Why the Former Head of MI6 Has No Regrets About Iraq

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0:26Gordon:Well, welcome everyone to this very special episode of the Declassified Club. Now, Gordon, we've had conversations with a few former CIA directors on the pod, but I believe this is the first time that we will be accompanied by one of our friends across the Atlantic, at least for direction. Isn't that right, Gordon? We'll be joined by the head or the former head of what you like to call MI6, Gordon, but I don't like to call it MI6 on the podcast. I like to call it the Secret Intelligence Service.

0:55David:That's right. We have got with us Sir Richard Dearlove, who was a career MI6 operations officer and then became chief of the Secret Intelligence Service, SIS, to give it its right title, or MI6, as it's popularly known, in 1999. He served in that role until 2004, which took him through the tumultuous years, really, of the 9-11 attack and its aftermath, including, of course, the war in Iraq. Since leaving, he's also been busy, including hosting a podcast, One Decision. Everyone's got a podcast these days, haven't they? So Richard, welcome to the Declassified Club. Thank you for joining us. Yeah, thanks.

1:30Nice to meet you.

1:32David:Online, Gordon and David. Anyway, I'm here. Richard, we're going to go back and talk a bit about your career as far as you can, and particularly focus on your time as chief. But I just wonder if it's worth starting now on your reflections on where we are at the moment, because recent months, the US, of course, has been engaged in a war in the Middle East against Iran, which the UK, unlike in the case of Iraq, is not involved in. I mean, do you view that as the right move for the UK to have stepped back from the relationship and the alliance in the way it has been involved in the past? Well, I think it could have been more supportive of the United States in this conflict without becoming directly involved.

2:14I mean, it made this esoteric distension between defensive and offensive action, which I thought was a little bit esoteric. But on the other hand, I think we should have, from the word go, expressed our support for this conflict. I mean, what's extraordinary about the conflict with Iran is that I retired in 2004. it's an awful long time ago what was the primary intelligence requirement when I retired it was Iran nuclear this is in my book perhaps or probably the final chapter of a long running problem which was always going to come to a head Trump and Netanyahu have acted in a manner to bring it to a head so I'm not at all surprised by what's happened and I think it was inevitable that given the intransigent nature of the theocratic regime in Iran, that this would eventually lead to a confrontation.

3:19And I sort of disagree a lot with the legal interpretation of the conflict. I mean, that's the opinion of international lawyers. It's nothing cut and dry about it. I think the Iranian regime has largely brought this situation on itself.

3:39Gordon:What do you think will be the sort of outcome or trajectory when this conflict is over, or if the notional ceasefire now holds and the conflict is resolved? I mean, do you see resolution or some kind of mitigation of the risks on that file? Or how do you see it going forward now that we've had Operation Epic Fury? I think I would expect the Iranian regime to implode. It won't necessarily happen immediately. But on my own podcast on the new year, I made a prediction that 2026 would see the disappearance of the Iranian regime. And I'm pretty sure in my own mind that that is where this will end up.

4:19I mean, the 12-day war destroyed the nuclear program. And what I mean by that is it probably destroyed enough of the centrifuges and the installations to make a serious weapons program ongoing. What it didn't solve was the problem of fissile material, which had already been produced, of which we understand there are 450 kilos buried somewhere under the mountain in Nantes after it was bombed. And, okay, that would allow Iran, let's say, to craft a nuclear device or one or two nuclear devices. And I use the word craft deliberately. What it wouldn't allow them to do was to create a weapons production line because I think that has been destroyed.

5:08So there is a remaining problem. And, of course, if you escalate the relationship, it's more likely that Iran would respond in time, maybe with some sort of nuclear device. which wouldn't necessarily be, you know, I don't want to go into the technicalities, but you can see what I'm driving at in terms of using the fissile material. So I think an essential part of the end of this conflict is a recovery of that material. And if you have a change of regime, you probably have a more compliant regime which would have a different relationship with the West. Maybe that material can be extracted without a military operation.

5:49I think that's probably the direction in which we're driving at the moment.

5:53David:You talked a little bit at the start about the fact that the UK perhaps could have been closer. Do you worry about risks to the intelligence relationship? I mean, you've been quite deeply involved in that and committed to it. Not really. It's a storm that will pass, you think? I think it's so heavily institutionalised. It's so long running. My informal indications are that actually it's in pretty good shape. Look, there have always been tensions and disagreements of policy. There are always isolationist elements within the US intelligence community. I'm not going to go into detail, but in my experience, you know, living inside the relationship isn't quite what people imagine from the outside.

6:34But on the other hand, the fact that it exists, the infrastructure around it, particularly things like the UQSA agreement between GCHQ and NSA, and the nuclear relationship, which isn't part of the actual sort of structure of the special relationship, but I'm including, given that our deterrent is American technology or some American technology, this isn't going to disappear or evaporate. And so personal relationships, particularly those that Trump's behavior generates are, I wouldn't say irrelevant, they create awkwardnesses and they create differences of policy. When I was head of station in Washington, which I was at one stage, I was often dealing with actually quite serious problems of disagreement, but it didn't make any difference ultimately to the major issue, which is a relationship which is profound, deeply based, institutionalized, and has its ups and downs.

7:34Okay, it's having a big down at the moment, but it's not going to collapse.

7:38Gordon:I wanted to ask you a bit more about your time as head of station in Washington, which I think was in the early 1990s, kind of at the tail end, or really after the Cold War had concluded. Could you talk a little bit about that period of time and in particular, what the special relationship was like at that stage and maybe how it's changed or how it hasn't over the past 30 years. You know, this is pre-911. I mean, it's in the period when the Soviet Union is implading. I think the exchanges and discussions, sort of understanding what was happening in Russia, what was happening in the Soviet Union, I mean, it was really important.

