My Life in 4 Trades: Dan Tapiero

32:36And I still had my massive long in, not in the European bonds that I'd had, but in the Japanese bonds. Thankfully, I had these call options and the calls within about a week or two in the middle of 94 went to zero. So it ended up being that I'd lost about 50 % of everything I'd made in the previous year. Wow. So within a week, literally it was a week. They went to zero almost immediately. And I held them. And so I was completely mortified. It was very early. It was my first really big trading loss. I had done the victory dance celebration, just like any, I guess in, in, in 93, I would have been 25, you know, shedding down to Miami, doing all that kind of crazy, stupid stuff you do, you know, with the, the big apartment overlooking the central park and the whole, the whole thing.

33:44Okay. It's dumb as you can imagine. I, you know, I, I didn't go completely overboard, but I'm just saying, I was definitely very confident and I'd done it myself and sort of these interesting different ways um it wasn't uh and i just thought okay look i was excited i came out of school and this is i felt like naturally this was something i was going to be good at and you know it was proven to be the case until i got wiped out in 94 and i still had made you know i If I hadn't had call options and I'd stayed with it, I would have been completely wiped out. But I knew risk management. It was a big enough haircut that it hit.

34:32It was a big enough haircut even though you didn't get completely wiped out. It was a big enough loss that it – No, no, no. It was massive. You lose 50 % of what you made in over a year in a week. It just, I didn't, literally, I did not say a word for like, felt like three months. I did not literally speak. I was just so shocked that I'd completely missed it and gotten sideswiped and that the fundamental analysis I'd done was just not relevant. The market turned and the Japanese economy could be in complete meltdown and it wouldn't matter. It got priced in. And when the market prices something in, it's obvious.

35:18Everything that I thought in March of 93 about Japan was more true in March of 94, but it didn't matter. It got priced in. The market sought. So very important early lesson that, you know, it's not really necessarily about what is your opinion or your view of the fundamentals. It's only important, your view and your analysis is only important versus what the market has priced. And so there are all sorts of signs of euphoria. And obviously, my situation, March of 93 was very different from March of 94. And it was just like today, I mean, I don't want to say I laugh at it, but I mean, it's very obvious, right?

36:07That things had moved a long way. That was enough. I wasn't going to get another, you know, 400 basis point drop in the following year. Right. And again, I did cut back a little bit and I did have those calls. But it was it was an important lesson also in risk management that, you know, those calls protected me in some way. I knew that always there was a lot of risk. I was massively leveraged. I really was. I mean, like it was like 50 to one. I was leveraged 50 times, something like that. We talk about risk of leverage all the time these days because people are continuing to learn that lesson the hard way.

36:49Yeah, yeah. Again, but because the risk was defined, it didn't matter that it was 50 times to me. I was like, okay, I didn't think that those calls would go to zero. But if they did, I could still live and function. Well, I didn't actually really function. That wasn't actually accurate. I was like for several months, like nearly catatonic. And I went back over the trade a hundred different times. What did I miss? How did I miss it? You know, I didn't do a trade for the rest of the year. Did anybody ask about that or ask why? You mean for your own personal account, you didn't do a trade or for at work too?

37:38Yeah. No, at work, I had one trade. It was very small. My activity just dropped off completely. Did anybody ask about it? Did people ask what was going on with you? Well, so in 94, many of the large guys got destroyed. Like Michael Steinhardt, I think, who had made, call it, you know, 50, 60, 70 % in 93, was down 30 % in 94. So in 1994, the two-year note went from three into March of 95 went to eight. So the movement in the two-year from three to eight was the largest bond market correction since 1929. I think the long bond correction, I mean, it was, I can't remember the exact numbers on the long bond at the time or the 10-year note, but the funds rate went up to eight.

38:32The two-year note went up to eight from three. and many people got completely wiped out. And then, of course, Mexico also got wiped out. And Bob Rubin came in and basically helped restructure some of their oil revenues in March of 95. That was the Mexican, the Fed hiking program wiping out the weaker countries out there at the time, Mexico. So it wasn't just me. I just got wiped out right away. It took another year. Everybody else is nursing their ruins. Nobody noticed that you were sitting there not putting a train on. No one noticed because there were much bigger problems happening and many people were, you know, but for me personally, it was impossible.

