In short
Kenneth Rogoff argues that the “dollar world” is changing slowly, driven less by tomorrow’s headlines than by long-run forces: rising real interest rates, persistent U.S. fiscal/political pressures, and gradual loss of the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege.” He also compares alternatives (euro, China’s strategy) and explains how crises keep the dollar central (Fed swap lines), while pegs and policy overreach repeatedly destabilize economies.
Guest background
Dr. Kenneth Rogoff is Harvard’s Moritz C. Boas Professor of Economics. He was IMF chief economist/director of research (2001–2003) and earlier worked at the Federal Reserve Board. He co-authored This Time Is Different (2009) and The Curse of Cash; he earned a PhD at MIT. He is also a chess grand master.
Key claims
Dollar dominance is fading gently (peaking around 2015 for the privilege of low rates). Populism and “spend/spend, tax/tax” pressures raise debt/inflation risk. Europe’s euro has worked but is constrained by incomplete fiscal/banking integration (e.g., no common bankruptcy code). Crypto/stablecoins persist mainly in the underground economy because governments can’t fully control it.
Notable examples
1971 Nixon ending gold convertibility; Triffin vs. Kindleberger; Mexico’s 1994 peg collapse and dollar-linked banking damage; ECB bond buying of southern euro debt; Fed swap lines (GFC/pandemic); China’s real estate overinvestment; stablecoin use in China/Russia/Iran; Fed regional voting power (NY vs SF).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOIntroducing Kenneth Rogoff and His Insights
0:45 to 2:19
Discussion on the relevance of the dollar in global finance and introduction of guest Kenneth Rogoff.
“In this episode, we are going to look at the least examined asset in maybe global finance, which is the position of the dollar at the center of the world's money.”
Reflections on the Book's Timeliness
2:19 to 6:06
Kenneth Rogoff discusses the themes and relevance of his book one year post-publication.
“So, you know, you have a little bit of hindsight in our discussion today, right?”
Populism and Financial Stability
6:06 to 11:03
Exploration of the relationship between populism, financial stability, and government intervention.
“I was very cautious in the book itself to try to frame things.”
The Dollar's Influence and Future
11:03 to 14:02
Discussion on the dollar's past, present, and potential future impact on global finance.
“No matter, you know, it's always been very rich countries that have run into debt problems, not just middle income and low income.”
The Exorbitant Privilege of Dollar Dominance
14:02 to 15:48
Learn about the gradual decline of dollar dominance and its implications.
“the dominance over the financial system.”
The Euro's Role and Europe's Financial Stability
15:49 to 17:48
Explore the euro's unique experiment and its impact on Europe’s economy.
“show off that, I want to show table one, if we could put that up.”
The Euro's Role and Europe's Financial Stability
18:52 to 19:25
Explore the euro's unique experiment and its impact on Europe’s economy.
“We advise investors who play the long game with a discipline that has proven success over long periods of time.”
Germany's Economic Challenges and Opportunities
19:26 to 24:26
Understand Germany's economic history and its current financial landscape.
“Like you talk about the Germans as a picture.”
Lessons from the Tequila Crisis
24:27 to 28:00
Learn about the problems of pegged currencies through the Mexican experience.
“Well, and you pointed out something in the ECB bond buying for like, say, the Southern issuers that I hadn't really thought about.”
The Turbulent Impacts of Dollar Debt
28:00 to 37:43
Discussing the historical impacts of dollar debt on economies, particularly Mexico and China.
“Their banks had issued a lot of dollar debt.”
Show all 23 chapters
The Turbulent Impacts of Dollar Debt
37:47 to 38:09
Discussing the historical impacts of dollar debt on economies, particularly Mexico and China.
“Investing involves risks, including loss of principle.”
Cryptocurrencies and the Underground Economy
38:10 to 42:00
Exploring the role of cryptocurrencies in the underground economy and their potential value.
“And while I'm asking this, I'll have our production team put up table three, which I'll be asking here.”
Exploring Stablecoins and Regulation
42:00 to 44:28
Learn about the evolving landscape of stablecoins and the implications of their regulation.
“Now, you point out the real problem in all this, which is if the government decides to change the rules tomorrow, it could be all over.”
The Concept of American Exceptionalism
44:28 to 46:46
Discuss the idea of American exceptionalism and its relevance in the current economic climate.
“I know you had kind of touched this idea a little bit on the bankruptcy comment you made in Europe.”
Understanding Swap Lines in Crisis
46:46 to 50:23
Discover how swap lines function during financial crises and their historical context.
“looking at the last 10 years, whether it's interest rates, debt, what have you, and don't just extrapolate what's going on.”
The Role of the Federal Reserve
50:23 to 54:49
Examine the challenges faced by the Federal Reserve and the pressures to address social issues.
“And they say, well, why don't you just do swap lines all the time?”
Debt Crisis and Political Inaction
54:49 to 56:00
Discuss the inevitability of a debt crisis in the U.S. and the political landscape surrounding it.
“Um, just stepping back, you know, do you look at this as just who wants to tell people that they're going to, you know, cut spending?”
U.S. Debt and Global Reactions
56:00 to 58:00
Explore the implications of U.S. government debt on global economics and international relations.
“There are a lot of different directions it could take.”
Economic Theory and Historical Context
58:26 to 1:01:25
Discuss the relationship between debt levels, economic growth, and historical economic patterns.
“Smead funds distributed by Smead Funds Distributors, LLC, not affiliated.”
Western Demographics and Economic Risks
1:01:25 to 1:07:19
Examine how demographic trends and political dynamics affect economic stability in the West.
“I want to ask you a couple other quick things before we wrap up.”
Future Predictions and Investor Sentiment
1:07:19 to 1:10:00
Understand future economic predictions, investor behavior, and the potential for market shifts.
“It will take quite a leg down when that happens.”
Understanding Global Finance Through History
1:10:00 to 1:10:38
Learn how historical decisions shape current financial landscapes.
“And we're very excited about that, of looking at how looking at history and global issues can help us understand what's going on in our country.”
Engagement and Resources for Listeners
1:10:50 to 1:11:18
Discover ways to engage with the podcast and recommend books.
“to A Book With Legs, give us a review, tell others about the books and great authors like Dr.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:21Welcome to A Book With Legs podcast. I'm Cole Smead, CEO and Portfolio Manager at Smead Capital management. At our firm, we are readers and we believe in the power of books to help shape informed investors. In this podcast, we speak to great authors about their writings. The late, great Charlie Munger prescribed using multiple mental models and analysis. We analyze their work through the lens of business, markets, and people. In this episode, we are going to look at the least examined asset in maybe global finance, which is the position of the dollar at the center of the world's money. Every investor alive has made every decision inside a system where, frankly, the dollar was just assumed.
