

16 Jun 2025 · 1h 17m · 15 chapters

The episode traces the origins and development of Iran’s nuclear program from the 1979 Islamic Revolution through the Obama-era JCPOA (2015), then discusses uranium enrichment levels, what the deal changed strategically, and why Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities matter for the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia.
Mark Dubowitz is a Canadian-American attorney and former venture capitalist, CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). He has focused on Iran for decades, criticized the JCPOA outside the Trump administration, testified before Congress 20+ times, and helped drive sanctions research and initiatives. He says Iran sanctioned him personally in 2019 and has threatened him with 24/7 security.
Iran’s enrichment is portrayed as having no civilian justification (given oil/gas reserves and a Russian-supplied reactor whose spent fuel is returned). The JCPOA is criticized for “sunset” provisions that allow Iran to expand to advanced centrifuges and approach weapons capability. The deal is argued to have provided cash, reduced Israeli strike incentives, and helped regime survival and proxy warfare.
uranium enrichment thresholds (3.67% civilian, 20% research, 60% submarine-related, 90% weapons-grade); Iran’s covert enrichment facilities revealed via exile groups; the 2009 Green Revolution context; Trump’s 2018 withdrawal and Soleimani killing; Biden-era escalation from 3.67% to 60% and near-90% levels; references to Iran’s missile attacks on Israel and proxy support (e.g., Hamas/Hezbollah/Houthis).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes.
Explore Mark's unique path to becoming an expert on Iran and its nuclear ambitions.
“With the JCF Donor Advised Fund, you can set aside funds for charity now, receive the available tax benefits, and decide where and when to give over time.”
Understand the implications of Iran potentially acquiring nuclear weapons.
“It's really the world, the whole Western world, the whole civilized world is whether Iran is going to get a nuclear weapon.”
Learn about the historical and modern implications of the Shia-Sunni divide in Iran.
“And even at one level of abstraction higher than that, a conflict between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam.”
Examine the shift in Iranian society from secularism to the current regime's culture.
“before we get to the enrichment of uranium and all the diplomacy around that issue.”
Explore the contrasting views of the Iranian population towards their regime.
“So the question is, what does the population of Iran want?”
Learn about uranium enrichment levels and their implications for nuclear weapons.
“But 20 % still support the regime for reasons we can discuss.”
Delve into the timeline and context of Iran's nuclear negotiations, especially during the Obama era.
“And by Iran deal, I mean the JCPOA Obama era deal that is generally referred to as the Iran deal.”
Explore the evolution of Iran's nuclear negotiations and the impact of sanctions.
“Sanctions actually kicking Iran off the swift banking system.”
Analyze the long-term strategic consequences of the Iran nuclear agreement.
“presidents can't realistically think beyond four because they can't assume re-election.”
Explore Obama's strategies to manage Iran's nuclear ambitions.
“Or are you just resigned to the fact that a deal right now is not possible until Iran is much more desperate.”
Delve into Trump's reasoning behind exiting the nuclear agreement.
“Let's build confidence with our interlocutors.”
Assess the outcomes of Trump's exit from the Iran deal on nuclear enrichment.
“Trump withdraws from the agreement in May of 2018, but there's kind of months before that of discussions and debates and negotiations that are taking place in Washington inside the Trump administration.”
Explore Iran's nuclear advancements and the implications of U.S. foreign policy under Biden, Trump, and Obama.
“They can break out to multiple nuclear weapons today.”
Discuss Israel's military strategies against Iran and its proxies in response to evolving threats.
“So one way of looking at this is that America has taken a range of approaches on the kind of dovish end of the spectrum.”
Explore the complex dynamics between Israel and Iran, focusing on military strategies and diplomatic negotiations.
“show your Middle East neighborhoods and show Khamenei in Tehran that you're not a Westerner.”

Get the gist, explore an idea or ask about something said.
On Conversations with Coleman, what are the key points of this episode?
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.
0:00Welcome to another episode of Conversations with Coleman. My guest today is Mark Dubowitz. Mark is a Canadian-American attorney, former venture capitalist, and current CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a public policy think tank. His focus for many years has been Iran, in particular, Iran's nuclear ambitions. He was arguably the leading critic outside of the Trump administration of the Obama-era nuclear deal with Iran. He's testified before Congress over 20 times and spearheaded influential research and sanctions initiatives through his think tank. I wanted this episode to be a one-stop shop for anyone who wants to understand the Iran nuclear issue at a deep level.
0:42So we start the story way back in 1979, when the Islamic regime that currently rules first took power. And then we trace the regime's nuclear ambitions through the 80s, 90s, and 2000s, all the way up to Obama's nuclear deal in 2015. Then we cover Trump's departure from that deal and Biden's attempt to revive parts of it. We also go over the basic science of uranium enrichment. For instance, what does it mean for uranium to be 5 % enriched as opposed to 60 %? And so on. Finally, we address the question of what's at stake. Why does it matter whether Iran gets nuclear weapons? And what actions are justified to stop this from happening?
1:22Keep in mind that this episode was recorded before Israel struck deep at the heart of Iran's nuclear program just a few days ago. So while this podcast episode doesn't address the headlines of the past few days, it will, I hope, give you a much deeper level of context for the articles and commentary that you're going to be seeing over the next weeks and months. So without further ado, Mark Dubowitz.
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2:41Make this the year you give more strategically. Open your JCF fund by December 31st at jcfny.org slash get started. Jewish Communal Fund, smart, impactful giving. Mark Dubowitz, thanks so much for coming on my show. Great honor to be here. Thanks, Coleman. All right. So before we get into the topic of this podcast, which is Iran, from a 10 ,000-foot point of view, How did you come to be an Iran expert? What's your bio? How'd you get here? So strange bio, Coleman. Actually, I was working in private sector and high tech and venture capital in the 1990s, working in Israel, working in Canada. Had that sort of standard career trajectory for someone with a law degree and an MBA.
3:34And then 9-11 happened. And I was sitting in my living room in Toronto watching the BBC reporting on 9-11. And it was hours after the planes had hit the Twin Towers. And the BBC host was blaming America for the 9-11 attacks. And I was so upset that I actually took my shoe and I threw it at the TV screen as my wife was walking down the stairs. and she sort of stopped and said, you know, darling, either you're going to have to get a therapist or you're going to have to switch careers. I won't say whether I got a therapist, but I definitely switched careers. And I went down to Washington. I actually tried to join the U.S.
4:17military, but I didn't have a green card and I couldn't work in the U.S. government. So I joined this new startup think tank. I'd worked in startups in the tech sector and it just opened its doors, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and joined them to help build the business. But early on, and this was right after 9-11, it was the Iraq War, I became very interested in Iran. I'd grown up in Toronto, which is affectionately known as Tayranto, so a huge Iranian community. And always fascinated by Iran, its history, but more importantly, its contemporary reality as a significant threat to the United States, to Israel, to other free nations.
