In short
Win-Win Podcast Episode Notes
Episode Title
#31 - Kristian Rönn - Escaping The Moloch Trap
Podcast Description The Win-Win Podcast, hosted by poker champion Liv Boeree, explores solutions to humanity's biggest issues through the lens of game theory, aiming to transform lose-lose dilemmas into clear win-wins.
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Episode Overview In this episode, Liv Boeree interviews Kristian Rönn, CEO and co-founder of Normative. They discuss Rönn's new book, *The Darwinian Trap*, and examine how society can escape Moloch's trap—global coordination problems that lead to detrimental outcomes for humanity, particularly in the context of climate change.
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Key Concepts and Discussions
Introduction to Moloch
- Moloch represents the traps of short-term thinking and competitive dynamics that lead to destructive outcomes.
- Rönn highlights that many global issues, including climate change and nuclear proliferation, stem from poor coordination among entities driven by competition.
The Darwinian Trap
- Rönn's book discusses how evolutionary biology and game theory reveal the pitfalls of human behavior in competitive environments.
- The book aims to propose positive-sum solutions to the challenges posed by Moloch.
Coordination Challenges
- Tragedy of the Commons: Explains why individuals in a shared resource scenario (like fishermen overfishing) fail to coordinate, leading to depletion.
- Survivorship Bias: Suggests that while it appears societies that coordinate survive, we often overlook those that did not make it due to their inability to coordinate effectively.
Game Theory Dynamics
- Stable vs. Unstable Equilibria: Rönn discusses how small changes in competitive dynamics can lead to significant negative outcomes, using examples like communal bike sharing at Burning Man.
- Natural Selection in Capitalism: The discussion pivots to how capitalism can foster competition that, while driving growth, may also lead to catastrophic risks if not managed correctly.
Solutions to the Coordination Problem
- Reputational Markets: Rönn introduces the concept of using prediction markets to create reputational scores for entities based on their impacts on intrinsic human values.
- Centralized and Decentralized Mechanisms: The conversation reflects on the need for a balanced approach, leveraging both centralization for certain governance aspects and decentralization for innovation and cooperation.
Proposals for Change
- Rönn suggests that a mix of centralization (e.g., reformed global governance structures) and decentralized mechanisms (like reputational markets) could provide a pathway to better coordination and longer-term thinking in economic systems.
- The discussion emphasizes the importance of transforming the narrative from blaming individuals to addressing systemic issues.
Hope and Awareness
- Both guests underscore the need to spread awareness about the systemic nature of these problems and the potential for collective action.
- Recognizing the interconnectedness of society and the importance of changing incentive structures is deemed essential for addressing catastrophic global risks.
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Key Takeaways
- Global Coordination Problems: These are fundamental issues leading to climate change, nuclear threats, and other existential risks.
- Game Theory as a Lens: Understanding human behavior through game theory and evolutionary biology can reveal solutions to seemingly intractable problems.
- Reputational Markets as a Tool: Leveraging prediction markets to create reputational scores could incentivize better behavior among corporations and governments.
- Awareness and Collective Action: Change begins with recognizing the underlying systems and advocating for better incentive structures.
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Additional Resources
- [Kristian Rönn’s New Book: The Darwinian Trap](https://www.amazon.com/Darwinian-Trap-Evolutionary-Explain-Threaten/dp/0593594053)
- [Normative - Kristian Rönn's Company](https://normative.io/author/kristian-ronn/)
- [Liv’s TED Talk on Moloch](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WX_vN1QYgmE)
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Closing Thought The episode concludes with reflections on the role of social environments, such as Burning Man, in showcasing the potential for human cooperation when resource constraints are alleviated, suggesting that under the right conditions, humanity can thrive collectively.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00societies of multicellular organisms that managed to coordinate and cooperate won over those who The most powerful states today are like, it's an amazing coordination machinery where we're all working together through rule of law. The fact is that those societies out-competed those that didn't coordinate at all. So it can give sort of a false picture of look at history, like coordination is everywhere. But I think what that doesn't take into account is survivorship bias. Welcome to the Win-Win podcast. As you can see, I'm in a little bit of a different setting than usual. No purple chairs. In fact, no chairs at all, because I am here at Burning Man in the middle of the northern Nevada desert.
0:47It's called Blackrock Desert. And the reason I wanted to record here in particular, my guest today, Christian Run, is also attending. And Christian just wrote a book called The Darwinian Trap about the topic of moloch. We will be talking about not only like the nature of these coordination problems, these moloch trap problems, as I like to call them, or as Christian calls them in his book, Darwinian Traps. But we also then talk about solutions to these types of problems and the different ways that we can design incentives, essentially redesign the competitive games that we play within society such that those games are actually good for us.
1:25Let's dive in.
1:38So, Christian, why did you decide to write a book on the Darwinian trap? So, first of all, Liv, thanks for having me. Like, I'm such a big fan of your podcast. What made me write the book in the first place is basically everything that we hold dear, like depends on us surviving for the next couple of decades. And if you look at the things that really threaten us, I mean, everything from climate change to potential like nuclear war to AI gone rogue, they all are different facets of global coordination problems. So I mean, we essentially behave in a way that we know is bad, like stockpiling more and more nukes to the extent that a nuclear war would kill like 5 billion people.
2:39It's obviously bad. We all know it's bad, but we're still doing it because of the overall incentive structures, like to survive as a nation state. you need to have more power than your neighboring nation states if you're all competing for the same resources. And same thing when it comes to climate change, right? Like in order to survive as a business, you need to be more profitable than all other businesses. So you get more investments in the stock market, you can grow more, etc, etc. So unless we solve these global coordination problems, like we are not going to be able to solve all of the other global catastrophic risks that threaten us.
3:23So that's sort of what compelled me to write this book, like really to go into the root causes of why we are here and why like this type of global competition is bad, but also the evolutionary origins of this type of competition. I think what would be interesting to define for people is like what you know why is it a problem of coordination in the first place because I think a lot of things people say is like well if we could just all coordinate then we would solve all our problems right so why is it hard to coordinate. Yeah, so I think the best explanation of what is hard to coordinate is like if you look at various examples from game theory.
