In short
Whether the U.S. is “winning” its war against Iran after Trump postponed strikes on Iranian power plants, amid reports of possible U.S.-Iran talks. Focuses on military degradation, the “Battle of Hormuz,” and a broader push for regime change.
Guest
Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies; longtime “Iran hawk” advocating regime change. Background includes decades working on Iran policy and support for maximum pressure and support to Iranian opposition.
Key claims
The U.S. and Israel are severely degrading Iran’s missile, navy, and nuclear capabilities; victory depends on what “winning” means. Dubowitz argues total victory is ending the regime, via a three-phase plan: (1) major military operations, (2) strikes to weaken the repression apparatus, (3) maximum support to opposition to enable street mobilization.
Notable examples
claims include Iran’s ballistic missile production rate “now zero,” launchers reduced by two-thirds, navy decimated, and nuclear facilities set back by Israeli strikes; phase two cites strikes targeting Ali Khamenei and IRGC commanders; Hormuz closure is framed as a response to leadership-targeting and regime-change efforts.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOThe Current State of U.S. Involvement in Iran
0:54 to 2:09
Discussion on whether the U.S. is winning its war against Iran.
“They have no Navy and they have no Air Force and they have no nothing.”
Military Successes and Challenges
2:09 to 3:54
Analysis of the U.S. military's achievements and ongoing challenges in Iran.
“seems very vague and nebulous at the moment.”
Defining Victory in Iran
3:54 to 5:25
Exploration of what total victory over Iran would look like and how it differs from military objectives.
“Let's just stay with military degradation for a moment.”
Three Phases of Achieving Victory
5:25 to 7:38
Insight into the three-phase process toward regime change in Iran.
“So now let's talk about the regime, because you already gestured at this by mentioning Israeli attempts to degrade the regime's capacities.”
Iran's Capabilities and Global Implications
7:38 to 10:41
Examination of Iran's ongoing military capabilities and implications for global stability.
“So phase one is major military operations.”
Inevitability of the Battle of Hormuz
10:41 to 14:02
Discussion on the inevitability of conflict around the Strait of Hormuz and historical context.
“And then, more importantly, the Iranians have essentially closed the Strait of Hormuz, throwing global energy markets into turmoil.”
Iran's Strategy and U.S. Military Options
14:02 to 16:42
Explore Iran's potential military strategies and the implications for U.S. foreign policy.
“Iran was not going to close the Strait of Hormuz six months ago.”
Trump's Leadership and U.S.-Iran Relations
16:43 to 19:06
Discuss the impact of Trump's presidency on U.S.-Iran relations and potential military actions.
“In theory, I knew that this kind of thing can happen in any family.”
Future of Hormuz and Iranian Control
19:07 to 21:34
Analyze the future dynamics in the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian influence in the region.
“And you're saying you don't think any president would have extended even that permission?”
Iran's Energy Control and Economic Warfare
21:35 to 24:48
Examine how economic strategies can limit Iran's control over its energy resources.
“because we don't have the ability to confront them when they have nuclear weapons capability, ICBMs, tens of thousands of missiles, a large Navy and a dominant position in the Gulf, right?”
Show all 21 chapters
Escalation Dynamics and Iranian Threats
24:49 to 28:00
Understand the potential escalation of conflict with Iran and its regional threats.
“What do you make of Iran's capacity to do something apocalyptic to its neighbors using whatever kind of missiles and rockets remain to it?”
Khamenei's Calculus and Trump's Strategy
28:00 to 29:17
Explore Khamenei's decision-making and the implications of Trump's approach to Iran.
“That was always his calculus because he always understood that the only country in the world was not Israel.”
Risks of U.S. Involvement in Iran
29:17 to 31:24
Discuss the risks the U.S. faces in potential military actions in Iran.
“They also risk ending up in a permanent state of hostilities with their Gulf Arab allies.”
Vision for American Success in Iran
31:24 to 35:34
Analyze different perspectives on success in U.S. dealings with Iran under Trump.
“the global economy is beginning to freak out, and again, their own leadership class is being killed.”
Defining Military Objectives in Iran
35:34 to 38:38
Delve into the military objectives of the Trump administration regarding Iran.
“by nuclear, missile, and military, then I think we have succeeded.”
U.S.-Israel Coordination on Iran
38:38 to 42:00
Examine the coordination between the U.S. and Israel in strategizing against Iran.
“I think that would be a good ending for President Trump.”
Negotiating with Iran: The Role of Israel
42:00 to 44:15
Explore the dynamics of U.S.-Israel relations and their impact on negotiations with Iran.
“And then a few other demands about sharing Hormuz or the Ayatollah and some other things.”
The Risks of American Alienation from Israel
44:15 to 46:18
Discuss the potential consequences of a failed military strategy on U.S.-Israel relations.
“like normal president emerges who says, look, we have a complicated relationship with our Israeli ally.”
Trump's Decisions and Israel's Risks
46:18 to 48:26
Analyze the decisions made by Trump regarding Iran and the risks taken by Israel.
“I think if the war goes very badly, I think that, yes, there will be people on the left and right who blame Israel.”
The American Perspective on Iran
48:26 to 50:34
Examine the American viewpoint on military action against Iran and its implications.
“And if October 7th was not a wake up call for them, no one would, nothing would be.”
Support for the Iranian People
50:34 to 51:58
Consider the possibility of supporting the Iranian people against their regime.