4:58And I began working on really the only thing that I had any competence in, which was the issue of sanctions. And the United States had just begun to understand the importance of economic and financial power. And the U.S. Treasury Department had just set up a whole new division on terrorism and financial intelligence. And this was under the Bush administration. So I began working on sanctions with the administration and with Congress. and began to really understand the power of this coercive tool of American diplomacy, which was to really try to squeeze the regime into abandoning its nuclear weapons ambitions and its support for terrorism and spent now 21 years working on the issue.
5:46I got sanctioned by Iran myself in 2019, threatened by Iran. I have 24-7 security. But according to the regime, I'm, quote, an economic terrorist. And they have obviously decided that FDD and my colleagues represent a threat to the Islamic Republic. So in 2022, we were blamed for also being behind the protests that broke out in Iran. So they seem to have this obsession with me and FDD. Yeah, you seem to be very powerful over there somehow. They think we are, yeah, but I think they're clearly overstating our influence. But there's sort of this regime conspiracy theory about people like me in Washington, and they think we are much more influential than we actually are.
6:34Right. Okay, so the central issue of American foreign policy looking at Iran over the past many decades, It's really the world, the whole Western world, the whole civilized world is whether Iran is going to get a nuclear weapon.
6:59So from 10 ,000 feet, what is at stake here? Why does it matter whether the Iranian regime gets a stockpile of nuclear weapons? Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, I think the first question, why does it matter to Americans? I mean, I think it clearly matters. Maybe you can break it down to the American point of view, the Israeli point of view, and the Saudi point of view, just for starters. Yeah. So let's start with the American point of view. And I mean, you know, the Islamic Republic of Iran, as distinct from Iran, as distinct from the Iranian people, has been a war with the United States since 1979, since the Islamic Revolution.
7:35We are considered in their conception to be the great Satan. And, you know, over the course of decades, they've killed and maimed and kidnapped thousands of Americans. And they've had this active nuclear weapons program for many years. I'm sure we'll talk about the details of it. But they are a revolutionary regime. This is not North Korea, you know, a sort of bankrupt Stalinist regime whose only ambitions maybe is to take over South Korea, but don't have sort of an expansionist agenda through the Indo-Pacific. This is Islamic Republic, which has a revolutionary agenda and revolutionary ideals.
8:18They are hard men with ideas, and they want to spread their ideas through the Middle East to begin with, and then through the broader Muslim world. And they believe that having nuclear weapons will give them that power. They're also, at least in their rhetoric and arguably in their actions, they're exterminationists. I mean, they have said over and over again that they want to wipe Israel off the map. and they've supported terrorist organizations who are committed to that agenda including Hamas who they financed and directed and provided weapons to and trained for the October 7th invasion of Israel which again has as its objective to you know to kill as many Israelis as possible and wipe Israel off the map so they are they're a serious country and they're a serious regime and they have serious power.
9:08They have huge oil and natural gas reserves. And they obviously have, you know, embassies all around the world and diplomats and spies operating out of those embassies and have the largest ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East, which they've now used on two occasions against Israel in April and October of last year, firing over 400 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. They've attacked the Saudis. They've attacked the Emiratis. They've created much blood and destruction through the Middle East, defending regimes like Assad's, you know, have killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of Syrians.
9:44So they've created a lot of destruction. And I think it matters a lot to the world that they don't get a nuclear weapon. I'll just add one other thing. They also have an active intercontinental ballistic missile program in ICBM. ICBMs are not used to deliver a conventional payload. They're used to deliver a nuclear payload. And they're not for Israel, and they're not for Saudi Arabia, because they have ballistic missiles that can strike those targets. The ICBMs are for the United States of America. So they want nuclear-tipped ICBMs to threaten the United States and engage in nuclear blackmail.
10:21Right. So the Middle East is famously complicated, but one aspect of it that, one simplification of it that is accurate some of the time is as a cold war and occasionally a hot war between Saudi Arabia and Iran with proxy wars almost in every other country in the Middle East. And even at one level of abstraction higher than that, a conflict between Sunni Islam and Shia Islam. So can you talk a little bit about the importance of Shia Islam in the motivation of the current Iranian regime and how the conflict between Shia and Sunni puts into context how we should view Iran? Yeah, I mean, it's an ancient conflict, obviously, with deep theological roots.
11:18But I think the important thing to understand in the modern reality is that The Islamic Republic of Iran came into being after the Islamic Revolution of 79, after Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah of Iran. And for Khomeini, this was an opportunity to build an Islamist state based on Shia Islam. Now, Shia Muslims are the minority in the Middle East. The Sunnis are the majority and indeed worldwide. and he believed that this was their moment. This was their sort of theological ambition, their moment to dominate the Muslim world. And he was contemptuous of the Saudis and the other kingdoms in the Middle East, whether it's the UAE or Jordan.
12:18And he had contempt for these Sunni Muslims who were, you know, skiing in Stadts, Switzerland, and drinking whiskey with their infidel American friends while inviting, you know, American oil executives to exploit the Saudi oil fields. And also having these, you know, these non-believers, these American troops on Saudi soil and in the Middle East and bases. and so he was a hard man of hard ideas and this was really his opportunity to create the first modern Shiite Islamist state and he's in some respects been very successful and has given the Saudis and these other Sunni leaders an incredibly hard time in the past almost five decades.
13:10Okay, so one more question about recent Iranian history before we get to the enrichment of uranium and all the diplomacy around that issue. So you go back before the Iranian revolution and you look at pictures of Iran, you see women in bikinis or other garb that is modern and Western. You don't see women having to wear the veil in public. You see, in short, a secular society that also has Islamic components, deep Islamic components, but you see what looks to be a kind of pluralistic tolerant society. All that changes after 1979. And in the past few years, we've seen the morality police in Iran really cracking down on religious codes around women's behavior and so forth.
14:12So the question is, what does the population of Iran want? How much do we know from polling about the percent of the population that is secular and would probably welcome at least an organic internal change of regime? And how much of the population really agrees with the core religious principles of the regime? Look, the short answer is it's hard to tell. I mean, I'm not a big believer in polling in these authoritarian countries. I mean, you imagine, Coleman, it's a Friday night, you get a call and some guy says, hi, it's Ahmed, I'm calling from the Islamic Republic polling company, got a few questions for you, Coleman.
14:56You say, sure, I'm just having dinner with the family, but what do you got? And he says, we just want to poll on, What do you think of the Islamic Republic of Iran? Are you a supporter of Ali Khamenei? You're a big fan. You're a big fan. Right. So what's interesting is you would expect, therefore, that the polling would be artificially inflated in support of the regime, given the fact that you're going to say you're a big fan because you fear the consequences of opposing the regime publicly. The polling does show that the vast majority of Iranians are opposed to the regime, 80%. That's backed up by a number of intelligence reports from both the US and Israel, which suggest similar numbers.
15:44So again, though I'm not a big fan of polling in authoritarian states, the number may be even higher of people that oppose this regime. It's the vast majority of Iranians. They despise this regime. they are secularizing in great numbers. A number of them are actually converting from Islam to Christianity. I mean, when you talk to Iranians, they'll tell you that the mosques are empty, but the private parties taking place in Tehran are full, like the raves that are taking place, obviously, outside of the purview of the morality police. Iranian, young Iranians look back at the time of the Shah, obviously they weren't alive, but they see the same videos and photos that we see.
