Antony Beevor: Downfall In Berlin

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0:23Antony Beevor: Hello there, it's Al Murray here, co-host of WW2Pod We Have Ways of Making You Talk, the second World War podcast of choice. Now, do you want a sample of what it's like being a Patreon club member, or do you want to get excited about the amazing history talks we have on offer this September at We Have Ways Fest 6? Perhaps you even came to the festival last year, but you couldn't get to hear every talk you wanted to hear. That certainly happened to me. Well, we here at We Have Ways headquarters are hard at work putting up the last batch of talks on our Patreon page in a collection just for subscribers.

0:56Antony Beevor: We've just uploaded a fantastic array of talks from 2025's HQ Tent, with some of the world's most engaging historians and Second World War buffs, such as James May getting nerdy with the Focke-Wulf FW190, Saul David on the Battles of North Africa, and the best general of the Western theatres in the Second World War is decided, once and for all and definitively. now is a great time to subscribe 33 % off for the summer and get lots of extra content you can enjoy ad-free listening priority access to new series and ticketed events regular live streams a weekly newsletter with book and model discounts and bonus episodes all that and more at patreon.com slash we have ways as a taster we've prepared an extract of one of the talks we've just uploaded listen as anthony beaver and james holland talk about the last hours of the second world war in berlin in may 1945 and you know this is the 80th anniversary year so of course it's entirely appropriate that we we discuss that awful truly awful battle um and with the daddy when it comes to this subject matter so anthony thank you very much for coming but we're going to start a little

2:08James Holland: bit earlier aren't we we're going to go back give a bit of but first of all let me say i was incredibly lucky on timing and let's face it, writing books is a bit like love. If the timing is good, you've got an advantage and I was lucky. I was lucky on timing because A, based on Stalingrad, the Russian archives had just opened. Picoia, who was the minister of the archives under Yeltsin, had forced the army to open their archives and the Russian army didn't really know how to handle this and that was a huge bonus but I was also lucky for Berlin because there was still some of the players around and as I will mention I mean it was a strange sensation shaking these hands which had all shaken Hitler's hand in the bunker because there were still several people who'd been in the bunker with Hitler right at the end and that really gave you a feeling of what it was like at the time.

3:03James Holland: But as James rightly said, we're going to start a little bit of a background just purely to give you the context. In December, remember, the British and above all the Americans were taken by surprise on the 16th of December with the Arden Offensive. It was a massive shock. They simply and certainly Bradley had refused to acknowledge the possibility that they could have prepared two panzer armies with two other armies in support to suddenly cross and attack. The whole idea, going all the way up to Antwerp to cut off the British and the Canadians from the Americans. And they thought they could actually knock the Canadians and the British even out of the war.

3:45James Holland: But the whole thing, of course, did grind to a halt, even though Hitler had been warned by his own generals that this was not going to work. And by Christmas Day, when suddenly the weather changed. A Russian high came in, i.e. freezing cold, clear weather. And of course that was when Allied Air Power was able to intervene and Bastogne was going to be saved and all the rest of it. The key point was that Stalin then realized this was his chance and he knew from weather forecasts what was going to happen in January. and so he tried to pretend that he'd stepped in early. He brought forward his great January offensive which was to attack all the way from the River Vistula in Poland all the way through to the River Oda only 60 miles from Berlin and he said, you know, oh, basically I'm trying to imply he saved the British and the Americans in the Ardennes.

4:47James Holland: Absolute rubbish, because, as I say, by Christmas Day, there was no chance of the Germans winning or really breaking through to Antwerp. And he also was going to be very, very manipulative and dishonest in the way that he passed information on Red Army intentions in the coming months and what the plan was.

5:11Antony Beevor: It's just one lie after the other, isn't it?

5:12James Holland: It was one lie after the other. In fact, it came to a head, in fact, slightly jumping ahead of myself at the end of... Hang on, we'll come to that in the right order. I'll try and stick to the chronology. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Sorry, I'm very careful. I know, I know, I know. You ticked me off last time about this, and you're quite right.

