In short
Podcast Summary: The Twenty Minute VC (20VC) Episode with Mark Roberge
Podcast Details
- Title: The Twenty Minute VC (20VC)
- Host: Harry Stebbings
- Guest: Mark Roberge
- Episode Title: 20Sales: Biggest Lessons Scaling HubSpot from $0-$100M in ARR
- Episode Description: Mark Roberge, co-founder of Stage 2 Capital and former CRO of HubSpot, discusses his experiences scaling HubSpot from zero to $100M in ARR and shares insights on enterprise scaling, channel partnerships, and sales compensation plans.
Key Takeaways
- Lessons from HubSpot’s Growth
- Roberge reflects on his journey as the founding CRO at HubSpot, highlighting:
- Effective Sales Strategies: Not all strategies worked; some lessons were learned through experience.
- Hindsight Insights: He shares what he wishes he knew at the outset, emphasizing the importance of adaptability.
- Team Building: Expansion of the team from 1 to 450 employees, focusing on hiring the right talent.
- Scaling into Enterprise
- Common Mistakes: Entrepreneurs often misjudge the timing for scaling into enterprise markets.
- Timing is Key: Roberge stresses that startups should not rush into enterprise sales too early (ideally after achieving around $2M in revenue).
- Readiness Assessment: Founders should evaluate product readiness and team capability before entering the enterprise space.
- Product and Channel Strategy
- Second Product Launch Timing: Guidance on when to introduce additional products and the rationale behind selective customer acceptance.
- Channel Partnerships:
- Most startups underestimate the work needed to mobilize partnerships effectively.
- Success requires understanding the partner's strategic priorities and incentivizing their sales teams properly.
- Sales Compensation Plans
- Designing Effective Plans: Roberge discusses the pitfalls of standard compensation models, suggesting:
- Align compensation with strategic business goals, especially during early stages.
- Consider customer success metrics in commission structures to incentivize healthy customer relationships.
- Common Compensation Mistakes: Avoiding an overemphasis on initial contract values while neglecting growth opportunities from existing customers.
Key Concepts and Discussions
Sales and Hiring Strategies
- Founder-Led vs. Sales-Led Transition: Transitioning from a founder-led sales approach to a structured sales team is critical yet challenging.
- Sales Playbook Development: Founders should focus on understanding buyer journeys and ideal customer profiles from day one.
Metrics and Economics
- Understanding CAC and LTV:
- Importance of comprehensively calculating Customer Acquisition Cost (CAC) and Lifetime Value (LTV).
- Roberge emphasizes that high initial costs can be mitigated by long-term customer retention and expansion.
Customer Retention
- Net Revenue Retention vs. Gross Revenue Retention: Roberge prefers focusing on net revenue retention as a more significant indicator of business health.
- SMB Challenges: Challenges associated with serving SMBs and the need for strong expansion mechanisms to maintain revenue growth.
Insights on Scaling
- Avoiding Enterprise Too Soon: Roberge cautions against pursuing large enterprise contracts too early, as they can misalign a startup's focus and resources.
- Leveraging Best Practices: The episode draws on Roberge's personal experiences and case studies from HubSpot’s early days, providing actionable insights for listeners.
Concluding Remarks Mark Roberge’s insights provide a wealth of knowledge for entrepreneurs and sales leaders looking to scale their companies effectively. His experiences at HubSpot and advice on sales strategies, compensation planning, and market timing present a robust framework for navigating the complexities of startup growth.
This episode emphasizes the importance of patience, strategic thinking, and the need for founders to be deeply involved in understanding both their products and their customers.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00I was consulting to HubSpot when it was like one or two people and eventually joined the company as the fourth employee. The skill necessary to get a million dollar deal done. There's so much in there in terms of like how do I identify and build a good champion. How do I understand the political dynamics. How do I differentiate between an economic buyer, a technical buyer, an end user, a coach, and a champion. How do I like deal with procurement. How do I deal with legal. My million dollar seller has all those skills. You are listening to 20 sales with me Harry Stebings. Now 20 sales is the monthly show where we sit down with the best sales leaders in the world to reveal their tips, tactics and strategies to scaling the best sales teams.
0:38And there is no one better than to stay guest. HubSpot is one of the generational defining companies of this era of SaaS companies. Our guest today was the fourth employee and their first sales hire. So as the founding CRO at HubSpot, Mott Rebege scaled Aero from zero to a hundred million dollars and expanded his team from one to 450 employees. In this episode, we unpack the biggest lessons from scaling HubSpot from zero to a hundred million dollars in Aero. But before we dive in, we need to talk about our sponsor for the day, Clary. Clary is an industry -leading AI -powered revenue platform that is purpose -built to help companies optimize their end -to -end revenue process.
1:20With over $4 trillion in revenue under management, Clarice customers have a material advantage to optimize their enterprise revenue process across all teams from rep to the boardroom by leveraging the world's largest and fastest -growing AI reservoir of enterprise revenue expertise. More than 1 ,500 organisations, including OCTA, Adobe, Workday, Zoom and Finastra, run revenue on Clarice to improve win rates, This prevents slip deals, forecasts with accuracy, and boost the productivity of all revenue critical employees. To learn more about how you can create, convert, and close revenue with clary, visit clary .com.