16:32And they see an Iran that was modern and secular and prosperous. I think they actually overstate how good things were. I mean, things were not perfect under the Shah. I mean, it was an authoritarian state. He had a pretty brutal police force and intelligence services that cracked down on dissent. But it was, I think it's a country that they look back on at a time before the Islamic revolution, and they want that to return, which is why the Shah's son, Reza Pahlavi, the sort of crown prince in exile, is really popular amongst Iranians, both inside Iran and outside Iran, because he just represents that time of greater peace and prosperity and stability.
17:20So the regime is facing a population that the majority of whom despise it. But 20 % still support the regime for reasons we can discuss. Let's get into some of the basic 101 elements of uranium enrichment that puts into context all the news we hear from the past 10 years. What does it mean for uranium to be 3.67 % enriched as opposed to 20 % enriched as opposed to 60 % enriched as opposed to 90 % enriched? Why do these numbers matter? What do they mean? And maybe you can just give people a little context on that. Sure. I mean, I don't want to get into the nuclear physics, like full-on granularities here.
18:06But I think the basic idea to understand is that if you're going to produce a nuclear weapon, you need fissile material. That's one of the essential components of a nuclear weapon. And you can get fissile material for nuclear weapons two ways. One is you can enrich uranium to 90 % to weapons-grade level, or you can reprocess plutonium. And you can turn that plutonium into the fissile material for a nuclear weapon. So enrichment and plutonium. There's a lot of discussion on the enrichment side. We'll say a little bit more about the plutonium. But on the enrichment side, that has been the main pathway that Iran has pursued for decades as they have built up this really significant, almost industrial-sized nuclear program.
18:55And enriched uranium at 3.67 % is what you would need for a civilian nuclear program. So if you're one of these countries, and there are five countries right now that have civilian nuclear programs and don't have nuclear weapons, that's Argentina and Brazil, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan. Japan actually has a plutonium reprocessing route. And by civilian, you mean nuclear energy? Nuclear energy, right? So if you want to power an electrical grid and you want to use nuclear power for that, then you would build a civilian nuclear program and you would enrich to 3.67%. And you would be like those five countries that do so, and they don't have nuclear weapons.
19:36If you go to 20%, then 20 % is what you would use for a research reactor. If you're engaged in producing medical isotopes that were for medical research purposes, you would need 20 % enriched uranium for that reactor. Now, if you went to 60%, There's no civilian use for 60 % enriched uranium. You could possibly use that to power nuclear submarines. So if you had a large submarine force and you wanted to power that with nuclear energy, you would enrich to 60%. And then finally, you would go to 90 % for weapons-grade uranium to produce a bomb. Now, Iran has actually no justifiable use for any enriched uranium.
20:253.67, 20%, 60%, and certainly not 90 % for weapons grade. Because number one, Iran has massive oil and natural gas reserves. Second, third, fourth largest in the world. It actually has a civilian nuclear reactor right now that was built by the Russians. It has never used any of its enriched uranium, these vast quantities of enriched uranium that it's produced over the years, for that reactor. So how does it power that reactor? Well, it actually buys the fuel rods from the Russians. The Russians ship over fuel rods. The Iranians put it in their nuclear reactor. They power this reactor. And then it produces what's called spent fuel.
21:10And that spent fuel is then shipped back to the Russians. Now, you don't want to let the Iranians keep the spent fuel because then they can reprocess it and turn it into plutonium. And that plutonium can be used for a nuclear weapon. So Iran can be today like 23 other countries in the world that have civilian nuclear programs, but don't enrich their uranium. They don't reprocess plutonium. They buy fuel rods from abroad. By the way, those 23 countries are all American allies. A number of them have agreements with the United States called one, two, three agreements. And we have this gold standard.
21:46and that standard is essentially we, the United States, will provide you with civilian nuclear assistance, and in some cases financing, if you agree to no enrichment and no reprocessing. So Iran can be one of those 23 countries, not have enrichment or reprocessing. It certainly doesn't sound like it's one of those five countries. I mean, when you talk about Iran and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the leading state-sponsored terrorism, which has been engaged in nuclear mendacity for decades, certainly that's not Argentina, Brazil. the Netherlands, Germany, or Japan. But it's certainly true Iran wants to be like the other countries, the countries that actually have nuclear weapons and do enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium.
22:27So that has been the big debate for decades. The Iranians say civilian nuclear energy. The rest of the world says, come on. You guys are engaged in a covert program to develop nuclear weapons, to advance your revolutionary ambitions, threaten Israel, threaten the Saudis, our other Gulf allies, and the United States. Let's go back to the pre-Iran deal era. And by Iran deal, I mean the JCPOA Obama era deal that is generally referred to as the Iran deal. What was the status quo at the time vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear capabilities? What was America and the world worried about that led to the beginning of negotiations and ultimately to a deal?
23:15So we've got to go back into the 1990s, when there was a first indication that Iran was beginning to develop a nuclear program. But it was really the early 2000s. Iran had been engaged in some enrichment. The United States invades Iraq. The Iranians had been in negotiations with the Europeans. and Tehran expects their next. So they agreed to freeze any enrichment activities and engage in diplomacy with Europe. They are also, I mean, they're playing these games, but they're really worried that U.S. troops are going to march on Tehran. And they watched how quickly the U.S. military had disposed of Saddam Hussein, who they had fought this brutal war against the Iran-Iraq war that cost over a million lives.
24:13Then there were revelations that came out, not from the Iranians, but through these Iranian exile groups who I think ultimately were fed the intelligence from Western intelligence sources, that there were covert programs that Iran had built, covert enrichment facilities. And these revelations came out, sort of shocked the world. and Iran had built literally under mountains, hardened in concrete enrichment facilities where they were installing centrifuges that it could enrich uranium to these higher levels, including up to weapons-grade uranium, to build nuclear weapons. And thus began a years-long diplomatic but also sanctions dance with the regime in Iran.
25:05attempt to get them back to the table to discuss their nuclear program. Five UN Security Council resolutions were passed with the support of China and Russia calling on Iran to end its enrichment activities. So that takes us all the way up to the Obama administration. Bush administration had put in place some sanctions. I mentioned that I started working on these sanctions when I came to Washington through the Treasury Department, some congressional sanctions. It was really under Barack Obama who decides that Obama is going to deal with this Iranian nuclear threat that he understood was very severe.
25:432009, Obama administration is coming in. The Green Revolution breaks out in Tehran. There are millions of Iranians on the streets in North Tehran yelling death to the dictator, President Obama. Are you with us? Are you with the dictator? The protests are broken out because of a fraudulent election. It was the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. You may remember him. Sort of a real notorious character, Holocaust denier. He was running these cartoon contests in Tehran. But who can make the most egregious Holocaust denial cartoon? He was threatening to destroy Israel. Invited, by the way, to New York, to Colombia, to speak at our prestigious university here.
26:29And causing a lot of angst, of course, in the United States, in the Middle East, and around the world. Obama decides not to support the Iranian protesters who are on the streets. He writes a letter to the Ayatollah, Ayatollah Khamenei, who had taken over from Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. He says, Khamenei, let's talk. Let's talk about your program. That's begun a diplomatic process of discussions, back-channel discussions, ultimately in Oman, through Ammanian mediators. And we reached a deal with Iran in 2013. Can I pause you right there? Is this an attempt by Obama to begin a negotiation when the adversary is weak and when we're in a position of leverage?
