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Podcast Episode Summary: Unlocking the Power of Data with VenCap’s David Clark | E1906
Podcast Details
- Title: This Week in Startups
- Host: Jason Calacanis
- Guest: David Clark, Chief Investment Officer at VenCap
- Topics Covered: Venture Capital strategies, investment metrics, the power law in venture capital, and the importance of data-driven decision-making.
Episode Overview In this episode, Jason Calacanis interviews David Clark, who brings over three decades of experience in venture capital. The discussion revolves around the nuances of successful venture capital investment, focusing on data analysis, portfolio management, and the dynamics of funding startups effectively.
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Key Takeaways
- Understanding Venture Capital Success
- Longevity and Success in VC:
- Successful managers recognize the top 1% companies and have the confidence to let them run.
- A single fund-returning investment can significantly impact overall fund performance.
- Data-Driven Decision Making
- Investment Metrics:
- VenCap's approach focuses on the distinction between alpha (high-performing returns) and beta (average returns).
- The average return in venture is around 10% IRR, while the upper quartile boundary is about 18%.
- Portfolio Strategy
- Finding the Right Managers:
- Concentration on a limited number of high-performing managers (12-15) proved effective for VenCap.
- Identifying which managers consistently produce upper quartile funds is crucial.
- The Power Law in Venture Capital
- Power Law Dynamics:
- Approximately 30 exits per year account for over half of the total exit value in the venture-backed ecosystem.
- The top 1% of investments often determines overall fund success.
- Challenges in Seed Investing
- Seed Manager Risks:
- Difficulty in selecting seed-stage managers due to a high failure rate (50-60% not returning capital).
- The necessity of focusing investment efforts on more stable and proven managers instead of the volatile seed stage.
- Managing Fund Reserves
- Follow-On Investments:
- Emphasis on reserving capital for top-performing companies rather than extending support to underperformers.
- The need for managers to balance risk while capturing high returns.
- The J-Curve Phenomenon
- Understanding Investment Timelines:
- The concept of the J-Curve highlights the typical underperformance in the early years of venture funds.
- Recognition of a return trajectory is essential for managing expectations among LPs (Limited Partners).
- Succession and Longevity of GPs
- Manager Dynamics:
- The importance of continual influx and mentoring of new talent within VC firms is crucial for long-term success.
- Not all successful GPs remain committed long-term; managing the transition is critical.
Discussion Highlights
- Investment Strategy:
- Clark emphasizes the need for managers to double down on the best-performing companies while minimizing further investment into struggling ones.
- Market Dynamics:
- The fluctuation in the venture capital landscape, especially during downturns, requires a recalibration of strategies to remain competitive.
Conclusion The episode provides invaluable insights into the strategic thinking and data analysis required in venture capital. David Clark’s experiences and observations about the market dynamics and portfolio management underscore the importance of making informed and calculated investment decisions. The discussion serves as a guide for both seasoned investors and those new to the field, focusing on the critical factors that drive success in venture capital.
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Additional Information
- Links:
- VenCap: [VenCap Website](https://www.vencap.com/)
- Gusto: [Gusto Payroll](http://www.gusto.com/twist)
- Northwest Registered Agent: [Northwest Registered Agent](https://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/twist)
- Uizard: [Uizard](http://www.uizard.io/twist)
- Follow the Podcast:
- Subscribe on Apple Podcasts: [This Week in Startups](https://rb.gy/v19fcp)
- Follow on X (formerly Twitter): [Jason Calacanis](https://twitter.com/jason) | [David Clark](https://twitter.com/daveclark85)
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This structured summary encapsulates the main themes and insights from the podcast, providing a comprehensive overview for readers interested in venture capital dynamics and investment strategy.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Look at the best managers, and they're the ones who are able to recognize when they do have one of those top 1 % companies, when they've captured that magic and they have the confidence to let that run. And I think it's something that really distinguishes the very best managers from, again, the rest of the pack, that they understand when to take money off the table, but they also understand when to let things run. And ultimately, if you are going to get those fund returning outcomes, you might only have one of those in a portfolio of 50 companies. If you sell it too early, then you've missed your opportunity there.
0:37And almost I would look at that as a bigger sin than perhaps not investing in it in the first place.
1:07wizardagent.com slash twist to get a 60 % discount on your next LLC. And Wizard. Struggling to transform innovative ideas into concrete product designs? Wizard can help you turn your visions into polished UI designs in a fraction of the time while enhancing collaboration across your entire team. Get 25 % off Wizard Pro for an entire year at wizard.io slash twist. That's uizard.io slash twist. All right, everybody, welcome back to the podcast. We've got a great episode for you today. Because we have with us today, somebody who's been investing in venture funds for three decades. His name is David Clark.
1:50He is the chief investment officer at VenCab. They're a UK-based fund of funds and investment advisor. If you're deep in the industry, you probably remember David went viral on Twitter, now X, when he broke down returns from 32 years of investments at Vencap. This was obviously to somebody like myself, who is a student of the game of capital allocation and trying to get better at what I do every day. Just absolutely the content I'm here for. And so, David, welcome to the show. Thanks a lot, Jason. I've been listening a lot to the podcast that you put out and super excited to finally be on one.
2:28Thank you. Well, as you can tell from my voice, I do a lot of podcasts and today I've got my raspy voice. So I'm kind of like Bob Dylan in the later decades here. I just want to get started recapping the tweet storm and your firm, Vencap, just so I make sure I level set with the audience, founded in 1987. You've made around 500 fund investments. So you have a certain number of managers and you obviously invested in them across many funds. Yep. Yep. Correct. And just to be clear, we probably started with a very generalist approach to venture. So over time, we've backed something like 110 different managers.
3:06Over the last 10 to 15 years, we've really concentrated those down into 12 to 15 groups. And it's those 12 to 15 groups that we've been active with for the last decade or so. Yeah. And concentrating in on those managers, you do that. Why? Because I've heard some people say, you need to have a certain number of managers in order to hit certain goals. Is the goal here to hit the beta plus chance of alpha, or just really go for that alpha across venture capital? Yeah, I think the whole conversation around alpha versus beta in venture is an interesting one, because I think the beta in venture is, if you look at that as the median return, the average median return using the Cambridge data is about 10 % IRR.
