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Podcast Notes: The Twenty Minute VC - Episode with Luca Ferrari
Podcast Information
- Title: The Twenty Minute VC (20VC)
- Description: A podcast that interviews top venture capitalists and founders to discuss insights into startup funding and venture capital.
Episode Overview
- Episode Title: 20VC: Bending Spoons: The Most Untold Success Story in Startups: Lessons Scaling to 500M Downloads, $360M in Reported Sales and a $2.55BN Valuation... Bootstrapped with Luca Ferrari, Co-Founder and CEO @ Bending Spoons
- Guest: Luca Ferrari, Co-Founder and CEO of Bending Spoons
- Key Achievements of Bending Spoons:
- Over 100 million monthly active users
- $380 million in sales in 2023
- 500 million downloads of their products
- $2.55 billion valuation
- Bootstrapped company
Key Discussion Points
- From McKinsey Associate to $2BN Founder
- Childhood Reflections:
- Described as shy, weird, and gentle by parents and teachers.
- Experienced social struggles leading to a deeper appreciation for relationships.
- Salary Sharing:
- Luca shared his McKinsey salary with co-founders to help fund the early days of Bending Spoons.
- Lessons from Failure:
- Importance of building a strong team and understanding the market needs.
- Emphasized the need for humility and thorough research before executing ideas.
- Bootstrapping Bending Spoons
- Decision to Bootstrap:
- Chose not to pursue external funding to maintain control and due to the perceived low chances of attracting VC interest.
- Killing Projects:
- Luca described the difficult decision to end a $7 million project and highlighted the lessons learned from such experiences.
- Investor Selection:
- Emphasized careful selection of investors based on shared values and past performance under pressure.
- Finding the Best Talent
- Key Traits for Talent:
- Luca focuses on three traits: talent, experience, and motivation, prioritizing the latter two while deemphasizing experience.
- Interview Strategies:
- Critiques traditional interview methods and prefers practical tests to assess candidates’ abilities.
- Hiring Mistakes:
- Admits to overvaluing experience in hiring decisions, which can stifle long-term potential.
- Mastering Acquisition & Growth
- Product Acquisition:
- Approach involves acquiring companies with proven market fit and enhancing their potential.
- Discussed the importance of user acquisition metrics and the challenges of accurately projecting them.
- Challenges & Lessons:
- Shared insights on risk management and the unpredictability of market responses.
- Reflected on the complexities of integrating acquired products and maximizing their value.
- Philosophical Insights on Entrepreneurship
- Risk Management:
- Stressed the importance of being intellectually humble and cautious with self-assessment.
- Motivation and Team Dynamics:
- Discussed the importance of team motivation and how it impacts performance.
- Work-Life Balance:
- Advocated for a balanced view of life and work, believing that personal fulfillment should encompass both.
- Future Aspirations
- Vision for Bending Spoons:
- Aspires to continue scaling the company while making a positive impact in the world.
- Long-term Goals:
- Hopes to leverage the company's success to tackle significant global challenges similar to the Gates Foundation.
Key Takeaways
- Humility in Entrepreneurship: Recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge can prevent costly mistakes.
- Talent over Experience: Prioritizing raw talent and motivation can lead to stronger long-term outcomes.
- Bootstrapping Benefits: Maintaining control and a steady growth pace can be advantageous in the long run.
- Market Responsiveness: Understanding the market’s needs and user acquisition dynamics is critical for success.
Conclusion The episode with Luca Ferrari provides a compelling look into the journey of Bending Spoons, highlighting the value of humility, careful decision-making, and the importance of team dynamics in achieving startup success. The insights shared by Luca serve as valuable lessons for entrepreneurs and those involved in venture capital.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00The moment you think you're very smart, the likelihood that you make very dumb mistakes, skyrockets in my opinion, we let others seek market fit and then we, if they will sell it, to us, we will acquire their company and try to make it even better than they have made it up to that point. The reason why we took that route, I think, is precisely because we crashed and burned by being arrogant in thinking we knew what the market would want and we could build it for them. Welcome to 20VC with me Harry Stabings and I'm so excited for the show today. This guest is the founder of the most incredible success story in tech that very few have ever heard of.
0:36Bending Spoons, an Italian company that has scaled that product suite to over 500 million downloads, 100 million monthly active users, a reported 380 million in sales in 2023, and a valuation of $2 .25 billion, absolutely insane, plus for the majority of their life, they were bootstrapped. This is such an incredible story, I'm so thrilled to be joined today by their co -founder and CEO, Luca Ferrari. But before we dive into this incredible discussion, there's no shortage of helpful AI tools out there, but using the mean switching back and forth between yet another digital tool. What was supposed to simplify your workflow just made it way more complicated.
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3:17You have now arrived at your destination. Luca, I am so excited for this. I think bending spoons is one of the coolest stories that we've seen in recent times in startup plans. So first, thank you so much for joining me. Thank you for having me. It's a pleasure. Now, I would love to start with a little bit of context. What were your parents and your teachers have said about the young Luca growing up? How would they have described you? Well, parents are probably not a good source. It seems to me they tend to be biased. I would say my teachers probably would say that I was incredibly shy. Some may even say I was pathologically shy.
3:54Weird and gentle, I think. I was considered kind of very careful not to hurt people's feelings. I would have been described as weird too, can I see did you feel like an outsider when you were growing up? I didn't have many friends at school and it shaped a lot of how I do what I do. Yeah, probably I really wanted to to make friends I couldn't forward for a spirulic tan or 12 years of my life. I have major struggles socially. Not incredibly well -versed with socializing these days, but I definitely proved a lot. I guess you could say an outsider. But I'm not cider who wanted to be an insider. It was an outsider because it was incompetent at being part of people's groups.
