20VC: Are IPO Windows Shut? Has Regulation Killed the M&A Market? M&A OG Frank Quattrone on Lessons from 650 M&A Deals Worth Over $1TRN and Taking Amazon, Cisco and Netscape Public

1 Mar 2024 · 58 min

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Episode Title

20VC: Are IPO Windows Shut? Has Regulation Killed the M&A Market? M&A OG Frank Quattrone on Lessons from 650 M&A Deals Worth Over $1TRN and Taking Amazon, Cisco and Netscape Public

Episode Overview In this episode of The Twenty Minute VC, host Harry Stebbings interviews Frank Quattrone, a prominent figure in the M&A space, discussing the current state of the IPO market, the impact of regulation on M&A, and insights from Quattrone's extensive experience in technology company IPOs and acquisitions.

Key Guests

  • Frank Quattrone: Founder and Executive Chairman of Qatalyst Partners, with over 600 M&A transactions and significant IPOs including Amazon, Cisco, and Netscape.

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Discussion Points

  1. Has Regulation Killed M&A?
  2. Quattrone's View: Regulation is not the sole reason for a decline in M&A activity.
  3. Current Market Dynamics:
  4. Market crashes lead to inflated seller expectations, complicating negotiations.
  5. Buyers become risk-averse during downturns, leading to fewer deals.
  6. Impact of Political Climate:
  7. Uncertainty around a potential Trump administration and its likely impact on antitrust policies.
  1. When Will the IPO Window Re-Open?
  2. Current Status: Quattrone agrees that the IPO window seems closed for tech companies.
  3. Historical Comparison: Explains how the current situation mirrors the dot-com bust and events of 2007.
  4. Future Predictions:
  5. Identifies conditions necessary for the IPO market to recover.
  6. Discusses the timeline for potential recovery, emphasizing the need for healthy market conditions and reasonable valuations.
  1. M&A: How Do Companies Get Bought?
  2. Process Insights: Quattrone outlines the essentials of how companies are acquired.
  3. Common Pitfalls: Sellers often misjudge their company's worth.
  4. Successful Strategies: Best practices from leading buyers and sellers to achieve optimal pricing.
  5. 'Companies are Bought, Not Sold': Quattrone supports this notion, stressing the importance of creating buyer interest.
  1. IPOing Amazing Companies
  2. Notable Deals:
  3. Shares anecdotes from the Amazon IPO, including a memorable pricing negotiation with Jeff Bezos.
  4. Discusses the acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft and the strategic negotiations involved.
  5. Shares insights regarding the Qualtrics acquisition by SAP, emphasizing the role of relationship-building in M&A processes.

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Key Takeaways

  • Market Conditions Matter: The state of the market heavily influences both M&A activity and IPO opportunities.
  • Seller Expectations vs. Buyer Reality: A disconnect often exists between what sellers believe their companies are worth and what buyers are willing to pay.
  • The Importance of Relationships: Successful M&A often hinges on strategic relationships and the creation of buyer interest.
  • Historical Context is Crucial: Understanding the past helps anticipate future market behavior and conditions.

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Conclusion In a rapidly evolving tech landscape, understanding the nuances of M&A and IPO processes is essential for stakeholders. Frank Quattrone’s insights provide valuable lessons on navigating these complex waters, particularly during times of uncertainty in the financial markets.

For more episodes and resources, visit [The Twenty Minute VC](http://www.20vc.com).

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Transcript

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0:00It's not necessarily regulation that's killing it. The worst eminions we've had, ironically, are when there's been a market crash. Sellers still think that they're worth what they were worth last year, and it's hard for them to imagine, that they're not worth 20 times revenues. They're really worth eight. And it takes a while for that to sink in. Trump is not a classic free markets Republican. He doesn't like big tech. So I don't think we're gonna see much of a difference in the antitrust environment. This is 20VC with me Harry Stebnings. Now I've been very vocal about my concerns surrounding the closed IPO markets and the regulatory barriers that are really preventing a lot of acquisition from taking place.

0:39And I wanted to really focus on this today and invite an OG of the acquisition space onto the show. With that in mind it was very clear who I wanted to invite. He's advised on more than 600 transactions over four decades with an aggregate transaction value of over a trillion $3 billion, he's become the OG of the space leading IPOs for Amazon, Intuit and NetScape to name a few. With that I'm so thrilled to welcome Frank Quattroon, co -founder and executive chairman at Catalyst to the show's day. But before we dive into the show's day, Merge is the leading product integration platform offering a suite of unified APIs across key software categories from HRIRS to CRM.

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3:27m3 -t -e -r .com. Today to transform your billing. You have now arrived at your destination. Frank, I am so excited for this. When I was thinking of this topic, there was no one that I would rather have do this and then so many mutual friends I've heard so many good things about. So thank you so much for joining me today. It's a great pleasure. I've heard wonderful things about your podcast and I'm really looking forward to our conversation, Harry. Well, I pay a lot of money for such good reviews, but I do want to start way back because I heard that meeting Steve Jobs that a Stanford investment class was the inspiration for your career in investment banking.

4:02Can you just take me to that and what that was? Sure. I'll go back just a little bit in time before that, but I'm from a blue collar neighborhood of Philadelphia South Philly. My dad worked in a clothing factory and I was very fortunate to get a scholarship to a attend university at Pennsylvania's Wharton School. And after Wharton, I joined a privately held company that I'd never heard of before called Morgan Stanley in New York. They had a two -year program for people like me who wanted to work for two years and then they kicked this out and you had to get an MBA if you wanted to continue with the firm.

4:31So I enjoyed the work but I didn't really find any passion. So I get to Stanford and luckily I got a job as a teaching assistant to Jack. literally the most revered professor. The first thing was he said, Frank, welcome to Stanford. This is 1979. Your first job is I want you to go down to this little privately held computer company in Cupertino called Apple. You probably never heard of it. I mean personal computers, I hadn't heard of what those were. And he said, I've just bought an Apple tube. Could you go down to Apple, pick it up, bring it back here to Stanford. And I want you to transport the software program that does investment analysis that's currently working on the mini computer in our labs to work on this new personal computer.