3:50And so nobody is in venture for the beta, you're only in it for the alpha. And for me, the alpha actually means the upper quartile return. But it's because of the power loan nature of venture, what we found is that actually the upper quartile is very similar to the actual pooled return for venture overall. So again, if you look at the average upper quartile boundary from the Cambridge data since 2000 or so, it's about 18%. And so what we try and do is to hit that upper quartile as often as we can and get as many funds that we invest in really over that upper quartile boundary. The challenge in venture is that it's really hard.
4:30And you know this, Jason, you've been doing this for a long time. And I think people who have come into the industry more recently have been perhaps a little less aware of that because the market's been going up and there's been a strong tailwind and everybody's been doing really well. But I think the next couple of years are going to be really challenging in the venture industry. And so the reason we concentrated down is when we looked across all the 110 managers we backed, we found the majority of those managers were only generating a median return. And there was only a handful of managers that were actually able to consistently produce upper quartile funds.
5:07And we can go into how they do that and why they do that and what the power load dynamic looks like, but happy to take that wherever it makes sense. Yeah. I mean, let's go right to that. What distinguishes people who have not just longevity, because my perception now going into my second decade is if you build a good enough brand, there's enough people who want access to this category that if they do get the 10 % with the optionality of maybe doing a little better, let's face it, there are some LPs who would be comfortable with that as part of a blended portfolio. It's kind of like, I'm going to get above average returns with some optionality.
5:44Now, if you're really trying to sharpen the knife and get into that upper quartile and hit that 18 % constantly, oof, it's really hard. So let's talk about what those funds or those managers or those brands do that makes it notable or in your estimation, worthy of being in your, I think you said your top 12? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Let me tell you what they don't do, first of all. What they don't do is really have any lower loss ratio than the rest of the market. So this is not about minimizing your losses. So when we look across all our portfolios, for an early stage fund, somewhere between 50 % to 60 % of deals don't return capital.
6:29And obviously, it varies a little bit by vintage year. In the most challenging vintage years, that can be up at 70%. In the best vintage years, it can be just below 50, but it's average in that sort of 50 to 60 mark. And even the best managers are kind of consistently around there. So venture is not about minimizing risk. This is not private equity. If we were having a conversation about private equity, we'd be having a very different conversation. Venture, as we know, is a power law industry. And so the power law really applies to what percent of companies ultimately generate the bulk of the value for the industry.
7:04And when we look at the exit data, what we found is that it's about 30 exits a year that ultimately account for more than half of the total exit value produced by all venture-backed companies globally. So we're talking the top 1%, the top 1 % of exits. And as a percentage of the total number of companies backed, it's probably going to be smaller than that because obviously, we know a lot of companies ultimately don't exit. So we're talking about how do you consistently get access to those top 30 companies each year that drive the bulk of the performance that comes through to the venture industry.
7:43And what we found when we look at who are the investors in there is that there's a relatively concentrated group of managers who can consistently do that. And it's no surprise who they are. It's Saks-El, it's Sequoia, it's Andreessen Horowitz, it's Kleiner Perkins. it's the managers that most people would be able to name. If you ask them, who would you say are the best performing managers, the franchise names out there? And so when we look at the data, it's very clear to us. If we want to consistently capture that upper quartile return, the best way for us to do it, and I'm not saying this works for everyone, other people will have different strengths and different approaches to the market.
8:24But certainly for us, the best way to do it is to try and optimize for those managers that are consistently able to back the top 1 % companies. And we've been doing it for 15 years, and it works. Okay. So for your terrific 12, I'm going to call your fund managers who are... Can I do that for our marketing deck? The terrific 12 is yours. Yeah, it's one of my things, branding. Or just conciseness. So in that terrific 12, what you've learned is they have the same amount of losses. They strike out. They miss their shots just like anybody else. Six of 10 startups return zero. Big donut, they flame out.
8:59Not zero. Don't return capital. Don't return capital. Don't return capital. About half of those probably end up at a zero. Okay. So they don't return capital, but it's really about the very small number of outlier exits. So when you look back, you've had how many companies across the history of the fund? And then how many companies, I think you actually did a chart here, which we could pull up, how many companies would fall into that power law designation? So the data that we used has just under 12 ,000 companies. Wow. And 113 of them are fund returners. So just over 1%. So again, let's define a fund returner for the audience.
9:42Yeah. So a fund returner is a single company investment in a fund that returns the entire committed capital of that particular fund. So if you were typically an early stage fund, might invest in 30, 40, 50 companies. So it's one company that returns the entire capital of that fund. And very often, that company will do it multiple times over. So it doesn't just return one extra fund, it can return 5, 10, 15 extra funds. And so it's optimizing for those types of companies. And there's a few things that also kind of play into that relationship. It's what's the size of the exit? It's what's the size of the fund that's backed it?
10:24And it's how much does that fund own of that company at the time of exit? And those three things have to be in balance in order to get the fund returning outcomes we're looking for. Listen, I know myself as a founder, there are things that I love doing. I love building products. I love hiring people. And there are things I hate, payroll, HR. So I use Gusto. Gusto is the best. Gusto's payroll and HR services make running a small business much easier because it was specifically designed for you, the small business owner. And payroll is something you definitely do not want to mess up. Oh, and I know it.
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12:05And so these are truly meaningless in terms of venture capital. So you have a full 80 % here, almost, yeah, exactly, 80.3 % that are just not moving the needle for that fund. Yeah, exactly. And then everything 3x, 5x, 10x, 10x plus or fund returners, that's where you start to see the returns and why venture is so special, which then leads me to believe that there are factors that determine these outcomes. And I just want to run them by you. These would be theories because you do need to make a decision as an LP when you bet on GPs and as a GP, when you're betting on companies to have what we would call a portfolio strategy.
12:46Yeah. Each fund has to have a portfolio strategy. So if only 1 % are fund returners and you do 30 names, how hard is it to get a fund returner? And does that not argue for maybe more names in a fund than we've seen historically? So maybe you could argue on one extreme, spray and prey on the other concentration and how you think about in a portfolio construction, what's the right number of names? And when people hear me say the number of names in a portfolio, you might hear other people say logos. It means the names or the logos of the startups. Yeah, I think it very much depends on the stage at which you're investing.
