In short
Liability-driven investing (LDI) and risk-controlled fixed income at Nyssa Investment Advisors, including how client conversations changed from near-zero rates to 2022, and how Nyssa defines risk, alpha vs beta, and fee/benchmark alignment.
Guest
David Eichhorn, CEO and Head of Investment Strategies at Nyssa Investment Advisors (institutional asset manager ~ $470B AUM; ~low 200 clients; mostly separately managed accounts; fixed income-heavy). Background: Joined Nyssa in late 1998 after work at J.P. Morgan; connected via Nobel laureate Phil Dibvig (Washington University).
Key claims
Managers should deliver true alpha, not disguise beta as alpha; risk control means being “stingy” with clients’ risk budgets and requiring each active bet to earn its way via information ratio; risk must be assessed across the investor’s horizon, not just monthly volatility.
Notable examples
LDI hedges interest-rate risk with longer Treasuries/zero-coupon bonds and derivatives (about half of derivatives are interest-rate). In 2022, clients largely didn’t unwind hedges; hedge ratios increased. Private credit: illiquidity premium ~3% but fees/vehicle leverage (SOFR+150–250) transfer >2% to managers; liquid alternatives (e.g., BDC vs high-yield/credit leverage) beat by ~3% annualized over 20 years. Hedge-fund-like liquid alternatives: co-developed to reduce hedge-fund fee/lockup burden using derivative-based, more index-like “dynamic beta” strategies.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOIntroducing David Eichhorn
0:45 to 1:25
Meet David Eichhorn, CEO of Nyssa Investment Advisors.
“overseeing approximately$470 billion in assets, which is broken up between$298 billion in physical assets plus about$172 billion in derivatives, notional value.”
David's Journey to Nyssa
1:25 to 2:29
David shares his career journey and decision to join Nyssa.
“Early in your career, you went to New York, but you always wanted to return to St.”
NISA's Client-Centric Approach
2:29 to 3:43
Understanding NISA's origins and client-focused philosophy.
“And for listeners who may not know the firm well, how would you describe NISA?”
Growth Trajectory at NISA
3:43 to 4:30
David discusses NISA's growth from $13 billion to $500 billion.
“sense of the being around such a concentration of academics and quats was just great when it was still very early in my career.”
The Dynamic Nature of Asset Management
4:30 to 6:20
Exploring how NISA has adapted to changes in the investment landscape.
“You know, I'd say in our industry, maybe I can't speak that broadly, but the strategic of constants for NISA.”
The Importance of Client Relationships
6:20 to 7:50
David explains the value of genuine client partnerships.
“Everything else has evolved quite a bit.”
NISA's Client Engagement Model
7:50 to 9:36
Examining NISA's intentional model of serving fewer clients with customized solutions.
“And one way that you are differentiated is you have relatively few clients compared to your large AUM.”
Contrast with Product-Centric Models
9:36 to 11:03
David contrasts NISA's consultative approach with traditional product-driven models.
“They build a product first and then they go and try to find clients to sell it to.”
Defining Risk in Investments
11:03 to 12:33
Understanding how NISA approaches risk beyond traditional measures.
“and of course, there's times where we've solved one client's problem, then it's one's client's situation.”
Risk Control and Client Budgets
12:33 to 14:00
David discusses the importance of managing client risk budgets effectively.
“So when you think about risk, what dimensions of risk matter most?”
Show all 25 chapters
Understanding Different Risk Horizons
14:00 to 15:00
Explore how varying investment horizons impact perceived risk and volatility.
“And then I think maybe if there is one distinction, I think we often I think sometimes the industry doesn't spend enough time on thinking about the horizon of folks risk.”
Risk Control in Fixed Income Investing
15:00 to 17:40
Learn about the importance of risk control in fixed income strategies and its impact on performance.
“I guess another way to think about risk is the risk of the future not transpiring as modeled.”
Market Efficiency: Equity vs. Fixed Income
17:40 to 20:15
Discuss the efficiencies and inefficiencies in equity and fixed income markets and their implications for investors.
“And because beta, when you add beta as a part of an excess return, you can't get breadth of bets.”
The Landscape of Private Credit Investing
20:15 to 23:07
Examine the current state, risks, and opportunities within the private credit market.
“as a result, we think there's a higher ability to deliver persistent, durable alpha.”
Introduction to Liability-Driven Investing
23:07 to 26:01
Understand liability-driven investing (LDI) and its significance in managing long-term obligations.
“We've been trying to point that out for a while now in this space.”
Asset and Liability Awareness in Investing
26:01 to 28:01
Learn the importance of viewing investments through the lens of future liabilities and how it can influence risk tolerance.
“Why do you think that shift may be hard for investors to make?”
Understanding Asset Liability Management
28:01 to 29:00
Learn how asset liabilities can influence investment strategies and risk tolerance.
“In other spaces, we think looking at asset liability in the right framework could actually give you more risk tolerance or capacity than you appreciated.”
Client Conversations in a Low Rate Environment
29:01 to 31:20
Explore the challenging discussions with clients during a decade of low interest rates.
“So take us back to the period before 2022, when interest rates were near zero.”
The Impact of Rising Interest Rates
31:21 to 33:34
Discover how client conversations evolved during and after the interest rate hike in 2022.
“How did client conversations change during and immediately after that drawdown?”
Differentiating Client Types: Public vs. Corporate Funds
33:35 to 36:26
Learn how different client types approach funding, risk, and interest rate sensitivity.
“And I suppose when you're fully funded, you should, all else being equal, want to hedge even more, right?”
Fees, Beta, and Alpha in Investment Management
36:27 to 40:06
Examine the relationship between fees and the distinction between beta and alpha in portfolios.
“But the bonds play a role of not directly as a liability hedge, more as how do they help offset some of the risks and balance the risk vis-a-vis their equity and other risk asset classes.”
Creating Hedge Fund-Like Returns with Lower Fees
40:07 to 42:00
Understand the strategy of replicating hedge fund returns while minimizing fees.
“What problem is that trying to solve for clients?”
Client-Centric Fee Structures
42:00 to 45:00
Learn about the importance of aligning fees with client value in asset management.