1:59Mark, I am so excited for this. I just mentioned I loved your content for a while now, so this is really exciting. Thank you so much for joining me today. Oh yeah, sure, Harry. I'm honored. Thank you for seeing that. Now, I would love to start. How did you first make your way into the world of sales? And when did you know that like sales was really one of your loves? Like a lot of the wins in my career. It was completely serendipitous, almost accidental. At 23, I discovered that I wanted to be an entrepreneur. And even to this day, I kind of consider myself more of an entrepreneur than a sales leader.
2:31Even though I was a founder CEO coming out of school, I knew I wanted a functional alignment and I was torn between marketing and sales. I was like, there's not a lot of MBAs that go into sales, so that's weird. But I really love the art of the deal. And I know generally speaking in tech sales people make more than marketers and I had a young family and like I was the financial Responsible for that sort of like that was important and ingredient But I felt like the MBA provided you more for marketing marketing was going more in a data driven direction I was consulting to HubSpot when it was like one or two people and eventually joined the company as the fourth employee And that's where it's Sarah kicked in because Haligan was the co -founder and he is a sales guy and he was like, if we're gonna use you one day a week of consultant, I want you to sell.
3:14And so that's how I got into sales. Do you wanna match hard for me for one day a week? You're now the CEO. If you want me to sell, I'll sell. If you want me to write code, I'll write code. Like it is what it is. So that's how I got into it. And it actually worked out beautifully because I was not only in sales, but I was selling cutting edge marketing software. So I got to learn about both, which was completely accidental but awesome. Where was HubSpot at that time? Did they have any customers? Did they have any funding just I'm just fascinated. I had sat next to Darmesh in school at MIT in O5 in a class and it was one of those classes where you there's like 50 students everybody shows up with a business idea on like one page that night you read them all you vote and 10 people get picked to be CEOs.
3:59I got picked to do mine which is in the social networking space and Darmesh got picked and his was a hotspot. So that was like the first time I met that house bought and then like he and I became friends. We would grab Chinese food like once a month or so, talk and get to know each other. And then when I was like, Hey, by the way, I'm actually gonna do mine and raise him money. He's like, I'm in, I'll be an angel. I'm like, great. And then at some point through that journey, he was like, can I pay you as a consultant too to helping with house bought? I'm sure you like need money. You have this big loan from MIT and all this stuff.
4:27And I'm like, sure. When I first got engaged on that level with house bought is it was just our match. He was, Brian was in venture capital but had been working with Darmesh and MIT on the concept and Darmesh was trying to recruit Brian. And so about a couple of months through into my consultancy with Darmesh, he said, hey, I was successfully recruited Brian to be my co -founder and BCEO. And so we sat down and Brian's like, I like Mark. Let's keep Mark on. But Mark just do sales if we have you one day a week. So I did that for about six or seven months. And then he took me into a Red Sox game and was like, so at that point now, we've acquired between Brian and I, we've probably acquired like 40 customers.
5:06We're probably at like couple hundred thousand in ARR. We brought a Mike Vulpius CMO. Brian took me to a Red Siles game, was like, hey, listen, General Catalyst is coming in for our A -round. We're gonna raise $5 million or something like that. He's like, why don't you come join full time, be our first salesperson and sales leader? Can I ask, in terms of the evolution, the hardest thing is often for founders to transition. from a founder -led sales motion to a sales team -led sales motion. What do you advise founders who are struggling in that transition? Yeah, it's a really hard one, and it's a key.
5:41A lot of founders today are product and engineering oriented, and don't have a lot of experience in sales. Every time I ask them, what are you looking for? They always say the same thing. Ten years of experience selling a product like mine to a customer like mine. And there's tremendous research that shows that that mindset doesn't work out. And it's not that it doesn't help. It's just that there's a whole bunch of other things you need to assess largely around sales skills that are not looked at. And because of that, you end up with the bottom 25 % performers in your industry. That's the biggest pahole.
6:12Essentially what that means is a founder needs to learn how to assess a seller on sales skills. And that's like saying to a salesperson challenging them to assess an engineer and how well they write Java. It's hard to do. Like you almost have to go to school for five years. So it's kind of the same thing. It's difficult. I can't just like say a statement and like you learn it in a minute Go find an advisor. Advisors are cheap. They're usually a little bit of equity Go find someone that's hired a bunch of salespeople Particularly that in this case it could be okay that it's in your domain. Okay, a couple of questions One does the founder have to create the first sales playbook?
6:48Well, can they actually bring in a sales lead from they want on revenue? It depends on the aspect of the playbook Harry So in terms of like a Sandler level or winning by design, like Mathematical Force Management methodology, that's going to take a professional leader to like bring in and navigate. Like even things like how do you manage the first meeting and do discovery well? I don't see a lot of product founders coming up with that. But one of the underlying pieces of the sales playbook is a buyer journey. What are the different ways that buyers describe the problem you solve or the opportunity that you create and how do they look to solve that and how do they look to make that decision.