13:24So if you're a pre-seed fund, then because the loss ratio looks different and the attrition rate is different, you need more names. And it also means you can afford to have more names because the delta between your entry value and the exit value is so much larger that it's easier in a way to get that fund return if you do have one company that ultimately takes off and is incredibly successful. As you start to get later as an investing fund, then you do need to be more concentrated in your portfolio. Because ultimately, the multiple you will get on any individual deal will begin to come down. And so what we've tended to find for early stage funds, and we would classify early stage funds as kind of Series A and maybe sort of early Bs.
14:11For those early stage funds, a portfolio of around 30-ish names is about the right size. And you're looking at maybe ideally probably 10 % to 15 % ownerships at the time of exit, which means that most of those early stage funds that we would be backing would today be somewhere in the region of$400 to$800 million. And so this is where the fund size versus exit size versus ownership relationship is really important. Because if you have a manager that's only ever been able to return$500 million in a single deal, and is raising a billion dollar fund, then the confidence level that they're going to be able to produce a fund returning outcome is very different to a manager that's raising a$500 million fund and has had multiple billion dollar single company returners.
15:09So I think it's being able to sort of handicap the ability of the manager to deliver those fund returning outcomes. And what is it that you have to believe in order to get comfortable that they can continue to do that going forward? Yeah. And so when you are investing in that Series A to Series B,$50 million to$200 million valuations in 2024 terms, I think we would both agree in order to get that 10 % ownership, which is kind of a goal, right? Maybe even 15%, if you're able to do it, to get that 10 to 15 in a company that has a$50 million post or a hundred or$200 million post, you're going to have to write somewhere between a five and a$20 million check.
15:52If you're doing 30 of those, you can just times 30 times 10 or Or 30, yeah, 10 million or 30 times 15 million might be even a more reasonable number. You get to 450. Plus a little bit of follow-ons as well. So you want to reserve capital for your best companies to do the next round, maybe. Yeah. And I don't know if you saw the Brian Singerman episode we just had recently from Founders Fund. Or are you an LP in Founders Fund by chance? Are they in the Terrific 12 yet? We don't publicly disclose who we're investors. Yeah. Totally fine. So the Terrific 12 remain anonymous, Yes, as is Dave's one. So Brian Singham was on, reserving 15%, 20 % of the fund to put into one name.
16:35They did it with Palantir, Airbnb, SpaceX, the rest is history. So what do you think the right number is? And what do you, before fall for the reserves, if you had to put a percentage range on it? And then what do you think of this really aggro strategy of the one? Yeah, let's take that one first. because I think it's a super ballsy strategy to do that. Oh, yes, it is. And I think credit to the guys at Founders Fund is that they've proven that they can do it successfully. As an LP, I'm happy with some of my funds doing that, but I also feel I need to sleep at night. And if I had an entire portfolio that consisted of Founders Fund type bets, then I think that would be incredibly aggressive.
17:20So I look at it at my level from a portfolio construction point of view to say, we want to have people in that portfolio that are willing to take really aggressive bets and are willing to back their conviction and to double down on their very best companies. But at the same time, we also need to have an eye on overall risk management. And from a funder fund's perspective, I can't afford to deliver a 0.5x portfolio to my investors. That puts me out of business. What we need to be able to do is to, yes, capture the upside, but also be cognizant of the amount of risk that we're taking in order to do that.
17:57I also think it's different between, are you writing that 30 % of the fund as a single check, as your first check into a company? Or are you layering it in over time as that company is de-risking, as it's scaling, as you're getting more comfortable about the ability to execute, the size of the market, how the competition is playing out, how the economics of the business are working. I can see getting to that sort of ownership or that sort of exposure over a period of time and multiple rounds make sense. Single investment, as I say, perhaps one or two of the funds, but I wouldn't be comfortable if everyone was doing that.
18:35I think you've made a great point here that I just want to highlight, which is being able to invest in the company over time gives you a decision-making process at each of those waypoints to re-underrate the company, meet with management, and really get a tight worldview on what's changed. And I've really started to take that to heart as I deploy more reserves. And I've really changed my fund strategy. When I came into the business 10 years ago, when I did my first fund, you had finished up being a Sequoia Scout. Everybody was like, yeah, you just do a$10 million fund. You do 50 or 100 names, 200K, 100k, whatever, and you're done and you just hope for the best.
19:17And unfortunately, I hit four unicorns in that first fund. So I thought I was a genius again. What I didn't realize was, even though that fund is 5x on paper and has returned all the capital already, and I feel great about it, we looked back. If only I had saved a third of the fund, 3 million, and taken the three of the four that were breaking out, I just went back and looked at my notes and I looked at my decision-making, we knew three of them were definitive winners. It was super clear, superhuman, calm, and Robinhood were just exceptional companies bringing out. Density, we weren't sure because it was hardware plus software.
19:57And so we were kind of monitoring it. So I'm not certain I would have made the second bet on that. And then if I just made one or two of those bets, 15x fund, 20x fund. So I guess my question from all of that is when you look at the seed space? Are any of the terrific 12s in seed? And then how do you view seed managers specifically, people who've chosen to be at the well? I always use the analogy that we run the orchard, we pick the apples, we put them in bushels, and then we bring the bushels to the market, and then that's the series A. So we run an orchard and we bring every year 100 of those apples to the market and we see who picks up on them.
20:37So talk to me about how you perceive seed? We went over the classic Series A fund. Now let's do the classic seed fund. Is there one in the Terrific 12? If so, how do you evaluate them? Yeah. So we don't have any standalone seed managers in that core manager group. However, some of those core managers will run multiple strategies, one of which will be a seed strategy. So there are seed-specific funds within our... So those 12 managers probably give us 40 or so funds across the cycle. So they're doing seed early growth. There may be some sector-specific funds. There'll be some non-US funds. So there'll be India, there'll be China, there'll be Europe.
21:18So there are a small number of seed funds in there. Starting a business used to be a pain. You needed a lawyer, there were hidden fees. It was a mess. Now with Northwest's registered agent, it only takes 10 clicks and 10 minutes. Northwest provides everything you need to start and maintain your business. Every LLC, corporation, or nonprofit at Northwest Forms comes equipped with registered agent service, a business address, a website, and hosting email, a phone number, and this is all covered by Northwest's privacy by default. Again, your full business identity will be live in 10 minutes and in 10 clicks.