“And with that, they would have had a stranglehold on our news, not for three weeks, not for six weeks, but effectively forever.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Ross Douthat:When you use the trusted investing and savings app Betterment to help grow your money automatically, you have more time for new niche hobbies like collecting miniatures. The joy that brings helps you sleep better at night and even motivates you to always use your PM moisturizer. Now you've got a dewy glow and a sense of balance to match. Not worrying where your money is growing. That's the Betterment Effect. Get started today at Betterment.com. Investing involves risk. Performance not guaranteed. From New York Times Opinion, I'm Ross Douthat, and this is Interesting Times.
0:53Ross Douthat:So, is the United States winning its war against Iran? They have no Navy and they have no Air Force and they have no nothing. And if this is what success looks like. The war in Iran has caused oil and gas prices to spike and it's not just affecting cars on the road. Economists say American consumers can't get a break. What would failure look like? If the Iranian regime stays in power, they win. My guest this week is the CEO for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He's a longtime Iran hawk who argues that victory is within our reach and that regime change is still a possibility. Mark Dubowitz, welcome to Interesting Times.
1:36Ross, thanks for having me. Honored to be here.
1:42Ross Douthat:so we're talking i'd say about 24 hours or a little more after president trump postponed his professed plan to strike iran's power plants if they did not reopen the strait of hormuz and we're also talking in the background of conflicting reports about possible talks between the United States and the Iranian government or elements of the Iranian government. All of that seems very vague and nebulous at the moment. But that's roughly where we are in the timeline right now. So given where we are, first question, very easy one, is the United States winning its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran?
2:26Well, short answer is yes. Longer answer is, depends what you mean by winning. And if you mean based on what President Trump laid out as the objectives of the United States, then we are winning. And those objectives, he was very clear, it's essentially to destroy the war-making capabilities of the Islamic Republic, which includes its missile program, its navy, and its nuclear capabilities. And I think with that in mind, it's only been three weeks in. I think the U.S. military, along with the Israelis, have done a pretty extraordinary job of severely degrading those capabilities across all lines of power projection.
3:09I mean, the missile program has been severely degraded. Ross, give you a sense, I mean, they had the largest missile infantry in the Middle East before the war started. Their ballistic missile production rate is now zero. Their launchers have been reduced by two-thirds. The Iranian Navy has been decimated. The nuclear program, I think, is still to be determined. But between the 12-day war last year and Israeli strikes against the nuclear facilities during the past three weeks, the program has been set back even more severely. But there's still the Battle of Hormuz to be won or lost. And I think that's going to be a decisive battle that will determine whether President Trump can legitimately claim at the end of all of this a major military success.
3:53Ross Douthat:Yeah, well, we'll talk about the Battle of Hormuz. Let's just stay with military degradation for a moment. In a scenario where this conflict ended soon, and those objectives were seen to have been met, there's no world where you're going to eliminate completely the Iranian regime's capacity to have a military, unless you invade Iran and occupy it and so on. does that mean that this military operation in its limited form is just about buying time so that we just don't have to attack Iran again for five years or something like that? Yeah, I mean, I think what we're trying to do is severely degrade their war-making capability and also their repression apparatus.
4:39That's actually been the Israeli piece of the military operation. But I think over the past three weeks, we have now gotten enough evidence from trump himself and from the white house that they're very much setting these objectives as missile navy nuclear so it depends on the extent to which iran can reconstitute its navy its missile capabilities and its nuclear capabilities it's difficult to know exactly how far we set it back and i think one should always be careful about those kinds of estimates and we also should remember that even if a u.s president is not prepared to bomb again as long as the u.s president, it doesn't block the Israelis from striking again.
5:17If they just keep coming back, and as they call mowing the grass, you can keep setting back those capabilities and degrading them over and over again.
5:26Ross Douthat:So now let's talk about the regime, because you already gestured at this by mentioning Israeli attempts to degrade the regime's capacities. A week ago, you co-wrote an essay for The Atlantic entitled Glimpsing Victory in Iran. I think it's fair to say that you have a broader definition of what victory looks like than the military objectives laid out by the Trump administration. So tell me what your vision of victory in the war is. Well, I think as we wrote in the piece, you know, our vision of total victory is the end of the regime in Iran. And I've, you know, that's been my longstanding position for now, 22 years I've been working on this issue because I believe that to permanently solve this problem, you have to replace the regime in Iran.
6:12And I've been a longstanding supporter of boots on the ground to do that, but Iranian boots on the ground, not American boots on the ground, which I really believe that across broad swaths of Iranian society, that the level of enmity for this regime amongst Iranians is deep and profound and has gotten even more deeper and more profound since January of this year when the Iranian regime killed Iranians on January 8th and 9th in the face of a huge protest movement. So I've long believed that providing maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for the Iranian people, and using a variety of overt and covert means to fracture the regime's support base will ultimately lead to the end of this regime.
7:05That's total victory. That's what I would define it.
7:07Ross Douthat:And in that essay and elsewhere, you've talked about what you've described as a kind of three-phase process of getting there from where we are now, where the first phase is the kind of military campaign that the U.S. has embarked on, degradation of the Iranian military. Just talk through briefly what you think each phase would look like, again, in a best-case scenario that ends in regime change. Yeah. So phase one is major military operations. You know, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been at war with America for 47 years. We've been fighting back against them for three weeks. So in the span of three weeks, I think there's been some extraordinary military accomplishments.
7:52I could see this campaign lasting for another three weeks. I think it would be a big mistake to pull the plug right now. But it'd also be a mistake to continue this war for, you know, for months. Right. In phase one. Okay. In phase two.