27:21Is that the game theory behind the letter? I think it's a combination, yeah. I mean, to the credit of the Obama administration, Obama decides in first term that he needs to build leverage with Iran. So his Treasury Department starts imposing sanctions. Congress really gets into the action, and they start passing the toughest sanctions against Iran that have ever been imposed, really going after the oil sector, the central bank, after the key instrumentalities of Iran's economy. Such powerful sanctions that the Obama administration is actually objecting to them because they're worried that this is going to undermine the diplomatic outreach to the supreme leader.
28:04Sanctions actually kicking Iran off the swift banking system. I mean, these are really, really tough sanctions. They ultimately pass Congress overwhelmingly. I mean, 100 to zero in the Senate, 98 to two, overwhelmingly in the House. The biggest bipartisan majorities that we've probably ever seen on any issue over the objections in some cases of the Obama administration. But nonetheless, Obama understands this is giving him leverage to negotiate. and it's between 2009, 2013 that the toughest sanctions are put in place and the Obama administration is reaching out to the Ayatollah to try and get some kind of diplomatic negotiations on track.
28:44So he sends Jake Sullivan and Bill Burns. Jake Sullivan becomes the national security advisor under Joe Biden. Bill Burns becomes the CIA director under Biden. But at the time, Burns was working in the State Department, senior official, and Jake was Hillary's chief of staff, or he may have been at that time Biden's national security advisor when Biden was the vice president. So Biden and Burns fly to Oman and they start talking to the Iranians. Back channel, no one knows about it. Secret negotiations. It's at that point that the Iranians, and this is going to be a recurring theme, say, look, America, we'll prepare to negotiate, but we have a red line.
29:25And the red line is, we will never give up on enrichment. And Jake and Bill say, well, there's five UN Security Council resolutions saying zero enrichment. And the Iranians say, we're walking away from the table. You concede enrichment to us, or this is over, and then you're going to have to deal with the consequences. So the United States says, okay, I'll tell you what, we'll give you 500 centrifuges, first generation. They've got to be above ground, and you can only enrich to 3.67%. And the Iranians say, okay, we'll agree to that. They sign the Joint Plan of Action, the JPOA, give the Iranians billions of dollars in sanctions relief.
30:03And this begins the next stage of the negotiations, which are two years, painstaking negotiations, multiple capitals in Europe and Central Asia. The Europeans get involved, the E3, France, Britain, and the UK. Chinese and Russians are there. I mean, this is now John Kerry, Secretary of State at the time, Wendy Sherman, lead negotiator, negotiating with Javad Zarif, the foreign minister, and his deputies. That culminates in the 2015 deal. So we get from 500 centrifuges, first generation above ground, 3.67%, to the JCPOA, the 2015 deal. And at the time, the Supreme Leader had, because he's not in the negotiations.
30:51He's actually never left Iran, never been abroad. But he's thundering away on social media, and he sends out a clear declaration to all the negotiators. I will not accept zero enrichment. Indeed, I'm looking for the equivalent of about 100 ,000 first-generation centrifuges. So remember we talked about 500? He says, I want the equivalent of 100 ,000. Did he say a percentage, or did he leave that open-ended? He left it open-ended, but 100 ,000 centrifuges. And it was expressed in this very technical way called special work units. I don't want to get too into the details here, but it becomes important because the JCPOA is reached.
31:38And for those of us who are critics of the JCPOA, The fundamental flaw of the agreement is the Supreme Leader gets way more than 100 ,000 centrifuges or the equivalent thereof. He just has to wait because inside the agreement, the restrictions on Iran's nuclear activities sunset over time. They disappear over time. And it's a 15-year deal. Many of the restrictions start disappearing after 10 years. And most of them are gone after 15. Well, it was reached in 2015, which means this is the year, 2025, where a number of the restrictions start to disappear. And in five years' time, effectively, they're all gone.
32:22And then Iran can have not just 100 ,000 first-generation centrifuges. It is building all the way along these advanced centrifuges. And it is at a point where, because of these advanced centrifuges are much more powerful and they can enrich uranium at much faster speeds, you need fewer numbers of them. Why would you want fewer numbers of centrifuges? Because they're easier to hide. Because you can put them in clandestine facilities that the International Atomic Energy Agency doesn't know about, that Mossad and CIA can't detect. So all the way along in this deal, Iran gets to test and build advanced centrifuges, wait for the restrictions to expire, and emerge by 2030 with a massive industrial-sized enrichment capability, thousands of advanced centrifuges, the ability to enrich uranium to any level.
33:16There are no restrictions once all the restrictions sunset, and build up its ballistic missile program, develop its intercontinental ballistic missile program. And we had calculated at FDD that through the life of the JCPOA, Iran would have gotten a trillion dollars in sanctions relief. which they could use to rebuild their economy, fund their proxies, and cause more mischief and havoc in the Middle East. So that was a trajectory we were on as a result of the 2015 deal, and obviously something changed in the meantime. Year-end giving doesn't have to mean making every charitable decision by December 31st.
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35:21Taxes and fees extra. Default terms at mintmobile.com. From the Iranian point of view, if you're the supreme leader of Iran, you're likely thinking on, at least if you're smart, you're thinking on at minimum a 20-year timescale. Most U.S. presidents can't realistically think beyond four because they can't assume re-election. They can't assume any decision they make won't be unmade after four years. puts them in a very unstrategic position relative to their adversaries who can simply outweigh them on a policy, building in to the negotiation, pricing in the fact essentially that many of these policies are likely to reverse in four years.
36:10What I'm hearing in the subtext of your criticism of the Iran deal is that it might have made a lot of strategic sense for them to say, okay, our short-term problem is a lack of cash, and this is hurting us. Our long-term goal is nuclear weapons. Now, if we just put off the long-term goal by 15 years, and we can still make some progress towards it without flipping the switch, as it were, we can solve our short-term cash problem and even build up cash reserves. And then the moment the sunset provisions hit, then if we're just patient, we'll get everything we want. Rather, if we insist upon it now, we may get nothing.
36:55Right. And is it right to say your criticism of the Iran deal is that it handed them that strategy as an acceptable strategy, and they have the world's kind of stamp of approval in a way. That's exactly right. They could take patient pathways to nuclear weapons. And that was fine with them because the patient pathway actually helped them deal with a number of different and related problems they had. The first is they were concerned that the Israelis were going to bomb their nuclear facilities. Well, they knew that it would be much more difficult for Israel to bomb their nuclear facilities if there was a deal.
37:35And as you said, there was the international stamp of approval that this was a legitimate, internationally recognized nuclear program. Much tougher for the Israelis to go bomb a legitimate nuclear facility than an illegal one. So this would basically take the Israeli strike option off the table. The second problem they had is their people hated them. And they had millions of Iranians who'd been on the streets. And by the way, they were crushed in 2009, but those Iranians came back to the streets in 2017. And then every year since, culminating in the women's life freedom protests that were in 2022, 2023.
