U.S.-Iran Truce: What’s Next?

8 Apr 2026 · 10 min · 7 chapters

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In short

The U.S.-Iran provisional ceasefire and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—uncertainties, possible re-escalation, medium-term risks to oil/shipping, and knock-on effects for supply chains and AI data centers.

Guests

Michael Zezas, Deputy Global Head of Research at Morgan Stanley; Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research at Morgan Stanley.

Key claims

This is a “pause, not a peace deal”; implementation and negotiation gaps remain, including Iran’s reported 10-point plan with elements the U.S. may reject (sanctions/asset unfreezing). Even if the ceasefire holds, long-term nuclear overhang could keep a structural oil risk premium. Strait of Hormuz reopening may not remove the “lingering tax” on global markets.

Notable examples

Oil price risk premium (not returning to $65–$70 oil); supply-chain “anti-fragile” strategies; potential shift of Gulf alignment toward China if U.S. security is seen as less reliable; AI data center buildouts in the Middle East becoming military targets, possibly increasing demand for U.S. domestic compute.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

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Current Situation Overview

0:46 to 1:30

Discussion on the provisional ceasefire and market reactions.

“We still have some key uncertainties around how the ceasefire deal is going to be implemented, as well as how negotiations will begin to take shape.”

Uncertainties Ahead

1:31 to 2:20

Exploring key uncertainties and potential re-escalation scenarios.

“should continue to progress because the incentives are widely shared across the key actors involved.”

Medium Term Perspectives

2:21 to 3:40

Assessment of medium-term implications of the ceasefire and regional dynamics.

“expressing its preference for de-escalation.”

Economic Impacts of the Ceasefire

3:41 to 5:54

Understanding the economic ramifications of the ceasefire on oil and supply chains.

“So that overhang you're talking about actually does have some real economic impacts.”

Shifts in Supply Chain Strategies

5:55 to 7:41

How geopolitical tensions are prompting changes in supply chain strategies.

“So the way we're framing this is this is another data point kind of in that trend toward a multipolar world.”

AI and Infrastructure Considerations

7:42 to 9:45

The intersection of AI development and geopolitical stability in the Middle East.

“So if that becomes more challenging and you see persistent instability, for example, in the Middle East, you're probably going to see more demand push toward domestic U.S.”

Looking Ahead: U.S.-China Relations

9:46 to 10:07

Implications of U.S.-Iran dynamics on future U.S.-China relations.

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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00Michael Zezas:Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Deputy Global Head of Research for Morgan Stanley.

0:05Ariana Salvatore:And I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research.

0:08Michael Zezas:Today, we're discussing the U.S.-Iran ceasefire's key uncertainties, consequences, and what we're watching for next. It's Wednesday, April 8th at 11 a.m. in New York. Okay, let's start with the current situation. The U.S. and Iran have agreed to a provisional ceasefire, two weeks tied to follow-on talks and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Markets so far are treating this as a de-escalation, but not a clear resolution.

0:40Ariana Salvatore:That's right. And I think the key framing here is this is a pause, not a peace deal. And in the near term, I would not assume things are suddenly stable. We still have some key uncertainties around how the ceasefire deal is going to be implemented, as well as how negotiations will begin to take shape. Right.

0:57Michael Zezas:And that's important. It seems like Iran's reported 10-point plan for the ceasefire includes some elements that might be non-starters for the U.S., some things around sanctions and unfreezing of assets. And so there's lots of ways that there could be some re-escalation in the near term.

1:18Ariana Salvatore:Okay, so that's the near term. Fragile, noisy, and still pretty headline-driven. But let's try to think about this a little bit further out. How are we thinking about the medium term?

1:28Michael Zezas:Yeah, so thinking a little bit further out, it seems to us that ceasefire and Strait of Hormuz reopening should continue to progress because the incentives are widely shared across the key actors involved. So the U.S.'s incentive to effectively be done with the conflict is pretty well understood. There's domestic political incentives and economic incentives. There's ways to potentially explain away some of the compromises the U.S. might have to make around the Strait of Hormuz, around sanctions, and maybe point to some incentives to work with partners in the region over time to diminish the importance of the Strait of Hormuz as a choke point.

2:12Michael Zezas:Iran's incentive is pretty clear to preserve its regime. And another actor here, which appears to be increasingly important, is China, which has reportedly been involved in expressing its preference for de-escalation. And that's pretty important because China has a lot of leverage on Iran, given its economic relationship with the country.

2:35Ariana Salvatore:So starting Starting with these negotiations, it seems like, as you mentioned before, there's still a lot of gaps between what the U.S. side and what the Iranian side is asking for. But let's put that in the context of the ceasefire. Even if it were to hold, that doesn't necessarily translate to stability, right?

