How Zepto Became India’s Fastest Growing Startup

0:00I genuinely believe we've got a once in a generation opportunity to build a world-class internet company out of India. We just had to push ourselves through some really tricky moments. We went from close to zero in scale to like 200 million in like six months. And I would not recommend that to anybody. Really do it for the love of building. That should be the end goal. The end goal should not be, I build so I can make X, Y, Z. I'm building so that I have the opportunity to wake up in the morning and build again.

0:29Welcome back to another episode of How to Build the Future. Today, I'm thrilled to be joined by Adit Palacha, the co-founder and CEO of Zepto, which delivers groceries to your door in just 10 minutes. There are up to 1.5 million orders a day across 50 cities throughout India, with over$3 billion in GMV and growing 300 % a year. And they're a unicorn at a$5 billion valuation. Adit, it's great to see you here today. Thanks so much for having me, Gary. I appreciate it. So when you were getting started, there were some pretty big players already in the space. Swiggy, Zomato, even Amazon was at it.

1:07How did you approach that? When we started and we were very small, there was no sort of grand strategy or ambition. Again, most of it was bottoms up from users in the very early days. But looking at it now, I think the reason why we're able to make a dent and create this scale is because a lot of the people that were in the market in the early days of grocery delivery in India were trying to build its supply chain backward instead of user backward or customer backward. code, right? And so they would build out models that were, you know, two-hour delivery, four-hour delivery, which made sense on paper and like, you know, logistically seem more feasible, economically seem more viable instead of building a retention and consumer first.

1:42The insight was, yes, let's do 10-minute delivery, but also let's build out the full stack of commerce where we're able to run the logistics, we're able to have a much better sense and selection on quality control and sort of that audacious thinking put us in a position where not only were we able to build a better product for users, but over time, and now sort of what's playing out is that if you build a better product for users, you also end up with a better P &L and a better economics, right? So if users love the platform, your CAC is lower, the throughput you're able to get into your supply chain is much higher, your costs come down, and now we're basically seeing like the economics play out pretty beautifully, better than like the 2R and 4R models because of how sticky the users are.

2:24So I think basically that's the dent that we had. We were like just thinking first principles, use a customer backward versus a lot of the big guys, the big behemoths that had like sophisticated P &Ls and finance teams were thinking supply chain backward. I guess if you win the consumer, you can win everything. Yeah. And the big companies sometimes lose sight of that. You're 22 now, but when you were 17, you had reached out to Jared Friedman, one of our partners here at YC. Tell us about that story. So we were just actually supposed to come here in California and study, but the pandemic hit. So the freshman year that we were supposed to have at Stanford basically got postponed by a year.

3:03We decided to take a gap year. And my co-founder and I were sitting in Mumbai, really had nothing to do. No sort of fancy internships at Goldman or anything like that lined up. So we just decided to hack around, work on a project. And it just started off as like a WhatsApp group where we were delivering groceries for our neighbors because it was a nightmare to get groceries in the first wave of the pandemic. And that slowly kept iterating as just like a fun project. And we were talking to people on Hacker News about it and, you know, just sharing updates. And I think one day we saw a post saying get 10 minutes with a YC partner.

3:35And we said, wow, this is, you know, YC was sort of this, you know, for two kids on the other side of the world, was just sort of this mystical land, right? Where we were like, you know, this hobby of building cool stuff, people actually do it for a living somewhere in the world, right? And so we said, wow, we'd love to talk to a YC partner. And Jared was kind enough to like agree after we, I think we, we like flooded the comment section saying that, you know, give us time, give us time. And Jared sort of gave us the benefit. And yeah, we had a, like, I think it was an eight minute call. We gave him a quick sense.

4:05He's like, Hey, there's a company in the U S called Instacart that does something similar to what you guys are doing. Maybe this could be a business. Have you ever thought of that? We said, you know, not really. But then he said, no, this could actually be something meaningful. Have you ever thought of applying to YC? And that's for the first time when we thought, wow, is this like, I thought this was just like a project, but actually could be something meaningful. What was the first demo like? How did that sort of come together? Yeah. I mean, the first like real interaction with the customer was basically a WhatsApp group.