4:06So there's this like very traditional example called the tragedy of the commons. And that sort of explains why we're all trapped in these arms races. So the tragedy of a commons, how it's sort of usually formulated is like, let's imagine that you have some sort of commons. It might be, you know, a fishery. So imagine a fishing village with a bunch of fishermen and you have a limited amount of fish. Like every year you want the fishing stock to grow back again so you can, you know, have something to fish. because if you fish too much you're gonna kill all of the fish and you're not gonna have a business left but what tends to happen if you look at this from a game theoretical perspective is that you know one fisherman might think that okay if I just fish a little bit more I will make a profit here more profit than everyone else gives them a little bit of an advantage yeah it gives them a little bit of an advantage like fishing a little bit more but then all of the other fishermen are Okay, you're fishing a little bit more so I need to do the same thing And then all of a sudden everyone is fishing too much and and the fish stocks gets depleted and like whoever Like says okay.
5:23I'm gonna not play this game. I'm gonna like try to be sustainable They're gonna lose to everyone else So that's sort of what what is happening and I think like I just want to bring like another example of this which is related to Burning Man. So on my way here to the podcast, there are these communal bikes called green bikes. So it's like a bike that anyone can pick from the community to drive somewhere. And if you look at Burning Man overall, resources are abundant. You can go anywhere to get camps that are handing out food or alcohol, things to drink and experiences. Everything is abundant, but bikes are not abundant.
6:10They're a truly scarce resource. So on my way here, I saw a very interesting phenomena because I was looking for these communal bikes. And I saw five of them on my way to the podcast, but they were all upside down with one tire deflated. And what is happening here? What I think is happening is that once you find one of those bikes, you don't want to let go of that bike. You want to keep it. So you deflate the tire, put it upside down. So then you can pick it up whenever you want to and inflate the tire and make sure that, you know, nobody else touches myself with taking bike and driving away, because then you, it will take some extra time for you to, to fetch your bike.
6:54So in a perfect equilibrium, everyone would coordinate and say like, we're not going to deflate the bike tires. the bikes are for everyone. But as soon as someone starts doing that strategy, then all of a sudden bikes are getting even more scarce. So when you get a hold of a bike, you're thinking like, oh, maybe I need to deflate this bike myself in order to keep this green bike. And it creates this like negative equilibrium. That seems to be the crux of it is basically there are certain types of competitive situations, certain types of gains. So in this case, it's the, you know, getting a bike when you need it.
7:32Whereby they have these vulnerabilities to certain types of strategy that once one person adopts it, it faces everyone else. It's like an analogy I also like. It's like, you know, you're at a stadium watching a rock concert or something. And it's, you know, one of those normal stadiums where if everyone is sitting down, you can all have a view. Yeah. But a few people near the front decide they want an even better view by standing up. And now that little action creates this cascade effect, which forces everyone else to have to stand up too. Otherwise, you can't see them because people are standing in front of you.
8:12So now everyone is stuck standing up. And because it's so loud, you can't easily coordinate to say, hey, everyone, this is stupid. Why don't we just sit back down again? Because now no one's got a comparative advantage over anyone else. Everyone's in the same sort of head distance, but now we're standing when we could have been sitting. Certain situations are very vulnerable. It's like they're like the equilibrium that they're in is instead of it being like stable, where like the ball is at the bottom of a hill and it can't go anywhere. It's perched on top of a hill. And any little nudge by just one new little strategy will force it to fall and leave everyone in a worse state.
8:46so that kind of brings to the to the like the question of like how when there are so many of these different types of scenarios where it's just like you know like a lot of civilization it feels like is is kind of herched it feels unstable yeah it works it's awesome and it's evolving but it it doesn't feel robust to these situations like say you know with environmental degradation or whatever especially like some new technology comes along that gives someone a new advantage that has sort of negative externalities. How do we design competitive situations where we can have competition, but it's not an unstable situation where it's going to fall down into a bad outcome?
9:31I think there's various ways of doing this, right? And I think you're really getting to the crux of the problem here. One strategy that we have done for the past like 200 years, it's very much a capitalist strategy where these problems disappear if we just have an abundance of growth and resources, essentially. And I mean, like the current capitalistic system has lifted billions of people out from poverty. But I think that that's not gonna be able to go on forever. Like, I think this, I think it's because we have essentially leveraged certain technological innovations. And then those technological innovations sort of have an S-curve where we can't scale them up anymore.
10:22So I mean, we discovered like relativity, we discovered like Maxwell's equations, we managed to build like the internet, and we managed to build, you know, electricity and fast travel and all of those things based on like fundamental scientific discoveries that led to a lot of growth. but I think that contract can't go on forever because eventually you will sort of reach a point where it's actually really really hard to innovate and that's why we sort of have this phenomena of okay like the US and the western world were first with these innovations so we sort of saw double digit growth for a long time but then it's sort of panning out and then you know countries like China are catching up because these innovations are basically free for them to adapt and then they achieve like you know double digit growth but eventually like you reach the point where innovating is so incredibly hard and then you get back to a position of scarcity so I think we have the wrong analysis of the capitalistic system I think like a common analysis is that okay this competition is great that is the engine of growth and I think that is true to some extent but it also dismisses the fact that we've had like a lot of public spending in fundamental R &D, like the DARPA net and NASA, and the DARPA net was the predecessor of the internet and like spending in universities for fundamental research that sort of unlocked capitalism to sort of leverage all of those innovations to its latest, greatest extent.
12:02So I think like if we look at the rest of history where you have sort of a proto-capitalism, without these technological innovations, you're actually seeing like very ruthless competition. So I mean, imagine sort of, you know, societies back in the days where, you know, basically didn't have any rules. I mean, most people sort of live their lives without too much involvement from the state at all. You know, you might have a feudal lord, but a lot of people didn't even have a feudal lord. They just lived like sort of very free lives, but it did so within like a context of very constrained resources, which meant that the best strategy in order to survive might be to mobilize a lot of men and pillage the village nearby and kill a bunch of people.
