In short
The episode connects the Iran-related war risk and oil shock (including Strait of Hormuz/toll dynamics) to the future of the US dollar and “de-dollarization,” arguing that despite rhetoric, the dollar remains supported by global financing needs and investor portfolio behavior.
Guest
Brad Setser, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; former senior roles at the US Treasury/finance policy sphere (frequent expert on global macro, reserves, and international finance).
Key claims
- The current oil disruption is physically large (about 10–15% of global supply; 20–30% of traded oil) but price increases are smaller than in the 1970s because substitution across regions is imperfect and futures pricing reflects supply expectations months out.
- Higher oil prices are not mainly a “petrodollar windfall” for Gulf producers; many Gulf states have high break-even prices and may be current-account deficits, while non-Gulf exporters (Russia, US, Canada/Alberta, Nigeria, Angola, Kazakhstan, etc.) benefit more.
- “De-dollarization” is hard to prove when the dollar is strong and total dollar claims on the US keep rising; some hedging shifts may occur, but the main change is rotation between dollar bonds and US equities.
- Reserve portfolios are often underweight dollars versus return-seeking equity portfolios because reserves prioritize safety/liquidity; China and Russia also reduced visible dollar shares.
Notable examples
- 1970s oil shocks (1973 Yom Kippur War; 1979 Iranian revolution) and the petrodollar system’s evolution.
- Saudi break-even oil price estimates (around $100/bbl) and Saudi borrowing to fund Vision/MBS-style domestic spending.
- Korea’s semiconductor-driven boom plus oil-import drag keeping the won weak; pension funds adjusting hedging.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOTax Day Rants
2:27 to 3:17
The hosts discuss their frustrations surrounding tax season and its implications.
“I'm pro-taxes, but I just had an email with my accountant.”
Oil Prices and Historical Analogies
3:17 to 3:56
The hosts discuss current oil prices and draw parallels to past oil shocks.
“I mean, obviously, again, in the context of like today, April 15th versus like, say, a version of this conversation that we might have even had like two weeks ago, things are a little bit calmer right now.”
Impact of Global Power Dynamics
3:56 to 4:50
Discussion on how global power dynamics affect oil prices and currency relationships.
“And so, yes, we've had this really big oil shock.”
Comparing Oil Shocks from the 1970s
4:50 to 6:20
Brad Setser analyzes the current oil shock in relation to the 1970s oil crises.
“Navy is what policed the high seas and made global trade flow and stuff like that.”
Supply Chain Dynamics in Oil Markets
6:20 to 9:26
Examining the complexities of oil supply chains and market reactions.
“lots of ink currently being spilled on whether or not that's the correct parallel for our current crisis experience.”
Beneficiaries of Current Oil Prices
9:26 to 14:00
Who benefits from the current oil prices and shifts in production?
“Look, I think you end up dealing with the reality that oil is close to being a perfectly fungible commodity, but it is not a perfectly fungible commodity.”
Shifts in the Global Economy
14:00 to 15:00
Explore the transfer of wealth from American consumers to producers and its implications.
“And while it's mostly a transfer from American consumers to American producers, that is one of the biggest shifts in the global economy.”
Petrodollars and Their Impact
15:00 to 18:22
Understand the legacy of the 1970s oil shocks and the concept of petrodollars.
“We need a catchy nickname for Dollar Tenge, like cable.”
Oil Market Historical Context
19:59 to 22:58
Dive into how the oil market dynamics changed from the 1970s to the 1990s.
“And Americans in general are very, very unhappy when oil prices are high.”
Diversification of Petrodollars
22:58 to 27:35
Learn about the strategies petrodollar countries used for diversifying assets.
“The Saudi cumulative current account balance went back into basically being neutral or into a deficit by 95, certainly was there by 2000.”
Show all 21 chapters
Reserves and Global Financial Structures
27:35 to 28:01
Discuss the management of reserves and their impact on global finance.
“So the notion that reserves are the source of inflows into dollars is a bit dated.”
Global Reserves and Dollar Underweighting
28:01 to 29:19
Explore the dynamics of global reserve portfolios and the shift in dollar dominance.
“Well, I mean, actually, Can you just expand on this further?”
South Korea's Economic Surge
29:20 to 31:06
Analyze South Korea's extraordinary economic growth driven by memory chips and its implications.
“Now, that's a bit misleading because the dollar share of the portfolios of the state banks, which now have a very large share of the total state portfolio, is much higher, 70%.”
Currency Dynamics and Economic Conditions
31:07 to 32:59
Discuss the relationship between currency strength and economic performance in Korea.
“Like, is there any analogy that comes to mind for what we're witnessing here right now?”
De-Dollarization Debate and Market Dynamics
36:29 to 40:39
Understand the complexities of de-dollarization and its actual implications for global finance.
“Just going back to the de-dollarization idea, as you point out, there's a lot of nuance with reserve portfolios.”
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Domestic Investment
40:40 to 42:09
Examine how sovereign wealth funds are adapting to increase domestic investment opportunities.
“Going back to sovereign wealth funds and just thinking about them abstractly, you know, countries, particularly big commodity exporters, have various good reasons to have sovereign wealth funds.”
Saudi Economic Transformation Under MBS
42:09 to 45:21
Explore the impact of MBS's policies on Saudi Arabia's economy, including borrowing and investment strategies.
“Well, we can debate about whether yet another data center is going to truly prove productive.”
Europe's Economic Challenges and Energy Dependency
45:21 to 47:48
Discuss the current economic challenges facing Europe, particularly in energy and its relationship with the US.
“So I realize in this conversation we haven't talked at all about Europe yet.”
Global Perceptions of the US and Dollar Dominance
47:48 to 54:21
Investigate the implications of global perceptions of the US on the dollar's status as a reserve currency.
