The Future Is Indian

0:01From New York Times Opinion, I'm Ross Douthat, and this is Interesting Times.

0:23Right now, 21st century geopolitics seems like it's defined by the struggle between America and China. But the major power with the world's fastest-growing economy and largest population isn't China. It's India. And right now, India has a unique role in global politics, doing deals with Europe one day and with Donald Trump the next, all while maintaining a strong partnership with Vladimir Putin's Russia. Its large and spreading diaspora gives it a unique cultural influence around the world, One that may only increase as other major powers grow old and people remain India's most important export.

1:06My guest today is a prominent international relations scholar who's written about what he calls a multiplex world order, a future where diverse powers compete to shape the world. I wanted to talk to him about India's role in this order and also whether there might be an Indian century waiting to be born. Amitav Acharya, welcome to Interesting Times. Thank you very much. I'm glad to be here. So I want to talk today about two big related subjects, which are India as a great power in its own right, and also the impact of the Indian diaspora of India on the move on the entire world. But I thought we could start with the story of the last 25 years that I think a lot of Americans who think about the world and great power competition have in their minds, which is a story where both India and China have modernized, have developed, have grown.

2:05But China has had the faster path. China has sort of roared to global prominence and India has taken a slower path. So could you just talk about India's path to development and power just over the last couple decades and what that looks like? I think you're absolutely right that India's path toward economic development, even strategic role, is slower to evolve. But let's not forget history. India was actually a major power, and India actually had a much bigger imprint on, at least on Asian international relations in the 1940s and 50s, where China was just getting settled into its communist government.

2:53But then India and China almost went parallel in terms of development, but then China took off. So there is always this India-China story, narrative, comparing these two. And economically, China has done very well, reduced poverty a lot more than India. But India hasn't done that badly. The last few years, actually, growth rates are higher than China. But it started on a lower base. And India has maintained its open political system, democracy, despite some hiccups and problems. the main problem with India has been generating employment. And that's what this is a challenge for the current government.

3:36But I think if the Indians can taking advantage of the trade agreements, for example, having more access to the European market, which they never had before, and reconciling with the United States and having fairly good trade deal for India, I think that India can overcome the crisis of the global economy. and also in some ways become a little more self-reliant, I think that that would be the best case scenario. Talk about demographics, right? This is a frequent obsession on the show. But one of the striking things about the Chinese position right now is that China's birth rate has collapsed. Whereas India, while its birth rate has declined, is entering into what often gets called sort of the demographic dividend sweet spot, which is, you know, the period when you have a large young population and you don't have a large older population to support, which is going to be China's big, big problem.

4:34Why does India have a demographic advantage over China right now? Because China, of course, now is paying the price of a very strict and a one-child policy. India never had the one-child policy. So India has more young populism coming up. But that can be a mixed blessing because you have to find jobs for these people, satisfy these people. India has to improve its educational infrastructure and employment possibility. That's not a given, but India is more open to integration into the global markets now. So with that trade deal with the Europe, nobody would have thought that's possible. So I think if India can integrate itself more into the supply chain, and it can never be like the factory of the world, like China is, but in terms of a combination of services, technology, and manufacturing combined package, India can do quite well.

5:25Just describe the trade deal that India has just made with Europe, because it's really quite distinctive. And I think the European leader, Ursula von der Leyen, described it as the mother of all trade deals, which is not normal European lingo. It has to do with opening markets. It has to do with opening migration. It's going to allow probably for more Indian migration into Europe. What does this mean for India and the world? I think it's a God-sent blessing for Europe at the right time and facing all these tariffs and threats from the United States because both India and the European Union are the receiving end of Trump.

6:05For Indians, it's a bit of a surprise in the long term because India has been very protectionist. But I think it opens up Indian exports a lot more, creates a new market at a time when the American market is shrinking for Indians. And so the European Union doesn't have 19 % or 18 % tariffs on Indian exports. Indian exporters will be very happy to have that. And also, there will be more investment with the European Union. When it has this trade deal, it will be more investment coming into India as well. It's a great opportunity for India and very timely, but politically also. And more migration.

6:42And more migration, right, Right, which gives you potentially the sweet spot, right, where India has this potential demographic dividend. But as you said, India also has unemployment problems. But if you can have more migration to Europe, maybe the unemployment problems are not as big. Especially when the migration of India into the United States is under question because of all these restrictions of H-1B. but that's only one, all of the restrictions on migration. Yes. So we're talking in a context where the Indian government has just negotiated successive trade deals. There's been a deal of some kind with Donald Trump, with the United States, but in terms of Indian companies and Indian products, if you're in Europe or if you're in the United States, you have probably more of a sense of Chinese, East Asian companies, as exporters, as people you buy from.

