In short
Podcast Summary: The Golden Age of Returns is Over
Podcast Overview Title: Making Money Hosts: Damien Jordan & Timeyin Akerele Episode Title: The Golden Age of Returns is Over Description: This episode features a discussion with Elroy Dimson, co-author of "The Triumph of the Optimists," focusing on historical investment returns, survivorship bias, and predictions for future market performance.
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Key Guests
- Elroy Dimson
- Co-author of "The Triumph of the Optimists."
- Creator of the FTSE 100 Index.
- Advisor for Norway’s sovereign wealth fund.
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Main Topics of Discussion
Historical Investment Returns
- Dimson's Research:
- Analysis spans over 125 years of global investment returns.
- US equity markets have historically outperformed other markets, but Dimson suggests this may not continue.
Survivorship Bias
- Definition:
- Survivorship bias occurs when only successful entities are considered, ignoring those that failed or were not recorded.
- Impact on Data:
- Previous UK data had inherent survivorship bias, as it excluded companies that went bankrupt.
- Accurate historical data collection is crucial for understanding long-term investment performance.
The Future of Investment Returns
- Lower Expectations:
- Dimson warns that investors should expect lower returns moving forward compared to the 20th century.
- There’s emphasis on the variability of historical performance and the unpredictability of future returns.
American Exceptionalism
- Discussion Point:
- The belief that the US will continue to outperform other markets is challenged.
- Dimson expresses skepticism about the sustainability of American market exceptionalism.
Global Diversification
- Recommendation:
- Dimson advocates for global diversification to mitigate risks associated with concentrating investments in a single market.
- Comparison of Markets:
- Insights into different countries’ performances highlight the importance of looking beyond just one market.
Investment Strategies
- Passive vs. Active Management:
- The debate on whether active management can outperform passive strategies remains relevant.
- Dimson notes the increasing popularity and advantages of low-cost index funds.
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Key Takeaways
- Historical Context: Understanding the past is critical, but direct comparisons to current markets must be taken with caution.
- Data Integrity: Continuous improvement in data collection methods is necessary for accurate investment analyses.
- Expectations Management: Investors should prepare for potentially lower returns and reassess their investment strategies accordingly.
- Global Perspective: A globally diversified investment approach is recommended over localized strategies, especially in uncertain economic climates.
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Additional Resources
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Conclusion In this episode, the hosts and Elroy Dimson delve into the complexities of investing, emphasizing the importance of understanding historical data while preparing for a future that may not mirror past performance. The podcast encourages listeners to adopt a diversified investment strategy in an ever-changing financial landscape.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:01You know what I love, Damo? Things that save me time. You don't have YouTube premium, mate, so I just don't believe that. Granted, I'll give you that one. However, I've got one for you. A great time saver in personal finance is Money Week magazine. They spend a lot of time distilling the biggest stories in personal finance down into consumable chunks, so you don't have to scroll and scroll. They give practical tips on savings, investments, pensions, the UK economy, the global economy. It's like your five a day, but for finance. If you want to give Money Week a try, you can get six issues in print and the app absolutely free by visiting moneyweek.com forward slash money.
0:34After your trial, you'll save an extra£5 a quarter on the subscription, which is exclusive to Making Money listeners. And that's moneyweek.com forward slash money. But there's a link in the description if you just want to click that. The optimists, if you go back, were people who thought that risky shares would give them higher returns. And they triumphed over the 20th century. Whenever people quote average stock market returns, is probably Elroy Dimson's data that they're using. That same data formed the basis of the landmark book, The Triumph of the Optimists, and now covers more than 125 years of market history.
1:10Not just that, he also created the FTSE 100 Index and advised the Norwegian Wealth Fund. Do you think that period, the 1900s, was exceptional? Looking forward from where we are now, people should be anchoring on numbers which are lower. Yours is the gold standard of research. You can't keep saying that. I'm not just saying that. Say it again. Stop, stop, don't stop. The gold standard. So the latest version of the research is 125 years, but correct me if I'm wrong, it started with 101. Is that right? Well, we started with our first publication as a private publication. And so for that, we had data which ran from 1900 to the end of 1999.
1:57but that publication was quite successful there was a follow-up and then princeton university press asked us for a larger report is that our book triumph the optimists uses data up to the end of 2001 which actually started with a launch uh for the beginning of the year 2000 and that had data which obviously had to end at the end of 1999 so it there was a soft a soft start to all of this we didn't realize how big this project would become so for those that don't know this work and the triumph of the optimists could you give us a summary of what you set out to do and what it is you found we started out knowing a bit about long-term u.s stock market history What we set out to do was to generalize that so that we would know what had happened to lots of countries, including ones which had not necessarily performed as well as the United States.
3:01What did we find? We found that the US equity market had performed very well compared to other equity markets around the world and compared to fixed income or cash in the home market. So those were, I think, the absolute core of our year 2000 research initiative. Yeah. And so it started before then because you didn't like the UK data that already existed. Is that correct? So that was the origin of your work into the UK market? The origins of the work for the UK market were coming up with a new index for Britain. And lots of people knew that the Financial Times 30 share, which was well known, was a pretty poor index.
3:54What it had going for it was a long history. and so Paul Marsh and I were involved in the design of a new index which was potentially going to be 50 shares 200 shares we messed around a bit and looking at the properties of the different ways we could do this and we came up with a 100 share index for the UK with a back history. So we'd done that in the mid-80s. We launched the FTSE 100 index, which still continues. And then a couple of years later, we got drawn into creating a small cap index for the UK, which still continues. It's not part of what London Stock Exchange Group do. so we'd had a bit of practice during the 1980s at creating indices and so we gradually became more confident about collecting data and infilling and sometimes it was possible to do things which we hadn't dreamed of so for South Africa for example the data that somebody else had collected was a South African academic, and his data began in 1940.
