138. Trump vs Iran: The Road to Operation Epic Fury (Ep 1)

21:11It gives rise to all these conspiracies because, well, after all, it is the US and the UK who helped overthrow the government in Iran. But I would say the fact of the matter is that it is also overplayed a little bit because it is a long time ago, after all. And the Iranians of younger generation have had plenty of reasons to hate the Islamic Republic. So it's not like every day they're thinking about, they have a much more negative opinion of the Islamic Republic than they do of the US and UK and also the Islamic Republic is one to talk I mean they have no legitimacy in claiming the legacy of the 53 in any way because the Islamists at the time support the coup the most important Islamist in Iran Ayatollah Kashani supports the 53 coup I'm not saying he's neutral he fully supports the coup and the other big clerics are neutral Khomeini himself is kind of neutral he's a kind of youngish cleric at the time So for the Islamic Republic to claim that they hate America because of 1953 is nonsense on several grounds.

22:14Because first of all, as I said, they were on the other side. And secondly, they don't hate America because it helped overthrow a democracy. It's not like they're democratic themselves. They hate America because they hate the West and because of really, you know, endemic reasons. I mean, they hate the West and civilization based on their own wars. they hate the Western civilization, they hate what it stands for so the 1953 is a bit of a talking point that they use in the West as sort of a guilt-tripping average American, it also is that sort of thing that makes you sound as smart if you sort of say it, you know someone would say, oh well, did you know we overthrew their government in 1953, you know which is sort of, it's a very important thing but it doesn't explain everything that has gone on since and the Zimbabwe probably kind of uses that So I think it's good to be suspicious of that narrative.

23:04Gordon:Well, maybe there with Mossadegh ousted and with the Shah now, I guess, more firmly in control. Let's take a break. And when we come back, we will talk about the relationship between the CIA and the Shah's secret police.

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24:58Gordon:Well, welcome back. The coup against Prime Minister Mohamed Mossadegh has succeeded. And of course, now, if you are the CIA, you have a problem, which is you've just made a pretty significant investment in the Shah. how do you ensure he stays on the peacock throne? And I guess I might stop there actually and just ask Arash, why is it called the peacock throne? The seat of power of the Iranian monarchy. Where does that come from? Yes, so there is actual peacock throne. Like there is a name of an actual throne, which I've seen a version of it when I was younger in Iran. There are more than one version of it.

25:42But it was commissioned by the Mughal emperor, Shah Jahan, in 17th century. Mughal Empire, this is a Persian Empire ruling over India. Persian was their official language. So a lot of Iranians sort of look into it. So the original peacock throne was built by him and it was in Delhi, in the Red Fort, if anybody was there. there. But when Iran invades India in 18th century under the great Nadir Shah, they take this throne and bring it to Iran.

26:16David:Interesting. And so give us a sense maybe of how the relationship with the US develops after 53, and particularly, I guess, the importance of US intelligence in working with the Shah, because it is vital, isn't it? So this is the Cold War. The US really cares about Iran not sort of going communist, as I said before, and there's an important communist party. And the CIA does help train Iran's security forces. So initially after 1953, the intelligence is basically the intelligence section of the army, which the CIA works with. But actually, by the way, so you know, I'm writing a book about Iran and Israel, and the Mossad, Israel Intelligence Agency, has a big role in working to build up what is called SAVAK in late 1950s, which becomes Iran's secret police.

27:02And interestingly enough, a lot of Iranians who were working with Mossad at the time, they complained that one of the reasons they had to go to the Mossad was that CIA doesn't take them seriously enough and so it doesn't give them good stuff and doesn't give them what they think is worth. But the interest of the U.S., the U.K., and the West in general, and Israelis in a very different way, is to keep the Shah on the throne and to make sure Iran's socialist communist movements are not able to overthrow him. And there are also elements in the Iranian army who Shah is suspicious of them trying to overthrow him by doing a coup.

27:40Because when you came to power with a coup, you think you can also go out of the power with a coup. This is going to be very important, by the way. The Shah, to the end of his life, is very conspiratorial. But anyways, the relationship with the Shah and the CIA is complicated in this way then. That Iranian intelligence officers think the CIA is not giving them enough, and the Shah is afraid and suspicious that they'll pull something against him.