5:15I had done a little bit of computer programming work at Stamford at Wharton. So I went down there and I saw this group of young people. I didn't see any offices. I saw a lot of jeans and beards and it didn't look like a traditional company but you could feel the energy. You know I said I'd grab the computer I brought it back. When I opened up the box it had a tiny minute or a very large vanilla colored keyboard in which the single circuit board of the computer's intelligence was embedded and it had a tiny little terminal and when you turned it on it was a green screen with a seed prompt just like a mini computer or a mainframe and and then it had a user's manual that's it it's three pieces the keyboard the terminal and the user manual there are no applications available for it yet although some were on the horizon so if you wanted this hunk iron to do something useful, you actually had to program it.

6:06So I had to learn basic for the micro computer and I did the port and it turned out successfully and I figured ah it's just a small mini computer, no big deal. So roll the clock forward a year later I'm in the same professor's class investments with Jack Mcdonald and right around that time Apple had filed for its initial public offering but it hadn't yet priced it. Jack gave us the job, our classroom, of pricing Apple's IPO before the underwriters did. And as an added inducement, he brought in the 25 -year -old Steve Jobs into our classroom. I was 25. I thought I was kind of a hot shot, you know, after all, Wharton and undergrad and Morgan Stanley.

6:43Now I'm about to get my Stanford MBA. And I need another 25 -year -old guy who really has a Tiger Bite detail. And he tells us the story of how he and his partner, Wazniak, had come up with the idea for a single board computer that could be on everybody's desktop and everybody's home and how they had no idea how to do a business around it, but they tried to take it to Hewlett Packard, the Digital Equipment and Technonics. No one was interested, so he told us that day he finally had a cell, his Volkswagen van, for $800 for working capital, get Apple computers started. Then the really interesting part happened.

7:17He said, personal computers are not just going to revolutionize the computing industry, But how we communicate, how we shop, how we entertain ourselves, and how we live. And I said, wow, I don't know what that guy's smoking, but I really want some of it. And the even more interesting part is that, Morgan Stanley, the blue chip firm that I had worked on at Wall Street, had never really done a high -tech IPO before. But they were the lead manager of Apple's IPO. They had also just opened up a San Francisco office. One of the great things my dear old dad, God rest his soul told me because he had failed to follow his advice.

7:56He said, son, if you ever get a chance to get in on the ground floor of something new, you should really jump at him. And the Morgan Stanley people were trying to recruit me back to New York to work in the M &A department ironically since that's all we do at Catalyst. But I didn't really want to do that. And I had had my eyes opened and it was Silicon Valley and the Apple and companies like that. and venture capital and all the things that were surrounding this risk taking and I told them no no no I thank you I'd love to rejoin you but what I really want to do is go into your new San Francisco office which I believe had zero revenues that year and work with these cool companies like Apple taking them public I think that's the future that I really identify with that like giving birth instead of going end of life with mergers so they said essentially Frank that's this stupidest fucking idea I've ever heard a human being utter.

8:46And that would be essentially career suicide for you. You'd be 3 ,000 miles away from headquarters. You'd be out of sight, out of mind doing tiny little deals for tiny little companies that nobody here cares about. And I said, yeah, but that's really what I wanted to imagine. Well, you know, if you really want to do that, I guess we could put you out there for a year or two, see if it works. And we're not going to be able to pay you as much as the people who work in New York. and you might not get promoted as fast. But that's really what you want to do. I guess we'll do that for you. And so I became the first full -time employee of the Tech Practice in Morgan Stanley's San Francisco office, because it was really run out of New York, like everything else there at the time.

9:26But over time, over the next 10 years, I started to develop some good relationships for the firm. And ultimately, I was put in charge of the technology practice. And we took it together with a few others from the smallest industry group at the firm. to the largest industry group at the firm in 15 years. And so, yeah, by 1995, adding 20 to 40 new clients to Morgan Stanley every year through initial public offerings. And we were welcomed into the industry by venture capitalists because back in 1980, most of the IPOs were very small. They were five, ten, 15 million dollar offerings for companies that had, you know, less than a hundred million.

10:07But venture guys really wanted a big firm like Morgan Stanley who was known as the banker of the triple a rated legitimate star Large corporations to put their you know halo blessing on this new upstart industry called technology And so we chose at the time to not be the volume leader We didn't want to take a hundred companies public when you could do so We wanted to take the top 10 % of the graduating class public and be known as the firm who took the highest quality firms public. That's what we did and pretty soon there was a demand poll for our services and everybody wanted more than family to take them public and the job got a lot easier.

10:45When you look at where we are now I'm too fascinated. Did it take longer than you thought it would for technology to be as pervasive as it is? Did it take shorter than you thought it would? Is it as expected? It took longer. I was like the weatherman predicting rain for the first five or ten years but then the rain really started to happen And so my first year back at Morgan Stanley, but in San Francisco was 1981. And back then, the Dow is at 700. Interest rates were at 16%. There were very, very few technology companies with more than a few hundred nine on market cap. So yeah, I took a much longer time.

11:17Frank, can I ask you, I was four or five in the dot -com bubble. Sorry, that's not an attempt at me to age you. But what was it like? Because I read and I'm a historian and student of this business. But what did it actually feel like being in it and being so in it like you were? Well, you know it's interesting because a lot of investors kind of missed out on PCs and PC software They thought Microsoft was too expensive because it was at 25 times earnings a bunch of them had bought Apple But you know they really weren't too sure about this PC industry because the big computer companies were calling it toys And everybody figured IBM would ultimately win this game these startups didn't have a chance and they all really got burned by not being part of Microsoft.

12:02Literally all the way up to $10 billion everybody thought it was way too expensive. And so when Netscape came along, they thought this was the next platform. The internet was the next platform and no one wanted to admit it was the most serious case of FOMO that you have ever seen in your life. And there were a couple of phases to this. You know, Netscape came public in 1995 and it was literally the most popular IPO at Morgan Stanley since Apple in 1980 and when we took Netscape public the Morgan Stanley telecom system almost got broken They had to add a new PBX to handle all the incoming calls of all the people that wanted to buy Netscape And it was at the point where if you got in a taxi in New York the taxi driver was asking you know How can I get a little Netscape and they're all starting to talk about the internet?