“So, you know, you talked about the high bar that would have to clear for some meaningful change and, you know, the dollar's role in the global economy or, you know, the dollar's dominance, et cetera.”
Choke Points in Global Supply Chains
54:41 to 56:06
Examine the significance of strategic supply choke points in contemporary geopolitics and trade.
“You know, one thing that struck me in that last answer, he mentioned the word toll quite a lot.”
Global Economic Shifts and China's Influence
56:06 to 57:52
Explore how global economic dynamics are shifting with China's manufacturing influence and the challenges faced by other countries.
“This is like the phenomenon of our time, which is that every region, every country or at least every region feels it has to spend on its own.”
Transcript
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2:24Hello and welcome to another episode of the All Thoughts Podcast. I'm Tracy Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. Joe, it is April 15th. Yes. Happy Tax Day to all who observe. I'm so annoyed. I'm just speaking of taxes. I'm pro-taxes, but I just had an email with my accountant. Anyway, I'm in a bad mood. I'm pro-taxes. I resent the fact that we have to like actually file them in this massive bureaucratic exercise every year. But anyway. This has nothing to do with what we're talking about. Well, OK, taxes, you know, financial flows of a sort. Well, taxes create demand for currency. Core MMC principle right there.
3:00There we go. OK, well, let's see. It is April 15th. The situation in Iran, still highly uncertain, very fluid. But, you know, we have seen higher oil prices in general. We've seen people getting oil from new sources, new parts of the world. And we've seen a lot of people reaching back to the 1970s oil shock as a sort of historic analogy for what we might be experiencing now. Right. Absolutely. I mean, obviously, again, in the context of like today, April 15th versus like, say, a version of this conversation that we might have even had like two weeks ago, things are a little bit calmer right now.
3:38But we absolutely do not know that they're going to actually have a durable ceasefire and so forth. Obviously, oil prices have come down. Nonetheless, it's a pretty big oil jump from where we were, say, in the middle of February. Even at that point, oil prices might have been pricing in some sort of around war premiums. It's even further jump from that. And so, yes, we've had this really big oil shock. And in addition, we might have some sort of shift in the global balance of power, particularly if Iran is a toll keeper in some way. So this is exactly it. And one of the reasons I mentioned the 1970s oil shock is because that moment is very intertwined with financial history and the development of the financial system itself.
4:22And we've done a number of episodes on the history of petrodollars and euro dollars. We had a great series with Josh Younger before. And so I think when you have a moment like this where people are bringing up those analogies and we can get into whether or not those are the correct analogies to make, it kind of generates this longer term discussion about what the financial system is actually going to look like and where financial flows are actually going to go to. Totally right. And, you know, one of the things that I'm thinking about, like some of our old conversations like we used to have with Zoltan Pozar, for example, and it was like, you know, one of the things that connected dollar dominance was this idea of, well, the U.S.
5:04Navy is what policed the high seas and made global trade flow and stuff like that. if that is under question of whether the U.S. actually can keep ships going in the way they were, how does that change the equation? What if it happens to be the case that to go from one place to another, you need to pay in Chinese yuan instead of dollars? All kinds of interesting things that arise about the relationship between power and currencies at a moment of crisis. Right. And if you're paying for oil in yuan, does that mean that you're going to save that like money in non-dollar reserve assets? Are you just going to put it like right back into treasuries?
5:40All right. There are a lot of questions that we have about this current moment. Obviously, everything's still highly uncertain. But who do we call when we're trying to untangle uncertain global flows? One man, and that is Brad Setzer. He is, of course, the Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a man who holds the title of most Othlots appearances, I think, at this point. What we love about Brad is there has never been a crisis in which he doesn't have some relevant expertise to bring to bear. That's right. Brad, welcome back to Othlots. Thanks so much for coming on.
6:13No, no, thanks for having me back. So why don't we just start with that historic analogy, the 1970s oil shock, lots of ink currently being spilled on whether or not that's the correct parallel for our current crisis experience. But in your view, how much does this particular oil shock resemble that of, I guess, 50 years ago now? I mean, not. OK, well, there's the obvious parallel in the sense that the 70s oil shocks, you know, 73 was a function of the Yom Kippur War, Israel, the Arab nations reactions, this or that. The second oil shock in 1979 was a function of the Iranian revolution. So same geographic region, different in the sense that the US and Israel are the instigators, and different in the fact that so far at least the magnitude of the shock is not at all comparable.
7:13Now it's not at all comparable in price terms. In 73 and then in 79, oil doubled or tripled. And by the end of the decade, oil had gone up like, well, six, seven times in dollar prices, less in real terms. We've only gone up whatever, 50 % max from spot oil. I mean sort of for Brent and for WTI and the next month future. It's a little higher for delivery in Asia. But we are not yet at the magnitude of the shock that we were in the 1970s. The obvious point is our economy as a whole for the US and for the world is a little less oil dependent, but I wouldn't push that too far. So I think the main distinction is, you know, we sort of started it, the US and Israel.
7:59We in theory can end it, although we would only end it if Iran finds its own equilibrium, which it allows other countries' oil to pass through the strait. And at least so far, the market has not anticipated that this will need the same kind of jump in price to balance supply and demand. That could change. If you look at it in terms of physical interruption of the flow of oil, some of your guests who've been on here have noted we're similar, maybe even worse. So we're kind of in this weird world where the physical interruption is bigger, the price reaction is smaller. I'm glad you brought this up.
8:35I would just love your take on this in particular. You talk to the commodity guys like we do, and they're like, this is crazy. This is the biggest shock ever. guys like me i'm a efficient markets guy like hey i just see what's on the screen it looks like what's not that big of a deal you'd be the third party arbiter here how do you make sense of the gap between what we see on our screen versus the shortfall on physical barrels 20 million every single day that aren't coming to the market right it's not quite 20 okay okay you're right there's been some route it's somewhere between in fifth 10 and 15 okay which which happens to be between 10 % and 15 % of global supply, happens to be between 20 % and 30 % of global traded oil.
