Iran, China, Canada? A Defense of Trump’s Grand Strategy

23 Jul 2026 · 1 h 3 min · 23 chapters

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In short

Elbridge Colby, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, defends the Trump administration’s “flexible realism” grand strategy: modernize U.S. forces, push allies to “step up” on defense spending, and use military pressure plus diplomacy to pursue strategic stability with rivals (China, Russia, Iran).

Guest background

Elbridge Colby is a Pentagon policy official responsible for big-picture strategy. He previously helped write the U.S. national security strategy identifying China as the key geopolitical rival and authored Strategy of Denial, arguing for deterrence focused on preventing Chinese aggression in the Pacific.

Key claims

The strategy is “strong and clear, but quiet” (measured by actions, not rhetoric). “Denial” means denying a great-power adversary the ability to seize and hold key territory of allies/partners, especially along the “first island chain,” using maritime and aerospace defense rather than regime change. Allies are being asked to be more candid and prepared for contingencies, not to exceed U.S. commitments.

Notable examples

Germany, Poland, and Scandinavian countries increasing defense roles; talks/pressure aimed at Iran to prevent a nuclear weapon and keep the Strait of Hormuz open; direct leader engagement with Putin and Xi; Ukraine support framed as enabling Europe to take primary conventional defense responsibility (“NATO 3.0”).

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

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Introduction to Gun Violence Awareness

0:00 to 0:25

Learn about the impact of gun violence on youth and the importance of conversation.

“Gun injuries are the leading cause of death for children and teens in the United States.”

Assessing Trump's Foreign Policy

0:27 to 1:50

An overview of the Trump administration's foreign policy strategies and challenges.

“What you're telling me is the administration's policy is leading our allies to spend more on their own defense and take more responsibility and lessen the burden on Americans.”

Understanding the Grand Strategy

1:53 to 5:30

Exploration of the grand strategy of the Trump administration focusing on realism and ally responsibilities.

“for the audience that I have actually known you for a long time, much longer than is true of most of the guests on this program.”

China as a Geopolitical Rival

5:30 to 6:10

Discussion on China's role as a geopolitical rival and the U.S. defense strategy.

“theater and talk about how it plays out around the world.”

Evolving Views on U.S.-China Relations

6:10 to 9:00

Analysis of changing perspectives on U.S.-China economic and military relations.

“So our policy, as the secretary has laid out, is strong and clear, but quiet.”

Strategic Military Insights

9:00 to 14:00

Insights into U.S. military strategy and readiness regarding potential conflicts, particularly with China.

“A lot of that is financialization of the economy.”

Military Strategy and Platform Discussion

14:00 to 17:54

Explore the complexities of maritime and ground warfare and the strategic focus on military platforms.

“Maritime warfare, amphibious warfare, it's very difficult.”

Middle East Conflict and Iran

18:35 to 20:31

Analyze the current military engagement with Iran and its implications for regional stability.

“Let's then head for the Middle East, but maintaining the connection to China.”

Assessing the Situation in Iran

20:31 to 21:41

Evaluate the U.S. strategy in Iran and the potential for a peaceful resolution.

“Well, I think first on the what are we accomplishing?”

Impact of U.S. Actions on China

21:41 to 23:14

Discuss the perceived advantages of U.S. military actions in the Middle East on China's global positioning.

“Well, I mean, it depends on how you're measuring it.”
Show all 23 chapters

U.S. Middle East Strategy Unpacked

23:14 to 24:51

Delve into the challenges faced by the U.S. in reopening strategic routes and dealing with Iran.

“oil and gas industry is doing phenomenally well, right?”

Evaluating U.S. Influence and Trust

24:51 to 28:00

Consider how the effectiveness of U.S. military and diplomatic strategies affects global perceptions.

“Like if this ends with a deal that is worse for the U.S.”

U.S. Foreign Policy Dynamics

28:00 to 30:14

Explore how the U.S. is recalibrating its foreign policy in the Middle East.

“Well, you know, A, you can help us out or B, take it up with Tehran.”

The Legacy of Military Conflicts

30:14 to 34:04

Discuss the implications of past military conflicts on current U.S.-Iran relations.

“You were warning that we didn't have unlimited military resources.”

The Legacy of Military Conflicts

35:33 to 36:14

Discuss the implications of past military conflicts on current U.S.-Iran relations.

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Ukraine Conflict and U.S. Strategy

37:02 to 42:01

Analyze the U.S. approach to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

“You mentioned earlier that you think that in many ways the administration's overall approach to that conflict has been vindicated by the fact that European allies are doing more for Ukraine.”

Intentional Strategy in Military Support

42:01 to 43:39

Discussion on the intentionality behind military support and strategy adjustments in the Biden administration.

“I am not in the chain of command, so I cannot order anybody.”

Understanding NATO 3.0

43:40 to 45:28

Exploration of NATO 3.0 and its implications for European defense responsibilities.

“Because another story, this is more recent in the press, was that the Pentagon had plans for troop reductions in Eastern Europe.”

Middle Powers and Independent Foreign Policy

45:29 to 47:38

Analysis of middle powers' ability to conduct independent foreign policy and the implications for their defense strategies.

“Actually, in a lot of ways, and this was the point of the speech, a key theme, we're going back to the Cold War idea.”

Challenges of Middle Power Defense Strategies

47:39 to 52:08

Discussion on the challenges middle powers face in establishing effective defense mechanisms.

“And this brings me to your recent memorandum slash tweet storm about what gets called.”

Canada's Military Responsibilities and U.S. Expectations

52:09 to 55:17

Debate on Canada's military responsibilities in the context of U.S. security expectations and cooperation.

“It's not like middle power should just pliantly wait.”

Perception of U.S. Military Posturing

55:18 to 56:00

Examination of how U.S. military posturing affects perceptions in Canada and the implications for international relations.

“Because that, and that's not just a nice app, that affects Americans.”

American Sovereignty and the Monroe Doctrine

56:00 to 1:07:20

Discussing the implications of American presence in Canada and its historical context.

“So you interpret the image of the stars and stripes flying up past Hudson Bay as just the Monroe Doctrine?”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00Ross Douthat:Gun injuries are the leading cause of death for children and teens in the United States. Some people avoid talking about gun violence because they don't think they can make a difference. But every conversation matters. When it comes to gun violence, we agree on more than we think. And having productive conversations about gun violence can help protect children and teens. Learn how to have the conversation at AgreedToAgree.org. Brought to you by the Ad Council. What you're telling me is the administration's policy is leading our allies to spend more on their own defense and take more responsibility and lessen the burden on Americans.

0:37That sounds good to me.

0:43Ross Douthat:Does the Trump administration have a coherent foreign policy? We don't need anybody. We need Greenland for national security. We attacked dangerous people from Iran. They're sick. I have no tension with anybody. Donald Trump returned to office promising to make peace between Russia and Ukraine, to stay out of reckless Middle Eastern wars, and to contain the People's Republic of China. I'm not sure it's all going as he hoped. Russia made clear they had no intention of striking a deal. China is happy to see the United States getting bogged down in the Middle East. President Trump scrambling to put together an international coalition to help force open the Strait of Hormuz.

1:28Ross Douthat:My guest this week is the administration's Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which means he's the man in the Pentagon in charge of thinking about the big picture. And if there's anyone who can explain the method behind this administration's approach to foreign policy, it's him. Elbridge Colby, welcome to Interesting Times. Great to be here. Thanks, Ross. Great to have you. So I wanted to start by just stipulating for the audience that I have actually known you for a long time, much longer than is true of most of the guests on this program. And I think that's relevant to the line of questioning I'm going to follow because I first met you when we were both 18 years old, and I'm pretty sure that you were the first college freshman that I met who had strong views on the 19th century Austrian statesman Clemens von Metternich.