21:58So here's your call to action. for$39 plus state fees, they'll form your LLC, corporation, or nonprofit and launch your business in just minutes. Visit NorthwestRegisteredAgent.com slash twist today. That's NorthwestRegisteredAgent.com slash twist today. The challenge we have when we are looking at seed managers in particular is that we just feel our ability to pick those managers is essentially zero. We can't separate the signal from the noise. And I'd be interested to see how successful other LPs are over the course of the entire cycle in doing that. And that's not because we haven't tried. So I mentioned we backed something like 110 different managers.
22:52A number of those would be classed as seed managers if they were operating in that space today. And it just hasn't been successful for us. And so rather than trying to do something we're not good at and hope we get lucky, what we have decided to do is really concentrate on where we think we have a competitive advantage and where we know that we are playing in a market where if you are able to access those very best managers, then you're going to get that consistency of performance and consistency of hitting that upper quartile performance, vintage after vintage after vintage. So it's interesting.
23:28So I've had quite a few conversations with LPs who are much more active in the seed space than we are. And I know you had Michael Kim on one of your podcasts, the guys at Send Down who have done a great job in pulling those portfolios together. The question I would want to ask someone like Michael is, what does that look like over the entire cycle? Because I think we would certainly expect seed managers to outperform in the last years of a bull market. So if you were looking at that 17 to 21 period, there's no question in our minds that seed managers would outperform during that period. And the reason they would outperform is because the Series B and C was so competitive and people were overpaying.
24:17Yeah, exactly. Exactly. So they were getting markups on their seed deals very quickly. The markups were very aggressive. And in some instances, if they were able to sell some into those later stage rounds, then they're putting real points on the board and getting DPI back to their investors, which is incredibly important. It does feel like things have changed. probably since the end of 2021, beginning of 2022, where I think it's getting a lot harder to make that transition from a Series C to Series A. Pricing has come down. Terms are becoming much more onerous. Going back to your earlier point, if you haven't reserved, then you could be in a difficult position, particularly if one of your companies stumbles a little bit and has to raise capital where the terms are a little bit more onerous.
25:11We've been in this long enough to remember pay-to-play rounds, remembering recaps. It feels as if more of those are likely to be coming through over the next 12 to 18 months. I think one of the things I'd be interested to see is how does the performance of those seed managers that looked really good back in the end of 21, on, how does that look in two or three years' time when they're having to revalue a lot of their markups, and particularly for those ones that haven't reserved and weren't able to get liquidity onto some of their positions when the market was much more positive? Yeah, this seems to be a leak in a lot of the early stage managers' games that they don't take advantage of the secondary opportunities as they're presented.
25:55And man, looking back on it, we took advantage of a number of them very strategically. My only regret is that we didn't have a proactive unit doing it. And it's a little bit dicey because being out there trying to sell your position in your startups can create a natural amount of tension between a founder and an angel investor or seed investor. So I think that's why many of them are reticent to say, I'm going to sell my shares or just even 10 % of them or 20 % of them because they haven't communicated that to the founders up front, their strategy. Yeah. I even think it's a harder decision when to sell in some instances than whether to invest in the first place.
26:34Because the other thing is, you go back to the power law nature of venture, and Sequoia didn't become Sequoia by selling its best companies early. They did it with Apple, and John Valentine said, we're not doing that again. you look at the best managers and they're the ones who are able to recognize when they do have one of those top 1 % companies when they've captured that magic and they have the confidence to let that run and I think it's something that really distinguishes the very best managers from again the rest of the pack that they understand when to take money off the table but they also understand when to let things run.
27:20And ultimately, if you are going to get those fund returning outcomes, you might only have one of those in a portfolio of 50 companies. If you sell it too early, then you've missed your opportunity there. And I would look at that as a bigger sin than perhaps not investing in it in the first place. And we've seen a number of managers, I think, that have done that. And I think that's one of the, again, one of the things we sort of look at is to, are they really able to identify who are the key value drivers in their portfolio? Can they double down on them? And do they recognize how to play the long game in terms of letting that value compound over multiple years?
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28:05Have you seen a manager sell their position and then subsequently the company go to zero or crash and burn? In other words, they made like the great trade. This thing became FTX and they sold FTX, not to pick on Sam Bankman-Fried, now serving in a correctional facility. But if you were in FTX and it went to$20 billion,$10 billion, whatever it was at, and you were a seed investor at$25 million or$10 million and you sold your entire position, my Lord, you might look like a genius right now. Have you seen that happen where somebody sold and it went to zero or something similar to zero? Not in private companies.
28:39What we have seen, though, is companies that have gone public. either via traditional IPO route or more recently via a SPAC deal, where the VCs have been able to get liquidity shortly after lockups had expired. And 24 months later, that company is in a very different place. You look at the market caps of some of those companies that went public in the 19, 20, 21 vintage, and they're pretty low. And so that tends to be more of what we've seen rather than taking early liquidity in a private company and then that company going to zero. Right now, startups have to do more with less. We all know that.
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29:59If you're watching, you can see it on the screen right now. Here's the brass tacks. Wizard is going to help you go from idea to mockup in minutes. So if you're creating a product from scratch, this is going to save you so much time. Start building products today faster with 25 % off WizardPro at wizard.io slash twist. That's U-I-Z-A-R-D dot I-O slash twist for 25 % off. Stop wasting time and start shipping faster. Yeah, the one I can remember was WeWork. My understanding was that Benchmark cleared their position or a very large portion of it in WeWork before it went public. you know uh maybe in the bill you know many billions of dollar range and uh they might have been the only winners in that aside from adam newman getting a buyout miraculously as well which is crazy it's interesting as we're having this conversation i've come to the conclusion balancing all these factors that if you're a seed fund and you sell 10 once or twice or three times you'll never be in a position to explain to lps or yourself and sleep at night that you sold too much in a winner and you will have locked up enough of the win after you've sold 10 to 30 percent 10 percent two or three times that you'll feel you know pretty great if the thing does become like i don't know i don't pick on any companies but buzzfeed i still always trading for nothing like less than their cash i don't know you remember those days from the dot-com era when companies were worth less than the cash they had in their bank account absolutely crazy moment in time so i'm accustomed to that but this time around in the cycle i'm going to i'm already started this discipline inside my firm, which is we're tracking all the secondary offers that are coming into us.