4:37Sorry for this weird tangent. Would you say you've become an insider or you just accepted being an outsider? No, I think I'd be from phases. So I was by, you know, your definition of trolling outsider initially who really wanted to be an insider. Then I became, you know, a kind of average so make it an insider like I started having friends and being invited to do things with others. And then as I grew older, particularly the last five or six years, I think I've become a little bit more of an outsider again because I find my bandwidth and my patients become more limited or perhaps have been tested more aggressively and so I learned to build more walls and more protections.
5:18One of your friends told me one of your points for improvement could be a willingness to accept more dinners and social events. So maybe they were, maybe they were onto something. I would love to start. I heard that you're at McKinsey and you were essentially sharing your salary with your co -founders to fund the early days of bending spoons. Can you just take me to that and those early days of bending spoons? So tell me a little bit about that. That's almost true, but I would say it wasn't Beninj Pons, it was a non -err company called Everteel, which I founded before funding manage points, it only lasted for about two and a half years.
5:52That was a fail the startup pretty, you know, by the book failure. And I had two co -founders there and all three of us also, you know, founded Bennage points plus two other people. I didn't know that. What did you learn from the failing of that company? I think we learned a lot from failings. What did you learn from that failing? Well, many things I would probably say too in particular. One is the importance of building a good team. At the time, we were quite naive and superficial. in that regard. And the second one was to be very thoughtful as to what you build or more broadly what you do and why.
6:26We had this idea and we just thought we were right and arrogantly got into execution mode and of course we crashed and burned. And you know you can still crash and burn even if you're thoughtful but your odds are better. So I would say we learned to do our homework a lot more and iterate more and faster. How did bedding spoons come to be done? So this company failed and the three of you and go, hmm, what now? Yeah, so they're connecting to your previous question. So the three of us, we started it. We didn't have any money. We had this agreement whereby we all three of us would look for a job and then why, regardless of the most lucrative job would work and pay for food and rent and the others would work full time and then once we get an investment or some sort of ability to do without the financing for the person working, you know, the this person would join full time.
7:13And so I ended up getting this offer from McKinsey. I told them before accepting that, or as I accepted that I meant to work and start a part time and then resign as soon as we hopefully got this investment. And I thought it would kick me in the ass and tell me to go away, but they were great. Actually they told me, this is awesome. I mean, we love the ambition and this works for us. And so I worked there for about a year, I think a year and three months, we were late. And then I was working nights and weekends in my vacation also on Evertail. I like to joke that once I joined full time, I made it fail very quickly.
7:48We immediately pretty much started banding spoons on the ashes of that startup. Can I ask, what was the insight with banding spoons? It was a straight -off transition to founding banding spoons. What did you believe? What did you see? What was that opportunity set? With Evertail, we went the usual path. You have an idea for a product. You focus on building that. You hope it finds fit with the market. it throws and you're successful and there as follows we took the opposite direction as in we focused on building a platform of technologies know how company culture employer brand fully optimized not for launching a product or specifically a technology product but acquiring a product that has shown feet with the market but where we feel there is some you know substantial untapped potential and then we we work to try to unlock that additional potential so that's a very for an approach we let others seek market fit and then we if they will sell it to us we will acquire their company and try to make it even better than they have made it up to that point.
8:49The reason why we took that route I think is precisely because we crashed and burned by being arrogant in thinking we knew what the market would want and we could build it for them and it turned out we were wrong and so we decided to see whether a different direction was more efficient for us. Can I ask a way of question, which is how do you determine what has product market fit or enough signal to be interesting? Because things can be volatile, things can be transient short term. How do you determine whether an asset has enough signal to be interesting to partner with? The assessment process is fairly sophisticated, but the very simple way of summarizing it is to say, we like user pays, a customer pays, or a recognizable brand, or good positioning in a distribution channel.
9:34What was the first product? And how did you acquire it, given you didn't have funding or money? The company we founded it with around $40 ,000, which was the leftover capital from Evertail. And then the venture capital firm at the time preferred to sell their... the money would been there because they had liquidation preferences, it's pretty typical for a B .C. deal. For them, it was more of the hassle of going through the liquidation process for $40 ,000 and paying low for lawyers and all that. So they sold their shares to us for, I don't know, a euro, I think, or something. And then we liquidated every tail and then we found that with a different group of people as I mentioned, the same three founders plus two employees we had at every tail.
10:18We found that Benin's poems. The first product was an aqua, wasn't, and I think the first two or three were not, were very simple apps. The first one I remember because I coded it myself with one of my co -founder, a co -founder, so I think it was called Fonsi. It was a very basic Fons app. We built it in like a few days and you know, neither of us was an expert software engineer. So, long story short, I think we made around $10 ,000 in all time revenues from that particular app. Launch that at one or two, maybe one slightly more successful, maybe made a hundred thousand dollars from it. But soon enough, we made our first acquisition, I think early 2014, so we're talking maybe six or seven months into the startup at the time.
10:58It was for a keyboard app, paid fifteen thousand dollars for it, and we managed to make it grow a little bit. And then we invested the proceeds into building team and learning a few more things, and building some in -house tools. bought a new high potential larger app. Rinse and repeat, compounding all those things over a decade now. I mean we're going for 11 years in a few months. We've gotten to a much bigger scale. Look, what did you know that you had something? When did you sit down with your other two co -founders and go, hmm, this is working. We have enough signal. So on the one hand we were pretty confident early on, but it was mostly based on some observation and first principles we didn't have a track record.