5:12But he gave that to us for us to use. But we wanted to start at 1900. But it turns out that all the South African companies that were of any value were traded not just in Johannesburg, but in the early parts of the 1900s in London. So we were also able sometimes not to have to travel somewhere else, but to do the work locally. so some people call this financial archaeology that's that's a wonderful way of saying it i guess we need to talk about that process then so you you say that we didn't have to travel there in in certain markets you have to physically go to the place and and try and hunt out the information yes yes um uh mike staunton went to new zealand and managed to flesh out data that we had for New Zealand.
6:03We, at a somewhat later stage, had been collecting data in Austria. And the person who we took on to work with us, who was somebody who was doing a PhD in finance in Vienna, he already had a PhD in computer science, but now he was doing a PhD in finance, which is sort of, at the time, of greater commercial value. The world's probably changed since then. So we arranged with the stock exchange that they could have ladders that would take up this very, very tall room, and they could look at the copper plate handwritten records going back. And there was data available for Austria. That was not very far away, but dusty and probably looking for the first time in half a century at some of these sheets of paper.
6:59It's like Finance Indiana Jones, isn't it? It's pretty cool. It's like looking for these secret things inscribed on library walls and stuff. How, I made a video and I know you've watched the video and I talked about survivorship bias. And I know that that was a key point around your UK data set. You basically explained that the previous data had survivorship bias built into it. But when you're going to Austria and looking at a wall and that's your record, is that not fraught with survivorship bias or you don't know what you're missing that wasn't engraved on a wall. It wasn't engraved on a wall.
7:34There were books that were stacked up. Sorry, I thought you said there was brass plates or something at the top. No, no, no. You climbed up a ladder. You weren't doing that to look at people putting prices on the wall. They were just books where they'd kept records. Okay. And so there were shelves high up. And the then PhD student was now a professor in Stockholm. He had a smart idea. He'd take our support and encouragement and then find the best person he could who would actually do a lot of the transcribing of the data. So sometimes there were spin-offs out of these, which were quite unanticipated.
8:14So the research assistant was so good that he managed the research assistant. Nice. Too bad, one step. Work and pleasure, business and pleasure. Just to clarify your survivorship bias, in case people don't know what that is, That's essentially the idea that some companies didn't, they might have gone bankrupt or they might have merged and it wasn't reported or certain things were lost over time and we only have the companies that remain. Is that correct? Sort of. I mean, I thought the analogy in Damien's example was good. And so people who are viewing this should go back and look at what you did, what you put up a couple of weeks ago, maybe more than a couple of weeks after people view the edited version of our discussion.
9:00So what does a survivorship bias look like? this one crucial thing which is illustrated by the UK. And that was that when people decided that it would be good to have a back history in the UK, they put together a 30 share index. It had a number of drawbacks in the way that it was calculated. But the data they used was companies which were important in 1955. But they wanted to go back further and they went back to 1935. and wanted to minimize the extent to which the index constituents kept changing over time. And so it seemed sensible at the time to make sure that to the best they could manage it.
9:49When they went back to 1954, 53, 52, 51, they were the same companies. So they left out companies which would have been in existence, their start date, which is the end of 1918. and those were missing. So all the companies which existed then and were destined to go bankrupt or to have very poor performance didn't appear. So this had built-in outperformance. Now there were other problems with the index so the method of calculation was not something that you would want today although the index is still produced. It's just having this month its 90th birthday day, but it's a funny index. So that's part of the survivorship bias was creating a back history of surviving companies.
10:43Another sort of survivorship bias is the survivorship of markets. So, for example, if a market became near valueless, people would not have been able to get any enthusiasm for collecting data on that market. And so even if we go to the period of the 70s and 80s, when new market indices came into existence, it was because somebody said, we really ought to include XYZ country. And that would be a country which may have seemed unimportant some years earlier, but had done well. If on the other hand, there was a country which had done very badly and its stock market had crashed, that would tend to get overlooked.
11:32So there's also survivorship of markets. Russia was a foreign market. Well, Russia, you didn't have a choice. So that died. And so for that one, we made sure that we collected data on Russia through to the 1917 revolution, at which point we deemed the values to be zero. So there were businesses which I suppose had some value, but no value to investors. They were businesses which were appropriated by the state. And the same happened in China. Those are the only two cases where we have an incomplete history. But the problem with survivorship is a big one. And you expressed it very well in the previous session that you'd done a few weeks ago.
12:24I was crapping myself because I was like, I know you're going to watch that video, and I hope you agree. As I say in the video, yours is the gold standard of research. You can't keep saying that. I'm not just saying that. Say it again. Say it again. Stop, stop, don't stop. The gold standard. Yeah, I'm not just saying it to flatter you. It is the best we have, but you've said there that we have complete records. There's only two markets we don't have complete records for, China, Russia. How can you be confident that you have complete records if records didn't survive? You don't know what you don't know.
12:58We have a record which is complete in terms of time, but not comprehensive in coverage. So every so often somebody will research a market and come up with something which looks better than what we've got. So that is slightly different from a market which subsides and then reappears. The most challenging period was linking Germany up to World War II and then beyond World War II. And there were some financial historians who had gone back and focused just on the companies, which had been in existence in Nazi Germany, about a tenth of which ended up in East Germany and were a little bit like those Russian stocks.
13:51And 90 % ended up in West Germany, and they traced through what had happened to their values and so forth. So we were able to bridge a history which ran up to the Second World War. Some of those prices are the best we can do, but some of them were controlled the the prices didn't fluctuate very much and the the people who write on this basically say that the the nazi regime just ensured that prices looked stable so there are difficulties sometimes with the data once you start averaging this to like get an annualized return over a very long period and once you have a large number of countries those things make relatively little difference to the figures that we report so you find that because this is why you release an annual version because you're constantly adding markets trying to improve the data collection methods i know you've got the returns data there so could we just go through some of the equity returns across the globe between 1900 over that initial period and in the most recent decades?
