68. Israel Attacks Iran: The Origins of the Iranian Nuclear Programme (Ep 1)

21:03Gordon Corera:Well, welcome back. I think, Gordon, it's probably worth going back even further in time. We love going back way in time. I do personally, at least in these episodes, go back as far as we possibly can. And usually, Gordon Carrera will try to edit it out. But actually, Gordon, you want to go back, which I love, and I'm here for it. So I think it's probably worth stepping back a minute. We've just set up Natanz, right? But go back and talk about the origin of this nuclear program kind of as a whole, because I think it does set up a bit of like, why are the Iranians doing this, right? What's the motivation for having a bomb?

21:39Yeah, yeah. Which I think is important to understand and kind of takes us also through explaining what's going on today, I think. So the Iranian nuclear program actually predates the 1979 revolution, which brings the Ayatollah and the clerics to power and back to the Shah's time before that you know there are plans to build a nuclear power reactor in Boucher he might have also been thinking might be useful to have a bomb and you know you've got Saddam Hussein in Iraq next door and the two countries are adversaries and are going to have a war together and they're each watching the other and thinking well what's the other doing and so when the 1979 revolution comes initially it's really interesting Ayatollah hominy says that he still sees nuclear weapons as the work of the devil and un-islamic so it's really interesting you know at that point it's off any interest in nuclear weapons but then the iran iraq war starts and you get this long brutal war through the 80s between the two countries and iraq is going to use chemical weapons against the iranians and the iraqis you know are looking for the bombs a nuclear bomb so you can see this kind of dynamic develops doesn't it?

22:47Where both countries are thinking, maybe we need the bomb just in case the other one gets it.

22:52Gordon Corera:In the way we in the West, or at least in the States, I think typically talk about Iran, there's a tendency to go back to 79, right? And talk about the revolution. I think that this war, this war that went on from, I think, 80 to 88 is a better lens through which to view the Iranian regime today. The formative experience of the generation of people who are running Iran today was the war, right? And I guess you could lump the revolution in there too, but it is an absolutely brutal conflict that I think drives, frankly, a lot of the militarization of the Iranian regime that we see today, right? And it makes a lot of sense if you come out of a absolutely catastrophic conflict with your neighbor, you'd want this insurance card.

23:44Gordon Corera:You would want a bomb, right? And you'd probably be willing to sort of bend Khomeini's ideas about whether a bomb is Islamic or not for purely pragmatic reasons. I think it makes a lot of sense. Yeah. So it looks like from about 1984, Iranian interest then picks up again in the idea of a bomb. And the then president, Ali Khamenei, now the supreme leader, was one of the supporters. I can see you smiling at my pronunciation. I'm going to move on. I'm always smiling. Come on, man. Ray of sunshine over here. But he was one of the supporters of moving forward, at least, on a nuclear program. Problem is building a bomb is hard.

24:20You need help. We've talked about this before. This is not a straightforward thing to be able to do. So where are you going to get that help from? Now, the answer is Pakistan. And it's been working on its bomb to counter India. And the crucial figure here is a very interesting man called A.Q. Khan, who becomes known as the father of the Pakistani bomb.

24:41Gordon Corera:He is the subject of a book. He is. I don't have the author here or the exact title, but there's a book on him that we probably should commend. What's the name of it, Gordon? Shopping for Bombs. Shopping for Bombs. Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, written by a young, upcoming author called Gordon Carrera. It was my first book. Oh, it was your first book. My first book was on A.Q. Khan. So that's why I'm a slight A.Q. Khan obsessive. But we are going to say we're not going to do the full wild story of his rise and fall because it's a great story involving the CIA and MI6 and Libya and all kinds of things.

25:17But we'll do that in another series, I think, down the line because we'll get sidetracked. There's too much there. There's too much there. The key thing you need to know is Khan is a Pakistani scientist who comes as a young man to Europe and he works at a nuclear enrichment plant in the Netherlands, part of this company, yorenko and at the time he's young he's ambitious he's also a fierce patriot and pakistan is engaged in this conflict this on off wars it's having at that point from india and it feels the threat from india he may be living in the west but he's not really a fan of the west it's fair to say young abdul kadir khan aq khan and he's particularly not a fan of the idea that only the west gets to have nukes or gets to decide who has nukes so he's got this job and he's going to take, crucially, not just the designs for centrifuges, but also the contacts of where to get the parts you need.