2:51Michael Zezas:Yeah, I think that's right. So if Iran were to start rebuilding its military assets, in particular, its nuclear program, at some point in the future, we'd probably come back to a similar point where Israel and the United States might find their ability to project that power to be intolerable. And what we don't know right now is if any type of deal is possible that can mitigate those very long term concerns. So even if commodities start flowing through the Strait of Hormuz at a rate that is similar to what it was before the conflict started, it seems like there will be this overhang of concern that that could shut down at any moment's notice if the U.S.

3:40Michael Zezas:and Israel and other actors in the area become concerned again with Iran's power.

3:46Ariana Salvatore:So that overhang you're talking about actually does have some real economic impacts. One way to frame this is kind of like a lingering tax on the global system. We see that through the oil market, right? So we think of this as a structural risk premium on oil. Our strategist Martin Ratz thinks that even in a de-escalation scenario, you're not getting back to that world of$65,$70 oil. This straight-of-form moves will continue to be a critical choke point. That doesn't necessarily go away overnight. And maybe over time, you could see some mitigation, construction of new pipelines, alternative routes, etc.

4:20Ariana Salvatore:But in the interim, that risk premium feeds through to energy prices, shipping costs, and ultimately food and broader supply chains, which is something that Chet and Aya has been flagging in Asia for quite some time.

4:31Michael Zezas:I think that's right. And so in highlighting that the Strait of Hormuz is a critical choke point for the global economy and for supply chains generally, it's a reminder of a problem that's been on display for the last 10 years, which is that there are supply chain choke points all over the place when you start thinking about the security needs of the U.S. and other actors throughout the globe. And so it underscores this dynamic where multinationals are going to have to rethink and are already starting to rethink their supply chains and whether or not they need to build in what our investment bankers have been calling an anti-fragile supply chain strategy.

5:14Michael Zezas:So we can't just solve for the cheapest cost of goods and cheapest transit. it, you have to wire up your supply chains in a way that can survive geopolitical conflicts. And while there's some extra embedded cost that comes along with that, well, they're more reliable. So it's more efficient over the long run. Of course, it costs a lot of money to rewire your supply chains. And so that's tied into this opportunity around capital expenditures going into proving this out. And so investors should be aware that there are plenty of sectors which will have to participate in effectively being part of rebuilding those supply chains.

5:57Yeah.

5:58Ariana Salvatore:So the way we're framing this is this is another data point kind of in that trend toward a multipolar world. We've seen certain geopolitical events accelerate that transition, Russia, Ukraine, for example, the pandemic. And this is just sort of another example in that same direction. And some of the sectors that we think are structural beneficiaries here, obviously defense in particular in Europe and industrials here in the U.S. Chris Snyder has been doing a lot of work on reshoring, how we're seeing that pick up, and we think that probably continues. But as we're speaking about the U.S. and what this could mean, let's bring this back to the AI angle because I think that's where this all really connects in maybe a less obvious way.

6:34Ariana Salvatore:Near term, we're thinking about the financing implications here as pretty modest. Unless we get a major re-escalation or a rupture of the ceasefire, it shouldn't really change capital availability in a meaningful way. But this could affect where capacity gets built.

6:48Michael Zezas:Yeah, that's right. And over the past year, there's been a lot of news about the U.S. engaging in the Middle East with partners to build AI capacity via data center capacity because there's also plenty of energy in the area to fuel those data centers. But those data centers as an infrastructure asset and an economically valuable one at that potentially become military targets when they're built. So there is a consideration here after this conflict about whether or not those things can be built or be relied upon. And it is a critical part of the US's strategy to build compute capacity in the aggregate with allies.

7:36Michael Zezas:And increasingly, they've been looking to the Middle East as allies in an AI build out.

7:42Ariana Salvatore:So if that becomes more challenging and you see persistent instability, for example, in the Middle East, you're probably going to see more demand push toward domestic U.S. data centers. And something that we've been highlighting has been not only the kind of pressures on the capital side, but also, you know, the bottlenecks that are very real, like power, permitting, labor, equipment and political resistance, which we've talked about on this podcast as well. We're seeing a lot of constraints. So it's not really feasible that the U.S. is going to be able to fully substitute that Middle East capacity.

8:12Michael Zezas:So I think the read through here is that the U.S. is still on track to build the compute capacity that it needs. The CapEx that's going into that that is helping the U.S. economy grow this year is still very much intact. It raises some potential future questions about how quickly the U.S. can build out. But it's unclear if that matters in the near term to A, both the build out and B, the productivity that can come from the current build out.