39:21I mean, it was very difficult, but it made me also realize the importance of having a little bit of that downside protection always, even if you have maximum conviction in your analysis. Yeah. I mean, these are the lessons hard learned. So your second trade is one of your best, and it's a few years later. So this is in 1997, the Asian devaluation. I love that you sent in the email, 1997, Thai bought Asian devaluation. Everyone else calls it the Asian financial crisis. So we had a hint even before I looked that it was one of your better trades because you referred to it as the devaluation. But you obviously were able to come out of that catatomic state, but you had that lesson in your pocket.

40:10I'm assuming that helps now as you're moving forward thinking about this. But walk us through. So where are you now? Are you at Tiger? Are you someplace else? No, I left and I ended up going to work for Michael Steinhardt, who was a competitor. And I was head of macro research there. Actually, with one of the senior, so the partner I'd worked with at Tiger, I ended up with him. And there was another guy who joined us. It was the three of us doing macro for Michael. And Michael retired in 1995. And I went to go work for, I took some time off, and I went to go work for what at the time was the largest Asian hedge fund.

40:57It was the first Asian hedge fund ever started called Sofair Capital. And it was a billion dollars in 1996. It was a pretty big fund. And he was a very, I thought, very smart, very good investor. And he basically, I said, look, it's time for me to have my own track record. So none of this just in my personal account. So I said, look, I was looking for a position where I could have my own separate account, and then I would run macro for the whole fund. And so he was doing mostly long-short equity in Asia and around the world. And that's what the whole team was doing, and I was going to do the macro part of it.

41:40And so what happened in early 97 was that the economies in Asia had really come under pressure. You know, I don't know if it was necessarily a delayed impact of the Fed raising, but the Southeast Asian economies, it was called the, what was it, the tiger miracle or something, the tiger in the early 90s. And they had big, big booms into 92, 93. And then the economies weakened substantially. And then by early 97, they were really weakening. And interestingly, those currencies were still pegged to the dollar. It was sort of a vestige of a time like, I guess, in the 60s and 70s when those countries didn't have the ability to manage their own currency policies.

42:37And, you know, they were still pegged to the dollar. They outsourced their monetary policy to us. And we saw that. And the dollar, TyBot rate, again, it was like the ERM crisis. So this was a bet that was easy in a way for me to see because I was in on the front lines of the peg breaks during the ERM crisis. And so I thought, this is the exact same thing. The tie bought valuation is much, much too rich versus where it needs to be. And the dollar had gone up a lot against the yen. And so what happened was it was exactly like the pound punt trade. The yen had weakened a lot against the bot. It had weakened a lot against the ringgit, all of those Asian currencies.

43:30And so they were getting destroyed because their trading, their export revenues had collapsed versus other currencies that had weakened against the dollar. because when the Fed raised rates dramatically in 94, that caused the dollar to go up a lot. But if you were pegged to the dollar, that meant your currency also went up a lot. It's amazing it played out almost the same way. It did. So if your country was in a recession and all of a sudden your currency went up 20 % against a competitor, you knew that wasn't going to be a, right, That was going to be not going to last. So what did I do? I said to Michael, so fair at the time, end of 96, early 97.

44:22I said, this is like the arm. I wrote up one of my like 10 page analyses. Cause I used to, this is from the tiger days and my history background. I used to write up the thesis. So I said, look, we need to have a hundred million dollar tie bought on. and these are the reasons and i remember i i wrote these pieces i probably still have them for every single currency i went through fundamental analysis explaining why it needed to be back and because i was gonna i did some in my own account for the fund so i had my own separate account and then i did some for the bigger fund and um it was interesting because it didn't cost anything to be long the dollar short the tie bob it was only the interest rate differential.

45:12So when you bought dollar, sold TyBot one year forward, the cost of carry, the negative cost of carry was one percentage point. And I was making the case that TyBot needed to go down 20 to 30%. So just think about that trade. You're going to risk losing 1 % to make 20 or 30. That was the best trade I'd ever seen in my career up until that point. So in February or March, somewhere around that time, I put on a one-year dollar tie bot forward. And I just sat there and I said to Michael, I said, you know what? I'm going to come in at 9 p.m. at night and I'm going to work from 9 p.m. till 5 a.m. That's going to be my work schedule because I need to be there to live this.