7:28That's something that a founder should be working on from day one just to start crystallizing that. Another piece is the ideal customer profile. You know, so what are the attributes of like what a home run fit is for us versus not? The other attribute is like just the general value proposition that we're pitching. Like these are typically areas where founders can make a lot of progress on their own. They might get it like 70 % of the way there, and then a professional seller is gonna come in and take it the final amount. Add the details like call calling, getting the appointment, doing discovery calls, tailoring the pitch, handling objections, dealing with negotiations, all that kind of stuff.
8:03I may found it in your portfolio, and I'm just, I don't know what I'm doing here, so you're gonna help me. For my first sales hire, then, I've got us to 700K in Aero. Do I have someone who's sold to customers like mine before? Or do I have someone who sold deal sizes like mine before if you could have one deal size or Category that they've experienced before which would you roll? I have a strong conviction that deal size has a higher weight in correlation to success Let's just say we we sell million dollar deals to banks and I have two candidates one candidate sells $10 ,000 deals to banks and one candidate sells million dollar deals to hospitals The skill necessary to get a million dollar deal done, there's so much in there in terms of like how do I Danify and build a good champion?
8:52How do I understand the political dynamics? How do I differentiate between an economic buyer, a technical buyer, an end user, a coach, and a champion? How do I like understand medic as a sales process? How do I like deal with procurement? How do I deal with legal? My million dollar seller that sells to healthcare has all those skills. Okay, my person that sells to banks, but they sell 10 ,000 or deals has none of those skills. I'd be much easier for me to teach the million dollar seller about banks that it is for me to teach a 10 ,000 dollar transactional seller, how to do all that other stuff.
9:25Okay, I'm in this process hiring all sales, rap, wafa, sales edition. What are the most asked questions? I love getting into a roleplay. That's the most important part is this part where it's like, okay, Harry, we're hiring for HubSpots. Like, let's just pretend you're a small business owner and you downloaded the HubSpot in about marketing ebook yesterday and you got the lead. Let's just do the first call. And so we'll do the call. And I'm looking at things like really good, open -ended questions, follow -on questions to do discovery and qualifying need and quantify need. I'm hoping that there's no show up and throw up and they give me like a five minute commercial on HubSpot that I could have just read online.
10:02And then I'll stop the interview a couple minutes in. And then I'm going to assess coachability. You know, in most startup contexts, no one's going to come out of the gate hitting their productivity in month one. Like they have to learn the product, the methodology, the customer. So I'm assessing their ability to be coached. And so I'll have you self -assess. And if you're like that, I was awesome. I have no feedback for myself, then that's a red flag. Every interview, I give a piece of positive feedback and a piece of need for improvement. So I give a positive, I give a need for improvement, I watch how they take the coaching, and then usually I have them redo the role play.
10:34And then if we're going to do another meeting, I'll say we're going to do it again. So let you think about it for two days and then come back. And that's a big part of my assessment. How false do you know when you've made a messiah? It takes a while and I have a lot of situations where I had a rep that was in there for three or four months and we weren't sure and they weren't hitting it. But we gave it a shot in seven months and they were toward the top and they stayed there. So that was perplexing to me Harry because I want a lot of early knowledge and leading indicators. but I've seen that happen quite a bit.
11:06It just took them a little while to get there. The only thing I can say early on kind of comes back to that coachability again. If I have a manager come to me and say, oh yeah, Pete's not working out. And I'll say, how do you know? Like, we'll look at their numbers. And I'm like, okay, well, what are you coaching Pete on? And I'm like, well, we're trying to get him to do a little better job on sense of urgency development. And I'll say, okay, how are you coaching him? So now I can assess if the manager's got a good diagnosis and good coaching model. and then I'm like, okay, when you're coaching them, are they staying?
11:36When you move them up a little bit, are they staying there? Or are they there for a week and then they go down? If they're going up for a week and go down, yeah, we probably need to make a cut. But if they're staying there, this is taking a little while, let's stay in there. I think we're gonna get there. That's the best I can see to get in early signals to where this person is gonna make it. In terms of the hiring process, when it comes to titles, what are some of the biggest lessons in terms of the title discussion and what it might reveal about someone joining a company. It's probably a red flag if they're over obsessed with it.
12:06A little bit of ego stroking and that's not going to be great for culture, especially early on when it has to be like, let's roll up our sleeves and do whatever it takes. Should young companies be worried about giving away VP of sales or how do sales too early because it makes it difficult to layer or not? I don't think it does. You know, to your point, I think it's a red flag for the candidate. But if I have a star and I have to give them a VP of sales title instead of director or a CRO title instead of VP to get them to do the job I see for them for the next 18 months and the assess. I don't see it being an issue.
12:38Like, is that okay? I hire someone. They kill it for 18 months and then after that we decide we've got to up level them. In one case, they're titles, director sales. In another case, they're titles VP sales. I don't think that's harder. What about money and incentive packages? Any big lessons there on advice me? I've never hired a sales team for, never hired a rent. How should I do it? How should I structure it? What do you advise me? What most people do, which is I think a big mistake, is they hire a sales personal leader and sort of delegate it to them because they sort of like are the functional expert expert on it.