8:41Ariana Salvatore:And I think a really important consequence of what you're describing has to do with the U.S.-China dynamics. So if the U.S. is, for example, seen as a less reliable security guarantor, then you may see some of the Gulf countries potentially deepen their economic alignment with China at the margin. And that's something that could be really relevant for the upcoming U.S.-China summit next month. Remember, that was postponed from initially it was towards the end of March. Now it seems to be around the middle of May. So that's a really important catalyst that we're keeping an eye on for now. That's a little bit further out.

9:13Ariana Salvatore:Near term, of course, we'll be watching things like military buildup in the region, any indications on how exactly the Strait of Hormuz will be managed from here, and how these negotiations progress over the next two weeks. As far as the equity market is concerned, it appears that the worst of this risk is behind us from a rate of change perspective. So our strategists think you should start to see leadership emerge from the sectors that were doing well into this conflict, namely cyclicals like financials and industrials leading the way from here.

9:39Michael Zezas:Well, Ariana, thanks for taking the time to talk. Great speaking with you, Mike. And as a reminder, if you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

9:52Ariana Salvatore:The preceding content is informational only and based on information available when created. It is not an offer or solicitation, nor is it tax or legal advice. It does not consider your financial circumstances and objectives and may not be suitable for you.

From the publisher

While a tentative ceasefire in the Middle East holds, the Strait of Hormuz continues to be a sticking point in diplomatic efforts. Our Deputy Global Head of Research Michael Zezas and Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore walk through some scenarios that could play out.

Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.


----- Transcript -----


Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Deputy Global Head of Research for Morgan Stanley. 

Ariana Salvatore: And I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research. 

Michael Zezas: Today we're discussing the U.S.-Iran ceasefire's key uncertainties, consequences and what we're watching for next. 

It's Wednesday, April 8th at 11am in New York. 

Okay. Let's start with the current situation. The U.S. and Iran have agreed to a provisional ceasefire, two weeks tied to follow on talks and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Markets so far, treating this as a deescalation but not a clear resolution… 

Ariana Salvatore: That's right. And I think the key framing here is this is a pause, not a peace deal. And in the near term, I would not assume things are suddenly stable. We still have some key uncertainties around how the ceasefire deal is going to be implemented, as well as how negotiations will begin to take shape. 

Michael Zezas: Right. And that's important. It seems like Iran's reported 10-point plan for the ceasefire includes some elements that might be non-starters for the U.S., some things around sanctions and unfreezing of assets. And so, there's lots of ways that there could be some re-escalation in the near term. 

Ariana Salvatore: Okay. So that's the near term – fragile, noisy, and still pretty headline driven. But let's try to think about this a little bit further out. How are we thinking about the medium term? 

Michael Zezas: Yeah. So, thinking a little bit further out, it seems to us that ceasefire and Strait of Hormuz reopening should continue to progress because the incentives are widely shared across the key actors involved. 

So, the U.S.’s incentive to effectively be done with the conflict is pretty well understood. There's domestic political incentives and economic incentives. There's ways to potentially explain away some of the compromises the U.S. might have to make around the Strait of Hormuz, around sanctions. And maybe point to some incentives to work with partners in the region over time to diminish the importance of the Strait of Hormuz as a choke point. 

Iran's incentive is pretty clear – to preserve its regime. And another actor here, which appears to be increasingly important, is China, which has reportedly been involved in expressing its preference for deescalation. And that's pretty important because China has a lot of leverage on Iran given its economic relationship with the country. 

Ariana Salvatore: So, starting with these negotiations, it seems like, as you mentioned before, there's still a lot of gaps between what the U.S. side and what the Iranian side is asking for. But let's put that in the context of the ceasefire. Even if it were to hold – that doesn't necessarily translate to stability, right? 

Michael Zezas: Yeah, I think that's right. So, if Iran were to start rebuilding its military assets, in particular its nuclear program, at some point in the future, we'd probably come back to a similar point where Israel and the United States might find their ability to project that power to be intolerable. And what we don't know right now is if any type of deal is possible that can mitigate those very long-term concerns. 

So, even if commodities start flowing through the Strait of Hormuz at a rate that is similar to what it was before the conflict started, it seems like there will be this overhang. Of concern that that could shut down at any moment's notice, if the U.S. and Israel and other actors in the area become concerned again with Iran's power. 

Ariana Salvatore: So, that overhang you're talking about actually does have some real economic impacts. One way to frame this is kind of like a lingering tax on the global system. We see that through the oil market, right? So, we think of this as a structural risk premium on oil. 

