In short
Real Vision Podcast Episode Summary
Episode Title
Charting the Course of the Global Economy
Episode Overview In this episode, Richard Koo, Chief Economist at Nomura Research Institute, discusses his economic framework, particularly balance sheet recessions, with Cullen Roche, CIO of Discipline Funds. The conversation explores the efficacy of quantitative easing (QE) during these recessions, the growing economic influence of emerging markets like China and India, and the potential stagnation of U.S. real estate.
Key Topics Covered
- Balance Sheet Recessions
- Definition: Koo argues that during a balance sheet recession, entities prioritize debt reduction over borrowing, even when interest rates are low, leading to economic stagnation.
- Cycle of Borrowing and Saving:
- Normal economics hinges on borrowers and lenders interacting; if everyone saves, no one borrows, causing economic collapse.
- Koo emphasizes that in a balance sheet recession, the private sector may minimize debt instead of maximizing profits.
- The Role of Government
- Government Intervention: Koo stresses the need for government borrowing to stimulate the economy when private sector borrowing is insufficient.
- Fiscal Policy Over Monetary Policy:
- In times of balance sheet recession, fiscal policy may be more effective than traditional monetary policy measures such as lowering interest rates.
- Koo believes that a robust fiscal policy can help improve the social rate of return on investments.
- Quantitative Easing (QE)
- Efficacy of QE: Koo critiques QE as largely ineffective in stimulating the real economy during balance sheet recessions. He argues that while it may inject liquidity, it does not address the lack of borrowers in the private sector.
- Historical Context: He recalls past instances where QE did not lead to expected economic recovery due to simultaneous private sector debt repayment.
- Emerging Economies
- China and India: Koo discusses how emerging economies are poised to dominate global growth, especially as developed economies face structural issues and a lack of competitive labor costs.
- China's Economic Challenges: He highlights potential risks for China's economy, such as a decline in corporate borrowing and the bursting of real estate bubbles, which might mirror Japan's past economic stagnation.
- U.S. Real Estate Concerns
- Koo warns that the U.S. could face a similar balance sheet recession if commercial real estate prices fall significantly and borrowing does not increase.
- The current economic dynamics, including the effects of remote work on commercial real estate demand, pose new risks.
Key Insights and Quotes
- On Balance Sheet Recessions: “When the private sector stops borrowing, the economy becomes prone to a cycle of bubbles and balance sheet recessions.”
- On Government's Role: “The government is the only entity that can operate outside the fallacy of composition.”
- On the Efficacy of Monetary Policy: “In the current situation, monetary policy is much less effective because of the sheer amount of excess reserves in the banking system.”
Conclusion The episode provides a profound analysis of the complex interplay between balance sheet recessions, fiscal policy, and the global economy's shifting dynamics. Richard Koo's insights challenge conventional economic wisdom about borrowing, saving, and the role of government intervention, urging listeners to reconsider how we understand economic recovery in the modern context.
For further insights and access to expert interviews, listeners are encouraged to subscribe to Real Vision.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
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2:37I have something special that I want to talk to you about today. I just want to speak from the heart for a minute about this. You guys know that Real Vision is more than just a job for me. It's a huge part of my life. It's an honor to get to do this, to get to create content and to interact with all of you. One of the amazing things about working at Real Vision is that we are all constantly forcing ourselves to grow, always experimenting with new things. This is one of them that I want to talk to you about today. We've all been blown away by the response to Raoul's video, The Past, Present, and Future of Real Vision.
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5:21Welcome, everybody. I'm super excited to be here. My name is Cullen Roach. I'm the Chief Investment Officer of Disciplined Funds. And I'm going to be joined today by Richard Koo. Richard is the Chief Economist at the Nemora Research Institute. He's also the author of The Pursued Economy and what I think is one of the greatest economic books of all time, The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics. And I just want to say beforehand that Richard has been hugely and positively influential in my career and my understanding of not just macroeconomics, but also the financial world. He is someone, Richard doesn't actually know this, but I knew a lot of his research colleagues at Nemora back in the kind of the great financial crisis period.
6:06And a lot of those guys in Japan, they understood a lot of what the United States was doing way before we ever started doing it. And so they almost had like this cheat sheet into understanding what things like quantitative easing and fiscal policy responses might be in response to what was going on during the credit crisis in the USA, coming out of the big housing bubble. And so having access to them was almost like cheating in a lot of ways. And it helped me navigate a lot of what quantitative easing resulted in. And so I think the beauty of Richard's work is that he thinks of the world in terms of balance sheets.
6:46And this accounting-based framework is very useful, I think, especially for understanding things like quantitative easing and a lot of these big government policies that have been been so influential in the last, really the last 20 years. And so, you know, welcome Richard. And I wanted to start off the conversation by, you know, maybe just give listeners an overarching idea of your framework for understanding the economy and how you think of things in general. Okay. Thank you for having me in this very important program. I came to this realization about the importance of balance sheets when I was just producing some charts for my presentations for no more clients.
