The hard lessons from building three startups with Maven’s Gagan Biyani | E1840

27:08But that includes creating. So, they're just natural. You know, they're publishing newsletters and blog posts and stuff. Their actual coursework is probably like 10, 15 hours a week tops, I would say. And it ebbs and flows, right? There's sprints leading up to a cohort or during a cohort. And then there's a lot of time in between where you're almost doing nothing. How do you get the students? When you have somebody like Nick, he's obviously got a following, so he can tweet it once in a while. He brings his own. But how do you get people to it? Are you doing a lot of advertising? We don't do much paid advertising.

27:41Our paid budget is really small and just experimental right now. Our primary way of getting students is through our instructors. So we have now built up a large audience of students who come to Maven and say, Hey, I'm interested in learning X, Y, or Z. And they search or they read our emails and they find out about a course. So roughly about 25 % of the sales on maven.com happen through Maven's marketing. And we have really intense tracking on this. And then 75 % still come through our instructors. And as we've grown, we've increased that number. It was 4 % when we started. And now it's 25%. So it's grown a lot over the last three years.

28:20And we expect it to get to our goal is to eventually be like, you know, 50 to 80 % are coming from Maven. Yeah, that makes sense. Talk to me about Coursera, edX, you know, all that stuff that MIT was doing once in a while, I'll just go on those. I'll go on to YouTube, I'll watch an MIT course, macroeconomics, whatever, I'll watch like a Stanford course, they put their courses up there. It's just interesting to listen to. I just do it like kind of passively, sort of like listening to a good audio book or something. But I find it kind of compelling. Those were cohort-based. Those, what do they call them?

28:50MOOCs, Massively Online Courses back in the day? Why have those, have they fizzled? We don't hear about them anymore. Were they a success, edX and Coursera? Well, both Coursera and Udemy are public companies, along with LinkedIn Learning, which would be public if it wasn't owned by LinkedIn, which is owned by Microsoft. And there's a couple other companies, ProSight and Skillsoft. I would say that the markets aren't super kind to these companies right now. They aren't kind to many people, many companies, but these companies aren't killing it. But there's multiple multi-billion dollar companies in there.

29:27So I would say it's a real success. Yeah, Corsair is about two and a half and Udemy is about one and a half. Yeah. You still got a bunch of Udemy stock? I have some, enough to be freaking out that the stock price has been going haywire, but not enough that I'm entirely focused just on Udemy. Yeah. I mean, Udemy, yeah, they peaked at 30 and now it's at eight. Yeah. Yeah. It's tough when that happens. I had that happen with Uber going from 60 to 15 and then, you know, back up to 45 and then they got profitable. So, you know, it's, it's hard to hold public equities at this time. But if you love the company, you love management and you know, it's strong, you know, you always have that opportunity to buy more since you're so close to the company and you understand the business model, you know, That's one of the nice things about it.

30:13I find I bought a bunch of Uber at, I think,$28 a share or something. And I wrote it back up. So, you know, you can always double or triple down. So in terms of success for the company, I remember when you were doing the round, you were like, hey, J. Cal, I want you on the cap table. Super oversubscribed. I got this little tiny amount. I was like, sure, you know, I'll take it. But you were the last of the Zerp. The last of the Zerp startups. You raised like 20, 30 million, I remember, from Andreessen in 2021. That's right. Am I right? Ballpark? Yeah, we raised 25 million total 20 million from from our series A and 5 million during the round that you you invested in.

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32:17You have kept the company relatively small. I don't know if you're profitable or not, but it sounds like you're crushing it. The company must have had a great valuation if you raised 20. You're an amazing salesperson, marketer yourself, and incredible at raising money. So you raise at the peak, you raised 20, you probably raised it for 10 or 15 % of the company, people can do their own math for the valuation. But now you got this down market. So how are you approaching that? Do you still have the war chest? You said you only got 15 people. It sounds like you're close to profitable. So talk to me about how you're thinking strategically as the pilot of the company with a lot of fuel, you know, in a great big jet, We've been very intentional about, I mean, we did have more people at one point, to be clear, but we never got over our skis from a cost perspective.