8:19There were areas where there were resistance on CIA's part to real closeness during that period. For example, they were quite preparatorial about their views of China. There were subjects where we cooperated very closely and subjects where we were not so close. But overall, being head of station, I think I went there in early 91. I remember driving down to Washington, having holidayed. I had three months off between two postings, and I'd been holidaying up in Maine and driving down to Washington as that attack on the When I say the White House in Moscow, you know what I mean. I'm not talking about the White House in Washington.

9:03Where that specific incident, which was fantastically dramatic, and then realizing that these events were going to color the whole of my time there. And, of course, there were some really big events like, you know, the defection of the archivist.

9:20David:Mitrokhin, one of my favorite stories here. He tried the Americans first, but the Americans didn't get it right. Missed that one.

9:26Gordon:Made a mistake there. Yeah, I missed that one slightly. We ended up with the prize, which became really quite a valuable prize. So, I mean, there was a whole lot of extraordinary stuff that went on during that period.

9:37David:I think you'd been educated partly in the US as well. So it was quite deeply ingrained in you. And then I suppose you'd lived through the Cold War when the relationship had been very close when you joined SIS. I was an exchange student under the English-speaking Union program at an American prep school, Kent School, Connecticut, which is a fine school, actually. I was subsequently a governor of it, so I know the school, or a trustee, as they say in the States, rather well. And, yeah, it was a fantastic experience. This was 62, 63. Anyway, it was the autumn of the Cuba crisis. When my mother died, I discovered she kept all my letters, and I've got them here in a drawer.

10:21I'm sitting next to it. And I found the letter that I wrote to my parents in the school in Connecticut during the Cuba crisis. And it's quite interesting to read the letters of a 17-year-old.

10:34David:Did you think you were going to die? Did you think it was all over? Well, I said, you know, they're talking about the threat of nuclear war. Anyway. No, I think my letters show supreme confidence that everything would be fine, as it were. But on the other hand, that there is this massive risk. It's very interesting to see how one sort of digested this extraordinary crisis at that age. And then you joined SIS and then you were in Prague, weren't you? I mean, I'm not sure how much you can talk about it, but I think you ran quite an interesting agent in Prague and you were under surveillance. And, you know, as a kind of young officer, I remember once after the end of the Cold War, trying to get hold of going to the Czech security service and actually trying to get hold of your file.

11:14David:You'll be pleased to know to find out what they knew about you and it had been magically removed from the archives. Actually, I've got it. I got it before you, Gordon. You got there first. I did my best. I've got most of it. I haven't got the whole thing. But interestingly, Penguin are going to publish a book about the case I ran next year. I'm sure you know her, Daniela Richterova, who is the most wonderful expert on the STP archives, has been immersed in these archives. I mean, she wrote this excellent book on the relationship between the Czech Communist Party and various Palestinian terrorist groups, which I thought was superb, because no one else had sort of delved into that and understood it.

12:01Anyway, she's now delving into this case. Of course, she hasn't got access to the MI6 archives, so I'm going to restrict my comments to what comes out of the Czech archives. But, you know, this was one of the big CI cases of the Cold War.

12:16David:Big counterintelligence cases. Yeah. The source was in charge of the operations in Czech that called Spravo Daske Hry, which means intelligence games, which basically means double agent cases. And his job was to run the operations to penetrate British intelligence. And we were running him. So it was a classic Cold War case. and it will make a fascinating book because he died. Well, whilst I was in Prague, towards the end of my time there, he actually died of natural causes. I mean, he had a heart attack and died. He wasn't very old. I mean, he was a man probably in his 40s or maybe a bit older than that in his 50s.

12:55Of course, the Czechs never could interrogate him. So once they discovered that he had been a British source, which they did from the papers in his house, who were bits and pieces of evidence he had left lying around. Their service was completely turned upside down by an investigation which lasted for 12 or 14 years. And sort of phrased their activity because it was such a key penetration. And it was. I mean, I think, you know, we had such a complete picture of what they were doing. It was rather, it was a privilege.

13:29Gordon:You might not answer this, but how did you get the file before Gordon did? what strigs did you have to pull to to get your own security file from prague and beat gordon carrera to the punch that was pretty easy because um i was invited immediately back to prague after the velvet revolution by haval actually who was by then president to celebrate the role i had played in as it were the penetration of there's a plaque somewhere in prague it talks about the torturing secret police anyway. The guy, the dissident, who became head of the Czech service, who was a delightful, lovely man called Alder Chaney, who I'm sure Gordon probably knew too.

14:09And Alder was a close friend of mine. And Alder said, well, I'm not really meant to do this, Richard.

14:18But he dug into the archives and said, I've got an interesting envelope here for you to take But it's interesting because it's not the investigational bit of the archives which recorded what happened after this case. It's my personal file, which is fascinating and very interesting. And, you know, I've read it with great amusement. Because the Czechs thought I was a knife rather useless. I mean, talk about hoodwinking them. I hoodwinked them extremely successfully because I was there to do one thing, which was to run the colonel in charge of the operations against British intelligence. And they'd never twigged until after he had died anyway.

15:01So the Czechs have celebrated this and they've been awfully nice to me. And I get lots of rather wonderful invitations to go back, which has been tremendous fun. It's a great, I love going to Prague. It's just a wonderful city. I used to speak Czech pretty fluently, so I still sort of understand it and can read my way around, but I can't really speak it in the way that I used to be able to.