2:25Ross Douthat:I think that's fair. Which is just to say you are currently at the Pentagon in a policy job where your role is to think about strategy. And you've been thinking about strategy for as long as I've known you. And I'm going to start by asking you strategic questions. What is the Trump administration's grand strategy? Just overall, what are you trying to achieve? Well, I wouldn't presume to speak for the president, but my interpretation is grounded in this flexible realism and common sense. And that's a term that the president himself used often, I use all the time when I'm trying to explain what we're up to, to foreign governments and foreign parties, is it's a non-ideological approach, but really kind of recalibrating and reassessing things in light of the current situation we face.

3:11Looking out at the world, you know, that President Biden left, there was a potential for simultaneous conflicts that we need to be prepared for and also to do so in a realistic and sustainable way. And I think if you look at our defense strategy and national security strategy, this is a very promising and I think successful and effective approach, which is, one, modernizing our armed forces and we're pursuing a very significant, albeit one time, increased infusion into the defense industrial base led by the president, Secretary Hegseth, Deputy Secretary Feinberg, to get production to a whole different level that also is very consistent with the re-industrial agenda, re-industrialization agenda at home.

3:50Second is, I would say, really a fundamentally different but much more sensible common sense approach to our allies and partners, which is getting them to step up and do their part in ways that are consistent with their own interests. So you see that with countries like Poland and Germany and the Scandinavian countries stepping up. And you have a lot of stuff that, oh, the administration is isolationist or restrained. That's demonstrably untrue. What we're doing and what you can -

4:12Ross Douthat:Or you have a lot of stuff that says the administration is bullying and cruel to allies in an effort to get this. Is it cruel to ask the Germans or the Japanese or the French to spend as much as Americans spend? I don't think that's cruel. I think that's fair. And I think, and if you listen to the Europeans or Secretary General Rutta or many other leaders, they'll say, we ignored the politesse that was sent our way for a decade or two, that the Europeans need to do more. And in a sense, they were not crazy to do so because there are no consequences. And the third part of it is, I think, a willingness to pursue peace and to engage with our potential opponents.

4:51I mean, right now there's potential talks with Iran. Obviously, we're using the military instrument to try to advance the objectives of preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and ensuring the Strait of Hormuz as an open waterway. In the case of the Kremlin, the administration has been willing to have direct talks. Obviously, the president himself has spoken to President Putin, President Xi. There's a very good relationship between the leaders. You had President Biden essentially insulting the leaders of these states and not having the military build up to back that up, nor the pressure on our allies to put us all in a position where we could deal with that.

5:25So I think the results speak for themselves and we're on a very good trajectory.

5:27Ross Douthat:So I want to take that agenda and go theater by theater and talk about how it plays out around the world. So China, right? In the first Trump term, You were part of the group that wrote the national security strategy that identified China as the U.S.'s geopolitical. I don't know what language you want to use, but rival adversary. Right. In the second Trump administration, there seemed to be a certain amount of internal debate about whether that framing is correct, whether you want to emphasize more hemispheric defense or defense of the homeland and so on. So just give me your perspective. Is China the most important threat that the U.S.

6:09Ross Douthat:faces right now? A couple of things. One is talk and action are different. So our policy, as the secretary has laid out, is strong and clear, but quiet. So measure what the United States and the United States Department of War is doing by actions and not what we call peacocking, which I think is really different from the last administration where President Biden would speak off the cuff, for instance, about the issue of Taiwan. um so you know our view is the national security strategy sets out is we're going to have a strong denial defense along the first island chain and we're going to work with our allies and partners to make that sure make sure that's the case just for viewers and listeners tell them what the first is the chain of islands running down off the uh the mainland coast of of asia and it's a kind of standard strategic term going back to the 40s and 50s and is taiwan considered part of the first island.

6:57Well, obviously, I'm going to be careful about discussing Taiwan. And as Secretary Rubio pointed out, we have not had a change in our policy, but the overall goal is strategic stability. But to get to your second point about the policy on China, I think we also have to look at things across time, right? I mean, in 2016, President Trump was the first to really introduce that we needed to relook at our policy towards China across the board, obviously, the economic piece being vital as well. We're 10 years down the road. I think people sometimes say, oh, Bridge, you're becoming such a dove or you're falling away from your position.

7:34I don't think that at all.

7:35Ross Douthat:So just for a backdrop, you wrote a book called Strategy of Denial, which was a book arguing specifically that US foreign policy should be oriented around deterrence against potential Chinese aggression in the Pacific. So that's the backdrop to anything someone says to you about China. I've always been a realist. I'm certainly not an isolationist, but I'm also not an uberhawk. And I'm particularly, you know, one of the areas where I think I've been very consistent is focusing more on, you know, the reality of the situation, the structural elements rather than the rhetoric. And the fact that I personally engage with Chinese counterparts, that doesn't mean we're naive to the contrary.

8:16Ross Douthat:But so what is then the structural reality in terms of the actual balance of power? How is it different from 2016? Well, I think there's a couple of things. I mean, in some areas where my own views have changed, I remember having a debate about whether the Chinese economy would ever pass the American economy in nominal GDP. And I thought it would. And I think the president deserves tremendous credit for ensuring the growth of the American economy and you see really the united states probably hopefully pulling away obviously investments in ai but our problems relative to those of china let alone other countries are much more manageable uh in terms of the the kind of structural economic factors so you're more you're more optimistic about america's economic advantages than you would have been i think eight years ago yeah yes i am and i think that's borne out by the performance and for those who anticipated it kudos and that's one where i've kind of altered my view obviously but then how How does that affect our defense strategy?

9:11Right. A lot of that is financialization of the economy. Vice President Vance has been talking very eloquently about this. We need to re-industrialize. We need to be able to make sure that we can re-onshore some of these industrial capacities, because especially when you're looking at military production, a lot of that is really about re-industrialization. Obviously, we're also working with allies. The president set a new global standard of 3.5 % on hardcore military spending. South Korea is committed to that. We're looking for other allies in the region to step up. The Australians are spending quite a bit as well.

9:39So that's going to contribute as well. What I would say is this is where we get back to the issue again of scoping the military strategy to denial.

9:46Ross Douthat:Denial means in practice denying a great power adversary the ability to seize and hold the key territory of the designated ally and partner. What we are trying to achieve along the first island chain is not regime changing somebody and occupying their country and pacifying them, blah, blah, blah. No, no. It is about maritime and aerospace defense along an archipelago. And that is something that really plays to the strengths of the United States. That's something that we and I personally am giving a great deal of thought to because I think who knows what what other people might be thinking. But let's let's make sure that they have every reason to think that such an endeavor would not be successful.

10:25Okay.

10:26Ross Douthat:So there were reports last summer. There have been a lot of stories about you in the press, which I may reference occasionally over the course of this conversation. One such report said that you were pushing allies to clarify their own approach in the event of Chinese aggression. Does that mean, as you've said in this interview, the United States is famously strategically ambiguous in our own approach to what might happen if China were to attack Taiwan? Are we asking our allies to be less ambiguous than we are ourselves? So I won't comment on specific conversations, you know, going on in the Pentagon.