12:50And I think we see the same type of equilibria in nature as well, where it's a dominant strategy to be perhaps a predator and chase and kill other prey or it might be a dominant strategy to sort of be a virus and replicate really quickly or a parasite so like the overall sum of just like natural selection sort of unconstrained with limited resources leads to like arguably like a world that is not worth living for most creatures and I think we can see this in nature with like you know antelopes and just like it's so much fear and suffering like out there. And I think we're really living in an era of exceptionalism because we have all of these technological innovations that we've been able to leverage.
13:41So I think capitalism is one model, but it's not sustainable in the long run. So I think what we need is other modes of cooperation where we are actually incentivized to be more altruistic right well i think one of the my main sort of critique is of capitalism is that it is by its nature it's designed to reduce everything down to a singular metric which is monetary value yeah dollar value pound value whatever currency you want to use but it's it's it's a quantification of intrinsic worth and when you try and do that for things like a tree, let's say. A tree has different types of worth. It has its lumber price, which can be measured.
14:30That's a fairly easy thing to measure. You cut it down, you turn it into planks of wood that you can sell for a price on the market. That's the way that capitalism values a tree. But a tree also has a bunch of other values, such as stabilizing the soil, or producing oxygen, or providing habitat for creatures, insects and such, which we then rely upon for maintaining our ecosystem and food supply and so on. And it fails to account for those values. Yeah. And I've not met anyone who is a capitalist who has had a decent answer to that. And I mean, I call myself a capitalist too. I still think it's the best system we have.
15:19I don't want to switch it out for anything else until we have a better solution. Exactly. But that is where I think the inherent problem lies. So really what it is, it's actually a problem of information. Yeah. It's the, the system's doing its best under its current capacity for understanding, you know, gathering information about the true value of things. Yeah. And so that's where, and so it, by not having sufficient information about the true value of something and it condenses it down into like, it's just low, you know, this singular metric. it leaves the system ripe for exploitation and having lots of externalities in the future.
16:05Because really, when you hear people talk about, oh, we're in this open loop resource extraction system, it's not... By definition, it means that it's palming off a bunch of costs. It's only measuring the immediate costs, but it's blind to the long-term costs of this extraction if you're extracting faster than the ecosystem can replenish. So yeah, it's really an information thing. So I wonder what do you talk about in the book about ways to try and improve quality of information? Because coming back to my moloch, when you talk about some of these examples like climate change, companies polluting, they don't want to degrade the atmosphere or you know pollute the atmosphere with too much co2 or methane or whichever greenhouse gas you want to talk about you know it's not like they're like thrilled about doing this it's just that like informationally a it's like a little bit muddy i mean you could argue we've got enough information to know that that stuff is bad but certainly at the time when they first started their business models it probably wasn't that clear and and then of course the incentive is to use it.
17:18So like, how can we better improve information flow so that people can actually see the long-term effects of actions better? What a great question. So I talk about that quite a bit in the book. And to sort of take a step back, like when you describe sort of capitalism and Moloch, in the book, I sort of define the concept that I call like Darwinian Demons, which is sort of similar to Moloch. And I define it in evolutionary terms, like Darwinian Demons is a selection pressure where it's adaptive for an agent. It can be a human, it can be an animal, it can be like a state or government or corporation.
17:59It's adaptive for an agent to adopt a strategy that negatively affects everyone else. So I sort of define Moloch or Darwinian demons as this sort of selection pressure. So to answer your question, like, how do you change the system? In order to answer that, we need to sort of deep dive into what is the problem with the current system. And I think it's natural selection, fundamentally, is an optimization algorithm that can't predict consequences in the far future. It can only know that from one generation to another, what is an adaptive behavior that maximizes survival right here, right now. But it doesn't predict like, you know, what will happen like many generations down the line.
18:49It's fundamentally incapable of doing so. So capitalism works through natural selection. Our entire evolutionary history, in fact, works through natural selection. So I think we need to solve for two things here. Like we need to build a system where we're actually incentivized to predict future consequences and future externalities in a holistic way that goes beyond like very narrow success metrics like profit. So that's the first thing. We need a prediction component. But secondly, we also need the incentive component. So let's say we predict that, you know, your actions might have negative consequences like X, Y and Z.
19:32we need to create the right sort of mechanism design where you're actually incentivized to behave in a way that maximizes like what we intrinsically value. And what we intrinsically value is probably not profit. Like, I mean, we want to use that money to like, you know, buy things that will make us happier and, you know, live better lives overall. Or we might intrinsically value nature just in and of itself, for instance. So I think you need to look at those two components. And in the book, I talk about the concept called reputational markets, which is essentially based on the idea of prediction markets.
20:17Explain briefly what a prediction market is. So let's imagine a normal financial market. I might bet money on Nvidia stock, for instance, because I predict that in the future, due to the growth of AI, demand for their GPUs will go up and I will make a lot of money from that prediction, right? So you have sort of normal stock markets that has an element of prediction into it. Prediction markets instead are purely focused on the prediction in and of itself. So one prediction could be like, oh, who is going to win the Euro World Cup, for instance. So that could be sort of, you know, one type of prediction.
20:59Another prediction could be like, who's going to win the presidential election? Or like another prediction could be like, right before Russia invaded Ukraine, are Russia going to invade Ukraine in the first place? And so it sort of operates a little bit similar to sort of a sports betting market almost. So if you are correct in your prediction, you're incentivized, because then you earn more money than anyone else. And the thing is that it's strategy agnostic. That's the beautiful thing about it. Because different types of predictions might have like different types of modeling features. I mean, let's say you want to predict like the soccer game and the outcome of that.
21:42Maybe the best way is to look at, you know, who is in the team and what are sort of the weather parameters and you know the people that are experts build like really uh really detailed models of that but if you sort of predict you know is russia going to war you might have like different types of input parameters so it's fundamentally agnostic to what extent you use mathematical modeling or super forecasters or ai like whatever is the best strategy to predict will win in the end of the day. So how does that tie in with reputational markets? Yeah, so it's a reputational market is essentially a prediction market with a few tweaks.