12:46But then the internet went through kind of a swoon and it became out of favor by that time I had moved from Oregon, Stanley to Deutsche Bank and one of the very first companies that came out of that. It was a top time for Internet stocks in 97, but at Deutsche Bank we were fortunate enough to lead Amazon's IPO. And there were already a lot of sick bodies, maybe not too many dead bodies in the Internet, but Bezos kind of brought it back. And 1998 was when it really started taking off when some companies that you'd never heard of with very little in the way of revenues, maybe sometimes no revenues.

13:19you know, we're testing the waters and the demand for these offerings, no matter, almost no matter what they did, was so insatiable that they would pop on the first day 100 % to 100 % 500%. Now, before that time, if you had a successful IPO, it was defined as one that didn't go down, might have gone up maybe 10, 15, 20%, but the underrated was viewed as irresponsible if they left 30 or 40 or 50 % on the cable. during the internet boom, if you didn't go up 100%, you're viewed as an unsuccessful company and people started to dump the stock. And by the year 1999 and 2000 at Deutsche Bank and then later at Credit Suisse, we had 16 separate groups following different sectors of the internet.

14:03Literally every industry was going online. I never had more than 28 people in the tech group at Morgan Stanley. At Deutsche Bank, we're only there for two years, we grew that to 170 people. Credit Suisse hired all of those 170 people and we'd grew it to 500 people. Literally, we're pairing bankers and analysts together to develop more niche and niche sectors. The normal valuation for a technology company was like maybe 10 to 20 times, trailing earnings, and then it got to 30 to 40 times this year's earnings, and then maybe 50 to 60 times, two year -out earnings. And all of a sudden there weren't any earnings.

14:40There were revenues, but there was not profit because people were stepping on the gas and trying to grow. And then it kind of left to 10 times revenues. And then concept companies started to come out. They didn't have any revenues. So, how can we value those? Well, let's do valuation per eyeball or per audience, or the number of users. And it became, I don't know, like 100 times the number of eyeballs. And before they had much of an audience, well, how about a million times the number of engineers they have? Do you know this is crazy when it's happening? Of course. Well, it kind of oozes. It doesn't just jump, right?

15:15So it's like a spectrum. It gets to the point where you say, this just isn't sustainable. Read more recently when cloud software companies were trading at 30, 40 times revenue, some of the deals we did were at 30 or 40 times revenues. You know, this is not going to be sustainable, but during the moment, what's causing it to happen while interest rates are zero for 14 years, which puts a premium on growth because when you discount five year out revenues and earnings at zero or like 3 % or something like that, if five year revenues is worth almost the same as today, so put a normal multiple and five year out revenues or 10 year out revenues because there's no cost of capital.

15:54And you know, at that point that, you know, this is going to end badly. You just never know what's what's going to make it end. Normally it involves leverage of being over leveraged. Did you feel the same way in COVID? We've spoken a lot about zero interest rate environments. Did you feel the same in COVID? So again, it was like all the sudden companies that helped you do things from home became the new platform. Zoom has always been a great company, right? But all the sudden, Zoom's evaluation seems like it has no end. And it was insane because you know, like, ultimately it's going to come back to the norm.

16:27But the best year we've ever had in any of my businesses in M &A was 2021, where by the way, not a single one of us saw any of our colleagues face to face, or a single client face to face, was our single best year in history. The valuations were very, very high, but there was a new type of buyer who had even higher valuations, and so you saw a lot of stock for stock deals, which by the way we hadn't really seen since 99 and 2000. So my team and my family are very bored of me hearing this dire tribe there haven't but I'm terribly worried about the lack of the quiddacy right now and I think the M &A environment is dead.

17:06Regulations have prevented any M &A from Giffy to Plard to Figma and everything in between. You're the OG of M &A. Am I right and has regulation killed M &A? Well I don't think it's killed it but you know last year and the year before were certainly not as good as 2021. It's not necessarily regulation that's killing it the worst eminions we've had ironically are when there's been a market crash and you think that that would be the time that buyers really step up and go on a bargain basement hunting expedition. But it's similarly a time when sellers still think that they're worth what they were worth last year and it's hard for them to imagine that they're not worth 20 times revenues, they're really worth eight.

17:50And it takes a while for that to sink in. And so it's really kind of sellers not being willing to come to grips with the new reality and During steep market drops buyers their shell shocked as well And it turns out that buyers really are their most bold and imaginative during times when their own visibility and predictability Is at their best and I think back to some of the best times that you could buy companies were right after the great credit crisis I think companies like Cisco and IBM and once it all had $200 billion cash They could have scooped up every great emerging growth company in the world at that time, but a those companies weren't really anxious to sell the lower prices and be the big buyers just were like deers in the headlight and they just didn't pull the trigger because they were really worried about their own businesses and visibility.

18:39And so whether you're a momentum investor or a corporate buyer, like sometimes those are the best times to buy, but you're kind of frozen because you're worried about your own outlook and visibility. But as a venture investor's day, we need the spigot to open on the other end. We put dollars in and we need them to come out. It's quite simple. And I'm sitting here going, I don't know how that coming out is going to work. What would you say to my worried mind? OK. Well, what are the things that caused it to freeze? I don't think it's so much regulation. We've had tough regulation for a long time.

19:16We had the Obama administration. They were tough. And then Trump comes along, you think that a Republican would be a little softer on regulation, but honestly, he was not a traditional conservative Republican free market. He was a populist, and he hated the big tech companies because they were so critical of them, and they almost seared the election to his competitor. So he clamped down even harder on big tech because he hated them personally. And now we've got another Democrat regulatory regime, and some of the leaders of that are taking more imaginative approaches, but company like Microsoft, it took a long time, it took 18 to 24 months, but they got Activision done.