11:05But one thing I think I people can, I think, fairly criticize me for my views or, you know, maybe I'm too direct or any number of things. I don't think somebody can criticize me for being inconsistent or unclear where I'm coming from. And I think this is a good example of where what we are asking our allies to do is, of course, I'm not going to ask them to do something that's way beyond what we would do. That violates common sense. That's not realistic. What we are trying to do is put everybody on the same page in terms of whatever contingency they might be facing, whether it's in Asia or Europe and say, hey, what can we reasonably expect?

11:46I think with Japan, we're having much more candid conversations. With Australia, we're having much more candid conversations. And the different policy sort of particularities come out in different ways. But I think the vibe that the message that we are trying to send and I think is being received is, oh, wow, these people are actually serious. like, oh, they're actually planning to actually potentially get into that conflict precisely so they can avoid it, because that's the best way to deter a conflict is by everybody having a clear sense of what they're supposed to be doing in that context. And then, oh, wait, I'm actually supposed to deploy forces that can do that.

12:20Some people are really getting it. Look at Germany, for instance. You know, I think they're really, I mean, just historic change over the last couple years, because they're saying, oh, the Americans are telling us, here's what we need to be able to do. And that, like, I mean, I think, if anything, you know, I'm sort of certainly like, you know, the president has said is really focused on peace. That's what our agenda is about. Obviously, you have to be ready to use military force. That's what we're thinking about. But with the goal of peace and strategic stability.

12:46Ross Douthat:Okay, last question on East Asia that will connect to questions about the Middle East, right, which is, I have had any number of people watching what's gone on in the Middle East with the Iran conflict, right, with attacks on our bases there, missile attacks and so on, say, look, in the event of a conflict with China, the United States position right now is just untenable, that our bases and aircraft carriers around China are just not going to survive, you know, day one to 20 of a conflict. And we will effectively have to fight our way back into the Pacific theater in that kind of scenario. Whatever is happening with an actual Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

13:29Ross Douthat:And this is something, by the way, that the president, who you're very careful to praise throughout this conversation, has himself commented on repeatedly on Taiwan. It's so close to China so far from the US. You make a number of excellent points and there's a lot of realities in there. This is why you really have to scope your objective. What is it that we are trying to achieve? We may be trying to project power in certain ways, But if in this scenario, if China were to try to project power, it would also be trying to project power over significant bodies of water, whichever of those areas you're talking about.

14:05That's a very difficult proposition. Maritime warfare, amphibious warfare, it's very difficult. You not only have to get someplace, you have to sustain those operations. That is very complicated. That is why, obviously, we're focused on ground forces, et cetera, the presence operations of the Navy. et cetera. But at the end of the day, what's really relevant in this context are platforms and munitions that can operate in heavily denied environments and reach out and achieve very significant effects. Not perfection. Going back to the Battle of Britain, if you look at that analogy, you had the Royal Air Force.

14:40The British were outclassed in almost every measure of the military balance, but it was sufficient for the purposes. And that's where we're really giving a lot of thought.

14:47Ross Douthat:When we're talking about platforms, We're talking about aircraft carriers primarily. Well, look at the totality. The Navy has aircraft carriers. It has cruisers. It has destroyers. It has submarines. The Air Force has short range, shorter range tactical aviation like F-35s. It also has B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s. Those have been employed quite a lot. The United States is also investing heavily in drones. The United States has ground-based fires that have been employed very effectively in the Middle East conflict. There's space capabilities, cyber. So there's a lot. There's a lot, but you were essentially trying to set up a scenario where even if China has a big advantage, we have enough platforms surviving.

15:30Ross Douthat:Advantage to do what? For defense. For defensive purposes. And this is the thing about it is that I feel very confident that I'm not being conniving or dissembling at all when I say that our posture is designed for strategic stability and the status quo and a balance of power. Because it's not the kind of capabilities that you can use reasonably to conduct aggression against military power. So if everybody just stays to their side, everything will be fine. And I think that's a very realistic objective. I think it's not easy. That's why we focus a lot on it. but it's uh it's viable and i think it's very consistent with the president's diplomacy and policy and our all of our policy towards china which is respectful does just speaks respectfully of of china does not purport and this is different from some members of the president's last administration talking about regime change in china it must induce china to change in more creative and assertive ways because beijing's actions threaten our people and our prosperity That's not what we talk about.

16:29Ross Douthat:So you think the second Trump administration has a more reasonable. Yeah. Oh, absolutely. Well, I mean, I think the president has had a consistent policy. And I think right now under his leadership, you have a policy of realism, which is a respectful, positive relationship at the top where you can make deals, but also an understanding that we need to operate from a position of strength.

17:04Ross Douthat:This podcast is supported by Nertek ODT Remedipant. We know you didn't ask for an interruption, but migraine doesn't wait for the right moment to interrupt either. It just barges in, takes your time, and throws everything off. So when migraine takes your time, take Nertek. It's for the acute treatment of migraine with or without aura in adults. NERTECH can provide pain relief in two hours, which can last up to two days. Ask your health care provider if NERTECH is right for you, because your time is for you, not migraine. Don't take if allergic to NERTECH ODT. Allergic reactions can occur even days after use.

17:41Ross Douthat:Get help right away for trouble breathing, rash, swelling of face, mouth, tongue, or throat. High blood pressure and Raynaud's syndrome can occur. Get help for high blood pressure, numbness, coolness, pain, or color changes in fingers and toes. Common side effect is nausea. For full prescribing information, call 1-833-4NERTECH or visit nerdtech.com. All right, back to your podcast. This podcast is supported by Oli, your wellness partner for all things back to school. When the schedules get fuller and the alarm seems to go off sooner, Oli Sleep helps you fall asleep, stay asleep, and wake up feeling refreshed.

18:16Ross Douthat:Because kids aren't the only ones chasing big dreams this year. Head back to class with the number one gummy supplement brand and stock up on Olly.com today. That's O-L-L-Y dot com. These statements have now been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration. This product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease. Let's then head for the Middle East, but maintaining the connection to China. Is it not, in fact, the case that many of exactly the kind of munitions and platforms that we need for the strategy of denial that you've described are now being used up in a currently stalemated conflict with Iran?

18:55Well, I wouldn't say it's stalemated. I think we're obviously. All right.

18:59Ross Douthat:I'll ask you about that next. But are we using. One, I think that point is exaggerated. Obviously, I can't get into the details here, but the capabilities that are most significant have not really been, are not really in the scarce supply. Can you give me one example of such a - I can't give you a specific example, but I can say with confidence that we're in good shape. Okay. But we are also paying attention to this. This is why we've been focused on this since day one. This is why we've been now pushing a$1.5 trillion budget request. This is why we've been impressing our allies, not only to build up their own capability, but to build up their own defense industrial base.

19:38So obviously we want to we want to, you know, grow so that we're we're in the best possible position ourselves as well as with others. But I feel confident where we are. Okay.

19:47Ross Douthat:So you just sort of prickled a little bit at the suggestion that the conflict is stalemated. We had Vice President Vance on the show when the memorandum of understanding was just being hashed out. And he expressed a great deal of confidence that the administration was reaching through military force, but also diplomacy, a stable place where the war would come to an end and there would be sort of fruitful engagement with Iran going forward. I fundamentally believe this deal will be good for the entire region and for the world. But at present, it would seem the U.S. is back at war with Iran. What are we accomplishing?

20:27Ross Douthat:Why is it not fair to at least describe this as a stalemate? Well, I think first on the what are we accomplishing? I think we're denying Iran a nuclear weapon. That's something that started with Operation Midnight Hammer, but has continued with this operation and also substantially degraded Iran's ability to project military power throughout the region. Now we're talking about drones and missiles. That problem obviously remains, but Iran's Navy, its air force, etc. There's been a very substantial degradation of Iran's capability, as well as significant parts of its defense industrial base. So that, you know, which was a.

