An explosion still echoing: Chernobyl at 40

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1:03The Economist.

1:35So now you don't need to step in there. On the way back, you have to step in and step here and go. Today, on the intelligence, some perspectives on an event that really did shape the world 40 years ago. No building here. Uh-huh, sorry.

1:54We visit the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, four decades after a devastating explosion. The worst nuclear disaster in history.

2:10They definitely didn't tell us that the reactor was completely destroyed. Now it's a site that became part of a war. We look at what lessons Chernobyl still has, even after all this time. Nothing was learned from 1986. Things actually became worse.

2:32From Moscow came the good news in 1954 that the first atomic power plant in the world had begun operating in the Soviet Union. Its creation was not only a great scientific achievement... In the midst of the Cold War, there were few societal advancements that couldn't be pitched as a competition between either side of the Iron Curtain. And as the nuclear arms race heated up, so too did the race to use that same technology to generate power. If we remove the protective lid, we can peep inside the reactor while it is operating at a low power output. That reactor design from 1954 evolved and evolved again, and by the 1970s became the RBMK, the largest then in the world.

3:21One single unit could power the whole Ukrainian capital. It could be built more quickly and run more cheaply than designs used elsewhere. But it did have its faults. Work began on an undeveloped site close to water, railways and electricity demand, where six such reactors were planned. Chernobyl.

3:45The first time I was here, it was 1972. I was there with my father. My cousin walked here, and I saw these amazing, amazing buildings. It was modern for that time. Natalia Olenchenko was inspired, so she went away to study, so she could come back just a handful of years later. I was a big boss. She jokes that she was a big Soviet boss, heading up a ventilation team. The power plant was staffed with young people looking to start their lives. They all lived nearby in Pripyat, a town built for plant employees. Pripyat was, you see, it was an amazing town. It's the best town in the world. Pripyat was, in Soviet terms, good living, no rations.

4:37A state-of-the-art culture palace was built in the heart of the city. 2 ,000 students attended a shiny new school. These days, it's a ghost town. So this is actually what was the main stage for the disco. Life for plant workers was ripe with possibility. Natalia met her husband at Chernobyl. Not long after, she gave birth to their son.

5:06Runaway reactions had been seen in RBMK reactors in other parts of the Soviet Union. Mishaps and near accidents that had been brushed under the rug. For the fallback, the failsafe, the worst-case scenario, was an actual big red stop button, the AZ-5. This plunged all of the reactor's control rods into its core. The rods absorb lots of the fast-moving neutrons coming from and starting more nuclear reactions. Plunging them in should make things swiftly more stable. That isn't what happened on April 26th, 1986. That night, engineers were carrying out a safety test to find out what happened if the cooling systems ever failed.

5:49So emergency cooling was shut off. The reactor was being powered down. But it started falling too fast. The engineers didn't know at that point that it was unstable. They did know they were under pressure to get the test done. So they removed more and more control rods to get the power back up. This wasn't in the safety handbook. and anyway the book was in the hands of a less experienced night shift who unexpectedly inherited the test after it was delayed. When the test began, the power surged unexpectedly. Thirty seconds later, there was only one thing to do. Push the AZ-5 button.

6:31But it was too late. The fuel had got too hot, burst its casings, jamming the control rods. Power kept rising. Steam built up. And after five seconds, they heard this explosion, huge explosion. The building shuddered as the core detonated with the force of 60 tons of TNT.

6:57On April 26, 1986, we were supposed to start our ship from 8 a.m. But there were calls during the night about the accident. No one could tell the exact cause or its scale then. All he said was that different systems refused to function. They definitely didn't tell us that the reactor was completely destroyed. Yevyan Yashin was 40 years old at the time, shift supervisor in the chemical department. He was at home in Pripyat when the safety test was carried out.

7:38When we got to the plants, where we were met with was a destroyed reactor. There was no protective wall. There was just a bare reactor with red flames. It was glowing.

7:57Immediately, 115 ,000 people were evacuated from their homes around the plant, never to return again. Later, another 220 ,000 people from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine would be displaced. The Soviet Union tried to bury the truth of the accident, just as those before it, but the evidence couldn't be contained. It's not certain when it happened, but we do know the radioactive cloud was carried to five neighboring countries. Swedish scientists said today that after overnight rain, the radioactivity levels had gone up 100 times more than the normal. I've heard about Chernobyl from my dad on the day of the disaster.

8:37My dad was always listening either to the Voice of America or to BBC radio because he didn't trust the local news. Ala Shapiro and her colleagues were sent in to examine the children from the evacuated areas, not being told at all about the circumstances they were walking into. I was a peaceful pediatrician until the Chernobyl disaster. Ala was just one of some 200 ,000 first responders exposed to unmonitored amounts of radiation at the time. But we didn't wear no masks, no gloves, nothing. And we evaluated children in that area, I think, 20 hours per day. Like, no rest at all. It's impossible to put a firm number on just how many people died from radiation exposure after the accident.