7:28And I just saw how much Japanese companies were borrowing from the financial market. And I realized that this is in the middle of 1990s. And I realized that Japanese companies were not borrowing money. They're actually paying down debt. And by then, Japanese interest rates are already at zero. And it says, why? How could companies be paying down debt when interest rates are zero. And then when you think about all sorts of possibilities, it came upon to me that maybe they have a balance sheet problem, that they really have to fix their financial health. And then that's where this whole notion started.
8:07And what was important, I think, in thinking about all this is that macroeconomics that we learn in universities, we always assume that there are plenty of borrowers out there, that if you bring interest rates low enough, real rates low enough, they will definitely come in and borrow money and the economy should respond. But what I discovered was that there are many occasions where even with zero interest rates, people are paying down debt. And when that happens, we really have to change our mindset completely to understand why that's happening, what would be necessary to keep the economy from collapsing.
8:47because in a national economy, if someone is paying down debt or saving money, someone has to be borrowing money on the other side to keep the economy going. And in a normal economy, it's those of us in the financial sector, you and me, taking the money from the savers, giving to someone who can use it, make sure that all the saved funds are borrowed and spent. And if there are too many borrowers, when the economy is overheating, interest rates are raised too few, interest rates are lowered, to make sure that the cycle is maintained. That's the usual economy. But occasionally, even if you bring rates down to zero, there are not enough borrowers.
9:23And when you're in that situation, you really have to change your mindset completely because that means the private sector is not maximizing profits the way we assumed in economics. They may be minimizing debt. If they are minimizing debt even at zero interest rates, then this cycle between the savers and borrowers are broken and what can we do to fix it? Well, the private sector it's a balance sheet problem for example, the bubble burst all these people in the bubble participated with borrowed money so the liabilities are still up there but as the price has collapsed the balance sheet is underwater in that case they have to repair their balance sheets as quickly as possible and quietly as possible to make sure that no one finds out that your balance is actually underwater.
10:15But in this process, they are doing the right things because as long as you have a cash flow to pay down debt, you use the cash flow to pay down debt. Because that way you don't have to tell your shareholders, sorry, it's a piece of paper now, you don't have to tell bankers, it's all non-performing loans, and most importantly, you don't have to tell your workers you have no more jobs tomorrow. So for all the stakeholders involved, using the cash flow to pay down, that is the right and responsible thing to do. The problem is when everybody does this all at the same time, we get into this fallacy of composition problems in that, as I said, if someone is saving money, someone has to be borrowing the national economy.
10:53But if everybody's saving, no one's borrowing, then the economy starts collapsing. So if I have$1 ,000 of income and I spend$900 myself, the$900 is already someone else's income. So that's not a problem. But the$100 that I save will go through the financial sector. And if someone borrows and spends it, then the total expenditure in the economy will be$1 ,000 that I spent, $900 that I spent, that this person borrowed and spent, to get$1 ,000 against my original income of$1 ,000, and the economy can move forward. So, Richard, you were explaining your view of the balance sheet recession, and it's similar to the paradox of thrift in Keynesian economics and the fallacy of composition that, essentially in order for the economy to grow over time, you need someone's balance sheet to be expanding.
11:41And typically the main driver of that is the private sector balance sheet through borrowing from banks and non-financial institutions. How do you think of this in the framework of the economic cycle? Do you think of the boom-bust cycle and this balance sheet recession? Is this sort of an inevitable part of just the way that the economy grows? Or what is the uniqueness of the balance sheet recession across the market cycle? Well, most of the balance sheet recession that are really severe usually follows bursting of the bubble. And so we might be in this bubble balance sheet recession and then bubble balance sheet recession kind of cycles.
12:25And that gets worse and worse when there are less and less borrowers from the real economy. if the real economy absorbs all the savings and puts them in building factories and so forth then asset price bubble will not happen because the money is used for real investments but if real investments are not coming forward but these financial types will have to put places money somewhere, the safe funds and if they only have existing assets to put their money on then you end up having these asset price bubbles, which eventually burst. And when it bursts, we fall into balance sheet recession. And once you're in balance sheet recession, because private sector thoughts are all doing the right things, as I was explaining earlier, they cannot change their behavior.
13:17They have to repair their balance sheets. But when you're in that situation, government has to come in to borrow money because government is the only entity that is outside the fallacy of composition. So if the government comes in and borrow the money, then borrow that$100 dimension, then$900 plus$100 ,000 against the original income of$1 ,000. And the economy stabilizes, GDP is maintained, people have income to pay down debt, and eventually balance sheets will be repaired after some years. But if the government fails to come in, then the economy falls into this balance sheet recession. if at that point the government tries to
14:01stop the recession by putting more money into the system that money really cannot circulate in the economy because there's not enough borrowers in the real sector so that actually adds to the bubble for the next round and I think that so many bubbles and subsequent balance sheet recessions since 1990 or so When most of the developed countries, the real side of the economy really stopped borrowing money because many of them found that return on capital is actually higher in emerging markets than at home. And when the real side stops borrowing money, then the economy becomes much more prone to what I call the cycle of bubbles and balanceary recessions.