11:39On the other hand, I tend to be paranoid by nature. So I always second guess myself and wonder if there is some huge risk lurking shadows. So I don't know. I've never, not even today, am I massively confident. So I think our level, at least my level of confidence, I can't really say for the others, but has more or less remained between decent and good, but it was never super high or super low for the whole of these decades. Do you think that's a European mindset? And I didn't mean that really, look of it. I spend so much time with US founders and it's just we're going to dominate from day one.
12:13We're going to change the world. It's all going to work. Do you think that's an inherent European mindset of being much more even? So I don't know. I would say the level of ambition has been wild since the beginning. We pretty much day one. I remember I was sending emails to people we wanted to hire and it was really honestly so that our goal was to build one of the best companies of all time, one of the largest, most admired and positively envied. I mean, of course, ambition is quite subjective, but at least from my perspective, there's high allowable ambition almost as you can have. So we didn't lack ambition, but yes, maybe we were not bullish about our ability together, which might be European trade.
12:50In terms of bootstrapping nature, why did you decide to bootstrap? You were three very smart guys. I'm sure you could have raised. Why did you end those kind of in between periods 2014 to 2019? Why did you not raise? I guess you can always raise, but I don't know that we should have at sufficiently appealing terms considered that we were three people with a failed startup behind us building a technology company in Italy which had a negligible VC scene and tracked that absolutely no interest from international venture capital firms. with a strategy that was as far as I can tell, unheard of. To this day, I don't really have a comparable company.
13:31I mean, there are, of course, you can come up with examples, but nothing that's really spot on like exactly what we do. And so we felt our likelihood of attracting capital at sufficiently appealing terms was very low. To this, you have to add, we really wanted to build this with a multi -decade view. And we felt that it was quite dangerous to relinquish control so early. Of course, we would have done it had the terms being sufficiently appealing. And lastly, we could afford not to. I mean, that's a big factor. If you are building a business that's losing money and you expect it to lose money for a while, then there's no other way, right?
14:03For better or worse, we had a model that, you know, maybe it was more, it's not the fastest growing model. We never grew by 300 % in a year ever, you know? Like, so it was more of steady pace. On the flip side, we were cashflow positive early on. At least we made it so, and so we could afford not to raise. Look, how would you respond to me saying it's like a PE model, buying distressed assets potentially, turning them around and having a roll -up play? Is that wrong? I would say yes, and I would say the main differences are the private equities typically they focus on finding sufficiently cheap financing and then making some relatively high -level improvements and then make a profit a few years down the line.
14:46In our case, we are incredibly hands -on, so unlike a private equity, we rewrite the whole software, or at least the most critical parts of the code base. We completely change the IT architecture. We design the user experience and the user interface. We add lots of features, remove other features, revise the marketing and monetization dramatically. It's almost like as if we build a product to launch it, but we do so on the foundation of an existing customer base or brand. So it incredibly hands on. In fact, if you look at us, you know, private equity in their team, they will have almost all of the people will be investment managers for lack of better work.
15:24In our case, out of 400 people, at least 300 are software engineers, AI researchers, data analysts, data scientists, product managers. So we are a product and technology company operation, we're speaking, but we do have a second soul, and it's the capital allocation soul, which is the soul of our private equity. So we're, I think we're hybrid. It's almost like a private equity had a baby with Google or something like that. You know, that's the closest metaphor I can come up with. Some people have characterized that way after ever note because ever note, some people thought would qualify as such, but we have acquired a lot of products that were on the way up, some that were flat, some that were on the way down.
16:04We really don't have an opinion in that regard. We just need the price to be right and the opportunity to improve the product to be significant enough. Can I ask you in terms of capital allocation? How does capital allocation and bending spoons work? Because you have several different products, you meet up, you have Evernote, you have Remony, you have Allot. How does that work? Is it like cash sits in Topco and then is allocated by you into sub -products? Yeah, the cash is managed at the top company level, yes. Not just that, all resources also are team members. And we were very fluid in that regard.
16:38The principle is simply to apply our resources to the next most valuable opportunity. So we will ask ourselves the question, if we were to allocate our resources both capital and the talent we have available to this product or that product based on the backlog of ideas we have to improve the product and the marketing of the product. Where would these resources on Lockham's value or on a per unit basis? And of course that's an assessment that remains fairly noisy. That is the principle we try to implement in practice. Do you have a absolutely, which we feel that it's not working. I remember one particularly we built a few years ago that cost us a lot.
17:15I think we invested six or seven million dollars in it. And we we we completely eliminated it. Well, told me about that. That's unbelievable. Yeah. So that was four years ago, you were taken, was called play on and the vision was to build kind of a Netflix of mobile games. So a Netflix, not not in the sense of streaming, but in the sense of you pay one subscription and you have unlimited access to basically as much content as you can possibly consume. We build a team, we licensed many games 50 to 100 games, some of which pretty significant games on mobile. The licensing was quite expensive and we built an app for the user to be able to subscribe and then access the library of games.
17:57That's exactly the case of us thinking, okay, this cannot possibly fail because it's such a good deal. There's plenty of players spending hundreds of dollars a month to try many many different games Most of which are pay up front You don't even know if you like it in the end and we only ask for you know We have different price points and we tested all sorts of things But you know even the most expensive monthly subscription was maybe 10 or 12 dollars So relatively inexpensive for someone who looks to play maybe a one hour per day That's a very good value for money And but it never flew the KP as we're terrible We could never make it work and then a roughly the scene time Apple released Apple arcade which is almost the same thing.