8:05Ross Douthat:Phase two. Yeah, phase two is very much what the Israelis are already embarking on right now, which is severely degrading the repression apparatus of the regime. They began that on February 28th with that initial strike that took out the former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his top IRGC commanders, generals and advisors. And they have been systematically, methodically, patiently taking out the repression apparatus day by day. And this is the RGC, the besiege, the police forces, the intelligence services, the people that are responsible for crushing Iranian opposition and did so in January. They have been eliminating those people.
8:46I would see that from a military point of view, continuing in sequence with phase one, when major military operations are over, that the strikes.
8:57Ross Douthat:You're still going to have essentially decapitation strikes against a wide range of Iranian military and political leaders. Yeah. Now, it depends on what happens on the negotiations, which I'm sure we're going to talk about. But if there is some deal where Trump has now negotiated an agreement with this regime, there's an open question about whether Trump would then greenlight continued Israeli military strikes, airstrikes on the regime. Or would he say, OK, those strikes are over, but then greenlight the Israelis to continue to do what they would do covertly. And then phase three is really what I call this maximum support campaign where you're actually providing serious support to the opposition so that the next time they come to the streets and they're coming to the streets again.
9:44But this time, unlike in January, you have changed the equation and you've strengthened the opposition so it's not defenseless in the face of that repression apparatus as it was in January. And you've given Iranians perhaps a fighting chance to take back their country, as President Trump said, once in a generation opportunity. Okay.
10:06Ross Douthat:I think that's a good overview. Let's go back to where we are now in phase one. There's no question, as you've said, that we have degraded Iran's military. However, it's also clear that at the moment, the Iranians are still quite capable of firing missiles and rockets at their neighbors, menacing the infrastructure that the entire Persian Gulf depends upon, meaning not just oil and gas, but desalinization plants and power plants. The number of missiles fired has gone way down, but it hasn't dropped to zero. And then, more importantly, the Iranians have essentially closed the Strait of Hormuz, throwing global energy markets into turmoil.
10:50Ross Douthat:What do we do about that? Yeah. So before answering the question about what we do about it, I just want to touch upon something that I think gets lost in the current debate, right? Because I think we all are moving so quickly. Things are changing so quickly. It's worth a little bit of sort of historical perspective on this. And that is that if you could imagine today's regime not severely degraded militarily, not having lost its missile launchers and ballistic missile production capability and had its nuclear program severely degraded and lost its navy. Imagine this regime, even under the Obama nuclear deal, a regime that would pocket a trillion dollars in the lifespan of that agreement, a regime that starting this year, the restrictions on the nuclear program would begin to sunset.
11:41Iran would emerge with an industrial-sized nuclear program. So imagine this regime with nuclear-armed ICBMs, tens of thousands of missiles, a trillion dollars, its proxy still intact hezbollah hamas the houthis shiite militias this regime threatening the strait of hormuz threatening the gulf allies threatening u.s bases u.s embassies uh israel and the u.s homeland i i just think it's important i can i can it it's yeah it's it's good to imagine
12:12Ross Douthat:that yeah i i don't want to get too deep into the deeper justifications for war yet but i i just want to say we're not we're not in the Obama timeline. We're in a timeline where the U.S. and Israel successfully delivered some significant blows to Iranian power. And now we've decided to deliver another more profound one. And it is that blow that has yielded the Iranian closure of the straits. So that's where we are now. So it's not that the counterfactual is important, but so is the reality that we delivered a set of blows successfully. We chose to go further. That has activated a really substantial Iranian response that threatens global energy markets, the global economy, and just sort of the core economic and civilizational functioning of the Persian Gulf.
13:08Ross Douthat:And so with that said, what do we do about it? Yeah, I make the point, Ross, only to say that it was inevitable that the Islamic Republic was going to close the Strait of Hormuz. And the only question was, were they going to close it with nuclear weapons, ICBMs, a massive missile inventory, terror proxies that were intact and growing and becoming more deadly and a trillion dollars in order to fortify their economy and fund their nefarious attack activities? Or were they going to close it, as they have, when they've been severely degraded along all of those lines that you've said? So the Battle of Hormuz was a battle that was inevitable.
13:43And the only question was, were we going to fight it in a way where we were stronger and they were weaker or they were stronger and we had very limited options in order to open the strait?
13:53Ross Douthat:But why was it inevitable if we were able to, again, substantially degrade both their terror proxy networks and their nuclear program? Iran was not going to close the Strait of Hormuz six months ago. It didn't close the Strait of Hormuz in response to our bombing of Fordow. It only closed the Strait when we went all in and more than going all in on military elements when we went all in in targeting regime leadership. And I'm just going to use the U.S. and Israel interchangeably here for this campaign, because I think that that that that is accurate to what is practically going on in a world where we didn't target the Iranian regime leadership, where we didn't attempt to force regime change, where we just carried out periodic bombings of their military and so on.
14:43Ross Douthat:it's not clear to me that you can say definitely oh well of course eventually iran would have closed the straits we they closed the strait in response to our attempt at regime change isn't that fair no i think that the iranian strategy which would and by the way this was always the smart strategy for khamenei and he'd still be alive to execute the strategy if he had done this which is i'm going to reconstitute so after the 12-day war i'm going to reconstitute my missile program and my nuclear program. And it was only 12 days and it wasn't obliterated, despite what President Trump said. I'm just going to work with the Chinese.
15:18The Chinese are going to send in Chinese air defenses. I'm going to rebuild my terror proxies and I'm going to wake President Trump out. And in January, 2029, Trump's not going to be in office. And it's a pretty good guess who was ever president at that time, unless it's perhaps Marco Rubio. But on the Republican side and on the Democratic side, you're not going to find a president willing to confront Iran militarily. So at that point, I'm home free. And I would have, if I were Khamenei, I would have done a deal with Trump, a two and a half year deal. I would have gotten hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief.