5:32James Holland: Anyway, so the key date was suddenly what happens. The Americans get across the Rhine at Rammagen. Now, Eisenhower hadn't expected to get across the Rhine until May 1945. I mean, unbelievable, but he was really very pessimistic. But anyway, there they were. They were across. Patton gets across too in the Palatinate. And Hitler, of course, wants executions, all of the officers involved. Stalin gets the news from General Susloparov, his representative at Allied headquarters. The Allies are across the Rhine. He immediately summons Marshal Zhukov back to Moscow and Marshal Konev and says, right, get planning, Berlin operation.

6:16James Holland: He does not want any opportunity of the Allies getting to Berlin first. And this is where he really starts lying to the Allies. And it even gets to the point where Eisenhower, very naively, because, of course, you've got to remember, the Americans were not interested really in the post-war settlement. They wanted to finish the war in Europe, get out, and then finish the war with Japan, which in many ways one can understand. And when one thinks of sort of American anti-communist paranoia and all the rest of it, all of that came much later. It did not exist really under Roosevelt and Eisenhower.

6:53James Holland: Roosevelt was hoping at one point that there would be a post-war order which would be shared. Well, Roosevelt was tremendous arrogance, thought that he was so charming that he'd be able to charm Stalin sort of becoming his friend. make Stalin your friend you might as well make a tiger your friend

7:11James Holland: Churchill of course was more realistic in that way Churchill was unrealistic in others but anyway he was more realistic about the real threat of what Stalin wanted which was of course to impose a courant sanitaire and this was the origins of the Cold War ever since that shock of 1941 where he had actually gone to pieces when he'd refused to believe that the Germans were going to invade and so he was determined from then on that never again would the Soviet Union be surprised by an attack from the West and that was why he was determined to control Poland and all of Central Europe as a barrier so that they wouldn't be surprised again.

7:52James Holland: So anyway, come March, there's Eisenhower who picks up on some rumours which came from some interviews that the Germans are going to plan a last ditch defence in the south, an Alpine fortress. And Stalin wants to encourage this idea. So when Eisenhower, to Montgomery's horror and Churchill's horror decides to give the Russians all of their plans ahead without even telling the British. He didn't even tell Tether, his chief of staff, what he was doing. And he told them that, oh, well, actually, we're not going to go for Berlin, we're going further south. And Stalin encourages this. And he said, oh, no, Berlin's lost all of its importance.

8:41James Holland: We might send some reconnaissance troops against Berlin. Hang on a second. You know, this was two and a half million men, reconnaissance in force. I mean, for God's sake, Altogether, there were 6.7 million men on that front between the Baltic and the Adriatic. So, I mean, it gives you an idea of the sheer size. Well over twice the Nazi German force invading the Soviet Union in 1941. So, suddenly, in this famous SCAF 252, Supreme Command Allied Forces 252, who tells Stalin exactly what our plans are. And Stalin says, you're quite right. Brilliant, quite right. We want to split Germany into attack further south and concentrate there.

9:34James Holland: Berlin's lost all interest. Well, actually, and this was my scoop, which I thought was the great scoop at the time, in the Russian archives, thanks to one of the secret archivists there. They passed us this material, which was still classified and not revealed at all, that actually Beria, the chief of the secret police of the NKVD, was in charge of Operation Borodino, which was the Russian plan to create a nuclear weapon because they'd been getting spies in the Manhattan Project to give them information. And their idea was to surround Berlin and then use NKVD troops, frontier troops and security troops, to secure Dahlem, which was where all of the nuclear research was carried on in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute.