7:43What are the companies in India? What are the industries where you would imagine a more open India ends up having more of an imprint on the West? When it comes to Europe, I think it will be agricultural products, textiles, and mechanical goods. But I think ultimately we will see India moving up the supply chain, just like China did, and also provide Europe with a whole range of products. It could be minerals. But I think, to me, the India-EU deal is a very political thing. I mean, the significance is more political than economic. Suddenly, you have the psychological effect of creating such a large market between the European Union is a considerable economic power, and there is India.

8:29So there would be, of course, further evolution. But I think basically India is going to import more high technology things from Europe, especially aircraft and they're already importing automobiles. And India has been actually investing in, say, iron and steel, for example, in Europe. And the French have invested in India in aluminium. But I think this will be more of a resource-cum-industrial mix rather than a very high-tech or purely agricultural resource export from India to Europe. So it seems like India has a substantial distance to go to get to anything like the point where China is in terms of being an industrial powerhouse, shipping things to the rest of the world.

9:17But maybe India's strength lies then as sort of a center of power for groups that don't want to be dominated either by China or the United States. Yeah, I agree. But just keep in mind, let's keep in mind that China was not always like that. A lot of the exports from China to the rest of the world were actually in terms of products that were built with technology that was borrowed from outside. For example, China can now export fast trains, but originally it got the technology from Germany and Japan. So what I'm talking about is that India could also do the same thing. So one of the problems of Indian economy is that it has not been integrated well into the global supply chain because of the protectionism.

10:05There is a political argument, ideological argument in India about having big corporations, foreign corporations. But Europeans may be more acceptable now than American corporations. Now it has a chance to have more investment and then use that to move up the supply chain and move up the industrial scale. Also in the services sector, India is very, very well endowed, especially high technology services sector. So this is an opportunity. India is not going to have that kind of industrial revolution like China had. That stage has passed. It's not going to become the factory of the world like China has become.

10:44That window has closed. But the next stage of economic development, combination of industrial, high technology services, India had to find that niche and still move up from exporting raw materials or textiles and the like. Tell me about India's relationship with Russia. Very close. The people, especially in the United States, don't understand it. But it goes back to certainly, I would say, the 70s when the United States and India, after having a fairly good start, actually went to different camps. So U.S. supported Pakistan and India had to look to Russia for help. the 1971 India-Pakistan War of Bangladesh was the turning point where Nixon and Kissinger deployed the Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, and India had to conclude a defense treaty with the Soviet Union.

11:41So that memory remains. And the Soviet Union, now of course Russia, became the largest supplier of defense equipment in India. So the Russians have been fairly reliable and fairly friendly, partners with India for a very long time. So there is a historical memory. There is actually in some ways sentimental, I would say. I grew up in India during the Soviet Union, and I have seen, felt that view, Indian view of the Soviet Union was nothing like the Western view. It was seen as friendly, much more benign than many of the former colonial powers of the United States. So that remains. So how does that translate into the Putin era?

12:24Okay. The Putin era, India has continued because it's dependent on Russia for weapons. But then the new element of energy dependence, because India did not actually import a lot of oil from Russia until the Ukraine war. Most of the Indian supply of oil came from the Middle East. But then when the Ukraine war and Russia started selling discounted oil. So, India became heavily reliant on Russian oil. But that's not a permanent. That can change. I think that is also the, you know, India, of course, now under the Modi government, moved much closer to the U.S. than any previous government had been.

13:08And they invested a lot on this relationship. I have talked to Indian leaders and they said, this is the best relationship we have with the US in a long time. The United States accepted India's nuclear power status, which is a big, this is not Trump. It started with George W. Bush. George W. Bush is hugely popular in India because of the change of policy. So with that, relations with Russia were not as special as they could have been. So India, as you know, is a non-aligned or multi-aligned country in terms of foreign policy. So India felt that it could maintain good relations with a traditional partner, the Russians, continue to get weapons.

13:52India wanted to maintain that relationship, diplomatic support from Russia, but at the same time, cultivate closure relations with the U.S. So you can say it's multi-alignment. You can say it's playing both ways, having your cake and eat it too. And how long can you do that? I mean, I'm interested particularly. So on the one hand, obviously, there's the challenge of managing a relationship with the United States when the U.S. is supporting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia and when Russia seems aligned with China against the U.S. But then even if that shakes up a bit, as it has under Trump, right, so then India decides to sort of move into closer alignment with Europe.

14:33But Europe is, you know, Europe is at war with Putin, right? Is there, basically, I'm asking, is there a way for India to sort of have a kind of sustainable, you know, non-American, non-Chinese bloc? Or is it always just going to be lean towards Russia one moment, lean towards the EU the next? That's a good question. I mean, first of all, the Indian policy has always been not to depend too much on one country or align with one power. So it was non-aligned. Now it's multi-aligned. Multi-aligned, right. So I think the rationale for that is very clear, that you don't have to choose sides. Like you can have some benefits by having that kind of a balanced relationship.