1:03That assumption was and is not free, and it was not permanent and may not be permanent. We'll discuss some of that today. Three currencies have always tried to take the crown in living memory and failed. Joining us is Dr. Kenneth Rogoff to discuss his book published in 2025, Our Dollar, Your Problem, an insider's view of seven turbulent decades of global finance and the road ahead. A little background. He doesn't need an introduction, everyone. I'm telling you that now. But Ken is the Moritz C. Boas Professor of Economics at Harvard University. From 2001 to 2003, he served as chief economist and director of research at the International Monetary Fund.
1:45And early in his career, he was an economist at the Federal Reserve Board. He is also more noted the co-author with Carmen Reinhart of their New York Times bestselling book that came out in 2009. This Time is Different, Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, as well as the Foundation of International Macroeconomics with Maurice Obsfeld and The Curse of Cash. He earned his PhD in economics at MIT. He is also an international grand master of chess, as he references in his book. Ken, very good to see you today. Thanks for having me, Cole. So, you know, you have a little bit of hindsight in our discussion today, right?
2:25You brought this book out in the spring of 25. Here we sit one year later. I know your paperback, it came out this year for the book. Between the release and now, if you're kind of doing, and I know you do this in the preface of the paperback, what do you do as your kind of postmortem one year in to this writing? How timeless is it? Well, I wrote the book to try to be something people read for 20 or 40 years. I didn't try to write it as something of what's the dollar going to be tomorrow, what are interest rates going to be tomorrow. I will say, just to mention, I finished the book, the page proofs, everything was done before the 2024 election.
3:10But because I went with the university press, they had some good feedback on the title and a couple other things, pretty light editing overall. They just sat on it because somehow they didn't have another bunch of books coming out. So instead of publishing it, I'd say it should have been December 2024. That's what I would have wanted. They waited until April 2025, right after, some of your viewers may know, Liberation Day. And it's funny, when I talked to people before and was showing them what I was doing with the book, they said, oh, that's, I thought both, I thought Harris and Trump both had problems.
3:54They were more similar than people think. Yeah. Populism. And so they said, oh, that's too dark. You know, like interest rates aren't going to stay that high. China is going to be out of its problems. And the dollar will be around forever. Then it comes out on Liberation Day. And first of all, it becomes the book of the month because, you know, it sort of hit the nail on the head with what the issues are. And I was sort of everywhere. And second, people said, aren't you a little too optimistic in the book about what's happening? You're not dark enough. So you asked me where a year later, obviously, a lot crazies happened, but let me hit on a couple themes where it kind of not moved much.
4:44So one of them is real interest rates. That's actually a big theme on the book because the chain of logic is the U.S. is having trouble getting its act together. We're richer than anyone, richer than anyone ever. But that's never stopped countries from running into trouble. And so I see issues on the outside. We'll get to that. But I see the issues on the inside being more problematic. And if you're the world's biggest debtor and global real interest rates go up, it's very problematic and leads to other problems. That is very much on train. I actually just had a piece come out in Foreign Affairs today on exactly this, revisiting what I'd said a year earlier.
5:37I'd also say China still, I wouldn't change anything on that, and really not that much on Europe. Obviously, since I finished in October 2024, did I guess everything Trump would do? Did I know there'd be a war in Iran? I mean, I knew there'd be another war. I mean, a lot of stuff has happened, but I think the broad arc of what I paint doesn't change that much. And that's really deliberate. I was very cautious in the book itself to try to frame things. This is what you want to know to think about over the long term. I'm not promising you what's going to happen tomorrow. Sure. Well, two things come to mind in that.
6:22And I had mentioned I was going to reference this before we started. But we had done Perry Merling's book, which is all about Charles Kindleberger, where he called America the banker to the world in that book. You referenced Kindleberger. A lot of your framework is Kindleberger. The other book that we recently did was Adrian Wooldridge, who's often written for Bloomberg, et cetera. And you mentioned populism. He argues that populism is the shadow of liberalism. and much of what you're talking about in your book is kind of like what's the liberal order or what we know as kind of the dollar world and the liberal order that's been sitting around us.
6:57How do you – I mean to your point on populism, these are clashes, right? These just are clashes. It's kind of a question of where will they settle? Will we go back to the old? Do we fracture a little more slightly away from that? How do you try to kind of balance that from say – to your point, what's happening in the next 12 months versus a lot of your book is about where we're going to be in the long run with the situation we're in. Let me start the easy part of that question, which is about Kindleberger and banker to the world. So there was this debate between Charles Kinderberger, who I took classes from when I was at MIT as a graduate student, and he was brilliant.
7:41Although, if I'm honest, I didn't realize, I didn't appreciate him fully as a graduate student, because he wasn't that technical. We graduate students, in fact, assistant professors and most young professors, and I did, do these very technical mathematical papers. And he was sort of writing what we regarded as very soft stuff that was very hard to get published, frankly, in journals. but you know he had a couple towering home runs and I and he was working on one of them his panics manias and crashes maybe his most famous piece was being written as I was taking his corks or being published and I wish I appreciated more I came to over time so the other person on the other side of this debate Kendall Berger just basically said dollar forever Or the system's never going to blow up.
8:37It's great. And the other person was Robert Triffin, who was at Yale. I was a Yale undergraduate. I could have taken his course. But as life has it, I didn't. He debated. He said the system would blow up. It turned out he was right, by the way. Kindleberger was wrong. Kindleberger had a good argument. But it didn't really solve the problem. Back then, it was a gold standard. I mean, many of your younger viewers may not even be aware that once, once, you could trade the dollar for gold. It's not just the dollar is good, it's gold. The dollar was good, it's gold. And in the 30s, Franklin Roosevelt abandoned it for the likes of us.
9:23We can get into that more. but in 1971, Nixon said governments could no longer get gold. That was a very big deal. And Robert Triffin had predicted that and the system blew up. And the 70s was a very bad period for the dollar, the shrinking of everything. So anyway, populism is a very broad term. It can go in so many different directions. But I mean, I think we clearly have something going on with more government intervention, whether it's MAGA or whether it's the Democratic Socialists or anybody. There's definitely a lot of pressures for government intervention all around the world. there's a lot of pressures to make a lot of stuff free for the middle class.
10:22Even in countries like Europe, where there is already a lot that's free for the middle class, and same here, there are these pressures that create budget pressures, which create inflation pressures and other problems. So I do think, of course, that's the root of what's going on. There's other things around us, the China wanting to take Taiwan, Russia invading Ukraine, Iran trying to find its place and us decide what place to give it in the Middle East. But the populism is a big undercurrent of problems. And at the end of the day, no matter how rich you are, if you have these pressures to like spend, spend, spend and tax, tax, tax, but spend even more, you run into trouble.
11:17No matter, you know, it's always been very rich countries that have run into debt problems, not just middle income and low income. Sure. Well, you reference – there's a couple lines and quotes obviously in the book and your book title comes from Connolly who you reference in the book. He told the Europeans at the time, it was our dollar and their problem. They were asking what to do with all their dollars because they thought they could get gold. And now we're saying, oh, just kidding. Well, I agree. And so I also – and you reference this in the book. The last major high prior to dollar strength the last few years was 0.02.