18:35And we were like, oh my god, this is so unlucky. But you know what? I think it really didn't play a role in our product failing. Arcade is not a great success either. No, it's not. But what did you learn from that failing? I'm intrigued again, that. Well, I think it reinforced the lesson we had with the everyday startup I mentioned earlier that. We feel we have to be intellectually humble when it comes to our ability to predict what the market will want, particularly when it comes to very new things. And if you're replicating, say, something that works in the US and you do the same in Germany, I think you can be more sure that it will work.
19:10Still not certain, but it's more likely to succeed. But if it's something very new, and at the time, to my knowledge, what I just described was unique, sure someone will have seen something similar and now claim I'm uninformed, but based on our research at the time, there was nothing like it, certainly not a mobile. And so when it's something so new, the likelihood that you are delusional as to the chances of success is pretty high. So I always suggest lower the odds in our equation, assume you're being positively biased or your idea. The truth is probably worse than you all think it is. Can I ask you then if we switch tasks because that's like creation of a product and again thinking that you can create product market fit with the new one?
19:56If we you switched to Evernote, which is a very well known brand and a very significant customer base. What was the thing here around that acquisition? Because I just called a spade a spade. People were like that to turn around if brand is going down and declining. But you saw value there. Can you talk to me what you saw that others didn't and how you thought about that acquisition? Well, I don't know what others sign it or didn't see it. We thought we could improve the product, monetizing more efficiently and also run the company more efficiently in terms of costs. So we felt all three levers were offered a little bit of space or improvement.
20:33I was very excited to acquire it and work on it. It's also, I won't deny it. It's particularly exciting to be able to work on something that is so relevant. Sometimes people have characterized, ever -note, as you said, on a decline. and it can be true in some ways, but it's still as used or more used than a lot other brands that people think are more successful or cooler. And I don't want to name names, but every now this is very important. I mean, there are millions of people who have built their professional workflows on it and use it every single day and have thousands upon thousands of notes.
21:09So it was very motivating for us to be able to at least try to make it better. And I think I think we've done the team, I haven't done much, but the team has done a lot of working that regarding just one year. How do you think about pricing these assets? Because I'm in early stage venture where we will lie and say that price doesn't matter where it still doesn't matter, by the way. But price really matters when you're you. How do you price these assets? The theory is simple. Now applying it successfully is difficult. Before you were asking me, how are you different from private equity? And I said the biggest differences that we are incredibly hands -on, on product technology operators.
21:45So it's not just a financial play. The other big difference is that we acquired to hold forever. We never sell. I won't say it will never happen. It may occasionally, but it's never happened to any of our significant assets. And so we buy to retain for potentially decades. The way we value these assets is consistent with this. We don't speculate as a private equity typically would on what the price earnings multiples or EBDA multiples could be once I sell it in four years, you know, we literally just look at free cash flows. So we project free cash flows for as far as the future as we can, a discount them, and so it's an IRR NPV calculation that informs our willingness to pay a certain price.
22:28Again, that's a financial theory that's pretty straightforward. The difficult part is how do you project that accurately? That is that is literally difficult of course. And the hard thing is you've got to make the seller want to sell at the price. And actually, you know, it's like secondary today, which is there's a big chasm between what the buys, willing to pay and what the sellers willing to sell at. How do you find seller response to your pricing analysis? So we don't really convince anybody to sell. These people are all these adults generally highly competent, intelligent professionals who have their own clear view of value.
23:00What we try to do is be quick and decisive in determining our price. We try to make an offer that That's not a bluff. It's an actual very good offer and close to the maximum we are reasonably willing to offer. If they don't like it, we walk away, but historically, we have never lost a process. Meaning every single time there was willingness to sell and we had a chance to bid, because sometimes you don't get to know about the opportunity and you only hear about it after the deal is done. Every single time to my knowledge our offer ended up being the highest. One reason to be were terrible negotiators.
23:35Another reason is because of our model and being so operational involved and trying to improve the product, the operations, the marketing, the monetization, everything so deeply, it's a lot of work. You don't scale it as quickly as buying just from a financial point of view would, but you can unlock more efficiencies. And therefore, you can offer a better price. I'm a venture investor for my sins. I quite enjoy financial engineering. When you think about the weight of capital, how do you finance the acquisitions? Is it on raised capital? Now, obviously raised. Is it on debt capital? That then you have very low cost of capital on.
24:11How do you think about efficient use of cash for acquisitions? So that's certainly a pretty common playbook equity. For sure, most of it has been retained earnings. We have raised, I think, a remarkably little equity relative to our financials and our valuation but really up until ever not included which is a year ago I can on first approximation I can say that all the while we have done we have done through our own earnings and debt. Prior to ever not we had raised a little bit of equity but it was almost in material in the grand scheme of things. Now more recently we have raised more equity roughly two hundred million dollars over the past ten months but again I think most of it is our own cash flows and and that.
24:54When you think about the deals you've done, have you missed price Danny and in the ones you missed price or misjudged? What did you not see that you should have seen or would like to have seen? There hasn't been a single one we have priced correctly. Thankfully we have made mistakes in both directions, sometimes things went better than we thought and sometimes they went less well. Probably the most significant problem or error we've made in particularly from the downside negative point of view has been to project future rates of user acquisition to optimistically, of all the important KPIs in determining the success of a product, I would say, rate of user acquisition is the hardest to project, actually, by a huge margin.
25:39It's happened multiple times, at least once we were way too optimistic with that, and ultimately the returns from the acquisition turned out to be much, much worse than we had anticipated. Why is Rative user acquisition so tough? I'm sorry to ask, but they tend to be quite baited assets. You've got historical data, you've got very bait customer acquisition channels. Why is it so variable and volatile to predict? I think it depends on a few factors. One is it depends on more drivers than other key inputs to the success of a product. And these drivers tend to be outside of your control more than drivers that hire behind the other key factors.