33:02And we listened to the advice early on that the market was going to change. And I had this, you know, childhood memory of being around when my parents were in the dotcom bubble. And I think I've been through a few pretty bad recessions that affected myself personally, like my family, really. I mean, I've been, in my adult life, I've been quite lucky. As you know, I started in that golden period, 2008, 2009. What time to come into the workforce? And when I started angel investing, wow. Yeah, we met during that time, if you remember, in a few different ways. Well, you guys were, I think, TechCrunch 50, if I remember correctly.

33:41you either we're in the pit we're in the demo pit i remember and a day oh uh yeah had introduced me to you guys and then i got a check from you to me at some point a day oh had this crazy thing at found shout out to a day or s he did something called founders institute and he would pull your shares so he would get one percent of a company or something two percent of a company that went through the program three and a half oh three and a half so he got it was like a you know mini accelerator and then he gave like half of a percentage half of those three and a half points like 50 basis points to the mentors.

34:13I was the first mentor. Literally on the first night, I was the first mentor. I gave a big speech to everybody. I broke a clipboard. I was telling everybody this fucking hard. You have no idea how hard it is. Your company's going to fucking fail. You got to be more serious. And I tried to get people to take it seriously. I did it for Adeo. I wanted to have, be a good speaker for him. And then like, whatever, seven years later, I got like a 25K check. And I'm like, or 15K, 25K, I remember. It was over$10 ,000. And I was like, Adeo, what is this? He's like, you signed the agreement. I'm like, I don't remember.

34:42It was a speaker release. He's like, the speaker release. It was a speaker release. And you get a pool and you were the second highest rated speaker. I think Aaron from Mint actually was better than me. I came in second. So Aaron got like whatever, you know, 20%. I got like 10 % and everybody else got 5%. So he literally even stack ranked us as the speakers and the mentors for the equity. Who's nuts. Tell me about Founder Institute and the journey at Udemy. All of our start was because of the Founder Institute in Adeo. because I found out about the Founder Institute and applied cold via TechCrunch, via TechCrunch posts.

35:16Yeah. And I had no technical background, no founders, no co-founders to speak of. And I applied, I got in. And then my co-founders, Aaron and Octai, who I had never met at this time, and we had no connections whatsoever, also applied separately as a fully technical team. And we went through about two thirds of the Founder Institute and had never met each other. and about two-thirds of the way through, Adeo realized because he has this automated system for keeping up with his companies, I'm sure other accelerators do this too, he realized that my products were not really coming to market. So, I wasn't able to find technical co-founders for one of them.

35:55The other one just wasn't really working out and he was like, Goggin, you know, he had seen me at the events. He saw that I had some, you know, minor social skills at that time and so, he was like, you need to meet other founders and potentially join up with them. And so, and then he was telling Aaron and Octai the exact opposite thing. He was saying, look, I can't understand what you guys are saying. You guys need a, you know, you need a business co-founder to sort of translate. Yeah, somebody more polished to present this to the world. Yeah. So he introduced us and we met over Skype. And that dates the conversation.

36:29Yeah, I know. Skype, right now people are like typing in S-K-I-P-E-I-E, what is it? skip skype skype was like zoom but it didn't work as well but it was kind of cool like a cool logo yeah yeah eventually sold to microsoft it was pretty powerful back in the day especially for international calling it was like a voip caller if you had an international uh you know a relationship it was a godsend yeah totally because it was basically free yeah well no you had to remember you had to also pay for skype in the beginning yeah yeah you had to pay for your minutes, right? You paid for international calling.

37:08So you could do you could do computer to computer without without paying. But if you want to dial somebody's phone number, it went through a game you had to pay that was what it was because yeah, people would use it. That's think about how crazy that was people would make phone calls from their desktop to other to phone numbers as opposed because the other person wasn't on their computer and it was just easier to click. Yeah, I did it all the time. I've I used it until 2014 or 15 or something because when I'm traveling, it's easier to call over Skype and call an international number or something.

37:44So, yeah. So, we met over Skype and I fell in love with the product that they had built. And at that time, it was actually, interestingly enough, it was a live learning platform. So, they had built an alternative to Zoom or a predecessor to Zoom that was live and allowed you to do live online courses. and we met, we decided we would work together. I was interning at TechCrunch. I don't know if you know this, but that's how I got into TechCrunch 50 because we didn't have money. So like, and we didn't have connections. No, Mike and I would give people the demo pit things. I think we charged 500 bucks.