“you have a lot of cushion because you're wiping out a large percentage of the fees.”
Vision for Growth at Nyssa
45:00 to 46:28
Explore Nyssa's growth strategy and the introduction of new equity strategies.
“So for my last question, I'm going to ask you for a moment to try to be a visionary.”
Closing Insights and Gratitude
46:28 to 46:46
David Eichhorn shares his appreciation for the conversation and insights gained.
“I'm excited that is a key pillar of our near and intermediate term growth.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:05David Eichhorn:Welcome to the Insightful Investor Podcast, a weekly series that seeks to share industry, investment, and market insights. We define insights as concepts that are counterintuitive, widely misunderstood, or underappreciated. In other words, unique ideas that you probably won't hear elsewhere. I'm Alex Shahidi, the host of the podcast and co-CIO of Evoke Advisors, a leading investment advisory firm. Learn more about our show at insightfulinvestor.org.
0:38David Eichhorn:Today, I'm joined by David Eichhorn, CEO and Head of Investment Strategies at Nyssa Investment Advisors. Nyssa is a leading institutional asset manager overseeing approximately$470 billion in assets, which is broken up between$298 billion in physical assets plus about$172 billion in derivatives, notional value. This is as of year end, 2025. NISA serves public pensions, corporate plans, and other large institutional investors. In today's conversation, we'll talk about liability-driven investing, NISA's risk-controlled investment philosophy, how client conversations have evolved across dramatically different interest rate environments, and how David is thinking about today's fixed income markets and longer-term financial risks.
1:23David Eichhorn:Welcome to the show, David. Thanks for having me, Alex. I'm really delighted to be here. And we're delighted to have you. Early in your career, you went to New York, but you always wanted to return to St. Louis. What was it about Nyssa that stood out to you at the time and convinced you to make that move? Yeah, I did always certainly want to return to St. Louis. Loved New York and still love New York to this day, but home was home. I wasn't sure I'd ever be able to pull that off, to be honest, just the nature of what I did at J.P. Morgan, and et cetera. And I actually heard about NISA really through the same professor that linked me to J.P.
2:01Morgan, now a Nobel laureate, Phil Dibvig. When I reached out and said I may be moving, I was considering moving back to St. Louis, he said, really, there's one shop you should talk to in particular, and it was NISA. And that was, I guess it was late 98 when I started conversations with NISA. And it just seemed like a perfect, an oddly perfect fit. I mean, truly oddly perfect fit, given some of the institutional work I'd been doing at JPMorgan and what the business line of NISA that was that time, not quite five years old. It was an exciting place to potentially work.
2:31David Eichhorn:And for listeners who may not know the firm well, how would you describe NISA? Maybe its origins, its founding purpose, and core focus? Certainly, its origins and founding purpose have always been a very, very client-centric model, which I know everyone says that in our industry. I think we really mean it and practice it every day. I think in part being brutally honest, some of that client centricity was out of just absolute need as a small startup, effectively at the time, had to be a scrappy organization for sure. And listening to clients and being very client centric and responsive and customizing strategies was one way, frankly, to get attention at that size.
3:10So that's certainly been a key hallmark from day one, could go through a number of others, but another key element and what attracted me to NISA in part was the academic rigor of the organization. It was founded by two professors out of Washington University that had spent some time at Goldman Sachs and came back to start the company here in 94. And really that academic rigor really appealed to me coming out of a research orient or research group at J.P. Morgan. That was really an attractive element of NISA and it lived up to that in the sense of the being around such a concentration of academics and quats was just great when it was still very early in my career.
3:51David Eichhorn:Well, when you joined over 27 years ago, NISA managed about $13 billion. And today it's approaching$500 billion. What did that growth trajectory look like from the inside? And how did that firm change, if at all, as it scaled? I think that's probably more correlation than causality. I like how you set that up in the 27 years I've been here. But maybe a little bit of both, but probably more correlation than causality. You know, NISA's outcome and success was certainly, it was never inevitable, but it certainly was not accidental. I think at times along the way, it's felt like both. At times, it's felt a little accidental and at times, it's felt inevitable.
4:29But I think, you know, over this time, what matters most and has always mattered is really focusing on the strategic constants. You know, I'd say in our industry, maybe I can't speak that broadly, but the strategic of constants for NISA. Again, I've already alluded to being wildly client-centric, almost zealot client-centric. And what do clients really need? What are we trying to deliver? That's been a key element of what has stayed the same, to your question. A belief that managers should deliver true alpha, not disguise beta as alpha. And so that means in some areas, we can't provide alpha, so we don't offer a product.
5:04But in the areas where we can truly generate genuine alpha. We do. And when we're able to do that, we love to deliver that product. And it relates to the client centricity, an extension of staff model. Again, maybe that was out of a scrappiness on day one, but it's actually a lot of fun to be able to hold yourself out to clients as, how can we help? What do we do on your behalf? And how can we be an extension of your staff? And that's been a term we've used since really the inception of the firm. What's changed is probably everything else. So, I mean, at a high level, you know, those are some, and I'm sure I'm missing a couple of key pillars, but everything else, I mean, this is an industry that's very, very dynamic.
5:44I think that's what makes it very fun, a lot of fun, but you need to evolve over time. So nearly everything else as far as whether that be technology, I mean, I laugh, I was reflecting a while back, believe me, when I joined, our email system was AOL. I mean, And maybe that's embarrassing to acknowledge, frankly, but as I joke with my kids, I'm too old to be embarrassed anymore. So almost everything else as far as the infrastructure of how we deliver and how we deliver, whether that the alpha, the client service has had to evolve. And we've had to be very deliberate about that. And I think we're still learning on that front, but that's evolved.
6:20Everything else has evolved quite a bit.
6:21David Eichhorn:And what you just described is very consistent with what I've heard with other firms that have enjoyed large scale, which is the core tenets, you know, the North Star has been there since the very beginning. And everything else has changed for two reasons. One is you sort of have to change the scale, but also the market, the environments, client requests and needs, they all change as well. So if you're dogmatic about everything else, you probably can't achieve that scale. It's just such a great point. And you're almost flirting out with words I've used around here, which is, and I've kind of, frankly, stolen these words from Bain and company that has a great concept of founder's mentality and something that I've really tried to instill that as you've gotten larger, we have to do everything you described.