15:19But that policy would work as long as the United States say that, OK, it's either you're with us or you're against us. So only under the second Trump 2 that U.S. started, you have to choose. And this is about, right, this has been mostly about energy, right? Saying you need to stop buying from Russia. Mostly about energy. But I think there is also, even under the Biden administration, there was a kind of thing that India was playing both ways. there was always the feeling of unease about this Indian voting in the United Nations against the United States, India's position in things like Ukraine, where India abstained.

15:57So I have always argued in some of my writings that you cannot have sustained this for too long. At some point, there will be a tension. And then you have to choose or you will get into problems. And that's exactly what has happened. But at the same time, The European Union is a relatively new thing. So they're moving so close to the European Union as a group. This is a very rules-bound, very conservative beast. The Europeans like rules. They really do. And they also have human rights. They have democracy. You know, I can tell you this. I work with some NGOs in India, and many of them get grants from the European Union, basically German foundations.

16:43And the rules are now so strict that everything has to be linked to human rights and democracy. And some of the foundations have closed their offices in India, moved to Nepal and other places. So I think the Indians don't like that. But I think it's a smart deal. So the bottom line is that there is no reason why India cannot have good relations with multiple powers. But when one of these big powers is saying that you have to choose, then it becomes complicated.

17:14Thank you.

17:46Strategically, what does India want? Is this just a matter of we're not one of the superpowers, we're just trying to play the best hand we can? Or are there a set of sort of geopolitical objectives that India is interested in? I think, again, Americans are accustomed to the idea that China wants Taiwan. China wants a certain kind of dominance in East Asia. China has, you know, some client states in Africa. There's sort of a sense of like Chinese grand strategy. What is Indian grand strategy? You know, there is an argument that India doesn't have a grand strategy. I don't believe in that. But let me say, Indians don't want to be a superpower in the same sense as China.

18:29I mean, I have lived in China actually much longer in the last 20 years than I have lived in India. And in China, there's an obsession of being number one. They won't say, they won't admit it, but the United States compete with the United States, overtake the United States. They have all sorts of studies looking at the relative power of nations. India has very little of that. India just want to have status. And the key word is status as a great power. Status as respect in the international community, what it used to have. And I think that means a little more kind of realistic view of what India can do.

19:06But on the other hand, some Indians see their economy growing. I mean, it's overtaken its former colonial master, Britain. And they see India, large country, the number one in terms of population. Many projections put India within the top, at least three leading economies in the world after United States and China or China and the United States. So they see a potential to be recognized as a great power. However, they look around the world and they see that they're not getting that respect. because everybody's obsessed with China. Everybody's obsessed with, yeah, at the moment, China is the name of the game.

19:41So Indians, you can say there is a complex here. I won't say inferiority complex, but a sense that they are not getting the fair recognition that they deserve. And that's what they want. And they thought they were on the way to get this. Then President Trump's tariffs, India getting until now 50%, is a big insult. But shouldn't they take it as a compliment? Trump wanted to put those tariffs on China too, right? It's a sign. No, I'm joking, obviously, but it is, you know, in its own way. The scale of the tariffs that Trump wants to impose on you should not necessarily be taken as an insult. Well, I think it's not China.

20:19It's Pakistan. Pakistan got 19 percent and Pakistan gets a visit to the White House and India got 50. So now, of course, it's the other way around. India got 18 % and Pakistan is very unhappy. So let's talk about then two concrete expressions of Indian power, the relationship with Pakistan and the relationship with China. Let's say we're living through a 15 to 20 year period where India's influence and power are going to increase. What does success for India look like with its less powerful but nuclear armed rival Pakistan and its more powerful neighbor China? I think, I mean, this depends on who you ask.

21:03The foreign policy. I'm asking you. My sense is that for India, if India can achieve the kind of growth and become the third largest economy, not necessarily overtaking China, but maintain its political system openness and have more diplomatic influence. I think that will be quite acceptable to India. India is not a revisionist power. India is a status quo power. So I think that's what success would mean. And domestically, at home, generate more employment, but you cannot have a natural largest economy without having a sustainable employment and industrial base. with Pakistan is terrorism. I mean, there is, of course, Kashmir and other issues, but it's all linked to, from the Indian perspective, support for terrorism.