15:51And Trump said, make Iran great again. And I would pocket all that money. I would have reconstituted slowly. And then once Trump was gone, I'd be off to the races and I would rebuild all those capabilities that I described earlier. And then I would be guessing, but it's a pretty good calculation that there's no way a President Newsom or AOC or Vance is going to support an Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear and missile program. And at that point, I'm in a position, I now control Hormuz. I don't have to launch one drone, one rocket or one missile. I just have the mere threat of using all those deadly capabilities.
16:30and I have now deterred the United States. I now own the Gulf. I have a stranglehold over the world's energy. I become a superpower. That is the Iranian trajectory. That's where we're heading.
17:09In theory, I knew that this kind of thing can happen in any family. Anyone's first cousin could be plotting murder.
17:16Ross Douthat:This is UCE 4735, and today is... Upstanding citizens are always turning out to be secret criminals. This is a recording with Alan Gessen. And I wouldn't even call my cousin Alan an upstanding citizen. You know, my clients are cartel-level guys. They're all badasses. But it's one thing to know... There's a more permanent way to do it. Is there? Yeah. More and more definite. Permanent. And another thing to understand... Alan, murder me. It ended up being so much worse than I thought I knew. The price is eminently reasonable. Okay. For what it's worth. What the hell was Alan thinking? Like, let's just say that I'm a little pissed off.
17:53Ross Douthat:Yeah, yeah, no, I get it, yeah. From Serial Productions and The New York Times, I'm M. Gessen, and this is The Idiot. Listen wherever you get your podcasts.
18:18Ross Douthat:so essentially what has happened is in your view donald trump was the only american president capable of confronting iran in any meaningful way allowing israel to confront its proxies And so, in fact, it is that we have chosen to fight an inevitable battle of Hormuz now because we don't trust our own political system to restrain Iran without an epic battle right now. We have chosen this because we saw the Iranians moving towards the end state that I described. To prevent them from moving to that end state, we would have to fight a major war. But again, I don't think by your own account we would have to fight a major war.
19:05Ross Douthat:We would just need the next president to continue giving Israel permission to degrade Hamas and Hezbollah and continue to do periodic strikes. And you're saying you don't think any president would have extended even that permission? I'm doubtful that any president would have extended that permission, but that permission is not enough because the Israelis don't have the capabilities to destroy deeply buried missile cities. They don't have massive orange penetrators. They don't have strategic bombers. They don't have Tomahawk missiles. They don't have the capabilities that we have to do severe damage to Iran's missile capabilities.
19:44So we—
19:45Ross Douthat:Okay, so it's not enough for a future U.S. president to allow Israel to conduct these raids. We also have to be involved in them. And that's fair. But again, it just seems to me that the evidence of the last few years is that you can do a lot of damage to Iran without having a full-scale battle of the Hormuz Straits. But I don't want to harp on this. Let's get back to the war itself. So we're here, and we're going to fight the Battle of Hormuz. Do we use ground troops? Well, by the way, it's not inevitable that we're going to fight the Battle of Hormuz. I mean, we saw President Trump now do a 90 degree U-turn and start to talk about negotiations.
20:30He actually had a comment, which I found really disturbing. He said something to the effect of, well, you know, maybe the United States and the Ayatollah, we just share the we share the Gulf. We share Hormuz.
20:42Ross Douthat:I mean, he likes he likes to talk like that. Yeah. Now, I don't know if he's serious and he's just doing his usual Trumpian faint. But that's obviously something that would terrify our Gulf Arab neighbors. and certainly should terrify the Japanese, the South Koreans, the Indians, our European allies, anyone who depends on Middle Eastern oil and natural gas. The notion that Trump would do a deal where we're gonna share Hormuz with the Iranians, with the Ayatollah, I think should be terrifying because if that is the case, and again, I just wanna get back to this because I think it's worth harping on.
21:18If Trump is gone in two and a half years and the next president is not willing to confront the Iranians and the Israelis don't have the capabilities to do enough damage to their war making capabilities, then Iran ends up not, we don't end up sharing the Strait of Hormuz with Iran. They end up owning it and they end up owning it because they've created deterrence because we don't have the ability to confront them when they have nuclear weapons capability, ICBMs, tens of thousands of missiles, a large Navy and a dominant position in the Gulf, right? We had to fight that war.
21:53Ross Douthat:Well, wait a minute. I mean, they're not going to reconstitute that in two years if the military campaign has been as successful as you've suggested, right? Not in two. Not in two. Right. But over a longer time horizon. Over six, over eight. I mean, I'm talking about the first two terms of President AOC. Ocasio-Cortez. Yeah. Okay, but in a world where Trump stays the course and we do essentially try and find a military solution to the Straits of Hormuz, does that involve ground troops? Well, Trump hasn't excluded that and depends on what it means by does it involve ground troops. Well, to me, as an extremely amateur student of military matters at the moment, it seems very, very difficult to render the straits safe for passage as long as the Iranian regime exercises full control over the literal physical territory on their side of the straits.
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22:55Ross Douthat:And so if that's the case, could be wrong, but if that's the case, then it seems like to open the straits, you have to seize that territory. Does that seem like something that could happen? I don't want to get into details on a public podcast, but I would just say that there are other ways to control the three key provinces that are important to the to the strait and are also critical to Iran's energy industry. right there's there's lots of ways in which you can not even through military means but through financial warfare and cyber where you could do severe damage to iran's ability to control its own energy industry uh pay its own workers and and and have effective control over that territory why haven't we done that yet well again it's it's it's week three ross it you know there's there's a There's a lot ahead of us, and there's a lot of things we can do besides dropping bombs or sending in the Marines, right?