15:08Well, if we want to compare across countries, we have to go into common currency. So the common currency that I'm moving into is the US dollar. But if we looked at comparisons, it would be much the same if we chose some other safe currency like the Swiss franc. What we can't do is work in nominal terms because the impact of inflation varies so much from country to country. inflation rates were thousands and thousands of percent in the hyperinflations that Germany experienced, for example. So let's look at the two examples where we focus on individual countries. We've talked a bit about the US.
15:52And what we can also think about then is what the average of all of the individual countries look like. And their stock market returns were in real terms 4.8%. annualised, and in real terms for the world index, which is heavily tilted towards the US, somewhat higher, 5.6%. Just to clarify, the figures Elroy just quoted there were just for the 20th century. They don't include this century. If we look at what happens to the bond market, the long-term government bond markets, that was a terrible thing for the average country over the course of the last century. and this time around it's not been so bad.
16:39But the transition from looking at individual countries to looking at the world market is dramatic and risks go down from being invested globally. For most people who are listening, the best thing to do is to diversify globally. Do you find that when there are changes and you go, oh, we got that wrong, this is now better, it doesn't really move the needle in terms of the performance? It doesn't move the needle on the world index.
17:12But unless you are fixated on being as good in quality as you possibly can be, then things will slip. If you don't try to be better all the time, you end up becoming worse all the time. And that goes for data compilation as well. I think, are you at 33 markets now? I know it's around 30, 33 to 35. Well, it's creeping up, 35. Yeah, and five asset classes, is it? Or five asset classes? Five asset classes, and then periodically we will write an essay on a particular theme, and so we'll bring in an asset class where we don't have year-by-year data that we wish to keep extending. So we've written on real estate, for example, covering quite a large number of countries, but we don't update that every year.
17:59We've written on artworks and collectibles, same sort of thing, getting esoteric data series, which will tell an interesting story and will enable us to write something which appeals to people at other times. Other sorts of data are very easy, gold, silver, and so forth. I know you're desperate to ask something. I'm itching. Would you consider adding a sixth asset class, Bitcoin? No. Why not? Because I mean, it has been, I guess you say, the best performing asset since its inception. That would be an added reason for not doing so. That would be a close cousin of survivorship bias. It's called success bias, bringing in something because it performed very well.
18:44The answer is that we don't have much data on Bitcoin from 1900, 1910, 1920. we've only got a tiny bit of data and the whole purpose of collecting a long-term data series is to enable people to escape from looking at the last decade but to take a long-term perspective so the answer is no it's not antagonism towards
19:14modern research and so forth it just doesn't fit with the long-term perspective that we take on our data set last time we recorded to maine you were having some real dramas with your accountant so how's that been going mate that's sacked so drama sorted um they're a big corporate firm um they didn't really reply to my emails very quickly like took a week or two at times um and they charged me way too much i mean i've got pretty simple taxes and yeah they were charging me thousands they saved me some money but yeah um i had to move on slow and expensive pretty much yeah this is one of the reasons that we're really happy to be partnering with tax app it's a tech platform that makes self-assessment simple.
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20:22We've left a link in the description and use the code MONEY10 for 10 % off your first tax filing. That code is MONEY, M-O-N-E-Y 1-0. So Mr. O 'Carolet, I hear you are a salesman. Elite salesman, yes. One of the best, they say? I've got a little bit of experience in the game, yeah, I could say. Done a few deals. A bill, a bill. What would your compliance team say about you? They will say that I am always nagging them and that essentially I just have beef with compliance. I love the team. Compliance slows down all my deals because every time I get to the finish line, they've got to check documents, KYC, GDPR, and it's just a nightmare.
21:03It slows the deal down by like two, three weeks. It's always on both sides as well, isn't it? Sometimes it can be blocked on the other side. Well, that's where today's sponsor can help. Indeed. Vanta helps companies of all sizes get secure and compliant fast. And they stay that way. They do it by automating compliance with over 35 security and privacy frameworks like SOC2, ISO 27001 and HIPAA. Yeah, all of them. And this saves businesses so much time and money. According to a recent IDC study, Vanta customers save over half a million dollars a year in costs. Not bad. And they also help you complete security questionnaires up to five times faster, which is great because everybody hates filling out forms.
21:40If you're a business that needs to prove security and compliance, visit Vanta.com forward slash making money to sign up for a completely free demo today. That's Vanta.com forward slash making money. There's a link in the description, though, so you can just click that. So how long would it take for you to accept to put Bitcoin as a new class? Would it be like 100 years? Would you wait 200 years?
22:06if i had to think about other asset classes which are sort of alternatives we've had debates on and off on hedge funds and other sorts of assets and even for hedge funds several decades is really not enough so let me explain why why you need a lot just imagine that you want a view as to what performance you might get from investing in long-term bonds. If you'd invested in long-term bonds a year ago, two years ago, everybody would agree that doesn't tell you anything. But if you go back 10, 20, 30 years, is that good enough? Well, if we go back to several decades ago, interest rates were running at the order of 16 % or so.
22:54I'm talking about British government bonds. And now they're very low. And so when interest rates come down, people will pay more for their bonds. And so we're now in a position in which it looks as though you made money from bonds. You made money over a period while interest rates were coming down. So if you want a long-term view, you need to go back not 30 or 40 years, but much further. So Bitcoin, well, if we were able to go back to early days and other attempts at alternative assets, it might tell us something. But there's only been a small number of attempts at that except for looking at precious metals.
23:45do you think then that the bitcoin is good because you're basically saying there's not a lot long enough like data set here to compare it but then do you think that going back is a useful comparison and do we ignore the modern world if we compare ourselves to say the 1900s or post you know the gold standard being removed are we in a completely different place as an economy that it makes it futile to compare us to the early 1900s? I think you learn something from history, but you've got to be aware that there are potentially drawbacks to that. If you were to think back to one of the things which you also talk about, which is mutual funds, you talk about the performance of a mutual fund over a period of time.