9:17It is still a massive, massive, massive shock. And my elasticity would imply a much bigger increase in price if that was a sustained expected interruption. Look, I think you end up dealing with the reality that oil is close to being a perfectly fungible commodity, but it is not a perfectly fungible commodity. A North Atlantic barrel can only get to China or Japan with a long trek around the world. So there's an extra shipping cost. A lot of the barrels in the North Atlantic are sweet and light. Light just as how vicious, easy to flow, like a measure of the weight of the oil, sweet, less sulfur.
10:02And a lot of the refiners in Asia were set up to refine medium sour. And for some things, you want heavier grades of oil because you get more diesel out of the heavier grades. And, you know, refiners just configured for different grades of oil. So when you interrupt the flow, fundamentally the flow from the Gulf countries to Asia, there's no immediate instantaneous substitution for barrels in the North Atlantic. I think that's first point. Second point is what people think of as traded oil is not actually the oil for delivery tomorrow. It is the futures contract for the next month, next month after that.
10:43The world could look completely different. The U.S. has within its ability the capacity to kind of pull back. And if the U.S. pulls back and maybe the Iranians insist on its toll, there is no shortage of oil that could come out. Now, it'll take a little longer now because of the physical destruction of some of the export facilities in the Gulf. But if you don't have this particular choke point strangled, the old global oil market was very, very well supplied. So I think the futures market has to balance between one possibility, which is that there is plenty of oil two, three months out, and oil is on a trajectory, not immediately because of the damage and everything else, back to 60.
11:27and another possibility where this persists in oils at 150 or above. And the markets had trouble figuring that one out. Yeah. So, OK, speaking of oil at 150, potentially, one of the key differences between now and I guess the 1970s is that the higher oil price is not necessarily accruing to the petro states. Right. Because if you're the UAE or someone like that and you can't physically get as much oil out, then you're not generating as much money. And so you're not recycling that money into potentially U.S. bonds or I guess nowadays U.S. stocks and things like that. And if you think back to the 1970s and the birth of the petrodollar market, you know, it was because they were making a lot of money that they had to put somewhere.
12:10Just talk to us on a very simplistic basis about who is actually like making money, whose current account is benefiting from higher oil prices right now. Well, you made the key point, which is that the usual winners, like the big winners from Russia in 22, the big winners when Libya went offline, big winners with some periods of Iran sanctions, big winners with some of the periods of tighter Venezuela sanctions are the countries in the Gulf. They have the most oil. And they also have some of the lowest breakeven prices. So any oil above 60 means a big current account surplus. us. Those countries are not going in a position to capture this windfall.
12:53So you've kind of taken Kuwait, Iraq, UAE out of the picture. The Saudis, like, at the margin, because they can get some oil out, but they can't get as much oil out. And they actually had a really high break even. They're a current account deficit country. They need$100 a barrel oil with 7 million merriles a day of exports in order to break even. They're going to get 100. Maybe they're going to get a higher price so they can make it up with 5 million. But the Gulf countries are just not the winners. Russia should win. The Ukrainians are doing their best to kind of limit the amount of Russian oil that gets to the market.
13:31The Kazakhs will win. All the stands that can export oil will win. Nigeria will win. Angola will win. All the South American oil exporters will win. And then the biggest locus of production outside of the Gulf, even bigger than the production in the West Siberian fields of Russia, are in the US South, Southwest, Texas, and then in Alberta. So North America is producing well over 25 million barrels a day, exporting five to the rest of the world. And while it's mostly a transfer from American consumers to American producers, that is one of the biggest shifts in the global economy. I left out Norway.
14:17So Norway really, really, really bends, especially if gas prices go up. It is the salt Brunei. You know, it's the smaller oil exporters who aren't at – don't fit your mental image of the petro chic. I'm looking at the dollar – how do you pronounce the Tenge? Do you know the Kazakhs? How do we pronounce the Tenge? I'm looking at the dollar Tenge cross, which is the Kazakh currency. It's been doing very well. And in fact, actually, the Tenge or dollar Tenge, which is how I think you're supposed to quote it, hit its low in the very early April, which sort of coincides with the peak of some of these fears, at least in the local terms.
14:59So your intuition or your description of who are some of the big winners seems to be matched in the market. We need a catchy nickname for Dollar Tenge, like cable. That's not that catchy, is it? No, you know what we need? We need like an acronym for the non-Gulf state, non-sanctioned oil powerhouses. Oh, yes. Like we need like Kazakhstan, Angola. What was another one you said? Nigeria, Colombia, Ecuador. The kinkers or something like that. We need, this is good. We'll play around with this. We'll workshop this later.
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17:46Brad Setser:Confetti. Retirement accounts, yep. High yield cash, yes again. They even have direct indexing. Public has modern design, powerful tools, and customer support that actually helps. Go to public.com slash market and earn an uncapped 1 % bonus when you transfer your portfolio. That's public.com slash market.
18:16Investing involves risk of loss. See complete disclosures at public.com slash disclosures. Let's zoom back in time for a second because we brought up the 1970s. But, you know, OK, there's obviously differences. How did the 70s reshape the world? Like fundamentally, OK, you have these oil shocks, et cetera. And people then start talking about these things called petrodollars is a word that comes into existence. But in what sense is, you know, did those shocks, what kind of legacy did they leave on the global financial system? Well, they had a real legacy. You know, going into the 1970s, oil was so bloody cheap, people burned it for electricity.