11:59And I'll never forget within six years, we kind of go to our economic low of 0.8, 0.09 and the dollar was weak. And so I think of a lot about everything moves inversely to the dollar. So again, if you go back, Canadian dollar was at par and all the Canadians flooded down to Arizona to buy their vacation home while our real estate market was weak. And so you see this inverse relationship between Canadian dollar, Aussie dollar, euro, pound, et cetera. Pound was back two to one back then. So I always think about that a lot. We sit in a world where we've had this dollar dominance or this idea of, I will make fun of this, American exceptionalism.
12:44And how often this is just the benefit of dollar woes create liquidity for the rest of the world? Well, I mean, you make an important point that the dollar goes up and down. And it's a very high still, even despite the depreciation in 2025. That was just a small setback from what's been a meteoric rise. There was also a big rise in the dollar in 1985, and it fell. And I'm not sure that was, by the way, terrible for the world when it happened. I mean, in fact, a lot of economists, I pick on Gita Gobanath, my colleague, has a theory that the dollar going up is actually bad for everyone. And we could get into why.
13:34I just want to say there are other points of view on this. The idea being it stifles dollar borrowed credit markets, for example, abroad. You talk about that in your book. Yeah. And it has an effect on trade because it makes things expensive. A lot of trade is indexed to dollars. But there's this difference between the dollar, what's it worth, which I've also spent a lot of my life studying. But it's really not what the book is about. The book is about the exorbitant privilege, it's sometimes called, of the low interest rates, the dominance over the financial system. And let me just jump to one really important point.
14:13I view dollar dominance as coming down slowly. It's a long process. But the exorbitant privilege, that's been fading for some time. The people who are really serious wonks on this. I would pick like Hanno Lustig and Arvind Krishnamurti at Stanford, for example, who have papers about this. I mean, they, like me, see it peaking around 2015. So for example, like half the point is that you get a lower interest rate. That's the most important thing. That is just no longer the case compared to other major advanced countries setting aside Britain with lots of sophisticated measures. That's been fading.
15:01And along with that, our savings on what we get. There are many other aspects having to do with our ability to impose sanctions, with our ability to spy on everybody. But I would say the people who say, hey, look, we use the dollar as much as ever. No, it's been gently fading. And this isn't about what's happening next month. It's the arc of what's going to happen over the longer period. And finally, let me say, ultimately, it's a decision of China. It's a decision of the European Union, a political decision that they want to have more separation. And if, you know, Donald Trump's been an accelerant of that.
15:47Yeah. I actually want to show off that, I want to show table one, if we could put that up. I have a saying I like to use. I've kind of coined this personally, but I always tell people things don't change overnight. They change over time. And the slide that I want to show here is from your book where you show right here on the screen. This is the history of the currency dominance of a nation over time, right? You start out with Spain dominating that all the way to the 10-year treasury. And I think it's a great slide of thinking about this. Let me pivot to Europe because you talk a lot about the alternatives, if you will.
16:26The euro is trade-weighted, a big alternative, potentially though it's never crystallized. How unique is the experiment of the euro? I mean, you rave about how it's actually kind of worked, kind of. And it's miraculous in some respects, isn't it? Well, I'm not a Europhile, like I say, maybe Barry Eichengreen has been. I've been watching from afar as a great skeptic of the whole thing. And a lot of times it surprised me. I didn't thought it would never happen. I thought it would blow up. Again, your younger viewers may not know it blew up in the early 90s. They were converging and crashed. It blew up.
17:12Some people, you, maybe some of your friends, maybe you made a lot of money off of that. And then they nevertheless succeeded later. So the euro was actually really moving up the ladder in the early 2000s, reaching the point, believe it or not, there was more euro government debt than dollar government debt at one point. Now there's more dollar debt than everything else put together. But they had done that, and they seemed to be coming along, and then they got hit by the euro crisis was a setback. I mean, there's a lot to say about Europe. Clearly, China has its act together much, much more than Europe.
17:57Europe has amazing advantages. But that said, they're regaining some of the market share that they lost after the euro crisis. That's been steadily happening. And they're very determined to build out their international transactions, mechanisms, as are the Chinese, slowly over time. And I wouldn't say take over from the dollar, but take a lot of market share. And that matters. When you lose market share, you lose some of the exorbitant privilege. But it's really important when it comes to sanctions, when it comes to spying. Sure. If there are lots of ways to do things, it matters. But that's going on.
18:41Hi, I'm Cole Smead, CEO and Portfolio Manager here at Smead Capital Management and host of this podcast. If you enjoy this podcast, I'd like to invite you to check out SmeadCap.com. At our firm, we are stock market investors. We advise investors who play the long game with a discipline that has proven success over long periods of time. Learn more about our funds at SmeadCap.com. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including loss of principal. Please refer to the prospectus for important information about the investment company, including objectives, risks, charges and expenses.
19:16Read and consider it carefully before investing. Smead funds distributed by Smead Funds Distributors, LLC, not affiliated. I think you did a good job. Like you talk about the Germans as a picture. You know, they you mentioned they insisted on the Maastricht limits that liberal economists called too restrictive. Merkel told you the Germans had been promised no bailouts and no transfer union. Obviously, that wasn't correct either. What I find interesting is if I look back at, say, the last 50 years of Germany, how often they didn't know what was coming. They didn't know that a gas line to Russia was going to be problematic.
19:54They didn't know that they'd have to pick up their war spending. And so I look at Germany very uniquely different. In fact, there's kind of a case in point, and I want to get your take on this. We own Unicredit. I was having lunch with Andre Orchell, who's the CEO of Unicredit. And it looks very obvious that the ECB is effectively using the free market, is what I'll call it, for these banks to finally merge. So an Italian bank merging with a German bank. And to your point, getting that – He's a great leader, by the way. Oh, he's a fantastic leader. He came and spoke at our Investor Oasis here in February.
20:27I agree with you. He's awesome. He's a brilliant banker and a great communicator, to your point. So the free market there is solving some things, like businesses are solving some things that the policymakers couldn't. A banking union has never came about, and the free market's solving some of that. I've been trying to communicate to people that that is going to go a long way for cost of capital, access to funding, things of that nature in the European economy. And frankly, banking had been a weak spot of Europe for 10 to 15 years. How do you look at those changes that are going on? Obviously, Draghi had made the case for competitiveness and said telecom and banking were as two high points.
21:07And you had referenced some of that in your book. So I'd love to kind of hear your thoughts of what could they do that would be better than the past is maybe a question for you. Well, let me start with cost of capital. So the biggest single impediment to them having a more efficient, more powerful system for everything would be having a common bankruptcy code. And, you know, it's as if you have to file your, you know, you're trying to borrow money and you have to file in all 50 states instead of one regulator with different judges and different laws. And so a lot of entrepreneurs, they end up just being in Austria or just being in Sweden.