24:37But the stocks which are in the mutual fund today may be almost entirely different from the stocks that were in the mutual fund 20 years ago. And you don't worry about that. You just say, well, that's the history of this fund. The same is true for a stock market. The stocks which are in the US or the UK or some other country's index are very, very different from what they once were. and you may want to come back and talk more about that in a while. And so if we were looking back at history, we've got to ask ourselves, what do alternative assets look like? Whenever you do that, there's a problem.
25:22So there's always a bit of success bias as well as survivor bias in all of this. Like Lego, right? I constantly get told that Lego is one of the best. Rare Lego sets are a really well-performing asset class. Well, there is a study done by a Russian academic, and she collected Lego data. I think it was when she was doing a PhD at London School of Economics. And there is a Lego series, but there isn't a Playmobil series. Or your 12-year-old, what is your 12-year-old? Pokemon cards, right? So that would be the thing. but for every pokemon card there's a another you know tazos or pogs or something these little toys that people attach their handbags are like these little fluffy things and you open the back the packet they're like going for beanie babies yeah well yeah we i once when i was uh running the master's degrees at london business school we had uh one candidate who had paid his way through having come from Europe with the only money he could make.
26:32And I was trading Beanie Babies. And he had paid for a three-year degree as a foreign student by trading Beanie Babies when they were really hot. Wow. So if you were bringing in Pokemon cards, would you encourage people to say, well, you've actually got to look at all the others that failed as well, like the Beanie Babies and these things? Because by just looking at Pokemon cards, that is survivorship bias. That's the one that lasted. yeah and if you if you ask uh your parents generation or if you've got grandparents around what people collected well it was stamps and we've done a study of the uh of investment quality postage stamps which had done quite well over the long term but in recent years they've fallen out of favor penny black is it the penny black is that the stamp that everyone wants yes yeah yeah how confident can because one thing i think people pick up your work and then they quote the average and i think a lot of people think that that is etched in stone on those walls that i was talking about before that it's a matter of certainty whereas obviously what you're communicating is that there's this process of data collection and it's ever-changing and that's why you you constantly look to improve it it's the best we can do and one might change heart heart have a different view um if it emerges that there's a problem with the data i'll give you an example in a moment or it might be that things change over time so let me give you an example of uh of changing your mind uh for the u.s data going back to before the standard data sets of that began in 1926, or that covers data from 1926 onwards, going back earlier to the 19th century.
28:23There's a longer term series, and that left out a company which appeared, grew big, and then went bankrupt. It was called the Second Bank of the United States, 2BUS was the abbreviation. And that got to be about 30 % of the US market and then became essentially valueless. And so if you took periodic scans of the market, you could miss it. And it was missed. When people collected data, they overlooked that. So that can change things a bit. But the main thing with influencers' confidence is how things vary over time. There's no golden rule for what the performance of equities will be, whether it's the nominal performance or performance relative to inflation or performance relative to bonds or relative to treasury bills.
29:30Those numbers change over time. In some ways, some of the changes are a little bit predictable. We might or might not come back to that later. But we've got data over a longer period now than we once had. And looking at the US and the UK going back not to 1900, but going back to 1800, it's clear that at that time, equities did not give you a large premium compared to fixed interest investing. And that's something you've got to factor into thinking about the future. And so when we think about what the 21st century will end up looking like, I think our best guess is that that will be a lesser performing equity market than the 20th century.
30:25or so far what we've got is evidence on the 19th century and a bit of the 21st century that's not as good as the 20th century so um i i think when it comes to extrapolating from the data that's very important and that's more important in some ways than the question of accuracy or whether a company got left out yeah i think so this idea that the 1800s that bonds may about outperformed the stock market just kind of challenges the idea that equities always win and this is period that didn't and so we could have that again and do you think that period the 1900s was exceptional well i i think that u.s data that you're referring to has some drawbacks because it's a comparison between equity performance stock market performance on the one hand and bond performance on the other.
31:25When we do that in the UK, and that's something which I've done with some co-authors, we compare equity market performance with government bond performance. And there is a premium that equities earned. If, on the other hand, we do it for the US, there were no government bonds because the US was a set of different states for much of that century. And there were winners and losers amongst the states before there was a United States. So there was no government to issue securities which were safe. They didn't control the printing presses. And so the bonds which are used as a proxy for government bonds in that American research contains corporate bonds, municipal bonds, anything which look low in risk.
32:19But if you're comparing equities to bonds which are not risk-free, then the bonds which are not risk-free should earn a risk premium. And so the gap between the two will not be as big as it would be in a country where the bonds were truly risk-free. So our evidence for the UK suggests that there is a a modest premium from equities compared to bonds even though that was i wish i'd known that because that's a great point because those state issued bonds i brought it in print i'll give you the article and it's very recent but it is published and has been peer-reviewed because those state issued bonds it was literally the wild west right so it was a bit more it wasn't we don't have the backing of a nation that can't go bankrupt essentially where we're a bit more confident in the fact that the US will pay its debts as a whole, but on the state level back then, potentially not.
Read the full transcript
33:10So they were riskier than the bonds we have today. Well, I think also equities may have been safer because a major part of the stock market in both the US and the UK were railroads. And the railroads controlled a revenue flow and had monopolies. and maybe at that time were relatively safe. So the equities were the bonds of the time in the sense that they were a safer asset class. I thought I'd want to push it too far. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it helps reframe it. So what you're basically saying is, though, that the risk premium, this point of if you take risk, you should be rewarded in the long run, that has persisted over hundreds of years, potentially.