7:07And I hate hearing words like, well, this is the way we've always done it, right? We want to be deferential to the status quo and what's worked, but not deferential to a fault. But we want to always remember what our insurgent mission was in this industry. And it really was to be a differentiated client-centric organization and one that genuinely partners with clients. You know, I see in our industry that term strategic partner gets thrown around a lot. And I think it's been cheapened a little bit, candidly, to mean we want a lot of your assets. That's what I think that often means. You know, for us, of course, we're very happy to run a lot of assets for a client.
7:43But really, a genuine strategic partner is when you're learning from your clients and making you better every day. That's what we really, as much as the AUM, we get that so often from our clients, and it makes us sharp, and it allows us to continue to push that insurgent mission of being a differentiated asset manager.
8:01David Eichhorn:And one way that you are differentiated is you have relatively few clients compared to your large AUM. Can you give us a sense of how many clients you serve and why that model is intentional? It is a very intentional model. As you mentioned, around$470 billion in assets. And again, depending on the exact quarter end, but low 200s of clients. So you can do the quick math there. That's really, really a large average account size. There aren't lead tables, but that's probably one of the largest in the industry, just given what we do. But again, it comes back to being a genuine extension of staff, being a genuine partner and customizing virtually everything we do is in separately managed accounts.
8:41You're 99%, something like that, of the assets we manage. So that necessitates larger engagements. And also a lot of the strategy we manage are fixed income. They're not private. They're not the highest fee from a basis point perspective. So that tends to lend itself how that works or how it can really only work is larger engagements where the customization makes sense, the extension of staff makes sense. And there's kind of a nice virtuous connection there that I think some of those really, so you can imagine if that's our account size, average account size, we tend to work with some of the largest institutional investors in the world.
9:18And lo and behold, they kind of demand or reasonably expect customization to what they genuinely need. And we like to provide that. And so that's how those two fit hand in glove for us. And we end up with a model that results in very large average account sizes.
9:35David Eichhorn:The other way you could be differentiated is when you compare it to many asset managers, they tend to be more product driven. They build a product first and then they go and try to find clients to sell it to. You've taken a very different consultative approach as you've described. How would you contrast that client relationship model with the traditional product centric asset management model? This is not feigned humility. I'm not a visionary. I don't I can't I don't think I can figure out what exactly clients are going to want by just going into the lab and designing it. Maybe others accomplish that and maybe others in our industry can do that.
10:10Or often what we'll see is let's prototype 10 strategies. And if one of those work, great. You know, but that to me always means then probably you have nine at least somewhat disappointed clients. And that's just never really fit our model. So I think those two things maybe combined to where I don't know how it sounds exactly, but genuinely listening to clients. stepping back, hearing what their challenges are, learning from them, truly going and seeing, are there ways we can help whatever that challenge is? And I think that sounds altruistic and what have you, but lo and behold, if one of our clients have a specific challenge and we're able to address it and help quite often in most of the cases in our history, others and many others have it.
10:52And so we effectively co-develop a strategy that we know the market actually needs and wants as opposed to what we're projecting on the market than trying to sell. And so that's, and of course, there's times where we've solved one client's problem, then it's one's client's situation. And that's okay as well. But I think there's a higher confidence with this model that what we develop and what we spend the time and energy doing will have applicability across our institutional clients.
11:17David Eichhorn:And in some ways, there's a potential friction in designing firms because Because what you described earlier, as far as you launch 10 products, one works, quote unquote, works, nine don't. And you can just get rid of the nine and you erase it from the institutional memory. And now you're touting the one product that's working. And you do that multiple times. It can be a very profitable way to build a business, but it may not necessarily be best for clients. So I think the way you're approaching it is from a completely different perspective. Academic description would be survivorship bias, right?
11:53And we see that in consultant databases or products just vanish or new products come and go, et cetera. We really have had an approach. And thankfully, because of that, and I think also focusing on true alpha has allowed us to run the same products. Again, they're evolving. How we're delivering the alpha has to evolve, et cetera. But it absolutely has evolved over time. But the key element of what we're trying to accomplish and that the actual strategies actually are the same. And we've added to them, but added to them in a very measured pace, the number of products over time.
12:28David Eichhorn:I assume one of the big objectives of clients is risk control. So when you think about risk, what dimensions of risk matter most? And how do you define risk beyond simple volatility or perhaps drawdowns? Yeah. Risk control is probably a term we use maybe ad nauseum around here for our clients' sake. It's critically important because we're just really stingy in how we use risk budgets of clients. That's what's dear to clients. They have a certain amount of risk budget to deploy. If you're not stingy with it, then you're taking it from somewhere else that maybe could be deployed and generate alpha or beta or whatever the client's trying to accomplish.
13:05But to your question, you said, I think, volatility and drawdowns. Those are certainly really, really important. Of course, those are natural starting points. We look at, you know, I don't know that I have any wild expertise in all the different, what's the exact best way to look at a volatility measure or risk in the sense of the end of it has to be a mosaic. You need to look at everything, right? So it's clearly vol and drawdown, or we can get into CVARS or Sortino ratios or whatever it is. But at the end of the day, you know, one thing about models is the name itself reminds you it's not the world.
13:39It's a model, right? And every estimate you have, the only thing you know with absolute certainty is it's incorrect, right? It's not how it's going to play out. That doesn't mean they're not useful. It just means you have to treat them with the appropriate amount of humility to say these estimates are helpful, but I want to look at a variety of measures of risk in a variety of different ways. And maybe the mosaic paints a picture for me of how to best act. And then I think maybe if there is one distinction, I think we often I think sometimes the industry doesn't spend enough time on thinking about the horizon of folks risk.
14:10And what I mean is, you know, the classic reporting, everything is typically on a monthly basis. So monthly volatility, et cetera. Very, very valuable, important, of course. But when clients have different horizons, different instruments and different strategies tend to have can have very different volatilities. My example, a five-year treasury zero coupon bond has a fair amount of volatility over the next week or month or what have you. Over five years, barring a default of the U.S. government, you know the outcome. It has zero volatility. And that's a little bit of a trite example and maybe an obvious one.
