The Future of Owning Bitcoin | Jonathan Pollock

24:24Which one should I buy? When you buy the ETF, you're not buying permissionless money. You're buying price exposure. And even worse than that, you're buying permissioned price exposure. And so what you're giving up when you're doing that is Bitcoin has a lot of utility beyond just price. And that's everything from being able to take out a loan against it as collateral, to spend it, to purchase things. And so you're sort of giving that up in the ETF world. But even still, to kind of walk it down even more, what if you say like, look, I really don't care about the utility of Bitcoin. I just care about price exposure.

24:58Should I do ETF or self-custody? I think even then it's not super clear because in the ETF world, you have all these additional restrictions on your Bitcoin, which is when can you trade it? You know, well, when the market is open. If you don't like an ETF and you want to move to another ETF, do you have to sell and take a tax gain and then buy in again? Like you can't just move it from exchange to exchange the way you can with Bitcoin. And same problem with even if you want to sell your ETF to buy real Bitcoin and move it to a hardware wallet, there's still like going to be a tax hit at that point.

25:32Yeah, and I think maybe one or two ETFs do like in-kind redemption, but most don't. And that's kind of the point, which is it depends on the provider. And so you're definitely in the permissioned world. And so I think you're definitely taking on more restrictions. But one of the things about how the question is typically framed, I think, embeds in it some priors, which I think have been true but may not be true anymore, which is like self-custody is harder and self-custody is less safe. And I don't know - Than the ETF. Than the ETF. Yeah. And I think that those, maybe if they were true, require another look.

26:13I think self-custody has come a long way in the past two, three years. It's probably harder. For people that maybe already have like a brokerage account, they can just buy the ETF on their phone. Like self-custody is harder than that. Yes. But it's like, what's the trade-off? Is it worth the work? Is it worth it? And I think one of the things that people undervalue is, what are the risks of the ETF? And these are like, while they are kind of long tail tinfoil hat risks, they have all happened before. So the idea of like, maybe the government decides you can't own Bitcoin anymore. So everyone, so you get forced converted back into USD at a semi unfair price.

26:50I mean, like that happened with gold or maybe the exchange is negligent and can't fulfill it. you know, take a Lehman Brothers or maybe it's full on fraud, like more of an Enron or like an FTX. And like there's a small percent that happens. But if you hold Bitcoin over a decade and you stack up kind of all of these catastrophic events, like you're not taking on no risk. It's not zero. And so I think what it comes down to at the end of the day is would you rather your risk take the form of political, governmental, business risk? So like the people who make the rules, or would you rather your risks take on the private key risks, which is like, can I manage it safely?

27:36Is it safe from natural disaster? And so you're either taking on self-custody risks or politician business government risk. And I think that when weighing those two, it's not clear to me that there's, you know, like the ETFs are the obvious answer. No, I know each side of that I fall on. Like I want to take the risk on myself. Like I want to be in control of my destiny. Yes. And I think what's been great about self-custody over the last forever, but I think a lot in the last few years is that risk has been getting smaller and smaller as the tools have been getting better and better. Like the risk of self-sabotage I think has decreased dramatically in the last two years as you start to get these collaborative custody solutions, these seedless solutions, things that make it harder to make a mistake and make it easier for you to have recovery, to inheritance, to have safe keys without having to deal with all of the details of setting it up.

28:27And do you think there's any argument to say that with the move away from the sort of more hardcore Bitcoin solutions, making things easy, like the seedless idea, does that take a step away from the core values of Bitcoin in any way? Okay, I don't think so. And I might not be reflective of sort of the most OG, hardcore Bitcoiners, but I've been a product manager for a long time, 20 years. And like, really, for me, it all comes down to like, what problem are you solving for who? And I think that one of the places where I think there's been a big gap in the products in the Bitcoin industry is there's been this idea of conflating self-reliance and as a virtue to cover the lack of products that do it for you, which is to say like, hey, take your seed phrase, protect it yourself, you know, put it in metal plates, buried in the ground, distribute it.