13:13And then that person uses the sales comp model from their last company. That's really broken. What a lot of founders don't realize is you can get pretty creative here, especially in their early stages. The best way to to rise a comp plan is to think about what you need the business to do in the next six to 12 months, strategically. Don't even think about sales, just strategically, holistically. Are any of those re -enforcible with sales, Pearson, behavior, or action? And if so, that's going to start deciding your complaint. So I'll give you some really common examples. First off, which is like semi -related to that point, I don't like Commission Plan sales people in the journey to product market fit.
13:54Like, I just want pure equity people. If we're trying to find product market fit, if we have three design partner customers and we need to get to like 20 to understand product market fit I'm gonna bring on a salesperson to help us do that and that person make and say 150 like 75 base 75 commission I don't want to put them on a comp plan. I'm gonna say like listen I'm gonna pay you like 125 flat out no matter what with some equity That's the right person because like we're sitting around and we're pivoting pivoting pivoting We're shoot we've got it wrong We have to go back to the driving board and it's gonna take us three weeks to build this thing.
14:26All the engineers are making their salary paying their mortgage and the sales rep is desperate and sweating, I don't need that. And furthermore, that's not the rep I'm trying to attract right now. I'm trying to attract a rep that enjoys that design journey is sitting there with the engineers not sweating making the mortgage payment or thinking short term. But then once we get into, okay, now we have product market fit, then this is a classic example where it's like, Now we need to get like go to market fit, but we have to make sure that as we scale, we keep customer value and success top of mind.
14:59And so I wanna make sure that my reps are not just selling customers and revenue, they're selling healthy customers, customers that are in my ICP, they're gonna see a lot of value from our product. Most comp plans don't motivate that, don't incentivize that. But here's an example of what we talk about, like think about your strategy and a line of the comp plan, it's like, okay, Harry, when you sell a deal, you're going to make 5 % on that deal. I'm going to give you half of the commission when the customer pays and half the commission when they hit their leading indicator of retention, which usually happens in the first 30 days.
15:32So that could be as simple as like they set up the product and process their first transaction. So as long as that leading indicator of retention is something meaningful, that again can happen in the first 30 days of the customer's life. But if it happens, they're probably going to be with a throw a long time. And if it doesn't happen, they're probably going to turn. And you'd be shocked how much like the sales process in terms of what's discussed, how the product is presented, what types of customers are pursued, drives that. And that's like a not commonly used compensation plan, but should be at that stage and is aligned with the strategic objective of the company.
16:06Are there any big fuck ups that you see portfolio companies make on comp plans for sales teams that you're like, Harry, don't make this mistake. So many, if you're pursuing like PLG or land and expand, the sales compensation plan can really eff that up. Because most sales compensation plans put most of the payment, the commission on the first ACV from the customer and have very little if any on expansion. It puts the salesperson at odds with how you want customers to buy your product. Because when you're in PLG or land and expand, the buyer wants to start small to test it and then expand it, whether that's with other functions or departments or whatever.
16:45And you as a company start up, your strategy is to do the same thing. Make it easy for customers to just like, give it a shot and expand it. But if your reps are paid in that way, they want the opposite. They want you to buy everything up front and you're likely to contract or turn. So that's a huge fuck up that we see a lot. Well, it's the right way to solve that then, because I'm just taking a say, it's like a 10K PLG product. And like a 10K is kind of the entry price, but we hold them to scale to 100K. As a company, you don't want to pay 100K up front, get hit with cash flow problems in that way.
17:15I would do something like this, Harry. You're a salesperson, your job's bringing customers. I'm going to pay you 3 % rate on the first ACB from a customer and 5 % on any expansion revenue. So now it's like, oh, sweet. Okay, I get it. So I will make the most money if I sell customers on a very small ACB to start and expand them later. Yes, that's what you do. And then the salesperson's like, wait, wait, wait, wait. Am I a CSM now? No, no, you just go hunt. You go hunt, you sign up customers, and we have a CSM team that onboards them. They expand them. They have their own different complex. They have their incentives too.
17:52That's just how yours works. If you sign up good, healthy customers with good expectations, you'll make a lot of money. If you sign up a bunch of crappy customers that don't stick around and don't expand, you're not going to make a lot of money. The thing that worries me when I see the biggest problem I see even in all of the company's is sales led growth with PLG pricing that doesn't expand. And what I mean by that is traditional large sales team selling three -day ACVs. And they say, ah, but you know, if we prove it and if we do this and this and this, then it'll expand to 30K. And truth be told, it rarely does.
18:28And so we have this kind of enterprise sales cost base for a PLG pricing that doesn't often expand. At what price point does it make sense to have a sales team? Yeah, that was a really good question. Okay, so my approximation would be even in HubSpot We started at like 3000 a year. I would say that's on the lower end now that required a lot of inbound Leads there's a big missing part to that is like the ACV is only one portion to answer like whether or not our go -to -market Motion is working whether we have a salesperson or PLG or we're using marketing inbound or we're doing cold call it whatever The absolute right answer comes down to unit economics.