21:51So you can't compete at scale with the United States. And a lot of it has to do with not having a common bankruptcy code. Draghi very forcibly made that point. And there was another report by Letao that came later. it hasn't they i'm told i was just at the ecb uh talking about the book and everybody's saying it's happening it's about to happen it's going to happen tomorrow well believe it when i see it that will be a huge step you can imagine uh for bond investors there are other things they have to do like be able to defend themselves yeah i mean like you know one friend of mine uh said to me you know, when I go to a European country and I see their beautiful opera house with the subsidized tickets, I think I paid for that.
22:46Because of course, they weren't paying anything for defense. And it's not enough to pay Trump's crackdown on that. They have to coordinate. If you have, 15 different armies and they all disagree about what tank they should use, et cetera, et cetera, it's problematic. They have a ways to go. But on the other hand, they have some great strengths, like the rule of law, if I might say. And also, we in the United States can have these incredible swings from, I don't want to get political, but let's say the Biden administration was very progressive. And then suddenly we go to the Trump administration, which is very conservative.
23:33Not slightly, massive swings. And everything changes. In Europe, if France changes from Macron to somebody else, it doesn't change everything overnight. Their decentralization provides a certain level of stability. So I actually think we're in a period where just everybody likes to dump on Europe. And okay, I did some in the book. But I also point to where it could get better. And I tend to be, I know it sounds crazy, an optimist on Europe. My European friend said, say, well, that's because you don't live here. But I think they will get back some of their market share, they will do better. But obviously, China is a much more urgent threat, not just militarily, but economically, and I think eventually financially to the United States.
24:32Well, and you pointed out something in the ECB bond buying for like, say, the Southern issuers that I hadn't really thought about. I think this is missed. And so I really appreciate you pointing out, when the ECB was out buying the bonds of the southern nations for Euro members, they were yielding so high that they were actually collecting a spread above and beyond inflation. It was very profitable in the end, as we've seen the yields come down. The ECBs made very good money and were getting compensated for that risk versus German bonds did not provide compensation for the inflation risks. So it actually put the financial system in a much better position for the ECB's strength as you lay out in the book.
25:19Yeah, although it could have gone differently. So I mean, the ECB took on a ton of risk. And I think most finance economists that have looked at this would argue that Germany made a very big subsidy to Spain and Italy in particular I've seen estimates of the, not to get technical, but the quantitative easing in Europe, which is where they print ECB money to buy bonds of these troubled states, to have cost Germany cumulatively on the order of 10 % of GDP and to have been a subsidy to Spain and Italy, a little less than that, but similar. Wow. So, yeah, I mean, if the Fed started going in and buying Illinois bonds, you know, just to pick an example when they're in trouble, it might pay off well, but it's a gift.
26:21I mean, if you're just saying, oh, we know you're going to pay. We know you'll never have a problem. And that's sort of what the ECB did. But that said, of course, the ECB was substituting for having a European-wide fiscal union. I'm not trying to criticize them, but there's a lot going on under the table there. And no, most people have no idea. It's funny, if you ask the European central bankers, I kid you not, they just say, well, it's safe debt. We're buying safe debt. We are. I mean, it's just, I mean, that's true of a lot of crises we face where it worked out okay. But if you did it 10 times, you would have lost your shirt once or twice.
27:10You got to kind of average it out. Yeah, no, that makes sense. One of the themes you touch across the book is the idea around pegs, right? And how problematic they historically are versus just free floating currency. Um, since, you know, this had been when I was young and most, you know, to your point about younger listeners to the podcast might not be aware of this. You touch on the tequila crisis in Mexico in the early nineties. Okay. Um, can you just kind of briefly explain what was problematic about it? You know, and you, you argue that, you know, they were really in the fold of America and yet it didn't stop them from having problems, you know, while being in NAFTA and being so close to America.
27:50Yeah. So Mexico had its currency, let's just say, very heavily stabilized to the dollar, despite the fact that they were borrowing very large amounts, the government, the country as a whole. They had very large borrowing. Their banks had issued a lot of dollar debt. And they ran into problems which surprised investors because people said, well, there's the North American Free Trade Agreement. The US isn't going to let that happen, are they? And the thing is, the North American Free Trade Agreement said nothing about being a bailout union. And I think Congress would have been very lucky to approve it.
28:36So what happened is, in late 1994, their, call it a peg, Bavarian Flexible Exchange rate got attacked. I think it fell by 50%. Talk about being pegged. And that just destroyed the Mexican banking system, which had borrowed in dollars very heavily, and also the government. And there was a bailout, but it didn't stop Mexico from suffering tremendously. Yeah. When you think about peg, you talk a lot about the Yuan and the Renminbi and China's structure of, you know, quote unquote peg and you give the history of, you know, really how stable they sought that to be and when they finally allowed it to slip marginally, but slip somewhat.
29:24I really loved your Chinese stories, like your stories of going to China. I think the one that comes right out of my head is when you're at this get together and it's all these like really well ornately dressed women, beautiful women, it seemed like based on what you're writing. And like a teacup goes to spill. And it's like a James Bond action figure pops out and she catches it. And you're like, how orchestrated is this meeting? Was that your feeling at the time? Well, we were told they were, Zhu Ranji was the prime minister. And he's one of the greatest ever leaders of China. And I got to meet with him at this.
30:02And we were told that they were his bodyguards. They're 20-something dressed in these blue robes. And we're all thinking, sure, that's what they are. And one of them knelt beside each of the seven or eight of us that were having a meeting with him serving tea. And one of the people turned and his teacup dropped and this one caught it like i i could i i'm not sure it looked like no tea spilled and it's like hmm you know they've got some skills yeah yeah yeah uh but uh no i mean the uh zhi ranji in particular was a real uh visionary of the future of china but i went to i i have six chapters on China in the book because it's our competitor.
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30:54And also, it's very interesting how the outward facing part of China is just so formidable. The inward facing part of China's much more complicated story. It's a much larger part of the economy. And they're having a massive real estate crisis, which I've written about for a decade. You've written a lot about that. You talk about the book, how you prescriptively had laid that out, obviously, a long time ago. And to your point, and again, for our listeners, and you can comment on this too, Dr. Rogoff, but in 2009, I mean, there were articles being written in the New York Times while you're doing your writing and your work that are arguing, you know what?
31:35Maybe we should be ran by a nine-person Politburo. It seems to me that they are doing a lot better things. We're still having that again, maybe. Yeah, there was that debate in the public square. that maybe we should more be like China. And you and others were saying, like I know Chano from an investment perspective was arguing this is massive overinvestment. It's gonna be miserable. You were making that case too in the longer run context. And yet here we wake up with today and it's not like anyone runs around and says, hey, Ken, you were right, by the way. Everyone else was wrong. Why has that not been more focal of look at how bad government allocation can be in the economy at times.