29:30Like self-reliance is a virtue in and of itself. You are now practicing like this higher form of, you know, Renaissance man. And I kind of look at that and say like, that's not what people want to do. They want permissionless money they can own easily and safely. And that's like, and this using the ideal to cover the gap in good products has always, never has really sat right with me. And so I don't see the ethos personally, I guess it's more of a personal statement than a statement about the industry, but I don't see the ethos as

30:07as I need to DIY it myself to be a real Bitcoiner. I need to believe in permissionless money. I need to use permissionless money. I need to do what I can to make everyone in the world have access to permissionless money. And I think if that takes the form of safer and easier solutions, that's a win all the way around. Yeah. So if you think, like with the BitKey, obviously in terms of seed phrases, they're gone. it's collaborative there's two or three where you have a key one here, one on my phone it has inheritance what's missing, what's the piece that you want to build next what do you think the hardware market needs yes, so because we were talking before about wrench attacks how do you look at that, do you have something in mind we do, yes so let me just kind of take the trajectory there because this is exactly how we developed BQ we sort of looked at the self-custody markets what are the biggest problems to solve and so the first one was people's recovery systems are really uneven in their effectiveness and their thoroughness and how well they resist different types of scenarios.

31:10Let's build a wallet with a recovery system built in. And that led us down the seedless route. And then when we got there, we said, okay, well, inheritance is the next biggest one. That's one of the hardest things to do because right now inheritance is like treasure maps or KYC solutions, even if they're self-custody to KYC. So then we We said, okay, let's tackle inheritance. And then we looked at our solution and said, well, because this is collaborative custody, we have one of the keys. And one of the things we don't like about having the keys is we had visibility into the wallet because when you have the keys, you can see all the transactions.

31:44And so we were very uncomfortable with having that sort of visibility because we don't want that data. So then we invented Chainco Delegation, which is a bit proposal. This was Jesse Posner and - Yeah, that's right. Yeah, so the two of them - Awesome. That's really cool. And that's something that's just good for Bitcoin as a whole. That's awesome. It is so cool. I love both of them so much and they're like - Yeah, I'm a big Jesse Stan. Yeah, yeah, yeah, for sure. Yeah, no, they did such a great job with that. So basically what they did is they invented a way for multi-sig, which typically every key has both signing ability and visibility of the wallet, to say, even if the key can sign for the wallet, it cannot see all the transactions of the wallet.

32:25Fancy cryptography, and it's applicable to any multi-sig wallet. We implemented it in ours, and so the key that block holds cannot look at the transactions. And that's on by default now, right? Yeah, this is how the wallet works. Yeah, it's not an option, it's just we don't want the data. Like, we don't want it in our systems, and so it's just the way how the wallet works. And so privacy was the next big one. Then the next big one after that was verification. And so we say, hey, we have all this infrastructure now to do like recovery and inheritance and all of this stuff. How do you make sure that you can verify everything that's doing all of that stuff is telling the truth?

33:02And so we put a screen on the hardware, not only to just do transaction signing, which every hardware screen has done forever, but to validate all of the steps of all of the other components. Was it partially to shut the Bitcoiners up as well? Well, not to shut them up, to get them as customers. I mean, we want to build a product that Bitcoiners love. The thing that keeps me up at night is the idea of a critical error with my Bitcoin cold storage. And this is where Anchor Watch comes in. With Anchor Watch, your Bitcoin is insured with your own A-plus rated Lloyds of London insurance policy. And all Bitcoin is held in their time-locked multi-sig vaults.