19:06And there's a couple different ways to measure unit economics. Let's just say payback period, which is the CAQ divided by the ACV. Someone pays us $10 ,000 a year, then the CAQ needs to be $10 ,000 for us to have a payback period of a year. Right? So if someone pays us $10 ,000 a year, and it costs us $10 ,000 to acquire them, we get paid back in 12 months. Anything above that, you start to question whether your economics work, anything below that, it's really good. The problem is ACV is only one part of that formula, Harry. The CAC is the other piece. The CAC for outbound sales teams is all over the place, because it depends on how many calls you have to make to get an appointment.
19:45How many of those appointments turn into a demo? How many of those demos close? Right, so there's a lot of different variations in there. Are you calling CMIOs of hospital systems, or are you calling like, Landscapers of small businesses that pick up the phone a lot? It really comes down to the absolute academic and practical answer is it have to have good you in economics, the CAC and the ACV have to match up, but it's not always like at 3 ,000 ACV you can have a sales team and at 2 ,000 you can. When you look at payback periods as an investor say, what do you like bad, good, great? At the IPO, less than 12 months is excellent.
20:2512 to 15 is good. 15 to 20 gets concerning above 20. It's going to be a real problem. 20 months. At the series A, less than 12 is a, it's almost like you're probably being too efficient. Like we probably like try to grow faster. 12 to 15 is really good. 15 to 20 is fine. It's kind of like, that's fine for now. We'll have to work on it later. above 20 it gets concerning. So you kind of have some semblance, but there's a little more flexibility at the Series A, because we know that there's a lot of improvement that's just gonna come with scale potentially, and then there's a lot of opportunities and low -hanging fruit for us to get to that just isn't a priority right now.
21:08So I see a lot of two to three -month paybacks, which at Series A, which to your point, isn't either. Yeah, there's always a game with numbers though Mark, isn't that? What's included in your CAC? And I've had somewhere, it's like, well, it's just my marketing spend, or it's just my outbound sales team. And it's like, well, that doesn't count. It's not quite that. What should be included in a CAC for a founder to truly understand that actual payback? Yeah, so at scale, it's going to be like, on your income statement, the entire sales and marketing align is going to be the CAC. And you divide that by the number of customers that are acquired in that period that say in a quarter that you're evaluating.
21:50Now that gets challenging at the series A because if the founders are selling, well then you have to attribute a part of their salary hypothetically. And if like you're throwing just general network and events for the company and that's leading to leads is that quote. So there's always these squishy costs just to keep it simple. Everything you're spending on marketing and salespeople and sales leadership and sales ops and all that kind of stuff and easygoing there. The one thing that we didn't discuss so ashy is the LTV and it does matter because if we look at banking customers for example, or phone customers, and I'm saying them because they are generally the longest serving customers, you know, they last for seven to ten years and so you can actually have a higher cack if your LTV is a much longer.
22:33How do you think about that when analyzing early stage companies where we have in the UK we would say fuck all data. You know, there's multiple ways to measure your economics, there's payback, and then there's LTV to CAC. For whatever reason, the industry talks about an LTV to CAC greater than three. It's a little bit of a farce, but it's not like a terrible measure. It's good to know what your LTV to CAC is. That's where you could find that, Harry, and that's going to be tricky because theoretically the lifetime value should be your ACV divided by your churn rate. You don't know your churn rate really for five years or more, so you have to make some pretty heavy assumptions there.
23:13Do you not think you know your turner? So if we take like the you know hub spot, why did so many investors pass on hub spot? Oh, you serve SMBs, don't they go out of business as such a high rate? Absolutely. The turn rates gonna be horrible. I think actually, I think there's some discrepancy and are not blaming anyone, but on I think the early hub spot turn rate, some points has been said to be like three to four percent and some eight percent. Point just being SMBs go out of business. A month, yeah. A month by the way, yeah, it was high. It was the highest ahead in February of 2008. Throughout 2008, it was mostly between three and four, which is terrible.
23:50I mean, even at three or four, that's 40 to 50 % a year. It's really bad. You're an investor, say. Do you invest in a company that serves SMBs with three to four percent share on rice? We do invest in companies that serve SMBs. That's become like a really great starting point and you can build a healthy business there, but more importantly, use that success to move upstream to the mid -market when you're product and brand and your sophistication, justifies it and then eventually to the enterprise, potentially these are very common plays. But yeah, with three to four percent, not a lot. I mean, you have to have a lot of other things going right because actually you just don't have a business.
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24:26Now, if you do want to make your business work in SMB, you just need a really healthy expansion motion because just macroeconomics, because of small business bankruptcy and budget sensitivities, if you're doing really well, you probably have an 80%, 85 % logo retention in SMB. So you need to have at least a greater than 15 % revenue expansion to get your business to be solid, to get your revenue retention to be above 100%. It's doable in PLG, most starting ACVs is zero. It's all expansion, right? And so only the people that have already seen value in your product start with revenue and that usually sticks very nicely and then continues to expand.