20:59Ross Douthat:But it still has the capability to literally strike U.S. bases in Jordan. Right. Right. And so, I mean, thereby sort of proving the point that it is remains a threat in terms of it being a stalemate. I don't think that's necessarily true. And I don't think diplomacy has been ruled out. Secretary Rubio was just saying the Iranians have been reaching out. But the question is whether they're serious or not. But I think we probably face a situation here where obviously the military instrument is very important to obviously to defend ourselves and our allies and partners, but also to impose significant costs on Iran or those factions with the Iranian leadership that are that are driving the train here on these strikes to make sure that that is not a sustainable situation.

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21:36So, I mean, I think it remains to be seen, but I wouldn't regard it as a stalemate. I don't think that's a fair assessment. Okay.

21:43Ross Douthat:I'm going to quote Fareed Zakaria wrote a column for the Washington Post where he said that the Iran war has been good for China because it is, quote, accelerated three of China's long-held goals, a Middle East less dependent on America, a world more dependent on critical Chinese technology, and a reputation for Beijing as a serious and steady world power. that doesn't seem unfair to me does it seem unfair to you i actually think it's not true okay good i saw that i'm once more a fan of zikari's but i it's very kind of conventional wisdomy um why is why is it why is that conventional wisdom so on the first one remind me of the first one well the first one is uh he says a middle east less yeah dependent on america which i i presume by that he means a middle east where a lot of countries think that you know the u.s is just It's not going to be sort of permanently.

22:39Well, I mean, it depends on how you're measuring it. But I would say the United States, I mean, obviously, a lot of the countries in the region are very worried about Iran, needless to say. And there's tremendous relations. The president just had a great meeting with the prime minister of Iraq. We've had a breakthrough in Syria. Obviously, very good relations with President Erdogan. Strong partnerships with, you know, UAE, Bahrain, you know, Saudi, et cetera. So, I mean, there's countries are playing different angles. One thing that I think is missed there is China does not come away from the situation looking glowingly.

23:13And, you know, nobody's more, you know, kind of exposed to Middle East oil over the long period of time than, you know, China and other countries like that. At the same time, I would say the U.S. oil and gas industry is doing phenomenally well, right? Obviously, there's structural issues where the flow of oil and gas out of the strait remains important. That's one of the reasons why we're working to open it up. but I think that's another factor where, you know, if you look at the growth of the American economy, energy production, et cetera, there's good news and the relative performances of the American and Chinese economy.

23:51So I actually think, look, you know, I don't think we beat up on China or anything like that verbally, but I wouldn't trade our position at all. I think our position looks really good.

24:02Ross Douthat:But so you just mentioned the Strait of Hormuz, whether or not you want to be in America's position at the macro level. The case for not wanting to be in America's position in its relationship to the Middle East right now is that we are currently trying and failing to permanently reopen the Strait of Hormuz. And absent a strategy to do that, it seems like Iran, a second tier power, not a great power rival, not the kind of power that you have built, you know your arguments around our need to contain is you know pretty effectively holding us off right i wouldn't say it's failing i mean first of all we're in the situation right no it's not it's not over yeah right and also i think it's showing the danger of iran that it is willing to do this and the united states and the president are taking action obviously in our benefit but also for the benefit of others who could contribute more in this kind of situation including diplomatically by putting pressure on iran i don't think it's a sustainable situation i mean this gets out of the the remit of the Pentagon, but I don't think it's a sustainable situation for Iran to essentially be holding hostage and violating, you know, the most, this is not expansive international law.

25:13Ross Douthat:It's, it's clearly, it's clearly not a sustainable situation in some, in some sense, but who gets to, who gets to decide how it actually resolves itself seems to be a big deal for generally how much trust people have in America's war making capacity, our power projection capacity. Like if this ends with a deal that is worse for the U.S. than whatever was sketched out in the MOU, then doesn't it seem like countries around the world look at that and say, well, the U.S. is in a pretty, it's a pretty weak position. I mean, I don't accept the premise. I mean, I think we're like, we are in it, right?

25:52And people have to give time to something when you're dealing with, you know, a regime a government that has you know been fanatically opposed the united states and its ally israel the gulf states for almost 50 years now uh people have to give some some uh time for this strategy to work out and part of that is this is military force which we're applying effectively part of as the diplomatic international pressure the economic pressure on iran the restoration of sanctions etc um and also you know as you say but what but what tips i mean we've been we've been

26:22Ross Douthat:bombing Iran. We've been imposing sanctions on Iran. And yes, I agree. It's been, you know, however long it's been, four or five months. Who knows what it will look like in a year. But also who knows what the global economy will look like in a year, right? What is the potential inflection point where Iran says, okay, the Trump administration has found a way to impose enough pain that we will make a better deal? I mean, obviously they're testing the limits, right? And the president is responding with very serious military force, but not only force, the restoration of sanctions, you know, the ability to interdict Iranian shipping.

26:58A lot of these things.

27:00Ross Douthat:Do you think they just have cumulative weight? Because it just seems like the Iranians, their view seems to be, or at least the people making decisions seems to be, we can bear the pain longer than the Trump administration. That's their bet right now. Well, I think that's the bet of at least some of them inside of the government. But I think obviously they are going to be feeling a tremendous amount of pain and they are their future economic prospects and not just in some sense of like the people in the street, but for the preservation of the government itself are going to start to tell. So time will tell.

27:30But I also think my sense is that obviously there's the application of military force, there's the sanctions and so forth. There's a lot of other options that can expand that leverage. We have seen that, you know, for instance, the blockade was very effective against the Iranians. And so there's a lot of escalation that the president still has that he can exploit across military and non-military tools. And then I think there's the international pressure because honestly, and I think people can see that this is not the United States that was seeking to resume conflict in the strait. This is Iran precipitating this conflict and saying they are the ones, you know, I've seen international leaders complain about the economic consequences.

28:05Well, you know, A, you can help us out or B, take it up with Tehran. They're the ones who are causing this. The other thing, let me address something else that I think is in there. One of the things that you said makes a sort of a broader point, which is, you know, I think you said that countries will start to judge that the United States is incapable of X, Y, Z and will start to tilt away. And I think that's one thing that's really important at a structural level that this administration is doing differently in a perhaps tough way sometimes, but also in a rational and common sense way, which is to price accurately the partnership and relationship with the United States, both in terms of access, things like AI or energy, but also in terms of leverage, you know, things like burden sharing issues or tariffs, etc.

28:45I think if I were going to put it in a kind of common sense one-liner, it's people can no longer take the United States for granted. And I think there was an element during the era of the international rules-based order when people did take the United States for granted. And the president is a masterful negotiator, comes from New York. Somebody said very memorably to me, the president insists that we mark things to market. And I think it's a kind of an idle claim to say that countries are going to go elsewhere. Where are they going to go? Iran can't compete with the United States. Iran is trying to use leverage over one particular thing.

29:14Iran doesn't have them. No, it's a pretty big thing, though. Right. No longer has the military power projection capability to even pretend to threaten those things. So we see the governments of the region actually, if anything, probably growing closer to the United States. Not to say they're going to agree with us on every particular thing, but there isn't really an alternative to dealing with the United States. Iran is not. I mean, A, they don't want to. And B, Iran is not strong enough to be able to pretend to that that kind of thing. So what we're talking about is their ability to molest international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and trying to leverage that.