33:55We believe it has persisted, but with a lot of variability. the reason that you should expect an equity risk premium is that equities are risky. If they're risky, bad things may happen. And it's because of that that you expect on average to get a reward. But over a five-year, a 10-year, or a 15-year period, the very nature of that risk is that you may do badly. If there was not a chance of you doing badly for equities, then they wouldn't offer a forward-looking risk premium. So you sometimes see these charts of what the equity premium was, the realized excess return of equities compared to bonds over rolling periods, and you find sometimes equities do worse, sometimes they do better.
34:44We really need a lot of data to form a judgment about that. How much data? I know in the briefing call you threw some quite big numbers around in terms of what you think would be acceptable amounts of data? I think in the end you have to fall back on some intuition as to what was going on but these equity risk premium numbers are used around the world for setting allowable rates of return so setting the rate of return, which it is reasonable for a railway company or a water company or whatever to charge to recover what look like reasonable returns for shareholders. And that, I think, means that those numbers are fearfully important because people take them.
35:39And if I ask you, what is pi, you can tell me it's 3.14159265358 something like that. I'd have stopped at 1.4. But it's a number. The equity premium is the pi for financial mathematicians. And it's not a constant like that. It can vary over time. So people look for great precision in these numbers, but they're only a starting point. But in some locations, those starting points become very important. They influence what financial regulators permit for making projections as to what the returns will be for investing in the source of products that you talk about when you talk about your favorite index funds.
36:33So they use those numbers and anchor to them. my take on it would be that looking forward from where we are now in the beginning of the second quarter of this century that people should be anchoring on numbers which are lower than we saw uh in the 20th century and documented in our triumph of the optimists book i was about to ask uh we always you always hear you always see written past returns are no guaranteed of future performance, but how can we put so much faith into, as investors, not as academics, how can we put so much faith into past performance numbers and average when the beginning of this, since 2000, the returns have been quite as good?
37:18And also with all the changes in the stock market, how can you really have so much faith in these numbers, especially in a time of like American exceptionalism and all these things? How can we think that the next century will be similar to the last century? uh we shouldn't the the the i don't know where the phrase comes from but they talk about uh history not repeating that history rhymes yeah and i think uh there are ways in which we can choose history as our starting point so uh if you were guessing um the weight of um uh items for example the used to be a guess the weight of the cake competition at the local primary school at the end of our street um and i won that once um so you had to write things down and they they passed you if you arrived late uh a uh the sheet of paper with everybody's guesses above it.
38:16I have no capacity to guess the weight of a cake. So I eyeballed the numbers and I wrote down the average. And a short while later, they broadcast who the winner was. This was their name at the bottom for this. It was just that I thought that the average would be helpful. So that doesn't mean to say that I'm fearfully insightful. And I think there's something similar going on, if you want to know what the equity risk premium might be, you would ideally like to average everyone's thought processes. You can't do that. But you can look at history. So it gives you a starting point. And then you've got to ask yourself, well, what's it going to be like going forward?
39:03In Australia, which is a winning stock market over the long haul, there's quite heavy reliance on the very high returns that have been achieved. So when there's a company which is being regulated, being told by its regulator how much is reasonable for shareholders to earn, they like those big numbers. But if numbers are very low, suppose you take a stock market which has just subsided, Argentina. Movedy in Argentina says they would look for returns from equities which are negative. It's just that the country did badly. So I think that history is a starting point. You've got to be quite cautious about it all.
39:52And once these numbers get used by regulators, you've got two sides to this. You've got the regulator and the regulatee, the regulated utility. And things can go wrong, as we've seen in the news very recently, or at least as we speak now very recently that regulators can get things wrong and get wrapped on the knuckles. I would like to ask you around how you feel American exceptionalism has surprised you in your research. Do you feel that this is a force that can continue? And if it doesn't, what does that do to someone like me who's globally invested? Well, to talk about American exceptionalism, let me go back then to before we had published our book, Triumph of the Optimists.
40:36And at that stage, just about all of the business schoolie textbooks in finance would have a chart which shows what the long-term history had been for investing in the stock, bond, or cash market in the United States. And that would be in an edition of a finance textbook, which might be in Hungarian or in French, whatever. And so our intuition on that was that we shouldn't really be relying on evidence for the US. We should be looking elsewhere. And so we need to deal with the question that the US had done very well. We called our book Triumph of the Optimists because the optimists, if you go back to a hundred or more years ago, were people who thought that risky shares would give them higher returns.
41:39And they triumphed over the 20th century. And we called it Triumph of the Optimists because people investing in shares had done so very well, it was a sort of caution that you shouldn't expect that to continue. and where had they done well more than anything else in the United States so the U.S. was a very high performing market and it seemed obvious that one should not be projecting that the U.S. would continue to outperform because if we all agreed that America will do well prices will go up to the point at which there is a new level but you wouldn't expect further outperformance. so we don't make forecasts we are evidence-based researchers we presented the evidence and the reader can make their mind up but what actually happened was that the US market which you thought would be much more average going forward ended up performing very well in investment terms so the first quarter of the 21st century was very good and when we started doing our presentations of the 1925 edition of our book we ended up showing what the results looked like and then we added on a little chart showing just what had happened in the first few months of 2025.
43:10So it continued to look good momentarily. Then there was a big dip. Then there's been a recovery. Who knows what the second quarter of the current century will look like. But the notion that America should continue to do well because it's done well in the past, that's a very American statement of sort of optimism about the future. A lot of Americans believe that. But nevertheless, over time, the proportion of assets held by American institutions in non-US companies, for pension funds, for example, has declined a great deal. They used to have nothing in overseas securities, and now have a substantial proportion, over 20%.
43:59So there was a belief that investing globally would make sense for Americans. They were wrong. But you can sometimes make correct decisions, and then you turn out to be unfortunate. And those who stayed in America did better than those that invested globally. What would we expect looking forward? We don't know which markets will do well. What we do know is that if you diversify, you end up with somewhat less risk than if you don't diversify. It's probably my favorite chart. It's that wonderful flow of markets over time and shows the impact. It shows Japan bubbles up in a period and then declines in relevance.