10:23James Holland: And this was absolutely sort of vital for them. What they didn't realize was, actually, that most of the nuclear material and most of the scientists had actually been sent down to Heigerloch in the Black Forest, and so they missed them. But they got a certain amount because they didn't have any uranium or very little. And actually, it was the uranium which came from the Belgian Congo, which the Germans had captured, and then which the Allies captured, which they made into the first of the bombs dropped on Japan, which, funny enough, most people seem to have sort of overlooked in a way, which is a strange thing.

11:00James Holland: But anyway, this was their plan. So their vital thing was to surround Berlin and make sure that the Allies, or above all the Americans, didn't break through to Berlin. So this is where we get to by March. And then... And then you've got the US 9th Army on the elbow. You've got the US 9th Army, which actually gets up to the elbow. They even get across, and they get across right at the very beginning of April. And they're in a position. You've got Patton's, some of Patton's, 2nd Armoured Division, 2nd... Hell on wheels. Hell on wheels, indeed. and others ready to go. And the interesting thing, of course, is that the Americans could easily actually have got through to Berlin.

11:47James Holland: And this comes into one of the what-ifs of history. Well, because all the Germans were surrendered to them, weren't they? Well, the Germans were longing to surrender to them. You only had the 12th Army facing them, and they were sort of young guys. They were very enthusiastic in many ways, but they simply didn't have the anti-tank weapons. and I was able to interview, I mean this is amazing at the time, I was able to interview the chief of operations and the chief of staff of the 12th army still alive there. And what did they say? Well they said, listen we wouldn't have lasted 12 hours if they really had made a push.

12:22James Holland: But actually Eisenhower by refusing to carry on to Berlin made the right decision for totally the wrong reasons. What he did was he realised that actually with the European here an advisory commission already most part of berlin and um all of um the eastern germany right up to the river l was going to be handed over to the russians anyway so why waste american lives when we are going to have to hand over that and also you've got the war against japan and there isn't an atomic bomb at this but churchill and especially montgomery but churchill was appalled because he said, but listen, for God's sake, we want to, and this was his phrase, we want to shake hands with the Russians as further to the east as possible, i.e.

13:10James Holland: reduce the amount of Central Europe occupied by the Soviet Union. And this is why he was begging Eisenhower to send Patton's army on towards Prague and all the rest of it. And in Prague, actually, it was the Russian heavies of General Vlasov's pro-German army, who'd actually risen in revolt, hoping to save themselves at the last moment, risen in revolt against the Germans, joining up with the Czechs in this battle. But that wasn't going to save them. I mean, Stalin was going to have his vengeance on anybody who'd put on German uniform in any form at all. So you can imagine what happened to them.

13:51James Holland: And Vlasov himself was tortured and then strung up when he was captured. He was captured, poor bastard, hidden under a blanket in the back of a car, trying to get out of Prague. Anyway, leaving that one aside, there you have, as I say, this moment when the Americans could have got through. But there's another irony here as well, which one can argue with Soviet or former Soviet historians and Russian historians, and certainly with Putin who tries to claim that actually there was never any chance of the Russia could have won or the Soviet Union could have won the war without any help from the West.

14:29James Holland: That's rubbish. You've only got to see what Stalin himself had said, what Zhukov had said, what Khrushchev had said. Without American help, we could never have survived, especially in 42, 43. And above all, got to remember the Leithland, nearly half a million military vehicles, the Studebakers, the Jeeps, everything like that, totally transformed. Well, Zhukov turns up to, when he takes over at Stalingrad, he arrives in a Jeep. Exactly, exactly. And this was the first time you started to see Jeeps all over the place and all the rest of it. Well, and operations Uranus as well, 75 ,000 American vehicles.

15:04James Holland: Well, it was just under half a million vehicles altogether, and that transformed the mobility of the Red Army for those incredible advances of 43, but above all 44. and in fact that's the irony without those American vehicles the Americans would have been in Berlin long before the Red Army but that's another story but anyway you can imagine here we have the Red Army all the way along the Oda and the Neisser, these two rivers facing inwards towards Germany, towards Berlin they're only 60 miles away and the fear of the civilians in Berlin is considerable, above all the fear of the women, because they've had the stories from the east of what's happening, and not just to German women, also to Polish women, to Hungarian women and all the rest of it.