25:11So SMB is very doable. It's just like, you probably have to start them on lowest ACBs and you have to have a really strong expansion mechanism. Can I ask, I had Dave Kellogg on the show then, and he said that he loves a GRR, gross revenue retention, and is much more telling the net revenue retention. How do you think about net revenue retention versus gross revenue retention for founders listening going, which one? I think that are both needed. I probably put more weight in net revenue retention because at the end of the day, if you have 120 % that revenue retention, you're gonna grow 20 % a year without acquiring any customers.
25:48That's really powerful. Whether that means you have 90 % customer attention with 30 % expansion, and that's how you get to the 120, or you have 50 % customer attention, 70 % revenue expansion, and that's how you get to 120. Either way, you're gonna grow by 20 % a year if you keep that up. That's why I think that's the most important. The problem with the latter of having 50 % customer attention with 70 % expansion, yeah, the customers that stick with you are seeing a lot of value and pain more. But that means half the world out there are being like, yeah, I tried Harry's product and it didn't work for me.
26:23That's not good. So that's why I want to look at customer attention, but like I kind of think net revenue attention is more. Is that not good? Like I think if you have a tight ICP and you're very clear in terms of who your customers, especially in a PLG world. There'll be people who pick it up and try it. And it's not for that. Yeah, it was never meant for you. I just worry that some customers don't know that. Like I know this company is selling yoga software and they sell it specifically for more of multi -location yoga studios. But yoga, almost studio owners talk to each other. And when they're at a retreat together, and they're like, oh yeah, I tried that.
27:01It didn't work for me. I don't think they're thinking, oh, were they an ICP or not? And you just think like there's a reputation. So I'm not that I see P .R. Yeah, exactly. Right, right. Well, you're different than me. Okay. So when you're investing, say, a net revenue retention of 120 is good for founders. Like how do you think about good and great? At some point, you need to get above 100 percent because if you're not above 100 percent net revenue retention, you have to, in order to grow, you have to outsell that gap with new customers. If you're at like 10 million in revenue, that's not that hard.
27:37If you're at 10 million in revenue and you have 90 % revenue attention, that means that you start the year, your customers are paying you 10 million and those customers will be paying you 9 million at the end of the year. So you just need to sell a million dollars a new software to maintain flat and you need to sell 5 million of software to grow by 40%. That's not that hard. but once you get to a billion in revenue, and you have a 90 % net revenue attention, that means that at the end of the year, you're gonna have 900 million. So you have to sell a hundred million dollars of new contracts to new customers just to remain flat and 200 million of new software to new customers to grow by 10%.
28:20That is hard. Versus if you're at a billion and you have 110 % never retention, and you can do nothing in new sales and you're gonna grow by 10%. So at some point, it's just like you can't outsell our net revenue tension less than 100%. One of the favorite things I have about HubSpot is the way that you just like broke the SaaS law of SMBs in terms of being a great business to serve and not needing to scale necessarily into enterprise. But you invest today in amazing SaaS founders and I'm sure you see them say, ah, we're thinking about scaling into enterprise. How do you advise founders that you work with or advise me?
28:57Yeah. In terms of winning the right time or at who to scale into enterprise? Both answers could be correct. I will say that it is extremely rare that you want to go into enterprise south of a couple million in revenue. Extremely rare. So it's a little bit of a trap for most entrepreneurs to want to go to the enterprise too early. A lot of my students do this. You know, like, oh, if I can just get that huge logo, everybody else will follow. Well, two problems with that. Number one, you really underestimate what it's like to get that logo. It's gonna take a long time, maybe a year and a half. And whoever's your champion, you might quit their job in that time.
29:33And by the time you get to the finish line, you're gonna have to do sucks compliance and show all the stuff and you don't have it. So it's like, it's just gonna kill you from a capital standpoint. Your better bet is to figure out what your product is, what your offer is, figure out your total just -well -market and carve out the lowest part possible. Now, it's not always like a couple people. Like we have an AI company for support teams. It doesn't work if you only have two support wraps. It just doesn't make sense. You have to have at least 20. But that's fine. We can go sell companies with 500 employees and 20 support wraps.
30:02That's fine. That's not trying to close a huge bank. So you just have to carve out the smallest possible. And then I've asked a lot of people from Chris Degnin, whenever LPs are the founding CEO of Snowflake. And the answer on when is always the same from them. It's like when you get pulled. Because like, you know, you're making hay in the SMB, you're going one million, three million, seven million. And like, big businesses start hearing about you. In fact, you're probably turning away big businesses before your show and sell them. Take the bold stance of disagreeing with Dagman and Egan. But that's why it's why I disagree with them, because you might actually get pulled at one million in ARR and actually very often I find enterprises can distort strategy and product roadmap before they are ready for it.