19:53And so we're not having trouble getting 80 % or 90 % of our deals done, it's really only 10%. But a big factor in M &A and tech over the years has been sponsor deals. And sponsors benefit from the fact that we had zero interest rates, which meant high yield bonds were very cheap to issue, plentiful, because investors were looking for a way to get something other than zero from their bank accounts. And high yield bonds were like, you know, they're inched out on the risk reward spectrum to buy high yield bonds at 5 or 6%. Well, I think everybody knew that interest rates were going to go up, but no one figured that they were going to go to 5 % from zero.

20:32And when that happens, all of a sudden corporate buyers have a cost of capital that's not 5 % it's 10 % or 11 % all the sudden financial sponsors are boring at 11 % or 12 % instead of 5 % that drives down the prices and it It narrows the base of investors and the availability of funds because all the sudden high yield is more risky and and people You know are more reluctant to put their money in they don't know where the rise and interest rates gonna stop and if you buy fixed income While interest rates are rising, you can really get burned. If you go back to 1981 when interest rates were 16 percent You can draw a line almost straight down to zero from there over the next 30 40 years And then we had zero interest rates for almost 14 years from the great credit crash to 19 to 2021 And so all of a sudden when interest rates are rising all of those trends start unwinding a larger cost of capital higher interest rates lower valuations and all of a sudden people freeze I just think it's a matter of time and IPOs historically have the windows really are not shut the way they were in the 80s and early 90s.

21:41It's more of a granular filter and what you need are great companies to come public and you need them to be willing to come public at reasonable prices. Why would they go public with this new market of late stage capital that is so big now and sovereigns entering pre -IPO like they've never done before? If you are a big prestigious company, why would you go public face the scrutiny? I agree with you. We need them to but why would you? It's a bit of an idea that's well, no? You're right. You're right. The trend since the end of the credit crisis, it was that even since the end, actually, of the internet bubble is that companies waited a lot longer to go public and investors demanded that they wait longer to go public.

22:24But you remember during the time of Facebook and LinkedIn, these companies would be waiting until there were several billion dollars of revenue before they'd go public. Some of the IPOs for the last few months that we've seen are companies with like two billion of revenue or more. And so yes, they wanted to wait longer, but employees need liquidity. Yes, you can get it through privately held deals. And also they need a currency for acquisitions. That's a lot of times what really drives the company to ultimately face the test and go public. And also some of the times they're the valuations of their options that they just have to the point where they offer investors the public route for liquidity.

23:01Yes, they can wait longer than they did in the past. But at some point, they need a public currency if they're going to be serious about acquisitions. They need access to public debt markets. This will take time. What needs to happen is as long as there are hundreds of ways for public investors to play a trend and valuations are reasonable, they'd rather buy public companies. It's easier to get in and out. There's really no risk of them trading down other than earnings or revenue surprises. So those companies have to kind of creep up in valuation, and then the next generation has to be willing to go public at a more reasonable valuation.

23:36Can I ask you, do you agree with the sentiment that companies are bought and not sold? For the most part, it's much, much easier to advise a company where there's buying interest on the table. But sometimes we actually have to create the buying interest. Ryan Smith, Qualtrics, great company in Utah. It's not part of the Silicon Valley fabric. Yes, they have a few Silicon Valley VCs, but not a whole lot of people know who they are. So what we tell our companies who are in that situation is, you spend so much time and effort getting ready for the IPO. You hire a CFO, you get a great auditing firm, you start building a board with people who have public board experience, you start practicing, you know, getting quarterly revenues to meet and meet expectations.

24:28But only 10 % of companies go public. Like back in the 80s and 90s, it's a 50%. But since 2000, 90 % of companies get liquidity through mergers. Why don't why don't private companies spend the same amount of time creating that option and perfecting it? even if you never sell, why don't you go through the same hygiene? And so that hygiene is, you know, working with an advisor who can help you understand the ecosystem of who the potential buyers are. And it's not always obvious because strategies are always shifting. So knowing who the buyers are, building trust with the people who are going to make the decisions outside the context of a transaction, meet with the Google's and Amazon's and Microsoft's and Service Nails and whoever Oracle's and SAP's.

25:16Let's get them to know who you are because they probably think that you're a survey software company. But no, you're an experienced management company and when Ryan came out with that positioning of experienced management being like the next great cloud potentially, that was a game changer and you have to educate these buyers what experience management is. And so we introduced them to a whole bunch of different serial buyers of Cloud software companies and it was interesting who sort of bit on it and who didn't and then all of a sudden, you know, Salesforce has been just killing it in Cloud and Oracle and SAP has been trying to catch up with them and then Bill McDermott makes this announcement at Sapphire.

25:56Experience management is the next cloud. It's going to replace CRM and we are going to lead in experience management. I had tried to get build a bite on call tricks for a couple of times, but that announcement was too much for me to bear, so I called them and yeah we've become really good friends over the earth and I said Bill you've just taken the biggest naked short in the history of software by announcing that you're going to win experience management and you have no way of fulfilling that and so let me try one more time to explain to you why call tricks is the way that you could best achieve that objective.

26:29That's when it started to But Qualtrics had already, by that time, started its plans for the IPO. It got to the point where it was really very, very close to the pricing of the IPO. And we had our CEO conference in Pebble Beach, just called our Catalyst Pebble Beach retreat. It was in October, and Qualtrics was just about to start its Roach Show. And we normally invite six speakers, three on Friday morning, three on Saturday morning. So on Friday morning, I had a ring for Ryan to be one of our speakers. and for Bill who really wasn't well known at Silicon Valley, even though he was the CEO of SAP to be the speaker.

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27:06They were right next to each other. And I think first it was Bill, and he's so energetic and visionary, and he tells such a great story that I'm looking, and I'm interviewing him, right, like you're gonna read me, and I'm looking out of the corner of my eye, and I see Ryan in the front seat, and I see him starting to lean in, and as I start to light up, because he thought SAP, big company, Germany, I should have used for that. And the way he saw Bill bring SAP to life and show off his, his culture and his personality, I saw Ryan, Ryan leaning in. And then very next speaker was Ryan and Ryan's also of course brilliant and he can tell a great story too.