32:18It's a really important point, I mean, and you'd think people would look at it. I started talking about it a little over 10 years ago. The New York Times featured something I wrote because it related to real estate, something I said saying, oh, this guy thinks there'll be a real estate crisis, but they didn't take it very seriously. And I talk about it in the book when I got to address the China Development Forum, which has all the leadership except for the president and every conceivable tech finance investor from around the world. And I went off script and said, look at your housing prices. You're going to have a real estate problem.
33:02And I mentioned some other problems. And I wasn't supposed to say that. But I thought, I'm here. I don't know what's going to happen, but what's the point of my being here if I'm not honest? I'm an academic. I'm not trying to make money out of China. And I relate how I stepped off the stage at the end, and maybe the vice premier came up to me and said, Professor Rogoff, we really appreciated your comments. And I was thinking, is that what they say just before they arrest you? I don't know. But it was a couple years later I started developing this more. And had a lot of statistics showing why that was going to happen.
33:49And I think people, you know, everyone was in love with the Chinese method, not just some Americans, but Africans, Asians thinking, you know, they're so competent. They're so good at doing things. And they are. I mean, they're amazing people. But, you know, when you have the government do something and you tell it, you know, you want a million nails, you might get 100 million nails. Yeah. And that's what happened. Their housing, they have more housing than much richer countries than France, than the United Kingdom. And they've got a problem for a long time. Unfortunately, that doesn't protect us at all because it's a giant country and the export sector is strong, the tech sector is strong.
34:39And so although the economy overall is struggling, there are these very competitive sectors we have to deal with. Sure. And you also point out the difference between, call it the national party and the local politics. Like there's a big spread. We had done a book on the history of China. And you just think about the warring factions of China to get to what we know as modern China. Like, you know, and the Qing dynasty, for example. You think about all that. And that really is still at play, as you point out. There is the national party and there's what goes on locally. And they might have very little in alignment with each other because in some respects, they all know that they want to keep effectively the party in power.
35:22But yet things have to run. Money's got to move. And there's a way to facilitate government locally that might be different than the national scene. Well, think of how much problem we have running our country with 350 million people. There are lots of debates, lots of stuff going on. imagine 1.4 billion people you're somehow trying to govern. And I think someone once said to me, you know, when I asked about, doesn't the center know what's going on in the Western provinces? And he said, they haven't known for 2000 years, you know, what's going on. Like, it's just very hard to control something.
36:03So it's not just a matter of differing incentives. It's also just such a behemoth to run something like that. And at some level, you have to let each city run itself a little bit. And yeah, there are a lot of tensions, a really odd one. For Americans, especially, there's no real estate tax in China. Imagine that. The local government, the province could be broke. But if you talk about putting in a housing tax or a housing real estate tax, forget it. I mean, look at New York these days. And why? Why do they do that? Because the center decided it raised too much money for the local governments. It gave them too much power, and they said too much corruption.
37:00And so they have a lot of tensions in their system that have to do with the size of it. There are a lot of progressives who greatly admire Denmark, and a lot to admire, but forget the population, six million people. I mean, it's like running like, you know, a little franchise compared to running China. Yeah, no, I totally agree. We hope you're enjoying the podcast. You know, we work hard putting together this show, but we work even harder for our investors at Smead Capital Management. At Smead, we believe in disciplined investing, which is why the Smead funds have a proven track record of long-term outperformance.
37:38If you're an investor who plays the long game and want to invest in wonderful companies to build wealth, we invite you to visit SmeadCap.com. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including loss of principle. Please refer to the prospectus for important information about the investment company, including objectives, risks, charges and expenses. Read and consider it carefully before investing. Smead funds distributed by Smead Funds Distributors, LLC, not affiliated. I agree with you on this. So I just kind of want to use your writing on it as a picture of it.
38:13And while I'm asking this, I'll have our production team put up table three, which I'll be asking here. So your view of crypto is one sentence. No private currency wins a game in which governments make the rules. You talk about Kublai Khan and how his subjects use tree bark money. You can see crypto has real value in the global underground economy. but it's the size of the informal or underground economy relative to GDP in Europe, which you have here in the book and we'll have it up here in a second. You looked back and just said, hey, let's look at the underground economy because that's effectively what you're saying is kind of the trough for that in effect.
38:59Is that fair? Yeah, that's the base use. So I have to say when When Bitcoin first came out, I did not fully appreciate what its final use was. There are these people who say it's valuable if everybody thinks it's valuable. It's money. There's a long chapter in Sapiens, which is a wonderful book by Yuval Nohorari that looks at cigarettes and prisoner of war camps and stones in the island of Yap and says, it's just the same. Bitcoin is money because people believe it's money. That is so misconceived. It's very eloquent, he writes beautifully, but the government has a lot of control. Where they don't have control is in the underground economy.
39:52They don't have control there of what people use. by the way, a lot of the underground economies, tax evasion. That's the monster part of the global underground economy. It's huge. Actually, it's smaller in the US than in Europe, because the VAT tax is easier to avoid than income tax. And if you go to India and stuff, it's even higher. But the underground economy is an eventual use. It's already, cryptocurrencies are very widely used. Stablecoins more than Bitcoin at the moment, very widely used. So I came to realize that we have an underground economy that I and the World Bank come to similar estimates of about 20 % of global GDP.
40:38So think 20 to$25 trillion. And cash has been very big, but cryptocurrencies have become very big. And so it doesn't mean, If you think about the numbers, it doesn't mean Bitcoin can be worth$10 million. Sure. But I think it does put a floor. I have no idea what it is, although I put a back of the envelope of$50 ,000. Sure. Who knows? But yes, no, the underground economy provides a use. I'm surprised how many people to this day, we won't name them. You probably had them on your show, have said it's worthless. It's never going to be worth anything. It's just totally mirage. That's not true. I mean, people are always going to be trying to avoid the government.
41:27If taxes get bigger, if regulation gets bigger, that's good for Bitcoin. Sure. Well, to your point, if you think about that, there's a cost to move money for illegal transactions or black market, whatever we want to call that, evasion, et cetera. And as long as there's counterparties willing to help you with that, there's value in that. Absolutely. Exactly. Right? So if I'm a speculator and you have a money movement issue and we can align on something in the middle, you will gladly attribute a value to that for me to hold. So I totally agree with you. Now, you point out the real problem in all this, which is if the government decides to change the rules tomorrow, it could be all over.
42:09In other words, like, great, you're not allowed to own that. Okay? So then it would be like a purge in a way, which is a bigger, higher order question. But I do want to pivot, though. Stablecoins, you give a kind of pragmatic view to stablecoins in some respects. I guess my question is, are stablecoins just a money market fund with less interest? Yeah. I mean, we haven't hit the endgame of this yet. It is a work in progress, and I mean the regulation. So right now, Tether is very, very widely used because it's really not traceable. I had a Chinese regulator who I've known for years very, very well, who's basically the czar of digital currencies in China, explained to me that there are 80 million stablecoin users in China.