44:44And the fluctuations of the market impacts over time, it shows this slow death of the UK from 25 % to 4%. if as we are now where the u.s market represents about say 60 65 of a global index if america does decline and someone is buying the whole index what would that do to their returns do you think i mean do you have a way of saying is that going to be a really painful process for that individual or would the rest of the world pick up america slack now let's be clear-headed about what happens when a market drops in price, then if cash flows haven't changed, then our expected return looking forward will be better.
45:27So as we look back, prices drop. When prices drop, you will do better going forward. So we don't know. People making international asset allocation decisions are influencing that. You're not influencing that because you've publicly posted that you don't think about any of that stuff. You just buy the world. And I'm very sympathetic to that point of view. But there are people who are thinking about the performance of different countries. And what you see is a kind of weighted average of all the opinions that investors and other professionals have. You say that index investors have gotten a free ride on the people who perform price discovery.
46:19So these people who think about it, people like me, have basically ridden on their hard work. Do you think there's a point where the index becomes too big or too much of a problem that it kind of overweighs the active component? Well, there is an argument that now is a better time to be an active manager. Because there are so many people who are just clinging to the index. But what you're focused on, I think very wisely, is doing all of this on the cheap. So what every investor wants is some exposure to the market. We sometimes call that return beta, beta, beta. And you also want some alpha, which is outperformance.
47:08Now, alpha from being clever, it's difficult to get right. People make mistakes. But there is one form of alpha about which you can feel very confident. That's negative alpha. The more you pay in fees, the more you will be adding a negative amount to the return that you get from the markets in which you're investing. So you're taking a bet on alpha. You are projecting large costs for some investors and low for yourself. And as you pointed out, those costs are becoming extraordinarily low for people in some mature markets, especially the United States. I've never really thought about it like that.
47:54I've always described it as the only thing we can control is fees. So we should try to reduce them. But this idea that you can generate an outperformance through reduction of fees. And by betting on someone who says, I'm smarter than the market, you're sacrificing that certainty of return by basically saying, I'm going to pay you an extra fee to try and be smarter. But that's uncertain and pretty hard to do. It's hard to do. There are clearly talented people who have great insights. You may pay quite a lot for that. so if you really want the people with the best insights they're probably people who work for hedge funds and you've had one or two of them on your show as well they all say this is the year the actives are going to win and they don't could i be as well just to ask you how how you invest or how you see you know asset allocation for yourself uh we we are heavily invested in the one of the Vanguard Global Funds.
48:54So, you know, I had known Jack Bogle a little bit. That's the name drop down. That's so good. That's so cool. I've never met anyone who's known him personally. So, yeah. So, well, I had been, just when my PhD was finished, I'd been at the time visiting in the US and became aware of the startup of index trading but didn't invest through that route because it's complicated and anyway I didn't have much money to spare but so we're invested with Vanguard you highlighted a lower cost but less widely distributed alternative. Oh you really watch some of the content thank you very much yeah i think at the time the investgo fund you're talking about which was a global global fund it's got much bigger now but yeah i mean it's it's a tiddler i think that the uncertainties of a small fund have to be in people's minds at the same time as a different headline cost but um it costs us so little um i mean 0.2 on a vanguard nowhere near as much as that.
50:15Are you buying through a US? No. Buying through, because I started investing early. I was on the, chairing the policy board at FTSE Russell, which is part of the London Stock Exchange Group. And the person who used to sit beside me was the European head of Vanguard. And so I was an early investor. You get that sweet connection. It was not a special deal. The only way of doing it was as an institutional investor. And he just opened the door for me, but there was absolutely nothing special. This is not like Tony Blair's wife getting her clothes at a discount. That was in the morning's paper, if you missed that.
51:03So there was no special discount, but it was just remarkably low. And yet there are lower cost alternatives to what we do. And, you know, I'm very much in favor of investing for the long term. But just to go back to the earlier question about not being clear on when performance will be good and when it will be bad. I think the best people to invest for the long term are ones who hope for good outcomes and can live with lousy outcomes. so um if you you know if you were saving up for um uh children's school fees or something like that your time scale is not very short but it's perhaps not that long if you are saving for grandchildren or you've got more money than you need and you visualize this going to charity or whatever, then you can take a very long view.
52:15And so I'm all in favor of equity investing and low fixed income content. Yeah, and you're saying that you expect the returns to be lower. If you had to make a bet, you don't like to forecast, but you say people should at least build into their minds that the returns of this century could be lower than the last. Do you still think that you'll see that persistence of equities the risk premium and them outperforming other asset classes and even though it's low it's still going to be potentially the best bet yes over the long term and probably so if i think in terms of my current employer which is the university of cambridge you have some very wealthy colleges super wealthy colleges and they can afford to take quite risky investments in the hope of high performance.
53:08Then you'll have some much less wealthy colleges. They're ones that came into existence relatively recently. And for them, if they didn't have the money to repair the roof over the organ, the costs would be just too much. And so you can't have that money that may be needed if you're unlucky with the weather and the rest in the near future. That has to be invested rather more safely. So the investment world favors the already wealthy. And it favors the already wealthy who include people whose time horizon is long because they've given money away. So the college that has received gifts is a college which can think about things over hundreds of years into the future.
54:08Yeah, this leads me on to your work with sovereign wealth funds, which I think are a fascinating instrument and some really interesting insight. Did you work with Norway? I worked with Norway. I chaired the strategy council for Norway. for quite a long time. Norway decided that once money started coming in from the relatively recently discovered reserves under the sea in the North Sea, that the money that had come into the country from oil belonged to the people of Norway, didn't belong to the wealthy rulers. and so they set up a structure i think that's very important you need some sort of structure otherwise people make knee-jerk decisions money initially was in cash then it was held in bonds for a few years until it got a bit bolder and they moved into equities and there was heavy reliance on the early work we'd done actually before publishing triumph of the optimist the privately published books that I told you about.