18:56And going into the 1970s, Americans drove, which we now have gone back to doing, honking big cars, you know, massive Cadillacs with big fins. So, you know, 15 years later, very little oil is being burned for electricity. You substitute for cheaper forms of fossil fuels, more new. They still burn oil for electricity in New England because they're so anti-climate change that they refuse to build a natural gas pipeline. So they burn oil instead. Anyway, sorry, keep going. And for a long time in Puerto Rico. I mean, there's also islands because oil is very energy dense and easy to transport. And look, we did move to smaller Japanese cars away from the big three massive cars from the 1960s.
19:38So there is like a very real set of adaptation in the economy. The economy becomes less oil intense because it was such a huge increase in the price of oil. Americans are very unhappy. If you remember in the 1970s, it was not good for President Carter when the Iranian revolution, there was the hostages. But the oil shock did not help his popularity. And Americans in general are very, very unhappy when oil prices are high. It's one of our national quirks. But then in the short run, at that time, there was just a huge windfall into the Gulf states. The Gulf states piled up dollars and there were dollars.
20:18Most oil – oil was priced in dollars before 1973. It didn't take a deal to price oil in dollars. The US had been the biggest producer of oil in the 1930s. We were the supplier of oil to the Brits and others during World War II. You know, it was only over the course of the 1950s and 1960s do other parts of the world kind of catch up with U.S. oil production. But the U.S., the oil industry in a deep sense was born in the United States and it was always priced in dollars. And the Gulf countries and, you know, Saudi Aramco was originally a joint venture with an American company or maybe even fully owned by an American company.
20:55I forget. So it was natural it was priced in dollars. Oil, it wasn't like in the 1970s you had to do a new deal to price oil in dollars rather than something else. Oil was in dollars. Those dollars piled up and it was a period of difficulty in the international monetary system. The U.S. was going off the gold standard. The Bretton Woods was breaking down. Inflation was not well contained after the first oil shock. And there was an effort to convince the Saudis to keep their large stock of new petrodollars in dollars, not by euros, and use them, at least in part, to buy treasuries. Now, even then, the Saudis were a little reluctant to visibly buy treasuries.
21:40And, you know, some Bloomberg reporters several years ago went through this history and the U.S. started masking who was buying treasuries at the request of the Saudis. Because the Saudis, you know, well, like, you know, you guys are supporting Israel. We don't really want to be buying your bonds directly. Can you hide it? And we agreed. And then because there was still this residual tension between the US and many parts of the Arab world, a lot of the dollars did not flow into the treasury market. They flowed into bank accounts in London, offshore, effectively euro dollars originating from petrostates.
22:17And then those got recycled and they got lent in no small part to oil importing emerging economies. And that is sort of viewed as the start of the buildup of the vulnerabilities that led to the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s. Now, there's another part of this whole story that I think people forget, which has sort of been on my mind and it's irritating me. After 79, 80, Saudis had built up huge, huge, huge, huge stocks of dollars. Great, great decade for the Saudis in the 1970s. In the 80s, in order to keep prices high, they had to cut production. And then eventually that wasn't enough and the oil price collapsed.
22:58And by the end of the 1980s and certainly by the middle of the 1990s, all the dollars that had been built up in the 1970s had been spent. The Saudi cumulative current account balance went back into basically being neutral or into a deficit by 95, certainly was there by 2000. So in some sense, the petrodollar boom came and it went. By the time of the Asian financial crisis, oil prices were very, very low in the 20s. And there was not a – there were no flows of petrodollars nor was there a very large stock of petrodollars. So there's sometimes a tendency to think the 70s just continued, continued, continued.
23:41And the reality is, setting aside the really rich emirates and Kuwait, the rest of the oil exporters were not in a position to continuously build up and save over most of the period after 1980. Until we get, you know, the big run up in oil from 03 to 14. The 03 to 14 run up in oil then. Talk to us about where those dollars actually went. What types of assets. Because my sense is that happens to coincide with the very moment that a lot of the wealthy Gulf states were talking about diversifying into things like tech stocks. Equities generally. Yeah. I think there's two stages. At the very beginning of the run up in oil prices, there are an awful lot of countries that remember basically being out of money in 98 and 99 when oil prices collapsed, when Russia defaulted.
24:40The Saudis were almost out of reserves too. And so the first stage is, you know, we're rebuilding our precautionary balances, at least in the biggest, most visible countries, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Now, it's a little different in Abu Dhabi, the biggest emirate, the one with the most oil. And in Kuwait, you know, Kuwait had to make up for the first Gulf War and some of the destruction. But in Abu Dhabi and Qatar with his gas, they from the beginning had felt they had a decent precautionary buffer and started doing the sovereign wealth fund style investments more into alternatives, more into equities.
25:19As time goes on, the Saudis build up a bigger buffer and they conclude they have enough reserves. And then they start doing a mix of spending at home and buying equities and taking direct stakes in companies. Over time, the Emiratis, who used to be kind of conservative and behind the scenes, just put the money in Adia, invested in a fairly diversified portfolio, don't take controlling stakes. They become very active investors looking for the home run. The royals become more involved in the management. It's a little bit less of an outpost of London professional fund managers and a bit more of a playground of some of the younger shakes.
26:01And then, you know, it kind of varies across the world. The Norwegians build up a massive professionally run sovereign wealth fund, which is a predictable portfolio balancer. And since equities have gone up over the past four years, all the new flow has gone into bonds because they hit a predictable target. And then the Russians actually started off building up dollars. But then they got worried about their political relationship with the US. The reset with Obama didn't really work. Even before Crimea and the Donbass, they had taken their dollar reserve share down to 40 or 50. And then after the Donbass, they took their dollar reserve share down to, we now know to be basically zero.
26:43They certainly took everything out of US custodial accounts. So you do see diversification over time across currencies and then even more so across assets. Now, the last point I make, and this is just sort of to be provocative because I'm tired of people blah, blah, blah, and about the dollar is a global reserve currency and how that's the foundation of everything. Remember this. An international large cap equity portfolio will have a U.S. share of roughly two thirds, 65%, 70%. The Saudi Public Investment Fund, my friend Alex Etra, has done some work on it. Its international portfolio has a dollar share of 80.