22:22So first of all, instead of predicting like sort of, I mean, a lot of prediction markets have like fairly useless stuff, if you ask me. That a prediction market is essentially, a reputational market is the first step of setting up a reputational market is to actually vote on what are our intrinsic values in the first place. So if I sort of register to this hypothetical reputational market, I will say like, okay, I actually value like happiness and well-being for myself. I value it for others. And I might have like a few sort of intrinsic values. Then the next step is to look at different entities in the world and say like, how do we think that they will affect the things that we intrinsically value related to a specific sort of outcome or or metric so it could be like let's say I value nature then I might be interested in okay will BP have another oil spill in 2025 or let's say I value well-being overall and like AI existential risks.
23:25So then one bet might be like, okay, will open AI's GT5 enable like a major terrorism attack in 2025? Because with these like AI models, it has been shown that you can sort of use and jailbreak them to give instructions on how to produce like bombs and bioweapons and all sorts of things. So then you sort of place all of those bets related to what we intrinsic value. And then you create like an overall score for any type of entity sort of, you know, in real time. So that's sort of a reputational score for that entity. That's interesting. So it's actually offering a way around this problem we talked about of like filling that gap in information around these like more nebulous values that the current monetary system struggles or the current capitalist system struggles to actually evaluate and weigh appropriately.
24:18Exactly. And I think moreover, it sort of offers a decentralized way of doing so. So you're not saying that, oh, this bureaucrat here in the government is the arbitrator of truth of what is right for human beings. It is very dynamic. And I mean, markets can adapt to whatever is happening. So if it turns out that, you know, oh, a bunch of safety researchers are leaving OpenAI, they're like, oh, I think actually that should affect the prediction of them enabling like a major terrorism attack in like one or two years. So the market can sort of adapt. And one more thing that I think is important to say around reputational markets is, you know, okay, why would anyone care about their score in the first place?
25:05So I mean, you have these reputational markets that are saying like, okay, this company has a good reputation. You have a bad reputation. Like why should anyone care like in the first place? Why not just ignore your score? And I think the beautiful thing is that when you actually look at power in the world, it is more decentralized than you think. Like the entire world economy is super decentralized. So if you take something like building an AI system, I mean, you do not just need like talented engineers. You need GPUs from Nvidia. Nvidia needs, you know, the foundries from TSMC. TSMC need lithography machines from ALSM.
25:47All of them need, you know, minerals, critical minerals from, you know, different mines in, you know, China and DRC and South Africa. So you have this like incredibly interdependent system with several sort of, you know, more or less bottlenecks. So if you remove a certain resource from that entire value chain, the value chain will more or less collapse. So let's imagine a system where actually like if you are NVIDIA you might think that oh like OpenAI just got a very low rating because of you know they're not taking safety seriously. Maybe we won't deliver you know chips to NVIDIA to OpenAI but then the question is like why would nvidia care so the mechanism here is that what if your score depends on you sanctioning someone with a low score so let's say you choose not to sanction open ai when you're nvidia then that might affect your score and you might be afraid that if you get a lower score you might not get access to the chips from uh from tsmc and they might be afraid that If our score gets downgraded, if we don't sanction, we might not get access to this type of machinery from ALSM, or we might not get access to investments from pension funds.
27:16So I think you can create a sort of new equilibrium where actually everyone cares about their overall reputation because you will be sanctioned by someone else in the value chain if you don't care about your reputation. What stage is this at in development? I love the idea in terms of it seems like a very elegant solution or at least partial solution to this issue. But it's not. My inner cynic feels like it's going to be so hard to get it to catch on, given that the incentives are for companies that are currently doing a lot of like short, short cutting, you know, harm externalizing practices.
27:56the incentive is for them to not have this they like if they can get away with misbehavior without reputational costs why would they want to like essentially have such a reputational measuring system in in existence in the first place you know how like what are the like how to steps of how to get this established yeah i think you need a injection from like a powerful full player in the global value chain network that actually genuinely cares about someone's score. Because otherwise, it's almost like an infinite nesting doll, like Russian nesting doll, meaning that, okay, like, okay, OpenAI would care because, you know, maybe NVIDIA cares, but NVIDIA would only care if TSMCs care.
28:45And then you'd like, if nobody cares, you don't have an injection of caring into the system in the first place. And I think the most likely injection of caring would be through something like pension funds, for instance. So I mean, pension funds, at least this big sovereign wealth fund, like the Norwegian or Swedish sovereign wealth fund, to some extent, a lot of other sovereign wealth funds as well, they're sort of, the way they think about things is, okay, how can I maximize sort of, you know, the values of the pension holders, like the people whose fiduciary duty it is for me to protect. And it's sort of interesting that if you look at the whole movement around ESG, so there exists sort of these ESG ratings in the world, most of them are complete bullshit.
29:38But the reason why they were created in the first place is that you had some pension funds that say, like the Norwegian an oil fund. Okay, we're going to care about these ratings. And them caring because pension funds overall in the world economy are responsible for 53 % of global investments. So if they start to care, like the private equities that they invest in need to care, and the portfolio companies of those private equities need to care, and the supplier of them needs to care. So you sort of see these network effects. And in fact, like with my company, like Normative, that I've been running for the past 10 years, we have been seeing those network effects of, okay, actually, like, I need to care about my carbon emissions because my buyer care about the carbon emissions and the investor care about carbon emissions.
30:25So why are the ESG metrics bullshit? And how do we ensure that these reputational markets don't fall into the same category? Great question again. They're bullshit because they're too narrow. Like, if you look from sort of an evolution... They're too gameable. Yeah, they're too easy to game, essentially. And I mean, take for instance, like Shell have a higher ESG rating for a long time than Tesla, which is absurd. It's absolutely absurd. How have they managed that? Because in the end of the day, the way they measure success is through, like, do you have a certain amount of policies in place? So you can essentially gain the whole system by just creating paperwork.
31:15Oh, I have a human rights policy. I have a equity, diversity and inclusion policy. I have a reduction target. I have, and you can just produce all of these papers and like, oh, fantastic. But that's like much easier than fundamentally changing your business model to like, I don't know, like electric cars or low emissions products and so on. So they're way too easy to gain. But then there is also like the incentives of the ESG rating agencies. Like they want to tell a story to like big investors and private equities and even pension funds. They want to tell a story where, oh, if you use our ratings, you're going to get a higher return of investment.