14:45But there's other strategies that have more convergence elements to them that you have to understand. Well, if an investor's horizon is over, they tend to be over multiple years, we need to make sure we're not over indexing on short term vol relative to the volatility over the horizon that matters most.
15:01David Eichhorn:I guess another way to think about risk is the risk of the future not transpiring as modeled. Absolutely. And it's not yet exactly right. Not transpiring as modeled and importantly, that connection to the time frame. Again, I'll use an example. I think that's some of the insightfulness of things like the Cape Shiller model, right? That at the end of the day, that's something where over the short term has terrible predictive powers, right? I mean, it's basically a coin flip that it's useful on a given day if it says right now equities are very expensive or equities are very, very cheap. But it's been a remarkably powerful indicator of the expected risk premium on equity over, I'll say five, but closer to maybe five to 10 year horizon.
15:45So if what matters and you have a gambler ruin situation where you may have to shut down risks and whatever, if what matters is over something over a month, then you better you better index on that because you may have you're allocating risk based on that. But if what actually matters is over that five or 10 year horizon, we need to be careful to not over index on the short term vol and focus on other measures. One example, like like Kate Schiller.
16:08David Eichhorn:And a lot of what you do falls under what you call risk controlled fixed income. What does that mean in practice? And why is risk control so central to generating reliable outcomes? Again, first comes down to being stingy. If we're fortunate enough to get any amount of a client's risk budget, we want to use it very purposefully. And I think we're efficient market people to a degree to start with. So we start if we're given a benchmark, whether in fixed income, whether it is the Bloomberg aggregate or long credit, we start with that benchmark and we look, how do we every decision around that benchmark, every active positioning needs to earn its way in on a risk-adjusted basis.
16:50Or, of course, what we talk a lot about around here is information ratio. So every active position has to earn its way in as the right information ratio bet on a standalone basis and how it correlates with other positions in the portfolio. And that's true on all the different types of the credit research views we put in place, if we have a yield curve positioning, et cetera. But the key, you almost can't be risk controlled almost. Maybe I'd argue you can't be just to say it maybe more provocatively. You can't be risk controlled and inject beta into your alpha process. So if you're trying to deliver excess performance, and I'm particularly using that word, not alpha, you're trying to deliver excess performance, but you're doing so by injecting some beta, overweighting high yield or going down in quality or what have you.
17:35It doesn't mean it's not a nice form of excess performance. I would just argue it's not true alpha. And because beta, when you add beta as a part of an excess return, you can't get breadth of bets. You're going to be very concentrated in effectively a risk on bet, right? It's effectively one bet. Even if I'm getting along a little bit of high yield and a little bit going down in quality and maybe some structured product, all those are highly correlated in events. back to your earlier question, in volatile environments and risk-off environments. And so you've lost all breath on that positioning.
18:09And so as a result, even if it delivers excess return, and it should, it's beta, it's a compensated risk asset class, it's going to come in at a very poor risk-adjusted return or a very low information ratio relative to what we seek to deliver.
18:21David Eichhorn:So there are views that the equity markets are relatively efficient, but it's potentially the case where fixed income could be less efficient. How do you think about that? I think there can be pockets of the equity market that are that are less efficient. But I think on balance, you completely agree that the equity market is on balance more efficient. Fixed income, one of the reasons that we've always lived in the fixed income space, maybe we're just kind of math geeks at heart. I'm a math geek at heart. And so it appeals to our quantitative geeky nature. But the other is that the fixed income market is just as beautiful, inherently over the counter market.
18:59Right. And so that that that doesn't necessarily dictate it has to be in a less efficient market, but it's a strong starting point of why there'll be inefficiencies. And the other thing about bonds is obvious, but kind of gets lost in the shuffle as well. They mature, right, which which sounds like an obvious comment. But a bond and how you think about measuring its risk, its potential alpha when it was issued at 10 years is different than when it's dropped down to five and two. And so modeling is actually kind of sneakily complex and how to understand that. And so that over-the-counter nature, the nature that the bonds actually mature and time vary in their risk profile, add to that that unlike stocks for the vast majority of companies, there's one stock that's traded on that company where for bonds in the investment grade universe, there's 10, 20, as many as 50 bonds that all trade a little differently.
19:51And they create this kind of wonderful little disturbance of what's the exact value of this issuer that we like to take advantage of and what we refer to as kind of relative value trading. Those are all kind of elements to us that just make inherently the bond market less efficient. I don't want to call it inefficient capital I, because of course, there's a lot of smart money that's chasing bonds every day, but it is inherently a less efficient market that we think as a result, we think there's a higher ability to deliver persistent, durable alpha.
20:20David Eichhorn:One of the areas within fixed income that's been in the headlines recently is private credit. What risks do you see there? And what do you see genuine opportunities across today's fixed income landscape? So it has been in the news a lot lately. I'll try to make this quick because I could talk about this forever. And I don't think that's the point of this today. But and I want to be clear, you know, whether or not private credit standing on the precipice. We'll see. That's a big macro call that I'm not really the best suited to make a big macro call on that front. What I've written, and I actually recently published, I guess starting right about year end, four short papers on private credit has been more structurally kind of some of the critiques I've had of private credit.
21:04But I'll start with your kids, you have put ups and put downs, right? So put up for private credit, which is when you look at the private credit loans, and I think the analysis we did was interesting because we really unpacked and really benchmarked appropriately and controlled for things like interest rate, differential leverage, mark to market nature, et cetera. But when you unpack the loans, private credits actually, before fees, has delivered a really nice illiquidity premium. I think we estimated about 3%. So we have nothing against the asset class. Again, maybe it's about to have an issue and maybe we're witnessing it, but we'll have to come back in months or a year to determine that.
21:43The challenge, what we see with private credit is more the structure, how it's delivered to investors. The fees are outrageously high, just to say it for what it is. There's just too much of the return is going to the manager. So that 3 % risk premium on an unlevered basis, we estimate more than 2 % of that goes to the managers over the last 20 years. And then add to it, the typical structure of private credit has a turn of leverage at the vehicle level, whether it be a BDC or private BDC or what have you. And that leverage is wildly expensive, particularly for our institutional investors. So even before the recent issues, those vehicles tended to borrow at SOFR plus 150 to 250.