30:45And people do not understand what it truly means to be an enterprise company as you said, so to all compliance is different. So no, not when they, yeah, you, I agree. You were actually in agreement. Harry, I probably didn't say it right is like they would say like you're not going to go unless you're pulled, but if you're being pulled, it doesn't mean you should go. You're on the same page with them, Harry. And like classic example, I mean, I think we're a two three million in revenue at HubSpot and one rep brought Facebook to the table as a customer. It was like a three million dollar contract.
31:16It would have doubled our revenue. And he said, no, we were being pulled, said no. Everything's gonna go bad at that point. Like, they're gonna start controlling your product roadmap. We're not built for that. It's not gonna go well. Things are gonna get around. It's gonna distract the company. And the other thing that happens to Harry is like, if one of them I had another company recently that did this where like a friend of the CEO at a big company came in and bought. And it was like a huge contract. Up until then they'd been selling $15 ,000 ACVs. And this one was like $200 ,000. And all the sales people were like, Whoa, look at that.
31:46I made my annual goal in one sale, and everybody will start doing that, and now I was on you of no sales, because you don't know how to sell those deals. That was like a lucky inbound. Real big trap. In terms of like you mentioned there, like the logo that drives social validity, to what extent do large logos drive social validity and subsequent sales? Does having drop box, Tesla, does that, does that really work for a certain, nah, nah, nah. Not as much as people think. Key studies in general, you throw a key study, Well, that's a bank and I'm in healthcare. Okay, well here's one from healthcare.
32:18Well, that's in oncology and I'm a dermatologist. Okay, here's one oncology. Well, that's in this type of oncology and I'm more this type. You know what I mean? It's like, or there on the West Coast and we're on the East. Like they're never satisfied. Yeah, it helps a little, but not as much as people think. And do you think that when you're advising founders, it's great to get sheer volume, number of customers through the door, volume volume, or quality of those logos. Good question. Like, you have to be specific about your ICP. Now, very early, it's a hypothesis. So let's say, like, if you take the whole world, and ultimately your ICP is going to be, say, like, 5 % of that, well, I might be OK, us selling to, like, 10 to 12 % and drawing a little bigger circle, because we just don't know.
33:01But, like, there's some folks, I like to do, like, a green, yellow, red. I have different attributes, like, you know, how many employees were they located in the world? What sectors are they in? These types of things, right? And the green is like we have strong conviction that those are good fits between 50 and 500 employees based in the US In tech that's green and we're gonna go after those all day So when our SDRs are co -calling there are only co -calling those people then there's a reds where we have strong conviction We will not sell in fact you cannot sell them Okay, so that might be outside of English speaking territories That might be healthcare nonprofit government and it might be like greater than 10 ,000 employees Those are red, you are not allowed to sell them.
33:41Yellow is you can sell them if they're inbound. So we're not going to cool call them, but if they come inbound, we don't have enough conviction to know that they're not a fit. We also don't have enough conviction to let go outbound. So that's how I kind of try to think about it and that green yellow red mind set, at least, to start. And then over time, you can start to evaluate customer success performances, etc. to get more conviction on it. What was your inbound to outbound ratio at HubSpot? Radiculously high. It's rare to see it that high. It was I think a hundred percent of our customers came inbound for the first two or three years How did that change at the time?
34:14I would say you know for and we also built a vibrant channel partner program a very fragmented channel partner program through like very small channels Channel partners. So I would say by year five we were 50 % inbound 30 % channel 20 % outbound around the IPO it becomes very blurry because at that point you tend to just like go to territories. The brand becomes so strong that like it's really not clear what an imbalmer is now. Like someone does a cool call and they're like, oh yeah, I know you just cold call me but I'm already HubSpot customer and you're like, what do you mean I'm a HubSpot customer?
34:48Like, oh, I've been using your marketing grader, your free marketing grader product for two years. Like, oh yeah, like you're not really a customer or like, oh, I heard about you guys. I saw you at an event. So it's like, when you hit brand scale, the lines start to get blittered. I'm so enjoying this. You mentioned channel partners. I think so many founders go, well, we're going to get a channel partnership with SAP or Workday and then they're just going to sell for us and oh my gosh, so many huge part. Okay, so tell me, what are the biggest mistakes startups make with channel partnerships? Yeah, exactly what you said, Harry, a complete underestimate of what it takes to actually mobilize that partner.
35:25Okay. And it's I get why they're it's like we're going back to our product founder and they're like yeah we have like 10 design partners and 10 design customers and now we have to go acquire a bunch of customers and I have two options. Option A is hire a big expensive, scary sales team that's going to destroy my culture. I don't know how to hire our salespeople or just go partner with workday who already has 5 ,000 sales people and I'll just give them 20 % of my profit. Why wouldn't they ever want to do that? That makes perfect sense. First off, do you even know how to get into workday's program?
35:53Like you need to like really have good alignment as high up as possible. to do that. Second off, do you even know how to get the mind share of the rep? Imagine being a workday salesperson. You worked for hours to get 30 minutes with a customer. What do you pull out of your bag to show them? Some start -ups, little product that I get a 5 % spiff on? To really mobilize, you have to understand what the strategy at the sea level is, make a case that your product aligns with that, and then convince them to spiff the crap out their reps so they're motivated to pull it out of their bag. Hard. I'm so sorry.