38:21When I did it, we charged, we gave it away for free, the demo pit. The demo pit, if we will know, Mike Arrington and I had a conference together called TechCrunch 50. He went off to do Disrupt. I went off to do Launch Festival. We broke up. But when we did it, I created this concept of a demo pit. And I said, you have all this space at this crazy san francisco design center we'll take both sides of the space and said mike mike said why would you take the other half we don't need it i was like i want to put up 50 cocktail tables like high tops he's like what are high tops i'm like it's like little round tables you know like when you're at a party and you put your cocktail on it i said i want to do like people can just open their laptop and show their products so during the things instead of just talking to people you can go see demos of startups it'll be helpful for startups and he's like that's gonna cost a lot of money i was like well this is a non-union place it costs ten dollars to rent the table.

39:04And I think electricity and internet will be like 100 200 bucks. So we'll just charge people 500. And it will like break even and we'll give them like a ticket or two. And so we did that. And then now disrupt, I think charges five or$10 ,000. And the web summit guy was a bit of a scumbag. He started charging like$20 ,000 for that. And then he would give people discount, he stole the idea from you, but he just decided to just charge 10s of 1000s of dollars for it, which I never liked about that guy. I never liked the guy, Patty. I've always appreciated your... I think I can say because I've seen you operate since 2008, that you've had a lot of authenticity about this pro startup thing.

39:45And I think the demo pit is a great example. And us at Udemy, this was one of the few opportunities to go and just start pitching our business. And one of the things I think I, a lot of founders forget is that one of the best ways to perfect your pitch is just to do it a hell of a lot of times. And the demo pit is a perfect opportunity for that because I was literally, I remember coming back, J. Cal, I don't know if you heard stories like this, but I remember coming back from the demo pit and my feet were sore. And I couldn't, like after two or three days of doing the demo pit, I had to stay, I had to stay seated for like, I was basically on bed rest for like multiple days.

40:26And the reason I had sores on my feet, or I think I had some bleeding. And I remember as partly because I just honestly didn't afford, I didn't have good shoes. And like, I was just a poor, you know, right out of college sort of kid. But the other reason was because I was nonstop talking to people nonstop for 12 to 14 hours from the day it opened until that night, just pitching you to me. It's such a cool moment in time. Yeah, such a cool moment in time when like, there was no entitlement. Anybody who was in startup was just super hardcore. And, you know, somewhere around 2014, 2015, you know, the industry made too much money, Zurb, whatever.

41:04And now it's getting hardcore again, right? And I kind of like this moment in time. It reminds me of the time when you and I met, it was like a smaller group of people, the funding rounds were tiny, but it was just more authentic, right? And then people were grinding it out. I love the demo pit, man, I miss doing the demo pit. That was like one of my favorite things to do was just walk around the demo pit and just take pitches from founders. It was like magic. Then you got fired. Why'd you get fired? I was young, man. I was like, I was 23 years old. I was kind of an ass to some of my employees.

41:35I think I was still I think I think that if we had better investors who could advise Aaron, my co founder a little more, and give me a little more rope, like if I had six more months, I would have figured out how to manage people with enough grace that we'd keep going. But I was a hard ass. And the challenge was my co-founder Aaron wasn't. He wasn't like that. He was more likable and more chill. And so our styles came into conflict. And at some point, I think he felt like there was a chance that if he didn't make this decision now, it'd be tough to do it after a Series B. By the time the Series B happened, we lost 80-90 % of the company.

42:15So there was sort of this window in time, there's a bit of time pressure. And I think the time pressure plus the fact that, you know, I was having some challenges with with managing people, challenges that I think are super normal for founders, honestly, you just couldn't take people not being accountable or not keeping up with your pace, you were a 12 hour a day guy, and just people didn't match your intensity. Yeah, exactly. I think I got frustrated when I didn't see the output I was looking for. And Instead of, I think the thing I've learned is, and I'm still working on this. I mean, I don't know about you, Jason, but I feel like management is a lifelong endeavor.