46:05and I was 27 or whatever it was, uh, and not married, uh, just starting to have a girlfriend who ended up being my wife, still my wife after 24 years. And she can remember this. She could put up with that schedule. That's a good, a good early vacation. Yeah. She put up with that schedule. She put up with a lot more also. Um, and they thought, probably thought I was nuts because Michael and his brother, you know, Philip, it was their fun. And, um, they're like, Holy, what do we do getting this crazy guy here? But this guy's going to make us some money. Hopefully. So we got on this dollar tie bot and we just sat there.

46:51And then all of a sudden pressure started built. I started talking to people about the thesis. I like circulated my memo that I wrote. It was just a, It was an idea. And then all of a sudden, a lot of guys started coming in. Like, wow, risk one to make 20. Ooh, right. That's a macro trade. And our max loss would be one. Yeah. Like, max love having a defined bottom because then you create the asymmetry, right? And so I sat there and I had a few other ones, but I was really just sitting there in the middle of the night with one dollar tie bot that was pegged watching and waiting. And then the pressure started to build and the forward started to move out.

47:38So then there were so many people doing it that it ended up costing, you know, 2%, 3%. People were still doing it. They're like, oh, 4%. So it's like, I'll risk 4 % to make, you know, 20 or 30%. This is fundamentally undervalued. And what was happening at the time, like you're saying, like, what was I doing in the middle of the night? The central bank was allowing capital exodus. So what happened was the short term currency reserves of the central bank were getting down to very low levels. Gap of flight. Like lower than two or three months. And so if some very small portion of capital flight started to happen, like Thai people pulling their money out, it would create a situation where the central bank didn't have enough reserves on hand to allow that exodus.

48:44So that was the linchpin. That was the linchpin, the fulcrum in a way. That was the point. And once you knew it went beyond a certain level, it was game over. And so I was sitting there, believe it or not, on July 4th. I'll never forget this. In the middle of the night, 1997, in my T-shirt, in the office we shared with Morgan Stanley Asset Management. It was Barton Biggs. I was very good friends with Michael. and I had a little office, it wasn't even an office, it was more like a little cubby hole there. And all of a sudden it prints across the tape, tied back on pegs. And we made, I don't know, within like a week or two weeks, it was like 50 million bucks or something like that.

49:34And then we ended up shorting over the duration of the year, all of the other currencies that were still pegged that needed to de-pay. So the ringgit, the rupiah, the sing dollar wasn't pegged, but it was going down. It was just dominoes. I remember it was just dominoes. Yeah. And the big one, I had two other big ones. I bought these puts on the Indonesian rupiah at a four vol, but I bought the puts and they ended up going up 18 times. like the value, right? You saw this because you were doing the, you were doing the, you were doing the, this, you saw sort of history rhyming. Correct. Did other people, I'm surprised it wasn't more crowded because did other people sort of see the correlation or were they just not looking in that part of the world?

50:31It's a little bit of both, but a lot of people, the macro, the New York macro community saw it. You know, my friend, by the way, who I'd worked with for the first five years of my career. The guy who I mentioned hired me at Tiger. He ended up working at Lou Bacon's firm, Moore Capital. And he and I, like, I don't know if I got him into the trade. I don't even know. But he ended up doing the trade really big for Lewis. So that was one guy that had it. I think they all had it. I think Julian, you know, I wasn't in conversation with Julian, but I'm pretty sure they had the Taibati Val. Soros, probably.

51:19I ended up working for Druck later on, and I remember him saying something about having it. But then he went the other way on the ringgit for some reason. He had some analysts who thought he should be long the ringgit, the Malaysian ringgit. So he lost a chunk on that. But I, it was, you know, I tend to be very concentrated and focused on opportunities that I think are really clear where there's a lot of asymmetry. So I didn't do anything else. I didn't have anything else. I didn't care about anything else. We just shorted every single currency. And our fund was the only Asian fund in the world that was up in 97 because in 97, the Asian stock markets went down like massively, 30, 40, 15%.

52:06I don't remember. There's a ripple effect through all that, which impacted so many, even if they saw it coming. So clearly your confidence is back by now, fully recovered. I mean, it didn't take three years. My confidence came back in 95 when the fundamentals in Japan, I know we don't want to go back to this, but the fundamental view that I'd had in 93 that I thought was right, that got sidetracked in 94, actually reasserted itself in 1995. I thought that Japanese rates needed to go to zero in 1993. You were just early. So it just took 10 years or longer to happen. They eventually did go to zero and stayed there for a long time.