31:35People are like, hey, we have a name. We have a buyer. I'm like, tell me the number. And they're like, can you get on the phone? I'm like, I'm too busy getting on the phone. Just tell me the number if you want to have a relationship with our firm. You must get some of this, right? I don't know if they're shady, but there's just weird underbelly of private company sales going on and hustlers try to buy a position, sell a position, whatever. We see the same on LP stakes. Oh, really? Yeah, we do get people contacting us saying, what would be your pricing on an LP stake in this particular fund? And sometimes they have a deal there that they actually are able to talk to people about.
32:15And sometimes they're perhaps looking for a bid in order to then go back to potential sellers and say, I've got a buyer who'll do this at X pennies on the dollar. Oh, that's gnarly. Yeah. Yeah. So they're working both sides of the marketplace. Hey, I hear Jason mentioned his first fund is 4.95X. Would you have an interest in taking a strip? And then they come to me, oh, we might have somebody, oh, that's a really interesting approach. Yeah. I started during this last two years as things were, how do I say it? Chaotic. I did have a lot of folks pitching me on these strips or getting me liquidity.
32:52I said, well, I personally don't need liquidity. I'm a worker, I've done okay for myself. So I'm heads down, but for shits and giggles, yeah, tell me what this is. And they're like, well, we can get you the GP a little bit of money. So I want to ask you a question, might be uncomfortable or maybe uncouth in some ways. When you look at GPs and they start to make money and money changes everything, especially for humans, how does that affect their psychology? And how do you parse that? Somebody hits a home run and they hit another home run and they're a GP, how do you know they're going to stay in the game and be aggressive?
33:27And how do you assess that? And is that an actual issue with fund managers over the 30 years you've been watching it? In other words, retirement, work ethic, desire, hunger, et cetera. Yeah. I don't know if you remember a firm called Crosspoint. Yeah, sure. So they invested in... Again, we're going back to the late 90s here. They invested in brocade they invested in uh ariba they you know these guys were were up there with the sequoias and the kleiners in terms of the the performance that they that they were able to generate and in 2001 2002 they just said look we're done we've made enough money we're not interested in doing this anymore and i think one of the partners went and bought a motor racing team and actually having that honesty to say to their lps you know we're done we're not you know we've made enough money where that's unfinished, I think is quite refreshing.
34:20And it is a challenge when you're looking at GPs that have been successful individually. There are certain GPs that you know are going to do this until the day that they die. It doesn't matter how much money Vinod Kozler makes on his investments. They're going to drag him out of the building. He will be investing in companies and working with founders until the day he can't. And I think there are a number of people within the venture industry that are like that. And I think they're doing it more because it's a passion. And the money is just a way of keeping score. They're super competitive. They want to win.
34:59They want their companies to win. They want to beat the guy down the street. And they'll keep doing this until they're not able to. And so I do think it's important that you do have a relationship with your GPs. so you get a better sense of what they're doing it for. But I also think as organizations, it's really important to continue to bring new blood into the partner group. And one of the things we've seen with good firms that have fallen away, it's happened because they haven't handled the succession properly. Because you get senior people who are still taking the bulk of the economics, their name might be on the door, but they're no longer doing the work.
35:43And they're not getting out of the way to allow that next generation to come through and to put their footprint on something. So if you look at the very best multi-generational firms, they've done a really good job in handling that succession and keeping the senior partners involved, but doing it in a way where it's much more in a mentoring capacity rather than still being the dealmaker in that organization. So I think that's something that's really important for us to see. We want to see that new blood continuing to churn. And if we don't, it's a red flag. And Kleiner Perkins comes to mind as taking a couple of, I'm going to be generous, but taking a couple of swings at bat to do their transition.
36:26And it seems like they got it right with Mamoun, Ilya. They got some great folks over there now running some pretty good investments. But that one comes to mind. And then Sequoia getting it right. Rulof and Alfred after Doug and Moritz after Don Valentine. And they seem to have, having watched that one happen before my eyes, because Roloff was my friend who, you know, I remember his first year there when he wrote the deal member for YouTube and just watching Moritz and Doug, you know, sort of mentoring him and Alfred Lynn, you know, and they just learned the craft of it. But I was there recently and Doug was there, you know, and I was there.
37:04I was at the San Francisco office a year ago and Moritz was there. So, you know, this idea that people have transitioned, they seem to take a decade to transition at Sequoia, whereas in other firms, maybe they're just collecting these ginormous fees. So, you know, I guess is another interesting topic for us, the allure of more fees. And how do you think about that? one of the challenges I have is people don't give me straight feedback. You know, when you're talking to an LP, they don't tell you what they don't like about your strategy or fund. So you and I have, luckily, you know, I get to have you, you know, in my circle here.
37:43And I ask you, hey, candidly, tell me what, you know, really bang on this here. I want to be better at my game. Tell me where I suck. And, you know, people were like, Hey, you know, in this market, should you get 25 % carry with a ratchet up to 30? you know that's a blocker for some people and i was like oh yeah i never considered that and then i asked five people i'm like two of them out of the five were like yeah that's our blocker i'm like why didn't you tell me like nobody's telling me the truth here tell me the truth you know and so so how do you think about fees how do you think about carry structure because now i had i also had another person who said don't lower your fees don't lower your carry because it's a sign of how good you are that you can actually close funds with 25 carry and then ratcheting it up to 30 which I've now disclosed publicly here was my carry structure which I thought was fair given the seed round and my performance but it is a blocker for some people so you just basically it's a non-starter that they would participate with you.
38:36How do you think about fees? How do you think about carry? Two arguments I've heard. Keep your carry structure high. It's a signal that you're a quality hotel that you have$1 ,000 a night room and you don't discount it or listening to the market. Yeah, so I would say pretty much all of the managers we back are at that premium carry level. And they deserve it because of their performance. The way that we look at it ultimately is, what are the net returns back to us? And if the net returns back to us stack up, then we're happy to pay the fees and the carry that you need to pay in order to access that performance.
39:13So I think you can get very fixated on paying premium carry for the wrong reasons. the challenge with premium carry is when it doesn't come with strong performance. So my preference would be to see a manager that said, we're starting at a 20 % carry. It goes to 25 % when we return this. It goes to 30 % when we return that. Have your full catch-up. But that means that interests are then aligned. If you do well, I do well. If I do well, you do well. I'm happy with that. The reality is for the very best managers out there, they don't need to offer those terms to investors. So they're not going to do it.