26:12So you need very specialised equipment, specialised steel, specialised ball bearings, all these kind of things. And he's going to understand the network that is supplying the European facility. And then he's going to take that and he's going to build his own network and use some of that network to first of all supply and build Pakistan's nuclear bomb. But then, and this is the kind of crazy twist, he's going to start selling and passing on those designs, that material, and the contacts of the network to other countries as well. And he's going to do it to Libya. He's going to do it to Iraq and Iran and North Korea.

26:50So, you know, he's a nuclear salesman, which makes him a very interesting, rather dangerous man.

26:56Gordon Corera:He's a commercial guy, a real straight shooter with upper management. Got to make a living. Got to make a living. Just trying to make a living in the world. Just trying to make a living in the world. Selling the designs for a nuclear program. Now, should we see this as an official Pakistan to Iran trade, or is Mr. Khan freelancing? Good question. And there's a book on that, actually, if you'd like to read. We should tell you some of the answers. I can recommend. Now, some of his deals are sanctioned by other people, it looks like, in the Pakistani military. and some of them are kind of exchanges and deals and some of them are money making and some move from one to the other and i think the iranian one's kind of interesting because it looks like the first deals are in the late 80s with iran and that looks a bit possibly state sanctioned or at least some elements of the pakistani state knowing about it and he basically gives the iranians a shopping list of what they need where to get it from allows them to buy some of the things through network, although they also set up their own procurement networks.

27:54And Iran isn't going flat out for the bomb. It's just kind of getting some of the parts together. But here's the problem. Some of the parts they get from AQ Khan are not in a very good condition. They're basically, they're secondhand. They're castoffs from the Pakistani program. And it looks like he's got a kind of warehouse in Dubai. And it's like a clear out sale. A nuclear garage sale in Dubai. Yeah. Which also explains why when the inspectors in the tents will find some traces of nuclear material. It's because they've been secondhand stuff, previous owner, Pakistan's nuclear program. And one of the problems it means is that the stuff isn't working that well.

28:28It's hard to use. The Iranians start complaining that some of the stuff is useless. Western intelligence is aware that something's going on, that there's some procurement going on by the Iranians, but they can also see they're struggling. So there's not too much worry at this point. So this is late 80s early 90s but then khan does another deal with the iranians and this one is more secret so it's not known about by others and it only emerges later on this is kind of mid-90s three million dollars two briefcases i mean it's like a proper kind of spy film stuff iranian officials bring those briefcases leave them at a lavish apartment used as a guest house by khan in dubai and this is a kind of more significant deal this time around because it's more designs more components and for a more advanced, what's called the P2 centrifuge.

29:15So now with that, the Iranians can now in the late 90s, step up a gear in terms of what they're doing.

29:22Gordon Corera:This whole period does say something interesting about the way that the Iranians moved toward the capability to have a bomb because they seem to move very slowly, cautiously, and at every stage to have these kind of potential off-ramps where you kind of get the sense that they haven't fully made a decision at any point. They're going to move along this chain of having the set of capabilities that you need to eventually have a bomb, but they're not making some kind of mad dash to get one. And this is happening in 2007, but when the Syrians have decided they want a bomb, I think for very similar reasons.

30:06Gordon Corera:I mean, this is a really rough neighborhood, right? And you have a lot of strong men who are running these countries who feel deeply insecure. And so getting a bomb in that context makes sense. The Assads want a bomb. They literally just go and essentially buy a program from North Korea and put a facility in the Eastern desert that is an exact copy of Yongbyon, right? They're not building this massive homegrown program. And they're moving in sort of comparison to the Iranian program, the Syrians moved quite quickly. Yeah. It's a weird thing, because I think the Iranians probably would already have a bomb if they had tried to go really quickly, but they don't.

30:46Gordon Corera:Throughout every stage, they kind of move very slowly and cautiously, it seems. Yeah, I think that's absolutely right. And it's not maybe our image of a country that is racing somehow for the bomb. That's absolutely not. Because we're talking here, This is 30 years ago that they were doing some of these deals. I mean, so they do, though, in the late 90s, move to a kind of more clandestine program. Previously, they had something called the Tehran Nuclear Technology Center, which is a bit of a kind of giveaway as a title. And then they moved to the Calais Electric Company, which is in the suburbs of Tehran, which they will claim is a watch factory, the Iranian use of cover watches.