43:03They don't want them, but they can't stop them. Yeah. They use VPNs and whatever. China and Russia trade with stablecoins. China and Russia and India trade with stablecoins. Iran famously has been trading with stablecoins. So the question, and this is too much of a deep dive to get into, but with the Genius Act, which is going to try to regularize them, is what information do you have to report and to who, what do I have to know about you? Do you have the same kind of requirements, know your customer requirements. And the questions, if you had those, what's the demand going to be if it doesn't pay interest?
43:50You don't care if it doesn't pay interest, if you're avoiding 50 % taxes or doing something illegal. But yeah, you were right. I'm constructive about it. I'm not dismissive of stable coins, but I don't quite know where everything's going to end up. So these numbers, like Scott Besson says, it's going to be$3 trillion. I don't know. It kind of depends on how the regulation evolves, whether it'll be like a money market fund. You said with no interest, I don't know that it'll have no interest. That's not fully settled. Sure. I kind of touched this earlier. I know you had kind of touched this idea a little bit on the bankruptcy comment you made in Europe.
44:35I want to ask you about the idea of American exceptionalism. This has been something that's been talked about the last few years. I'll give you my view, and I'd love to kind of get your take. I look at the idea of American exceptionalism. It's kind of like throwing a parade after everyone knows you won the prior era, like in the stock market and the global economy and things like that. Now, whether we did, as measured by debt and other things you talk about in your book, we could also debate the finer points of that. I just say that because I look at all of life as a game of copycat, right? If you do something really well, I'm going to figure out what you're doing well, and I'm going to adopt it, adapt to that, et cetera.
45:11It's a complex organism that's adaptive in this world. And so I think of like exceptionalism comes and goes. And so if we want to say that, as soon as we say it, it comes out of our mouth. It's probably fading already. How do you think about the idea of American exceptionalism? Well, that was very eloquent. No, I mean, there is American exceptionalism at the moment. But coming to something I said earlier, not with the interest rates we pay anymore. It's hard to detect that we're being given a privileged position. Now, to be fair, we borrow a lot. So, you know, controlling for our borrowing, there's something.
45:54But, you know, it's not something that you own. It's something you have to earn all the time. It comes from our rule of law, from our constitution, from our formerly stable political system, from our markets, from many, many things. and you know it's something we constantly have to work for i mean we it is the greatest country in the world i'm not saying anything otherwise but i think sort of anyone i think you know you might have said to this to me before we started recording anyone who thinks it everything's just going to continue in every way the way it is that's very naive i've sort of uh made my life of the last 30 years, pointing out if, why don't you look at 200-year averages instead of just looking at the last 10 years, whether it's interest rates, debt, what have you, and don't just extrapolate what's going on.
46:55Now, the dollar has been around a long time. AI seems to be good for the dollar, but I think there's a lot of undercurrents going on that are likely to weaken our grip, not eliminate it, but weaken it. And if we don't adjust to that, it could be very painful. Sure. In the book, you talk about swap lines. And what I appreciated about your section on swap lines, even though it wasn't a big part of the book, I think it's just very helpful for average people to understand what is a swap line. So I want to put up a slide while we're doing this. It'll be your figure 14. And it's a chart showing the foreign central bank use of Fed dollar swaps from 03 to 2024.
47:41Here's a picture of it right here on the screen. It shows you that it's exceptionally used in times of crisis. You explain the reasons for swap lines. In some respects, as I was thinking about all your writing of pegs and fixed currency and all that kind of stuff, at those moments and times, they are kind of a peg. We're providing a lot of liquidity in a fixed way to counterparties that need dollars. Is that a fair way of thinking about swap lines in crisis? No. The idea originated at the end of the 50s and the early 60s when we were on gold. And the Europeans were accumulating dollars. That's what Robert Triffin, I alluded to earlier, was complaining about.
48:24And we didn't want them to come and take our gold. So we offered these swap lines whenever there was stress, particularly in the UK market where a lot of Europe traded. So that's when it was invented. And then it was brought out big time in the pandemic and the global financial crisis. So if we want everyone to use the dollar, we want to make them able to deal with a panic. If we, the US, we can't have a run on the dollar that makes us default because we can just print it. I mean, we can have inflation because of it. We can have high interest rates, but we don't have to default. But if you're somewhere else, not just Argentina, you're in Japan, you're in the UK, and you have big dollar markets.
49:20And suddenly there's this demand to everyone wants dollars. It expresses itself in violent interest rate movements, violent exchange rate movements. And if we didn't do something to smooth it over, they wouldn't want to allow this. They would start banning the dollar markets. So we're not the only ones who do it. China has swap lines out to, I think, 39 countries. The euro system has swap lines out. A thing that I mentioned about swap lines is it's not free. It's not riskless, even if Fed testimony says it is. You're making a loan to Korea in the middle of a disaster that we've never seen before.
50:08The pandemic, the global financial crisis. You know, not every time it's going to work out. We are actually taking a lot of risk when we do that. It's worth it. It's a business decision, but it's risky. And so sometimes people forget that. And they say, well, why don't you just do swap lines all the time? Why don't we give swap lines to every developing countries? Why don't we democratize swap lines? You can imagine the kind of people giving those speeches. But you strategically, and I think as we have, it supported the dollar. You mentioned copying people, your copycat. China saw that. Europe saw that.
50:49And now they're doing the same thing to try to expand use of their currencies. They say that the best form of humor is self-deprecation. You talked about mission creep at the Fed. You said it's not the EPA and that the interest rate cannot do surgical redistribution. As the old saying is, interest rates are a very blunt tool, as has been said in the past. you were talking about a friend of yours who was the head of research at one of the regional feds and and i don't have this in my notes but the line i remember from your book is it wasn't an east coast reserve bank right in other words it wasn't one of those regions um but i think you mentioned that they were interested in inequality and climate and he was joking to you that he's one of the last people doing he was the last person working on monetary policy at that at that regional Fed.
51:44You know, what does it say? You know, this is it's all very human thing. We just get misguided by the wrong needs and outcomes and incentives, things like that. My crazy idea is like I live in Phoenix. We're like the fourth largest metro area in America. You know, we don't have a federal reserve. I didn't know that. So we don't have a regional bank sitting around us. Right. Do you ever think that the regional aspects of the Fed ever need to be rethought because the Federal Reserve in San Francisco dominates the West Coast, and yet people in San Francisco have very little in common today in some respects with Phoenix, Arizona.
52:22Well, concretely, the New York Fed president always gets to vote at the meetings of the Open Market Commission, Federal Open Market Committee, which determines interest rates. And the California Fed, the San Francisco Fed, does not. That's ridiculous. Like, that's ridiculous. I mean, it should, especially with tech, this is an absurdity. So I would certainly quickly agree with that. It's a complicated question. Sure. You know, there were a lot of pressures on the Fed to solve everything because they seemed competent and Congress didn't seem competent. So just as sometimes people go to the Supreme Court to get something done they really ought to get Congress to do, but they can't.