Read the full transcript
27:26And that's probably typical because most private equity funds are going to be mostly pretty dollar heavy. A typical global reserve portfolio is now at 57%. So the notion that reserves are the source of inflows into dollars is a bit dated. A reserve portfolio will typically have a lower dollar share than a standard return-seeking equities fund, which just because of the outperformance of the U.S. large caps will be more overweight dollars. Joe, mildly annoyed Brad is the best Brad, I think. We should ask a question about the IMF report on global imbalances. No, no, we have a lot to talk about. Well, I mean, actually, Can you just expand on this further?
28:10So we look around the world and we see that actually reserve portfolios are arguably or all things equal, maybe underweight dollars. Was that always the case? Is there a structural reason for that? Like what's the story behind this mismatch? I didn't actually realize that. Well, reserves can be managed for safety and liquidity and not for return. I see. And so the pressure to get the most returns is weaker. So you don't have to chase the tech stocks. You don't have to match an index. And if you don't have the tech stocks, you're underperforming the index. You're underperforming your benchmark.
28:47Your benchmark as a reserve manager will be more bespoke. Higher priority on safety and liquidity. That's observation one. Observation two, and this is where things get funky. A quarter of global reserves to the first approximation are in China. Now, China still manages its currency against the dollar. But China, as a matter of policy, brought its reserves, formal reserve dollar reserve share down, last disclosed number, down to 55 % from 79 % in 2005. They did not like the optics of financing their strategic rival and holding a lot of treasuries in visible ways. Now, that's a bit misleading because the dollar share of the portfolios of the state banks, which now have a very large share of the total state portfolio, is much higher, 70%.
29:41And if you actually net out the offshore liabilities of the state banks and just look at the net, the euro offshore portfolio is matched by euro offshore liabilities. So that nets out. The dollar offshore are matched by dollars onshore. So in a sense, the BOP flow through the state banks was almost – setting aside some of the CNY lending, which has gone up, was like 100 percent dollars. Like a Taiwanese lifer portfolio, one of my other favorite topics, would be 95 percent dollars. Remember, central banks are holding reserves as an asset against liabilities, money that don't pay interest. Some have to sterilize.
30:24So they don't have the same pressure to generate returns. And so therefore, they can hold lower yielding, safer assets. And a couple of big players, China and Russia, just didn't want to be too heavy dollars. God, there are so many things now that I'm thinking about. We could like different avenues I want to ask Brad about. But just since you mentioned Taiwanese life insurance companies, it got me thinking about East Asia a little bit. But I'm just curious, like, have you ever seen anything like what's going on with South Korea right now? No. I only think because East Asia, where it's just like this insane.
31:00I mean, this is a real, obviously, like a big, generally rich, developed economy by and large. And it's just having this insane growth spurt, both in the stock market and actually the real economy, because of how the incredible margins and sales it's getting on essentially memory chips right now. Like, is there any analogy that comes to mind for what we're witnessing here right now? I'm not that comes to immediately to mind. I mean, a huge growth in exports. Yeah. Very rapid real growth, particularly in Taiwan, actually, but narrow one sector expanding. Right. And then weakening currency. You know, you have growth outperformance.
31:38You have a terms of trade positive shock from the semiconductor prices. And then you have a weak currency. And then you have an economy – like last year, all of the outflow from Korea that matched the current account surplus was into equities. A third of that was from their national pension fund, so a policy flow. Two-thirds of it was just retail and retail decided, even though Samsung is making money hand over fist, that they preferred to hold US sex socks. So, no, I haven't seen anything like it. I mean what is also interesting right now is that Korea is a very petroleum-intensive economy, a lot of petrochems.
32:16energy intensive industries in addition to the memory chips and so and it's uh energy poor fossil fuel poor so it is on the one hand benefiting from this giant positive shock memory chip surge in price surge in demand ai is helping samsung print money hand over fist and then the economy's on the receiving end of a pretty big negative shock because of the loss of oil flow. And so, you know, we've sort of stayed in a, that mix has kept the won weak. The interesting thing to me is that the Koreans are now starting to complain that the won is too weak, despite being a country that historically likes a weak currency for exports.
32:58And the National Pension Service has just announced they're going to expand their hedging program. I hope they succeed. The world economy does not benefit from won at 1 ,500 and an even bigger Korean surplus over time. Well, we'll have to bring back former Odd Lots guest, Hyun Sung Shin, to talk about all of this. Good luck. I mean, he's got a promotion. He does a good job these days. I just refer to him as former Odd Lots guest from now on and forever.
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36:29Just going back to the de-dollarization idea, as you point out, there's a lot of nuance with reserve portfolios. And then one of the things you always see when a headline comes out saying that foreign countries reduce their share of U.S. treasuries is this idea of the custodial accounts. And maybe we're not getting a full picture of exactly what they're buying. When it comes to gauging de-dollarization, I'm doing air quotes. No one can see me because this is a podcast. But like, what are you actually looking at to score and gauge whether that's a real trend and whether or not it's accelerating over the past five weeks or so?
37:05It's hard to track in real time. I mean, the obvious indicator is if the world is de-dollarizing, they're going to be buying fewer dollars and the dollar should be falling in value, which in general is not. So, I mean, I think that's the simple high frequency metric. To me, it is very difficult to have a credible story around de-dollarization, when the dollar is strong, not weak relative to history, and when the total dollar claims on the US, including dollar-dominated equity claims, have continued to increase. And so in 2025, the world was longer dollars than it was in 2024, despite all the hot air spent talking about de-dollarization.