31:22But it's actually where they're testing their centrifuges. Maybe we should move it from the Tehran Nuclear Technology Center somewhere else. Yeah.

31:30Gordon Corera:Maybe that's a sitting duck target as we develop our nuclear program. It's at this stage, though, we should. I mean, friend of the pod, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, is at this point starting to be the sort of head honcho of the program as well. Yeah, exactly. And they are starting by 1999 to kind of master how you build a centrifuge. We're going to come back to them. Don't worry. You haven't missed your centrifuge explanation. Those are waiting for it. Yeah, it's coming. It's coming. Gordon Guerrero is going to explain it. He's drawn up some charts. He's got charts and graphs to show us. So what's interesting is Western intelligence has missed this second car sale.

32:05But from 2000, the mini McCloskeys, Gordon, the mini McCloskeys are working out that Iran is doing something at Natanz. They are seeing, you know, by 1999, they've kind of perfected the technology enough to build a facility. and that facility from 2000 are going to be Natanz. And, you know, I was told that kind of the analysts were scouring satellite photography to look at this site and the Iranians seem actually aware of when satellites pass overhead so that they can avoid doing anything sensitive at that time, which I guess in those days you didn't have 24-7 coverage. The satellite only moved over at a certain point.

32:40Maybe now I'd imagine it's a bit different from that. So they seem to be aware from 2000, but secretly in Western intelligence that something is going on and they're trying to work out, you know, do we go public? What do we do about it? Then in 2002, that opposition group makes it public. And now the inspectors finally get in in 2003. And then you get this cat and mouse game with the inspectors in which the Iranians are kind of like, nothing to see here. It's just a nuclear power facility. Nothing awful, nothing nuclear bomb related. But the inspectors can see that there's a lot of clandestine work going on.

33:13And they learn about other sites and other facilities. and every time they try and go to them, the Iranians have basically bulldozed the sites in advance. In some cases, actually raised the topsoil from the sites, obviously, because they don't want any environmental sampling to pick up traces of nuclear work there. So the inspectors are hunting for it and the Iranians are hiding it at this point.

33:35Gordon Corera:I mean, obviously hiding things, that sort of raises your suspicions, you know, if you're the IAEA. But Iran at this stage isn't violating any international agreement that it's a signatory to. And frankly, I guess it's possible. I think it's not the case, but it's possible that they could be doing all of this solely for the purposes of a sort of civilian nuclear program. Yeah. In theory, when you look just at where they were in 2002. Yeah. It's nice to hear you defending the Iranians and what they're doing. But yeah, Iranian nuclear program, hero or villain? Let's debate. But you are right. The key thing is that you're allowed to have a peaceful nuclear program.

34:10You are entitled under the Nonproliferation Treaty to have a peaceful nuclear program. but not to be developing a bomb even building an enrichment site is not against that because it can be entirely for peaceful purposes yeah and this is the kind of crucial point isn't it is that enrichment this process can be used both for nuclear power and for building a bomb and it's a kind of dual use facility or technology and that is almost the key problem is that it's not something which proves that you're building a bomb. So even though the inspectors are finding evidence Iran is hiding something, they find traces of nuclear material, I love this, on door frames and on the rubber seals of toilets, because these are things that the Iranians haven't cleansed and razed to the ground.

34:58But even when you find these, the Iranians just go, well, it's all part of our peaceful nuclear program. We might be being a bit evasive about it, but that's all it is. Nothing to see here. Move on, Mr. Inspector. to. That's right.

35:08Gordon Corera:It's just been us, you know, querying Ask Jeeves and just building this program. Early Google searches have gotten us here, Mr. Heinenen. There is nothing to see. And I guess I would imagine they also played this game where if you're the Iranians, you can have this little dance with the IAEA where you say that, well, there's maybe pieces are a part of a site you can't go to because there's not nuclear stuff going on here, but it's a sensitive military installation or something like that. Right. And so you get into this weird dance. I always found the dance between the Iranians and the IAEA to be fascinating because it just seems sort of absurd.