22:25That's too much of the yield is being given away in the leverage where our clients can lever on their balance sheet and effectively SOFR by lending treasuries, right? You put all that together and the punchline of the series was, you know, what's kind of been lost almost in the narrative right now has been what the problems of private credit may or may not be having. Even before all of these, if you looked at publicly traded BDCs and compared those controlling for leverage and interest rate differential, so compared it to high yield plus a turn of high yield CDX leverage, that liquid alternative has actually beat BDCs by, depending on the exact horizon, by something like 3 % annualized over the last 20 years.
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23:06So that's kind of the too much of the return structurally is going to managers as opposed to asset owners. We've been trying to point that out for a while now in this space.
23:16David Eichhorn:I know one area you focus on is liability-driven investing. We have some listeners who may be less familiar with that. How do you explain what LDI is, what it means to hedge, and why an institution would want to hedge rather than simply maximize returns? Sure. I mean, I think the short of it is, you know, and this really lives predominantly in the corporate defined benefit space. And it really we had talked about managing risk versus liability forever. Inception of the firm. Camidly, not many people listened. But there were a variety of regulatory changes in the mid aughts right before the financial crisis that made liabilities much more mark to market.
23:53So what it really did is bring into sharp contrast for plan sponsors and the fiduciaries of those plans that the liability itself has a lot of interest rate risk, right? When you're running a pension, you've promised to pay money way out in the future to your pensioners. Well, that feels like a bond. It's a promissory note to your pensioners. So that bond has an interest rate profile, very long duration interest rate profile, candidly. And so if I'm marking that to market like we do in the corporate space, that's going to have a lot of volatility. If rates drop, the liability is going to go up a lot and your funded status will fall and vice versa if you're not hedged.
24:30And so that's really the nature of liability driven investing and kind of how it started. And we were very early into that market and are one of the largest managers in that space. You know, that's an area where as clients begin to understand the risk, we started making the key point that you need to address that risk. It started with simple things like owning longer bonds, longer treasuries, longer zero coupon treasuries to match the interest rate risk of your liability or better match the interest rate risk. And then over time, that really was a key element of what grew our derivative businesses.
25:01A large, to this day, a large portion of our derivative business, around half, are interest rate derivatives to further hedge that liability risk. So those clients, as they look at their LDI strategy, they say, I don't want to be at the whim of interest rates, and I want to hedge some, if not all, of that interest rate risk. And kind of the funny thing that we've said maybe coming from a bond manager is we've always made the point, interest rate risk is not a well-compensated risk. We've said that for 30 years. It may not be compensated at all, but it's certainly not compensated like the equity risk premium.
25:33Again, funny for the kind of a bond manager to say it that way. So we said hedge most or all of your interest rate risk and use your risk budget on equities to the extent you can tolerate equity risk. Some can tolerate a little, some a lot. But that's, if you think of LDI comprehensively, it's better managing interest rate risk so you can deploy whatever risk budget you have into markets where you think to be compensated more handsomely.
26:00David Eichhorn:There's also a significant mindset shift from managing assets in isolation to managing assets relative to liabilities. Why do you think that shift may be hard for investors to make? And why is it so important? And how does that framing change portfolio decisions? I think it just because, you know, liabilities don't get talked about every day in press and a whole host of reasons. And when we talk about every variation of assets, but I think for clients who step back and look at it, it's not as hard. Now, what it means for different investors can be different, but it doesn't have to be as hard as it sounds.
26:33We're recording this a day after the national championship game. I think Michigan scored, going from every 69, I think 69 points in the game. And given they'd been scoring 90 something throughout the tournament, if you only told me that, I'd say it probably didn't work out well for Michigan last night. But you need to know UConn scored, I think, was 63 last night, if I recall. all. That's asset liability and asset liability awareness. I'm not even getting LDI as a specific genre of that, but asset liability awareness is that is just stepping back is the reason assets exist, contrary to popular belief, is not so that folks like NISA can manage them.
27:12Assets exist so that they can absolutely store value to pay some consumption in the future from most of our clients. That's a pension liability or an endowment payment, something like that. And so when you frame it that way and you step back away from it, you said, well, what is my it could be a capital L liability, very marked market like corporate liabilities, or could be more lower case liability like an endowment. It's not exactly as clearly structured, but there's still payments out there you want to you want to make to the university or the mission or whatever it is. when you frame it that way, I think it really helps clients think about it appropriately and think about risks the right way, including in some cases, that means a comfort of taking more risk.
27:52It's not always, I think sometimes people are about asset liability matching is always a de-risking discussion. That's been a lot of what's been going on in corporate DB space. In other spaces, we think looking at asset liability in the right framework could actually give you more risk tolerance or capacity than you appreciated.
28:09David Eichhorn:Well, because you're going back to the purpose of the assets, which is to cover future liabilities. And some of those can be more easily ascertained because if you have your corporate pension plan and you can roughly figure out what your liabilities will be. But I would think most investors have some liabilities, even if you're an individual and you have a portfolio, it's to cover your future expenses. So there could be some matching almost at every level. Really well said. And that's, you know, even how, again, we've described at times in the D.C. spaces, it's your pension liability to yourself.
28:45Right now, again, it's not as contractual, but at the end of the day, you'd like to retire very comfortably. Right. So you have some stream of cash flows you want to be able to pull out of your assets. So I think that's a great way to describe it, Alex.
28:57David Eichhorn:So let's live through the last, let's say the last decade. So take us back to the period before 2022, when interest rates were near zero. What were the hardest conversations you were having with clients during that environment? That is a weird environment. I hope I hope we don't go back to it for a lot of reasons, frankly, not just as this is an asset manager. So, you know, clearly conversations, whether, you know, long bond at two percent, two and a half, you know, wherever we were at different points in time. Naturally, there'd be a conversation. Should I own bombs at two percent or on the front end of the curve, effectively zero and on some parts of the globe negative.