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26:19Basically, if it's an equation, you have more variables, and you control them less. And so your ability to then force the future the direction you wanted to go is lower. When you make a mistake there, you generally didn't have an opportunity to fix it. Whereas in other cases, maybe you thought something, you could achieve something, and you thought it would be easier. It turns out to be harder, but you can't go the extra mile. I'll locate a few more resources somehow you get there. But if the rate that we sure acquiring users isn't where it needs to be often there isn't much you can do I mean you can spend more in advertising that you're gonna lose money otherwise you would be spending it already Right, so the problem is you can find ways of acquiring users efficiently and that happens to be the end of it Do you find scale network effects and what I mean by that is given the portfolio of products there's cross -promotion referrals the ability to increase ones No, not a factor.
27:15Maybe it's because we have failed to leverage it, but no value coming from that. In the one that worked out really well, what were the lessons from that? We spoke about the challenge of predicting user acquisition. In the one that went to the upside, what was the lesson from that? Yeah, there are some small tactical lessons. The bigger lesson is acknowledging the incredibly high level of unpredictability of some of this and bake in appropriate safeguards, particularly a sufficiently large margin of safety so that when you are wrong, as long as you're not massively wrong, it doesn't destroy you.
27:49Maybe you won't be happy with that investment, but it doesn't destroy you entirely. And you can move on to live to fight another day, as they say. How do you build margins of safety? Is that in diversification of product lines? Is that in pricing? Well, that helps. Yeah, probably want to do it both on the individual, let's say, capital allocations, for example, an acquisition, but the same concept would work if you allocate capital in R &D marketing, because that is still cash. It's no less real than if you buy a company. So, you probably want to bake in a good margin of safety as you do that.
28:19And then naturally, if you have a broader portfolio of initiatives, whether it's multiple products like we do or multiple R &D projects, then your further protected statistics are on your But risk assessment and mitigation is a surely complex topic. I think we could talk a lot of hours. What do you know about risk and risk mitigation today that you wish you'd known 10 years ago? Assume you're not as smart as you think you are. The issue here is that most people who end up making significant capital allocation calls. Generally those people, they wouldn't be there if they hadn't been somewhat successful by most measures.
28:58Sometimes academically and then professionally, but at least professionally, right? Otherwise, it's unlikely to imagine that someone will be managing $50 billion or, you know, ask a scale -up or billions. If that's a case, it's very easy to think too highly of yourself. And that is very dangerous. The moment you think you're very smart, the likelihood that you make very dumb mistakes, skyrockets in my opinion. Now you need to retain a little bit of self -confidence, otherwise you won't make any moves, but I think a healthy level of the second guessing yourself assuming your biased in favor of your ideas that you're lazy and don't want to look into a certain risk factor because you know it's going to take you 50 hours of grinding through benchmarks and analyzing data that you should assume that's a case and adjust your aim accordingly.
29:45Lika when did you take too much risk on an asset? Too much that you shouldn't have taken. Oh I mean it's difficult in hindsight you know it's like if you play a hand of poker It's quite dangerous to assess why are you played it well based on the results. So I'm thinking based on what I knew at the time and what I could have possibly known. One that's obvious to me, we did buy this app, I'd rather not mention it by name, but a pretty significant product. We made the mistake I mentioned earlier. We were quite bullish that our projections of user acquisition rates were conservative, And I think we were a little bit lazy in really studying the underlying factors driving user acquisition Historically, we just looked at it in aggregate and a bit naively had we done our homework more Thoroughly, I think we've just plotted that some of the underlying factors were waning and dropping quickly and that Consequently the rate of user acquisition was likely to to shrink faster than we had anticipated because we had actually projected it to decline but not nearly fast enough.
30:47That's certainly a case where I feel I'm not very proud of the way we handle ourselves. I think we did a mediocre job there. Did it change how you do it? Yeah, definitely. Every year or so we try to spend an hour reminiscing that particular situation. A repeated retrospective. We have dissected our mistakes. Adnauzum, so it's not that we're gonna learn anything new, but I think it's healthy to remind yourself just how lazy and dumb you were at some point. So you don't assume you've become hardworking and smart all of a sudden. I did love your humility. Can I ask you on the flip side? Is there a time when you didn't take enough risk?
31:20And you're like, come on Luca, you should have done more that. We could have been more aggressive. I think it's probably one of my greatest shortcomings as an entrepreneur and manager. I feel I'm too concerned, scared even of disappointing others, colleagues, investors. And as such, I believe we've waited a little bit too long to raise capital. We've waited a little bit too long to push on the accelerator to implement our strategy, the fastest speed we were capable of. I feel our level of caution has been generally speaking excessive. I think had we been more aggressive, we would have made more mistakes, but overall, I believe we would have created more value for our shareholders, our colleagues.
32:00You can't really A, B test life, and so maybe it's not the case who knows, but that's my read in hindsight. Right. Likki, what other people think? Do you care? Unfortunately, yes, that's the second. It's part of the, I was just mentioning I'm too concerned about disappointing otters. I don't think I want otters to think highly of me. I don't think I'm egocentric in that way, but it really bothers me if they hate me or think poorly of me. So it's more like the downside that I or the negative end of distraction that really annoys me or frustrates me. I don't necessarily seek to be on the other end of the spectrum and be praised, but I hate when they really don't like me.