31:59So what they end up doing is that they're actually tweaking the parameters of the model to so that the model, the rating that they have select like the most profitable companies. Right. They're not actually optimizing therefore for environmental. Exactly. Or they're optimizing for making the people who select their thing money. Yeah, exactly. Which again is usually slightly at odds. Yeah. And again, like this is a problem of like one central entity, like being the sole sort of arbitrar of truth of what is sustainable and not sustainable. And it doesn't matter if it's like a monopoly of private enterprises with, you know, ESG ratings or a monopoly of, you know, the government saying that it's good or bad.
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32:41Like it's way easier to game than if you have a completely decentralized system where everyone has a say and where the market can instantly react and like have a proper debate of you know what what what is actually happening and what are we actually valuing here so reputational markets is one possible solution to sort of essentially creating a new set of incentives yeah the long-term things that matter and not just optimized for the short term what other possible solutions are there i mean other possible is solutions like involve more centralized type of mechanisms so for instance I mean we might reform the UN like the problem right now with the UN is that they can't enforce like global laws like it doesn't matter if Putin is is like on the you know ICC wanted list or whatever like in the international criminal court says like arrest him like there's nothing they can do because they have no global police to enforce laws.
33:38And the thing about centralized mechanisms that make it so hard is that it's against the incentives of like a nation state to give up their power in the first place. But there are, however, some exceptions. And I think the European Union is like an excellent exception because with the European Union, like 14 % of nation states have willingly given up their sovereignty. And it has been stably giving up their sovereignty over time. Unlike the UN, which was formed right after a world war. And okay, we need to prevent this from ever happening again. It was formed after catastrophe. The European Union was also formed after the Second World War, to be fair.
34:23But it has constantly expanded because the incentives to join for a lot of countries are actually higher than not being a part of it. And the key here is the free market. Like for a lot of countries, like being a part of the European free market is so beneficial. So you're willing to give up certain parts of your judiciary and self-governance in order to join. The thing is that, you know, I think over time we might have something close to like a world government through you know a union of of unions but the time scales at which that operates is just so incredibly uh slow and i think one could argue that it's it's not gonna happen like at all i agree uh that said it's not strictly obvious to me that while there are benefits that come from for example having you know this very centralized powerful global um essentially adjudicator of the world including like an ability to police stuff uh is that that takes away like that that opens up the realm of potential tyranny yeah um extremely and that is arguably as terrifying in many ways to me because we've seen sort of like over oversteps like when because because no centralized agency is perfectly good at what it's meant to do and in fact often they're like the more centralized and like powerful they become the less error correction mechanisms there are within them uh and this that thus the more likely they are to go awry like you see that with like the who which cleared about as bad a job with covid as it could possibly yeah it managed to both fail to contain the disease and also completely destroy public trust yeah in important disease mitigation things.
36:23So we're arguably in a worse state. Shouldn't the next pandemic come along, which may be much worse than COVID, I think we're going to be even less equipped to deal with it because so many people are quite rightfully distrustful and pissed off with like centralized agencies around like public health. That's just one example. So really like a long-term solution I think that we need in that realm is yes having more powerful centralized agencies will help us certain things around resolving the tragedy of the commons but then that opens up this risk of like essentially so like if moloch is the god of decentralization do decentralized game theory gone wrong i there's the god of centralized sort of bureaucracy gone wrong yeah i like to call it this thing called norm um because it's like what's like what's the vibe if molly's like ah you know like you but i must win yeah they're using i must win this war and then screw the consequences that's like that's molly's vibe what's the god of of bureaucracy where it's just like this stagnant paper pushing like have you ticked this box oh you haven't and then like they you know they're very like rule stickly sticklery and um inflexible and oh this little dust devil's coming there's my titties yeah very uh got something in my eye um yeah yeah i call it the norm like it's like for northern yeah it's like uh how do we design a system that is takes the best bit of centralization but also the best bits of decentralization such that you know it's like a third attractor state as daniel schmack but i good likes to call it yeah um which minimizes the risk of of like game theory driven chaos and death by bureaucracy and potential risk of totalitarianism forever yeah what's the third option i mean first of all like the totalitarianism like really worries me because I mean there's depth of bureaucracy and stagnation is one aspect.
38:34I think another aspect is like good heart's law which is essentially like when you have a particular metric it ceases to become a good metric because you can sort of hack that metric. Right. And you see that in bureaucracy like a lot right. I mean let's say for instance you know policing in the United States. A lot of police departments it might seem super reasonable to have some sort of ticketing quota out to make sure that police are doing their jobs, bringing in like revenue to the police department and the county overall. But that leads to sort of an incentive structure where the best way of doing so is just to be super aggressive in your policing.
39:12And then it, you know, derodes trust, deteriorates trust in local communities and so on. And I think like on a global scale, it could be much worse. Like, let's say your only success metric is we want to reduce existential risks at all costs. Then we get something that, you know, like Nick Postrom calls this high-tech panopticon potentially, where, you know, you build a surveillance state where everyone is surveyed at all points in time to make sure that they're not doing something risky and you just have this like global tyranny, which would be absolutely horrible. Something like this wouldn't be allowed to exist but no exactly it's very like laissez-faire like it's a phrase safety third yeah exactly you're way too free here it's the most alive i feel at this place it's like yeah yeah if you want to climb that big structure you want to go 40 feet in the air without any safety measurements go for it i fall at your own risk you know um but that is you know the inverse of like this sort of like safetyist culture which um many people who are very pro-centralization want yeah and that is yeah extremely terrifying you know it varies from person to person some people find i think depending on your risk tolerance some people find the idea of like uh decentralized chaos more scary and others find uh centralized tyranny more scary um i think i find both yeah it'd be terrifying i want something i want neither you know um but I just interviewed Nate Silver who just wrote this book on basically the different appetites of risk and these different communities he calls it the river and the village and the village is kind of like the sort of the centralized establishment which tends to be very risk averse and more of wanting the safetyist culture and then the river he calls it is like the sort of mixture of gamblers and VCs and like techies and you know silicon valley yeah and like people who are very like they love calculated risk yeah or even uncalculated risk but they're much more risk tolerant and much more into decentralization so it's it's really again um it's like this this tension and like a lot of this sort of culture war we're seeing going on is this is this tension between those who want more centralization and those who want more decentralization yeah so it's like what is the win-win answer where both sets because both have some yeah are right about some things and are wise about something so how do we find a win-win between both yeah i completely agree first of all and i think like another sort of two communities that are fighting mostly online but i think that fight will have like real ramifications in the next decade or so it's like the effective accelerationists that are very much sort of you know the vc community mark and reason like i mean And look at, like, if we just have bureaucracy and centralization, look at what innovations it will prevent us from creating.