33:35So you have the peace of mind knowing your Bitcoin is insured while not giving up custody. So whether you're worried about inheritance planning, wrench attacks, natural disasters, or just your own silly mistakes, you're protected by Anchor Watch. Rates for fully insured custody start as low as 0.55 % and are available for individual and commercial customers located in the US. Speak to Anchor Watch for a quote and for more details about your security options and coverage, visit anchorwatch.com today. That's anchorwatch.com. Do you want to pay less in taxes and stack more Bitcoin? Of course you do.

34:08Well, by mining Bitcoin with Blockware, you can. Under section 168k of the US tax code, Bitcoin mining servers qualify for 100 % bonus depreciation. This means every dollar you spend on miners can directly offset your income in a single year. And that's true for both business owners and W2 earners. If you have$100 ,000 in ordinary income, you can purchase$100 ,000 in miners and potentially offset your tax liability entirely. Blockware's mining as a service does all the heavy lifting. They secure the rigs, they source the low-cost power, and they handle all the day-to-day maintenance. So you get to stack Bitcoin every single day while drastically shrinking your tax bill.

34:42Get started today at blockwaresolutions.com forward slash WBD and use code WBD for$100 off your first miner. That's blockwaresolutions.com forward slash WBD. If you already self-custody Bitcoin, you know the deal with hardware wallets. Complex setups, clumsy interfaces, and a seed phrase that can be lost, stolen, or forgotten. Well, BitKey fixes that. BitKey is a multi-sig hardware wallet built by the team behind Square and Cash App. It packs a cryptographic recovery system and built-in inheritance feature into an intuitive, easy to use wallet with no seed phrase to sweat over. It's simple, secure self-custody without the stress.

35:20And time named BitKey one of the best inventions of 2024. Get 20 % off at bitkey.world when you use the code WBD. That's B-I-T-K-E-Y dot world and use the code WBD. Okay, so that takes us to sort of where we are right now. So now we think the next big thing to solve is this wrench attack solution. So we do have a solution in mind and it's almost there. And so we'll be publishing this in probably a couple of weeks to sort of solicit feedback from the community and get people to poke holes in it and do all that. But this is the basic idea, which is you put your Bitcoin into a vault. And the vault has essentially two doors and both are important, but we'll talk about the first one first, which is the normal door is just it requires a signature from both you and BitKey and Block.

36:10And what Block will do is Block will withhold the signature until certain conditions are met. And so this becomes like a two of two? It's a two of two. The first door is a two of two. And the Block will say, okay, in order for me to sign, you need to first pass a biometric scan. Second, wait a certain amount of time that's configurable by you. So this could be days, weeks, months. And then third, pass another biometric scan on the other side of it. And so what this is meant to protect against is any sort of smash and grab wrench attack. Because you need to pass that biometrics check at the end of the period, it forces the attacker to force compliance throughout the entire length of that period, and that could be days, weeks, months.

36:52And one of the things that we used to frame this was we looked through James Lopp's GitHub where he lists out all the wrench attacks, and there's hundreds of them there, and looking at if you make the attack last longer than one week, you're already down to 1 % of the attacks on that page. If you make it last longer than a month, there's not a single attack on that page that lasted longer than a month. Very few people are going to kidnap you for a month. To get your thing. So that's the first door. So that I think mitigates the sort of first problem of rent or tax. The new problem you introduce with that is that it's not self-custody anymore.

37:30It's joint custody. And so now what you need to do is put self-custody back into the solution. So this is where the second door comes in. So the second door is controlled entirely by your own keys, but it's time-locked to when the vault ends. So when you put it into the vault, you say, hey, I want this vault to last for two years. Over the course of those two years, you can use the first door as much as you want. That's the normal door, add, you know, to withdraw Bitcoin, you just go through whatever settings that you've configured and the vault just works. If for some reason you wake up one day and you're like, I don't trust Block anymore.