14:51Hey, everyone. We're going to take a quick break right now to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
15:03How do you think of the central bank's balance sheet in the context of all this? Because this is arguably the most controversial, the largest balance sheet that everybody talks about these days. And so, you know, I remember back in the 2000s and around the financial crisis period, you referred to quantitative easing as one of the greatest monetary non-events. And your general thinking was that the central bank can flood the banking system with reserves, but they can't make the private sector borrow. And so how do you think of the central bank's balance sheet in the context of this, given their extraordinary involvement in everything these days?
15:44Well, you know, the economics profession was, after World War II, after the Great Depression, the whole fad was on fiscal policy, that Keynesian economics can solve all the problems. But by then, US balance sheets were already repaired after World War II, and so government borrowing was not all that necessary, but they did anyway, and became inflationary, caused all sorts of misallocation of resources, and Keynesian economics then became less of a fad. And then the monetarists came on board because there was a lot of inflation after the 70s and 80s. And by the time we were facing 2008 financial crisis, monetarists basically who argued that monetary policy, if it's implemented correctly can solve all problems.
16:37So they came in and basically, as you said, flooded the place with money, thinking that if they put enough liquidity into the system, eventually something should happen and the economy should come out of this recession. So they kept on doing quantitative easing, one, two, three, increasing monetary base massively in the process. But I could see that... we are in the situation where borrowers, private sector borrowers, actually repairing balance sheets. So having all this money in the system should not do any, should not produce any results. But that kind of added to the people on the monetary side who said, well, if it's not producing any problems, why don't we continue to do it until we will produce positive results?
17:28And as a result, we ended up having these massive balance sheets in the central banks, not just in the United States, but in Europe, UK, and Japan as well. And now, some borrowers are coming back. I mean, after 10, 15 years of repairing balance sheets, some balance sheets will become fully functional, fully presentable. And if interest rates allow these guys to come back and borrow money. But when they come back and borrow money, then this massive size of the balance sheets, both at the central bank level and at the private sector banks are flooded with excess reserves. We'll be faced with this situation where central banks will have to tighten monetary policy because private sector stocks are coming back and inflation is picking up with this huge excess reserves already in the banking system.
18:22And that's the first time in history where we are facing this kind of challenge. In the past, for example, when Paul Volcker was tightening monetary policy, I was at the Fed at that time, Central Bank actually had two tools to tighten monetary policy, right? Either they can raise interest rates or they can squeeze the availability of reserves. Because at that time, most banks had very little excess reserves. So when the Central Bank tightened the availability of reserves, they all had to scramble to get sufficient reserves to meet the reserve requirement. And when Paul Volcker did that, starting October 1979, short-term interest rates went up to 22 % because everybody needed these reserves.
19:04And that's basically stopped the economy and stopped inflation. But this time, Chairman Powell is facing something like$3 trillion of excess reserves already in the banking system. So the option of squeezing the availability of reserves does not exist. You have to do everything with your interest rates. and I think that's part of the reason why rates have gone this high where most people thought at the beginning of the cycle the terminal rates may be 2.5, 3 % but now, you know, close to 5.25 going to 5.5 and perhaps almost to 6 % that's because all the burden of monetary tightening has to happen on the interest rate side because the other two I mean, these are, of course, not completely independent, but the other two is not available for use under the current circumstances.
20:02Yeah. Do you think that, so one of my views is that the more that I study quantitative easing, the more I think that QE is essentially, it's what I call an asset swap. You're basically the private sector is getting a checking account and exchanging it for what was essentially a savings account. So they're getting deposits and they're swapping out their treasury bonds. So they're swapping out a low interest account in exchange for what they had before, which was a high interest bearing account. And the central bank is essentially taking that treasury bond out of the market. It has made me wonder whether quantitative easing and these types of balance sheet expansions, whether they're effective at all for a private sector.
20:44And so what's your view? Do you think that these things are only ineffective inside of a balance sheet recession? Or would you say that monetary policy, the financial crisis period and all these big balance sheet expansions, would you argue that it exposed sort of the reality potentially that monetary policy just isn't as powerful, especially these balance sheet expansions aren't as powerful as some people, especially textbooks, taught us? well when those textbooks were written those were written in the 50s and 60s when macroeconomic was was becoming a kind of an independent discipline on itself at that time there were plenty of borrowers and people wanted to borrow to expand their factories and do all sorts of things at that time i think monetary policy was very effective as long as there are plenty of borrowers who respond to higher lowering of interest rates and they change their investment behavior, expenditures based on what's available in the financial market, then monetary policy will be very effective.
21:49But today, as I indicated just now, a lot of developed countries are experiencing lack of borrowers from the real sector. People are no longer expanding factories as they used to. then I think quantitative easing will have much less impact because the money can go to the commercial banks or stay within the financial sector but they really cannot come out because there are no borrowers in the real sector so I would argue that monetary policy and quantitative easing in particular will be very effective there are plenty of borrowers out there But it would be not very effective or totally ineffective if there are very few borrowers of people actually paying down debt.
22:41We're going to take another quick break to hear a word from our partners. We'll be right back with more of the day's top analysis on the Real Vision Daily Briefing.