27:42And the way he started to explain experience management and how it was going to just basically change how any corporation gather sentiment about its employees and customers and how that that factors in to daily decisions on who to pay more attention to and how to save customers, how to save employees from leaving. All of a sudden you could see and I had a corner out of the corner of my eye saw Bill and he was leaning in and his eyes were lighting up and I said, okay, this is pretty interesting. So I had to take a break before the third speaker and I was looking around and I couldn't find Bill or Ryan.

28:17And suddenly I get a text from Ryan and he says, we've just gone to the coffee shop a few yards away. I said, well, you want me to come down there?" He said, yeah, I wanted you to come down. So I see Bill and Ryan, and they're at this little coffee shop at Spanish Bay, and they look like two teenagers who know what they want, but they don't have the words to consummate the deal, if you know what I mean. And so there was still a gap in what they were looking for. And I basically went up to them and I said, you know, Bill, I know you're interested in Ryan's company. Why don't you tell him the three reasons why you want him to join forces with you and tell him what you need from him in order to bring you guys together and get across the finishing line.

28:57I said, Ryan, I know you're interested in Bill and SAP. Why don't you tell him the three reasons why you would be excited to join forces with him and what you need from Bill. Now I'm going to go away for an hour and then I'm going to come back and you guys better have this deal finalized. So I come back and But there's all of a sudden they're smiling and happy and joking. And I said, what did you guys do? And they hand me this cocktail napkin. And they have the price, they have the retention, they have a few key terms written on a cocktail napkin. Now I had heard stories for 30 years about deals being written down on a cocktail napkin, but I had never had one happen to me.

29:35And so there it was. But that was an example of having to try to develop demand for a company that didn't have it because too few people knew what they were all about and why they were strategic. Maybe I don't know 70 % 75 % of the time we react to a client who said we've just gotten an offer from so and so we think others may be interested we'd like you to run a process. Those are a little easier they take a little less time. Which deal way you've had to create you've got a buyer and you're trying to get lots more in? Essentially my question is what was the most competitive deal you have a what on and how did you drive the price?

30:12Yeah, all right. Well, all these details have become public and so with LinkedIn, we had interest from several parties, but it really kind of came down to Microsoft and Salesforce. And I've never seen companies bid privately and come up with such close prices on every stage. It was like 150, 151, 162, 163. It was very, very close. And Microsoft of course had all cash. And Salesforce had a combination of cash, stock, and Salesforce had to borrow a lot of money to get to the same aggregate price. And so it finally got to the point where we couldn't keep doing this. And again, George said, best and final, whoever comes up with the best price on the next ground, we're going to go exclusive with towards definitive agreement.

31:02And so very, very close, but the board decided to go with Microsoft. Like, we won't tell everybody everything that they want to hear as a buyer, but we won't be disingenuous with them, right? So when we say best and final, it's best and final. So in that case, the board chose Microsoft, it was best and final, and they went down to the definitive agreement. So they went into like a 30 -day ex -loosivity to try to get to definitive agreement. And during that period Salesforce lobbed in several offers that were higher. That meant that towards the end of that period we had to inform Microsoft, hey, your deal is no longer the best deal.

31:40If you want to end up with this, you're going to have to improve your offer. And so they got to the point where they had a deal that the board preferred over Salesforce towards the end of that definitive agreement. And by that point, Microsoft had done the due diligence, we had a definitive agreement that the board had approved. And there was a currency all cash that Microsoft, you know, it was greater certainty. At the end of the day, LinkedIn got an outstanding deal and they ended up going with the party that they wanted. Frank, what percent of deals die in the process of M &A and what are the most common reason or two reasons why they die?

32:17Honestly, the answer is probably a lot higher than people think, but 90 % of deals probably die when things get started. It's hard to get a deal done. A lot of times it's really valuation. Sellers have a very, very high view of themselves and are very optimistic about the future. Buyers are worried about precedent because if they pay 50 times revenues for a company, all of a sudden that will become the floor instead of the ceiling. But companies will say, but if I wait two years, I can go public at a lot more than 50 times the current revenues. And so mostly it's valuation, but sometimes it's cultural fit to companies get to the point where they think it's going on paper and strategically.

32:57It fits like a glove, but they just can't stand each other. And one that I have in mind is where the deal is literally on the goal line. And a CEO asked the seller, how long do you think you're going to have to stick around for this integration to work? And the seller said I think probably at least two years. And the buyer said thanks very much for telling me that there's no way this deal is going to happen. And that would have been maybe one of the large steels in the history of the industry. It's really mostly valuation and cultural fit that present the barriers. I spoke to one of the biggest buyers the other day and they said Harry, the reason why we're not buying now is because it takes so long for acquisitions to go through that by the time it completes, the original deal is so different to what it was.

33:45You know, it wasn't Figma or an Adobe, but you know, the Adobe Figma deal ended up being a $30 billion deal for Figma by the time it would have converted. It's a very different number than 18 billion. Some sellers also have the opposite of that, where they agree to a price when the buyer's stock is at an all -time high, and then there's a valuation correction and all of a sudden it's worth maybe 40 % of what it was worth at the time of signing and then it creates some very very tough dynamics. So yes, one of the biggest challenges now is how do you deal with an uncertain regulatory environment and before it was almost unheard of for deals to take more than six, nine months.

34:25Now it's 12 months, now it's 18 months, and now sometimes it's 24 months. To predict what's going to happen in a pure seller, thinking, well, I'm really going to be bound by some covenants for a really long period of time. If you think it's going to take two years to get a deal closed, what are you willing to give up about the stewardship of your company for almost two years? If the deal doesn't happen, where are you going to be? There was a deal early in the career of Georgia myself. We almost had them to it sold to Microsoft. It would have been a great deal for both sides Into it with their checkbook software had beaten Microsoft in a category for almost the first time and so and very few people It heard of into it at the time and Microsoft kind of they admitted defeat in this category And they had to sell off their own product in order for the deal to happen that deal was under intense regulatory scrutiny that was right around the time that Microsoft was being investigated for broader antitrust issues.

35:23And so they reached the conclusion that the deal wasn't going to happen. And you'd think, oh, poor into it, they've just been dragged through the the ringer here and what's going to happen to them. Absolutely. It was the best thing that ever happened to them because the fact that Microsoft endorsed their product and everyone now knew that they were the chosen ones, it just enabled them to take off. So, but yes, mostly the regulatory environment is a much more challenging one and to have to think through what constraints you're willing to put on your business to be willing to endure that kind of regulatory period is very, very challenging.