38:14So they figured, get all that cash, and we can buy off our people. And maybe our people hate us because of the terrible economic conditions. If we solve the economic problem, then we can preserve the regime, which ultimately is the regime's overwhelming priority, is the preservation of the regime. Much more important than having nuclear weapons is to make sure that the Islamic Republic continues and that Ali Khamenei can hand that off to his successor. That helps solve that problem, maybe. And then they can also build up, finish their ICBM program. And by the way, wage proxy warfare, because the JCPOA never dealt with support for terrorism, support for Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Shiite militias, the Houthis.
39:01It was not part of the deal. So Iran would have trillion dollars in cash, not only rebuild its economy, but really build up this massive, what they call axis of resistance. I call it the axis of misery. But this is this proxy army and build this kind of ring of fire around Israel because that was their strategy. I mean, when I think about this, do I think the Iranians are going to drop a nuclear bomb on Tel Aviv? One should never exclude that possibility. And we can talk about that. But I think the actual play And if you listen to Khamenei and his words, the strategy that he wants to run is similar to the one that the Kim family ran in North Korea.
39:42Build up nuclear weapons, have ICBMs that threaten America, but basically send a message to the U.S. military and the South Korean military. We can destroy Seoul in three days. You can't touch us. And then start to squeeze and run a war of attrition. And what Khamenei wanted to do is have these nuclear weapons, build up this ring of fire, and then run a strategy of asphyxiation to strangle the Jewish state with missiles and drones and invasions and terrorist attacks and drive the best and the brightest out of Israel because many of the best and the brightest work in tech and speak multiple languages.
40:24Some of them have foreign passports. They'll leave because life will become intolerable in Israel. And then Khamenei could move in for the kill shot against a rump that's left behind that can't defend themselves against his terror armies, all the while having nuclear weapons to threaten nuclear escalation. And he also learned, I think, a valuable lesson from Putin and Ukraine. When Putin threatened to introduce tactical nukes into the war in Ukraine, the Biden administration thought there was a 50-50 chance that he was not bluffing. god forbid there was going to be nuclear escalation with with the russians and so the biden administration decided not to send advanced weaponry to the ukrainian military that could be used to attack russian troops that were mobilizing on the russian ukrainian border and so they were at a real disadvantage so that's the way khamenei thinks of this if i have nuclear weapons i'm going to severely restrict the ability of the idf to respond to my terror armies and i'm going of force an American president to force an Israeli prime minister to force the Israeli military to stand down because nobody wants to risk escalation with the Islamic Republic and revolutionary regime that may, because you never know, may be prepared to use nuclear weapons.
41:44So I think that's the way he games it out. In foreign policy, as in economics, you're often just dealing with bad alternatives and trying to choose the least bad alternative. So what's the counterfactual? If you go back to 2013 and you're in charge of the White House, are you going for a different kind of deal in that scenario? Or are you just resigned to the fact that a deal right now is not possible until Iran is much more desperate. Yeah. So let me make the case for Obama. I think there are a number of elements in how he saw it and how he was trying to, I think, genuinely try to deal with this nuclear weapons problem.
42:32And I think he saw it as a significant threat. I mean, there's a lot of voices out there now on the left, on the isolationist right, or who cares about Iranian nuclear weapon. Barack Obama really cared. And he wanted to prevent it. But his strategy, I think, I thought was flawed, but I thought it was at least defensible. I think number one, I think Obama really believed, I think as Donald Trump does as well, that if you flood hard men with cash, you'll turn them into responsible stakeholders. And by the way, this has been a bipartisan view for years. I mean, this was Nixon and Kissinger and China, right?
43:10This has been China through every administration, let them into the the WTO, open them up to global trade, make the hard men of Beijing rich, and you'll moderate them. I think there was the same view after the fall of the Soviet Union. At the end of the day, this guy, Vladimir Putin, we can deal with Putin, he's a pragmatist. Let's make him rich. Let's make Russia rich, and we'll turn the Russians from the bad old days of the Soviet Union to a more prosperous European-looking country. Obama said this. I mean, I think in his view that if you opened up the Iranian economy and you integrated Iran into the global economy, the hard men of Iran would ultimately be more concerned about their time on this earth rather than what comes next after they're gone.
44:08And that was very much his view, which has made sense, right? I'm going to restrict the nuclear program. I got 15 years here. They're not going to develop a nuclear weapon. And I'm going to flood them with cash. And at the end of 15 years, we're going to have a more prosperous Iran, a more moderate, and a more pragmatic Iran. And by the way, within the internal wars that take place within the regime, we're going to isolate the hardliners. And we're going to embolden the reformers. So I think that was very much the view. I think the second defense of the Obama deal is, and they never publicly articulated this.
44:45It was really interesting. I've asked many of my friends in the Obama administration why they didn't. But the best way I would have defended that deal in 2015 is I would have said, this is phase one. It's a 15-year deal. But we intend, after year 10, to negotiate a renewal of the deal with Iran. We'll give them more money in exchange for more years. and then we'll buy ourselves another 15 years. Or we'll use, you know, it's impossible to know how the world will change in 10 years. We'll use every leverage point we have to get them to renew this after 10 years. Right, right. But this is the best we can do now and it's better than nothing.
45:23Better than nothing. As you said, you know, it's not about good and bad alternatives, it's about bad alternatives and worse alternatives. This isn't a great one, but it's better than Iran breaking out to a nuclear weapon. So we'll renew this deal. It'll take a few years, so we'll start after, you know, whatever, year 10, year 12, and we'll renew the JCPOA. We still have some leverage because some of the sanctions are going to remain in place, particularly the terrorism sanctions. There probably won't be a massive gold rush into Iran because people will be cautious about dealing with their counterparties who are in the Revolutionary Guards or supporters of Hezbollah.
45:59But we'll still retain some leverage, and we're in the United States. We'll obviously always have significant leverage, And that is that we always have a military option. If the regime refuses to comply, we could always order U.S. military strikes to take out their nuclear facilities. So we'll renew the deal. So I think that was the second argument. By the way, they never made that argument publicly, which was always strange. And they told me that they didn't because they didn't want to upset the Iranians at the time who would be thinking that this is they're only a 15-year deal and then they can ride off into the nuclear sunset right so you don't want to upset the iranians i think that was very much part of the the obama administration's entire negotiating position with the regime and that is we want to use confidence building measures we don't want to upset them we don't want to get involved in in these you know tough brinkmanship negotiations so that was very much the view of the Obama administration, of Kerry, of Wendy Sherman.
47:04Let's build confidence with our interlocutors. Because by the way, our interlocutors are the reformers. Those guys back in Tehran, those are the hardliners. And Zarif and his negotiating team were very good at using that. Classic good cop, bad cop. Classic, classic good cop, bad cop. In fact, Wendy Sherman proudly told the story about how she actually cried in front of the Iranian negotiating team in order to express her emotions. It was a tough time, a lot of tension. And she broke into tears. And she thought that was a good way of showing that there were human beings on both sides of the negotiating table.