36:28What is spitting? It's a little like one -off bonus, okay? I'll give you an example. So salesforce .com was an early investor in our series D, believe it or not, and actually became a big channel partner for us over time, about 10 % of our customers before we became competitive. Here's an example of what happened. We had contacts really high up. George Hugh, I think it was, it was COO. and he eventually got us Benny off's ear. And we heard, at the time, Salesforce wasn't in marketing yet, in the marketing cloud. We also heard that the number one sales objection and reason for closed -lost was, hey, cool, you organize my leads for me and my deals.
37:08My biggest issue is getting more leads. And the salesforce .com sales reps didn't know how to talk about demand generation. Benny off knew it. And he's like, okay, we need to find partners that can help us with demand gen and help us train our reps how to talk about demand gen. And George's like, I got this new company, HubSpot, that's really cool. So he started to learn about this. And Benioff's like, whoa, this is exactly what we need. So he's like, Benioff looks at all the partner, all the different things that are in their app exchange, doc you sign, all this stuff, right? And Benioff is like, we're gonna choose 10 out of the 3000 that our reps get quota relief on.
37:43It counts toward their quota. And HubSpot is one of them. And I'm gonna talk about that on our sales kickoff. So Benioff gets up and says, hey, keep selling all our child. We've really cool channel partners at 3000 minutes, a huge app exchange. And there's 10 of them that you get quarterly. And all the reps are like, whoa, that's amazing. Now, even when that happened, they're only like 1 % of our revenue came in. So I had to take one of our best salespeople, Adam Maverico's, and assign them to that partnership. And Benioff and George who were so into it, they gave Adam his own office in Salesforce Tower and Server Cisco, in the Toronto office.
38:18And he had his own login to the Salesforce .com CRM for the Salesforce team. And he was on chatter all day like, yeah, good job. You got a quarter of a leave. And he'd fly around to all the Sadalab offices. And after a year, they were considered in 10 % of our revenue. So hopefully that's a good example of what it takes to mobilize a big partnership. It is hard. Listen Mark, I know you have to run this day. So this is the first of a very special two -parter. We cannot wait to have you back on the show. and thank you so much for joining us today. I love doing these vertical shows. I want them to be as granular and as helpful as possible to early stage founders.
38:53So let me know if there's any people or topics that you'd really like me to focus on in the show. Do check it out on YouTube by searching for 20 VC and I always love to see your comments there. But before we leave you today, we need to talk about our sponsor for the day. Clary, Clary is an industry leading AI -powered revenue platform that is purpose -built to help companies optimise their end -to -end revenue process. With over $4 trillion in revenue under management, Clarice customers have a material advantage to optimise their enterprise revenue process across all teams, from rep to the boardroom, by leveraging the world's largest and fastest growing AI reservoir of enterprise revenue expertise.
39:31More than 1 ,500 organisations, including OCTA, Adobe, Workday, Zoom and Finastera, run revenue on Clarice to improve win rates, prevents slip deals, forecasts with accuracy and boost the productivity of all revenue critical employees. To learn more about how you can create, convert and close revenue with clary, visit clary .com. As always, I so appreciate all your support and stay tuned for an incredible 20VC episode coming this Monday with Sam at Greylock.
From the publisher
Mark Roberge is a Co-Founder and Managing Director at Stage 2 Capital and a Senior Lecturer at the Harvard Business School. Prior to these roles, Mark was the founding CRO at HubSpot, where he scaled ARR from $0 to $100 million and expanded his team from 1 to 450 employees. Mark was ranked #19 in Forbes' Top 30 Social Sellers in the World. He was also awarded the 2010 Salesperson of the Year at the MIT Sales Conference.
In Today's Episode with Mark Roberge We Discuss:
1. Biggest Lessons Scaling Hubspot to $100M in ARR:
- What are Mark's biggest lessons in what worked in their sales strategy in scaling to $100M in ARR?
- What elements of Hubspot's sales strategy did not work? What would he have done differently with the benefit of hindsight?
- What does Mark know now that he wishes he had known when he started at Hubspot?
2. How the Best Startups Scale into Enterprise:
- What are the single biggest mistakes startups make when scaling into enterprise?
- When is the right time? What do founders get most wrong on timing of scale into enterprise?
- What do you need to have in place both from a team and product perspective to make the transition?
3. Second Product and Second Channel:
- When is the right time to launch the second product?
- Why does Mark believe that you should be turning down customers in the early days? Why is not every customer right for your company?
- How does Mark think about channel diversification? Does Mark agree you only need one channel to scale to $50M in ARR and two to scale to $100M in ARR?
4. 99% of SaaS Founders Do Partnerships Wrong:
- What are the single biggest mistakes founders make when doing channel partnerships?
- What can and should they do to set channel partnerships up for success?
- What do the channel partners need to have to be equipped to sell the partner solution?
- What level of buy-in and from who on the channel partner side is needed for the partnership to be successful?
- What did Mark learn from Hubspot's partnership with Salesforce scaling to 10% of Hubspot's revenue?