42:53And I have learned to become more factual about, hey, this is what's going on. This is what I'm expecting and letting the person succeed or fail instead of trying to make it work. And I think the thing I used to do is I tried to make it work so hard. and my way of making it work because my internal voice in my head and the way I want to be treated is to be yelled at and I get that that's like not what other people want but I grew up as an Indian kid with Indian immigrant parents you had an intensity you know in my dad's restaurant if I screwed up my dad would like what the f are you doing these customers are here they're paying us money it was intense you know and he was not going to deal with any bs so then yeah sure you you go into the workforce and people don't perform you could be intense with them but you have to realize and what you did realize, it's not your job to change them.

43:43And nor will you succeed. It's almost never can you I mean, I literally think it's been one out of 50 people in my career that I've tried to change their work ethic, and it actually worked, maybe one out of 100. I just don't think it's worth doing. You don't have the time to do it. You can't change their childhood, you can't change their operating principles, their motivation. And so you're better off just saying, hey, here's what's expected. Do you think you can hit it? And if you don't, maybe we should talk about, you know, you moving on to your next adventure, we'll give you a nice severance.

44:12And we'll give you a recommendation can be your choice. I just say that frankly, to people, if you can't keep and I just tell people now, my trick, I'll give you this one. Now that I'm 50. At some point, when I got out of my maniacal 20s, I got to my 30s, I just started saying to people here, all I expect is for you to keep up with me. And if you can run as fast as me, you can run a little faster if you want, you can run ahead of me. But I'm gonna run fast. And if you want to be here, just keep up with me, you know, plus or minus 10 hours a week. If you don't totally understand, there's another place for you to work post office, Starbucks, Walmart, some chill startup that works four days a week, whatever it is.

44:45Yeah, to be clear, I don't think this was just about work ethics. Sometimes it's about style and output and other things. But yeah, but I definitely think ethic is part of it. And yeah, I mean, we were young and scrappy, and we're working hard. And sometimes it got intense. Honestly, in retrospect, I find it to be both a good learning experience for me, but also kind of a reality check for me that I look at back on it and say I had a lot more shame about it than I do today. Because I think today I look at it and I'm like, dude, you know, intensity is a good thing too. And there's a lot of positive that comes from it.

45:20And I think that it just needs to be softened, but not eliminated. And that's what I've been... You can have intensity without destroying people or breaking them, right? And, you know, a lot of times when you have that intensity, I've had it myself, it comes because the founder is has some fear of failure, or they're scared about not getting their next round closed. And so then that's just how they operate the business. They're operating from a point of fear, as opposed to, hey, we can we can solve this problem. And as you get older, and you know, you get your ass kicked, you kicked ass, you know, you can kind of come to it with a different thing.

45:53Were you displacing your fear and your anger or your frustrations on the team? Was that the, because that's kind of the classic. Yeah, I think that was definitely part of it. I also think though, that my natural way of communicating was just different. I came from a culture where it was normal to say like, that doesn't make sense or that's stupid, you know, and that is an offensive thing to a set of people. And so I just learned, I had to learn to translate. To be clear, my management, if I look back, I don't think my management challenges were as bad as they sound in this conversation. But they were because I would say that that was also a translation issue when the employees went to Aaron and said, hey, Aaron, like, can you help Goggin work on this?

46:37I think Aaron interpreted this as, oh, fuck, we got a real big problem here. And so I think it kind of got out of control faster. I've had a really good relationship with almost everyone I've ever managed. Oh, great. But not everybody. And there are times where I go, I go a little too far, for sure. No question. So, and that is me putting my stress on other people, for sure. Yeah, and I think if you work at a startup and you work for a founder, you could also understand that if they're freaking out a little bit Probably because you know, they're just under stress and they're trying to make this thing work and it's hard You know, like listen, you chose to go out on this crazy pirate ship Try to go across the world And yeah, you might run out of provisions.

47:17You get attacked by another ship, you know, it's hard You can get lost at sea people go mad. It's nuts. Tell me take me through sprig. I remember sprig and social capital had invested I had a small investment in a company, Bento, that did the same concept. This is during the on-demand economy. Tell me what was Sprig. Tell the audience, I know what it is. Tell the audience what was Sprig. I know you had gotten to tens of million in revenue, but why did it ultimately fail? Because it was such a good idea on delivery, on-demand meals. It was great. Yeah, it was an on-demand restaurant. So essentially, we were a ghost kitchen before Ghost Kitchens happened, where we had a central location in the center of San Francisco and Chicago, where we would make food in large quantities.