22:53This is related to your view of what you call the pursued economy. Richard's new book, by the way, is called The Pursued Economy. and it discusses his framework for understanding the current situation that we're in, essentially. And so this seems really important in terms of not just financialization, but also inequality, which is obviously such a big, important issue these days. Can you give the listeners kind of a framework for what you think of as the pursued economy and what this means for the general framework, thinking about the world and the macroeconomy today? Okay. I came up with this term, pursue the economy, because I, well, first of all, I was born in Japan, and that was in the 50s.
23:42Japan was still a very poor country, recovering from the war and so forth, and still very poor generally. Then I moved to the United States in 1987. I'm sorry, 1967. And wow, U.S. was great. Everything was beautiful. But just 10 years after that, for example, 1975, 1976, it was Japanese companies that were chasing American companies on every front. So many American companies were disappearing, going bankrupt, because Japanese companies were taking over their business. And they said, wow, just 10 years made such a big difference. And then I moved to Japan, and I began to see, I was headhunted from the New York tractor to Nomura.
24:27and then I began to see the Japanese companies being chased by the Taiwanese companies South Korean companies and eventually by the Chinese companies and then I, 10 years later those companies, especially Taiwanese companies, were then chased really bad by the Chinese companies and going through the same process that American companies went through in the 70s and then Japanese companies in the 90s, Taiwanese companies in the uh uh 21st century. So I began to see this pattern that after a certain point, the return on capital, meaning CapEx on capital, it's higher abroad than at home because of your higher wages at home and so forth.
25:17And when that point is reached, you are actually chased by the other side.
25:30because you have to be able to make these rapid maneuvers to be able to avoid, you know, if you have a fighter plane and the enemy is right behind you, you don't want to be flying straight as before because then you can be shot down very easily. You have to be very agile to be able to fend off who is coming from behind. and I think the US did that with so-called Reaganomics, supply-side economics. And Japan and Europe were kind of slow in catching up with that, which is why Japan and Europe began to slow down quite a bit in the 1990s, when other emerging economies began to chase all of us. And this is not really discussed in economics in the sense that But once the return on capital is higher abroad than at home, then the effectiveness of monetary policy, changing interest rates at home by 100 basis points or 200 basis points, might not make much difference if the wages in Vietnam or Bangladesh is like one quarter of the wages you pay at home.
26:44That difference is so large that just a little bit of movement in exchange rates might not do much. But the economics we learn in universities assume that you only have factories at home. And if that is the case, of course, monetary policy should be very effective. Well, that was the case until about 70s and 80s in the United States, but that's no longer the case for most developed countries today. So that's where I'm using this term,
27:15to designate a situation where if the return on capital is higher abroad than at home, what kind of adjustments we have to make in our policies to make sure that our economies will still do well in this new environment. Yeah, so in the context of the current situation, I guess you would argue that the developed economies today, essentially the United States and most of Europe, are the economies that are being pursued, essentially. and so how do you in terms of thinking of the way this is going to likely develop going forward do you then think that this means that the do these developing world economies then are they at sort of a natural disadvantage in terms of economic growth going forward or how do you think about that in terms of your general framework where you know do you think of now Southeast Asia for instance as being sort of the centerpiece of global growth going forward right so So Southeast Asia is what I call the golden era, golden era in the sense that domestic return on capital is highest.
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28:28And so most of the investments are taking place there. But for the developed world, I think there's structural issues and macro issues that have to be addressed once you're in a pursuit phase. the macro issue that has to be addressed is that the household sector are still saving money as before as they used to do for the last 5 ,000 years you know we still worry about our old age so households still continue to save but the corporate sector they used to borrow all the household sector savings to invest in capex during the 50s 60s and 70s they are no longer doing that so developed world have this excess savings problem within the private sector which requires that the government has to come in and borrow and spend those funds but the public debt in most of these countries is already pretty large and this is going to be a very long term issue it's not going to end tomorrow suddenly all the developing countries become developed countries That's not going to happen very quickly.
29:39So this is going to be a long-term issue. So what that means is that government needs to borrow money to keep the economies going. But because this is going to be a long-term proposition, they will have to put those money in those projects that produces a return that is higher than, has the social rate of return that is higher than the interest rates. And you might sound like that's going to be very difficult. Well, the estimate part of the process is that when the economy is in the pursuit phase, there's extra savings in the private sector. So interest rates usually come down to these very low levels.
30:26And when the rates come down to these low levels, it should be much more easier for government to come up with projects projects that has a social rate of return that is higher than those rates. I mean, right now, because of the inflation in the United States, a 10-year bond is yielding 3.8 % or so. But if the inflation rates come down with the Fed tightening, and if it comes down to, let's say, 2.6 % or something, then all we have to find out is those projects that has a social rate of return higher than 2.6%. And that should, that will keep the economy going. And it will not become a burden of future taxpayers because the social rate of return of this project is higher than the interest rates that are being incurred.