28:02Gordon:The suspicion, I guess, in one sense is warranted. And in another sense is kind of remarkable because I take the point that the Israelis step in in a big way and invest a tremendous amount, in particular, in the intelligence cooperation between Mossad in Israel and SEVAC in Iran. But in the 1970s, the CIA trains hundreds of SEVAC officers every year. There's direct financial assistance provided to some officers of the Iranian secret police. The National Security Agency, NSA, is operating listening posts and early warning radars in northern Iran, which are very focused on, of course, the Soviet Union.

28:42Gordon:And the Shah is the largest foreign buyer of U.S. weaponry during the mid-1970s, spending, I think, in some estimates, up to$16 billion over a four-year period, which is like$130 billion today. And it's interesting because obviously the frame, now when you think about massive U.S. weapons buyers and intelligence partners in the Middle East, you think about Israel, you think about Saudi Arabia, you think about Jordan. And in this period, in kind of the 60s and in particular as we go into the 70s, it's really Iran that is almost kind of a forward operating base for the US in the Middle East. It is the closest security relationship that CIA has in the region, far closer, I think, than even the Jordanians or Mossad at the time.

29:35This relationship changes a lot by the 70s. Iran leaves a very closer. Of course, President Nixon famously sits by the Shah and says, Your Majesty, protect me. And effectively, what he means is that in the Middle East, Nixon is going to rely not as traditionally had been the case on Iran and Saudi Arabia, but primarily on Iran. And in 1969, Britain declares that it's evacuating all its bases east of Suez Canal. So the order changes in the Persian Gulf after 1971. that's why a country called United Arab Emirates comes to be by the Trucial States joining but also Iran takes over these three islands that are disputed between Trucial States and Iran it takes them over and Iran finds a sort of very important role the Iranian ships are now going to the Indian Ocean but also on the weapon side absolutely the Shah is kind of he's basically addicted to uh it's like he's he loves military toys um I don't want to by the way I don't want to give you this caricature image of the Shah to be clear I think actually Iran's foreign policy under the Shahi 1970s is the best our country has ever had, I think.

30:38But in the military, he loves different weapons and aircrafts, and he loves his catalogs to go through them and buy them, and he keeps asking the U.S. to allow more. But unlike what the regime says, this wasn't some frivolous guy just buying useless weapons. He was really trying to turn Iran into a region of power, and he had a very successful diplomacy. Iran had good ties everywhere, and he was no one's lackey. You know, he was not a U.S. lackey.

31:03David:Yeah, I know. It's interesting. But I guess we talked a bit about the foreign policy and the military there. But what about at home? Because the perception I have of this period is that SAVAC, the secret police we talked about, you know, working close with the CIA, become increasingly repressive and part of daily life as the 70s go on. And they become a pretty nasty outfit. Is that the right impression to have? For sure. So Savak, particularly under a guy called Nasiri, as the 60s go on, they become very repressive. They torture their opponents. The torture stops at some point in the mid-70s, I think.

31:42But they torture for a good part of a decade. and not only they suppressed so the proponents of the shah now loves to say well of course he was suppressing them because there were armed militant communist groups fighting against us and they had to be suppressed and yes there were armed militant groups and they're suppressing them but they're not just suppressing them they're suppressing students they're suppressing you know anybody who says anything is slightly suspicious gets a visit from the savak gugus the grand singer who I hate using comparisons, but Barbara Streisand or Beyonce, but a lot of times bigger.

32:19Yeah, not Taylor Swift? Much bigger, much bigger.

32:22Gordon:Bigger than Taylor Swift. 100%. At the time in Iran. And she's someone who sings at the Shah's birthday, right? She actually sings for the Iranian troops in Oman when Iran intervenes in Oman against the communist forces. She sings there. but even someone like a Gugush gets visits from the Savak when they don't like because of course the people writing her poems are often leftist right because this is the culture and arts in the world is very lefty in the 60s and 70s and so even she can get visits from the Savak or maybe don't read that line or so Savak is very repressive and it cracks on on any sort of elements of opposition to the Shah.

33:01David:So you get a kind of mix don't you of a kind of modernizing regime but which is also very repressive. So in the early 60s, Shah does what is called the White Revolution. And this is, he grants the rights of the vote to women. He nationalizes the jungles. He does land reform, most importantly. And yes, these are modernizing moves. But yes, they're done in a very authoritarian way. And it's very politically repressive. And in fact, if you want to understand the 1979 revolution, I think the best sort of understanding device, given by historian Erwan Abrahamian, is that there is a dismatch between economic development and political development, right?