16:02James Holland: I mean, it was just simply, totally irrespective almost of nationality. The Red Army was out of control. And this, in a way, is an irony, because one thinks the Soviet society and Stalinist society as totally controlled. But in fact, when the guys were drinking in the evening before they went out hunting, as it was said, the soldiers, the officers didn't dare control them. Otherwise, they'd be gunned down themselves by their own men, and that quite often happened. But it didn't mean, obviously, that every single Red Army soldier was a rapist. I mean, there were some, and there were, for example, particularly some Jewish officers.

16:39James Holland: I mean, I came across a lot of, in the Russian archives, we came across a lot of anecdotal evidence showing that actually quite often Jewish officers who might have had more reason for wanting revenge than anybody did more to try to prevent their soldiers from taking revenge on German women. But anyway, that in itself, I'm afraid, is a big debate itself, and I've had that debate with many different historians on the subject of how, to what degree rape in war is a weapon of war or is not, and what circumstances, and so forth. But there's no doubt about it, with over 2 million German women alone raped during that awful period of early 1945, it was probably the worst example of mass wear in modern warfare.

17:32Antony Beevor: But there was also, you know, with the Red Army troops, I mean, you know, life was very, very cheap then, wasn't it? I mean, you know, the casualty figures are just...

17:39James Holland: It's also psychologically, psychologically also, it was because they were treated so badly by their own officers and commissars. And we've seen this in Ukraine and we're seeing this in Ukraine as well. I mean, I'm afraid this is one Russian tradition. and I remember when I was researching in Moscow in the 90s, you know, there were 5 ,000 suicides a year amongst the recruits because of the way that they were hazed, tortured, bullied or whatever on joining the Russian army. 5 ,000 is a lot, isn't it? I know, I know, it's terrifying. And they thought it was a joke. I mean, I remember the British ambassador went to see General Lebed, who was a famous character who actually died in a helicopter crash afterwards, and Lebed greeted him with a joke about the whole thing about sort of, he'd invited the local general in Siberia to dinner and he said, no, tell me, general, what's your problem?

18:29James Holland: He said, well, it's the weather general, of course. He said, well, of course it's the weather, we're in Siberia. What do you mean it's the weather? And he said, well, you see, he said, we had so many soldiers committing suicide during the winter that as soon as the thaw came, I had everybody out digging graves and do you know what, half of them deserted. Ha, ha, ha. They thought this was his dining out joke, to give you an idea. So I'm afraid there is just total contempt for their own people, for their own soldiers.

18:58Antony Beevor: Do you think that is completely endemic? I mean, is someone like Rokossovsky a little bit better than Zhukov?

19:05James Holland: Oh no, Rokossovsky was better, but Rokossovsky also was Polish. But even in the Odovistula campaign, there's something like 600 ,000 casualties or something, isn't there? Yes, of course there is. But I'm afraid this was the Red Army thing. You know, they talk about the steamroller, but in fact, it was basically, I suppose, actually it wasn't so much of a steamroller, it was basically an armoured hearse. I mean, you were just crushing the enemy with your own casualties.

19:32Antony Beevor: I would rather sort of liken it to a sort of battering ram, because you see these patterns, don't you? You have these incredibly violent, intense, offensive, and they last six weeks, two months, whatever. Then they all have to pause the game because they've got to create another sort of 80 divisions or whatever. And then it swung back and then in it goes again and it's just repeat, repeat, repeat. So they're never fighting the whole time. There's always these. Oh, absolutely.