39:54Of the terrific 12, how many are premium carry? Ballpark. I would say all of them. There you go. So you like to stay in luxury hotels, the price is the price, and you get the experience to pay for. The bigger thing for me though is less around the fees and carry. It's more about fund size. And I think one of the challenges we've seeing with the cohort of managers that we do back is like everybody else in the industry, they have scaled their fund sizes over the last two or three cycles. And now you start to... The challenge for us, it goes back to the equation we were talking about earlier, exit size versus ownership percentage versus fund size in order to get those fund returners.
40:35And so one of the things I'm hopeful for, and we are starting to see it a little bit, We've got one or two managers that are coming back with new funds in the market today, and they are right-sizing their fund sizes to some extent. And so I would be... For me, it's less capital is better than more capital. We've seen that with companies, the whole issue around what Southbank was doing. I grew up in the venture industry in the late 90s, where a lot of funds increased their assets under management pretty drastically, and it didn't work out. And so my default position is in venture, less capital is better than more capital.
41:12You need to have enough. You need to be able to do the math we were talking about, 30 shots on goal, be able to lead those A rounds. So there is a minimum size that works. But I also think there is a concern that if you get too big, you just become a capital allocator rather than a venture investor. and it goes back to what are the sort of returns your LPs are looking for. If you're then getting the big checks from the sovereign wealth funds, then they're probably happy with that median venture return. We need to do better than that. Not all LPs are looking for the same thing. Some would like to get the average because the average is better than other averages and they want access to this.
41:56And average, like as we started our conversation, average with the chance of alpha is a great concept for them. And you did see that with Andresen Horowitz go into 10 billion plus under management, 20 billion assets under management. At least that was the perception here in the Valley. You know how that's turned out. I don't have their fund returns and except maybe for the press, you know, dunking on fund managers. They don't understand the J curve, which I don't know why, but you're not going to believe this Dave, but somebody didn't understand somebody on the internet made a mistake. And I felt obligated to go fix that and correct it.
42:29But journalists were all looking at like Andreessen Horowitz leaked data or something. And there was like misinformation about, well, this is year three or four of that fund. And I'm like, the fact that that fund has any IRR, do you know what the J-curve is? And I just started asking these folks, you know, if you're a journalist, you don't know what the J-curve is. Listen, what we do is unique in the world. And so, and the J-curve, did the J-curve go away for a decade? Is that the problem in our industry? Yeah, it did. And it was interesting. Every three months, we do a review of all of our funds.
43:01We just did it yesterday. And what was really interesting was that when we were looking at the investments we've made in our current fund, which is Fund 16, 90 % of those investments were below 1x. They were in the J curve. And that's the first time we've seen it for probably six or seven years. the j-curve prior to that had been compressed and in some instances had disappeared altogether whereas this time around it's back and and while that might seem you know counter intuitively for me that's that's a positive because it means less money's coming into the industry it's harder to raise capital only the best companies are going to be able to do that so the level of competition for the best companies is going to go down their ability to be more capital efficient because they're being forced to do more with less is increasing.
43:54Their ability to recruit the best talent is increasing because that talent isn't as thinly spread. So the fact that we're seeing a J curve in years, one, two, three of the investments we've made recently, I take as a positive. Yeah. Constraint makes for great art, and deadlines make for great art. This is something I've learned in my career. I was listening to an interview with Bob Dylan and arguably blood on the track. So I'll go back to bob dylan today i don't know why but yeah blood on the tracks i mean a seminal album and they were you know asking him like how did you know he hit this magical album you know tangled up in blue shelter from the storm this is really great great tracks on there and he said yeah you know uh columbia records i owed them a record and they were going to sue me and i had gotten a big advance and so i had to give them a record and so my manager said bob you're going to have to pay a big settlement if you don't get that record out so i went to the studio and i recorded it's like all these top reporters absolutely crestfallen at the inspiration for blood on the tracks is you know had to return the advance or had to get this thing out the door yeah no it's it's i was gonna say it's it's crazy it's it is it's crazy you know that the what what it takes to for that inspiration to happen you just never know and then i remember at the turn of the century, the digital camera came out, the Sony VX1000.
45:17I had met this kid, Bennett Miller. He did a documentary called The Cruise at Sundance. And there was this big debate. Well, now, because you weren't using film socket, you didn't have to get it developed, that we would see this incredible renaissance where anybody could take this VX1000, shoot on digital, and you could do a hundred takes. So no longer did you have to worry, you would get better art because and it turned out the constraint of having to ask your investors for more money to develop more film to get an extra day of shooting the constraint of only being able to shoot for 10 days on an indie film or you know 45 days on a medium-sized film or whatever it is constraint made all of those artists directors set designers actors focus and that's my perception of what's happening right now is the constraint of lps constraint with the founders having only a certain amount of money deployed, everybody gets a smaller budget.
46:11Everybody gets really focused. Make better art. Make better startups. It's just clear as day to me. Yeah. No, it's really interesting. Just one comment on the sort of fund sizes and what you were saying about a firm like Andreessen. Again, there seems to be a bit of a narrative going around sort of VC Twitter that it's impossible to get fund returners on a billion-dollar fund. So we just had a look at our data to see how many times we've had one company return a billion dollars back to a fund. And there's been nearly 50 instances, 5-0. 5-0? Wow. Yeah, 5-0 instances. I can name them. Yeah, it's Facebook, Uber, Robinhood.
46:59Yeah, I mean, it's hard to get a billion dollars. WhatsApp, Snowflake, Coinbase. Snowflake, Coinbase, sure. roblox pinodo uipath slack yeah some of them are still unrealized so you know databricks bigma yeah stripe stripe comes to mind yeah yeah it makes sense when you think about it it's so hard to hit a deck of corn that's the other thing like a 10 billion dollar company everybody thinks that they're i think because of the paper corn you know i just had aileen lee on the pod three weeks ago i mean it's such a bounty of knowledge on this podcast uh and you know she was talking about the paper corns and we were trying to estimate of whatever number of unicorns out there she thinks it's like 40 50 percent are not going to reach unicorn status again what do you think it is unicorns from the last cycle that will not get a billion dollar evaluation again yeah i mean i i i don't have any visibility into putting it into putting a number on it i think i think broadly, I think there's a lot of companies out there that are way overvalued.
