Will the Market Crash in 2026? with Andrew Ross Sorkin

19:20And he did that pilot in Oakland, right?

19:22Andrew Ross Sorkin:So maybe we're all living in some kind of UBI utopia, but I just don't know what that ultimately feels like or looks like. And I do think that Elon has, in terms of his timelines, have always been aggressive, let's just say. Did his 1920s corollary suffer from that too? John Raskob, no, John Raskob was like Elon only in a different way. John Raskob, so famously, he's the one who actually changed the culture of America actually around credit and debt. So he was working at General Motors, running General Motors, and he decided, how are we going to sell more cars in America? We're going to loan people money so they can buy cars.

20:06Andrew Ross Sorkin:Prior to that, it was like a moral sin to take a loan. People didn't even like to get a mortgage back then. And once they started buying cars from General Motors with a loan, then Sears Roebuck clocks what's going on. They say, we're going to do this. And then Wall Street says, okay, well, now we can do this too. And it really did change the whole psyche of taking on credit. So that was sort of his first invention. He then becomes an extraordinary investor, makes a small fortune, is then inventing the idea of the equivalent of maybe one of the first mutual funds that ever existed in the financial space.

20:41Andrew Ross Sorkin:He then, by the way, like Elon, decides, ah, I'm going to get into politics and supports. He loses. He's on the wrong side. He ends up losing to Hoover. He supported Al Smith for president. but then decides to spend basically all of his money for years trying to undermine the reputation of president hoover secretly by the paying journalists and creating all sorts of uh secret schemes then he builds the empire state building and he was like a philosopher king in that every journalist in america would come talk to him and finally he comes up and i don't think he gets enough credit for this we now have a five-day work week right he wrote a paper in 1929 that But we should have – back then people worked six days a week.

21:25Andrew Ross Sorkin:The stock market was actually open on Saturdays. Everyone worked on Saturdays. And he had this idea that we should not work on Saturdays, not because he wanted to be nice to people, but because he thought that actually would create a bigger consumer economy. If you had the weekend, more people would buy cars because they could go places. They'd buy gardening equipment. They would do different outfits to go to different events. Oh, interesting. And the other thing that's fascinating is this is the time, the 1920s, or the time where I will say celebrities become uglier, which is to say they stop being just athletes.

21:54Or I should say, that's not kind. Celebrities become less good looking. They stop being actors and athletes and Hollywood starlets.

22:01Andrew Ross Sorkin:It's not all the beautiful people on the covers of magazines. It's now. The deal book crowd. It's the business folk. The business folk. No, it was true. This is when financiers, for the first time, are on the cover of magazines and newspapers. And they became their own version of a celebrity. It wasn't Babe Ruth anymore. It wasn't some beautiful actress. And people cared what they thought about everything, like the way we do now. Oh, yeah. We care about what Elon thinks about everything. Right. We all care about what Elon thinks about now. And you know what Sam Altman thinks. And all the people are – Jamie Dimon, they're on the cover of these magazines.

22:37Andrew Ross Sorkin:That really started in the 20s. So Forbes magazine starts in 1917. Time magazine starts in 1923. The New Yorker starts just a little bit later than that. Yeah, and the New York Times have been around for a while at this point. How much of that creation is just money doing money's thing versus media doing media's thing? Oh, that's a great question. you know i think it's probably like everything in life a combination of both clearly the business community realizes that they need to reach people so they want to take advantage of the medium yeah and to the degree you think that media and journalism are trying to reflect what people are interested in yeah that was a shiny object that was that was a new shiny toy No joke.

23:31But one of the billionaires who we're so fascinated by, Mark Cuban, is somebody who's like a capitalist who is a proponent of universal basic income for caregivers. Right. Which I think is actually like a great agenda for the Republican Party to try to seize and implement right now. What I was shocked by is that when you have Doge and people like David Sachs and all these people from the AI world who've been immersed in some of the thinking about UBI have such an agenda in Washington, there didn't seem to be any forward movement on that kind of social safety net at all for this massive technological shift.