53:16People will go to the Fed. That's been particularly going on in recent years. And obviously, there's a lot of theater about Trump's pressures on the Fed. But there were certainly pressures from Obama and much more from the Biden administration of caring about inequality, caring about the environment, and stressing those points. And I only mentioned that everyone's trying to use the Fed to their ends. And so what happened bizarrely almost is the research conferences, I'm going to Jackson Hole, the big central bankers conference in a couple of weeks, that conference had special editions of this inequality, social justice, environment, because that was something that some people want to talk about.
54:11Those are really important issues. But the Fed doesn't have the competence. It doesn't have the instruments. It doesn't have anything to deal with that. And so I used that San Francisco Fed, my friend's line, which was true, that he sent a letter to me to try to illustrate that, that everyone's trying to use the Fed to their purposes. And I'm very sympathetic, frankly, to what Kevin Warsh is doing in trying to streamline what they do in order to have a better focus. Sure. Um, you use the Dick Cheney line that deficits do not matter, which is being co-opted by everyone and their brother on either side of the aisle to your point.
55:01Um, just stepping back, you know, do you look at this as just who wants to tell people that they're going to, you know, cut spending? I can't find anyone on either side of the aisle. So I don't think this is like a single party problem. This is a big American problem. I think you would agree. And I think – in fact, while we're talking about this, we could throw up figure 16, which is the gross debt and the advanced economy. It's just kind of a picture of this. But I look at this as our incentive is to please people politically. We have our largest population group doing Medicare and Social Security, two of our largest spending categories.
55:39Is there any way to get away from this except for in a crisis? Because as Churchill said, the United States always does the right thing after exhausting the avenues. Are we just going to have to exhaust the avenues on debt? So that was a central theme of my book was that we would need a crisis to slap us to reality and how it worked. There are a lot of different directions it could take. Most other countries are not really debating this. They've seen it. And the United States, even though we have as much government debt as all the other major advanced economies combined, that's the figure you were going to show.
56:21That's what it illustrates. Our interest rate's creeping up, but we haven't yet reached a point where it went up to where it just dominated the conversation. Mind you, interest payments now are more than defense spending. The Congressional Budget Office has them on track to be our number one expenditure. But it's certainly... So that was my thesis. The book's about many things, but my overarching thesis of the final part is we've been using sanctions on everyone. We've been spying on everyone. China's going to react. Europe wants to keep Greenland. They're going to react. But that the biggest problem is the inside, exactly what you said, Cole, neither party thinks it can get ahead by talking about what they call austerity, which I take it to mean not running a 6 % or 7 % budget deficit.
57:24And yeah, even though it seems impossible for something to happen, I think we're just going to keep both feet on the accelerator until it does. And, you know, we'll see.
58:03look, or better yet, reach out at smeadcap.com. And don't forget to mention your fan of the podcast. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including loss of principle. Please refer to the prospectus for important information about the investment company, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses. Read and consider it carefully before investing. Smead funds distributed by Smead Funds Distributors, LLC, not affiliated. I'm going to add a little theory that we've been talking about, and I haven't had anybody disprove this yet, so I'm very glad to say that in some respects, but Charlie Munger, he said often he told people to invert things, always invert them and think about them from the other perspective.
58:47So if we just go back and look at economic history, and to your point about the deficits, and we say, okay, how often have we ran 6 % to 7 % you know, deficits as a percentage of GDP. And when did we do those? Well, history argues we do those in deep recessions or economic problems. Wars. Okay. And we're doing that in the middle of economic growth. So I jokingly, I say this tongue in cheek, but there's a lot of truth to the joke is it's like economists and investors have been running around, look, running, looking for this big game animal called a recession. And we might not be able to produce a traditional recession with this largesse.
59:32That's my view. And we're like, we're four years into talking about that. And no one's disproven the view. And to your point, I'm not saying we can't have a technical recession. I'm not saying we can't have a slowdown, but a traditional recession seems very far away based on the spending is kind of my take on it. Well, I mean, I would agree that we don't seem anywhere near having a recession, but I think it's the political dynamic underlying this debt problem. It's on both sides. It doesn't matter who wins in 2028. We're going to have massive deficits until there's a problem, which is why I think there'll be a problem.
1:00:11And when I think the traction hits is when there's a shock and we find our interest rates already high, our debt's phenomenally high, we're passing any level that we've ever seen, our political system's paralyzed, unable to deal with anything, those interest rates are going to start moving up and investors are going to look at us not reacting. And I think that's when I give, there's a whole bunch of ranges of things that can happen from inflation to what I call financial repression, which is sort of welcome to all your treasury bill holdings at a low rate that you didn't know you wanted. That's another form of tax that Japan has done and Europe actually, to some extent.
1:00:59Something's going to happen. And I think in the United States, it'll be very traumatic when that happens. But yeah, I mean, both parties will spend whatever it takes to not have a recession. They don't want to, they think, well, that'll happen tomorrow. And I give a forecast in the book of 10 years that I think something will happen. I think a shock will hit. I move that up a little bit, you know, since I've written the book. Yeah. I want to ask you a couple other quick things before we wrap up. And this doesn't really come up your book, but I just love to get your take on it because it's a Western problem, not just an American problem.
1:01:38But take what you just said there and add to the fact that the Western world is not reproducing children, for better or for worse. It's just what we're not doing. Do you think about that as an added filter in that view? And then I think the other thing I would bring up while we're talking about that, I think we've got so up in the American exceptionalism. Our debt is pretty cheap. deep, we're so successful kind of discussion in our own head that this Iran oil flow problem looks very problematic at a basis issue. In other words, you know, 73 was problematic because of the shock it caused. Is there a potential that this causes a shock that could then kick off the kind of problem that you're talking about?
1:02:22Because some would argue that energy costs are really ultimately the long-run driver of interest rate costs? Well, there's a big debate about where interest rates are going, and I spend a chunk of the book talking about it. I debated many prominent economists in the 2010s, Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, who was talking all about secular stagnation. He was nuanced eventually about it. Olivier Blanchard. I mean, I'm not saying they're the same. I debated Peter Thiel actually about this and they were all insistent, you know, this is just going to go, you don't go on forever. And I think to be fair to Larry, he said, well, just in case use long-term debt and not short-term debt, which the others absolutely did not say.
1:03:12So I said, look at history again, look, just look at a graph over a longer period. interest rates are low until they're not low. But where they're going from here, I have brilliant young colleagues who say they're going to go back to zero because old people have all the money, they're not going to spend it, and the interest rate's going to go to zero. And we can see that. Or rich people are going to keep getting richer, and they're not going to spend all their money, and the interest rate's going to go down, et cetera, et cetera. Well, if you look at the history of interest rates, not easy to pinpoint what's going on.