31:18So I think that's the way we have to think about pursue the economy on the macro side. And on the structural side, on the structural side, During the what I call golden era, where the return on capital is highest at home, it's usually the manufacturing sector that is doing great. And then, of course, the manufacturing sector absorbs lots of capital for their CapEx investments. Manufacturing workers don't have to have a very high level of education. So in a sense, it raises the income level from the bottom up. So if you have lots of manufacturers, inequality problem that you just raised earlier gets resolved because people from the bottom of the society start benefiting from economic growth.
32:12But once the manufacturers start moving away to lower wage areas, then what's left will require much higher levels of education and that's where I think inequality problem gets worse and worse and worse for those people who didn't study all that hard during the high school or college days and that means we need a much more robust educational programs in perceived economies than we had during what I call the golden era so those are the changes that I think has to take place once you are in a pursued era. Yeah, so in context of the pursuing economies at this point, I've seen you argue that China currently is potentially looking increasingly like Japan.
33:02And so China is obviously, you know, the whole region there, China and India, I'd argue, are, you know, going to be really the growth engines of the global economy going forward for the next 100 years, in large part due to just demographics and the sheer size and scope of the interconnectedness of the globalized world now. And so how do you think of China in the context of all this at present?
33:28Well, China is in the golden era, as I would describe it. And so it should be growing actually much faster than it is growing right now. uh it's export uh its manufacturers are very highly competitive in export markets they're coming out with lots of interesting products innovative products so china has a great potential but what's been happening over the last six seven years is very bothersome in my view because when you look at the flow of funds of the chinese economy you'll notice that the corporate sector has been reducing their borrowings even before the bubble burst 2022. They should be increasing borrowings at the current stage of Chinese economic development, but they're actually reducing it.
34:25And Central Bank brought rates down. Central Bank also relaxed their reserve requirements quite a bit during this period to encourage more companies to borrow. but that has not produced the results they expected. Companies actually reducing their borrowers. But the household sector is still saving money but the corporate sector is now borrowing money and so the government had to come in and keep the economy going. And you can see that government budget deficit, this is general government budget deficit, not the central government. If you put in the provincial governments and so forth, they're already running something like 9 % budget deficit as a percentage of GDP.
35:13And I find that very, very disturbing because China is now entering possibly the Japan-like balance sheet recession because the real estate bubble is bursting. When Japanese bubble burst back in 1990, when the Japanese real estate bubble burst back in 1990, Japanese government was enjoying budget surplus, so they have plenty of borrowing power to support the economy. But the Chinese economy is facing this potential financial recession with the bubble bursting, with the government already running such a large budget deficit. So they have to increase their borrowings from that point on further. And that could mean 10%, 12 % of GDP budget deficit.
35:57And that may cause some problems for the Chinese financial market. And so the number of issues here, why are the companies not borrowing money when their export competitiveness is still second to none? and if the government had to borrow money with this balance sheet recession starting how much can they borrow when the provincial governments have already exhausted their borrowing power because they had to support the economy five years prior to bursting out the bubble so my sense is that the problem Chinese economy is facing is quite substantial. Because if the Chinese companies stop borrowing money or reduce their borrowings because of uncertainty with the West, this geopolitical confrontation, and there's a middle income trap issue, China is right at the middle of the middle income trap where a lot of companies may be moving their factories to cheaper places.
37:06And of course, demographics that a lot of people talk about. and finally the population shrinking on the same year the bubble burst in the Japanese case a lot of people associate Japan a Japanese economic slowdown with population growth but Japanese population was growing all the way until 2009 the bubble burst in Japan at 1990 so there was 19 years when the Japanese population was still growing but the economy was stagnating because of the the balance sheet recession. In the Chinese case, two are happening on the exactly same year, 2022, population declining and the bubble bursting. So if you put all of these together, my guess is that unless something is really done drastically to bring back confidence to these companies that future is much brighter, regulatory uncertainty is no longer an issue, Western markets are completely open you can export as much as you want unless these things are put on the table my guess is that Chinese companies will remain hesitant and if that's the case and the household sector is still saving a lot of money China may begin to look like more pursued economy in a sense that the household sector is saving money but the corporate sector is not borrowing money Yeah.
38:35So Michael Pettis, who's a professor in China, he's a famous macroeconomist as well from the United States, now based in China and sort of an expert in the area. He, I think, listened to your interview recently on Odd Lots where you were explaining this view. And he said that he thought you misunderstood the causation of this in the sense that the The government in China was, in large part, the causality of a lot of the bubble. And so this response that the government then needs to respond to the bubble, he said, could actually exacerbate things. He said that the market value of these assets really needs to come down.
39:15The losses need to be realized. And that intervening in a lot of this has the risk of sort of zombifying, creating these zombie banks and zombie entities. What's your response to that? Well, I really have to understand the logic behind what he said.
39:39If the government is such a large part of the problem, so private sector wants to borrow money, but the government is borrowing money away from the private sector and then spending this money on some useless projects, interest rates should be much, much higher. But the fact that Chinese interest rates have been coming down, even with central banks, even with a large budget deficit, suggests to me that the private sector savings is even larger. Otherwise, you cannot have this 9 % budget deficit, 9 % of GDP budget deficit that China is now incurring. If the private sector also wanted to borrow, rates must be much higher than 2.6 % after 10 years.