38:04I don't want to work with them. I don't want them co-signing my transactions or Block goes out of business or the BitKey app gets pulled from the app store or anything that you can imagine. That second spend path with your own keys can now get the money back out of the vault. And so now you've fixed the self-custody. But how, wait, I don't know if I understand that. So like how would the second door of the vault like know that Block's gone out of business? So it wouldn't know that Block's gone out of business. The door just becomes usable at a certain time. Okay, okay, okay. And so you would just - So you still have to wait the two years.

38:36You still have to wait, yeah, yeah. So you have self-custody inevitably and you can unilaterally decide you're not signing anything until the second door opens then use the second door yourself. Yeah. And so it's just like if you were to like a really kind of crude example is you take a Bitcoin, you time lock it for a year, it's still your Bitcoin. Is this using Miniscript? There's a couple ways to implement it. I think we're, depending on the shape of the solution, we're not sure exactly how we're going to do it, but yes, we're using, I mean, you can also do it with just some time locks, just basic time locks on the second spend path.

39:11Okay, so then there's one more piece of the solution. And this is the thing with self-custody, is like, it's all trade-offs. And so what happens, okay, first door, you kind of solve the attack problem, but you break self-custody. Second door, you fix self-custody, but you've actually reintroduced a new attack, which is, I'll just take your keys and hold on to them for two years and then get your Bitcoin. So we have to fix. So that's the last thing to fix. And so our idea here is that we would restrict where that Bitcoin can be sent to. So this is back in kind of a governance pattern. And so, okay, this Bitcoin can only be sent to a predetermined address.

39:49And so that way, even if the attacker steals your keys, they can only send that Bitcoin to a predetermined address that you may still control. Assuming they didn't steal that as well. So here's, yes, no, this is your, yeah, this is exactly right. So 100%. And so the way that would be enforced, because Bitcoin doesn't have covenants yet, is you can do it on the hardware's firmware. And so you can say, hey, the firmware will only sign transactions of a certain shape. And that shape is going to be the shape we decided when we set up the vault. And so you can configure what that shape is, and then it's locked forever.

40:27And this is another reason why the seedless architecture gets you there, because if the key is inside the hardware, then the hardware can determine how the key is used. If the key is exported out of the hardware, which is what seed phrases are, then no system can make any decisions about how the key is used. So anyway, so the last piece of this, which you've already started poking holes in, and this is the piece we need help with, is what should that final destination be? Yeah. Because if it's just another wallet, then they could steal that too. Can I tell you my really non-Bitcoin perspective on this?

41:01People are going to hate me for saying this, but I wonder if the best place is like a Bitcoin exchange address. That's where we ended up to. That's where we ended up to. And I love that you got there. We didn't get there maybe quite as fast. But yes, I think so. And it's weird to say being such a self-custody maxi. But one of the things that institution and custodial Bitcoin does really well is it's not susceptible to physical violence the way private keys are. Institutions cannot be physically coerced the way private keys can be physically coerced. And so even though I would pick self-custody over custodial Bitcoin 100 % of the time, actually not 100%.

41:43If there is a violent attacker trying to steal my Bitcoin, where do I want my Bitcoin at that moment? in a KYC-based exchange. And so one of the nice things about a solution like this is it says, okay, you can basically put it there in that moment that you need it there. And then it's identity-based. And it's like, don't let perfect be the enemy of good in this situation. Like, I agree that like, I don't hold Bitcoin on any exchanges, but in that situation, I can't think of a better place for it to go. But I guess the best solution would probably be allowing users to decide. It would be put an address in it.

42:19That's how we would implement it. You put an address. You want it to be, you know, the other things we thought about is, could it be another bitkey? And like, how do those start chaining together? Could it be someone else's bitkey? The problem is then you get into this situation where you have to like educate users on how to keep the second bitkey and all this stuff. And like, I'm sure you don't want the headache of that. Because if something goes wrong, they're going to be like, this is what you told me to do. Yep. And so the other one is like, could it be inheritance? Like should we plug up an inheritance solution into that escape route?