1:03:53I'm talking about real interest rates, wars, populism. And I mean, I would guess that interest rates are as likely to go up as down going forward. because even though, again, my brilliant young colleagues have the most elegant model of this one factor. So the theories that they have is that the aging population will bring down interest rates, which there are people on the other side of that. Charles Goodhart's a very distinguished professor who used to be at London School of Economics. He says, hold on. These people are now living forever and they cost so much when they get old. You're looking at the old life expectancy tables and not the new ones.
1:04:47We'll see. Yeah. Well, to your point on that, I mean, we also see, I'll give you some statistics. This is Federal Reserve FRED data, the Z1 report, as they call it. Love that one. Great, great report. The whole thing has got massive amounts of great data. But if you look at equities as a percentage of U.S. household financial assets, it's never been higher. Except that when that metric goes high, it tends to be pretty cyclical at heights. So the prior highs were 69, 99, 2021, but actually today is higher today. today. And so I point out to people, the wealth that we think we have tends to be something that we talk about at the time.
1:05:29And then you wake up to your point, things change five years later and, oh, we don't like stocks anymore for a period of time, as an example. And so I think people are overcompensating for the, I'll call it their anchoring into wanting to own stocks in a good market versus we could wake up in a world in five years where they hate stocks and interest rates could be higher. And everyone's like, you know what, the government's paying me five and a half percent. Why would I take risk? And we get kind of the crowd out effect from too much government debt. So I agree that for every action, there's an equal and opposite reaction like Newton's third law.
1:06:03And we're all treating it like it's very rote and it's very known and the future is foreseeable, to your point. No, I mean, I don't, I have no idea. You have a much better idea of what's going on with the stock market, it's so hard to know. But the fact that we're, as a country, we're rich does not mean we don't go bankrupt. Over history, when Spain was super rich, it went bankrupt. France, when it was super rich, went bankrupt, and on and on and on. Argentina, I was the chief economist in 2001 to 3 when Argentina defaulted. Argentine citizens had more money in Miami alone than the Argentine government owned, but they just couldn't get their hands on it.
1:06:47And in our case, yeah, we could raise taxes or cut spending, but nobody wants to. And that's why I kind of feel there needs to be blood in the street before you're going to see action. The voters just won't believe it. They haven't, they've had such a long lull. We'll see. There's certainly other areas of the world I worry about, But in terms of US exceptionalism, the dollars, tremendous dominance that I think has been fading for 10 years by many measures, but still remarkable. It will take quite a leg down when that happens. It won't end, but our market share will drop and there'll be a big price to it.
1:07:33It's actually a phenomenally big deal. When you're paying 1 % less on your interest rate or even half a percent less and you owe$40 trillion, that's real money every year. And so that'll be painful. We'll find the sanctions don't work so well. So there's plenty we can do. I mean, nobody needs my book to see what we could do about it, but I don't think we will. So I'm going to part with a hot take and I'll just want like one or the other on this one because I agree with your framework. If I put a gun to your head and said, you know, Ken, here's the deal. We have two ways out of this. We are going to cut spending and we're going to pay off our debt successfully.
1:08:25Or you're just going to pay back in cheaper dollars in the future. What is the easiest fix of those two? We're never going to do the first one. So it would only be the second. Yeah. I mean, we might raise taxes too, right? Yeah, we could. But to your point, that's what the Monarchs paid you back in lesser coins. That's what they did too. I mean, that's my hot take. Obviously, there's a lot to be said. Yeah. Well, I appreciate your time. I was going to ask you. So obviously, you're going to be at Jackson Hole. You mentioned you're going to be doing Bloomberg. Where else can people follow you going forward?
1:09:03Where do you regularly write and publish? Well, I mean, I write a book every eight or 10 years. I'm going to try to be a little faster to the next one. I have a column every month in what's called Project Syndicate. It's actually published in 50 countries. That's pretty easy to find. I go through periods where I'm in the media a lot. I was a tremendous amount in the media the last two years because of my book. I've been hiding, trying to finish something, but there'll be a lot around Jackson Hole, I imagine. And yeah, I mean, you just check out my name. I don't have a social media presence that's very big.
1:09:48I am planning to launch a podcast through the Manhattan Institute with Alison Schrager on a few select topics, probably a limited series. And we're very excited about that, of looking at how looking at history and global issues can help us understand what's going on in our country. Well, that's wonderful. So I want to thank you for your time today. Dr. Rogoff, your book reminds me that the ground every investor stands on was built by decisions someone made and it can't can be also be unbuilt like you discussed the same way the dollar position was won and has been kept as much by the failures of others europe china etc as by anything america did on purpose that is worth remembering when we are tempted to believe the last 50 years are simply how the world works our listeners should go and buy a copy of our dollar your problem if you enjoyed this podcast go to apple spotify youtube wherever you listen to A Book With Legs, give us a review, tell others about the books and great authors like Dr.
1:10:54Kenneth Rogoff that we have the opportunity to understand and study the world with and through. For our tribe, if you have a great book that you'd like to recommend, email podcast at smeadcap.com. That's podcast at smeadcap.com. You can also send your suggestions to us on X. Our handle is at smeadcap. Thank you for joining us for A Book With Legs podcast. We look forward to the next episode. Thank you for listening to A Book with Legs, a podcast brought to you by Smead Capital Management. The material provided in this podcast is for informational use only and should not be construed as investment advice.
1:11:30You can learn more about Smead Capital Management and its products at SmeadCap.com or by calling your financial advisor.
From the publisher
In this episode of A Book with Legs, Cole Smead, CEO and Portfolio Manager at Smead Capital Management, sits down with Dr. Kenneth Rogoff to discuss his book, "Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider's View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance, and the Road Ahead."
Kenneth Rogoff is the Maurits C. Boas Professor of Economics at Harvard University. From 2001 to 2003, he served as Chief Economist and Director of Research at the International Monetary Fund, and earlier in his career was an economist at the Federal Reserve Board. He is the co-author, with Carmen Reinhart, of the New York Times bestseller "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," as well as "Foundations of International Macroeconomics" and "The Curse of Cash." He earned his Ph.D. in economics at MIT and is also an international grandmaster of chess.
The conversation explores the dollar's position at the center of global finance, from the history of currency dominance dating back to Spain, to the rise of populism and its threat to the dollar's exorbitant privilege, to real, candid stories from Rogoff's own experience meeting Chinese leadership and warning of the country's real estate crisis years before it hit. They also discuss the euro's uneven path, the Mexican peso crisis, and what stablecoins and cryptocurrency really mean for the future of money.
Read Kenneth's column here: https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist
"Our Dollar, Your Problem: An Insider's View of Seven Turbulent Decades of Global Finance, and the Road Ahead," published by @YaleUniversityPress , is available now.
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