40:29That's the 10-year Chinese government bonds. But the fact that it is 2.6 % suggests to me that even the government has borrowed lots of money. The private sector saved even more than that. Otherwise, you know, the math doesn't come out, right? and Michael Pettis and so many other economists get all these kicks out of coming up with these big debt numbers. I'm sure you have heard many of those yourself, but when I look at those debt numbers, I want to compare that with interest rates. And if interest rates are very low, which is the case in so many countries, that suggests that even though the debt might be large, the excess savings in the private sector must be even larger.
41:15And in that case, just looking at the debt and saying, let's cut the deficit because the debt is too large, that will actually make the situation worse. Like 1 ,900, 810, 730, that process can actually happen in China and elsewhere. So if interest rates are very low, but even if government deficit is large but interest rates are very low, my first reaction would be that yes the budget deficit is large but maybe it's not large enough to offset the uh savings generated in the in the private sector so i will not just look at one side i i want to look at both sides to see uh what makes sense under those circumstances Yeah, so that's a good sort of segue into what's going on in the United States these days, where I think at least part of the lesson from COVID and the government response in the USA is that the government fiscal policy can cause big time inflation, and it can cause interest rates to have to adjust.
42:28And so there's been a lot of talk in the United States in the last 36 months about how we've had sort of an everything bubble, is what people have referred to it, where bonds were bubbly, the stock market was frothy. You had a huge boom again in real estate. Do you think there's a risk of the United States having a Japan-like balance sheet recession going forward? Well, the US had one in 2008, and it was a pretty serious balance sheet recession. But I'm glad to note that so many policymakers within the Obama administration that faced this understood that it was a balance sheet recession. Chairman Bernanke,
43:14Janet Yellen, Larry Summers at the NEC, they all understood that this was a balance sheet recession and took appropriate actions, putting in the necessary fiscal stimulus. Chairman Benenke in particular, he used to say that if the appropriate monetary policies are in place, they can solve most problems. Well, during 2009 or so, once he realized that it was a balance sheet recession, he started talking about fiscal cliff, that we cannot afford to fall off the fiscal cliff, the government must continue to borrow money. that was quite different from what he used to say about the effectiveness of monetary policy.
43:54And so same thing will happen again if U.S. ended up in the balance sheet recession. But for the U.S. to end the balance sheet recession on this occasion, commercial real estate prices, house prices will have to fall significantly beyond where they are now. And commercial real estate prices are falling for about 10 % nationwide. But housing prices fell a little bit now. It seems to be picking up again. And so I think the immediate danger of U.S. falling into balance sheet recession, I think, is limited. And when you look at the flow of funds for the U.S. household sector, they do not seem to be all that leveraged compared to the flow of funds data of 2007-2006, 2006 when at that time U.S.
44:49household sector was actually a net borrower. You know, we all learn in universities that household sector saves money and the corporate sector borrows the money. But during the housing bubble back then, U.S. household sector was actually a net borrower. So that's how bad the housing bubble was back then. This time, I don't see that household sector is actually a net saver. not by much but they are certainly not borrowing all that much and so even if house prices start falling it might not have the kind of impact it had back in 2008 commercial real estate I'm not so sure because no one buys commercial real estate with cash so there has to be borrowing behind the commercial real estate and if the commercial real estate prices really loses its bottom or something, then that could push us into a voluntary recession.
45:46How much do you worry about that? The commercial space is interesting, especially with the United States, there's been this big trend of work from home. And there's obviously there's all this empty real estate all over. And this seems to be a very well-known risk. But how risky do you actually think the commercial real estate situation is in the United States?
46:11I think it's quite risky. But now that so many people are watching it, my guess is that if enough people watch it and realize how risky it is, it won't be as risky as it could be. Back in 2008, when there was this housing bubble, people said, this is perfectly natural, this is great, this is fine. And of course, that was not mine. But this time, I think people in the real estate market at least many of them should be aware of the risk because they experienced something similar in 2008. And so I hope it's not going to get to something as bad as what we experienced 15 years ago. And in terms of policy response, it was October of 2009 when FDIC, Federal Reserve and Comptroller Currency, the three banking supervisors in the United States, jointly issued this, what we call it, pretend and extend.
47:18Pretend that everything is fine and continue to extend the loan, even though at that time the value of the collateral was way below the value of the loans because of what happened to commercial real estate market in the United States. And when that pretend and extend was implemented October 2009,
47:46that policy was able to stop the bubble from collapsing. And so I suppose policymakers now know that if the situation really gets bad enough, they can use that tool to provide a flow to the commercial real estate prices. Yeah, and in the sort of broader context of all of this, now that we see the sort of extreme involvement from the monetary policy side and increasingly the fiscal policy side, do you think that looking at the global economy now, do we all need to get used to the potential that fiscal policy is going to be have a much more sustained, larger impact on the global economy going forward.
