these companies swing more dramatically thanks to changes in interest rates. When valuing early stage companies, Mobison and Callahan suggest zooming in on the company's basic unit economics for expansion. With brick and mortar retailers, you try to determine the return on investment for building a new store. With a subscription business, you'd try to estimate the lifetime value of a customer based on the present value of their future subscription payments. And if a company has favorable unit economics, then short-term losses are both palatable and to be expected as they invest in building the business.

51:15In the conclusion of Mobison's and Callahan's paper, which I think also wraps up things for today's episode well, they remark that firms don't age linearly, but rather transition between stages according to the strength of their advantages and competition. We've talked a lot about the corporate life cycle today, and to understand it even more deeply, I'd recommend reading Aswass' book and blog posts, as well as Morgan Stanley's study on investing across the corporate life cycle. I have links to those resources and more in the show notes below for this episode. Demodaran's primary insight, at least for me, is to critique how decline is managed in corporate America today.

51:48To understand his point, we went over the corporate life cycle more generally and then narrowed in on three case studies of companies that are arguably in different stages of decline to understand what decline looks like in practice, how it can and should be managed, and in what circumstances it may present attractive opportunities to investors. We also reviewed Michael Mobison and Dan Callahan's research, published through Morgan Stanley, on using excess returns on capital over cost of capital to measure companies' age and the strength of their competitive advantages. On top of that, we discussed the risks and rewards associated with companies at different stages of the life cycle, examples of companies transitioning between various stages and how that can be done non-linearly, and how key transition points, especially for companies transitioning into growth and maturity, represents an opportunity to earn superior returns, assuming you can identify which companies are best positioned to increase their returns on capital in the coming years.

52:39I hope you enjoyed digging into these topics as much as I did. I'd like to end today's discussion with a quote from the legendary investor Peter Lynch, and I think his quote here fits our topic perfectly. He says, this is the way the capitalist ecology works. Industries decline, old companies wither away, and young companies rise up to replace them. The process is hard on many, but ultimately, it is healthy. That's all for today, folks. I'll see you again next week.

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