9:34The best guess from scientists puts the total at something like 15 ,000. Clearly, the workers at the plant and the first responders were the ones at the highest risk. About 30 died shortly after the accident from acute radiation sickness. Some workers chose to leave, but most stayed, bound by a sense of duty to the plant and to public safety.

10:01A lot of people would do anything in order not to be removed from the plant. Those who could not hide all their symptoms and those whose condition was in need of hospitalization got acute radiation sickness. and they were taken out of the facility. Yveni was among those who got sick and later that summer was sent to a hospital in Moscow.

10:28I watched many of my colleagues die right in front of my eyes.

10:38The policy of our government was to falsely attribute as many of these deaths as they could to others' health conditions, instead of the accident. This way, they could decrease the official number of victims.

11:00The cleanup effort was gargantuan. Hundreds of thousands of men, referred to as liquidators, brought to the site, haphazardly wrapping themselves in thin lead sheets and getting to work. By the end of 1986, a giant concrete structure called the sarcophagus had been built over the ruined reactor number four. The rottenness of Soviet management and the damage the regime's secrecy could do, that was the first lesson of Chernobyl. Another became apparent first in 2022, the day the Russian invasion began. Chernobyl became the first nuclear plant in history to be occupied by an invading army. A week later, Zaporizhia in southern Ukraine became the second.

11:42Then in 2025, the giant radiation-tight structure put over the sarcophagus in 2019 was pierced by a Russian drone. That these haven't led to tragedy? Mostly dumb luck. Chernobyl's wider lesson about safety is one that nuclear experts and workers desperately want the world to learn.

12:10And probably you know that at the night when the reactor number four explodes, Valery Hodinchuk, who was senior operator of main circulation pumps, was the first victim. He died during this night. There's a memorial between reactors three and four inside the Chernobyl plant. There's a plaque and a sculpture and flowers. flowers that even 40 years later are still changed out regularly. Because a lot of structures of Unit 4 were completely destroyed, he was lost somewhere under this debris of the equipment. So now we can go to the Unit 4. This family was my neighbor in Pripyat, next building. Natalia has worked at Chernobyl since 1986 and says it's hard to explain what keeps her here.

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14:13Scalin requires infrastructure, talent, and policy certainty. The UK's modern industrial strategy delivers all three and more through a 10-year plan. With 10 trillion pounds in capital, world-class universities, and unrivaled market access, the UK is engineered for growth. Start your investment journey at business.gov.uk forward slash growth. This time-in-law is done all on Government street flood events offers Crushed menos commercial carnage and germany students Stop it guys burlato An official announcement from the Council of ministers. There has been an accident at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station.

15:02One of the atomic reactors was damaged. The consequences of the accident are being taken care of. Help is being given to the victims of the accident. A government commission has been set up. For me, who lived through Chernobyl back in 1986, I lived also through mobilization of the Ukrainian society, taking place under the slogan, Tell us the truth about Chernobyl. Serhii Plohi is a professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University and the author of two books on the subject, Chernobyl, The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe, and Chernobyl Roulette. The key issue, the key question was the truth, right?

15:41What is truth? And that's also one of the reasons why I researched and wrote the book, because I wanted to answer that question that I had back in 1986, when I had to keep my children inside, when my information was coming from BBC, and Voice of America and Deutsche Welle and my own government at that time was either silent or was lying. In the process, I also was researching and telling the story of the late Soviet Union. How much would you say the Chernobyl accident was attributable to how it was managed, that notion of hierarchy and information flow, and how much of it had to do with, you know, bad protocols, bad safety procedures, a bad kind of reactor?

16:26In the Soviet Union, they believed, honestly believed, that reactors don't explode under socialism, and that only under capitalism, something like that is possible, like Three Mile Island. It turned out they exploded, but they exploded also in a very socialist, communist Soviet way. First of all, Chernobyl reactor originally was based on the design that was stolen by the Soviet spies from the United States back in the late 1940s. It was a dual-purpose reactor that could be turned from the one that was boiling water, as was the case in Chernobyl, into one that would produce weapon-grade uranium or plutonium.

17:10And that is why the problems, they were kept top secret. So even operators didn't know that the reactor had those issues because it was also a military reactor. So that secrecy was one major factor. Another major factor was, of course, the top-down political and bureaucratic culture. If you look at what happened at Fukushima, what happened at Three Mile Island in the UK, there was an accident in 1957. the people on the plants when the accident happened, they were empowered to make decisions on their own. In the Soviet Union to evacuate Pripyat, one had to go all the way to the head of the government of the Soviet Union.

18:00So that creates all sorts of issues and problems. And also the key element of that political culture and managerial culture is avoiding responsibility because it never was a law-based society, and that's a big difference. So reactors explode both under communism and capitalism, but they explode in a little bit different way. What lessons do you think the nuclear industry learned from the accident in the sort of immediate aftermath in the first couple of decades? So the radioactive clouds didn't pay attention to the Iron Curtain. Chernobyl is viewed as one accident where there was some learning, and those adjustments were initiated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, agreements on the exchange of information about accidents.