32:38That's a major handicap in my role. If many of the best CEOs they don't give a shit to a fault even. I think it's a superpower to have. I've tried to be more resilient, emotionally in that regard over time. I've gotten more fatalities to gain. You grow a thicker skin. When you get criticized a lot, then at some point you either die or give up or grow a thicker skin. So I've been able to grow a thicker skin, but that's an issue for sure for me. I was walking in the park with a friend of mine. He's a founder of a 20 billion dollar business, and I was moaning about something and he was like, how are you shut up?
33:10Your job is to get punched in the face 50 times a year and just get up every time. That's life as an entrepreneur, like get on with it. My question to you is, what do you tell yourself when you do get punched? When you do get that hit down? What is that voice in your head say? I think I'm very self -critical to a point where maybe it's unhealthy. I wouldn't recommend that necessarily to others. I don't think it's part of my character to give up. Now, at least in the situations I've been so far because there's always something harder and maybe there's a point where you break down, but I think I can claim to have gone through the truly difficult things in life that some people have to go through.
33:47My challenges have been business -related, which I find are frankly, look -story problems to have. I've been in a situation where I was complaining to particularly to other people in similar roles, but in hindsight, I think it's irritating that people like you and I complain about these sort of things because we really are privileged. I mean, come on, we were born and raised in somewhat affluent countries and clearly had a chance to try our hands at things that are certainly not terrible. I mean, it's a privilege to be able to do what, at least what I do, I think you probably feel the same way about what you do.
34:19So maybe we should just probably just take a step back and have a laugh, you know, the real problems in life are not these ones. Absolutely not. The life of a venture capitalist is brutal, Eka. We are positively Suppressed as a class of people. No, I completely I completely agree with you my grandfather I found out like seven pounds an hour shoveling gravel on a golf course at 82 and I was like, you know what a little bit of Perspective is important. I want to touch on and there's worse than death I mean, that's a thing. That's not even as good as better as it gets you know, so I do want to touch on the people around you because so many people told me about the talent density that you build.
35:00And you mentioned before to me about talent and motivation density. It's quite a specific use of words actually. It's not like, oh, we have great people. What did you mean by talent and motivation density? Yeah, I think so. We built a framework internally to describe exactly these sort of things, but a short of it is that three important components are talent, which is how good you can be, then there is experience which is cumulative exposure to relevant experiences which will help you based on your talent, unlock your potential and then there's motivation which is kind of a multiplier factor going from zero let's say to one where based on how much you care to be great in that particular context you'll do better or worse within the range determined by your talent and experience.
35:44It's a trade -off when you hire people you can say I want to hire for experience talent motivation you can but you're gonna do worse at any one of these than if you focus on just one or two. In our case we chose to focus on talent and motivation almost entirely disregarding experience. Experience we can provide talent we can't motivation we can try to create the conditions for it but you don't change what what someone wants and cares about and and this is the way in the long term we have the best team we can. Let's just unpack this like talent. What does that mean and how do you test for it? Is it raw skills and how do you test for them?
36:17We try to test people as much as possible practically and measurably. We have come to be wary of interviews at least. The more traditional structured interview where the interviewer will just ask a bunch of questions and tell you how they feel about the candidate. We discovered that is not a good predictor. And so we try to have practical tests or at least have to simulate or require the underlying abilities that the actual job will require. And we try to go more toward general problem solving abilities than as I said before acquired knowledge. So we're fine to have someone who doesn't know the things as yet as long as they show us that they have the work ethic, the ability to learn, the right teamwork and mentality to then be great at our company.
37:02So that's talent. Motivation, happy test motivation. You need to try to understand what triggers the person in a good way. What are the factors which one present drive the person to really give their best. With recruiting, like, the goal is not to be perfect, it's just to be less bad. And so it's not that we are great and all of a sudden can predict what gets people to be as motivated as possible. We just aim to be a little bit better than most companies and a little bit better than we were yesterday. And I think we have improved substantially, but it's still wildly inaccurate our prediction, but better, that's worth something.
37:39What have been the biggest mistakes you've made in talent identification and hiring? Too many to count, but I would say broadly speaking, the biggest one was to assign too much weight to experience. In that trade -off I mentioned earlier, ultimately, if you assign a lot of value to experience, you get someone who's more valuable immediately or early on, but then because you've had to trade talent and motivation potential off for more experience, you'll have a lower level of contribution in the long run. And we saw that quite clearly that I think we did that a little bit too much. In terms of density, how important is it for you that people are together?
38:16That there's a physical co -location. We have seen that working together physically tends to correlate with higher -perform levels of performance. It's really hard to tell whether that's because people are in the same place on site or it's a consequence of the fact that people who are intrinsically more motivated about working at the company or doing what they do. They also want to be with others because if you really care, you typically tend to want to be where the action isn't so it's simply that it's self -selected, that sample. But we have incredibly high performers who work remotely all the time too.
38:48It's just on average slightly less probable. Our decision has been to fully support remote work. Some of our best performers are working, almost entirely remotely or completely remotely, but we do pay a price for that. It's not clear cut. When a company decides to only do on -site, I don't feel like I can say it's a stupid move. I could see how that could ultimately prove to be the right move. For us, it's kind of a toss of a coin. We're not sure, so we just keep all options open and again, we're very happy with our remote colleagues. They are great and again, some of them are some of the best colleagues we have.
39:19Do you pay remote different to normal? Standardized pricing is a hard thing to get in terms of remote talent, depending on where they are at different prices. Currently, we have the same salaries, regardless of where you are. Being in Italy and in Europe, I suffer from this assumption too, but a lot of our American friends and counterparts say, ah, you lack the ambition, the young people don't live to work. They work to live. Do you agree with that assumption on Europe? I know it's a general statement, but do you think it's fair? I don't think anybody should live to work. I don't know that you should even try to make a distinction between life and work.