29:33Right. You know, we, of course, always came back to every risk premium should be thought of as on top of the risk free rate. You know, for practitioners speak, a treasury is a risk. I hope it's a risk free asset. I think it still is. So one, in that very low rate environment, there's going to be a different total return on all your assets. And it's always comparing a bond yield versus what you think you can get in a comparable instrument. But clearly that created conversations with clients. Should I own bonds at these levels, etc.? There's a paradox in that, right, because somebody has to own every bond.
30:07And the one thing I do know about assets is they're all owned. The Fed didn't own every bond in that environment. And so what made interest rates as low as they were was, well, someone had to own them. And you get in this paradox of, well, if you're not owning it, who does own it? And I think what came through loud and clear in that environment was certainly individuals who have very specific hedging requirements were very natural owners of those. And so, you know, our LDI clients in corporate space, they maybe added less to hedges over that environment because I think there's more upside than downside in rates.
30:41But they were really, really on balance, kind of true to their hedging objectives and at times difficult conversations to your question, but still nonetheless held with it and held with the hedging strategy that from a managing risk overtime and deploying risk budgets where they're best deployed, i .e. equities, it still, I think, serve clients well. Of course, crystal ball, if everyone knew exactly what was going to happen in 22, they should have unwound all their hedges and what have you. But, you know, mapper timing is really, really hard. That's why I don't really try to do it in any real size.
31:10And so most of our clients stuck with their hedges throughout that environment.
31:14David Eichhorn:And we know with perfect hindsight, interest rates were near zero for over a decade. Then, as you mentioned, came 2022 when long duration bonds experienced one of the worst years on record. How did client conversations change during and immediately after that drawdown? That was an uncomfortable environment. I mean, markets make you uncomfortable and they humble you every day. That's kind of what makes it fun. But I think that was an environment where the conversations, we certainly, I think we, but maybe more important than this, our clients reap the dividend of all the hard work of preparing boards and committees for what they were doing with their fixed income.
31:52So yes, clearly bonds sold off a lot. If you were hedging and you own bonds, that part of your portfolio was losing money and potentially a lot of money in the case of it was a long bond portfolio and a long bond portfolio plus an interest rate derivative. But at that point, still a majority of our clients that were using bonds in that context were not fully hedged. So the dividend that I'm referring to is, you know, we always describe to clients, to our clients, their committees, their boards, that when you're not fully hedged, as weird as it is to say, you want to lose on the asset you own, right?
32:27I mean, of course, perfect foresight is you wouldn't own the asset, right? But you have to balance your risks. But if you're 60 % hedge, you still want all those equal interest rates to go up. Because if they go up, you're picking up around on your liability. And so we actually saw one, I think over that period, effectively, no one, again, there can always be one counterexample that I'm not remembering, but I can't think of really a circumstance where a client unwound a hedge because they didn't know what they were in, right? They stuck with them. And quite to the contrary, as rates were going up, it's like, finally, there is an opportunity to hedge it higher.
32:58I've been waiting for higher interest rates. We're finally getting it. And we really saw our hedge ratios across clients go up quite meaningfully throughout 22 and beyond, particularly when 22 obviously wasn't a great equity market. But as we came out of that and equities really started to get their run and rates stayed at high levels. Now you had like a great double whammy in a good way. You had great appreciation and funded status thanks to interest rates having gone up and now equities climbing as well. Now, that's why corporate pension funds right now for the first time really in decades are more than fully funded.
33:32And that's been kind of that one-two punch of, I'll call it, 22 interest rates and subsequent to 22 equity markets.
33:39David Eichhorn:And I suppose when you're fully funded, you should, all else being equal, want to hedge even more, right? Yes, absolutely. With an asterisk that if you would have asked me that a couple years ago or a few, I would have not put the asterisk on it. Honestly, Alex, I think what's changed in the corporate space has been interesting is a combination of relaxed funding rules, how quickly you have to fund any deficit. There's been material changes for some of the rules I alluded to in the early aughts. And additionally, some other legislative changes on the use of surplus. So forever, we talk about, particularly if you're a closed plan, de-risk, maybe get to a little overfunded, but just try to really de-risk your plan.
34:19And now we've had some interesting conversations with clients where maybe you want to keep a little bit more risk in perpetuity because you have a use for surplus. We've seen some pensions actually reopen for the first time in ever, basically, you know, right? A few very notable pension plans. And so I wouldn't call that watershed at this moment that it's happening everywhere. So, yes, still the risk to your point, still meaningfully de-risked versus the old classic 60-40 or 70-30. Still very interest rate hedge. But maybe there's a role for a little bit more risk assets going off into the future because of some of the legislative and regulatory changes.
34:55David Eichhorn:You work with public pension plans, corporate plans, and also multi-employer funds, and each has a different liability structure. How do these client types differ in how they think about funding status, risk, and interest rate sensitivity? I'll order them this way, you know, going from kind of the most market to market to the least, right? You have the corporate pension community, the multi-employers a little bit in the middle, and then public funds are, I'll say, the least. So they look at their liabilities certainly differently. And I think the main difference there is interest rate risk hedging central to what you need to do to manage risk.
35:34And certainly for those first two sets of clients, it absolutely is. the nature of the role bonds play in their portfolios tend to be a risk management tool vis-a-vis the liability. Whereas in public fund space, bonds play a very important role. But in what's really nice with, as you alluded to, with rates higher now, bonds actually are delivering some amount of return at this point because they have a reasonable yield for the first time in decades recently. So our public fund clients think of them as the diversifier generally. And again, I'm painting very broad brushes, but generally as the diversifier to their equities, the safe asset class, the asset class they can draw on when there's the inevitable equity drawdown, et cetera.
36:18In some cases, they use some longer bonds because, and again, until the inflation scare recently, typically interest rates have fallen recently when equities fall out of bed. That correlation has been thrown into question a bit recently. But the bonds play a role of not directly as a liability hedge, more as how do they help offset some of the risks and balance the risk vis-a-vis their equity and other risk asset classes.
36:41David Eichhorn:Earlier, you talked about beta disguising itself as alpha in institutional portfolios. But how do you think about it when it comes to fees? And how does NISA help clients address that? You can trigger me on that. So I have to be a little curious. So I think the main thing we've contributed to this area is, and I'm going from memory, seven, eight, nine years ago is publishing a lot. And others have done this as well as looking at particularly in bond markets and bond markets where the index has a material amount in treasuries like the Bloomberg Aggregate Index. If you regress managers' excess performance on betas, that could be the high yield market or credit spreads, depending on the exact horizon, but often over half of their excess return is attributable to betas, correlates, and therefore there's a coefficient to a beta asset class.