35:56And the buyer, most of the times buyers paying cash, and then the seller also has to realize, well, okay, if it's going to be 18 months and I'm accepting a fixed price in 18 or 24 months, is my own stock going to be much higher than that? Is it going to be much lower than that? Where evaluation multiple is going to go? You know, a lot of boards are going to are saying like, look, But if valuations are 50 times EBITDA, I want a little cash in that deal because if we're going to be in regulatory limbo for 18 to 24 months, that downside protection can really help us in that environment. Frank, how do you feel buying boards feel today?

36:30Do they feel, hey, there's a great amount of assets that we can buy cheaply? Or do they feel markets are bad, cash is tight, let's be conservative and not add? If you compare this market to 2021, there are a lot more bargains. I mean, a lot of the indices that come back too close to their old time highs, but it's been concentrated and now it's the magnificent 7 because Invidia is part of that. And Tesla and a lot of the comeback has been in those stocks, but if you look at the average cloud software play, which is where a lot of the activities happen in M &A, we're kind of back to that 68 times revenue area that it's traded at for most of its existence.

37:08And so there are relative bargains, but the financing environments harder, the regulatory environment is harder. Strategic are now more focused on buying private companies. A lot of the activity and buying public companies are private equity. A substantial percentage of the public deals have been private equity. I've seen numbers like 60, 70, 80, maybe even 90 % in recent years of public companies been bought by private equity firms. and I think with strategic say they have to recognize that sometimes it's better to buy a private company before it gets public and has a big aftermarket premium.

37:45Even if you're paying a higher multiple when it's private, you're paying a lower price. I don't think that buyers view this as either a bargain phase or a crazy phase like 2021. I think that we're in a phase where things are coming back in M &A. We've had two consecutive down years, but for the last six months, our business started picking up. So I think that when interest rates are stabilizing, and it looks like it's now only a question of when we'll start to see a more favorable interest rate environment, that the hardest part is when we're on this rise in interest rates from zero to five percent.

38:22No one knows when it's going to stop. That's when things freeze. Now, it looks like things are stable. And when visibility starts to improve, both in the buyers' businesses and the sellers' businesses and the financial markets start stabilizing. So I think ashy race will stay high for a prolonged period of time with a huge amount of underlying inflationary pressures that people don't often think about, if they do stay high, does M &A and do we still stay frozen or does sentiment just become familiar with a new environment and progress is normal? Yes. By the way, I agree with you. I think there's a lot of optimistic people that believe that rate cuts are going to happen much earlier.

39:01And I think the central banks were fooled, especially the US Fed, and they came out with this temporary inflation business, and it was shaming on them, and they're not going to let something like that happen again. And by the way, 5%, like we had 5 % treasuries right before the credit crisis, we had 7 % in 1999. These are not unusually high rates for someone who started his career when treasures were 16%. So 5 % is pretty still attractive. But I think you hit the nail on the head when you said, what really is a period of stability? When either valuations are coming down rapidly, going up rapidly, when interest rates are going up rapidly and valuations are coming down because the markets are just racked with this new environment where there's actually a cost of capital, that's when things freeze up.

39:45We've now, I think, had several quarters where things look like they're stabilizing. Of course, we have the US election coming up. That's another unknown. You know, no one really knows who the candidates are going to be, even though they appear almost certain to be Trump and Biden. But that could create a little bit of a crazy time later in this year, things get volatile. Trump wins. How does that impact M &A environments? Honestly, I don't think it's going to impact it much because, as we talked about earlier, Trump is not a classic free markets Republican. He's a populist. He has personal vendettas.

40:20He doesn't like big tech Because he views them as all You know run by a bunch of liberal people who hate Trump So I don't think we're gonna see much of a difference in the any trust environment if some of his economic policies Result in some of the economic growth and stock market conditions that we saw in the first few years before COVID I mean, you think about it. Trump's policies had the economy in a pretty good place. It was only really a pandemic that could have cost him probably to lose the second election. So if he comes back, I think it might be viewed positively for economic conditions, but I don't think any trust will change very much at all.

41:03Final one, Frank, is it easier to sell to P or to other strategics? It really depends on the situation. I mean, private equity buyers, are not looking for the highest growth names. And so they're looking for moderate growth. They used to be looking for very low growth, and just to turn around, then they started looking at moderate growth. And I think that the insight that they have was that tech companies pay an awful lot of marketing and sales money for the last few points of growth. So if we could subtract a lot of that S -GNA and maybe lose a point or two of growth but convert margins from 10 % to 40 % or 50 % will create a much more valuable company.

41:48And it was rare that they would pay 10 times EBITDA for a company. It was more like 5 or 6 times EBITDA. And now they're getting much more imaginative about the prices that they're rolling to pay. But they won't pay 20 times revenue or 30 times revenue or 40 times revenue like a strategic well. If there is a deal among PEs, there are normally three or five PE firms that all look at it and say, yeah, I want that. And it's just kind of a question of price. In many strategic situations, there might only be one buyer. And your job is to make sure that you can do a one -off negotiation with that buyer if there's not other buyer interest.

42:24And it's more rare, but not uncommon for there to be multiple buyers. I'd love to move into a quickfire where I peppy with questions and then we're all with that and 60 seconds per answer does that sound okay? I'll do my best when an M &A process happens and the deal gets done and it's all cash Does the money come in one go like does the founder just get like two hundred million dollars in their account? Is that how it works? Most all cash deals have a single closing and and all the money gets transferred on that day. Now, there's also other ways that founders can benefit. They often get tension, they get new stock options, and the like, sometimes, you know, there's a mix of stock and the deal, and founders get stock that may be locked up for a while.