29:48Ross Douthat:Do you think that the conflict with Iran would have gone differently in five or 10 years with a set of Middle Eastern allies that were better armed and better equipped? Well, I think that's where we want to get. I mean, already we've seen actions from a variety of our Middle Eastern partners that was not the case in previous conflicts. So I think that's already been there's been progress. And a lot of that's the president goes back to the first term. Yeah. Yeah. Last one, last on Iran. You know, you've talked about things people might say to you based on your writing in the past. I think the obvious thing that someone would say to you about the Iran war is this is a conflict that has totally vindicated Elbridge Colby thought from several years ago, where you were the guy who was, you know, wanted to pivot to Asia.

30:34Ross Douthat:You were warning that we didn't have unlimited military resources. The American military, while without peer, is not infinite in its application and resources. Potential opponents have been building their strength and capabilities, and it is not fair just... During your confirmation hearings, the fact that you had not been a big Iran hawk was a big point of contention. And someone would say, look, yeah, you've been vindicated by the policies of your own administration that have revealed all the weaknesses that you yourself spoke about. How would you respond to that? Well, I definitely would not put it that way in any respect, Ross.

31:07A couple of things. First and foremost, in my confirmation hearing in the confirmation process, I pledged to support the president's policy to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and to provide in my capacity as the undersecretary for policy, military options, credible and rational military options to the secretary and whoever else is relevant in that context to back up that policy. And I have absolutely done that. And I have been proud to support the administration. I think we've contributed to and the president, we've contributed to degrading Iran's military capability and set back Iran's nuclear ambitions substantially.

31:45The other thing I would say, kind of stepping back a little bit, is my observation, you know, watching kind of people from, you know, who we might, you know, look at on Twitter and the commentary. I think people need to put stuff into perspective. I, you know, 58 ,000 Americans killed in Vietnam, over 100 ,000 ground troops on the ground in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom. um you know obviously every american service member's loss is is a tragedy and i and i have the utmost respect and and take that with the utmost gravity um i think it's important to keep in perspective what's what's it what's at issue here we're not you know this when people say oh the president has rejected the nation building we're not doing nation building this is not an endless war right i mean as the secretary has said there there it's not all right wait it's But I also think but I think this is important because people want a black pill to use the kids terminology on something where I think the broader perspective is actually really encouraging.

32:51Ross Douthat:So I I completely agree that the Iran war does not resemble the Iraq war or the Vietnam war in any. I mean, you've described and that and that is a big deal. At the same time, as we were just going back and forth about, the Iran war is still ongoing. Right. It is, whether or not it's stalemated, it has not come to a victorious conclusion for the U.S. When people look at our current situation and say the administration seems a bit trapped, part of what they're seeing is that they're very aware that the president doesn't want to escalate in those ways, that the president doesn't want to send in ground troops and so on.

33:29Ross Douthat:Well, the president is escalating. But if the president doesn't want to do those things, then it's unclear to go back to the earlier point. I know, but you're going back into this. So one thing, I'm not taking the president's decision. We're circling around. I'm sorry. Well, no, no, but the president is countering very strongly and is prepared to escalate. He's made that clear and he's followed it up. So I don't want to suggest that the president isn't prepared to escalate. He's also prepared to deal if they come in the right spirit, as Secretary Rubio said. But the point I'm making, Ross, which I think you conceded, is people need to look at this with the correct perspective.

34:01And I think that has been lost.

34:03Ross Douthat:All I'm saying is that the dilemma is connected to the fact that for good reason, we don't want this to turn into another Iraq or Vietnam. So then the question is, OK, if those options are off the table, as maybe they should be, how do you get out? No, no. But and again, I mean, there are escalation options that don't involve doing Vietnam and Iraq. And that's what's another part that's different is that you end up large numbers of troops in the case of Vietnam, the draft or something, you know, almost like it in Iraq, you know, where you're pacifying, you're driving down the street, making sure people are going to school or whatever.

34:38That's not the job of the American military. There could be some very substantial escalation options, obviously military, but also non-military that would have a major impact on on on Iran that are in the presence, you know, inventory if he chooses to if he thinks that's the right call and will support him if he does. So I don't think it's not that he's like trapped. He has options. But my main point here is just to keep this this entire operation in perspective.

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36:53Ross Douthat:Visit betterhelp.com slash New York Times to get started. Okay. Russia and Ukraine. We're doing just small, small subjects. You mentioned earlier that you think that in many ways the administration's overall approach to that conflict has been vindicated by the fact that European allies are doing more for Ukraine. We are still supporting the Ukrainian effort, but we are doing so more indirectly, weapon sales and so on. And Ukraine has been able to continue fighting, even regain ground and so on. A different argument is that the administration came in to the second term, convinced that, as was said repeatedly, Ukraine didn't have enough cards to play.

37:39Ross Douthat:And it was really important to push the Ukrainians to be willing to make a deal with Vladimir Putin and with Russia. That seemed to be a big part of the administration's approach in at least the first six months, right? And that part has, one, there hasn't been a peace deal. Two, Ukraine has found many more cards to play and has continued surviving. So I'm curious what you think about the value of that initial push on the Zelensky government to try and make a deal. Was it useful? Did it go anywhere? Well, let me try to, I mean, so I think the structural argument that I was referring to, which I think you captured well, is that Europe could and would take primary responsibility for its own conventional defense, which has happened.

38:27They have made the commitment and now they're spending to follow it up. Two years ago, that would have had people's heads falling off. So now we've actually gone a long way towards, obviously, there've been direct negotiations between the United States and Russia and obviously very close contact with Ukraine, but also a lot of the groundwork on things like coalition of willing and what a peace arrangement might look like or a ceasefire or whatever it is. So I think I actually think we're well positioned. But, you know, from the perspective of the Department of War, this is really about having the Europeans step up to take the responsibility for something that they can do, you know, much more substantially on their own.

39:00Ross Douthat:I guess I'm just asking, have you been surprised by the resilience of Ukrainian resistance in the absence of an armistice? i wouldn't say i've been surprised but i mean i think the ukrainians have conducted a very stout and admirable self-defense for four years i mean they've right lost a tremendous amount of people i think they've been very uh effective at adapting their obviously technology like drones but also their military operations they also are trying to deny or defend right the russians are the ones who are trying to to take land so that puts them in a harder point you know i will say right now, I think the Ukrainians in some ways have improved.

39:39The situation is still, you know, largely attritional. And there's, you know, mutual, you know, firing at cities, which is obviously a tragic loss of civilian life, etc. You know, I think if I were in the Kremlin, I would counsel saying, this is a good time to, you know, end this conflict. And, you know, you have a man who's genuinely interested in peace in President Trump, and let's be rational, and let's make a deal. I think that would be the wise. Why do you think that hasn't happened yet?

40:10Ross Douthat:What do you what do you think? I mean, getting inside the heads of our, you know, other, you know, heads of state is always a fraught endeavor. I think, you know, if you look at what President Putin has said publicly, he's very committed to this objective. His interview with Tucker Carlson, for instance, he's got a deep historical sense about it. So I think 500 years of history. I mean, I think this is reference. Yeah. But I think this is part of the again, this is not like a pro Putin administration or something. It's saying if you're going to make peace with with a great power, you have to kind of grapple with, you know, the way they think and the reality that they do have a lot of power and go at it with that kind of mindset.

40:49when we negotiated with the communists in Vietnam or Korea, with China. That was the mindset that we were dealing with. So I think that's not something...