52:53So I want to move, picking up on being concentrated and really focusing where you see opportunity. So your third one is one of your worst trades. It's a 2008. And this is so interesting. It's a VC investment in an avatar metaverse company. This is so interesting because of course, everybody knows away what was going on in the focus. So we're, you know, sort of in the beginning of the financial crisis and you're already in that part of the world or you're just beginning to get interested. Talk to us about that one. Yeah. So 07, 06, 07 was a very good year for me. I was, then I had moved to focusing on agriculture and grains and starting in 05, 06, I'm sorry, 06.

53:39And it had a pretty nice windfall in a bunch of investments, had a great years and end of 06, 07. And even 08 ended up being a great year for me too. And a friend of mine came to me and said, look, I've got this, uh, you know, investment that I'm doing in this company and it's a metaverse and you go into, you have your avatar and, uh, you can like, I'm like, so what do you do? Well, you can hang out like in a room together and talk and people with similar, you know, uh, hobbies can, can talk and do this and that so he's like you got to come down and again i'd made a decent chunk of money and people were always coming to me for you know for investments you know they were suggesting you know coming to me with their business ideas etc so this is a good friend of mine who incidentally he and i had done a trade together before in the grain related thing that had we'd made seven x in three months which is sort of my biggest, shortest term hit up until the time.

54:53So we'd had a good rapport, right? It wasn't just like somebody saying, hey, come look at this company. This is a guy who I respected, made a lot of homework, who together with me, we both made this 7X in a three-month period. This is while I was at SAC Capital in the early 2000s. And so he says, you've got to come look at this business. So I went down, I looked at it. and again I hadn't made too many private investments at the time but I looked at the thing and I was like wow this is really interesting I could see people from all around the world so I said you're telling me people from all around the world can get together in this living room and they can all talk about like cars that they like to drive so it was that kind of functionality the avatars are a little clunky but I was like this is really cool and I sat down with a guy I need the CEO and he seemed like a decent guy.

55:52And I asked him about the financials. Right. And he's like, well, you know, it's been a little rough period for us, but we just need some money to like get through this little rough period. And then we have this big deal. So I said, okay, all right. And I was like, well, you know, I wanted to see the financials. And just to, you know, you've got to have some books, audited record. Anyway, he kept hemming and hawing about that. And my friend was the single largest owner, outside owner, my friend, who I had done these deals with. And he's like, Dan, it's fine. It's all good. And I don't think he misled me.

56:34I just think that maybe he didn't know. I don't know. Anyway, the bottom line is I ended up making an investment in this company and it was only a few percentage points of the business that I ended up owning. And I never got to see the financials. And I completely trusted my friend who had a much larger position, had millions in it. And this is the guy that I had made a 7X. So I made my investment. And then all of a sudden, a month later, I called him to try to speak with him. and like he wouldn't answer the phone, things aren't, whatever. I couldn't reach him. And then he basically, you know, I finally got him and he's like, well, you know, we're done.

57:28It's over. We're closing. And I was like, well, what do you mean you're closing? I just gave you this chunk of money a month ago. He's like, yeah, well, we couldn't get any money from anybody else and we don't have enough to run and we're just going to close. And I was like, oh, my God, you just defrauded me because you knew you were going to go under. And maybe my friend didn't know. He probably had some inkling. But I was like, the money was gone. Zero. And I didn't sue him. I don't do that. I mean, I leave that for sort of, you know, that's not a way to live happily or successfully. Yeah. But it's interesting because you had such a process and research things like that.

58:23That's the way you operate. And then this one time you just kind of didn't follow your own rules, right? Yeah. It was a little bit of a different area for me. It wasn't macro. It was a little macro in some ways because it was this very big picture idea, but he was building this product. And again, I was maybe living like a little too confident from all my gains in the previous year. And I was like, ah, it didn't matter. It wasn't such a huge amount in a sense. It didn't change my life at all, of course. but it was really a wake up call that well you don't do that again you know you don't you know not only not go through your process but that excessive trust on one character also who was my friend was not a great idea and the guy just straight out lied to me and um So I have a pretty good sense when someone is just lying to me because there's a lot of misleading and lying going on.

59:35I still make mistakes. I still make mistakes.