55:26And so I got drawn into Norway, giving some guidance on what performance looked like over the long term. And then found myself after a few years chairing the Strategy Council. Well, the Strategy Council is not an asset manager's strategy group. I was doing this for the owners. The owners are five point something million Norwegians who delegate to their government and the government delegates to a department which is the Ministry of Finance. So my role was thinking about the big picture questions with other members of the Strategy Council and spent quite a long time doing that and thinking about how one might invest And I must say that the option of going to an index fund provider that is truly global and has securities all over the world, that's essentially what Norway does as well.
56:29when you are that big and that wealthy, when you own about 1.5 % of the equity of every company in the world on average, you don't spend your time worrying about whether a particular company is going to do well or badly. You think about the big questions and that's how we started out. Is it the largest sovereign wealth fund on the planet? Am I right in saying that? There are two very large funds. There's that, and then there is the Japanese government pension fund, which you might regard as being in the same sort of league. It started later and grew fast. But as a pure sovereign wealth fund, it is the biggest.
57:13And they're globally diversified through equities as a large portion. Globally diversified, but interestingly, in the early stages, they were gradual changes. So there were questions like, how much should be in Norway? How much should be in Europe? How much should be in other countries? The answer on Norway was nothing. And they set up a separate Norwegian fund that would invest in Norwegian stocks, because otherwise this huge global fund would just swamp the Norway. We should do something like that in the UK. Well, we should have with the North Sea oil, because we had the same... Were you pulling...
57:56Were you despondent at the time that you were doing this work with Norway and you were looking at the UK going, why are we not doing this? The UK's failure to take advantage of its oil was somewhat earlier than all of this. My involvement was after we'd produced our first book in 2000. but I think that the sovereign fund is very focused on governance that has some upside people who are the owners that's the five million Norwegians know exactly what's going on if you look at other countries they've very often gone for other sorts of strategies so some will spend on infrastructure and say that's for the good of the people and they'll build roads or there may just be a setback in the local economy and they'll draw money out to help on that what the norwegians have is a spending rule and spending rule used to be four percent is now three percent of the fund smoothed over time so that is like saying um you've got the good fortune to have chosen your parents with great wisdom they've left your trust fund but your parents don't really trust you to to be let loose with your trust fund that they've graciously bequested to you you can spend just a small amount each year so um it should be under the returns i'm guessing yes like the trinity study almost isn't it it's like the four percent rule or something but it's yeah it's it's genius and so they think so long term and it feels like a lot of things we're lacking yeah you know i would have looked the foresight to protect it for future generations is great what that they do not describe bit as mimicking or doing something different from Britain.
1:00:00When the structure was set up, it was to avoid Dutch disease, not British disease. The Dutch disease was the Netherlands found and exploited oil somewhat earlier than the Norwegians. They had a lot of money that came in, and there was domestic inflation, people felt wealthier, they spent a lot in the Netherlands and the Netherlands never really achieved the sort of ultra-long-term benefits that the Norwegians decided that they wanted. At the minute, the UK is trying to create a system whereby auto-enroll pension schemes create almost like a home bias or they're pushing them towards putting a certain percentage of their holdings into UK assets.
1:00:46I read a paper recently as well that argued that a home bias is a good thing for domestic investors. There's a guy called Ben Felix, he's a great YouTuber and he presented this idea that this paper put forward that you should have 25 % of your pie in your local market. Do you think these kind of approaches make sense when you're talking here about global investing? No, they're wrong. Okay, I'm glad to hear that. So do you think the UK's approach around pensions then is wrong? No, the UK is doing it wrong. You do not want to have global investors that fail to diversify. What you want is to have your shares, the shares will exist, it's a question of who owns them.
1:01:36and what you want is for people from outside the UK to want to buy shares to the same extent as British people might want to buy shares from other countries. So I think good practice for managing pension funds and what the sort of more senior members of your audience should want is to avoid this pressure to invest locally and to invest globally and to maximize diversification. Yeah, it's a shame that it's happening within the default funds, which are by design the funds that people just get slapped in that don't know what's going on, and then they're being dictated to around. But most of those people are people who either worked for or did work for British companies.
1:02:29they are already overexposed to the performance of Britain. If Britain does well or does badly, people in the country will do well or do badly on balance. So there's an argument as to why people in that position should want to have international exposure. So I think the home bias that's being encouraged by the government is a mistake. Have you got examples of markets where that's been attempted before, where what I get the impression from Rachel Weaves is almost like we want to jumpstart the UK market, because if we put pension funds into them, maybe the prices go up then, and then that makes it more attractive to international investors.
1:03:11It's kind of, it's like a chicken and an egg thing, isn't it? I don't think she could believe that it will jumpstart the market, because pension funds in Britain, which were once very large, are not very large now. So we're talking about either defined benefit plans, that's the pension you get if you are in a long-standing, for example, public sector pension plan, and those are getting less important, or they are defined contribution plans. Those are ones where you as an individual decide how your money will be invested. And what you're describing as organizations where there is a default, you do usually have some choice.
1:03:59You can choose, as unfortunately most people don't. And those people probably should be trying to invest internationally because institutions can invest internationally at a lower cost than individuals who, if they've got an ISA, are more likely to be investing locally. So they are exposed to the UK economy and probably more likely to buy a FTSE 100 or some other British exposure for their investments. So probably they would be better served by having exposure, which is ex-UK. you actually blew a little bit hot and cold about the ex-UK chart that you had at one stage. You know my content better than I do.
1:04:55This is super impressive. Thank you. Do you feel that your work is in any way misrepresented or misunderstood? Is there anything that you'd like to say to people about the work that you do and how they should absorb and use it?