47:40Of course, back in Tehran, she was readily mocked for being weak and Western and who cries at a negotiating table. And then they knew they had her. That's their version of events. Wow. Okay, so let's talk about Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iran deal. Did you support that at the time? And how do you think it looks in retrospect? What was Trump's reasoning to the extent he had a coherent set of reasons? And what do you think the consequences have been? Yeah, so we're now in 2018. Trump withdraws from the agreement in May of 2018, but there's kind of months before that of discussions and debates and negotiations that are taking place in Washington inside the Trump administration.
48:33I'm in close touch with the Trump folks. My recommendation is let's first try and extend the deal. Let's get the Europeans to the table. Let's do a deal between the United States and the E3, Britain, France, and Germany. Let's agree amongst ourselves, that is the Western negotiators, that we won't honor the sunsets. For us, it'll be a permanent deal, permanent restrictions. So let's try that first. Let's get Congress to support that and turn that agreement into statute. So now you've got bipartisan support from Democrats and Republicans. And then we can go and negotiate with the Iranians, right, with a unified U.S.
49:15E3, Democratic-Republican position. So Trump actually begins that process. He tells Mike Pompeo, he's the Secretary of State at the time, and Brian Hook, who's the main Iran envoy, to begin discussions with the Europeans. And those discussions are going on. By the way, the Europeans have no interest in doing this kind of side deal. They're resisting this. And at some point, Trump just says, enough with this. By the way, he famously says, sorry, who's Brian Hook? He's the lead Iran envoy. He famously says, I don't know who Brian Hook is. anyway, I'm out. We're done. This deal is fatally flawed.
49:54And he explains, he says, you know, I read the entire agreement, all like 150, whatever, three pages of it. And it's the worst deal ever negotiated. And we're gone. This deal gave enrichment to Iran. That is the key capability they need to develop nuclear weapons. And he pulls out of the agreement in May 2018. I, at that time, supported the withdrawal from the agreement because the other recommendation that I thought would have been better would have been to stay in the deal, reach that agreement with the Europeans. And by the way, use elements of the deal that I think were favorable to the United States while putting massive sanctions pressure on the regime and really reestablishing the credibility of American military force and power.
50:38But nevertheless, Trump's makes his decision and we're out of the agreement in 2018. Yeah, so I think it's, you can look back on Trump's record on Iran in one of two ways. objectively, Iran seemed relatively well-behaved when Trump was in office the first term. He killed Soleimani. He showed that he was willing to use force controversially and even more worrisome from their perspective, unpredictably. Many people have talked about the madman theory of foreign policy, which is what you fear most actually. And this, to some extent, it's true in a game like poker as well, is you fear someone that is fairly competent, but somewhat unpredictable.
51:30What you want is someone who's very consistent, who you know exactly what their incentive structure is, and you know exactly what the incentive structure they want for you is, someone that's readable. Trump, he changes his mind very quickly from day to day. The people that work around him have even said this over and over again, how frustrating it is to get him to commit to a decision and that he can reverse by tweet the next day. So if the people around Trump can't read what he's going to do in the next 24 hours, certainly the leadership of Iran can't. And they can't rule out that he's going to do something really crazy.
52:10And so from their point of view, it would make a lot of sense to just say, this guy, Trump, he's a loose cannon. We don't know what he'll do. Let's be on our best behavior until he loses the election. And if you look at the record, really the moment Trump loses to Biden, all of a sudden you start seeing action on Iran's nuclear program again. So one way of looking at Trump is that, look, he left the Iran deal and it looks like the consequences were not, like they didn't immediately begin enriching uranium, really. But another way of looking at it that I think I'm more sympathetic to is that, sure, he left the deal.
52:50Not sure whether that was a good decision. But he was also a kind of quote unquote madman, not in the negative sense. And that's what deterred Iran while Trump was in office, not the fact that he left the deal. So your theory is bolstered by the clear evidence when you map out the political timeline and the nuclear timeline. Because that's actually exactly what happened. So Trump withdraws from the agreement. For a year, Iran does nothing. Then they start small incremental expansion of their program. and then Trump kills Qasem Soleimani. And the regime is shocked. We're all shocked. I mean, no US president was prepared to do this.
53:38George W. Bush wouldn't do it. Obama wouldn't do it. The Pentagon opposes Trump. I mean, Qasem Soleimani, I mean, look, the world's most dangerous terrorist, responsible for killing and maiming thousands of Americans, but they're also their most fierce battlefield commander. I inspire both fear and awe in the Middle East. and no US president was willing to take him out. Trump says to the Iranian regime, if you touch an American, they will be hell to pay. Soleimani thinks, okay. They shoot down an American drone. Trump does nothing. They attack the Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia, take out 10, 15, 20 % of global oil overnight with missiles and drones.
54:21Trump does nothing. four months later Soleimani or their Shiite militias kill a U.S. contractor and Soleimani and the head of the Shiite militias on Mohandas decide this guy's a paper tiger we're going to actually plot to take over the U.S. embassy in Baghdad so they begin preparations for that Trump says that's it draws the line based on this like exquisite intelligence from Mossad They know exactly that Soleimani is going to land in Baghdad on this plane at this time. He's going to get into a convoy in this car seated next to al-Muhandas, the head of the Shiite militias. And Trump orders the US military to take out Soleimani.
55:08The regime is shocked. For 11 months after that, they don't touch their nuclear program. There's no nuclear expansion. Joe Biden wins the election. and Biden wins the election on a promise to go back to JCPOA and abandon this failed maximum pressure strategy of his predecessor, as he states it. And then you're exactly right. From then on, all through the Biden administration, Iran goes from 3.67 % enriched uranium to 20 % to 60%. They go to 84%, right? Just to see how much they can get away with, just shy of the 90 % enriched uranium. They start experimenting with uranium metal, which you need for a warhead.
55:49They are building and installing thousands of more advanced centrifuges. And we are where we are today with the Iranian nuclear program on the cusp of breakout. They can break out to multiple nuclear weapons today. They have enough enriched uranium. They have the ballistic missiles to deliver. And the only thing they have not perfected yet is the actual warhead. but all of that nuclear expansion occurs under Joe Biden because he's predictable. The regime can read him. And by the way, he's very clear. I want to go back to this agreement. He's not prepared to use significant sanctions pressure. He's certainly not going to use military force and he doesn't appear to be willing to let the Israelis do what the Israelis need to do.
56:33But then things change after October 7th. Maybe we can talk a little bit about that. But the whole dynamic changes. on the israeli side after hamas invades so let's get to that just in a moment but just to summarize what it seems like to me if i look at the obama era trump won and biden holistically tell me what's wrong with this theory the obama iran deal was all right it was a decent short-term solution to the problem with some long-term liabilities. Trump's madman approach to foreign policy was also a pretty good short-term solution to the problem with the long-term liability of what happens when Trump is gone.
57:23Both of those were short-term deterrents to Iran's nuclear program. And they both worked reasonably well with some downsides. What doesn't work is having neither of those approaches, which is what Biden had. Biden had no deal that he could credibly be a part of. He tried to kind of, in a wishy-washy way, establish some understandings that were deal-like. But you can't have neither of those, Because if you have neither of those, you give Iran very few reasons to even wait with its nuclear program. What's wrong with that theory of like the past 15 years? No, I think that's a really good summary.