37:30Over half of their excess return often comes from a beta as opposed to alpha. And we argue alpha is where skill is, and you should be paid more for skill. I'm not necessarily picking that you shouldn't be paid for solid beta construction. I just think in a world where you can get beta effectively for free, go buy a corporate bond ETF at very low fees or high yield ETF, the active management fees should be thought of in the context of, well, how much is that skill delivering, genuine alpha, versus how much is the beta delivering? And the fee discussion should reflect that. And it should reflect.
38:05And to be clear, this is not the only manager. There are some managers who you look at what they deliver, a preponderance of what they're delivering is genuine alpha. It's just the majority, the median manager is very healthy, has a very healthy dose of beta. And as a result, we question, should they be receiving an active fee level that's commensurate with a true alpha type of approach?
38:25David Eichhorn:I guess the other way to say it, perhaps more simply, is in some ways it's a benchmark problem. So you have managers that are managing against the Bloomberg aggregate index, and that has a certain makeup. And they're tilting one way or the other all the time, effectively. And if there was a better index that had that same tilt all the time, and you could access it cheaply, that's how they should be measuring their alpha and measuring how much fees they charge for that alpha generated. You actually said it perfectly. And it's again, I alluded to all the customization we do. If we were talking to a prospective client and they said, great, we really like your alpha against the ag, et cetera, but we would like you to deliver some of that excess return by overinvesting in credit, et cetera.
39:12We would say to your point, Alex, well, let's change the benchmark. We can, you know, there are full credit benchmarks or intermediate where 100 % of the benchmark is that beta or high yield benchmark, depending on how aggressive you want to be. So we're very comfortable setting up. In fact, we spend a lot of, and I'm so glad you mentioned that we spend a lot of time with clients. Let's make the benchmark representative of the beta exposure you want, because at that point, you can't always get that passively depending on the exact benchmark design. but for artistic license, probably can get a close enough version of it passively.
39:44Then hold us accountable to have we delivered alpha over that new harder benchmark? I think that's one of the particularly the aggregate with with the amount of treasuries our government keeps issuing. It's become a larger and larger portion of the benchmark. And it's just an enormous attractive nuisance of an overweight for spread product. We would argue to your point, change the benchmark and hold us accountable to that.
40:06David Eichhorn:I know NISA also focuses on replicating hedge fund-like returns using derivatives. What problem is that trying to solve for clients? Yeah, and that goes, but you alluded to kind of how we develop products and I said not being a visionary, just partnering with clients. That really came out of a very direct one-on-one conversation with a client where I'll say a problem, the challenge that they were seeing is fees going up wildly. you know, the hedge fund winners that really, and there are some great hedge funds, fees going up wildly and lockups going up considerably. And maybe they're the best managers, or frankly, maybe they're just in the distribution, the ones who've done well lately, right?
40:46And I think this asset owner was somewhere between frustrated to indignant on, they're managing liquid assets and they're locking me up for three years and fees are high, et cetera. So they presented the challenge to me of, we know you run very adjacent strategies with some of your derivative programs you want run, sometimes referred as QIS strategies, et cetera. Will you build a portfolio for me that seeks to deliver that type of return? Different way to say it is maybe some elements of hedge fund returns are actually kind of beta. They're messy dynamic beta, but trend is an example, a classic CTA type strategy where there are a lot of trend managers get a lot of high fees managing against trend.
41:27We think there's this very basic strategies that are more index-like that can deliver a hedge fund-like outcome, and you should be charged something not low index fees because it's a dynamic beta, but much lower than hedge fund fees. And that was really the problem slash challenge that was thrown our way. And it's really been a really interesting strategy to run and kind of, I'll say, co-develop and begin managing to help address that issue of fees, lockups, and a liquid alternative that can be dialed up or down depending on the posture in the market at any point in time.
41:59David Eichhorn:And what's interesting about that approach is even if the gross returns aren't as good, you have a lot of cushion because you're wiping out a large percentage of the fees. Exactly right. And it's a heck of a head start. I know we have a client who's done similar things where we don't manage private credit, but a client who's invested themselves and co-invest. And it's exactly to get that head start on back. My earlier comments of avoiding grabbing that illiquidity premium, grabbing whatever the asset class is trying to deliver, but try to avoid fees. And again, I'm a manager where everything we do is based on asset management fees.
42:35So certainly we like fees, but they should be apportioned in some reasonable amount relative to the the absolute excess return you're going to get get in in that asset class. And importantly, they should be a portion relative to is it beta or alpha? And again, I think some of those asset classes, hedge funds, private credit, there's actually more beta bouncing around in there than I think people appreciate often. And the fee structure should reflect that in our opinion.
43:01David Eichhorn:And this focus that we just talked about that you have is also some evidence as to your client-centric approach, whereas many managers don't have those similar types of conversations. And in some ways, their business tends to do better the more fees they charge, as opposed to looking for ways to reduce the cost for investors. You're absolutely right. And I want to be clear, you know, because I wouldn't want people to see this in like, you know, Nissa and Dave are pure altruism. You know, clearly we need to earn a reasonable fee so that we can deliver this very non-scalable in a lot of ways business.
43:35this. So of course, we're not above fees, far from it. But you're right, we certainly, the nature, and I think this is why we have very high retention rates with clients, et cetera. We only offer products we believe in. So we offer very few products, candidly. And it's a high bar for us to have a product that we believe in, that we believe we're delivering genuine alpha, or for that matter, if we were delivering it, just a beta in a passive way, but one that we can deliver at the right fee. And I think that's important because I think that's what, again, if you want a long-term partnership, it's important that you work with clients to understand, well, what value are you getting out of it?