37:49Function of the fact that we have a current account deficit of over a trillion dollars, so we have to sell a trillion of financial assets, and we are not selling euro or yen or yuan-denominated claims to the world. So last year was sort of financed 50-50 with dollar debt and U.S. equities, which implicitly settle in dollars. So in that sense, I find it a silly discussion. In order to de-dollarize, the world has to stop funding the U.S. in dollars. Now, there's a whole bunch of other things that can happen around the world. And there is a small subtrend where some emerging market borrowers are borrowing in yuan to save money.
38:25And so I think that is an interesting cross-current, but it is a modest cross-current. The sanctioned countries, of course, don't use dollars or euros to settle payments because they cannot. Now, in general, they seem to want to get rid of the sanctions. They're not saying, oh, this has been great. We are so lucky that we have to settle payment in yuan and sell our oil to China at a discount. They generally would like to say, well, we would love to be unsanctioned to sell in dollars and to have a competitive market for our oil, not just a monopsony buyer in China. But look, you look for indicators of changes in hedge ratios.
39:06You look for individual countries or individual institutions that have changed their portfolio allocation in a meaningful way. And I think over the past nine months, there was decent evidence that some of the Scandinavian pension funds, institutional investors, hedged or reduced their dollar bond holdings, partially in response to some overheated rhetoric around Greenland. On the other hand, unambiguous evidence because of some silly changes in regulation that had a big impact that the Taiwanese lifers reduced their hedge ratio by a really big number. And the Japanese lifers continue to see – like they let their hedge ratios slip because hedging is costly in Taiwan.
39:54It's costly in Japan. And you haven't been rewarded for hedging because the currencies have stayed weak. And in fact, in Taiwan, when you reduce the hedge ratio, that works as a bid for the dollar and it pushes the dollar back up and pushes the Taiwan dollar down. So it becomes self-reinforcing circular Soros reflexivity. So you see parts of the global economy that are hedging. You see parts of the global economy that have really reduced their hedge ratio, just gone all in long dollar fixed income. And you see parts of the global economy that are less comfortable holding dollar fixed income, but they are absolutely unwilling to be underweight U.S.
40:33equities. And so what you really end up seeing is not de-dollarization. It's just more a little bit of a rotation towards holding U.S. equities and a little less bonds. Going back to sovereign wealth funds and just thinking about them abstractly, you know, countries, particularly big commodity exporters, have various good reasons to have sovereign wealth funds. Their revenues are going to be very volatile and cyclical. And so you want to smooth them out. In some instances, though, one factor is that you have these countries that get incredible dollar inflows, but don't really have big domestic industries, and so you can't spend it all domestically without creating a lot of inflation.
41:14But now we see in the Gulf countries in particular that there is just a lot more domestic economic activity happening, period. We know that sort of Abu Dhabi and Dubai are just growing, bustling cities in their own right. And so there is actually opportunity. There might be domestic capacity. We know that Saudi, you know, they're trying all kinds of stuff from we've talked about this in the past, from soccer teams to mile long, multi mile long cities in a vertical in a horizontal line or whatever. But just generally, does the growth of some of these countries, just in terms of domestic economic activity, change the calculus about how some of these revenues are used?
41:58It's like, oh, we can actually deploy this domestically in a productive way, maybe by building data centers and so forth, that it won't just be we're going to add to inflation. Well, we can debate about whether yet another data center is going to truly prove productive. Our AI tech barons certainly believe it to be. But there is a scenario where they've kind of drunk their own Kool-Aid and are overbuilding data centers. You know, Saudi Arabia is a great example. The line looks like it's not going to be a line at scale back. The desert ski resort with artificial snow is no more. That's been canceled.
42:34Everything was sort of getting pulled back in. Well, not everything. The big cube in Riyadh, I guess, is still going forward. But yes, it did fundamentally change Saudi Arabia when MBS came and said, I am going to throw a ton of money into domestic development, basically real estate, but also sports, entertainment, da-da-da-da, combined with some social liberalization around women's role in society. Huge change. And what it in practical terms meant, some people use the fiscal break even. I think fiscal spending, some things can be kept off budget. I prefer to just look at the good old-fashioned balance of payments.
43:18The balance of payments break even of Saudi went from 60 to 90 to 100. So in order to have a current account surplus that needs to be invested abroad, the Saudis now need an oil price of roughly 95. They did not get that last year. So they were running budget deficits. They are running a current account deficit, which was financed by borrowing from the world. And since MBS not only wanted to do all these domestic economic developments, he wanted to play in the big boy league with the Emiratis and do big investments in the US and be chums with Donald Trump. The Saudis, in order to do all that, buy equities, as well as build all the domestic projects, they borrowed$100 billion last year.
44:05They were the biggest borrower in the emerging world. So if you don't have the level of wealth that the Emiratis or the Qataris have, you will find yourself in a position where you are no longer a source of petrodollars. You're a drain on the world's euro dollar system. And the Saudis have flipped and become a drain on euro dollars. The Emiratis can do whatever the hell they want. I mean, the Emiratis just have so much money and so few people. So few people as in Emirati-born residents who have a claim on the oil surplus, not the high-end. I know, Tracy, you were a high-end guest worker when you were in Dubai.
44:45And the low-end guest workers who don't have a claim on the oil. And so the Emiratis are just in a position. In some sense, the Emiratis can – they are like the Rockefellers if they had not given their money away. They wouldn't actually need to run an oil field in order to invest in all sorts of things just because they'd made so much money from oil over the past 50 years that they can just become investors. The Rockefellers, if they hadn't donated to the Council on Foreign Relations, right? Spent all the money. I'm very happy that they gave some money. We all are very happy. Okay. So I realize in this conversation we haven't talked at all about Europe yet.
45:26Yeah. And it feels like lately, whenever we do talk about Europe, the only certainty is always that it's going to come out in a worse position than it was before. If you're looking at Europe right now with the additional burden of higher energy, with all the focus on AI, with China's export boom, is Europe just inevitably in a structurally weaker place than it was before? Not enormously. At the margin, losing Qatari gas means they're going to become more dependent on American gas. They're not thrilled with that. They're, of course, not thrilled with any increase in oil price. But where we are now, this is a manageable shock.