18:51Once the Berlin Wall fell, a lot of these reactors, the Soviet-made reactors, were really modernized in accordance with the European and Western standards in general. And the phrase was born out of that, that became part of the now general understanding of the dangers of the nuclear industry, that Chernobyl anywhere is Chernobyl everywhere. So suddenly it became very clear that if the decision to build a nuclear power plant is a sovereign decision of individual state, once something goes wrong, it becomes an international problem. And that realization, that understanding is now deeply ingrained in the thinking of international community in general.

19:36Now, my analysis in particular, that it's more than about just technological deficiencies of the reactor. It's about the political culture. You really can't go to Russia and turn it into the law-based society or somehow take the party in China outside of the decision-making on the reactors or how the industry is being run. And we saw that once again in 2022 with the start of all-out Russian aggression against Ukraine. The war went nuclear on the very first day of the invasion, on the 24th of February 2022, when Russia took over Chernobyl nuclear power plant. They waged a battle on the territory of the Parisian nuclear power plant in March of 2022, the largest nuclear power plant in Europe.

20:28And that demonstrates completely another level of disregard for nuclear safety, for life of your own soldiers, life and health of the population in general. So when there is a learning from Chernobyl on the level of technology, I found zero learning when it comes to the political decisions and the political culture. In particular, here we are talking about Russia. Nothing was learned from 1986. Things actually became worse. One thing that we found on our first trip to Ukraine, looking into the occupation at Chernobyl, there was a safety protocol for all of the possible failure modes of this massively complex machine, but no game plan for if somebody comes to the gate.

21:19Did that surprise you that there was just simply not any kind of protocol around that? It didn't surprise me because that was unthinkable. So my surprise was linked to the decision that was made by the Russian government, by the Russian military commanders to do that. And another surprise really linked not to 2022, but to the year 2026. And my understanding is that as there was no plan and there were no instructions back in 2022, we are as unprepared to humankind to that sort of developments now in 2026. As it was the case in 2022, the major piece of international kind of legislation and agreement comes from late 1980s, where the reactors are treated on par with the hydroelectric power stations.

22:17So they're in the same category. I am arguing after occupation of Chernobyl for the need to have a major international convention on the nuclear side, specifically at the time of war, how they can be protected. Because my personal belief, I am not against nuclear energy in general. I think that the question for me is I want the public to be informed. I also want safety to be there. We are not learning lessons at this point. To a degree, that reaction to Chernobyl 1 in 1986 was almost immediate. Within a few months, agreements were made. There is no learning of any sort from Chernobyl 2022, despite the fact that even an aggressor country like Russia is interested in some sort of an international agreement, because in 2023, the Ukrainian armed forces launched an offensive on the territory of Russia in the Kursk region, getting probably 50, 60 kilometers close to the Kursk nuclear power plant.

23:23and Russians were using the same language in 2023 that the Ukrainians were using in 2022, appealing to the International Atomic Energy Agency, what is going on, where are you, why you wouldn't stop that. And International Atomic Energy Agency has actually no mandate. It has no mandate, even what they're doing, and people are very critical of what they're doing, It has no mandate to do even what it was doing in Chernobyl and in case of Zaporizhia. The taboo on the occupation and military attacks on nuclear sites that existed before 2022 had been broken. It is gone. Now, the war in Ukraine is the war of drones more and more.

24:10And the non-nuclear country can very easily go nuclear by attacking somebody's nuclear facilities like nuclear power plants. That's the new reality. I hope that people behind closed doors in the military intelligence and planning and things like that, at least consider that and think about that. So my position is we have no business building new reactors before we found a way to protect the reactors that we have. And there are ways to do that. One needs a political will, and that's what we lack so far. How do you think that the fact that the Chernobyl accident happened, that it sort of exists now as a sort of cautionary tale, ultimately affected the nuclear industry's proliferation, the degree to which people didn't want a power station on or near their border, for example?

25:08Certainly, Chernobyl became the symbol of the dangers that come with the benefits of nuclear energy and nuclear industry. For very good reasons, again, the size, the number of people affected. But also because of its representation in the popular culture. What we see generally is that with any nuclear accident, there is periods measured in decades. that people would be really cautious and reluctant to touch again nuclear industry. In the United States, only three reactors were built in the last 30 years. After Fukushima, Germany decided actually to go nuclear-free. So that is one of the reasons why it is so risky to bat on nuclear industry, to deal with climate change.

26:03Because the accidents do happen. because any accident, God forbid, will mean that the nuclear industry would be put on pause for another couple of decades. The legacy of Chernobyl is not that nuclear should not be used, but it should be used responsible and international oversight should be much stronger than it is today. Fascinating. Professor Plohi, thank you very much for taking the time with us. It's a pleasure to be on the podcast.