48:34Now that we're in this world of the pursued economies where we see that monetary policy in the developed world doesn't seem to be having as big of an impact. It's been a big discussion point, especially in the United States and Europe in the last, especially 18 months, where a lot of people have argued that the large interest rate increase, the biggest we've ever seen or the fastest and largest we've ever seen in recent history, aren't having quite the impact because they're not impacting the debt markets to a larger degree. Do you think that fiscal policy is something that's going to become larger and larger going forward?
49:10And is that potentially a problem in certain economies? Well, fiscal policy has to become much larger, has to play a much larger role in these developed economies because they are all in the perceived phase where household sector is still saving money, but the corporate sector is not borrowing as much. So fiscal policy has to fill the gap. In that sense, yes, fiscal policy has to play a much greater role. And because this is going to be a long-term issue, they also have to look at the content of what they do with the fiscal policy, make sure that those fiscal stimulus will produce a social rate of return that is as high as the bond yield that government has to pay.
49:55But on the other side, about the monetary end of it, the reason why monetary policy is not working as much as we expected, that even in spite of this high interest rates that we're already seeing, is, as I explained to you earlier, there's so much excess reserves in the banking system, about$3 trillion US at the moment. And so in the old, in the world that, in the textbook world, where banks do not have that much excess reserves, and central bank raises interest rates to a certain point, let's say 5%, a borrower comes in and says, I'm willing to pay 6%, give me the money. But the bank doesn't have that much excess reserves, so it has to go to the market or try to collect deposits to meet this guy's demand, and that, of course, is a very involved process.
50:57And that's how this tightening of monetary policy worked. But today, if someone walks into a bank, and let's say federal funds rate at, let's say, 5.25 or so, where if someone comes in and says, I'm willing to pay 6%, give me the money. The banks are flooded with excess reserves,$3 trillion worth. So these guys can say, okay, sure, you can have the money. And so even with 6%, where the inflation rates now, the real rates are very, very low. And if these guys continue to come in and borrow money, then monetary policy looks like it's not doing its job. and this index that's published by Chicago Fed, the National Financial Condition Index, it is still in the negative range, minus 0.2 or something.
51:54That means the financial condition is still loose compared to the average of the last 50 years. this number has to be in the positive range before you can expect tightening real tightening of our financial conditions and we didn't get there yet we haven't got there yet i think it's because of this uh qe provided excess reserves in the banking system and so qe during balance sheet recession does nothing but once the economy is out of the balance recession and then people come in to borrow money, then the QE produces all sorts of problems because monetary tightening that is required does not work as well as it used to.
52:40And so I would argue that we should not use monetary policy too lightly once you are in a pursuit phase. I mean, during COVID-19, when government needed money very quickly, only central bank would provide that. So I have absolutely nothing against those QE that Federal Reserve put in to make sure that people have something to live with. But other than those natural disasters and very urgent issues, I think Central Bank should be more careful with monetary policy in this pursuit phase. How do you think that relates to the current environment? A lot of people are worried about, we've had this nice trend in inflation this year where we've had a really steady disinflation.
53:31The headline CPI is down to 3.1 % in the United States. And so it looks increasingly like there could be sort of a soft landing in the United States, which I think has surprised virtually everybody. But there's still a lot of people who are worried about sort of a double bump in inflation, where you get this 1940s or 1970s situation where we had a big jump in inflation early, and then the inflation kind of roars back. And in part, I think a lot of people are worried that that could be caused by the fiscal policy side of things, and especially the large interest rate payments that are being made.
54:10Are you worried about sort of a 1970s-style inflation in parts of the developed world? Well, during 1970s, the option of moving factories to Mexico or to Southeast Asia did not exist. So once the labor supply is kind of exhausted and wages start rising very, very rapidly, and that created the wage price spiral. In this period, that is no longer the case, right? Japanese can always move factories to Southeast Asia, Americans can move it to Mexico, and the Europeans can move it to East Europe. And the globalization is still very much in place, even if China may be a little bit out of the picture.
55:00And so once the initial supply shock from the COVID-19 or reopening after COVID-19 is absorbed, then my guess is that inflation rates will come down to much more reasonable levels. because there's still a lot of emerging economies who love to get into the action of globalization, attract factories from abroad, and ship cheap products to develop the world, which will keep inflation rates down. So I'm not in a camp that says we're going to be returning to the 1970s because I think in the 1970s, Mexico was still very closed. most of Latin America was still following this import substitution model of growth and Southeast Asia was under Vietnam War and Eastern Europe was on the other side of the Iron Curtain.
55:55And so that's a very different situation. How does that fit into your overarching view with the pursuit economy perspective and the way that, especially in the United States, we're seeing a lot of pushback against the idea of globalization. My general view is that globalization is something that is almost naturally occurring in large part because the technological world has made everything really so much more accessible. Like you were alluding to, in the 1970s, you just didn't have the technology to make it even feasible to export work or to manufacture goods in Southeast Asia the way we do today.
56:35hey, my view is that the technology, and this is related to the inequality issue and everything, that I essentially think that the technology is going to make all of this worse going forward, that the world is going to become a smaller and smaller and smaller place, and that we can fight the globalization trend, and that there's no getting around it. What's your perspective on how globalization fits into this? And does it make sense for countries to fight it? Or should countries embrace the globalization trend, even though, as you said, with your pursuit economy perspective, it could potentially cause other problems?