48:04One of the things we look at is those loss ratios. We talked about somewhere between 50 % to 60 % of companies not returning capital back to the funds that backed them. We've seen those numbers be a lot lower in recent vintages. My sense is that they are only going to go up. Whereas for the last four or five vintage years, we might be at 20 % to 30%. Ultimately, I think they're going to hit those 50 % to 60%. So if you're backing that into what does that mean for companies, I don't know what percent of companies are valued at a billion dollars out of the cohort that was funded over those years.
48:42So it's difficult to give you a percentage of how many of them are going to disappear. But I think broadly, we have to expect that things are going to get worse before they get better. In the seed stage, it was unbelievable to me how often a founder would be able to get a bridge for 18 months, 12 months. And they didn't have product market fit. And this was just a new startup in the same shell of the past one. It was basically a hard pivot or a soft pivot, but generally hard pivots. And then something happened last year where the founders themselves... And my belief is one I learned from Rule Off, which was I give up when the founder gives up, or the day after the founder gives up, that's when I decide to give in and accept the reality that the startups are zero or whatever.
49:29We're doing an acquihire, whatever it is, they shut down. Yeah, we saw them all come in the last year. And we had to sit with the founders, recognize the effort they put in for two, three, four, five, six, seven years, and that it was going to result in a zero. And I give them all a talk. I said, listen, this is like the greatest success that you tried um and all i ask in this failure is two things one we shut down properly so that you don't have tax issues and the employees everything so just let's let's do this properly because i've seen this blow up um in a bad way um so let's wrap up gracefully and then number two can i be your first phone call when you have your next idea it's the only two things i ask um and then let's have a dinner in you know 30 days or 60 days and when you're licked your wounds and feel good and let's figure out what we learned and what you want to do next and you want to gig somewhere i can help with that if you need a vacation recommendation i can tell you where to go skiing and i just kind of like really focus on that moment because man having been there myself as an entrepreneur it sucks it really sucks to to put the startup to bed and you know i hate to say it didn't trigger anybody but it's it's like putting down a dog or something you know like yeah that feeling of like oh it's eminent pain and suffering i'm gonna have But I find so many VCs and so many capital allocators don't own that moment.
50:50They just disappear from the board and they stop talking to the founder. And I just thought, well, if you're going to be there. Yeah. One of the things that I think will be interesting again over the next year or two is it feels like there's clearly been a huge influx of new entrants into the VC space, whether they're solo GPs or sort of super angels. and we haven't invested in any of them, but we've talked to a number of them. And it does feel as if there is a, clearly not all of them, but a significant percentage that are almost seen as a lifestyle choice. They're doing it because they can raise a little bit of money from friends and family and they can fund their friends' companies and they can be everyone's favorite person.
51:35And when the music's still playing, it's great. But when you have to tell your friend that you're not going to fund their next round, and they're going to have to lay off half their company, and actually, they're probably going to have to shut their company down, then it suddenly becomes a very, very different business. And so I think it'll be really interesting for us to see what happens to that group of investors that came in towards the top of the market thinking venture was an easy asset class when you do start to have to have those really, really difficult conversations. Yeah. They're just not built for it.
52:12I'll be honest. I'll call it what it is. When you have to have those hard conversations, some people are built for it. Some people aren't built for it. And I just don't think most people are built for it. I'll be honest. This is an extreme pursuit on the founder level and the GP level, on the LP level. And each person, it's a little bit less extreme, but it's still an extreme pursuit. And most people are not built for the conversations we're talking about here and how hard it is. And then I can tell you, if you do happen to be lucky enough to make it to your third or fourth fund, guess what? Now you got a track record.
52:44Now you have every bet you've ever made. and people like yourself who love to dive into that data. And then you will face the reckoning. You gave an extra 50K to this company instead of giving it to a new company. Why? Oh, well, I wanted to support the founder. And this is something where I've changed my attitude 100%. I'm telling founders, the reserves are for the top 5 % of performers. And then my team, because they have big hearts and they love these founders. I really think we should put something in. Hey, can we just put 50K in? Can we put 100K in? And I have to tell them, hey, well, that 50 or 100 could go into the top 5%, who we know are going to, on average, return at 2050x.
53:24So do you want that 100K to turn into 5 million? Or do you want to put 100K into something that we are relatively sure will just extend its life for 12 months? And this is, again, not to use graphic analogies here, but if you know this person's going to die, we're doing triage. That's the way to say it. And triage is not a pretty business. Yeah. And it's interesting. It's super important as well, because one of the different ways we've cut our data is we've talked about what it looks like in terms of the percent of companies that don't return capital or do 5x. We've also looked at it by the cost basis.
53:59So how much capital actually goes into each of those companies at those different levels. So companies that return less than 1x, companies that return 1 to 3x. And what we find generally is that the underperforming managers tend to put more capital into their worst performing companies. So let's say they had 50 % of their companies fail to return capital. They could be putting 55 % to 60 % of their capital into those companies. Whereas the opposite is true for the best performing funds. They actually put less capital into their worst performing ones, and they put more capital into their best performing ones.
54:38So if you were looking at, say, 5 % of their companies were 10x multiples, they might have been able to put 7%, 8%, 9%, 10 % of capital into those 10x companies. And it's that nuance of portfolio management and portfolio construction, which I think you have to be a real kind of venture geek in this industry to really appreciate. Yeah, it's such a good point, man. I think it's like, it's the one for me as a manager that along with doubling down, which this falls into really the most important of my game that I have to get better at, you know, and you have, it's great about talking to you and, you know, appreciate your time and the conversations we had off the program is you can only get better at the game by studying your performance.
55:23if you're not willing to videotape yourself putting up three-point shots and have people say listen you know this is what you need to change in your shot or like review game tape you're not going to get better and you're not going to win and then if you don't win you don't you know you may be able to fake it for two funds but you can't fake it for three or four you know you got to bring it and i know the reason why these managers give it to the bottom half of the performers instead of the top half it's because the bottom half are the squeaky wheels that run out of money that don't have a competition to buy their shares.