42:46And so this is really where we're looking to solicit feedback, which is like, because we only want to build things that people want to use. And so if people look at this and they're like, you know what? I do want it in an exchange. In this one moment, in this one case, I want it in an exchange. Great. If everyone's like, no, that's the worst idea ever. I don't want to do that. But I mean, truthfully, like apart from the fact that obviously it's going to a KYC exchange, like if that did happen, you could just withdraw it again. Like it's not the end of the world. And that's the other thinking too, is almost everybody, everybody, unless you're a miner, has an exchange that registered to.

43:15That's where they got their Bitcoin from. And so like you already have an account set up. You already have a relationship there. And most likely your Bitcoin came from there in the first place. Do you want to be able to teleport it? That's not actually how it works. But do you want it to be able to go there in a wrench attack? Yeah. The thing that that doesn't fix, and I actually think is potentially impossible to fix, is the like you're still the attacker that comes into your home who wants your Bitcoin can't get it. And it never stops the physical side of that attack. And this is where, because they still might chop your finger off.

43:50But I do think this is where things like Anchor Watch are really interesting, where you can just send them the Bitcoin. Just have it go away. And then you've got the insurance claim. Would you ever look into doing insurance type stuff within Bitkey? Oh, I don't know. I thought you were going to ask me what my thoughts on it. And I was going to say, yeah, I think the insurance angle is very powerful. Would we put it on our roadmap? I don't know. To be honest, so the BitKey product in and of itself, very narrowly, it's a non-KYC product. So I don't know if you can do insurance without KYC. I seriously doubt it.

44:25If maybe someone figures that out, sure. Would it be a better Block product? So Block does a lot for Bitcoin. They've got Cash App for buying Bitcoin, Square for spending it, BitKey for storing it, and Proto for powering it. Spiral for developing it. spiral for developing it. Would one of those other brands, could we do some ecosystem play where you can get insurance through cash or something? Maybe. It's not on the roadmap, but I think looking at the synergies between the different Bitcoin solutions is really where we turn Bitcoin into true permissionless money, where it has all the features of traditional finance in its own ecosystem.

45:06So yeah, it's a great idea. And I do agree with this piece of even when you take on the assumption of the attacker has full knowledge and the victim is fully compliant, will they be pissed if they can't get Bitcoin? You can't really design away that piece. And so yeah, I think there are interesting insurance angles here. Yeah. You've obviously thought about this a load. And you said you've been a product manager for 20 years. Can we take a step back? Like why are you in Bitcoin? What happened? How did you get here? Oh, so my career up until about 2020 was all in like big tech, internet firms and AI.

45:52And then right around 2020, I kind of caught the, I want to say Bitcoin bug, but honestly, it was the blockchain bug. And I really believed in this idea of decentralization and permissionless. And then I kind of sort of came to realize that Bitcoin was really the only truly decentralized permissionless protocol. And it had real product market fit with permissionless money. And that's what I wanted to work on. And that I found my way to block. And like, you know, like Jack Dorsey's Bitcoin ethos was like really refreshing after sort of the DeFi, DGEN tour. And so I joined the Bitcoin team about a year before we launched the first version of hardware and have been there ever since.

46:39Nice. And so you obviously spent a load of time looking into the hardware wallet side. Is there anything else you look into in Bitcoin deeply? I mean, no, not as deeply as self-custody hardware wallet. I mean, that's like my full-time job and I love it. But just being like, you know, a nerd and like liking the Bitcoin space. So you're not getting into the quantum debate. I mean, I've listened to so many people on it that like know a lot more than I do. My take is probably naive, but it's I think I don't think we can freeze coins. I think that's I think that's just that's just theft. It's just another version of theft.