47:59We'd have three or four options a day, relatively healthy meals that you could order. You'd order it from your phone. And because we were so well located, because we made the meals in advance and just heated them up, or we had them in the car ready if they were salads or something like that, we could deliver them within 10 or 15 minutes. And our cost per delivery was significantly less than DoorDash or Uber Eats. And so Sprig became what we known for healthy meals,$20, 20 minutes, you know. And the reason it succeeded is because that value proposition was like, so easy to explain to a customer.

48:42And so it spread like wildfire. And a large percentage of San Francisco, honestly, was using Spray. I mean, we were the largest restaurant in the city. At one point, based on what we think, you would open an app, you'd have like five dishes each night. Yeah, you know, one would be protein, whatever one would be vegan or vegetarian, you had a lot of different options. But they came, they would already be in the cars, the cars to be running around like Ubers. And so you ordered it, the wait time sometimes was five minutes, 20 minutes, you got your food fast. Yeah. Why didn't it work? When we started the company, the competitive landscape was us against DoorDash and Postmates.

49:22So we saw DoorDash and Postmates. And at that time, they were unit economically responsible. I wouldn't say they were profitable, but they were responsible. And so it cost about$15 to$20 to get your delivery and it took over an hour and the food would come all jumbled. And so we had this assumption that our vertically integrated model was going to be much more powerful than them. And that worked. Fast forward about two years, two and a half years, and we were at$20 million run rate, had 1300 total people because we employed our drivers. And Uber Eats launches. and the day Uber Eats launches, which was basically a copy of DoorDash or Postmates, the day Uber Eats launches, our growth rate went from like 1 % to 2 % weekly to negative 1 % to 2 % weekly.

50:14And from then on, we just couldn't recover. We could never compete. And the real reason was because Uber Eats decided to subsidize the market so heavily that they were doing 30 minute deliveries, which cut our advantage dramatically because DoorDash and Postmates at that point was about 45 minutes, 50 minute deliveries. And maybe, sorry, Sprig, a little slip there. Sprig was 20 minutes. So, we had creeped up from our original 10-15 minute promise up to 20. Uber Eats caught us right in the middle, got to 30. So, that was one part of it. And then on price, Uber Eats also subsidized the market and dramatically cut the price down by taking money from the restaurants.

50:52And so, pretty soon, we were dealing with a product that was not that distinguishable from us from a price and time perspective. And then from a selection perspective, they killed us because Uber Eats was delivering from any restaurant, you know, from a large number of restaurants in the city. And so the selection of Uber Eats eventually trumped our quality and convenience. Yeah, it's interesting, like you really were a pioneer in both education and in that food delivery space. One of them becomes a public company, the other one becomes roadkill. That's kind of how it's pretty good track record, I got to tell you, and now you're crushing it with Maven.

51:27When you look back on products and building products that matter, what's your philosophy at this point in terms of building great products? Do you have a playbook or some insights for people who are, you've got a lot of founders obviously listening to the show and they're triangulating on product market fit. They're trying to come up with a great idea. They're trying to refine it. They're trying to get it to grow. What's your playbook for product market fit? Yeah, I wrote a post that went kind of viral about this called the minimum viable tests framework. And so it's just slightly more advanced.

51:55It's just an evolution of minimal viable product. MVP, the idea is you have this vision for a company, you boil it down to the most simple form, and then you build it, and you launch it, and you iterate upon it. I think the challenge with that is that oftentimes you start going in a direction before you actually know what direction you should go in. And so I invented a step just before that that I call minimum viable testing, where before you even build up something that could be a product, you start running one-off tests that actually test very specific assumptions within your overall business idea.

52:30What's an example? So in the Sprig case, right, a minimum viable product would be a restaurant that served meals three or four days a week that might be open four hours a night. That was what we eventually launched when we launched our MVP and started making revenue. But for the six months prior to that, we were running a bunch of little tests. And our tests would be all more varied than that. So we ran a test where we worked with a chef to deliver meals that were preheat. They were pre-cooked or par-cooked, and then you had to heat them at your house. I remember this. Yeah, you might have been on the email list for this, actually.