4:31There was like an old lady down the road from where we were staying in Mumbai that was really struggling to get groceries and she stayed alone. And so we were just delivering groceries for her. And, you know, she would basically say, hey, you're going to this grocery store down the road. Why don't you also go to the butcher store? that was like the first real interaction with the customer and we should be able to do multiple stores and then she started adding her friends to the whatsapp group and so more and more people kept ordering um but that was the early days and then i think the first real product that we built was probably i would say two months after the first delivery or like a month and a half two months after the first delivery uh and at the time it was called kirana card right uh and we it was a pickup and drop service similar to what instacart is in the us that you know prototype probably would have taken like 72 hours to build.

5:16I attribute most of the heavy lifting to my co-founder, KB, right? But we built it, we asked the users to move to that app, and that's how it started. There was no like launch moment per se. It was just like getting feedback from a customer on a doorstep and just cycling around. And that just like slowly iterated into something more and more meaningful day by day. But there was no like one like, boom, you're now in a startup. And that never actually sort of happened until we got into YC, I guess. The initial model for it was Kirana Kart. And then what's a Kirana for some of the folks watching?

5:49Sure. No, Kirana basically is the Hindi word for mom and pop shop, right? So it's like these small mom and pop stores that exist in India. Obviously, in the US, you've got more Walmarts and Costco's and Kroger's. But in India, it's primarily these small mom and pop shops that dominate grocery. So that's what a Kirana is. So Kirana Kart was like corner shop delivery in a way. That's what it means. So the other thing that was very important was sort of extreme speed. So it wasn't, you know, an hour or half an hour. It was 10 minutes. How did that come about? So I think when you speak to most people in the U.S., they think of 10 minutes as like a convenience value proposition.

6:24But actually in India, it's very different, right? So if you look at India, the overwhelming majority of consumption actually happens within four kilometers from your house, which is very different from the U.S., right? Like the frequency of purchase in India is four times more for grocery than it is in the U.S. and so people actually just buying these small tickets multiple times a week which is why most retail in india is hyper proximity right so unlike let's say the big box walmart costco models that work in like suburban sprawls people are used to doors the milk delivery guy coming to the doorstep or the fruits and vegetables guy showing up outside their house every morning or the local mom and pop being 200 meters down the road and so that's the dominant format of consumption and retail your 10 minutes was never really like a you know let's do 10-minute delivery for the sake of 10-minute delivery it was more you know customers would basically keep telling us on their doorstep and we did a lot of the deliveries for the first few months ourselves they'll basically keep telling us that hey uh this is great you know it's covid but i would much rather just go to my fruits and vegetables guy uh in the morning he comes you know pretty much there why do i wait for two three hours for you guys it's not a convenience thing it's like i'm just used to buying so much more frequently so much more easier and so that's when we we sort of gradually moved shorter and shorter delivery times to have the ability to create that doorstep like experience now obviously at scale the the insight is that it's not just important because people are used to it but it's just it's a necessity because you've got a lot smaller household sizes in India you've got a low penetration of four-wheelers you've got much more perishables that people buy people have got lower disposable cash so they don't actually have the luxury of buying in bulk and so when you fit all of those consumer insights in and mainly just again talking to people on the ground you start realizing that hey this 10 minute thing is actually critical to do the way the the style of purchase that people like versus like a nice little convenience value prop so so that's how it came out but i think uh it was more just uh just talking to people and like constantly saying okay we need to reduce it every time by 30 minutes by 30 minutes by 30 minutes until eventually we were like let's just be at their doorstep like one of the things that yc we often talk about is do things that don't scale was this one of those things where you had to go and do those initial deliveries at 10 minutes and realized there's actually a palpable difference in that experience from the customer.

8:42100%. So I think in the middle of the batch, we started getting a lot more pushback from users where basically we're just not seeing the retention, right? In the early days when you're delivering like in an hour. And so people would use the app. The next week, three, four percent of people to use it again. And so that's when we started talking to people and lots of things came out like selection, pricing, quality, but this was one of the big ones. And so we said, okay, we have to be at their doorstep. So what KB and I did is we went to one of the stores on the platform and we basically commandeered the store ourselves, right?

9:17And we ran it for a short period of time, but we did a pilot where we said, if we are able to control the customer experience end to end, including the delivery time, what's the reaction that we get? And so I was basically like the shopkeeper for a couple of days. KV was delivering and we could basically see that, you know, at the customer's doorstep, there was a lot more delight. And that was obviously the subjective indicator. And then as we sort of got to a couple hundred orders with that model, we could see that, hey, people are actually repeating at like, obviously the data was not that sophisticated, but we could see the very early signs of, hey, there's these like 10 people that ordered last week, a good chunk of them are still ordering this week.