44:10What value are we getting out of it as a manager? And we should both, you know, I view fees, neither of us should be perfectly happy, right? Because, you know, we need to run a business and clients should be getting appropriate amounts of excess performance given at the end of the day, it's their balance sheet at risk, not NISA's, right? If there's defaults in private credit, right? That's on their balance sheet, not the manager's balance sheet. we spend a lot of time and I think I think we're thoughtful about the right apportioning of fees. And it's a it's a key element, I think, of just treating clients the appropriate way.
44:42David Eichhorn:And it goes back to an unreasonable business setup is one where you earn reasonable fees for the actual value that you're creating. Succinctly said, I should I should I don't do enough podcasts. I could have said it that way. Been done. Sorry. Sorry. That was long winded. No problem. So for my last question, I'm going to ask you for a moment to try to be a visionary. What do you see as the next growth phase for Nyssa? The quick answer is I'll say more of the same in the sense of those strategic constants and being a genuine solution provider. And that's really the platform that I think if I've probably been feigning a lot of humility, where we've been good, I think, over time is in spotting based on that solution provision, spotting a jumping off point of like, wow, this is probably really something that's going to interest clients.
45:30I think we can do well. I think it's a really great outcome for MISA as well. So it starts with that always. And so I think you alluded to a number of them. We've been doing some really interesting things and I'll say hedge fund alternatives. I've kind of referred to myself as the accidental hedge fund manager. It's not exactly what we were trying to design it. It came out of client conversations. And I found this whole conversation, I can't believe, and I failed probably to weave in, we have recently started, we brought on a team to manage equity strategies, particularly dynamic extension and equity market neutral, that actually on the surface may sound different for NISA, but it's actually the same wild breadth of active positioning and seeking high information ratios.
46:11That we brought on, and I do view, I think this is probably its biggest single core competency is serendipity. The opportunity presented itself for the team, and it seems to be the right moment for dynamic equity extension strategies, equity market neutral. And we've been really excited with the conversations we're having with clients, existing clients and prospective clients on that strategy. I'm excited that is a key pillar of our near and intermediate term growth.
46:40David Eichhorn:That sounds great. David, I appreciate you joining us and sharing all your insights. Thank you. This was great. I really enjoyed it. Thanks for having me, Alex.
47:10David Eichhorn:sure you don't miss future episodes. And don't forget to forward today's conversation to others you think would enjoy listening. Important information. This podcast is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal, tax, investment, or business advice. It is not a solicitation, recommendation, or endorsement. All opinions expressed by participants are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Evoque Advisors Division of MAI Capital Management, LLC, or Evoque, its affiliates, or any companies mentioned. Information shared has not been independently verified by MAI or its affiliates.
47:44David Eichhorn:MAI Capital Management, LLC, or MAI, is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, which does not imply any particular level of skill or training. Certain information contained herein has been obtained from third-party sources, and such information has not been independently verified. No representation, warranty, or undertaking expressed or implied is given to the accuracy or completeness of such information by any person. While such resources are believed to be reliable, Evoke does not assume any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of such information. Evoke does not undertake any obligation to update the information contained herein as of any feature date.
48:21David Eichhorn:The content is intended for a general audience and does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell securities or adopt any investment strategy. Any examples or scenarios discussed are illustrative only, involve risks and uncertainties, and do not guarantee future results. Non-traditional assets carry significant risks and may not be suitable for all investors. Decisions should be based on individual objectives, risk tolerance, and circumstances. Statements herein are general and may not reflect an individual's or entity's specific circumstances or applicable laws, which vary by jurisdiction.
48:54David Eichhorn:Further, speakers' views are personal and may differ from evoke and MAI recommendations and are not specific investment advice, and do not consider client objectives, risk tolerance, and diversification. Guests may have current or past relationships with Evoke and MAI, its affiliates, or the host, including as clients, service providers, or business partners. Participation does not constitute an endorsement or testimonial. No compensation has been paid or received for guest participation unless disclosed. MAI and its affiliates may have business relationships with entities mentioned in this podcast, which could create potential conflicts of interest.
49:28David Eichhorn:These relationships may include advisory services, investment management, or other arrangements. MAI seeks to manage such conflicts consistent with its fiduciary obligations and policies.
From the publisher
David is CEO and Head of Investment Strategies at NISA Investment Advisors, an institutional asset manager overseeing approximately $470 billion in assets as of year‑end 2025. In this episode, we discuss how NISA builds custom investment solutions around client needs and liabilities, why managing assets relative to liabilities changes portfolio construction, and how risk control and client dialogue can drive innovation at scale.
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This podcast/webcast is provided for informational purposes only and should not be considered legal, tax, investment, or business advice. It is not a solicitation, recommendation, or endorsement. All opinions expressed by participants are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Evoke Advisors Division of MAI Capital Management, LLC ("Evoke”), its affiliates, or any companies mentioned. Information shared has not been independently verified by MAI or its affiliates. MAI Capital Management, LLC (“MAI”) is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which does not imply any particular level of skill or training.
Certain information contained herein has been obtained from third party sources and such information has not been independently verified. No representation, warranty, or undertaking, expressed or implied, is given to the accuracy or completeness of such information by any person.
While such sources are believed to be reliable, Evoke does not assume any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of such information. Evoke does not undertake any obligation to update the information contained herein as of any future date.
The content is intended for a general audience and does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell securities or adopt any investment strategy. Any examples or scenarios discussed are illustrative only, involve risks and uncertainties, and do not guarantee future results. Non-traditional assets carry significant risks and may not be suitable for all investors. Decisions should be based on individual objectives, risk tolerance, and circumstances.
Statements herein are general and may not reflect an individual’s or entity’s specific circumstances or applicable laws, which vary by jurisdiction. Further, speakers’ views are personal and may differ from Evoke and MAI recommendations and are not specific investment advice; and do not consider client objectives, risk tolerance, and diversification. Guests may have current or past relationships with Evoke and MAI, its affiliates, or the host, including as clients, service providers, or business partners. Participation does not constitute an endorsement or testimonial. No compensation has been paid or received for guest participation unless disclosed. MAI and its affiliates may have business relationships with entities mentioned in this podcast, which could create potential conflicts of interest. These relationships may include advisory services, investment management, or other arrangements. MAI seeks to manage such conflicts consistent with its fiduciary obligations and policies.
(As of December 22, 2025)