46:06This is a much, much smaller shock than the loss of Russian pipeline gas in 22, which I think we underestimate how big of a shock that was to the European economy. So I don't know that this particular shock is enormously negative to Europe. It is modestly negative because Europe's a net importer of 12 million barrels of oil. So, you know, every$10, lose 40 billion on the current account. Europe is wealthy enough. It can afford that. It's not going to impinge them. It causes political problems when gas prices go up. The Germans want to cut fuel taxes to offset that, like, you know, as rich countries sometimes do.
46:47I don't think it fundamentally changes much about Europe. It does highlight fossil fuel dependence because Europe is fossil fuel light. It does add to pressure to do more nukes, to be more serious about renewables. And it certainly doesn't help Europe figure out how to respond to the China shock, which I think is a much bigger shock to Europe than at least this kind of petroleum shock. And then the other baseline problem, which we'll see if it's solvable or not solvable, is that we're going to be in a world where missile interceptors are constrained and there's going to be a scramble to make missile interceptors.
47:27And the US is going to be even less willing to provide missile interceptors to Ukraine. So we're in a world where Europe, its missile defense, will have to come from its own production to a much greater degree, which is arguably a positive for long-term development. But it does create a near term sense of vulnerability. But I think I think the the central shock in this case is going to be much more heavily felt in oil importing Asia. Yeah. So, you know, you talked about the high bar that would have to clear for some meaningful change and, you know, the dollar's role in the global economy or, you know, the dollar's dominance, et cetera.
48:07But look, there's a widespread view around the world that the U.S. has become a very reckless nation, right? I mean, there's these complaints. Why does global policy, the prospect of a war being started by the U.S., depend on what 10 ,000 voters in Michigan and Wisconsin? This is some quote from some European, how they view things every four years. We have been extremely hostile to formal allies for reasons that most people around the world can't comprehend. The Greenland example. Joe, you were not on board with Canada becoming our 51st state. I'm disappointed. Canada is a great example. Didn't you grow up on the border?
48:50Didn't you see? These things just pile up, right? And so even setting aside—and then, of course, now there is this current war, which most countries are clearly not on board with. Hard to understand. Most countries don't really understand what the goal was. It may end up being a huge own goal if it permanently gives Iran. It's unclear what's going to happen. Could these things pile up in such a way such that, look, setting aside these flows, the U.S. ends up being kind of a trend more towards a global pariah. We know that polls about the U.S.'s favorability continue to decline throughout much of the world, et cetera.
49:34How sustainable is it to have the dollar as a reserve global currency, the thing that everything priced in, if so much of the world essentially views the U.S. as a rogue state? When it's framed in those rhetorical terms, it almost feels like, you know, the only possible answer is that the dollar will become less dominant in global transactions. And as I mentioned, as a share of cross-border financial assets, the equity share is bigger than the reserve share. It's not no longer just the flows. The flows coming from holding safe reserves are nowhere near big enough to have a net international investment position of negative 100 or even a net debt position of negative 50.
50:19So you can certainly make that argument. I can also make an argument that before the Iran war, China, because it was unwilling to let its currency adjust, was intervening in the foreign exchange market to the tune of$100 billion a month. And that$100 billion was flowing into dollars. So unless China changes how it manages its currency, and this is a much bigger flow than anything around petrodollars. And it was hard to track flows. going into bank funding markets, so forth and so on. But in some sense, until China, which didn't love the U.S. before, decides that it is willing to change how it manages its currency and how it manages its economy, it is compelled to go into the market and buy if its exporters want to convert dollars for yuan.
51:14And when its exporters are not converting dollars for yuan, they are still holding dollars. Now, they could hold euros. But if they hold euros, you know, they get less interest. So it hinges on a little bit more than just global perceptions of the U.S. The Chinese have not loved the U.S. for a long time. The Chinese have not found a way to really extricate themselves from a world where they often need to really buy a lot of dollars and add dollars to their system. Like the world doesn't love China. I think China can be a coercive power. You know, President Trump basically had a theory around last year's trade negotiations, which in the—to put it in this year's terms, he wanted other countries to pay a toll for access to the U.S.
52:01consumer market. They should be giving us things because, you know, this is our world's greatest market. The Chinese have wanted people to pay a political toll, treating China or the great nation with respect, not criticizing the CCP, various other things, to have access to certain industrial products, rare earths. And it sometimes have suggested, well, you cannot criticize us on trade. You know, show us respect because otherwise those permanent magnet licenses won't come. So they extract a toll. They are, can be coercive. Think of how they treated Australia after the Australians said some impolite things about China's handling of COVID.
52:47Yet it is very, very difficult for most countries around the world to respond by not trading with China. So I think in the foreseeable future, countries may not respect the US. They may believe the US is a reckless and a rogue power. But you can still use our dollar to transact between Africa and Latin America efficiently. And that will not be viewed as a political statement. It'll just be viewed as the most efficient way of getting something done. So that's kind of how I would expect things. Now, I do think we are in a world where an enormous share of the world's financial wealth, Both people looking for safety, the reserve assets, people looking for a bit more yield than you can get out of a safe G10 government bond, the private credit, CLO world, and then people wanting the equity home runs.
53:46All those investors globally are now quite overweight U.S. assets. And as a result, the dollar is quite strong. And so to me, the core question is not really whether the geopolitics will change things. assuming we don't get into a full-on blow-up with Europe, which would, I think, accelerate some shifts. I think the real question is, is this intense overweight in the dollar sustainable when we have fairly reckless policies? And the answer so far has been yes. Brad Setzer, thank you so much for coming back on the show. Really appreciate it. Thanks for having me again. Thanks, Brad. That was fantastic.