9:52Maybe that's a good thing. You did this unscalable thing. You did it yourself. You're not running around and hiring other people to do it. You're directly experiencing it. But as a result, you came to, you sort of ran it to ground and you had this like very intuitive idea about what the product needed to become. For sure. And I think that it started with like the subjective intuition, just like what are human beings telling you verbally? You know, over time, it became more objective, right? Which is like, what's the retention of each cohort that we're seeing? Are we seeing that repeatability? And I think that rigor of testing whether we had PMF came from the grinding we had to do at YC.

10:30YC was probably that most intense period where we learned all of these frameworks very quickly. And so Jared would push us saying, okay, you're getting good verbal feedback, but are people really repeating? And if that's the case, then you're building something real versus just like a hypothesis. You guys also pioneered this dark store concept that now a lot of people are using. Was that also a necessary consequence of becoming a 10-minute provider? Like you needed control over what that experience would be like. Absolutely right. Like being able to control fulfillment logistics was critical for us to be able to get that like that delivery time and SLA for the customer.

11:12But more importantly than that, you know, the people think of us like a 10 minute delivery provider here. If you go into the ground in India, we sort of looked at more as like a like a hyper local Amazon, not just like good serviceability to the customer, but also great selection, great quality, great pricing across. and you know today we're doing not like you know 700 800 products we're doing now almost 45 000 to 50 000 products that you can order everything from like you know oranges and apples all the way to earphones and hoodies we're basically building out an internet supermarket chain right although people sort of anchor on the 10-minute piece the owning the full stack logistics is also pretty consequential for all the other axioms of customer experience right so it's speed for sure and then And there's also quality, there's also selection, and there's also price.

11:57And so all four of those pillars of customer experience improve dramatically, at least in our experience, when you're able to just like control the entire stack. So I think as a result of owning it, we're able to do, you know, 50 ,000 products. We're able to control the entire supply chain on the back end and get better quality of produce for customers. Now at scale, we're able to cut all the inefficiencies in the back end and give them better prices, right? and so all of that is at the end of the day helpful to the customer so the customer thinks of us you know 10 minute deliveries got our foot in the door but now they're basically thinking of us as their their go-to like supermarket chain in india or their go-to one-stop shop one of the blessings we had pretty early on is that like and you know you remember this as well right very early in the company's life cycle we got hit by march 2022 where capital markets which basically fell off a cliff and we couldn't raise capital and we had two competitors that had seven times the cash on balance sheet than we had, right?

12:51And so that was like a big forcing function, right? Like execute or die was the philosophy in 2022, 2023. We had to just create as much efficiency, create as much operating leverage as we could very quickly, maybe faster than a lot of other consumer internet or e-commerce companies have globally, very much early in our life cycle, because it was existential, right? And in retrospect, that was the best thing that could have ever happened to us, because when we are now well capitalized, we're able to not only allocated capital better but we were able to do it more efficiently get more growth for a lot less investment right and so essentially what happened is that we got to this point in March April 2024 where we had gone from zero in August of 2021 to two and a half years later we had hit about a billion in GMV and the business was actually pretty close back then to EBITDA and operating cash flow break even and once we were in that point we were able to show hey 70 % of our markets are profitable the most mature markets are touching four to five percent ebitda um and they're turning profitable faster and faster and we're still able to grow but why don't we accelerate right like if if the economics are working then we should actually be accelerating into the business instead of you know trying to cash our chips in at just a billion of gmv we've got an opportunity to build you know the largest you know grocery player in india which it's is a 700 billion dollar market right and so if i'm in that position we can easily build 20 25 30 billion of top line, we should be accelerating today.

14:18We should be doubling down. And that's what's basically happening as we speak. What are some of the bumps that you hit in the road? And like, you know, even as a 22 year old founder, how did you think about, I mean, holding teams to account? Like, these are sort of the more difficult things, especially in 50 different cities, like, were there cities where the numbers didn't work out, and you had to find a new leader? Or, you know, did you have to react to different, like specific things in different cities that were surprising. I would say some of the biggest roadblocks have been people and talent related.