33:41So that economically Iran is growing, double-digit growth rate in the 1970s, good relations with the rest of the world. You know, a lot of exciting things are happening. But politically, you're giving nothing to these people. So that, you know, an average Iranian sort of middle-class person now can travel to Europe, can see how the world is. But inside his own country, he has no political say. and there's no elections for him to vote. There is nowhere to raise discontent. And of course, Shah also does the crazy thing, you know, drunk with his power. He, at some point, 1975, I believe, he shuts down the party system in Iran effectively, even that limited party system that exists in the parliament.

34:19And he builds one party. It's called the Resenders Party or the Rastakhis Party. And he says at some point, if you don't like the party, you can leave the country. So he really becomes the autocrat of a higher order. And yeah, that doesn't help.

34:32Gordon:I read an analysis of sort of the development of Savak in this period. And I thought the author made an interesting conceptual point, which was that the secret police enabled the Shah to become politically autonomous from his own society. And so I saw that Savak was called the Shah's eyes. There's sort of this all-seeing kind of panopticon. Let me get an example. my father who was a kid in some village in iran wrote an essay for his essay class we're talking primary school and believe it or not my grandfather got a visit from the savag you know um about the essay his son had written um my late grandfather um after all after the visit told my father stop doing this the gentleman who showed up from savag was actually very nice and you know so um you know So we reminded him of the story later.

35:27But anyways, the point is that, yes, of course, it was Shah's eyes everywhere. And it allowed you to be autonomous from your own society. And the other big thing that we can see a lot in Scott Anderson's recent book about the history of the revolution is that one of the terrible things the CIA does is that it doesn't do its own research, basically, about Iran and the Shah's stability. Because the Shah is freaked out about them meeting with anyone but the Shah's officers. right? Because Shah is thinking the CIA is trying to overthrow him. So he basically bans them from meeting opposition and others, and they accept that.

36:02So the CIA does not know how feeble the Shah's rule can be in the late 70s.

36:09David:That's really interesting.

36:10Gordon:It's relying on liaison reporting from Sivak about what's going on inside Iran, or maybe they're not even providing it. It's just a black hole. No, they are providing it. And that's exactly it. They're always saying, it's everything great, your majesty, everyone loves you. But it's obviously a big folly by the CIA because if you want a serious intelligence organization, you have to know what's going on in the country. You can't just rely on this guy.

36:33David:So effectively, they don't see what's happening, which is this building pressure, whether it's from the merchant class, whether it's from the clergy, whether it's from people who want democratic change, that is growing in the country. So they're going to miss, I guess, the buildup to where we should turn to now, which is 1979 and the revolution, which is, I think, as we said at the start, perhaps the seminal moment in US-Iranian relations. It's fascinating, isn't it, to try and understand. I mean, we could spend a lot of time doing it, but this issue, I mean, it is missed, isn't it, David, by the CIA, the notion that it's coming?

37:08Gordon:Yeah. I mean, when you go back and look at some of the intelligence assessments that are produced in even the months before the Shaflis, they're relatively embarrassing, I think is probably to put it kind of lightly. It's interesting. I think when you look back, there are reports, both from the intelligence agencies, the CIA, but also from State Department officials, that do comment, I think, on the situation in Iran in 78 and 79 with some real clarity at Insight. But as I think we discussed this in January, those reports weren't making it to the actual decision makers in Washington in any kind of systematic way.

37:49Gordon:And I think in general, there was, and Arash, I'd be curious for your thoughts on this, it seems like the Carter administration and the agency, the CIA, there's just a general failure of imagination to conceive of a world in which the Shah was not ruling Iran, which in hindsight looks inexcusable given that it had been the CIA who had taken this kind of tottering, indecisive, frankly, monarch who was very prone to flee and helped put him on the throat in the first place. But by the time we get to the late 70s, there was like a tremendous anchoring bias. The Shah's regime is stable because it has been stable in recent years, and therefore it will continue to be stable, is kind of how I think about it.

38:35Well, as you know, President Carter, you know, his most infamous statement is that a year and a half before the revolution, he's in Tehran, and he says, you know, Shah today is an island of stability, you know, in... Didn't age well. Yeah, it's those kind of really unfortunate quotes, right?

38:54Gordon:On that point, too, I mean, there's a CIA assessment five months before the Shaflis that said, Iran was not in a revolutionary or even a pre-revolutionary situation, which also feels like a real, real miss.