59:42It's difficult. There are a lot of misleaders out there, people who kind of suggest. There's a lot of desperation, right? Like someone's reluctant to give up their dream. And so they, they think they're manifesting the future, you know, and. Right. Right. And I don't know if you ever are able to completely scrub that out. I mean, I, we can talk about this later on, but I mean, I, in my current business, in, in the digital asset ecosystem world, I passed on over, you know, over a hundred deals in the last two, three years. I passed on FTX three times. I passed on BlockFi, passed on Celsius, you know, but we have two companies in our portfolio.

1:00:40I mean, it was less than 5 % of AUM combined, but I had to go to zero. And both the cases were guys essentially, you know, misled. And it's two out of 26. So it's sort of the nature of any investing or trading. You have your winners and you hope that they run high, and then you're inevitably going to have things that don't work out, whether it's the founders or it's just the timing or it's too early. That's the nature of VC investing, I suppose. Which, by the way, I'm going to switch things up. Hold on one second. That is not exactly right. Like, meaning that you can make an investment and, okay, the cycle turns, the growth goes down, whatever it is.

1:01:26But fraudulent behavior is, and it exists in the current space. losing money as a result of that is not the same as losing money because you were early or because you know, these two cases now often they're connected. Okay. I get that. But I just saying even now after 30 years plus of making investments in trading, I, you know, I relied on somebody internally on those two investments. I probably didn't do as much work as I should have myself. And this is the problem is that, and I've removed both of those people from anything I'm doing in the future. But look, it's my responsibility. I run the fund.

1:02:26All investments are my responsibility. I have final decision-making on everything. So I never blame anybody else. It's my fault. But, you know, had I done the full work, you know, maybe I would have missed it. Maybe not. There were things that were bugging me about these two investments. My only point is that even after all these years, right, and remembering that 08 experience. experience. And again, this guy didn't blow up because of the financial crisis in 08 had nothing to do with that. It was just a straight out fraud. He knew he was going under and he took my money to pay himself back some money before he announced that he was going under.

1:03:16Right. And I, I, I, I, I relied on someone else's judgment a little too much. Right. The balancing point, and this is an interesting one, and I'll stop after this, is that, you know, if you're to grow to a certain point, you have to have a team. You have to be able to rely on the team. You know, Warren Buffett, when he makes an investment, it's not just him doing all the work. He has a team of people who he respects and trusts. And you need that. You can't do everything yourself. Right. And so, yes, a very big part of this is partnering and having the right people working for you. But even after 30 years, you still can make that mistake.

1:04:09So they just have to try to structure your portfolio in a way where if that does happen, it minimize you have the loss is not a cataclysmic. It's a loss within a portfolio. So those two things were 5 % of total AUM. So it didn't, you know, so, so meaning like even after 30 years, you need to protect yourself, even when you're investing in things that you love. That's right. And listen to your gut. And for the people on the other side, don't be an idiot and burn bridges because if you're operating in a straightforward way and being honest with your investor, you're going to suffer the consequences of that, which you didn't sue, but certainly many others could have pursued it that way.

1:05:05So you really need to try to keep that moral compass, I think. I want to, for your fourth trade, switch things up a little bit because we're going to do another one of your best. Long Gold was in there in 2009, but I actually want to, since we were just talking about this early foray, I want to do the fourth one as the best one, which is starting 10T. because it's so interesting having heard your whole journey through macro, being at a front row of not only some of the biggest trades that went down and profits that were made, but also this sort of, you know, running in the circles of the names that are now legendary and working with them alongside them.

1:05:46You've kind of shifted your focus and are really concentrating on this digital space. So talk to me about launching Tenti. Why does that feel like one of your best ones yet? Well, it is the biggest macro trade of all time. The growth in the digital asset ecosystem and the broader general adoption of Bitcoin, I think it's something that's outside the existing macro world. And so all the bets I did, and again, starting the gold company, GBI, the company Druckenmiller and I launched together, Agcoa, which was a farmland reed. I sort of moved from just trading in liquid markets to starting businesses because the risk reward, the asymmetry of the bet in starting a business is much greater than in just doing a trade.