40:59Ross Douthat:But you haven't gotten there, which suggests that there is a... I mean, it's not ultimately we can't snap our fingers and make it so, but it's a noble endeavor. And I think we're structurally setting up the conditions to make that plausible and viable. And then, of course, the Ukrainians deserve a lot of credit, obviously, for being able to erode the Russians' ability to advance. On the, again, on the stories about Elbridge Colby Front, one of the recurring stories in the press in this administration is that the Department of Defense slash war, meaning Secretary Hegseth, but in the stories often meaning you, has wanted to go further in limiting support for Ukraine, limiting weapons flow to Ukraine, and then it gets reversed.

41:46Ross Douthat:So last summer, you were personally blamed for holding up a shipment of weapons to Ukraine because U.S. stopped. That was a false story. Okay, so tell me what happened in a case like that. There was a memorandum that was signed out by the Secretary. First of all, it's very important. I am not in the chain of command, so I cannot order anybody. I don't have the power. It would be absurd if I did. I'd probably get thanks. There's the door. What we were doing at that time was trying to put, I think, what has been a hallmark of this administration, which is trying to be intentional. I mean, the Biden administration, I think a lot of stuff was just like going out the door without knowing what was happening.

42:20I think in this administration, we're saying, hey, we need to have an understanding. You know, we have global requirements and we have a strategy following up. We're going to improve our situation where necessary. We've got very strong inventories, but we're going to be more intentional about it. And actually, there was a task to some military organizations to actually set up a new way of facilitating transfers to Ukraine. And there was some kind of and I don't exactly know what happened, but there was some kind of mix up on on that side of the house. And it was eventually rectified. But I think that more broadly, the proof is in the pudding.

42:50We have been I myself have participated in the Ukraine defense contact group and made the exact points that I'm saying to you now. I myself have signed off in terms of supporting multiple transfers of munitions to Ukraine. I think what we were trying to really do and reframe was, you know, exactly what I've been saying, which is we need to think about this in a common sense way. America first. Obviously, you know, we want to have the ability to support Ukraine, but we also need to know we're doing. And we want most importantly, we want to transfer the responsibilities the president said to those who have the biggest stake and who are most invested in it.

43:25I mean, that's a key point of I think the administration's approach, this flexible realist approach. It's like the Europeans are constantly talking about how important this is. And, you know, in a lot of ways we agree, but they can do a lot more. And in fact, they're doing it. That is what we want. We want a Europe and a Ukrainian defense industrial base that's more self-sustaining, right?

43:44Ross Douthat:How do U.S. troops fit into this picture? Because another story, this is more recent in the press, was that the Pentagon had plans for troop reductions in Eastern Europe. Oh, we're talking about in Europe. Yes, in Europe. And that, again, the story was that, you know, people in the Pentagon were pushing for deeper reductions and then it went up to the president and it got it got slapped down or something. Right. Like this is a recurring narrative. I mean, I think the president has been very clear, Secretary Higgs has been very clear for many years that the relationship with NATO is unbalanced and that we need to rectify that.

44:19I mean, we have an amazing secretary general right now and Mark Ruta. I mean, he gets a lot of flack, but he's really doing what people need, which is to see the situation as it is and to try to work with us in this period of transition to NATO 3.0. Right. That's what we need.

44:32Ross Douthat:you would expect the goal of the administration whatever is happening over six months here or six months there is for the u.s ultimately to have fewer troops in well i think look a couple things i mean to me it's more of a positive goal that i laid out in my speech at nato 3.0 well you can tell me tell you can tell me about nato 3.0 but first just specifically well the goal is troop level troop levels yeah but troop levels are downstream of the overall right okay nato 3.0 What is NATO 3.0? You've referenced it. We talked about in February and has since been embraced by the alliance and its leadership and so forth, European leaders, is basically a concept where Europe takes primary responsibility for its own conventional defense.

45:15What we were trying to do with this NATO 3.0 thing is there had long been this idea that President Trump and his administration were abandoning the post-war order. And that's just wrong. What really— Post-World War II. What President Trump and the administration are really doing, and certainly as we see it, is moving on from the post-Cold War order, the order, the world of the end of history, of the liberal international order delusion, of unchecked free trade that can't be balanced and that leads to deindustrialization of America. Actually, in a lot of ways, and this was the point of the speech, a key theme, we're going back to the Cold War idea.

45:49In the Cold War, at the end of the Cold War in 1988, West Germany had 12 active divisions. That was a country that's two-thirds the size of the current Germany. which basically had nothing until now they're doing great since in the last year or so. So this is going back to the basics of building military readiness. The other thing is you mentioned Russia. Let's look at the challenge that NATO faces. And we don't have to get into all the political, what is Vladimir Putin actually thinking? You can see Russia's military capability. It is building up its military, you know, and the European allies feel threatened.

46:21okay let's have you focus instead of getting into you know theological debates about you know this this or that nato summit declaration focus on building the military capability in the same way that i think the administration the president doing very successfully in asia strong and clear but quiet and you now have the germans building up you have you know the fins are very strong the poles are fantastic model ally there even the swede the swedes the norwegians we're hoping the british pick up the slack under the new government unfortunately thus far it's not been sufficient The French have a strong ready military.

46:53They need to spend more. It's a difficult budgetary situation, but everybody's got challenges.

46:58Ross Douthat:There's a few difficult budgetary situations in Europe. Indeed, but get in line, right? I mean, Americans make sacrifices. So one thing that you hear in the context of these buildups, right? And these buildups are happening. You're absolutely right. A number of U.S. allies are spending more on defense. The long-term economic prospects of Europe are a more open question. But they're often being framed as not so much as NATO 3.0 and a recalibrated partnership with the United States as a hedge against the U.S. becoming much more of a rogue superpower. You hear this a lot, the idea basically that U.S.

47:39Ross Douthat:allies looking at the Trump administration's behavior, looking at its demands, looking at, you know, threats over tariffs and so on are saying, yeah, we need to be stronger militarily and we need to be stronger economically because we may need to conduct foreign policy independent of the U.S. And this brings me to your recent memorandum slash tweet storm about what gets called. I don't think it was a storm. It was like a few guys. That's what they call it. It's a term of art. A tweet storm. It's just a series of tweets. It's a technical term. Okay. Sorry. From my profession. Your profession has technical terms, too.

48:14Ross Douthat:So in this thread of tweets, you talked about what you saw as the delusion of middle powers conducting some kind of truly independent foreign policy. Just tell me what you were saying. Sure. Can I answer the first question? Yeah. So so you're framing, I would regard as tendentious. Well, I'm it doesn't have to be my framing. It is it is framing. But many people, many people are saying, but let me let me. OK, so let me object to the frame. Yep. However, if we look at the structure, what you're telling me is the administration's policy is leading our allies to spend more on their own defense and take more responsibility and and lessen the burden on Americans.

48:55That sounds good to me. I mean, to me, it's like I think that basically you had a situation in which allies and partners were taking the United States for granted. You know, that doesn't mean going completely the other direction and pulling out, but it means countries now, whether it's on tariffs or whether it's on defense issues, they have to calculate they actually have to do more. I mean, my feeling about allies is that you want to reassure allies enough so that they don't kind of fall apart or in some circumstances defect to the other side. But you want to keep them sufficiently on their toes so that they do their part.

49:27Right. I mean, that's just human behavior. I mean, so this critique, I really don't get because also when you peel back the onion, it's not like Germany's building up its military to sail to southeastern Africa and reestablish a colonial empire. Germany is building up its military to take more responsibility for NATO 3.0, which means that we are in a better position. Obviously, you know, I imagine without presuming any decisions that we will remain, you know, tied to NATO. So the fact that we have very capable states taking more of the weight is all good. So I would say President Trump and the approach that we're taking now is the savior of NATO, because this is the way that NATO was going to last because it was going to become more more more durable.