39:55You know, life includes work, includes play, includes love, includes exploration, includes sorrow, happiness. So I think they're just on two different dimensions and it's just logical to compare them, but having said that, I don't have a lot of certainties in life, but this is one of the strongest opinions I have. And that's that if you want to have a chance to be the best or one of the very best at what you do, not only do you need to be very talented, whatever talent means for relevant to that particular pursuit you have, but also So you need to work your ass off for a very long time. In a competitive world, this seems pretty straightforward to me and I've seen it proven out with a truck rack or the almost 100 % in the people I've seen being great at what they do.
40:37It is very rare that they haven't tried very hard to be great for a very long time. So that's my general appreciation for hard work and I think it should be imposed on anybody and I think it's either morally good or morally bad to want to try hard to be great. I think it's really arbitrary, whatever you want to do with your life. Forgive me if this is too dark. You feel like you're quite hard on yourself. People say the same to me. Do you ever give yourself a bit of a break? Maybe I am, maybe I'm not. I think as I said before, I feel very privileged. I don't want to sound like I pity myself or being hard on myself.
41:08It's okay. I'm as lucky as it gets. I have a big dream. I've been very fortunate to find and be found by amazing people. I love working and living with. I get to pursue my dream. It'll be part of a team, with a big ambition, love my job. And yes, it's a sacrifice, including the hard truth of not being great at many things and trying to be better. I think I wouldn't want any other way to be honest. Final one for you before you do a quick five, but many mutual friends said I had to ask about your co -founder relationship, saying that it's a very unique pairing. Would it been some of your biggest lessons or would it take to have a great relationship with your co -founders in the way that you do?
41:47If you were Italian, I would tell you that it takes a lot of cool, you know what it means? No. So that translates to ass like the body part and it means a lot of luck. A lot of luck. But the truth is I got lucky. I had been friends, particularly with one of them for the longest time before we even started the first startup. We went through again from the entrepreneurial perspective quite a bit of hardship together failed startup in which we had pulled our hearts and souls for multiple years and the relationship didn't fracture but actually got stronger in those lowest moments. And that is the best proof that you have something to build upon.
42:26How did you choose your investors? Is there another form of partner? Capital partner? How did you choose your investors? Oh, I mean, it was easy. Nobody else would give us money, so we... No, sorry. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I mean, there have been different moments in which we welcomed you investors, and the answer would change a bit before the sake of brevity, I will say, we have some advisors we trust. One, for example, is called Allen & Company, an equity M &A financing advisor from the US excellent. You know, they know a lot of investors, they've seen them in different situations, particularly the shitty ones where you really see what sort of principles they abide by.
43:01Because it's easy to be lovely when you've been generating great returns, but it's a lot harder to be professional and fair when I think aren't going that well. So they provided us with a short list of firms they thought highly of. And then we had a few relationships, so we added a few names that list. And then we went through a process of they studying us us studying them and talking to people who had them as investors for a long time and had difficult moments with them on board and ultimately it was a mutual selection. Is there anything you do differently about the fundraising processes having been through them?
43:33Different things on negotiation, on price, on length, anything you do differently? Yeah, I think you want to create a certain level of competition if you can. I'm very happy with investors we have. We could have obtained better terms early on and we could have closed faster, have to create a little bit more competition because often what they tell you and they might actually mean it, the initial enthusiasm. You always hear this is awesome, we definitely gonna invest, we're gonna cover the whole round, you don't need to talk to anybody else, this would be amazing and then once due de -illegion starts, there's always a tendency to then commit a little less capital, try to walk back on a few of the key terms and if you don't have any competitive tension, it's hard to avoid that from happening.
44:13But if you have a reasonable amount of competitive pressure, then and you keep it up all the way to the end big mistake Is to just base your selection on the early feedback and then wave goodbye to all those you don't plan to take on board and proceed only with the one or two that you plan to take on board You shouldn't do that. Just keep a broader spectrum of parties involved up to the very end when you're signing Well, see immovable time fee. You mentioned terms that are important. Is that one that's like, hey, no mass. Not gonna budge on that one Well, I'll exchange each time, but I would say one that stayed the same throughout our rounds was liquidation preferences All our shareholders myself our institutional investors are colleagues who got equity through their working at the company Nobody has any liquidation preferences over all on equal terms economically The reason why we fought very hard to avoid that is we didn't want our colleagues who despite our efforts to educate them financially actually, of course, are not as financially savvy as an investor.
45:13And unlike an investor, which has maybe dozens or even hundreds of investments, many of them better metaphorically speaking that their house on the company, we really didn't want to be in a situation where had things gone poorly, then everybody would be left empty -ended, bought water to investors. But that was something we really pushed against. Well done. That's a good thing to be able to push against. That's not an easy one with the scale of cash erased. I do want to move into a quick file, so I say a short statement, you give me your immediate thoughts. Does that sound okay? Yeah, let's do that.
45:44What if you changed your mind on in the last 12 months? I used to think that I should try to read as many books as possible. Quantity, I wouldn't say, is irrelevant, but not so important. What's really valuable is to select and well and try to read each and analyze each in depth really ponder it. You learn a lot more, or it's a lot more useful that way. What three books would you most recommend someone listening? Our Mathematical Universe by Max Tecmark. I'd say the selfish gene by Richard Dawkins. And then maybe to go fiction versus no fiction, I would say a gentleman in Moscow by Amor Tiles, a bullet that's up, you pronounce it.