35:43Gordon Corera:Like we all kind of know what's going on. And yet there's still this kind of, I don't know, this theater, right? Around the inspectors having access or not having access. And I mean, it goes on for almost 20 years. It's crazy. Yeah, it's mad. And they're putting cameras in places, trying to spot what's happening and the Iranians invading it and building other sites as well. Is it time? It's time. It's time for the nuclear lesson. And we should note that in the notes that Gordon has prepared. We are now to a point where it says, David, time for a, the rest is classified nuclear lesson. And there is a warning here, which I also agree with, which is if you, dear listener, if you're a nuclear physicist, let's say, you might just want to like, just fast forward for two minutes, right?

36:26Gordon Corera:Just kind of pull that little dial forward. In all honesty, though, Gordon has been working tirelessly over the past few weeks to come up with the few paragraphs here on how this is going to work. So, Gordon, we're in your hands. Yeah, thanks for that buildup. Okay, here we go. We've done how to build a nuclear bomb before, remember, for Klaus Fuchs. This is enrichment. The rest is classified 101 guide to how to enrich uranium. Okay, two routes to a nuclear bomb. So you can use plutonium from a nuclear power plant, or you can use enriched uranium. We're going to be talking about the enriched uranium route.

37:02OK, so you can mine raw uranium from the ground. Anybody can do it. Anybody can do it. You might have some in your garden. But the good news is, you'll be pleased to know, is that stuff won't spontaneously go nuclear and cause an explosion or fuel a nuclear power plant. It's not fissile in itself, the stuff you get from the ground. That's because it mainly consists of uranium 238, which is very stable. That's my second favorite uranium isotope. Your favorite, though, is uranium-235. Yes, that's number one. And that is the good stuff. If you're building a bomb or making nuclear power, that's the stuff you want.

37:40But only 0.7 % of the raw uranium you mine from the ground is the good stuff. Only 0.7%. So if you want to go nuclear, you need more of the good stuff. So you need to take your raw uranium and you need to increase the percentage of U-235. And that, David, is called enrichment. Okay. That's good. A minus. I give you an A minus. Thank you. And it's not easy. That's the other thing I should say. So one way, and there's different ways to do it. You can do it with kind of lasers and other things, which sounds more high tech. But the way most people do it is to turn it into a gas, and then you put it into a centrifuge.

38:15Gordon Corera:This is a tall metal cylinder. This is the second hurdle that Gordon must climb here. It's about the size of a large hot water cylinder. Do you have a hot water cylinder? You know what I mean? It's a kind of large fridge, American style fridge, you know big one but doesn't have the two doors it looks like uh we would call them a hot water heater okay yeah i guess in your home yeah but it's not a hot water heater because inside is a rotor which spins at supersonic speeds by spinning it so fast it's going to separate the heavier u238 from the lighter 235 only a tiny bit by spinning it but then if you feed what you get out of that by having separated it into another centrifuge part of what's called a cascade of centrifuges each time you can slowly enrich the amount of the good stuff the 235 that you want and enrich it from that 0.7 upwards so if you enrich it to about three to five percent new 235 then you can use it as fuel for a nuclear power plant but if you keep enriching it above that.

39:22So same process, you just keep going, you can get towards what you need for a nuclear bomb. Ideally, you need it at about 90 % for a nuclear bomb. So the problem is, it is the same technology you use and the same raw material to enrich for power and enrich for a bomb. So how was that?

39:40Gordon Corera:I think that was pretty good, Gordon. Thank you. I have to say. Yeah. Thank you, sir. I don't like giving you compliments as a general rule. I think listeners will know that, But that was well done. And I guess it's also worth saying that it's not a linear progression. The early percentages take more time and effort. It's much harder to get from 1 % to 5 % than to get from 60 % to 65 % because of important science stuff. There are scientific reasons and mathematical reasons why that is true, but I can confirm it is true that the early stuff is harder. So once you get to, you know, above 20%, where it's starting to get usable and dangerous, it starts to get much quicker to turn it into the good stuff for Obama.

40:20Yeah.

40:20Gordon Corera:And that is relevant from really the standpoint of the whole kind of arc of Iran's nuclear program going up to the most recent strikes, because if you are doing a whole bunch of stuff early on, that is the hard stuff. Yeah. But that is also, in theory, compatible with the story that you're just developing a civilian program. As your program matures, your timeline starts to get squished. Yeah. And so if you're the Israelis, for example, you can have the Iranians at whatever, 40%, 50%. And all of a sudden, if that's taken you six years, it's not like you have another six years to get to 90%, right?