50:09Ross Douthat:Just for just for background, too, this is something that is an idea that's specifically associated now with the prime minister of Canada, Mark Carney, who delivered a big speech, basically saying a version of what I said to you, that Canada and other countries like it can't rely on the U.S. in the way that they once did. Argue the middle powers must act together because if we're not at the table, we're on the menu. So let me let me explain if I could. What I was specifically arguing against is this idea of middle powers. And really what I was saying, it was not as the kids call it so much about flex.

50:44Really what I was saying, because then the first in the first tweet, I made the point that the problem is that if countries that are situated like this do something that is counterproductive or wasteful, they will be probably in greater danger. So if you're a country like Poland or South Korea or something like that, and you face what you regard as a fairly serious threat, if you embark on like, let's take a middle powers defense industry initiative and it doesn't pan out or it results in something far inferior, you will pay the cost. the middle power strategy is based on it's based on i think as we said a faulty understanding of international relations which is that powers in a certain bracket will naturally have reason to align and work together in that context we actually are encouraging middle powers not only to work with us but also to work with each other so for instance i put on twitter meaning just just if i

51:35Ross Douthat:could clarify you would be in favor of middle powers working together if it means south korea australia and japan but but here's the thing with the focus on something concrete and specific and leveraging the united states and working with the united states rather and that we may not need to work together all the time there may be situations in which you don't buy for instance an american weapon system but the overall approach should be designed for the middle powers or smaller powers to take more responsibility with the goal of fielding combat capability so take it in the defense space the f-35 is the you know essentially the best fifth generation aircraft out there if you're say canada and you're you know they're going over a year on examining the f-35 versus the grippen the grippen is a swedish made aircraft the grippen is dramatically inferior to the f-35 canada has norad requirements north american air defense requirements americans will face greater danger if canada goes in the direction of an inferior aircraft also one that might not be able to communicate as effectively.

52:34So that's the whole point. It's not like middle power should just pliantly wait. We constantly, continually say we want partnerships, not dependencies. We want countries that are able to take more responsibility, but it should be with a practical objective designed to achieve the goal as quickly as possible. Because if we take the Europeans at face value and they are worried about something happening militarily in their continent, you can't be wasting time on an uncertain, untested collaboration with countries that may fall apart at the end or will produce inferior equipment. They're going to make sure they get the best stuff.

53:08So that's, I actually think our policy on this is very reasonable.

53:12Ross Douthat:But we know why Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, as it might say something in this regard, that the leaders of Poland would not, right? The President of the United States and people around him in this second term have made, let's say, jokes about the addition of Canada to the United States as the 51st state. They have made statements suggesting that the U.S. might be willing to use some kind of military force to take over Greenland for America's national security purposes, but from a NATO ally, right? There has been a set of public statements by this administration that has been perceived as threatening, predatory in a way that is distinct, I think, from just like demanding that Germany spend more on the military.

54:04Ross Douthat:Right. And that is what has yielded, at least in the case of Canada, this kind of rhetoric, surely. Right. Well, I mean, let me be clear. I mean, under President Trump, we are restoring the Monroe Doctrine, the Trump Corollary of the Monroe Doctrine. Obviously, there's, I think, a productive diplomatic track on the Greenland issue, but it's important that that be addressed to the president's satisfaction and to our satisfaction. I mean, he pointed out that, you know, this is something that America essentially is responsible for the security of Greenland. The United States is the only country capable of actually providing the security of Greenland.

54:39We're obviously working out a diplomatic track. So I think that that's very important that that lead to a productive outcome. And I think with Canada, the president's spoken about that ambassador greer and others from the department of war we're saying look our security is interlinked um and canada basically functionally demilitarized after probably the first trudeau government the trudeau the father and that has direct complication implications for the security of americans in a world that could be more dangerous so we're i mean what we're telling the canadians is all we're expecting you to do basically be like the germans of the polls gets you use your defense increase increased canadian defense dollars to buy real military capability that fills joint needs.

55:19Right. Because that, and that's not just a nice app, that affects Americans.

55:22Ross Douthat:This is good and I'm all for that. But you're doing that while the president is, you know, appearing on TV or in a video still or wherever else it is with a map showing, you know, US stars and stripes covering North America, right? Which is different. That's a different, that's a different policy ask from more defense. Well, I don't think it's a different, I mean, I don't think what we're doing is different than what he's doing. He's, he's. What is he doing? I wouldn't presume to characterize what the president is doing. Well, then how do you know it's not different from what you're doing? It's certainly not incompatible.

55:53I mean, I think the president, as I understand it, is communicating that the United States needs to be secure and have our interests respected in the hemisphere.

56:02Ross Douthat:And he communicates it in that way. So you interpret the image of the stars and stripes flying up past Hudson Bay as just the Monroe Doctrine? Well, I think the stars and stripes should be flying high above anywhere. So it's great. We're proud of it. It's 250 years. Flying anywhere is a statement of sovereignty or just as a statement of awesomeness? Well, certainly awesomeness. But what do you mean you think the stars and stripes should be flying anywhere? Well, I just think we are... You don't think it's reasonable for a proud Canadian to look at that image and say, at the very least the U.S.

56:41Ross Douthat:is trying to vassalize us? Because that is, I mean, that's the reaction that I think you're getting, right? That's driving like Mark Carney's speech or something. There's a difference between asking the polls to spend more money on the military, which the polls seem happy to do, and acting like Canada is just an extension of the glorious United States. Well, I think the president has been saying when he's talked about it, he says that the Canadians have an insanely favorable trading arrangement and that they're, you know, really almost, you know, right on the American economy and that that needs to be recalibrated.

57:20Ross Douthat:And that's that's all you think he's saying. I know you don't presume to speak. I don't presume to speak for him. I think it speaks for itself. I think the way I think we absolutely and I'm proud. I mean, when he gave his remarks on Inauguration Day, he made clear that, you know, going back to the Monroe Doctrine, to Teddy Roosevelt, to a strong and assertive and unabashed declaration of American ascendancy, certainly in this hemisphere. Well, China is operating the Panama Canal, and we didn't give it to China. We gave it to Panama, and we're taking it back. And he's negotiating with everybody to reflect that.

58:00Okay. All right.

58:01Ross Douthat:Let me ask a last, somewhat long-winded question. So you keep describing yourself as a foreign policy realist. And as you said, this is a school of thought that emphasizes fundamental interests. Nations have fundamental interests that are more important than ideological commitments, flights of idealistic fancy, all these kinds of things. And I think one critique of realism is that it can underplay the role of, you could call it irrationality in world affairs, but you could also call it like a sense of sort of honor and, you know, woundedness and a desire for glory and a desire to assert yourself in ways that are themselves not necessarily perfectly rational always.

58:51Ross Douthat:Right. And so, like, when you talk, whether you're talking about Canada or NATO or the Middle East or anywhere else, you keep stressing basically that everybody are allies in all these different regions. They would be stupid to go anywhere else. They don't, you know, look to China. Why would you look to China? They're an authoritarian state that doesn't have a global military. Make a deal with Iran. Come on. The Iranians, you know, they're weak and they're a threat and they're run by fanatics. It's not in your interest, right, to do that. Like Canada needs to step up, right, for all these reasons.