39:07David:That's a miss. Yeah. The mini McCloskeys, the analyst, didn't get that right. But I will tell you this. Okay, I'll tell you a couple of points. First of all, you know, 1979 revolution, like all Iranians have always thought about how it happened, why it happened, you know, the reasons. I gave you some. But it's very important to remember how much of a freak accident it also is, right? that yes you could have and should have seen the signs coming but in no way was this inevitable and in no way and it's really hard to predict events generally I'm very keenly aware of it now because of course every show I am now these days they're like they just the anchor looks at you and says so Arash what's going to happen now I'm glad you asked I'll tell you exactly yeah open your polymarkers

39:52Gordon:wait till the second episode of this series I'm going to look you square in the eye and I'm going to ask you the same question So be prepared. We'll be happy to get there. But look, it's really hard to predict. Who knew that Shah is going to flee so early? Who knew that the Iranian army would just throw its hands up? I mean, how little resistance there was to this revolution? Who knew that this Mullah from Iraq and then Paris can come down and lead the government? I mean, all of this is not easy to predict these things. Impossible, I would say. It's actually impossible. It's impossible to predict these things.

40:30And they'd really get, Iran gets really unlucky, if you think the eruption was a bad event like I do. And these guys get really lucky. I mean, sometimes in life, you just get really lucky. And the Shah has cancer. I mean, there's that whole...

40:42David:Yeah, I was going to say, that was one thing, wasn't it? The CIA doesn't know.

40:45Gordon:The Americans don't know. He's got lymphatic cancer. They don't know. Exactly.

40:49David:You mentioned the Mueller from Paris, which is Ayatollah Khomeini. Why don't you just explain a little bit about who he was, where he came from, why he ends up playing such a big role. Ayatollah Khomeini was an important sort of religious authority who in the 1960s, he was a cleric in Iran. In the 1960s, he breaks through the tradition of clerics having been kind of politically quietist and loyal to the regime in some way, or at least really not activists. He breaks through that tradition and becomes a political activist. He very much instigates political activism. He protests against Iran's ties with Israel.

41:32He protests, you know, against the Shah. Although, let's not forget his first big political activity, you know what it is? His first big political campaign is against female suffrage. It's in 1961, I think. I mean, he comes out against female suffrage when there is a proposal to give the right of the vote to women and he comes out against it. This is very embarrassing for the regime later. So they kind of dance around it. But it's very much there and incontestable. This is Khomeini's first big political act. As I said, for example, he is not active around the coup. Like in the lead up to the coup in 1953, he is not some big activist.

42:09He does not support Mossadegh really. So Ayatollah Khomeini in the 60s rises up. But he has this quality, even though obviously his politics are very reactionary. you know the fact that a cleric has risen up against the shah's regime is a big deal it would be like if you had a movement in ireland led by the catholic clergy right so the clerics are very important in iran society they are widely respected they're sort of seen as seats of some moral quality so to have a major cleric and he was a major ireland example is good because

42:43Gordon:the shia are the catholics of the islamic world isn't that right there we go we can there we go Well, debatable, debatable. Might be Protestants or the Catholic. But Shias are more ritually similar to Catholics. This is true. The Shias are ritualistically more similar to the Catholics. So anyways, Khomeini is a major cleric. He rises up against the regime. And for the opposition, for the secular opposition, this is kind of a curious and welcome development because now all of a sudden you have these clerics. You know, the clerics are against the regime. They can get the sort of following and the sort of networks that the seculars can't dream of.

43:20Also, there's so much suppression. So there's a lot of stories here. People say, you know, why did Savak not repress the clerics enough? There is a trend everywhere in the world to use Islamist against communism, right? And the Shah's regime also tries that a bit. They're hoping that, you know, different discourses of Islam and indigenous knowledge and Islam can help suppress the left and the secular left. And also they can't shut down all the mosques. So Khomeini is able to be active much more than the leftist groups because he has access to all these mosques. But by the late 70s, he rises up to really be seen as this big leader.

43:59And again, accents of history here are great. They play a very strange role. So he's kicked out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein because he's Shia. Saddam is obviously Sunni.