23:59Which is not to suggest that Trump may not do that, but I think there's just a lot of ways we can take away Iran's control of its energy industry and essentially strangle it economically. Everybody's talked about Karg Island, seizing Karg. Obviously, Karg is an important part of this energy industry. You know, 95 % of oil exports go through CARG. It's 50 % of the state budget. It's$78 million a year. It represents three years of budget for the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence, the security apparatus, and the proxies. So even if you, like, block CARG, now that could be through Marines or the U.S.
24:36Navy quarantining it. But that is just actually one piece of an overall strategy where you literally could take away Iran's entire energy industry. And you don't need to do it necessarily with Marines. You can do it with some innovative financial warfare tools, which I'm not going to get into on an open podcast.
24:55Ross Douthat:That's fine. Okay, yeah. What do you make of Iran's capacity to do something apocalyptic to its neighbors using whatever kind of missiles and rockets remain to it? Because this is, you know, part of what's been going on is the president has sort of threatened various forms of escalation. And then there have been sort of exchanges of fire that have involved natural gas, desalinization, different things. And then there's been a kind of walk back and a sense, at least to some observers, that Iran is willing to sort of go further up that escalatory ladder than we are. Do you think that that's a danger where Iran, where it's not just Hormuz, but it's Iran saying, the regime saying, if we're going down, no one's going to be able to drink fresh water in the Gulf for the next six months or something like that?
25:46Yeah, I mean, again, I think it's important to understand. Number one, I don't think it's President Trump's objective to bring the regime down. I mean, he's made it very clear is, you know, he wants to do a deal and we can talk about what the elements of that deal should look like. But you're right. I mean, I think in an apocalyptic situation, yes, the Iranians will strike. And with whatever capabilities they have left that haven't been destroyed by the United States and Israel, they will fire whatever they have left at the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Bahrainis. They'll go over pipelines, salination plants, electrical grids, try to wipe out all the energy infrastructure.
26:22They'll have the will to do that. There'll be an open question about whether they'll have the capabilities. And that was to my point earlier about will and capability, right? The fact that we would ever let Iran have both the will and the capability to do that would be very, very dangerous. They now have the will, but they don't necessarily have the capabilities.
26:37Ross Douthat:But again, they have the will right now because whether or not Trump himself is fully committed to regime change, we, in collaboration with the Israelis, have embarked on a policy of killing their leaders, right? Like that's where the will comes from. If you existentially threaten the regime, you do give them more reasons to go higher on the escalation ladder. Not that they would never have escalated before, not that they weren't interested in destroying Israel or being America's enemies before, but things like what we were just talking about, the sort of attempted like a total destruction of the functional architecture of civilization around the Persian Gulf.
27:17Ross Douthat:Right. That's something that is more plausible to them today because we, the Israelis, however you want to cut it, have, you know, been killing their leadership. Right. Right. That's just surely that just obviously changes their escalation calculus, like as a just as just as an inevitable matter. And then it's and then we have to figure out what to do about it. Well, my point is that they have been escalating against us and against Israel and against their neighbors for decades. You're right. They continue to go up the escalation curve as they're prepared to take more and more risk against us.
27:53It's often with the Iranians that they back down when they believe that the United States of America is committed to taking down their regime. Now, that was under Khamenei. That was always his calculus because he always understood that the only country in the world was not Israel. It was the United States who could bring down his regime. And I can give you lots of examples how Khamenei made that decision to back down when the United States of America even sent a hint that they were willing to take down his regime. But I think the current leadership, and I think Kalibaf is the kind of man who understands that after losing Khamenei and losing Laron Jani and losing many of his closest commanders and friends and colleagues for over many, many years, has a choice.
28:38He has a fundamental choice with President Trump. And the choice is either to do a deal and end this, or the United States of America is going to adopt the Israeli strategy of regime change. And when America intervenes and adopts that strategy, I think at the end of the day, we will bring down that regime. And I think for that reason, they have to be very careful about going way up the escalation curve. By the way, as they go up the escalation curve, not only are we on the Israelis going up, but so are the Saudis and the Emiratis. So I think they have to be thinking after this war is over, did they go so far up the escalation curve that they risk regime change?
29:17They also risk ending up in a permanent state of hostilities with their Gulf Arab allies. And that is not a position this regime wants to end up in going forward. Okay.
29:32Ross Douthat:But meanwhile, there are some risks to the United States as well here, right? There are risks associated with having the Straits of Hormuz closed. And there are risks involved in, again, I know you're not explicitly calling for this, but sending in ground troops and getting involved in a ground war in Iran, right? So all of those risks from a, let's just say from a domestic American political perspective, seem incredibly substantial. And they all, to me, seem like reasons why I completely expect the president to want to cut a deal. Isn't a deal here just absolutely the Trumpian thing to do? Absolutely.
30:19Absolutely. And again, I mean, I've said one, all the risks that you outlined are risks I acknowledge. Those are risks that I would also put up against the risks of inaction. My view is the risks of not doing something were much greater than risk of doing something. However, the risks that you've outlined are substantial. And I completely agree with you that Trump wants a deal. By the way, Trump has wanted a deal since his first term with the Iranians. Trump always wants a deal. I agree that that's probably where we're heading. If the Iranians are smart, they'll take a deal. And if they do, then I think we move to phase two and phase three of what I described earlier.