53:10And then eventually, a company called Munchery actually turned this into a business. And then we had another test where we tried to run three days in a row. And so we were doing these little tests that would help us understand what the operations, what the user behavior was like, and that helped us refine the MVP. And then we built an MVP. And the MVP was like our go live date. And then we built on top of the MVP and kept building more and more from there. Got it. Yeah. And what do you think is the right way to grow a product? You know, when you start thinking about beachhead markets, paid social, how do you get, you know, people into a product?

53:50Do you have any thoughts on that now that you've done it three times? Yeah, I think the biggest thing that people miss growth hacking, you know, growth marketing now, everyone's always looking for some sort of breakthrough channel like, oh, TikTok, YouTube, whatever, whatever's new and hot. I actually think you have to start with the user. You have to ask the user. And I have a whole series of questions that I ask the users. And I interview the potential of the users and I find the market that needs my product the most. And I ask them, what is it that you do right now to solve this problem? Where do you look for information on this problem?

54:23What do you listen to podcasts? Do you watch YouTube videos? Do you, you know, go on TikTok? And I start to get a demographic and psychographic understanding of why the user buys the products that are current alternatives to my product, and what where they look for find out information about this. And then I derive marketing, marketing ideas from that. And so I consider it a kind of bottoms up approach to marketing, where I'm really user driven in what the channels are. And I find that to be pretty successful, especially for the first few 1000, in, you know, 10, 20 ,000 users. What about fundraising?

55:03We'll end on fundraising. We're now at basically the fundraising market that you and I came into it me as an angel, you as a founder, it's 2009 to 2012, all over again,$5 million seed,$5 million valuations at the seed round, or pre seed seed hitting 1015, you know, it's it's a series A, you know, maybe you got to have two or 3 million in revenue. Now it's kind of crazy. So how do you think about fundraising? Why do VCs invest in certain companies and not others? I think like the more you understand the power law of VC, the more successful you're going to be as a fundraiser. VCs only make money on, well, angels only make money on like 2 % or 5 % of their investments.

55:43VCs only make money on 10 % or 20 % of their investments. And they make even more money off of the one investment that they made that really went big. You know, Jason, you know this. um yeah go uber robin hood com yeah it's uh yeah so because it's so hits driven you have to pitch you have to first of all want to build a hit okay that is like that is like a critical thing most people don't actually want to build a hit they don't know it's too hard it's hard to build a billion dollar business it's not just that it's hard it's that it's not always uh the right combination of risk reward for the person.

56:25You know, building a bootstrap business is also hard. But it's a different type of hard. And certain people think that the raising capital world is easier than the bootstrap world. And I think that there's a continuum here, you can raise$1 million, you can raise$5 million, or you can raise 100 or$200 million along your journey to becoming to get to an exit. And you can raise$0. And I think people often don't evaluate for themselves how happy they would be with various versions of risk reward, and whether their company is actually the type of company for which that calculation is the same as what the investor wants.

57:03And so you have to be aligned with the investor in your goals. And ideally, it's like, hey, I'm actually building something that could be a multi billion dollar business. Yeah, that is the key. If you're not the if you're not in the power law sweepstakes, and the investor doesn't think you can get there, why would they they get 30 swings at bat per fund or something like that you know the average fund probably does 30 or 40 investments if you're not going to build the next uber or robin hood or udemy why and i think that's what you got right with sprake too right like uh it feels like you know sprake could have been you know doordash or something similar and it feels like maven could be like udemy coursera or i think even bigger so continued success if people want to check it out maven.com that's like a million dollar demand name thanks yeah we worked hard on that one you got it for less i hope i would pay a million for it yeah i mean i think like literally if you think about building if you're trying to build a billion dollar company if you did pay a million for if you told me i have 25 million in my bank account should i pay a million for this i would say yes only because even if the company didn't work out you had to sell it you could sell it for 500k like the next person would pay 250 500 for it it's like a killer killer domain thank you all right listen it's been a great hour i appreciate being in the program and we'll see you all next time on this week in startups bye-bye