42:17I mean, we might not, like, use AI to cure cancer or, like, go out and colonize the galaxy or do, like, amazing things. We might not be able to have a reputational welcome. Yeah, exactly. We might not be able to have that either, right? Yeah. And then you have, like, I think on the other camp, like, the more risk-averse sort of effective altruists that are, like, we need to stop this, like, right now. at any cost, more or less. To be fair, I don't think it's just like a lot of effective altruists are not wanting to stop AI. No, I agree. But it's true that there is a subset within who are like very much like ready to stop AI.
42:49Exactly. I think the average effective altruist is like very pragmatic and sort of you'll see both sides. But then you have sort of very, very extremes of effective altruism, right? And I think you need to just be pragmatic about it. Like centralized mechanisms are better for some things. decentralized mechanisms are better for other things. And I mean, if you look at sort of the global economy and nation states, the states that perform the best is the ones that have sort of a mixed economy. And you have a very pragmatic approach of where do we need centralization? I mean, we might need it for healthcare and basic infrastructure and R &D.
43:28Like, where do we not need it? I mean, we don't need it in terms of like five-year plans, like the Soviet Union, because then it stifles like innovation and just creates, you know, perverse incentives through Goodhart's law. So more concretely, like how can you combine the both? I think like AI presents like such a good opportunity to combine both of them. Because if you look at sort of the global system of like artificial intelligence and the value chain of AI, it is actually highly decentralized. So, and what I mean by that is different nation states are dependent on each other. And especially China and US are depending on each other in a way that is not talked about enough.
44:12So now, for instance, you have US export controls. We, you know, the US don't want to give access to high end GPUs to China, because they might use that to create like more and more capable AI agents that can be used for like military purposes and whole host of things. So they are frozen out from getting access to the high-end ships. The interesting part here is that TSMC and NVIDIA and sort of the companies that are under the US sphere of influence, they're completely dependent on rare earth minerals and sort of mineral inputs into the semiconductor industry. And when you look at that, like China and its allies in sub-Saharan Africa has complete control over that.
45:02So that level of decentralization could create the right conditions where eventually China could say that, you know, okay, we're going to have like export controls against you. We're not going to give you access to all of these rare earth minerals. And there might be a trade war for a while. And then both of them might realize that, you know, actually we need each other to create sort of you know AGI and we might do so through some sort of you know these somewhat decentralized multinational AGI consortium where we sort of agree on okay let's build like an AI together because clearly we need each other throughout the value chain and supply chain it might be a little bit of sort of an optimistic and picture and there might be flaws to that argument.
45:49It sounds nice, but like, that seems like an unlikely outcome. Even if it were true that they do actually need each other, it feels like the incentives to defect are still so strong. Like, how would such a situation be immune to the same moloch problems? I mean, I think because there is this like clear interdependency, similar to like ourselves in our body need to coordinate. Like, you know, you can defect and that's called cancer but if you do so like you kill the entire organism but then cancer continues to exist yeah what happens right so because it doesn't it's not smart enough to see what is the long-term effects of its behavior is i actually want to take this in an interesting direction because i think like one sort of objection that i hear a lot is that global coordination and cooperation is more or less evolutionary inevitable like look at every major evolutionary transition that we have had like micro coordination yeah it's more coordination like micro molecules learned how to create the first metabolism then sort of you know RNA and lipid cell membranes created sort of the first protocell they coordinated and and and created like big clusters of cells that we call multi uh multicellular organisms we we include them right societies of multicellular organisms that managed to coordinate and cooperate won over those who didn't.
47:17Like, I mean, the most powerful states today are like, it's an amazing coordination machinery where we're all working together through rule of law, et cetera, et cetera. And the fact is that those societies out-competed those that didn't coordinate at all. So you can give sort of a false picture of, look at history, like coordination is everywhere. But I think what that doesn't take into account is survivorship bias. And to explain survivorship bias, there is this like World War II analogy. So, you know, during World War II, you had a lot of, you know, planes that went out on bombing skirmishes.
47:56And then when they come back, statisticians looked at all of the bullet holes in the airplanes to see like, okay, where do we need to put extra armor in order for the planes to survive? And it turns out that all of those bullet holes were around the wings of the planes. And then you might conclude, okay, we must put more armor in the wings, because no bullet holes were around sort of the engines. But actually, like the planes that hit the engine, they... I mean, those pilots crashed and died. So they never came back. And I think we are committing this sampling error globally, because planet Earth is just one single data point.
48:35Like we don't know what looks like in other worlds. Like there might be other planets where in fact, like multicellular life might form really easily. Like Nick Lane and other biochemists seem to think that. And I think they have strong arguments. It's basically just chemistry to create biogenesis. But then in that biogenesis, let's say thermal vents in the ocean floor, maybe viruses evolve really early and they kill all of life. Or maybe a super predator evolves really early before life can sort of, you know, properly diversify and kills everything. So there might be sort of these defectors throughout evolutionary history that kills all of life.
49:20So the question is, do we see the similarity to bullet holes in our plane, in our evolutionary history. And the fact is that we do. And I can't believe this is more, not more talked about, but like arguably five out of six major mass extinctions was caused by life itself. So essentially like bacteria or algae having a mutation where they're incentivized to just grow and multiply really, really rapidly. But that multiplication creates like runaway climate change or like acidification of oceans that almost kills all of life. And that has happened like again and again. So I actually think that life through natural selection is less stable than we think.
50:05And Bostrom sort of has this analogy about technology. We invent new technologies and it's almost like picking a ball from an urn where some balls might be white and it's clearly beneficial technologies, but others might have a dual use that can kill us. It might be AI, it might be nuclear weapons or something else. And it's actually blackball that can kill us. And I think the same thing exists in mutation through evolutionary history, in biology itself. But then isn't that just a question of timescale? Because we, yes, there are all these, we've had all these like six mass extinctions and so on.