19:55James Holland: Remember, remember, in between Bagration, the great operation which destroyed Army Group Center in 1944 and the Vistula Oda operation of January in 1945, you know, there was almost five months or whatever. but certainly it was enough for them to round up local populations and just force them into the army. They didn't even record their names. The only times that the names of ordinary soldiers were recorded was when they were suspected of treason to the motherland. It is very hard for us in the West, I think, to sort of get our head around this. I know. It is democratic confirmation bias. We cannot understand the mentality of a totalitarian dictatorship.

20:39James Holland: But even that, there's no practical sense.

20:42Antony Beevor: I mean, forget sort of democratic bias. I mean, there is no practical sense to just be that profligate with people's lives because every time you've got another person, you've got to quit them, you've got to give them another right, you've got to, you know, start all over again. Wouldn't it be better to trade them properly? But things seem to have changed very much, do they?

20:59James Holland: No, that's my point. I know, I know. It's staggering. It's just staggering. It is staggering. That's the way it is.

21:06Antony Beevor: Anyway, so the plans are built up for the Battle for Berlin.

21:11James Holland: Right. So anyway, they line up their guns. I mean, literally, it's axle to axle. And they fire two million shells on the first day. This is 16th of April. This is 16th of April, exactly. And this is in the Oderbrück, which is the marsh plain of the river Oder, below the Selow Heights. Now, the trouble is, Zhukov, who usually was very good in doing his sort of recceous beforehand, he seemed to have rather lost his... Yes, he had this absolutely nonsensical idea to use searchlights. Well, he first of all tries to do what Monty did, you know, of moonlight, you know, artificial moonlight or whatever, using searchlights, which actually silhouetted his own troops.

21:55James Holland: Well, also, as everyone knows, you know, when you're in fog, you dip your headlights. Precisely. But, I mean, it was amazing that they made that mistake. They all said an even worse mistake there was that, of course, with this massive artillery bombardment, it had plowed up the ground. And the idea was, of course, for the infantry to clear the way and then the guards' tank armies would smash through, two guards' tank armies ready to go. Well, he panicked because, of course, what's happening is Stalin is pulling the strings in the background of rivalry between Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Konev.

22:37Antony Beevor: We should just explain that there's three fronts, which is what we would consider an army group, along this front line.

22:45James Holland: In the north, you've got Rokossovsky, who's been clearing what was called the Baltic balcony, which is basically Pomerania. But he's been delayed. And so Stalin, worried that the Americans might break through, says, right, we can't wait for Mrokosovsky. You're going to go, i.e. you Zhukov and you Konev. Zhukov in the middle, Konev to the south on the line of the Nysa. Which is a tributary off the Oda, isn't it? More or less, yes, yeah, yeah, exactly. They do join up. Anyway, the point is that Zhukov, as I say, starts to panic because Stalin is on the telephone to him saying, how are you doing?

23:31James Holland: You know, basically saying, Konev is doing very well to the south. Well, he had actually quite a lot, much easier, but he handled it very well, of crossing the river and then pushing right through. But Zhukov was facing the bulk of the German defences. And Zhukov started to panic. and he made the terrible mistake of changing his plan on the first day of the battle, which caused chaos. He pulled back the infantry armies, basically, to push through the guards' tank armies. Well, you can imagine there was absolute chaos. And with the ground all churned up and all the rest of it, they had underestimated how steep the Zelo Heights were.

24:15James Holland: and, you know, as a result then, Stalin gave Marshal Konev's, you know, full permission to go flat out and to attack Berlin from the south. And the idea was then for Konev to come in round the side, round the south, while Zhukov came in round the north. Interestingly, again, this whole thing to envelop Berlin to make sure that the Americans couldn't get through, even if they changed their mind at the last moment.

24:45Antony Beevor: Ah, it's fantastic stuff that, isn't it? And to get someone of Anthony's calibre along, ah, top notch. Right. If you want to hear the rest of the talks, as well as hours of other exclusive member content, subscribe now at patreon.com slash wehaveways. That's patreon.com slash wehaveways. And we'll see you in September for We Have Ways Fest 6.