43:12But most cash deals, yes, the money crosses the wire at the very beginning. Frank, hardest time in Catalyst Journey, the moment you thought, oh my God, the world is caving in. Being involved in the credit crisis. Yeah, I mean we started our firm and it was two days after Bear Stearns was sold in a forced sale for two dollars a share to JP Morgan Bear Stearns had been trading at 150 bucks a share a year earlier and then leaving when bankrupt six months into our Launch and deals just basically dried up and then Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs came this close like I'm holding my Ancient my finger and inch apart from going bankrupt and Paulson had to save gold because that's where he was from and he couldn't save a goldman without saving Morgan, but deals really dried up during that time.

43:56The beginning days of Catalyst, we found it a little bit hard to attract bankers from big public bullish bracket firms, but I remember one of my former colleagues from Credit Suisse who had run a sector for us had gone to Lehman. He was running all their technology practice, so when he started Catalyst, I asked him to come back and be one of our first partners. He said, all that would be really exciting. Get the old gang back together and be really fun to work with you again, Frank. like, let me just check in with my wife and this must have been like April of 2008. At that point, he had all his net worth tied up in Lehman's stock and he came back to me and said, I'm sorry, sorry, Frank, you know, we've got kids, we've got tuition bills.

44:33My wife just doesn't think it's time for us to take a risk with an unproven company. And so he didn't join catalyst, which you know, it would have been a pretty good deal for him to do that. Just three, four months later, Lehman went bankrupt and he lost all his net worth. That was a crazy time, because as I said before, that was a bargain basement hunting time for the big corporations who had a lot of cash, but no one could pull the trigger. And by the way, that first year, I didn't know if we could make payroll until our very first deal closed literally on December 25th. We got our first piece that we were able to make payroll.

45:08Frank, what makes Bill Gurbys such a good investor in your mind? Oh, he is brilliant. He's hardheaded, hard -nosed. He's visionary. I mean, I loved meeting Bill for the first time. He was still a research analyst for First Boston at the time, and he had a newsletter called Above the Crowd, which is so funny because he's six feet nine. He can see above any crowd literally, but he was thinking about things in the future, and not just writing about, you know, earnings and business models. Like, he was the closest thing to a visionary that I had seen in a research analyst. And we, we left Morgan Stanley and I thought for sure Mary Meeker who I had recruited more in Stanley as our PC software and hardware analyst and ultimately became our Internet analyst when we did deals for AOL and Netscape.

45:55I thought for sure she was gonna follow us and she didn't I had a recruit an Internet analyst I asked Roger Matt to me who was a very very smart investor who's the best Internet analyst and he said oh Bill girly you got to go after Bill girly so we came he came to Deutsche Bank and the two of us worked together on the Amazon IPO and he had written a report where he referred to some internet companies as wave riders. Back then a lot of people were focused on digital media companies but Bill was more focused on not picking the winner in any digital media or other internet category but who were building the foundation of the internet that could be the enablers and ride the wave no matter who was the ultimate winner on the top and when he showed that report to Amazon they really got it because that's what Amazon was.

46:42It was building an e -commerce platform, and it didn't matter what category of product. They only had books at the time, but that was a wave rider. And Amazon saw that bill was brilliant and influential and could be really helpful to them in bringing their story to investors. And it was that long -term vision of his that translated so well into his becoming a venture capitalist. He got along really well with entrepreneurs, and even the tough ones who were hard headed and stubborn because he can be that way as well. I knew he'd be successful venture capitalist but he just really over achieved anyone's expectations and really not to cover off the ball.

47:21So one of my favorite moments with Bill is when we had to price the Amazon IPO, it was again during a kind of a tough period in the internet. It wasn't frothy at all. When we took Jeff Bezos out on the road, the first thing that happened was that Barnes and Noble stewed him for false advertising because Amazon flogin at the time. You may remember, was Earth's largest bookstore. And Barnes and Noble had no sense of humor about that. And so they sued him. And so it was like this, ah, the big bookstores suing Amazon, it created a little bit of a conflict, but Jeff is so charming. And he had investors eating out of their hands.

47:57He's one of these guys that combines brilliance with humility and charm. And when he left, it's so hard not to laugh even louder, which makes him laugh louder and you laugh louder and everybody's having a good time, right? So we took him on the road and the book of interest was building rapidly. We were selling, we were trying to sell three Three million shares of Amazon at 12 to 14. Jeff did such a good job on the road that we said, hey Jeff towards the end We said the book is is really building. We have good news. We're gonna raise the range from 12 to 14 to 14 to 16 dollars to share and So he said great.

48:30Let's keep going. So we did Boston. We did New York again book is building like crazy and we say, Jeff really good news. You know that new 14 to 16 range we're going to be able to price it at the high end of the range. So this is the pricing call which usually lasts 10 minutes. The underwriter says here's the price. Yes, here's how we're going to allocate the shares. Great job. Okay, we agree. Done. So we had just delivered him this good news and he says 16, huh? Well, what about 17 and we say, well Jeff 17 would be a little risky. Now might be price too high and your initial investors might not like it too much.

49:05You're going to have to come back to the markets and raise more money. You want to leave a good taste in the mouse. You really have to focus on, you know, how the socks want to trade. And he said, Frank, would you guarantee me that if we price it at 17, it would be a colossal failure. And I've never heard that question before. Jeff, no, you know, we don't, we're not in the business of guaranteeing colossal failures. But, you know, we think it's risky. And he said, well, what about 18? And we went through another like round of this. This is like hour two of the pricing negotiation. And even John Doerr, who was a Jeff's lead venture capitalist, is always arguing for more for the entrepreneur, was trying to put the brakes on him, right?

49:42And so he asked me the same question. He said, Frank, 18, can you guarantee it's going to be a colossal failure at 18? I said, Jeff, I know, again, I can't guarantee a colossal failure. But there is a chance that at 18, this will trade below the offering price. And so if I were you, I wouldn't go there. because you don't want your stock trading down in the first few days of its IPO. And he says, Frank, the difference between $18 a share and $16 a share for Amazon. Those $2 times the $3 million shares, that's $6 million. That's a lot of money for Amazon .com. We could use that money to buy billboard ads that could drive a lot more people to our website.