40:58So the timeframe starts to slow down. What Iran is doing is very interesting and very logical because it isn't racing for the bomb. It is dangerous if you race for the bomb. Instead, it's looking to have what it needs to go for a bomb if and when the final decision is made. The idea is to shorten what's called the breakout time, the gap from the decision to actually go for a bomb to actually having one. And at one point, that can be years to have a breakout capacity and to turn that highly enriched uranium into bomb-grade material. But the more you accumulate and the higher you enrich it, you shorten that breakout time.

41:35And I think that's the thing which Iran has been trying to do over the years is shorten the breakout time without racing for a bomb which would then lead to an immediate attack and i think that's the way to understand what iran's game has been is to kind of build that capacity up as much as possible so it's got the possibility of going for the bomb rather than making the decision it's worth saying it's not enough just to have the highly enriched uranium you also have to turn it into a weapon you have to shape the metal you have to make it into a bomb and work out how the explosives will cause the chain reaction to turn into a kind of nuclear bomb.

42:14Gordon Corera:Yeah, that's what Klaus Fuchs was working on. Yeah, that's what Klaus Fuchs was working on, exactly. And you have to work out then how to miniaturize that and then put it onto a delivery system, a weapon. So actually, you know, there are a lot more stages beyond this highly enriched uranium. And it's interesting because we're in this kind of early 2000s period, and the Iranians are nervous about being attacked, especially because, you know, the US... Because the US had attacked the country next door for having allegedly weapons of mass destruction. Yeah. Which didn't actually exist. Which didn't exist.

42:42Gordon Corera:And most of the factories a day is sitting there thinking, oh boy. Iran's like, we've got a real one. So what's interesting is, and this is the US national intelligence estimate, is that the Iranians stopped weaponization in 2003. So weaponization is the bit after you've got the highly enriched uranium to turn it actually into a bomb. Yeah. All the signs are, and this is the official US intelligence assessment, which has lasted until this year, is that the Iranians have not been weaponizing the nuclear material. They've not been trying to build that final stage of turning the enrichment into the bomb, just trying to perfect the centrifuge process and accumulating the highly enriched uranium.

43:21So they're trying to kind of get to the line or as close to the line as possible, but without inviting an attack.

43:27Gordon Corera:And I guess it then raises the question, if we kind of shift over and think about some countries in the region that might not be super excited about Iranians having a bomb of, okay, what do in particular the Israelis do about this program? Because obviously they're becoming aware in, I mean, I'm sure the Israelis are probably aware in the 90s of some of this stuff, right? But by 2002, 2003, it's got to be clear to the Israelis that the Iranians have embarked on this journey. And this is where Mossad, the Israeli security establishment, got to start thinking about how do they prevent it from happening, right?

44:04Gordon Corera:I mean, that's the question. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, for much of this period, including now as we're recording this, is obsessed with Iran, isn't he? He sees it as a kind of existential threat to the state of Israel, which he is personally wanting to do something about right through this period. So he is pressing Mossad to say, I want to do something about this. I want options to attack it. I want military options. And, you know, and this is the interesting thing looking at it now. Back then, he's saying to the US, I want to attack it with a military strike, but I want you to be in with me because I need you, American help, to finish the job and to be able to do it.

44:40Very similar outline to what has just occurred. I mean, it's exactly, you know, he's been saying the same thing for 20 years. You know, this cannot exist and I want to attack it and I want you to help me attack it. And I guess the pressure is going to grow from about 2005 when Iran elects a new hardline president, Ahmadinejad, who is a more radical figure, and he starts to push forward with enrichment. And they're starting to install those centrifuges in the towns.

45:04Gordon Corera:We should say, though, it's not Ahmadinejad who's making these decisions on the new program, right? I mean, this is driven by the supreme leader and the coterie of military and security types who are around him. But I think it is important just to go back to the Israeli perspective for a second is you're absolutely right that Dania has been obsessed with Iran for a couple of decades now. But you can, at least I can understand why the Israelis, it's not fair. I mean, because the Israelis have their own bomb, right? So this isn't fair. But from the standpoint of just Israeli security, if you've got a regime in Iran that is rhetorically committed to your country's destruction, you don't want them to have a bomb.