55:54So if you were to compare the bottom to the top, the top has got tons of people throwing money at them. And they may not even come to you, or they may ask you to waive your pro rata. In which case, you've got to fight for your pro rata, which I've become an expert at, dealing with certain firms, I won't say which ones, that have tried to screw me on my pro rata. But people who follow me on Twitter might be able to guess, literally being in standoffs with one particular fund twice, and they know who they are. but then you know you're you got the the other group which is struggling to get capital and so they ask you for capital and founders are self-selecting for charisma self-selecting for spinning a yarn the good ones at least uh you know but i think all of them and so the bottom half that probably should be shutting their companies down and they're just so good at hey i need you jay cow you supported me early i need you to support this round i need you to lead this round We don't lead these rounds.
56:48We've already made two bats on the company. I find having that conversation on the way in two or three times with the founder, how we do our follow-on investing has helped us deliver the news a little bit more crisply later on. Hey, remember when we told you we only have reserves for the top 5 % of performers? Here's what that looks like right now. It looks like 4X revenue year over year. What was your revenue growth? It doesn't help either that there are so many examples of really successful companies that have had those near-death experiences that in the back of your mind as an investor, you're thinking, that's a good point.
57:22Just one more round. Just one more round. We'll get them over. And because every company that you invest in, you have high conviction on every founder you back, you believe is going to be super successful. And so to actually flip the switch and say, it's time, it's time to call it a day because for that founder, their most precious thing is their time. It's not the capital, it's their time because they have a finite amount of that. And if they're spending it, trying to knock their head against the wall on something that's not going to work, then they're missing doing something that could be really impactful.
57:58Yeah. It's just such a good point. I didn't even consider that one because you also have the fund manager, the GP is like, I just want to see one more card. Maybe my hand will improve. And you know what? Yeah. Sometimes it does. Sometimes you hit runner, runner, and all of a sudden your flush comes in, or you hit your straight, or you hit your trips, and oh, yum, yum. But you do have to put a percentage on that. Listen, Dave Clark, amazing to have you on the program. I'm putting you on the schedule right now. You're going to be one of the top guests already of 2024. So we're going to do our year-end wrap-up in December.
58:27Can I put you on the schedule for a December show? Yeah, no, it would be delicious. All right. Thank you, my friend. And we'll see you all next time on This Week in Startups. Bye-bye. Hey, everybody. I talk to a lot of founders here on This Week in Startups and as an investor, and they tell me the same thing over and over again. They want to spend time together. So we've been working here on a new meetup program. We call it Founder Fridays. And Founder Fridays are an event by founders for founders. This is an event that is hosted in cities by people like you. If you're listening to This Week in Startups, you're a founder.
58:59Now, why is it important for founders to get together? Shouldn't you be at home just focusing? Shouldn't you be in the office just focusing on your startup? Well, if you get together with other founders, true founders who are in the arena building like you are, you're going to get a lot of value from that because you can trade notes about what's working at your startup and what's not working. The truth is, if you're facing a problem, there are hundreds of founders out there who have probably solved it already. And instead of you banging your head against the wall, when you sit there and you talk to three or four founders, somebody say, oh, you know what?
59:29I had that same human resources problem. Oh, I had that same technical problem. Oh, I had that same marketing problem. and they might tell you about a tool or a service that'll solve that problem for you. This happens over and over and over again when I do Founder Fridays with our portfolio companies. Now we're going to give you that same experience, but here's what I need you to do. I need you to host this in your city. So you're going to go to thisweekinsartups.com slash meetups. That's it. And you'll see a landing page where you can sign up and you can say, I want to host in my city. Now your city may already be hosting, so you can just join that person.
1:00:00We're using a wonderful piece of software that we've invested in called River. You can sign up for a River account just by going to thisweekinstartups.com slash meetups. And we're going to do these on a rolling basis. You can join an existing meetup if it's already occurring in your city, or you and one or two other founders can start your own. Please go to thisweekinstartups.com slash meetups if you are a founder. This is for founders by founders. We vet everybody to make sure you're a founder. And if you host it, it's a non-commercial event. So this is your chance to connect. Go to thisweekinstartups.com slash meetups.
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Todays show:
Jason joins David Clark of VenCap to discuss what distinguishes longevity and success in VC (5:25), the importance of strategy and timing when selling (25:47), preparing with founders for when things may go south (48:43), and more!
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Timestamps:
(0:00) David Clark joins Jason.
(2:41) Looking at the data behind VenCap’s approach to alpha vs beta, managers and their over 500 investments to date.
(5:25) What distinguishes longevity and success in VC.
(9:15) Analyzing the data from David's chart covering 12,000 companies and the power law.
(10:34) Gusto - Get three months free when you run your first payroll at http://www.gusto.com/twist
(12:43) Portfolio strategy and finding that 1% of fund returners.
(18:59) The value of investing in a company over a longer period of time.
(21:23) Northwest Registered Agent - Get a 60% discount on your next LLC at - https://www.northwestregisteredagent.com/twist
(22:17) The challenges VenCap faces when looking at seed managers.
(25:47) The importance of strategy and timing on selling.
(29:18 ) Uizard - Get 25% off Uizard Pro for an entire year at http://www.uizard.io/twist
(33:05) Managing successful GPs and having them ‘stay in the game’.
(41:49) The misunderstandings of the J-Curve.
(48:43) Preparing with founders for when things may go south.
(58:36) Founder Fridays message from Jason.
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LINKS:
Check out VenCap: https://www.vencap.com/
Watch the Brian Singerman episode here: https://youtu.be/o5Z0-d5w18M
Watch the Michael Kim episode here: https://youtu.be/a2FL_FvwoUA
Check out Founder Fridays: http://thisweekinstartups.com/meetups
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Subscribe to This Week in Startups on Apple: https://rb.gy/v19fcp
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Follow David:
X: https://twitter.com/daveclark85
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/david-clark-6678b6b/?originalSubdomain=uk
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Thank you to our partners:
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Great 2023 interviews: Steve Huffman, Brian Chesky, Aaron Levie, Sophia Amoruso, Reid Hoffman, Frank Slootman, Billy McFarland
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Check out Jason’s suite of newsletters: https://substack.com/@calacanis
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Subscribe to the Founder University Podcast: https://www.founder.university/podcast