50:44But if you zoom out far enough, life has still prevailed. Yeah. And you could argue that it's still on this trend of increasing complexity, even though it might have these sudden mass die-offs and so on. Basically, if you zoom out enough, it seems like it's a one-step-backwards-but-three-steps-forwards type of situation. But I guess your point is that we can only be here to say that in the worlds where we happen to have been lucky and survived. We don't know whether it's a true fact of life that coordination always exists or that we just happen to be extremely lucky on the one planet where life itself has managed to survive its own inner self-destructiveness.
51:30Exactly. I mean, we will always have a biased sample. Our existence of being here, asking the question. Exactly. And so I think the best we can do is sort of look at our evolutionary history, but also look at where are all of the aliens? Like, we don't seem to find aliens anywhere. And like, there's different solutions to the so-called Fermi paradox. Like, why don't we see life everywhere? I mean, if you look at population curves, they tend to go up. And cosmically, that should be the case as well. You know, it should be sort of an adaptive strategy to go out there and colonize the universe. And in fact, you could colonize the entire Milky Way galaxy within like a couple of million years, which is nothing in cosmic townscales.
52:14So we should see them everywhere. And one explanation might be, oh, biogenesis, it's super hard for life to form. Or it might be, oh, life always kills itself because of dangerous technologies. But I actually think that Moloch or like Darwinian demons and multipolar trap is just one continuous long filter. because we're constantly picking those balls through like mutation and natural selection. Right. Of just like basically a cancerous type species coming along and doing the cancer. Exactly. And I think it's actually worse than just picking the balls at random because I think we're sort of incentivized to pick darker and darker shades of gray balls.
52:56Like if you plot sort of, you know, the evolution of civilizations, you know, Oh, you had maybe some civilization back in Mesopotamia or modern day Iraq that invented iron and they could produce better swords. So they built an empire around that. You might have the Mongol Empire that realized that, oh, we can actually have archers on horses and then we will overpower everyone else and build an empire. So you sort of have these selection pressures for more and more dangerous weapons over time, from like swords to gatling guns and machine guns to nukes and now potentially like, you know, rogue AI or like bioweapons where you need to just innovate like worse and worse and more dangerous things.
53:47And there is a selection pressure to do that. I buy the logical arguments, but it's just like it's such a gloomy and seemingly hopeless situation if that were to be true. I kind of don't even want to like subscribe to it. Intuitively, it just doesn't feel like that's the case. If that was truly the case, that like basically it's inbuilt in nature, that it's like almost the odds are overwhelmingly against any one planet from actually really just persistently making it. Do you discuss solutions to that if it were actually true? Yeah, I think what gives me hope at least. So I have to admit that gives a super gloomy picture.
54:23And when I first got that idea, It was like back in high school when I played around, like I wanted to be a better Python programmer. So I built like evolutionary simulations. So agent-based simulations where you sort of had mutations, predator-prey dynamics, like virus host dynamics. And I'm like, whoa, life dies all the time in these simulations. Like why is that same thing not happening on sort of planet Earth? And then when, as I sort of deep dived, I'm like, whoa, maybe actually the same thing is happening, but we're just like extremely biased in, you know, the way we look at our evolutionary history.
55:01But what gives me hope here is the decentralization of things. Like, I think we live sort of in a system where everyone in some respect is dependent on everyone else. So like I have this example in the book, like, let's imagine you want to create a chicken sandwich from scratch. It sounds like the easiest thing ever to do a chicken sandwich. But let's say you don't, you can't buy any tools or raw materials from everyone else. Then you're basically back to stone tools. So you need to grow the grain. You need to figure out how to mill it. You need to feed the chicken. And there was actually a guy on the internet that tried to do that.
55:42And it took him six months and it costed him$1 ,500 to create a simple chicken sandwich. So it just is a testament to how extremely interconnected power actually is. So it seems like power is not interconnected, but that's because we don't have this global view of what everyone else is doing. But I think something like a reputational market could offer that global view where actually you know that if you deliver a certain component to someone, you know the reputation of that person or you know the reputation of the next company in the supply chain and so on and so forth. So I think that interconnectivity gives me a great deal of hope.
56:27What can people watching do to either find out more about reputational markets or to help build them and design them? So first of all, you can pre-order the Darwinian trap on Amazon and read the book. But then secondly, I think we need to spread awareness. I think there is this narrative where everything wrong in the world is due to a couple of bad apples. Like, okay, social media created a bunch of fake news and everything is Mark Zuckerberg's fault. But the fact of the matter is that if Facebook didn't invent the feed and sort of the pay-per-click model in a social media feed maybe myspace or someone else would have done it and they would have been the winner so it's not like we need to stop blame individuals so like don't hate the player hate the game uh as a famous you know hip-hop artist change it to don't hate the players change the game yes oh yeah i love that even more yeah let we need to all change we need to recognize that there is the game here and we need to go away from like scapegoating individuals and think about what system of incentives are creating this in the first place so you need to vote for like politicians that are not connected to this sort of simple narrative of you are good and you are evil so I think that's one thing that you know everyone can do uh but then you might be in a position of power you might be I don't know like running a pension fund for instance then you might have a great deal of power in terms of like who you invest in or who you not invest in you might run an enterprise you might have power of like your suppliers or employees and everyone you're you're connected to um you know as a politician you might even have a greater deal of power so i think like everyone has a little bit of power but i think the first thing we need to do is that we need to make sort of this concept of you know moloch multipolar trap or whatever we call it and probably we need to coordinate everyone who's talking about it and sort of you know use the same name I actually feel like as a side note it's like a little bit of a coordination failure on my part calling it like Darwinian demons because when I wrote the book like there were not so many people talking about Moloch and then like your TED talk came out which is like brilliant by the way and I feel like there's been a lot of more sort of you know popularization around that as a concept.