30:54And I think phase two and phase three of maximum pressure on the regime, maximum support for the Iranian people and continued fracturing of the support base is something that can be done. The Israelis can lead with American support and much of it, not all of it can be done, not from the air by dropping bombs, but by through other instruments of American and Israeli power, which I'm happy that you and I can talk about. I think that is the strategy. But why would Iran make a deal at a moment when, again, they have closed the straits, the global economy is beginning to freak out, and again, their own leadership class is being
31:37Ross Douthat:killed. I think they keep the straits closed and invite us to send in the Marines. Again, because I think if your professed goal is not a deal, but killing their leadership and replacing their regime, why aren't they going to go apocalyptic? Again, that's my - I just struggle with this calculus. Ross, that's my ultimate goal. And there's a difference. It may not sound like there is, but there's a difference between me and President Trump. No, I know there is. Yeah. I know. So but but it still seems to me that, again, by allying with Israel in a campaign of decapitation, we have already committed to regime change.
32:20Ross Douthat:That's what we've done. What would be different about a world where Iran keeps the straits closed and Trump says, all right, that's it. Now we're going for full regime change. OK, what would we do? What would the U.S. be doing differently? Well, the first thing is we too would be bombing the regime, not just taking out its military capabilities. We too would be doing that. We'd be joining Israel in that. We would be committing to do that over a sustained period of time. And we would basically say, we are not going to finish this until the regime goes down. And then we can do other things, which I think are things we should do anyway.
32:55And I'm not sure we will. And I'm not sure the next president would. And that is actually join the Israelis in this maximum support, maximum fracturing campaign, where ultimately the goal is to get millions of Iranians on the streets and we arm them and we provide them with weapons. And we're not just arming the Kurds in the northwest of Iran, but we're arming all ethnic groups and the Persians. And we're going after 20 major cities and we're flooding in weapons. And we are ultimately going to back the Iranian people to bring down the regime and we're going to do it to the hilt. The United States of America has not made that commitment.
33:29Israelis want to go there, but they have certain capabilities to do it, but they can't go all the way without American support. So if I'm an Iranian trying to...
34:05Ross Douthat:ground, sometimes have involved regime change, sometimes have not. I don't think that there has been a sort of certain through line in the administration's arguments. And I'm actually, in certain ways, almost more confused by your articulation of your vision, because it seems like in some moments you're saying, well, it is all going according to plan. And then in other moments You're saying, well, it's going according to plan, except that the president might change the plan completely and make an unwise deal. Is there, from your perspective, any kind of planning inside the administration that is that is close to your own views?
34:50Ross Douthat:Like, how does how does how do you think your vision fits together with what the administration is actually thinks it's doing? Yeah, I mean, Ross, maybe again, I haven't articulated this well enough and shame on me, but I don't think - There's no shame in podcasting. There's no shame in podcasting. There's no shame. Well, let me just try to do a slightly better job, I hope, of doing this. I mean, I think that I have a vision for success. I have a vision for significant success, and I have a vision for success is consistent with the administration's articulation of their military objectives. If we do severe damage to the war-making capabilities of the Islamic Republic, as defined by nuclear, missile, and military, then I think we have succeeded.
35:46Ross Douthat:And that holds true even if Trump makes a political deal now in order to reopen the straits and bring military operations to an end? You would say it's a success, but it's just a limited success. Well, it depends on the deal. If it's a good deal that strips Iran of its remaining war-making capabilities, then yes, that's a success, because then through military means and negotiations, we have stripped Iran of its ability to wage war against the United States and our allies. That's a success to me. There would be a greater success and a total success if we then move to the next stages that we've discussed through phase two and phase three, and then we're able to do severe damage to the repression apparatus, open up space.
36:33And one day there are millions of Iranians who come to the streets and we've provided them with support and they take back the country. And we have Iran that is peaceful and stable and not at war with the United States and our allies. That's total success. But I would be happy with partial success. I would be happy with significant success. And I would be elated with total success. I think the administration, President Trump is not a disciplined speaker. He certainly didn't do an address to the nation, which maybe he should have. He couldn't do it before, but he should have done it after, where he really laid out very clearly.
37:09but I think that he is not committed to regime change. And even when he says, well, Iranians can then take back their country, it's a once in a generation opportunity. He means what I essentially have articulated, which is over time providing support to Iranians to come back to the streets. I think he has defined the military objectives in a limited way. And I think that military is on its way to achieving that. It has only been three weeks. my sense. And again, I'm not being read into briefings by the Pentagon. I don't know exactly what they need, but there is talk about three more weeks and having this thing end April 9th or something.
37:50And I guess at that point, the United States and Israel have done, in their assessment, severe damage to these capabilities. If that happens with then a deal, and then a deal continues to defang these capabilities, I think that the president can then rightly declare victory. I think the United States can't afford to lose the battle for Hamus. We've talked about what losing means. But that I think the president would rightly be able to defend as we had a six week war. We had, you know, weeks and months of diplomacy. But at the end of the day, I'm leaving to my successor a severely weakened Islamic Republic that will take years to reconstitute its nuclear missile and military capabilities and no longer represents a threat to the United States, our interests and our allies.
38:42I think that would be a good ending for President Trump. And it's certainly an ending that I would consider to be a significant yet partial success.
39:27Ross Douthat:Transcription by CastingWords What's going on? Now we're bringing those videos to you in the Watch tab in the New York Times app. It's a dedicated video feed where you know you can trust what you're seeing. All the videos there are free for anyone to watch. You don't have to be a subscriber. Download the New York Times app to start watching.