14:50Like the most fundamental input for our company is execution excellence. And like the most important input to execution excellence is high quality talent. And so the biggest mistakes I've made as a consequence of that are the wrong hires in some cases or the wrong people management. So in retrospect, the setbacks have been, oh, you know, we could have done, you know, let's say management better or ops better if we had had the right person. And if you, those mistakes are very costly, especially in that 2022, 2023 period where it was existential for us. And so there were situations where we had, you know, not so much cash, you know, we almost effectively could have died in that Silicon Valley bank thing, if you remember that, right?

15:32We had a lot of our cash in that. In that period, some of those mistakes could have been very costly. And so, yeah, like I think at a high level, just getting the right folks on board, we've made some mistakes initially, and now I think we've learned from them, and that helped us. Let's go a little deeper into some of the existential moments for Zepto. What are some other moments that gave you the deepest lessons into building this company and coming up as a CEO? In the very early days, I think we had plenty of existential crises that the YC partners helped us through, right? There was like, before we got into this whole first party thing, we were realizing when we did it, like an intellectually honest assessment of the business in the early days that, hey, there's no retention here.

16:18And like in this sort of pick up and drop off service, we're not able to do it well. And so we thought we were dead. And like, there was a point in the earliest days where we just said, I mean, what are we going to do? We've tried everything. We've killed ourselves. You know, we're working. This was before the 10 minute. Yeah, this is before the, yeah, before the first party stack. And so this is before we started commandeering stores, right? And we said, hey, this model is not working out. You know, we thought it was going to be perfect. We'll just do this model. It's going to grow. Everything's going to be great.

16:45Got a reality check. After like a few months of like hitting the wall, we said, is there even a model that works? And like pretty much everyone was telling us that hey, grocery delivery in the world is, you know, has never worked really that well other than a few exceptions. India, there was lots of companies that came before us. There was a graveyard. And so all the feedbacks we were getting from investors and from people that seemed to know much more than we did is that you guys are essentially in a dead space and we could see it in the data so in the very early days there was that like super despair period where we would have I mean very close to giving up right that would have been probably the highest likelihood chance of death that this company had and then obviously as we became like a larger and larger company there were all sorts of crises right I mean I think we had a if you've been in positions where you know the border is capital and then a crisis happens whether it's you know March 2022 and the Ukraine war happened in that period or let's say we're about to, it's funny actually most of our fundraisers have coincided with some sort of crazy crisis that's happening, right?

17:43And it has actually made it harder, right? Like I think right before we raised that round in 2023, which was like a fundraise from hell almost, right? Because it was like the only unicorn round in India for that year. Immediately prior to that, the Silicon Valley Bank thing happened and so to raise that round took like eight months, seven months. Within that I mean like there were lots of places that we could have died in that were real. Like there was, there was a period where we had to build a lot of financial controls, right? Like we had to go through like EY audits that, you know, if we didn't make it through them as tightly as we would have wanted, we would have, you know, not gotten capital, right?

18:21And when you've got competitors with over a billion dollars of cash in bank, it's existential, right? And we didn't want to sell. And so we just had to like push ourselves through some like really tricky moments there, but there are probably plenty more still still to happen right i'm sure i think uh the really cool part of your story is that um you know you didn't look at sort of how other people were doing it and uh sort of accepted that as you know sort of ground truth yeah there's a ex maxim now that is you know you can just do things yeah so i i see a lot of uh you can just do things energy and what you're talking about here i mean it's a little bit of night of being naive and young that helped actually like you know it's like they say, right?

19:04Like if you knew how hard it was when you started, you wouldn't have done it, right? Yeah. That's the Paul Graham slept blindness essay in a nutshell. Yeah. So you've personified it. I really like how you thought about retention. Did it feel like you were just asking questions about that? And you're out of asking questions, why is retention, you're not where it could be? Like that sort of teased out, well, we could try this, we could try that. Like, Were there a few other things you tried other than the 10-minute thing? Yeah, we did. We tried to build a SaaS model for mom-and-pop shops. We tried to build a B2B logistics play.

19:41Is there a better model? Maybe what if we just do only the delivery part? Or what if we only do the software part? And we just realized that grocery in India can be much better than it is in general as a market. And we realized that everything is so broken. Like whether you go into the back end, you go into the storefront, you go into the delivery in the last mile. If you want to build something that really solves the problem end to end for the customer, which is across like speed, quality, assortment and price, then you just need to suck it up and own the whole thing. The push basically came from a lot of just like radical candor.