Our strategist, Martijn Rats, thinks that even in a deescalation scenario, you're not getting back to that world of $65-$70 oil. This Strait of Hormuz will continue to be a critical choke point that doesn't necessarily go away overnight. And maybe over time you could see some mitigation, construction of new pipelines, alternative routes, et cetera. But in the interim, that risk premium feeds through to energy prices, shipping costs, and ultimately food and broader supply chains, which is something that Chetan Ahya has been flagging in Asia for quite some time. 

Michael Zezas: I think that's right. And so, in highlighting that the Strait of Hormuz is a critical choke point for the global economy and for supply chains generally, it's a reminder of a problem that's been on display for the last 10 years.

Just that there are supply chain choke points all over the place when you start thinking about the security needs of the U.S. and other actors throughout the globe. And so, it underscores this dynamic where multinationals are going to have to rethink – and are already starting to rethink – their supply chains. And whether or not they need to build in what our investment bankers have been calling an anti-fragile supply chain strategy. So, we can't just solve for the cheapest cost of goods and cheapest transit. You have to wire up your supply chains in a way that can survive geopolitical conflicts. And while there's some extra embedded costs that comes along with that, well, they're more reliable, so it's more efficient over the long run. 

Of course, it costs a lot of money to rewire your supply chains, and so that's tied into this opportunity around capital expenditures going into proving this out. And so, investors should be aware that there are plenty of sectors which will have to participate in effectively being part of rebuilding those supply chains. 

Ariana Salvatore: Yeah, so the way we're framing this is, this is another data point kind of in that trend toward a multipolar world. We've seen certain geopolitical events accelerate that transition. Russia-Ukraine, for example, the pandemic; and this is just sort of another example in that same direction. And some of the sectors that we think are structural beneficiaries here: obviously defense, in particular in Europe, and industrials here in the U.S. Chris Snyder's been doing a lot of work on reshoring, how we're seeing that pick up – and we think that probably continues. 

But as we're speaking about the U.S. and what this could mean, let's bring this back to the AI angle. Because I think that's where this all really connects in maybe a less obvious way. Near term, we're thinking about the financing implications here as pretty modest. Unless we get a major re-escalation or a rupture of the ceasefire, it shouldn't really change capital availability in a meaningful way. But this could affect where capacity gets built. 

Michael Zezas: Yeah, that's right. And over the past year, there's been a lot of news about the U.S. engaging in the Middle East with partners to build AI capacity via data center capacity – because there's also plenty of energy in the area to fuel those data centers. But those data centers as an infrastructure asset, and an economically valuable one at that, potentially become military targets when they're built. 

So, there is a consideration here after this conflict about whether or not those things can be built or be relied upon. And it is a critical part of the U.S.' strategy to build compute capacity in the aggregate with allies. And increasingly they've been looking to the Middle East as allies in an AI build out. 

Ariana Salvatore: So, if that becomes more challenging and you see persistent instability, for example, in the Middle East, you're probably going to see more demand push toward domestic U.S. data centers. And something that we've been highlighting has been not only the kind of pressures on the capital side. But also, you know, the bottlenecks that are very real – like power, permitting, labor, equipment and political resistance, which we've talked about on this podcast as well. We're seeing a lot of constraints. So, it's not really feasible that the U.S. is going to be able to fully substitute that Middle East capacity. 

Michael Zezas: So, I think the read through here is that the U.S. is still on track to build the compute capacity that it needs. The CapEx that's going into that – that is helping the U.S. economy grow this year – is still very much intact. It raises some potential future questions about how quickly the U.S. can build out, but it's unclear if that matters in the near term to (a) both the build out and (b) the productivity that can come from the current build out. 

Ariana Salvatore: And I think a really important consequence of what you're describing has to do with the U.S. China dynamics. So, if the U.S. is, for example, seen as a less reliable security guarantor, then you may see some of the Gulf countries potentially deepen their economic alignment with China at the margin. And that's something that could be really relevant for the upcoming U.S.-China Summit next month. 

Remember that was postponed from – initially it was towards the end of March. Now it seems to be around the middle of May. So, that's a really important catalyst that we're keeping an eye on for now. That's a little bit further out.

Near term, of course, we'll be watching things like military buildup in the region. Any indications on how exactly the Strait of Hormuz will be managed from here. And how these negotiations progress over the next two weeks. 

As far as the equity market is concerned, it appears that the worst of this risk is behind us from a rate of change perspective. So, our strategists think you should start to see leadership emerge from the sectors that were doing well into this conflict, namely cyclicals like Financials and Industrials leading the way from here. 

Michael Zezas: Well Ariana, thanks for taking the time to talk. 

Ariana Salvatore: Great speaking with you, Mike. 

Michael Zezas: And as a reminder, if you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please take a moment to rate and review us wherever you listen. And share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

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