57:13Well, globalization certainly caused lots of problems for a lot of families, especially in the developed world. And even though I would argue that we should embrace globalization, because that's basically natural market forces, I wish U.S. government, my government, to be a lot more careful with the exchange rate. And as I describe in chapter 9 of this book, U.S. has paid so little attention to exchange rates and allow the dollar to be determined mostly by capital flows which is of course the industry we are in and so I'm part of the problem I'm not part of the solution in that sense
58:12but the original position of original idea of the free trade which is of course what made globalization possible, is that if the countries start running these huge imbalances, too much, too large a surplus or too large a deficit, exchange rates should adjust. That was the original idea. But in 1980s, starting literally 1980, that year, all these countries started removing their capital controls, this and that, and the foreign exchange rate lost that function of balancing trade or at least keep the trade imbalance from going totally out of whack. And that created this backlash against globalization.
59:03That made the backlash against globalization much worse than it had to be. And I remember the Plaza Accord of 1985. I was a little bit involved in the sidelines on that issue. At that time, the U.S. dollar was so strong, 260 yen to the dollar, 250 yen to the dollar. And most people in Washington were saying there's only two U.S. companies left who are still for globalization and free trade. One was Boeing and the other one was Coca-Cola. Everyone else was against free trade. With that kind of exchange rate, you can understand that. and of course then President Reagan pushed this dollar down quite sharply using the Plaza Accord but since then and that was good but since then the dollar was kind of allowed to float on its own and recently the dollar is one of the strongest currency in the world again especially on a global straight weighted basis and I'm afraid that this will make many blue collar workers in United States very unhappy again.
1:00:13And that might, of course, add to the kind of movement that Trump was able to lead by saying that our blue-collar workers really need our help. They certainly do need our help, but that should be through our exchange adjustments, not by just giving out money in my view, because even if we help this industry, the steel industry, this and that, another 10 % movement in exchange rate and all the subsidies, all the taxpayers' money to help these industries will be wasted. And then you might ask the question, can we really control the exchange rate now that the capital flows are such a large part of foreign exchange market?
1:01:02and I think we can and I was involved in the Plaza Accord as I mentioned to you earlier that event how did government manage to bring the exchange rate down from 240 yen to the dollar to 120 yen to the dollar and eventually 80 yen to the dollar in the 10 year period simple you just scare the investors sufficiently so that they don't buy too many currencies of the deficit countries. And we saw that most recently with President Trump. He talked about trade deficits almost every day, right, during his four years of presidency. If the U.S. president keeps on talking about trade deficit and how we need to fix it, those people who are buying dollars get a little scared.
1:01:56because with this kind of president, he might tell the secretary of munichin to intervene in the foreign exchange tomorrow. And if that risk is there, many investors will think twice about buying U.S. assets. They may still buy it, but much more carefully than if someone else was the president. And as a result, if you look at, I mean, the yen dollar rate might not be the most representative, But if you look at the yen dollar rate during President Trump's period, it was remarkably stable for the whole four years. Even though during that four years, Federal Reserve raised interest rates nine times.
1:02:39And the Japanese kept the rates very low. So Fed raised interest rates nine times. Japanese did not increase the rates. And the yen dollar rate remained remarkably stable. Because someone like Trump keep on talking about trade deficit. I'm sure many Japanese institutional investors who used to buy U.S. treasuries and so forth got a little scared and they were more careful in purchasing U.S. assets. But Japan was still running large trade deficit trade surplus with the U.S. So that's a natural force to push dollar down and yen higher. And if the Japanese insurance companies did not upset that by buying U.S.
1:03:22treasuries, then that will keep the dollar from appreciating. And so I think we can learn from those experiences of Plaza Gold or during Trump years that there is something government can still do. And I think we need to do it to make sure that this reaction to globalization does not go too far to the point where free trade is put in danger because free trade made so many of us prosperous, both in the developed world and in the developing world. But we have to make sure that it works properly as originally advertised by making sure that the exchange rate really doesn't go totally out. That's interesting.
1:04:17I never thought of all of Donald Trump's talking as being a soft currency peg of sorts. So maybe there was more benefit to all of his talking than some people expected. So anyways, Richard, you've been super gracious with your time. I know it's 10 o 'clock there in Japan. So thank you very much. We could go on and on all day, but we'll let you go. So thank you so much for all your insights. And Richard's new book is The Pursued Economy. me and Richard's, you know, what I've said was, I think one of the great macroeconomic books of all time, the Holy Grail of macroeconomics, you should buy them both.
1:04:59Richard, thanks so much for your time and hope to talk to you again soon.
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Richard Koo, chief economist at Nomura Research Institute, is renowned for his expertise on balance sheet recessions. He joins Discipline Funds CIO Cullen Roche in this can’t-miss, peer-to-peer review of Koo's economic framework, the impact and efficacy of QE in balance sheet recessions, the potential GDP dominance of emerging economies like China and India, and the possibility of U.S. real estate stagnation.
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