20:17right and i think that you don't really find a lot of that you know candidly in in india so far which is why obviously why c was as valuable as it was because you know people were just like you know brutally honest with us that hey man you want to make it you want to build let's instacart you want to build doordash you want to build like a nice consumer-retired company uh this is what the early days of those guys would have looked like obviously they went through their own struggles but you're not not you're not at a point where you can credibly claim product market fit and then And having that like really brutally honest feedback loop really helped us.

20:52And then we sort of pushed ourselves to say, okay, if we're being super honest with ourselves, are we building an exceptional product, right? Sure, maybe we're getting a little bit of a pop in the early days because it's COVID, people are locked down, they have to use the app. But can I really say that I built something that somebody actually wants long term? And until we had conviction that we were there, we didn't go all in. It was just like a great feedback loop and like a lot of like a lot of tolerance for iteration and pain basically Well, talk to me about that moment where you did feel like you got a product market fit and that's when you know Maybe you were in only in one location and then you said okay time for you Did you do one additional location or did you say all right like five locations?

21:32Like what was that like? It was actually the first location first dark store We launches in a neighborhood in Mumbai called Bandra and pretty quickly that neighborhood became bigger for us than the rest of the entire city that we were operating in. And it just sort of ballooned. And I remember going there because it was an experiment, right? And it was like, effectively, it was like a cardboard cutout almost of like what a Darkstore looks like today. Because now Darkstore is like, you've got proper racking and, you know, chillers and freezers and everything all set up properly. But over there, it was just like a bunch of like stuff on the ground, basically.

22:04And we were just living from there. But the experience was so well managed because we were able to, you know, curated a good selection right and work with a couple of people to be able to do that we were able to get the deliveries consistently and so just started picking up very rapidly and long long story short i mean i did a couple of deliveries and i was like wow people really have a spark in their eye when they're getting like a delivery here versus like what i'm used to which is oh this is bad this is bad deliveries delayed items are not right so yeah i think that was like the aha moment and that is also when we were we got lucky to just keep getting like the right mentor at the right point of the journey and so that's when you know our series a investors which was nexus in india basically came and said hey you know this is real product market fit probably right and we said i mean are you sure like we were very cynical right that's when i think the right time at the right place we met the people that gave us the conviction that you know you can actually try this again in the second store try this again in the third store and that's when it started just really picking up.

23:02We went from basically like close to zero in scale to like 200 million in run rate scale in like six months. Right. And like, I would not recommend that to anybody ever again. It caught fire. Like people really wanted it. Yeah. Like pulling the product out of you. Like when are you coming to my neighborhood? Yeah. And even like just even, I mean, obviously it's 2021. So it's crazy. Right. But even from a capital perspective, we went from like effectively the 125K from YC to like a$9 million round to a$50 million round to$100 million in like four months. And that was obviously crazy back then. In hindsight, it was probably the right thing because that was like sort of the inflection point to just go all in on.

23:41And then in 2022, we stabilized and said, okay, let's start building a business out of this. I guess given that, like, do you consider Zepto a success? No, absolutely not. Like, I mean, not even close to it. I think we've got a couple of decades before we can realistically say that we've won. I genuinely believe we've got a once-in-a-generation opportunity to build like a world-class internet company out of india and you know sitting in in places like this you you you get really humbled because you realize that wow like look at the kinds of quality of companies that have been built in the us and in other parts of the world and i don't think we're there yet and until we can credibly come in and say that hey uh we're able to hold our own to some of the best uh globally like a like an amazon or a doodash or a mercado libre or all these other companies then i don't think we've won i also think that the ambition is less about like oh this valuation this that like it's now come to a point where you just really want to build something exceptional that can be like a benchmark for for the rest of the ecosystem so i think it's going to take 20 30 years to get there uh we are very excited to do that for the next 20 30 years minimum and then much more and we just have to execute like crazy to make that happen so that's what that's what we're trying to do yeah people are always uh overestimating what they can do in one year and way underestimating what can happen in 10 or 20 yeah 100 100 so uh you just you once tweeted uh nothing against work-life balance in fact i recommend it to all our competitors yeah uh you know stupid idea i think about that often i mean i think it is possible to have balance but you know yeah you can also do you can run your work like a really good marathon yeah yeah oh for sure you know i think the the for the people that like work at a company like zepto i'd say that you know join here if you're really looking to do the best work of your life right and like this is the place that is going to get that out of you right um because it is a very execution focused culture everyone is really deep into the game when you're just like in these super execution focused cultures then and you're really like accountable for real problem statements every day you can actually just become like the best version of yourself and i think the it's not for everybody, right?