21:50And they see that. They see the West not really understanding India's position. And then China's support for Pakistan. China is the biggest, you know, they say, ironclad relationship with Pakistan. And they see that Pakistan will not be as adventurous as assertive vis-a-vis India without Chinese help. That's what gets Indians angry about China. Otherwise, I don't think there is any totally like unresolvable or a kind of a sort of dimension that cannot be diplomatically addressed between India and China. And what changes the situation for the better for India? Is it just economic growth or is there a kind of level of military power where India thinks that it could get Pakistan isolated and sort of force China to be friendlier?

22:42I think nuclear weapons play a big role here. I mean, Pakistan has nuclear weapons, but China is also a much bigger nuclear power. For a while, Indian foreign policy moved in the direction of ignoring Pakistan and engaging China. So it's China they have to deal with. China is the true sort of peer competitor rather than Pakistan. How strong is India's military apart from nuclear questions? You mentioned, obviously, it's importing weapons from Russia, importing weapons from the United States. How significant a global force is the Indian military potentially? I think it depends on the location. So if it comes to the Indian Ocean, which is India's backyard, Indian capabilities are very significant.

23:28In terms of the global power projection, I don't think India has the capability. So I think India focuses on the Indian Ocean. The Chinese, of course, were building a blue-water navy, and they want to go into the Indian Ocean. They're already in the Indian Ocean. And India feels that it can act as a deterrent or counter to Chinese expansion in the Indian Ocean. And that, in Indian strategic thinking, is kind of helpful to the West. So Indian strategic doctrine focuses along with nuclear capability in the Indian Ocean, power projection within the Indian Ocean. I want to move to culture, but let's try and make a bridge between geopolitics and culture.

24:10So Narendra Modi, the Modi government has been in power for some time now. You know, the Modi government is nationalist, Hindu nationalist. It has a particular conception of Indian civilization rooted in Hindu religion, Hindu identity, and so on. is there a kind of cultural geopolitics where Indian nationalists imagine themselves as sort of dominant in a kind of civilizational space where like all of South Asia is shaped by its Hindutva, the sort of religious ideology or political religious ideology? Yeah. So that's a very good question. And certainly under the current ruling party, or BJP, Modi's party, the BJP's ideology is based on Hindu nationalism, Hindu Torah.

25:06But I think you can say that some of the policies, domestic policies of India has moved in that direction. And it is creating a lot of concern among the Muslims, among the secular forces in India, which is still very substantial. And at the same time, the civilizational narrative you're talking about, that India is one of the great civilizations. There's a big debate in India about whether Indian civilization was born in India and went overseas, influenced the whole world, or whether Indian civilization actually is kind of a hybrid. There was a pre-existing civilization in Indus Valley, and then we had migration from the Pontic steppes to Central Asia, Persia, and it's kind of become a hybrid civilization.

25:51That's the view I take. But that's not the view of some of the key members of the ruling elite, ruling party in India. And that creates aggravation and fear among the neighbors, but also within India, among the secular forces, which are still quite substantial.

26:38So, the idea that Indian civilization is something that's born in India and then spreads around the world is obviously relevant to an age when Indians have spread around the world. And Modi has, I think, very explicitly talked about the Indian diaspora as kind of a mode of Indian national influence. But let's just, let's start with, let's talk about the diaspora. Let's talk about America. You mentioned, you know, in the United States, relations have been better than ever up until very recently. Trump in particular spent a lot of time courting Indian American voters. He did an event with Modi in 2019, right?

27:21Howdy Modi in Texas. It's an amazing name. But then in the second Trump term, there's been a swing and it isn't just a swing where Trump is imposing tariffs on Europe. It's also a swing where there is this kind of anti-Indian backlash on the right. So both tell me where you think that comes from, but also just talk about how you see, how do you think Americans see India or see Indians, I think is the better way to put it. By the way, don't forget that Modi had this, one of the biggest rallies right next door, Madison Square Gardens. So yeah. Not just, no, no, it's New York as well as Texas. All the centers, yeah.

27:56So I think generally Modi has used that as a foreign policy tool. I mean, partly it's genuine, but partly also is a significant foreign policy asset. So how about the American perception of India? First of all, Americans don't know much about India. I'm sorry to say this, but it's not. So India doesn't strike American imagination the way the Chinese do. And also in some ways, actually, the Soviet Union did because it was a threat for a different region. There are many more universities with centers for China studies, Americans going to study in China, getting trained in the language. This goes back to the Cold War period.

28:34There's nothing like that. As a professor, I can tell you that India studies is nothing comparable. So American students and American academic institutions and to some extent think tanks too, they're catching up now, but nothing like China. As you know, United States is not a country where there's a lot of interest in foreign cultures, right? I can tell you that I have a son who just graduated from school and they started about China, about Europe, Rome, Greece, not much in India. So that's part of the problem. Americans don't go to India. There's large numbers of tourists. So because of that, we have this relative ignorance about India, neglect of India.