59:27Ross Douthat:And I agree with you 100%. Like, I don't think - Can we stop there? We can stop there. No, we can't stop there because this is my interview. I agree with you 100%. I do not think that under current circumstances, it makes sense for our friends and allies to recalibrate their posture to try and balance between us and China or cut deals with Iran or anything like that. But I also think that countries do things that don't make sense all the time. And sometimes they do things that don't make sense as a response to a sense of bullying, insult, aggression, predatory behavior, all of these kinds of things.

1:00:08Ross Douthat:and that's that's where i see sort of your case for realism potentially breaking down that you could get in a war with china or you could be dealing with the middle east and the u.s could say to our allies it's totally in your interest to support us and mark carney could say well it might be in my interest but you know you kept talking about how we were going to annex canada so screw you no thanks for i mean i appreciate your agreement um yeah but the uh i mean look Look, realism, like anything, is not a total explanation of human behavior and far be it for me. I mean, that's that's why I use flexible.

1:00:42And it's not it's not our job here, unlike in the academy, is not to prove a theory, but rather to do things that are make sense for America. And I think and our allies, honestly, but I think realism is definitely the the major explainer, especially in kind of stressful or transitional situations. It's critical to see things in time. I mean, we talked about this in the China context. Right. I mean, I think things had certainly since the end of the Cold War had gone so far in one direction, become so detached that there need to be a fundamental recalibration. This is not, you know, there will be future presidents.

1:01:16There will be, you know, presidents of different parties, et cetera, et cetera. There's going to be various.

1:01:21Ross Douthat:Can I hold you to that one? Well, there's going to be like adaptation over time. Yeah. And people are going to, you know, are going to adapt and so forth. And I think that President Trump, in addition to having the right policy in general, was a really necessary corrective and adaptation that I think is actually much better to happen now in a period when things were getting very bad, particularly under the last administration, I think, very dangerous. But it's not like we have to, you know, it's not like this is this is the way things are going to be in perpetuity. In 10 years, Germany will be really strong military, hopefully, and its economy will be more rational.

1:01:57Hopefully, Canada will be in a situation where it can actually meet its NORAD commitments. right and people will have more to say they'll say instead they'll say back to us hey i am doing my part so i i'm not so worried about that maybe because i am a pretty thoroughgoing realist and i think if you look historically countries do tend to go where their interests are especially when you're thinking about survival or fundamental prosperity and that's the language that we communicate also in nato 3.0 it's saying we're not saying that you need to do everything we say all the time we're saying you need to build up you need to help us out on things like Operation Epic Fury when it's something that's in your interest and you say ostensibly you're supposed to also care about the Iranian nuclear threat.

1:02:32Hey, but if you know what, if you have a military that's more developed to deal with a NATO scenario, you'll also be able to deal better with operations in the Middle East. So I think it all kind of goes together. So that to me, I'm not too worried about.

1:02:47Ross Douthat:But just on the role of emotion and affection, maybe, maybe less emotion than affection. I was in London recently, and there's no lower form of punditry than quoting your Uber driver, but I'm going to do it anyway, because I had an Uber driver who learned I was American, and he got this, how could he tell when my Cockney accent was so flawless? And he got this kind of amused, but also slightly hysterical edge in his voice, and we went back and forth and back and forth about about president trump and everything else and he kept ending each like sort of run of half joking commentary by saying but we're still friends right we're still friends and friendship right affection these are these are power these are powerful forces in foreign policy too right so are aren't aren't they i have a i have an analogy for this okay which i use with europeans because they this fits for them so it's like they i think they want friendship yeah but the alliance was like a think about it as like a private business like let's say we had an accounting firm together and we're like cousins right but then over time one one of the members united states uh did kept doing phenomenally well or did did phenomenally well And suddenly, but their shares are more or less the same.

1:04:15And the other partners are kind of like, hey, remember that time that we went skiing together? Remember the good old days? And it's like, okay. But like eventually in these kinds of partnerships, people have to renegotiate. This gets to the mark to market thing. And I don't think this is a banal example. Actually, it seems to resonate with a lot of Europeans. um you know it's a friendship i guess but ultimately we're talking we're talking about putting americans lives at risk we're talking about lots of americans being killed and a ton of american money and us you and me and everybody here and everybody watching in america paying substantially more for defense i that's got to be something more fundamental than friendship if you go back to the friendship between winston churchill and franklin roosevelt franklin Roosevelt drove a hard Martin Dwight Eisenhower was the one who did the Suez in 1956 right yeah so it wasn't like oh you get to do whatever you want and like your people and the Brits are obviously been a lot better than most but I think that's I don't I don't buy I mean the sort of mystic chords of memory thing are important but I was I was gonna go to the mystic chords of memory next and I gave the remarks at the I had the honor to represent us at the international ceremony uh at D-Day and I turned that argument around on and it was it it was it was the location was between sword and juno and i said you know there's a belgium defense attache started moralizing about america and isolationism and you know and i said you know my remarks were like we want the britain and the canada that fought for four years in world war one and six years in world war two and then we were the ones the johnny come lately's you know so they will be in a much better place to moralize about us if they spend as much as we do and if they're willing to build military capability and if they have economies that grow so they can be taken seriously, that getting back to that kind of how it all is reinforcing, I think there's a kind of entitlement, like a sense that, oh, of course we'll be able to.

1:06:04No. And it's incumbent upon them. And I think that's a favor because the world is, I mean, if you think we're tough, look at some of the alternatives. So I think it's the, it's actually the, it's actually the sort of salutary toughness of a friend.

1:06:18Ross Douthat:All right. Elbridge Colby, thank you for joining me. Thank you very much, Ross. Pleasure to be with you.

1:07:17Ross Douthat:isn't coming, it's here. And your business needs to be too. If your revenues are seven figures or more, try NetSuite Next free at netsuite.ai slash NYT.

From the publisher

Is President Trump’s grand strategy unraveling? The United States is at war with Iran, China is ascendant, Russia and Ukraine are stalemated and American allies are openly questioning our commitment to them.

Elbridge Colby, the under secretary of defense for policy, joins me to discuss the state of America’s foreign policy and he makes the case that Trump’s approach to our allies and adversaries is making us stronger.

  • 0:00 - Intro 
  • 1:24 - What Is Trump’s Approach to Foreign Policy?
  • 5:00 - Is China Still America’s Main Rival? 
  • 7:08 - Colby’s Strategy of Denial in the Pacific
  • 9:58 - How to Avoid a War with China & Taiwan
  • 12:18 - Can U.S. Aircraft Carriers & Bases Survive a Pacific Conflict?
  • 16:43 - Is the Iran War Draining Our Weapons and Resources?
  • 17:49 - The U.S. Military Strategy in Iran War
  • 19:44 - Does the Middle East Conflict Help or Hurt China?
  • 22:04 - Trying and Failing to Reopen the Strait of Hormuz
  • 28:13 - The Parallels of Iran to the Vietnam and Iraq Wars
  • 33:17 - Trump’s Strategy With Russia & Ukraine
  • 40:49 - "NATO 3.0" & Returning to the Cold War
  • 43:21 - Did the Pentagon Try to Cut Support for Ukraine?
  • 46:28 - How "Middle Powers" Fail 
  • 49:30 - Greenland, Canada, and the Monroe Doctrine
  • 52:22 - Canada: Neighbor or 51st State?
  • 54:23 - What We Expect From Allies

(A full transcript of this episode is available on the Times website.)

Thoughts? Email us at interestingtimes@nytimes.com. Please subscribe to our YouTube Channel, Interesting Times with Ross Douthat.

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