47:20And so, okay, and this is my current thoughts, but like, I don't know, I change my mind sometimes on this, but are stolen coins that big a deal? And so like the one, so let's say whatever, million coins get broken by quantum computers. So there's a ton of, there's a huge supply shock, the price crashes, all the real believers pick up a ton of super cheap sats. Is it an existential threat to the Bitcoin network? And I've seen people argue, yes, that like, okay, if that happens, then miners do this. And then once the miners do this, then this thing happens. And now Bitcoin's gone. I don't know that I buy that.

48:04What to me feels like of if we confiscate people's coins, that's an existential threat to Bitcoin. If the supply instantly increases by 5 million, like not increase to 26 million, but you know, obviously all these coins just flood the market. Is that existential to Bitcoin? I don't think so. And so I think it's, it would suck. But anyway, I feel like my take is that the quantum resistant algorithms exist. Bitcoin will upgrade the protocol in time. Most people will upgrade their coins in time. And then would I rather be in a world where Bitcoin broke the promise of property rights or in a world where the price crashed tremendously?

48:51I take the price crash. So there's nothing else to say because I agree with everything you just said. I passed the test. Do you think there's anything that we've missed on the hardware wallet conversation that you pay a lot of attention to? Yeah, so the, well, the one thing I think a lot about is this idea of like, what is a hardware wallet, which seems like kind of a trivial question. But if you think about hardware, it is an air-gapped piece of technology that does signing. And necessarily you don't want it on the internet because it keeps your keys super safe. If you think about a wallet, it has to be connected to the internet because its job is to scan the blockchain, tell you your balance, construct transactions and broadcast them to the network.

49:35So the idea of like a hardware wallet is a little bit ambiguous and it doesn't mean like a wallet that has a hardware signer. There's no Bitcoin in there. Right. And so like, is this a hardware wallet? Like this by itself, well, Bickey's a little special, but like if you take a hardware wallet, usually they're like, a better name would be a hardware signer. A signing device. Right, it's a signing device. And the reason I think that's important is because wallets should have not only like transaction capabilities, but recovery capabilities. Where do you put these ideas of recovery and inheritance and all of the things you might want from your BitKey self-custody system?

50:10And we don't really have a good phrase to talk about self-custody as a system. And that's how we think about BitKey. It's how we build BitKey. And so are we a hardware wallet? Well, we have a hardware signer. Are we a collaborative custody solution? Well, we have a collaborative key. And so what category are we in? And I think of it personally of like self-custody as an overall solution. Self-custody solution, self-custody system. And so this idea of like hardware wallets, I think unless like you're ready to go really deep with someone about it, it can give people like a misconception about like what like the different components that are being put together.

50:53Especially when you get into like multi-sig is like if you have multiple keys and some of them are hot keys and some of them are cold keys. Like how do you refer to that? And so I just think of like thinking of self custody as an overall system and how it handles security, recoverability, privacy, and ease of use is like the framework to bring to it. And then looking at the system as a whole. It's not as marketable to call it a signing device as a wallet. So one of the shade that gets thrown at things like Trezor and Ledger and these hardware wallets, signing devices that like have multiple coins on is that like complexity is the enemy of security in a lot of ways yeah and so like comparing you to like i'm sure one of your bigger competitors being like cold card um this is far more complex in its design like in the sense that it's collaborative custody it has inheritance it has like potentially wrench attack protection in the future like does that add any issues with security whereas like you know like if you buy a cold card but it has your keys.

51:55That's kind of it. It is just a plain signing device. Yeah, yeah. No, it's a good question. And I think the way I would answer it is if you compare just the hardware signer to the hardware signer, then there's no extra complexity. When you start comparing a hardware signer to a full self-custody solution, then there's all of this extra complexity on the recovery system inheritance like you mentioned. But what I would sort of urge you to do in that comparison is to say, well, what's your recovery solution? And so you need to compare, if you're taking, let's say, the cold card approach, you're not just comparing the cold card hardware to the BitKey system.