58:09I mean, I do think the JCPOA was a fatally flawed agreement because of the fact that it conceded enrichment. It conceded a nuclear infrastructure. It abandoned years of the international consensus that said Iran can't have enrichment. It allowed Iran to take a patient pathway under the deal. And so even though you got some short-term restrictions, very quickly you allowed Iran to accelerate its nuclear program and then break out into this legitimate program with a trillion dollars in your pocket. So I'm not as generous to the 2015 deal maybe as you are. but yes in terms of that you know if you're u.s president you're trying to kick the can down the road for four years so that iran quote doesn't get a nuclear weapon on my watch then it's a good deal for obama right right by the way you're if you're donald trump and you're like they're not going to get a nuclear weapon on my watch then you withdraw from the agreement you impose maximum pressure you bring the iranian economy to its knees you take out sulaimani you credibly threaten and Iranians with military strikes, and you deter them from action on your watch.
59:24So in many ways, Biden was screwed over by Obama and Trump's short-term approaches. I think that's fair. But I think he was screwed over also by the fact that the Biden administration's entire doctrine was that we are going to always de-escalate. we're going to de-escalate by de-escalating. So we're going to invite the Iranians back to negotiations. We're going to talk to them. We're going to give them some financial incentives. We're not going to enforce sanctions. We're going to build confidence. But we're not going to escalate to de-escalate. And that's why the Biden administration runs smack into the Israelis after October 7th.
1:00:03Because the Israelis, all the while, who have been deeply concerned by Iran's nuclear weapons expansion, the buildup of its terror armies. By the way, the Israelis are completely excluded from all these negotiations. They don't have a seat at the table. They only learn about the secret negotiations in Amman in 2013, not from the Americans, but they learn because they're sitting on top of the Iranians. And they have significant intelligence capabilities that are obviously not bugging Americans, but they're bugging Iranians. And they learn about it. So, I mean, they're not exactly inspired with great confidence that the United States has their back.
1:00:40But after October 7th, the Iranians who have trained and weaponized and financed and directed Hamas and Hezbollah, both of whom start attacking Israel, the Israeli response is, we are going to escalate to de-escalate. And they go after Hamas and they go after Hezbollah. And they do things that I think shocked most American military and political leaders in their ability to take out both these very deadly terrorist armies that Khamenei had always used and saved, used against Israel in a grinding war of attrition, but he had saved Hezbollah. I mean, he wanted to save Hezbollah as a deterrent against any kind of US or Israeli attack on his nuclear facilities.
1:01:33Well, Israelis eviscerate Hezbollah's leadership, Hamas's leadership. They're escalating to de-escalate. And then the Iranians retaliate, fire 400 crews and ballistic missiles at them in April and October. And the Israeli Air Force goes in, takes out all of Iran's strategic air defenses a couple of hours, reduces their ballistic missile production capability by 93%. Exactly. And all of a sudden, all of the years that military planners have spent warning the Bush administration, the Obama administration, the Biden administration, the Trump administration, that we will lose pilots. This will be a serious war.
1:02:18These Iranians have bought Russian S-400 air defense systems that are very difficult to defeat. This is a formidable Iranian military and it'll take weeks or months. the Israelis have basically taken them down, or at least taken the air defenses and their ballistic missile production capability down in one night. And now we get to the end of the Biden administration and the transition period, where now there's a big debate going on in the White House and between Washington and Jerusalem about what is the next step against Iran's nuclear program.
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1:04:29So one way of looking at this is that America has taken a range of approaches on the kind of dovish end of the spectrum. And Israel, really because of October 7th, because of the vast public support in Israel, the knowledge of how vulnerable they are after 10-7, and also, I think, a crystallizing of the fact that Iran was the head of the octopus. That's been known for a long time, but there's a way in which it could have felt abstract until October 7th. And the way that allowed Israel to take the hawkish end of the spectrum against Iran and its proxies, has that approach, I mean, I think, the conventional wisdom in my circles is that that approach has been really surprisingly successful, not just in its military, you know, in the military wins Israel's had with Hezbollah and Iran, but in the political consequences vis-a-vis Israel's stature throughout the Middle East.
1:05:39I think you said in one of your interviews that essentially the Middle East is a tough neighborhood where weakness is provocative. And Western countries are used to living in a really nice neighborhood with nice neighbors where toughness is provocative, actually. And weakness builds trust and builds bridges and leads to good consequences. Not weakness, but rather signals of wanting to cooperate aren't read as weakness, essentially. Between U.S. and Canada, signals of being willing to cooperate usually lead to win-win outcomes because our basic attitude towards each other is one of collaboration and positive some games.
1:06:30Until we start calling it the 51st date. Exactly, until Trump did that. Right. But if that's true as a basic characterization, then Israel benefits even vis-a-vis its Muslim nation potential collaborators like Saudi Arabia and UAE. It actually benefits from showing strength and capabilities rather than deference. So if all that's true, does it cast into more negative light U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East towards Iran over the past 10 years or so? Yeah, I think that's right. Or are we just in different situations because we're not in that neighborhood? I think it matters. I mean, it matters.
1:07:14For the Israelis that live in the Mideast, not in the Midwest, as you say. Their neighbors are, it's a brutal neighborhood. And it's a neighborhood where if you're weak, they will take that as an invitation to destroy you. Israel's fought multiple wars. It has never had a day without the threat of terrorist attacks. But the Israelis live in this strange split screen. On one hand, they have the Middle East split screen where they have to show toughness to their neighbors and their enemies. And that requires them to do things that are, to use military force. I mean, it's worth adding. I mean, October 7th, I think they changed their doctrine, but Mossad had been hammering the Iranian nuclear program for years.
1:08:05I mean, they'd killed nuclear scientists. I mean, there've been some incredibly daring takedowns of nuclear scientists, including the killing of the Robert Oppenheimer of the Iranian nuclear program, a guy named Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who Mossad killed in this daring operation using an AI-controlled gun that was fired remotely from Tel Aviv and took out Fakhrizadeh in his car without hurting his wife and not even taking out his bodyguards. And that was an incredibly daring operation. Olympic Games, where they released a cyber attack against centrifuges. This was a cooperative effort with the CIA, but it was really a Mossad brainchild and destroyed 1 ,000-plus centrifuges using cyber weapons.
1:08:57They have taken out senior IRGC terrorist leaders. They killed, this was after October 7th, but they killed a senior Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in an IRGC safe house in Tehran by putting a bomb under his bed. And they've also done significant damage to Iran's centrifuges and drone programs. So even before October 7th, Mossad had been engaged for decades in a struggle with the regime over the nuclear program and certainly was not tentative, if anything. It was very forward-leaning, very creative. There were times where the United States was really afraid that the Israelis were going to strike militarily.
1:09:40and particularly around 2011, 2012, when there was a big debate within the Israeli cabinet about whether they should order military strikes. And Netanyahu at the time blinked under both U.S. pressure, but also because internally within the cabinet, there were members, including the head of Mossad at the time, Meir Dagan, who thought this was not the time to strike militarily. So the split screen on one hand is Middle East, show your Middle East neighborhoods and show Khamenei in Tehran that you're not a Westerner. You mean business. And you will use military force or covert action in deadly ways to stop this most dangerous regime from developing this most dangerous weapon.