58:53But we need to sort of spread that concept to make people realize that, you know, this is actually the generator function behind a lot of the problems that we're seeing. Are there any like specific resources that people can go to now? Like, is there a particular group already developing these reputational markets through production markets? Like, is there a website people can go to? No, not at the moment. But my hope is by sort of you're presenting this idea and i've talked to a bunch of people who are sort of interested in developing the idea further one of the you should make like a subreddit or something oh yeah i think that that would be super cool you should maybe just make a subreddit of uh reputed r forward slash reputational markets you should just make that yeah i love that idea anyone listening christian's gonna make it go join yes i'll join it too yeah and then like let dialogue start and then maybe over time it can become a discord server or whatever but like i I think that's, you know, that's talk about decentralized solutions.
59:50Yeah. And that's a decentralized way of like, because, yeah, as you say, it needs a kind of hive mind. It needs a community to help make it. And then it would be a form of a hive mind. So just to finish up, last question. Why Burning Man? Why are you here in the first place? What is it that is so special about it? Because to me, it is a perfect example of a decentralized system. It's got the tiniest amount of centralized organization in terms of like they lay out, the organization marks out the streets. They provide a few porta-potties. And there's a medical center and such if you need it. But otherwise, it's like, there you go.
1:00:37There's the infrastructure. Now you people come in and there's a few basic principles. like I don't have to say rules but it's like don't drop trash um be you know inclusive and don't make your any don't build something that's only for a certain you know like special group of people let anyone be able to access and enjoy whatever you build and uh be and radical self expression you know don't become a monoculture like you want to be into hip-hop you can you want to uh be into metal you want edm like I mean there's a different flavors of music but it's just like different like styles of aesthetic um and yet just through this basic these these basic 10 principles and this basic little bit of infrastructure this like very decentralized thing does its thing and so much cool stuff emerges like just i've never seen something where i like i call it like the high density of what the fuck's per second yeah i have just like I'm like, what the fuck?
1:01:35There's like a guy wearing, like there's a T-Rex who will be part of the, there's a dog pushing a lawnmower. It's just endless moments of surprise. It's so fun. So why is it, what does it mean to you? Why is it a win-winny thing? Yeah. So I've been a burner for the past like 12 years. It has had like such a great influence on my life. And I think what it really highlights is that humans are like pro-social creatures. Like we want to be loved and we want to love one another and we want to do cool stuff for each other. So like in the ideal of like circumstances, like we just want to do good. And I think, but I also think there's like failure modes where Burning Man is sort of glorified.
1:02:29And what I mean by that is this situation is so unique. Like you have people that are organizing camps for like a year. Like as soon as they leave Burning Man, they think about how do I build the next thing. But there is so much resources. There is an abundance of resources pulled into this week. So you essentially have so much resources that there is zero competition for resources, with the exception of the bikes that I mentioned earlier, where you sort of have the clear coordination failure. So I think what it shows that in the ideal of circumstances where we have sort of resource abundance, we tend to cooperate.
1:03:09And I think like Burning Man sort of ties down to this sort of old debate between Hobbes and Rousseau. I mean, Rousseau sort of argued that, you know, the natural state of humans is that, you know, we just sort of want to be in a tribe and we want to be pro-social. And Hobbes argued that, you know, actually the natural state is that we will sort of kill one and each other. And that debate was renewed recently with like, you know, Steven Pinker releasing Better Angels on Nature, essentially arguing that, you know, our nature is actually not that good. I mean, we have a lot of suffering and really horrible punishments and wars and people clubbing each other down on the street in the past.
1:03:54And then someone like Noam Chomsky sort of defending Rousseau and saying like, actually, anarchy is good. We are all pro-social. But I think both are right at the same time. And it all depends on the resource constraints of the system itself. I think Rousseau is 100 % right. like if we have resource abundance, which I think to some extent we had like pre-agriculture with like, you know, smaller societies where we could like all live off the jungle and the land without any problem, without like rapid population growth. But with the advent of civilization, we went more into sort of the Hobbesian or pinker world, if you will.
1:04:35So I think Burning Man is just a testament of like, us humans are multifaceted And it all depends on the incentive structures of where humans are embedded at any point in time. Awesome. Thank you so much. Thank you. This was great. Yeah.
From the publisher
How do we escape Moloch’s trap for good?
In this special Burning Man edition of Win-Win, Liv forgoes the usual purple chairs for dusty playa to chat with Kristian Rönn. Kristian is the CEO and co-founder of Normative, a platform for helping industries strive for net zero emissions.
With intellectual roots in Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute and his own mission to create positive-sum solutions to climate change, Kristian has just launched a new book - The Darwinian Trap - and in this conversation, Liv and Kristian examine solutions to the short-term thinking and cost externalisation that traditional markets often produce. A conversation full of evolutionary biology, game theory and economics as they examine solutions to the world’s deadliest demon.
Chapters
(01:42)-The Darwinian Trap(03:42)-Why Is Coordination So Hard?
(07:19)-Unstable Equilibriums: The Butterfly Effect of Game Theory
(13:55)-Natural Selection: Capitalism's Ace In The Hole
(20:16)-How Can A Market Model Anything At All?
(22:10)-Betting On Our Values
(27:29)-What Problems Do Reputational Markets Solve?
(32:56)-Centralized Mechanisms for Overcoming The Darwinian Trap
(35:16)-The Risks of Over-Centralization
(39:46)-The Burning Man Model
(43:00)-Mixed Economies
(45:53)-Killing The Incentives or Kill The Organism?
(50:59)-The Miracle of Evolutionary Success
(54:03)-Finding Hope
(56:21)-Spreading Awareness To Defeat Moloch
(59:58)-Why Burning Man?
Links
♾️ Kristian’s New Book♾️ Kristian’s Bio
♾️ Liv’s TED talk on Moloch
♾️ Reputational Markets
♾️ Episode Transcript
Credits
♾️ Hosted and Produced by Liv Boeree♾️ Post-Production by Ryan Kessler
The Win-Win Podcast:
Poker champion Liv Boeree takes to the interview chair to tease apart the complexities of one of the most fundamental parts of human nature: competition. Liv is joined by top philosophers, gamers, artists, technologists, CEOs, scientists, athletes and more to understand how competition manifests in their world, and how to change seemingly win-lose games into Win-Wins.
#WinWinPodcast #TheDarwinianTrap #Moloch