1:06:51And also I'm more of a long-term investor and it's much easier from a lot of different standpoints to structure a bet within an operating business. Um, but so, you know, the experiences that I've talked about in the beginning, this idea of being able to sit through volatility, um, being able to, um, build a sort of broad diversified portfolio. those are very important things we didn't talk about my experience with ag coa which is a diversified portfolio of farms um that was built and ended up becoming the largest private farmland in the u.s and we ended up selling 2013 but the structure of the investment the structure of 10t how it exists, this fund with 24 different companies, the way that it's put together is, in a way, it's built to optimize and leverage to the greatest degree the upside while having a control on the downside.

1:08:19and this space is the most difficult that's ever existed. This trading cryptocurrency, not just Bitcoin, ETH, but like all of these other various things, this is, in my view, 10X more difficult than trading the euro. So the structure of 10T exists. it comes right out of my background in terms of trying to create this asymmetry where you have a limit on your downside, but then you are participating in the upside. I think that the volatility in Bitcoin, ETH, the whole space doesn't exist in the old world. It doesn't, you don't have an asset that goes up, you know, 20 X and then drops 90%, 20 X 90%.

1:09:13It's a whole, you know, it's a whole new world that's being built here. It is literally the digitization of money. And I always say like the internet was the digitization of ideas and information. This is the digitization of money value. And then it's something well beyond that. This whole concept that I talked with Raul about back in 2019, this truesmith machine concept, it's a permanent ledger that can't be distorted. And so when you start to think about what is a permanent ledger, digital ledger that can't be manipulated or distorted, like what's the value of that and how applicable is that to almost everything that we do?

1:09:54You know, maybe, you know, maybe it can help remove the odds that you deal with fraudulent people or fraudulent things. Let me ask you, so I can see how this is this sort of new world connecting back to your idea that you create a thesis, you get conviction, you study these things, you're all in it intellectually. do you feel that your gut and all the experience you learned from these massive macro trades, do you feel like that process, you can bring that process into this chapter and this trade that you're in the midst of? Yeah, 10T doesn't exist at all without my previous background. It's not something that, like we are right now, as far as I know, the only growth equity fund in the world.

1:10:50exclusively focused on crypto blockchain, Web3 digital assets. It shouldn't be that just some old time macro guy is the only guy focusing on this. Where are all the other, like the growth equity guys, the crossover guys, where are the guys from the KKRs or Blackstone or Silver Lake? But it's a very strange area because it's very interdisciplinary. in there. And you need to understand macro and currency and monetary policy and cryptography and coding and tech. And it's just, it's so many different things. So you really have to be, you know, you have to be able to think creatively about like, what could the future look like?

1:11:39And do you believe in that future? And that took me a lot of work to get to this point, right? It took me, it took me a lot of work. And so maybe in some ways, the strategy is unique to my background, but it's not exactly because you have people like, you know, Dan Moorhead, Mike Novogratz. These are guys my age who were earlier than me to the space. Mike is Galaxy, of course, Dan, very successful, Pantera. And these are guys who had that macro analytical framework and they got and now they're all in on the space just like me because what you realize is oh my goodness all that stuff that we used to do and those guys did many of the similar bets that i did that's like a horse and buggy situation right like the old macro i mean you can still make money there those guys are very successful but it's really the old way and the opportunity set in the new world is so huge.

1:12:42The only caveat is, as I said, the greatest macro investment trade of all time, but there's a caveat, is that it comes with crippling volatility that human beings aren't really normally used to. And so the structure of 10T and the investments that we've made in the fund, the way we've diversified it and the structure of the actual equity that we own puts us in a position to weather that volatility and then also participate on the upside. So I would say I certainly had, there's no chance I could have come up with this. It comes right out of my experience with early macro trading in the 90s and then building Agco and GBI.

1:13:34And I'm not even saying it's the best structure. There are funds that are going to outperform us, but it is the only thing I could do to get myself to a place here where I felt comfortable bringing in outside investors. It's amazing. And when you put it that way, I just get the sense that the sort of Brown University graduate who is studying history and philosophy and writing these theses in his 20s is sort of applauding and has a front row seat to this. It sort of feels like that. So it's a fantastic arc. Dan, you have so many trades and so many stories that's like impossible. We really need three hours.

1:14:13So maybe we'll have to have you back for another one. But it's been an amazing conversation. Thank you so much. My pleasure. Thank you. We hope you enjoyed this episode. At Real Vision, we arm you with the expert knowledge, time-efficient tools, and a powerful network to help you succeed on your financial journey. Get a taste of financial freedom with our free offer at realvision.com forward slash free.

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