44:10Gordon:And we should say Khomeini had been exiled from Iran, I think, in 64 and had been in Iraq for a number of years. He's exiled to Turkey first and then to Iraq. OK. And he's there for like, you know, he's like there for 12, 13 years. Iraq is the major seat of Shia. So first of all, going to Iraq was good news for him because he's at a major seat of Shia learning. He meets everybody there. Everybody can go and meet him in Iraq. So all the Iranian opposition, different figures. And he's able to organize, right? he's at the vatican of the shia faith basically and he's able to to organize um so it's good for him to be in najaf in iraq um and anyways but iraq kicks him out and when they kick him out he tries to go to kuwait they don't let him in um he ends up in paris he's able to go to paris because he's an iranian citizen iranian citizens don't need a visa to go to france so he goes in shows his passport gets in French immediately tell the Shah we can do with this guy whatever you want we can kick him out to Algeria if you want we can send him somewhere we can kick him out to Syria his visa free stay is only for like three months or something so we can't kick him out and the Shah says no and which tends to be another folly because Paris is great for the Ayatollah not because he's hitting the nightlife or you know seeing the shows but because there he can speak to media so you have this figure who is a holy figure who seems to represent a calm antidote to the Shah he is a Gandhi effectively as far as the Iranian oppositionism is concerned and they also think they can use him it's a very important part of the story the average Iranian opposition activist think they can use him they're like oh Khomeini obviously he's not going to be able to rule because what does he know he's an old mullah

46:02David:And so you've got this period of unrest, I guess, strikes. And then, as you said, the Shah leaves, perhaps surprisingly, in January 1979. He just flees. And Khomeini returns, I think, at the start of February, doesn't he? This kind of huge arrival. And that leads to something which people didn't expect, which is this turning into what many people didn't necessarily want or expect, which is an Islamic revolution. Well, yes. So Shah flees the country in January. He leaves in the care of a prime minister. He's appointed Shahpur Bakhtiar. Somebody who was an old pal of Mossadegh, was an ally of Mossadegh.

46:40He's from the same party as Mossadegh, National Front, although the party kicks him out when he becomes prime minister. Bakhtiar is a social democrat. He was in France for many years. He had supported the Spanish republicans in the Spanish Civil War as a man of law. So he's very much a figure of the center-left in a way. So Shah hopes that under him a new government can have more legitimacy. But no, people now want to reject the whole regime, so they come out against him as well. And Khomeini comes to Iran in February, and within 10 days, there is a mass uprising that finally overthrows the Bakhtiol government, and the power passes on to the interim government that Khomeini had appointed.

47:19At this point, it's not clear what the future of this revolution will be. As far as everybody knows, it's going to be called an Islamic Republic, but no one knows what that is. And Khomeini, they think he's got to be some sort of a spiritual leader. Now there comes a time to write the constitution and decide the future of Iran. And very freaky incidents happen there as well. Very strange. This course of events are also strange.

47:44Gordon:And to put a point on the Savak story, I was out of curiosity looking into what happened to Savak in the revolution. And it looks like Savak headquarters, of course, one of the first government buildings that seized. And then this was, I guess, interesting to me. The second, third, and fourth chiefs of the Savak are all executed that spring on charges of sowing corruption on Earth. The first Savak director, I was wondering what happened to that guy? He had fled Iran after falling out with the Shah and had been assassinated probably by Savak itself back in 1970. So all of the heads of Savak. Not probably, for sure.

48:21For sure. That's Taimur Bakhtiar. By the way, he was the cousin of this other Bakhtiar that I spoke about, Shah's last prime minister. He was killed in Iraq, Taimur Bakhtiar. And yeah, Shah had a lot of suspicion. Well, not just suspicion. Taimur was trying to organize their own opposition against the Shah. A lot of people there, including Khomeini, communists, they were all in Iraq, and Taimur Bakhtiar was hoping to lead them against the Shah.

48:45David:I guess, David, the other thing that happens in 1979 is another event which gets referenced, including by Donald Trump quite a bit and recently which is this hostage crisis which happens at the US embassy in Tehran. Now I think we're going to look at that a bit deeper later in the year and do some episodes on it where we can really deep dive into the story but it is important isn't it in terms of the legacy which is what we're really looking at of mistrust and enmity between these two countries that hostage crisis that takes place. yes another african's event you know no seriously how much how much in the years 78 and 79 seem to be just contingent events that end up solidifying things is crazy because yeah so what's the story the story is that in november 1979 a bunch of islamist students stormed the u.s embassy and take it over now everybody thinks this is gonna be a crazy thing that some people did and it's over in a couple of days right no they keep u.s diplomats more than 50 of them hostage for it ends up becoming more than 400 days right and this was really a bunch of students who had done it and the government the interim government is led by prime minister Mehdi Bazargan again old islamist ally of islamist but very mild islamist but ally of Mossadegh is really from the national front with Mossadegh and Khomeini for whatever reason had appointed him as prime minister Not his clerical lieutenants, you know, not more hardline Islamists by him, but him.