1:10:23But the other side of the split screen, Coleman, is what the Israelis face. And we know this because we've seen it, especially since October 7th. They're Western-facing, right? They love America. I mean, you never, July 4th in Israel is like full of American flags. And I think in Israel and Poland, the two countries where America has the most favorable ratings in the world. So they love Americans. They want to be American. They love being in New York. They all come to New York. And they face West. And when the Western world looks at them, especially now after October 7th, they face this real dilemma because they are engaged in a war, particularly in Gaza, but also in Lebanon.
1:11:09And they're fighting an enemy that uses civilians as human shields and buries with weapons under civilian homes and mosques and hospitals. And there've been obviously significant civilian casualties. And there's been a huge backlash against the Israelis. So this is what the Israelis are contending with this split screen. And I think it also feeds into their decision-making on Iran and on the regime and what they can do, what they can get away with doing even now under this second Trump administration. Okay, final question. What is your greatest hope for what might be possible in this administration?
1:11:45And what is your greatest fear for what might happen? Well, my greatest fear is that Trump is going to do another batter-on deal. That right now in the negotiations, the American team has come in, finally after a number of weeks of confusion and confusing messages, But they've come in with a unified position. The administration is saying zero enrichment, full dismantlement. Members of Congress and the Senate and the House, the overwhelming majority of Republican senators and House members have said a deal has to be zero enrichment and full dismantlement. So they're walking into negotiations with that position.
1:12:27And the Iranians are saying, no way. Did you hear the Supreme Leader? Because he said, full enrichment. We can negotiate maybe some restrictions, limited, time limited, certain levels. Maybe some of our stockpiles will be sent to the Russians, blended down, whatever. Technical details are less important. But we will absolutely maintain enrichment and we will not dismantle our nuclear program. So we're now in a negotiation where someone has to blink. And if past is prologue, it's the Americans who always blink, not the Iranians. I mean, the starting positions now are getting so wide, right? Because we're asking for something that is worse for Iran than Obama's nuclear deal.
1:13:12But Iran is way further, much closer to the finish line, right? Correct. But Iran is much weaker. Right. Now, to be fair to Obama, when he was facing off against Iran in 2013, 2015, they were under punishing economic sanctions. The economy was reeling. But they still had Hezbollah. They had Hamas. They had the Shiite militias, the Houthis, their strategic air defenses, their ballistic missile production capability. He was facing what he perceived, I think rightly so, as quite a formidable enemy. Well, most of that has been severely degraded or eviscerated. So the Trump administration has greater negotiating leverage than Obama had in 2013 or 2015.
1:13:51And Iran is playing a very weak hand. Now, their negotiating leverage is their nuclear program has significantly expanded under Biden. So they got nuclear cards to play. But the regime is very fearful. And they're not only fearful of the Israelis and the Americans, but as we talked about earlier, since 2009 and since the deal was reached in 2013 and 2015, there have been these massive protests. So what I'm most hopeful about is that finally the Israelis have made supporting the Iranian people a central pillar of their Iran strategy. after after many years uh they finally realized that they need to if they're going to really solve this problem it's not going to be just through some nuclear deal or or it's not just through strikes on iran's key nuclear facilities that there are 80 percent of iranians millions of iranians who despise the regime they've been on the streets yelling death to the dictator president bush president obama president biden president trump are you with us are you with the dictator.
1:14:58Every American president seems to be interested in engaging with the Ayatollah. And Trump also, second term, wrote the Ayatollah letter, let's negotiate, just as Obama did. And yet the Iranian people keep coming back to the streets. And the Israelis now understand that if Khamenei is spending 80 % of his time and resources thinking about how to kill them, kill Americans, and 20 % of his time thinking about it, defend his regime against his own people, he wins, we lose. If it's 80-20, he wins, we lose. If it's 20-80, he goes down. If it's 50-50, 60-40, 40-60, it means he's spending a lot more of his time and resources thinking about how to defend his regime against his own people.
1:15:41And I think the Israelis finally understand that if you want to have a maximum pressure campaign against the regime, that's necessary. But for it to be sufficient, you need a maximum support campaign to defend the Iranian people, support them when they take to the streets. I'll just say one final thing on this because a lot of people, especially in the Trump administration and the president himself are like, we're totally opposed to regime change because it never works in the Middle East because of Iraq and because of Afghanistan. I don't think anybody who's sensible is talking about 500 ,000 mechanized US troops invading Iran.
1:16:16I think what people are saying is, take a page from the Reagan playbook, what Reagan used so successfully in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. And Reagan's unique insight at the time, and it was a unique insight, much against the conventional wisdom that the Soviet Union was economically bankrupt. They were ideologically bankrupt. The Red Army was stretched around the world. And there were these anti-Soviet dissidents who became household names for many of us during the Cold War that were pushing against communist governments in Poland and in Czechoslovakia and in Hungary. And if you supported them, you could you can undermine and you could weaken the regime and reagan ran this playbook and from his west minister speech in 82 before the british parliament where he said marxism leninism it's inevitable that it'll end up in the ash heap of history seven years later the berlin wall came down and tears after that the soviet union collapsed so many of us have been making that case you know buying books on the reagan strategy distributing hundreds of copies to american and Israeli policymakers and trying to get them to understand that Soviet Union is not Iran and 1980 is not 2025.
1:17:28But there are some lessons to be learned about how support for the people while putting pressure on the regime can wear away what is already a very weakened regime. All right. Mark Dubowitz, thanks so much for coming on my show. Thanks for having me, Colin. Ryan Reynolds here from Mint Mobile with a message for everyone paying big wireless way too much. please for the love of everything good in this world stop with mint you can get premium wireless for just 15 a month of course if you enjoy overpaying no judgments but that's weird okay one judgment anyway give it a try at mintmobile.com slash switch up front payment of 45 for three-month plan equivalent to 15 per month required intro rate first three months only then full price plan options available taxes and fees extra see full terms at mintmobile.com
Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has long focused on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and advised multiple U.S. administrations on policy toward Iran. I invited him on Conversations with Coleman to explain the Iran nuclear issue at a deep level.
We discussed the science of uranium enrichment, the differing Obama, Trump, and Biden policies on containment, and the history of Iran’s nuclear ambitions from the 1979 Revolution to today. Mark laid out the stakes of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran—not just for the United States, but for global stability—and the consequences of getting it wrong.
Mark emphasized how the calculation on confronting Iran has changed for Israel since October 7, 2023. While the U.S. has followed a doctrine of de-escalating to de-escalate—favoring diplomacy, economic incentives, and restraint—Israel now believes it must escalate to de-escalate.
This conversation was recorded before Israel launched its attack on Iran, striking nuclear facilities, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps military bases, missile launchers, and commanders’ residences. It’s now more important than ever to understand the context for the articles and commentary that you’re going to see over the next weeks and months. Subscribe to The Free Press for all of our ongoing reporting about the conflict at TheFP.com.
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