1:05:11um well i i think i'm probably speaking for my two co-authors paul marsh and mike staunton as well as myself that we want to portray the data we will torture the data to give us answers to contemporary questions but we don't produce forecasts we don't give recommendations except of a very light touch nature. So people who want to look at the book, I brought a copy with for you. Thank you. So the book itself looks at all sorts of different issues. And you might encourage them just to learn more for themselves. But I don't think we are misrepresented. Sometimes people use our data in a way that we wouldn't use it.
1:06:10So, for example, I gave you the illustration of Australia, which has done very well. People grab that. And I think sometimes people rely too much on individual countries. They should be looking more at our world numbers and then adjusting them a little bit. If you focus on individual countries, you could take one country like the Netherlands, which has had very good investment performance, and a country like Belgium, which has had lower performance. And if you were just looking at the stock market as the guide to where you should invest, if you were trying to work out whether you should build a warehouse on a road somewhere near the border between the Netherlands and Belgium, them, you wouldn't want to have a different cost of capital for one that's 100 meters down the road that way or 100 meters the other way.
1:07:06You say they must surely be evaluated in the same way. So there is a danger from focusing on individual countries. And yet, the different experiences of these countries, so we have altogether, including equity markets, which don't have bond markets, over 90 markets altogether, for which we have data, but not going back 125 years. You could learn something from seeing what the different experiences of different markets. I think that's important. Does it not matter how big the country is if you say don't look at countries overall? I mean, because, for example, America, California is the same GDP as lots of countries, or bigger than lots of countries.
1:07:53So does it not matter if the country's bigger? Well, I think the stability of the United States, which is bigger than all the other countries put together in stock market terms, does make it less problematic if you have home buyers in your portfolio than would otherwise be the case. And many countries have a large proportion of stock markets represented by companies that are just in two or three industries. yeah something from the research with the concentration of certain markets is well i constantly hear that america is so concentrated over concentrated then you look at other markets and you realize there's concentration issues it's one of the least concentrated markets is great yeah but the reason people think that america is concentrated is that large companies are american So of the 10 largest companies in the world, nine are American, and one is in the Far East.
1:08:58So it's a problem that you should want to have. America is so broad that it provides enough diversification compared to what you would find in any other single country. but if you had lots of initiatives to drive people towards home-biased portfolios, that for some countries could be very costly. It could drive them into just a couple of sectors. Have we seen concentration of the levels that we have now throughout history? Would you say going back that you always experience that the winners win in a sense? um no the the the last few years have been remarkable for uh large companies doing very well so those large companies were american and excluded the year that we that hasn't uh finished yet the recent past um those large companies had done had got bigger and bigger and they got bigger because they were bigger, but also their performance was high.
1:10:16And so they've had a huge impact. And the net effect is that America, at least until the beginning of this year, was getting stronger and stronger in terms of its investment returns and its overall value. So this question of concentration is something which should concern people. But those who worried about being overweighted in American stocks, year after year after year, for quite a number of years in succession, were worse off if they tried to underweight America because it looked so big. It's very difficult guessing which markets will do best. market timing is costly and buried inside those decisions to reallocate money from one market to another are costs you never really see.
1:11:13Damon, what do you think about that? You're a big fan of Ooi Dimson's work. Massive fan of Mr. Dimson and his colleagues as well. There's three of them that were part of it. But yeah, it was kind of surreal to sit there with someone that I've quoted their work in a lot of my content and for him to spout off a load of my videos because he'd been watching my stuff and yet again world-class expert sits there and talks about buying a global index fund is i feel good you know really reassured you built your whole life around it yeah i do think that people need to listen to that point though around market returns and how he expects them to maybe not be as good in this century as they were before i think a really useful exercise is to get a good compound interest calculator and just play around with different figures at different levels so you You can make sure that you're on track with your goals.
1:11:58If I do say so myself, we have a really good one. I'll link it below. You can add fees into it and it will track inflation and these kind of things. He's going to stress test it with different amounts so it's not just the 10%. You can change the... Yeah, the real returns he was talking about at nearer 5 % and then tweaking that down and up just to make sure you're on track because I do think one of the mistakes that people make around his work is they just quote the headline figures without acknowledging that certain centuries weren't as good. Yeah. And focus on America and not global. Like, yeah, there's a lot of different returns.
1:12:32Yeah, they focus on America. Sorry, I thought you were telling people to do that. No, no. Everyone focus on, no, don't. Focus on global. That's what we think. Well, that's what we do. Yeah, that is what we do. Yeah. But we don't give financial advice. No. That's what we don't do. No.
1:12:47Before you go, it's really important to remember that nothing we said there was financial advice. The reason it's not financial advice is because it's not tailored to you. If you want advice that's tailored to you, it's worth speaking to a financial advisor. As with everything financial, please do your own research. We really encourage that because no one cares more about your money than you. I'm Damo. I'm T. Jack and Ben from Flowspire, film and edit for us. Ruth's app producer and Will is the co-founder at most. See you next week.
From the publisher
Whenever you see long-term stock market averages quoted, chances are they come from Elroy Dimson’s research. Together with Mike Staunton and Paul Marsh, Dimson co-authored The Triumph of the Optimists, the landmark study of 101 years of global investment returns—now expanded to cover more than 125 years of market history. He also helped create the FTSE 100 Index and advised Norway’s sovereign wealth fund. So, what does their research tell us about future returns? Can we really trust the numbers? And is American exceptionalism over?
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Here’s the video I made that Elroy talks about in the episode: I Analysed 100 Years of Index Funds, This Is What I Found
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This is not financial advice. The reason it’s not financial advice is because it’s not tailored to you. We explain the principles of building wealth but if you want personalised advice, it’s worth speaking to a financial advisor. As with everything financial, please do your own research. We really encourage that because no one cares more about your money than you and if you learn the basics then it will change your life.