39:58Ross Douthat:I think people listening to this conversation can tell that I find the entire strategic approach of both the Trump administration and people like yourself who support the Trump administration up to a point but wanted to go further. I'm confused by it, right? And I'm also confused by the state of U.S.-Israel alignment right now. So is it a problem that there is some kind of difference between what the United States is committed to and what its military partner is committed to? Does that matter? Well, I think it could matter unless the Americans and Israelis were not coordinated. If they were not well coordinated, then you could see problems emerging, but I think they are very well coordinated.
40:41And I think for President Trump, the Israelis are very useful points of leverage against the Iranians, right? In any negotiation, President Trump could essentially say, like, I got this mad pit bull on a leash, and I can let it go. And if I let it go, they will continue to do what they've been doing to you, and I will just let them do it. Or you can negotiate with me and here are my terms. And I mean, we haven't even talked about what the terms that the president has laid out, because they actually are, I mean, from an Iranian perspective, they should be pretty reasonable terms. I mean, I don't think they're reasonable because I don't think they're enough, but the president has laid them out.
41:21And the president has said, here are my terms. No enrichment capability. You don't need enrichment. The only reason you've ever wanted enrichment is to build nuclear weapons. I'm not gonna give you enrichment capability. The HEU, give it back to me. He said something about missiles, which I wasn't clear. He was not that articulate on it, but it was sort of like he said they should be low key on missiles, quote unquote. I don't know what that means.
41:44Ross Douthat:That's a great Trumpian phrase. I also want the world to be low key on missiles. Yes. So low key on missiles. I don't know what that means, but presumably there's a certain amount of flexibility there for the Iranians to retain a missile program, but be low key, not be high key. And then a few other demands about sharing Hormuz or the Ayatollah and some other things. Right. If that's the list of demands, then he's looking for a deal. But again, you just said that you don't think that's a good deal. Israel doesn't think that's a good deal, right? Israel has more maximalist war aims, which is why its actions are geared more towards regime change, right?
42:28Ross Douthat:Is Israel a pit bull on a leash? Like, is Israel actually on the American leash? Is it just the case that if the U.S. says, we're done fighting Iran, and then, you know, some future president, Gavin Newsom, sort of becomes even more conciliatory towards Iran, that Israel just accepts that? Well, I think under President Trump for two and a half years, they're very much on President Trump's leash. Yes. Yes. Okay. Yes. I think that absolutely. I think as the June war demonstrated, as soon as Trump said 12 days, it's over and ordered Netanyahu to order the Israeli Air Force back to its basis, just as the Israeli Air Force was about to drop bombs and kill a thousand members of the besiege.
43:09Of course, the prime minister is going to listen to President Trump. Now, what happens in two and a half years time with an anti-Israel president or a president who's more conciliatory towards Iran? Do I think they'll be on that leash? Certainly that leash will not be as tight and will not be as effective. But for two and a half years, absolutely. And from a negotiating perspective, it really helps President Trump to have the pit bull on the leash to say to the Iranians, look, you have a choice. You agree or I'm going to unleash them. And by the way, I'm not going to just unleash them. I'm going to join them and therefore take your pick.
43:45And when I join them and they're unleashed, there is a risk that we're going to bring down your regime.
43:50Ross Douthat:Do you think Israel just takes it for granted that this will be the last pro-Israel president that the United States is likely to have? No, I don't think they take it for granted. I mean, I think that, you know, there's a possibility that Marco Rubio becomes president of the United States. There's a possibility. I'm not sure. I'm not a political analyst. That maybe Josh Shapiro wins the Democratic nomination. or that a sort of normal, like normal president emerges who says, look, we have a complicated relationship with our Israeli ally. You know, they're a difficult ally, but not only do we believe in their right to exist, but we believe that they're an important partner and we're going to work with them.
44:29And we have disagreements with them on the West Bank and settlers, and we have disagreements on this and that. I think we can get a normal president who has that kind of relationship with Israel because, you know, we've had those kinds of presidents. Right. In modern American history. And I think there's a possibility we still will. I do think the Israelis are deeply worried that we are going to get a president in the White House who is hostile to them, who either doesn't believe in their right to exist or believes they are more of an adversary than an ally.
44:59Ross Douthat:Do you think there's any risk of this being essentially a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy? Because again, it just seems to me that the world we were in a few months ago was a world where Israel had achieved a lot of political and military objectives at some real cost in terms of public opinion in the United States, especially around the Gaza War. and what's happening now is a much bigger gamble. And if it's perceived in the United States as essentially a failed war, and I think that could happen under conditions where Trump cuts bait and makes a deal, could also happen, I think, under the scenarios that you're outlining of a longer commitment with sort of substantial economic pain.
45:52Ross Douthat:In both of those scenarios, it seems to me, and I am a political analyst of some kind, right? It seems to me that there's a world where Israel is already more unpopular than it's been at any point in my lifetime in the United States or certainly my adult lifetime. I think it's very easy to see a world where the fruits of this war are a profound American alienation from Israel. And maybe it's the end of the alliance. And I just wanted to put that scenario to you and get your thoughts on it. I think you're right. I think there is absolutely that risk. I think if the war goes very badly, I think that, yes, there will be people on the left and right who blame Israel.
46:31I think incorrectly, unfairly, but that doesn't matter because that'll be the narrative. because I don't think President Trump was dragged into war with Iran by Israel. I mean, you know, if you've been listening to Trump, he's been obsessed with the threat from the Islamic Republic and the feckless American response for many, many years. And he's talked about denying Iran a nuclear weapon for many, many years. So the notion that, you know, Bibi Netanyahu somehow manipulated Donald Trump to go into war with Iran, I think is fanciful. But I think you're right. I think that'll be the conspiracy theory on both the left and the right.
47:04I think the Israelis took the risk.