52:31You need to compare the cold card hardware plus whatever multisig you've set up, plus whatever recovery you've set up, plus whatever inheritance you've set up. And is that system and the complexity of that system compared to the complexity of the BitKey system, I would expect the BitKey system to be far more elegant in its design because you're not doing a DIY project yourself. Yeah, that makes sense. I think there'll be a lot of Bitcoiners out there that think they have a really secure setup. And if push came to shove, maybe that wouldn't be the case. And it's one of the things that really scares me in terms of pushing people who I know who are getting into Bitcoin into self-custody.

53:10It's like there's a really steep learning curve there into doing it, not just like buying a hardware wallet and sending Bitcoin to it, but then actually protecting those keys is a big step if you're doing it the seed phrase way. Yeah. So when I was doing some product research for designing BitKey, I was at, I think it was the Opnext conference, because I want to talk to like the hardcore Bitcoiners. And what I was going around asking folks, and I thought it was really illuminating, this is a little bit technical, but I think it's really helpful, is that a lot of them had multi-sig setups, right?

53:45So let's say you have a two of three multi-sig setup. And you've done all of the things, these are people who are really good at it. You've done, you've put them in geo-separated locations and you've done your, you've got your descriptor backup, you've done all those things. Okay. So then a scenario happens where one of your keys gets compromised. And it's just like, it's gone missing. You go to check on it, it's gone, whatever. Or your device is dead or something. One of your keys is in bad shape. So now what you need to do is you need to move to a new wallet, right? You need to sort of fix your setup.

54:18And so the question I ask them is kind of given this scenario, do you A, take your two existing keys, get a new third key, and create a new two of three with those keys? So you have instead of ABC, which is the original, you have ABD, okay? Or the alternative is, do you get three new keys, you know, whatever, DEF, okay? And the reason it's not like a philosophical question, it's more of an operational question, because it's how many signing devices do you need to do migration like that. Like, do you have one key on each device or are you loading different descriptors onto it and have one hardware wallet that's actually, or one hardware signing device that has multiple wallets loaded onto it?

55:04And so my question is like, when you did your testing, which approach did you use? And for most people, they've never tried it before. And they could do it, like they have the know-how to do it, but the fact that you haven't tested your recovery system or even sort of done it, to me, is a signal of just how complex this stuff is. And so even the hardcore folks who haven't done a multi-sig recovery and thought through the number of devices they want to use and how they're going to micromanage those devices, to me, says, BitKey is for you because we have tested it. We know how to do it. I can give you the BitKey answer.

55:42I can tell you the BitKey answer takes 10 seconds of a loading animation in background and it's done. And that I think is really the strength of BitKey. And so it says like, it's doing the thing that you would probably choose. And so when I tell people, oh, this is exactly how BitKey does it. It's like, oh, this isn't a normie wallet. Like this is the solution I would do that I haven't tested yet, but I could test it in a few minutes on BitKey. Yeah. The problem in that scenario as well is it's probably the most high stress scenario when you're trying to figure this stuff out. Like you're not going to be thinking straight when you're worried that like your life savings in Bitcoin is gone.

56:12Right. Yeah. It's, it's, it's a wild. Yeah. Being in that situation for real is like, I mean, I get nervous when I'm like, because when we do all these testing, it's like, I don't want to lose the like 20 bucks on my wallet that I took out of the treasury for testing. And I was like, oh, but like to do it with your life savings is stressful. Yeah. I think the big key thing is awesome. And I think the screen is a huge addition. Thank you. It's very cool. Is there anything else you want to talk about before we close out? Oh, no, I don't. I don't think so. Well, I'm excited to see how this goes. Vegas starts tomorrow, man.

56:42It's going to be a wild few days. Yeah. I always love these conferences. I've already lost generational wealth at the tables again. This is two years running. There's still time. There's still time to win it back. Exactly. It never works that way though. But thank you, man. This has been really cool. Thank you. I appreciate you doing this. And let's go have fun in Vegas. Yeah, let's do it.

57:13Thank you.