50:22He says, I don't care what the stock does in the first two weeks or day or month. But if people buy Amazon at 18 they're gonna make a lot of money over the next 10 years So that was one of the very few discussions where we said, okay Jeff 18 it is and so we priced at an 18 on the first day it pops up during the day to 23 and pops right back down to 18 and you could have bought all the Amazon you wanted at 18 for about the first month until they Announced earnings and then it was off to the races by the way that 18 after all of the stock splits since then is seven and a half cents versus the $170 Amazon is trading today.

51:00So 2200 times the IPO price. Bill, by the way, as our analyst was not too pleased that we priced it at 18 versus 60. And shortly thereafter, he left to become a venture capitalist. Now, I don't think it was causation. But I always ask Bill, hey, Bill, what do you think about Amazon? Do you think we should price of an 18 after all. So we have a lot of check -als about that. Final one, which is when you look at M &A markets today, where do you think they and where do you think catalyst will be in 10 years time? Actually, fuck M &A markets. Let's just put our catalyst. Where do you want catalyst to be in 10 years time?

51:40We are going to try to continue to understand what are the themes that are driving change. So if you keep looking at the world the way you did 5 or 10 years ago, you're going to fall behind. Our first lesson in that was cloud and mobile, where we didn't do some of the first cloud software M and A deals, but we did the next three that were the most important. And all of a sudden, now we're the banker of choice and cloud, same way with mobile, when we did motor mobility. And now it's like, you have to recognize which trends are fake trends and which trends are real trends. Because it's a small firm like catalyst, and we have less than 100 people.

52:15I don't think we're ever going to be a lot larger than that. And so you have to organize the world in a way that makes sense. And so now we're grappling with artificial intelligence. Now, some people might think artificial intelligence that's really new. Artificial intelligence was coined as a phrase the year I was born, 1955. And there were some work done before that, eight, ten years before that, that you could have called artificial intelligence. But artificial intelligence needed its killer app. And it didn't have one for 50 years or 60 years. All of a sudden we have generative AI. That was what opened up my eyes.

52:49And a lot of times you don't have a killer app. And then you have a killer app and you have a product leader. And sometimes that product leader is becomes a leader and sometimes it never gets there. But when I saw chat GPT, to me it was the same reaction I had when I saw Google search versus the initial search engines. And all the sudden it changes the world. Google had built this entire business on paid search being the model where people find out things. If now with chat GPT you can ask in English questions and pay a subscription to that, what's going to happen to paid search? And so what I've been trying to do with our guys is to say, okay, here's where all the other technology breakthroughs just changed the world and all of a sudden we had a new group of leadership.

53:33When PCs came, it was no longer IBM, it was Intel and Microsoft and the industry fragmented. When Cloud came, it was no longer Oracle and SAP. It was Salesforce and Workday and the world changed. When mobile came along, it was no longer Intel and Microsoft supplying the components. It was Qualcomm and it was Apple and ARM. And so now we've got artificial intelligence and you've got Nvidia. And now artificial intelligence is not just going to be the basis of new products that are all artificial intelligence but it's going to be present and change every industry, the way the internet changed every industry.

54:12And so what we have to keep doing is to say, what's changing? If we can focus on the five or six things that are changing in technology products, in technology delivery, in business model, and go in the market, and be the first firm that advises on an important deal in that sector, that will make me happy. Will we add new areas? I don't know, will we add biotech? Well, George Bucharest says maybe with the next CEO wide biotech. Will we add financial services? I mean, we do fintech and payments and things like that. But I don't know if we continue to focus on what's changing to help our clients see around corners, see who the new leaders are going to be and state to where the puck is going to be, then I think we're going to do just fine.

54:55Frank, I had so many great things. I imagine Eric. I mentioned Bill Frank, Peter on your team, Jonathan. This has been such a joy to do. I love this. So thank you so much for joining me today. You're welcome. It's my pleasure and thank you. It was a fun experience for me and looking forward to seeing how it turns out. I mean, what a show that was with Frank. I'm a historian, but hearing the pricing of that Amazon IPO just an epic. I also didn't know the origin story of the Qualtrics SAP acquisition. So that was awesome to hear. If you want to see more of the show, you can check it out on YouTube by searching for to zero VC, that's to zero VC on YouTube.

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From the publisher

Frank Quattrone is the Founder and Executive Chairman of Qatalyst and served as its CEO from the Firm’s founding until January 2016. Over more than four decades, Frank and the teams he has led have advised on more than 600 mergers and acquisitions with an aggregate transaction value over $1 trillion and on more than 350 financings that raised over $65 billion for technology companies worldwide. Frank led the IPOs of Amazon.com, Cisco, Intuit, Netscape, among many others. He advised Apple on its $400 MM acquisition of NeXT (which led to Steve Jobs’ return to Apple); Concur on its $8.3B sale to SAP; LinkedIn on its $28.1B sale to Microsoft; Qualtrics on its $8B sale to SAP and Twitch on its $1B sale to Amazon.com.

In Today's Episode with Frank Quattrone:

1. Has Regulation Killed M&A:

  • Why does Frank disagree that regulation has killed M&A?
  • What is the real reason why M&A is so down at present?
  • What would impact would a Trump administration have on the M&A environment?
  • What are some of Frank's biggest lessons from 600 prior transactions over dour decades of what happens when an M&A market shuts down?

2. When Will the IPO Window Re-Open:

  • Does Frank agree that the IPO window is currently closed for tech companies?
  • How does this IPO window compare to the dot com bust and 2007?
  • What is needed for the IPO window to re-open?
  • What is the timeline that Frank puts on the IPO window opening again?

3. M&A: How Do Companies Get Bought:

  • What is the process for a company to be bought?
  • What are the single biggest mistakes the seller makes in the process?
  • What do the best buyers and sellers do to get the best price?
  • Does Frank agree with the notion that "companies are bought and not sold"?

4. IPOing Amazing, Selling Linkedin and Qualtrics:

  • What is the story behind, Frank, Bill Gurley, Jeff Bezos and John Doerr pricing the Amazon IPO?
  • How did Linkedin come to be bought by Microsoft? What did that process look like?
  • How did Frank structure an event to ensure that Ryan @ Qualtrics and Bill McDermot @ SAP would meet and lead to the acquisiiton?

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