47:05Ross Douthat:Now, isn't it possible not that Netanyahu manipulated Trump into war, but that Netanyahu, among others, not just him, sold Trump on the idea that regime change could happen faster, right? Like, again, you've given me a story of, you know, regime change happening as a result of this war over a two year time horizon. Doesn't it seem like Trump looked at Venezuela and, you know, thought, I punch Iran hard and in six weeks there's a new regime and maybe the Israelis were happy to sort of flatter that delusion? Well, I know there's been some reporting in your paper about this. I don't think the Israelis told Donald Trump that the Iranians will be on the streets while we're dropping bombs on Iran and that there'll be regime change in a few weeks.
47:52I think it's absurd to allege that it happened because we know that Iranians would not come to the streets while bombs are dropping. They didn't in June. It took them six months to come to the streets. And President Trump, in the first couple of days of the war, maybe even the first day, told Iranians to stay home because bombs were dropping. So I don't think the Israelis told them that. I think, again, President Trump has made that decision. I think he believed that he could go to war with a very capable partner. But I think you're right. I think that will be the narrative. And I think it'll be very difficult for Israel to defend against such a narrative.
48:27And I think the only reason the Israelis decided to take that risk is when they looked at the past couple of years, when they looked at October 7th, I think they decided that leaving the Iranians with the kind of war making capabilities and the possibility of developing nuclear weapons was an existential threat to the survival of the state of Israel. And if October 7th was not a wake up call for them, no one would, nothing would be. And they had to, within at least two to three years while Trump was president, do as much damage to those capabilities that the regime has to destroy the state of Israel.
49:04And then they would deal with the knock on effects of this politically over the coming years.
49:11Ross Douthat:But what you're saying then is that there is this fundamental gap, I think, between Israel's goals in the United States, because Israel, in that description, Israel's goal has to be regime change at almost any cost. And I live in the United States of America. I know what even very pro-Israel people think in the United States of America. And that's just not, that's not going to be the American position. No, I agree with you. Regime change at all costs. I agree with you. Of course, it's not the American position, nor should it. Okay. It should not be the American position. We have oceans. We're a superpower.
49:44We've got major commitments. We've got the Chinese, the Russians. We've got massive commitments that cannot be at all costs. I mean, I think it could be at certain costs. I think we're week three and already Americans are saying it's not worth it because we're at week three and gasoline's gone up by 40 percent, so it's not worth it. I don't want to speak to that. It's a difficult question for each individual American to have to assess. But I think as an American, I am furious that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been killing, maiming, torturing, kidnapping Americans from 1979. And we've done very little about that, Ross.
50:18And if it means Republicans losing the House or losing the Senate, I mean, that's not for me to decide. That's for the president to decide. That's his calculation politically. And maybe he's made the calculation that it is worth it. And maybe he'll be proven right. And maybe he'll be proven wrong. But you're absolutely right. I mean, I think we should be prepared to pay some price against an enemy that is an American enemy that would have developed nuclear warhead carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles that threaten the American homeland. And with that, they would have had a stranglehold on our news, not for three weeks, not for six weeks, but effectively forever.
50:58And then we would have been susceptible to this regime, this nuclear armed regime that had a stranglehold in the global economy. I think it was worth preempting that and stopping that and weakening the regime and not ever getting into that end state. And by the way, we've spent a little time, but not enough time talking about the fact that there are 80 % of Iranians, about 70 million Iranians who despise this regime and have been on the streets repeatedly for year after year and year after year, who've been brutalized, tortured, killed, taken prisoner. This regime, I'll say one other thing, because it's worth remembering, this regime launched chemical weapons attacks against Iranian schoolgirls in 2023 to break the back of the Women's Life Freedom Movement.
51:43So, you know, at some point, I'm not saying we go to war for the Iranian people, but the Iranian people are maybe prepared to go to war against their own regime. Maybe the least we can do is provide them with material support to succeed.
51:57Ross Douthat:All right. Let's leave it there. Mark Dubowitz, thank you so much for joining me. Great honor. Thanks, Ross.
52:26Ross Douthat:Interesting Times is produced by Sofia Alvarez Boyd, Victoria Chamberlain, and Emily Holsneck. Jordana Hochman is our executive producer and editor. Original music by Isaac Jones, Sonia Herrero, Amin Sahota, and Pat McCusker. Audience Strategy and Operations by Shannon Busta, Christina Samulewski, Andrea Batanzos, and Emma Kelbeck. Special thanks to Jonah Kessel, Alison Brusik, Marina King, Jan Kobel, and Mike Purets. And our director of opinion shows is Annie Rose Strasser.
53:14Thank you.
From the publisher
Is the U.S. winning the war with Iran? Even though President Trump claims success, it doesn’t quite feel like it — oil and gas prices are high, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed, and the Iranian regime is still in place. Mark Dubowitz, the chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a prominent Iran hawk, explains why “total victory” is within reach in spite of the cost. I pressed him on the gap between Trump’s desire for a quick deal and his desire to end the Islamic Republic.
- 00:00 - Intro
- 00:03:49 - Is Iran biding its time until Trump leaves office?
- 00:07:07 - Three phases to regime change
- 00:09:42 - Iran's military capabilities and the Strait of Hormuz
- 00:14:54 - How will the next American president treat Iran?
- 00:18:48 - The battle for the Strait of Hormuz
- 00:23:27 - Will Iran attack its neighbors?
- 00:28:43 - Will Trump cut a deal?
- 00:38:19 - Does Israel think Trump is its best chance?
- 00:43:04 - Risk of U.S. alienation from Israel
- 00:48:01 - The cost of inaction and the Iranian people
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