46:21Wonderful, wonderful novel. Maybe the best novel I've ever read, one of the best. I was gonna suggest Venture Deals by Brad Feld and so you have a lot more diversity than me Luke. because they don't like. Ah, some people tell me I need to get out of Vansha. I probably agree with them. What does a day look like for you? Do you have a routine? I'm just intrigued. You look like a fit date. I mean, I don't think I'm anything incredibly surprising. I work out around 7, 7, 30, walk my dogs, go to the gym, I can run, maybe lift weights, I try to mix stuff a little bit. Then I have breakfast and read the same time.
46:54That's my health and our meditation. To me reading and eating a light breakfast is really recharging. And then I have my workday. I tried out a lot of time to do individual work. I think it'd be surprised by how few meetings and external meetings particularly. What we're doing here is quite rare for me. I maybe do two of these three per year max. So most of the time I spend doing individual work. We promote individual work a lot of the company at all levels. We want all of our managers to be incredibly hands on. Do you know I have direct reports that report to you, Litha? Yeah, I do. I do once every two weeks.
47:24Maybe it takes about five hours a week. And then I have other meetings, but I would say I probably have no more than 20 hours of meeting a week and I squeezing maybe 40, 50 hours of individual work each week and then I try tend to be done around maybe 8 .39 in the evening. I spend an hour my fiance with my dogs again you know there's just chatting watching a part of a movie eating dinner then walk the dogs again read a book full of sleep pretty simple. Tell me if you could choose one person as a bold member who would it be? can be anyone. Sidharata, the fictional character from the book by Hermann Hess.
48:01I think it'd be great as a poor member. Most say Bill Gurley, so you know, good. That was me. That was me too. What's the biggest piece of BS advice that you hear most often? The opinion I hear most often that I think is really poorly informed and poorly thought out is that artificial intelligence will create more jobs than it will eliminate. We will see, I might be very wrong, I'm quite confident that it will prove to be otherwise. Distortion or jobs? Yeah, if I were an excess of job creation in the medium long term. I don't know if it's a few years or a few decades, but I'm quite convinced of that.
48:38An ultimate one was the kindest thing anyone's done for. Two friends from middle school or classmates. I told you it was almost pathologically shy at the time. They went out of their way to pull me out of my shell and teach me how to socialize with others. For two kids of 10 years of age, to do that showed a level of, I think, selflessness and maturity that I still remember today with incredible gratitude. And it changed my life for real. And you gave them 10 % of bending spoons to thank them in gratitude. I did not, but maybe I should. Well, you know, it's a $230 million gift. I'd help you socialize more if that was on the cards.
49:20Final one for you, Leica. The most ambitious that you can be for bending spoons 10 years out. What is bending spoons then if everything goes right? I do think and hope we we can continue doing roughly what we do we like what we do We think has potential and we're fun doing it. I think we can do it at a much bigger scale We can do it a lot better and I hope that we have Developed a level of competence and accumulated enough resources that we can Increasingly find ways of making a positive difference. I think it's quite difficult in business Everybody talks about it, but it's very few businesses that you can really say in order to make a very positive difference.
49:57I don't think we make a very positive difference, nor do 99 % of the businesses as far as I can tell, but I would like to be in a position to make that difference without a doubt. I love to see things like the Gates Foundation. It's very inspiring to me. Being able to tackle polio and almost eradicated. That is incredibly inspiring to me. So being in a position to do something like that. Maybe it doesn't have to be charity, can be many ways, maybe it's charity, maybe not, but have that level of resources and credibility and access to tackle some of those problems at that level. That will be a dream control.
50:27You mentioned that you do, you know, two or three of these a year. Thank you so much for agreeing to do this with me. I've long been in the admire of the model that you have. I've wanted to do it for a long time. So thank you so much for the time, Staleyka. Thank you, Harry. My pleasure and congrats on all you do. I just so loved doing that, Shoe. I think it is such an untold story of success. as we said there are 500 million downloads over 350 million in sales and barely anyone knows this company, it is an incredible story of success which we should celebrate more if you want to see the full interview you can watch it of course on YouTube by searching for 20vc but before we leave you today, there's no shortage of helpful AI tools out there, but using the mean switching back and forth between yet another digital tool, what was supposed to simplify your workflow just made it way more complicated.
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From the publisher
Luca Ferrari is Co-Founder and CEO of Bending Spoons, one of the most incredible but untold success stories in startups. Luca has scaled Bending Spoons to 100M monthly active users, $380M in sales in 2023 and aiming to reach $500M in EBITDA by the end of 2026. The company’s products include Evernote, Meetup, Remini, and Splice and their products have now been downloaded more than 500M times.
In Today’s Episode with Luca Ferrari We Discuss:
- From McKinsey Associate to $2BN Founder
- What was Luca like as a child? How would his parents have described him?
- Why did Luca share his McKinsey salary with his co-founders?
- What were Luca’s biggest lessons from his failed startup?
- Bootstrapping Bending Spoons
- Why did Luca decide to bootstrap Bending Spoons?
- What does Luca think about the EU vs. US startup environment?
- Why did Luca kill a $7M project? What were his lessons?
- How did Luca pick his investors?
- How to Find the Best Talent
- What are the 3 key traits Luca looks for when picking the best talent?
- Why does Luca think traditional interview strategies do not work?
- What tests does Luca conduct for each candidate?
- What were Luca’s biggest hiring mistakes?
- Mastering Acquisition & Growth
- How does Luca determine which products to acquire? How does he identify signals?
- How does Luca approach pricing assets? How does he win every bid?
- What are Luca’s biggest lessons from acquiring Evernote?
- What key lessons on risk management does Luca wish he’d known 10 years ago?
- What are Luca’s biggest challenges on user acquisition?