50:13So obviously he can't approve of this, right? He wants to have diplomatic relations in the U.S. He can't approve of this. He resigns, effectively. And this is the end of the liberal period of the Islamic Revolution. It ends in November 1979. The governments that follow are all going to be much more ardent Islamists. And Ayatollah Khomeini does something crazy, which is that he approves of the hostage-taking. So these are students who had taught, you know, even themselves, they had taught, bro, think it will be over. I mean, everybody thinks this is something. And people had even done it before.

50:44There was like some leftists who had stormed the embassy at some point. And people think it will be over. But Oytola Khomeini says, this is great. Keep doing it. And he calls it the second revolution. And it radicalizes things in Iran, right? It is the age of radicalism. Radicalizes things in Iran. As I said, the liberal government of Bazargan. And, you know, I use the term liberal liberally, right? But, you know, mild Islamist, whatever. So that government is gone. And the change of the course of Iran in history really changes. And what is also fascinating is that Iran and the U.S. do start negotiations at some point about this release.

51:21But, of course, they drag on and drag on and drag on. And finally, the hostages are released during the inauguration of President Reagan. And one of the other conspiracies that exist there, which many people believe in, its past most prominent defender of this theory is Gary Sik, who was in the National Security Council in the U.S. at the time, is what they call the October Surprise, which is to say that elements in the Reagan campaign conspire with the Islamic Republic to prevent the release of hostages so that President Carter is hurt in the election year in 1980 and he's not elected. I'm not endorsing this theory, but there are -

52:04David:I think more has come out to support that theory in recent years, actually, in people who were intermediaries. Yeah, yeah. There's a new book. And there are many prominent people that have believed versions of it. And that leaves a lasting legacy, doesn't it, David, for the way that the US sees Iran particularly.

52:19Gordon:Yeah, and I think it's worth putting a point on this as we close out this first episode, As we've been talking about the revolution, I think you put it well, Arash. I mean, there's a whole bunch of different kind of contingent, almost freak accidents that create this, I guess, tendency toward radicalization throughout the process, but that at any point didn't necessarily need to happen. I mean, how do we end up post-revolution with the US and Iran seemingly locked in this vicious dispute? I mean, the hostage crisis, you know, I mean, even the way Trump talks about it is sort of, in some ways, the original sin of the current predicament that we're in with Iran.

53:04Gordon:But as we kind of close out this first episode, how would we characterize kind of where we have gotten in this secret war between the two states? Khomeini, in his path to power, one of the most smart things he did was try to reassure Americans that they have nothing to worry about him because he's not a communist. It's very important. And of course, this in the Iranian conspiracies goes to the level, oh, Carter put Khomeini on the throne. No, Carter did no such thing, of course. But it is true that President Carter did not think an overthrow of the Shah would be such a bad thing necessarily. like at the very end where he saw it as well it's just happening anyways he did not think it would be the end of the world he says so in his diary I think the exact phrase is like a non-aligned Iran you know might not be such a bad thing something like that he writes in diary in January 1979 right before Khomeini comes to power so Khomeini had helped reassured the Americans but he has reassured them that he's anti-communist so they have nothing to worry about him.

54:08So on the face of it, there's no reason why Iran and the United States shouldn't be able to develop good relations, even under the Islamic Republic. But if it wasn't for the ISIS crisis, he would have found other ways. And the reason is that he was a genuine, true radical. I mean, he was a real radical. He wanted Iran to be both against communism and Soviet Union and against the United States and sort of the free world, quote unquote, in the Cold War. He wanted to stake a radical independence from both of them because he was a genuine radical in a way that he really rejected modern conceptions of politics right this he this wasn't for him about left versus the right he was a sort of a sufi mystic who wanted a form of you know islamic governance that went beyond all modern conceptions of politics so it was inevitable that he would storm out against the US

55:03David:like he did. So maybe there with the tension now set up between this new regime and the US, let's end this first episode and we'll come back next time and really I guess take it up to the present and how we get from 1979 to epic fury and events today. Just a reminder, you can listen to that straight away. If you're a Declassified Club member, do join at therestisclassified.com and you'll get access to this special bonus Q &A that we're doing with our Ash for our club members. So do join up, but otherwise, we'll see you next time. We'll see you next time.

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