45:50Gordon Corera:And I think Ahmadinejad is kind of, he's this firebrand kind of guy who, again, he's not making the decisions, but I mean, he's the one who's saying things like, you know, wipe Israel off the map and push it into the sea and all this kind of stuff. And, you know, it just, it seems like at some point, if you're the Israelis, you're going to say, look, we don't know exactly what it's going to look like if they get a bomb, but we just cannot allow it to happen. And it's interesting, isn't it? Because this is the time of the George W. Bush administration in the US. And he'd put Iran on the axis of evil, and he'd gone to war in Iraq over a nuclear program.

46:24And he kind of certainly, in Washington, they're fearing that an Iranian bomb will also lead to other countries wanting the bomb. But this is an administration in Washington, which is still reeling, you know, at this point, 2005, where we are, from what's happened in Iraq. They haven't found the weapons of mass destruction. They're mired in an insurgency at this point. this is not the moment to be getting involved in another war in the Middle East, is it? There's no desire, no appetite to join with the Israelis and starting airstrikes, which could lead at that point to a war and a wider war. So there's a dilemma there for Washington.

46:59Gordon Corera:This is the stage where Bush essentially says, look, what do I have? Two options here. I can either let Iran go nuclear, which doesn't seem like a great idea. And we should say from a U.S. security perspective, I think one of the major fears is that an Iranian bomb leads to a cascade in the region where all of a sudden, do you have a Saudi bomb? Do you have a Turkish bomb? and in a already extremely militarized region, right? With all kinds of cross-cutting rivalries, like the last thing you want is to be having to play 40 chess with a bunch of states that are all armed to the teeth with nukes, right?

47:39Gordon Corera:So I think some of the US standpoint, insofar as you can separate it from the Israeli perspective, is the idea of this cascade, right? And so you can either let that happen or go to war. And to your point, Gordon, we're in Iraq, we're in Afghanistan, And at this point, we have the Iranians smushed in kind of a sandwich, which is ironic because they're actually developing a nuclear weapon. And of course, we're in the two other countries around them. Bush says, I need a third option, right? This is the stage where he says, I need something else on the table, which sounds like a great call for covert action, I would say, Gordon.

48:11Says the former CIA man. That's right. You want a third option, you say. One short of war. That's right.

48:20Gordon Corera:Enter the spooks. And maybe there, Gordon, with the tease of covert action upon us, something very clean and deniable, but also effective. The plans are going to be developed for that third option is going to be short of war. It's going to be something that has never been done before. It is going to be a program that is the modern day equivalent of the Manhattan Project. And it is going to be codenamed Olympic Games. So maybe there with that tease of Operation Olympic Games upon us, let's end. And when we come back next time, we will see how this weapon is developed. And David, don't forget, if people can't wait to find out how the Olympic Games evolve, they want to see what happens in the big event.

49:07They do not have to wait. You can be in on the games right away by joining the Declassified Club. at therestisclassified.com and there you can join the club and get immediate access to all the episodes in this series. Otherwise, though, we will see you next time. See you next time.

49:32It's David Olushoge from Journey Through Time. Here's that clip that we mentioned earlier. If you look at all of the accounts of the fire at this point, as we get to the end of Sunday the second, the first day, this fire is not behaving in any way the way fires traditionally did in London. And there are some people who've argued that it was becoming a firestorm, that the heat and the wind and the movement of air caused by the fire was feeding, it was becoming self-sustaining as it were. John Evelyn, who's a great writer and a diarist of this moment, he talks about the sound of the fire. He said it was like thousands of chariots driving over cobblestones.

50:15There are descriptions in Peeps and elsewhere of this great arc of fire in the sky. I mean, imagine that everything around you is coloured by the flames, yellows and oranges, and above you is this thick black smoke. This is a city you know. These are streets you walk. This is a place that's deeply familiar to you, and it looks completely otherworldly. It looks like another, like a sort of landscape you've never seen before. People describe the fire almost as if it's supernatural.

50:47Gordon Corera:If you want to hear the full episode, listen to Journey Through Time wherever you get your podcasts.

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