25:50That sort of mindset and thought process. But it is for like the super ambitious, the super capable that really want to get the best out of themselves. And it's not forever, right? You're not going to have to do this like work so hard for many, many decades. But like, you definitely need like, I think, I believe portions in your life where you take yourself to the maximum, right? And really achieve a lot. I think Zepto is sort of that place. It doesn't feel like work, at least for me. And I know that that's not a realistic expectation for, you know today we've got like 3 000 plus corporate employees right uh and mainly ops folks but like with 3 000 people and it's not realistic for me to tell everyone that hey you know love what you do work seven days a week it's not realistic right but at least for kv and i i mean just it feels like the journey of a lifetime right and like there's nothing more exciting than this uh to be spending time on so uh that's that's i guess the thought process but what i what i will say though is if you don't really have like a mission that excites people right then you can't push them to that to that level to really give them their all and i think that like spacex is a good example of a company that is just able to like get the maximum out of people because it's such an inspiring mission obviously we're not sending rockets to space we're delivering groceries but i think that the mission that at least i like to try to bring out is that guys let's build like a truly great internet company in india and let's like kick off the internet revolution in india that should have been much bigger than it is today.

27:11I mean, I think we can create 10x more value for the country than we have so far. I think, I mean, if you look at even like places like China, right, the dynamism came from the internet companies and then that spread everywhere, right? So maybe we can play a small part in that. That would be great. What are some of the unique advantages and challenges you've experienced building a startup, you know, specifically in India? Yeah. So I think the advantage is that the talent is incredible. Right. And I initially didn't realize this deeply, but, you know, we interviewed like American engineers and obviously they're exceptional.

27:48We said, hey, the guys that we have are as good. Right. And I think a lot of people underestimate that. That's why, you know, a lot of great internet startups set up offices in Bangalore. Right. And hire people there. And so the big advantage is that you just have such an incredible talent base and really although it's very competitive it's still a lot less competitive to get such high quality talent than it would be sitting in san francisco i'm sure uh i think some of the hurdles are as an ecosystem i think we're like very much like post 2001 right now because we had like a big reality check in 22 23 and there's still a lot of fear and lack of ambition in general and i'm sure you you know you you've seen some of that like in the post 01 kind of period right i'm sure uh where people were less ambitious right than they could have been so we're sort of coming out of that and saying you know guys why we you know if we execute well we should go we should swing for the big leagues and so i think the the challenge is like whether it's hiring a senior executive whether it's you know bringing on board a new board member i feel sometimes and sort of scavalholy like a little bit in the minority camp i was saying it's very easy to be at like three four billion of gmv and just take it uh take it easy right and just get to break even and then build a nice little company go public you'll do well right but wouldn't it be much better to go for 5x that, 6x that.

29:01And if the opportunity is there, why not go for it? And so I think in the US, that mindset is sort of taken for granted. Everybody has that here. Yeah. Right. And it's such a special place because of that. Right. But in a place like India, it's still germinating. I mean, I think you're one of the leading importers of the philosophy itself. Yeah, hopefully. We've got the talent. We just need to get that mindset, the dynamism, basically. Right. So what else do you have on the plate and sort of in your vision for Zepto over the next 10, 20 years? I think from our perspective, there's a lot of areas to innovate in like Indian consumer internet.

29:33And we want to, I mean, we don't want to get distracted where we just, you know, try multiple verticals. Like we really want to just go deep into the compounding flywheel that we have a product market fit and say, how do we just keep improving our product market fit? I believe that PMF is like, it's not static, it's dynamic, right? You can keep improving it over time if you keep innovating. And so there are like a few exciting innovations we're working on. So for example, there's Zepto Cafe which is basically first party food delivery that we've now started to build into our dark stores where in like a three and a half thousand square foot facility we have 250 square foot that's allocated for coffee, tea, snacks.

30:10Like if you've been to 7-Eleven in Japan, for example, or even in the US, you have all that. Amazing in Japan, not so good here. Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. Right. And so that it came from the same inspiration. Can we build that out there? And that's doing phenomenally well. So we've scaled that effectively starting last year and we've gone from zero to over a hundred thousand orders per day. And that's the beauty of all these consumer internet businesses, right? When you have like 15, 20 million people opening your app every week, and then you add like a new little use case for them, you can just funnel hundreds of thousands of people just by moving pixels around.