54:28This is like, you know, now every episode is going to get ranked. And I was like, yeah, that was probably one of his worst three. We should all have the community. Nothing like, and I know I'm never going to hit Taiwan Life. Yeah, no, this was a good one. This was a good one. Excellent.
54:53Joe, always good talking to Brad. Always good. You know, one thing that struck me in that last answer, he mentioned the word toll quite a lot. You know, the idea of China trying to extract a political toll, now potential tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. And I've been thinking about that a lot because, you know, if we think about the, back in 2022, I wrote a piece called Chokepoint Capitalism. And it was the idea that governments around the world were waking up to the importance of strategic supply and this idea that because of COVID, you have to have a certain independency in important things. And I think like we're starting to see that kind of translate into the geopolitical sphere in terms of like power nowadays is basically being able to control those choke points.
55:41And so a lot of diplomacy, a lot of geopolitics is now focused on, you know, Trump is going to affect a choke point in semiconductors or a choke point in the world's oil supply. Yeah. I don't know if I'm saying that right, but like there's something there. Yeah. Well, I mean, I thought it was interesting. So Brad talking about, you know, Europe is going to have to spend more money on missile defense, for example. The U.S. is going to be less reliable. Stocks are being depleted, etc. This is like the phenomenon of our time, which is that every region, every country or at least every region feels it has to spend on its own.
56:17Right. The capacity of another nation that it may have assumed it could trade with will not necessarily be reliable. The other thing I was thinking that I've been thinking a lot about is, OK, Chinese manufacturing dominance is a very thoroughly discussed issue in the U.S. and Europe. Right. But it's not it doesn't really get as much attention in the rest of the world. So, you know, you don't hear about, for example, the effect of Chinese exports in undermining Mexican exporters nearly as much or Brazilian exporters, etc. These are also countries that are trying to. You might if we were in Mexico or Brazil.
56:57Right. I agree. But the upshot is, I think because we are in a sort of U.S.-Europe dominated media landscape, we mostly hear about China as a sort of pressure point to rich countries. is that we are not discussing the fact that also there is going to be this domestic stress that will emerge from manufacturers in these countries. In other words, what I'm saying is you look at the rest of the world and you say, well, they're going to pivot to China because the U.S. is this reckless rogue state, et cetera, except that they're all going to be facing the same - The same issue. The same issues as the U.S.
57:33and Europe are. We're just not talking about them because Because that's not the center of our conversation. But the idea of like, OK, it's very obvious for Mexico or Brazil or any or Kazakhstan or whoever else to, quote, pivot to China, whatever that means. They're facing all of these same issues in many cases as well. Yeah. I think the middle power theory gets really interesting in that context. Anyway, shall we leave it there? Let's leave it there. This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast. I'm Tracey Alloway. You can follow me at Tracey Alloway. And I'm Joe Weisenthal. You can follow me at The Stalwart.
58:07Follow our guest Brad Setzer at Brad underscore Setzer. Follow our producers, Carmen Rodriguez at Carmen Armand, Dash O 'Bennett at Dashbot, and Kale Brooks at Kale Brooks. And for more Odd Lots content, go to Bloomberg.com slash Odd Lots. We have a daily newsletter and all of our episodes. You can chat about all these topics 24-7 in our Discord, discord.gg slash Odd Lots. And if you enjoy Odd Lots, if you like it when we have mildly annoyed Brad Setzer on the podcast, then please leave us a positive review on your favorite podcast platform. And remember, if you are a Bloomberg subscriber, you can listen to all of our episodes absolutely ad free.
58:43All you need to do is find the Bloomberg channel on Apple Podcasts and follow the instructions there. Thanks for listening.
58:59Thank you.
59:29Brad Setser:Expectations around masculinity can quietly wear men down, often without clear warning signs. In Season 3 of The Visibility Gap, Dr. Guy Winch and his guests explore how these pressures show up, how to spot them earlier, and how men can access meaningful support. Listen to the new season of The Visibility Gap, a podcast presented by Cigna Healthcare. This Mother's Day, celebrate all the women who make life brighter with a gift from Pandora Jewelry. Choose jewelry that reflects what she means to you and the moments you share. Make it even more meaningful by personalizing your piece with an engraving in your own handwriting, something no one else has.
1:00:06Brad Setser:Either a date, a name, or something unique to you. Because the best Mother's Day gift says more than I love you. It says I appreciate you. It says I see you. Find the perfect Mother's Day gift at your local Pandora store or online at pandora.net. Go on, get a little out there. Into the big heart of Nevada. Or you can go off-road and off the map, on two lakes or on horseback. Dip into hot springs and dive into deserts. Climb a mountain or make your best effort. See thousands of stars in some of the darkest skies. Stake out haunted hotels. Can you make it to sunrise? There's always something new to see because we've got plenty of space to just be.
1:00:47Brad Setser:Plan your trip at TravelNevada.com.
From the publisher
It's possible that the war in Iran could reshape financial flows in significant ways. Perhaps the Gulf states will end up as less desirable places to do business. Perhaps Iran will have a tollbooth at the Strait of Hormuz. Perhaps this episode will accelerate the world's shift away from oil. It's impossible to say. But given the uncertainty, fresh questions are being raised about the existing financial world order, upon the top of which the US dollar sits. On this episode, we speak once again with Brad Setser, the Whitney Shepardson senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. We discuss how the war is already creating new global imbalances, and the degree to which this episode parallels past energy shocks. We also talk about broader trends in reserve management, other factors driving financial flows, and the unique situation facing East Asia, which is seeing a surge in its energy import bills at the same time its making making a fortune selling chips for the AI boom.
Read more:
US Probes Suspicious Oil Trades Made Before Trump Pivots
China’s $51 Trillion Savings Help Bonds to Outperform During War
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