24:09Andrew Ross Sorkin:that if we all don't have jobs, the class or the jobs that we have today, that ultimately we are our caregivers to each other. Like that would be what you'd hope for. And then we would, as a society, pay out in whatever form, barter or whatever it is. That's what you'd want. So this crash that happens that sparked in 1929, but actually takes a long time to go on, you talk about in your book as the collapse was not a moment, but a relentless unraveling. Relentless. Can the cause of it be pinpointed, even if the timeline of it isn't pinpointed? Well, so I can identify the cause, but the cause is the confluence of four, five, or six different things.

24:53Andrew Ross Sorkin:Okay. The crash being sort of the first component part of it. So you have the sort of confidence sucked out of the system with a bunch of people who've now lost their homes or mortgaged their houses or out of work. But that's still a relatively small group of people. Interestingly, the stock market by the end of 1929, that year, is only down 17%. I know. That was wild. But that was like a head fake for the President of the United States and for everybody else who looked at the market as some kind of barometer of how things were going. because what it missed was you could look at it and go, oh, things are okay, except that all of the people who had bought on margin and taken out these massive loans, they weren't able to get back to the 7%, even to the 17 % because they'd already had to sell their homes to pay for the losses when the stock market went down 50%.

25:44Andrew Ross Sorkin:The bank didn't say, you can just hold on to that until it comes back up again. They said, you can't afford to do any of this anymore because you owe 10 times that. So the leverage is a huge cost. It was the leverage. It was the leverage. That was the huge cost. So that's the first sort of piece of it. Then you get into the 1930s. And Hoover had promised farmers who he had tried to get to vote for him back in 1928 that he was going to implement tariffs. That was his whole thing. His whole thing was like, hey, guys, you vote for me. I will help you. I'm going to put tariffs on the table. By the way, every economist like today goes to Washington, begs the man, says, please don't do this.

26:21Andrew Ross Sorkin:You're going to just destroy things. Every economist or every capitalist? Everybody. Everybody. Everybody. Economists, the bankers. I had diaries of these folks literally talking about how they're on their knees begging this man, do not do this. Of course, trade drops by 60 % a year later. Yeah. Okay. So that's a huge cause. So that's to throw that into the mix. Then you have a separate situation going on where he's, by the way, deciding to raise taxes. He's also interestingly trying to jawbone. This is interesting. Sort of trying to jawbone folks into believing that the economy is better than it actually is.

26:58Andrew Ross Sorkin:It's sort of very, by the way, it's very Trumpian and even very Biden like in that, you know, people feel what they feel. They see what they see. And yet you have people out there telling you that it's not that way. But that seems like – I mean, I had Paul Krugman on and we did this whole episode on are we counting the economy wrong? Because it feels like that all the time. Like these indicators are not useful indicators for my own experience of life and I feel lied to by government, right? Which doesn't help trust. Totally. So he was an optimist seller. Totally. So you have this optimism seller on one end.

27:29Andrew Ross Sorkin:By the way, the tariffs are not helping the farmers. So now the farmers are having their own problems. That's, by the way, hitting some of the smaller banks. Right. Because of the farm debt. Because of farm debt. So now they're having their own problems. The Federal Reserve is sitting around on their hands thinking, well, we can't really do anything about this. When the truth is that the lesson that we learned, we learned it actually in 2008, though I think Ben Bernanke actually learned it because he did his PhD thesis at Princeton on the Great Depression is when you have a problem like this, you have to throw money at the problem.

28:03Andrew Ross Sorkin:The US did the opposite. They went into sort of austerity mode. Yeah, they need to go into pandemic mode where they were writing checks. Writing checks. Now, the other big debate that was happening during this period, though, was it wasn't clear the Fed technically could print money the way they do today because back then we were still on the gold standard. So every dollar that we printed needed to be connected to gold. And there was a big debate. Could we get off the gold standard? But nobody really wanted to do that. And then there were other things that didn't happen either, which was you could tell that the banks were going to start to struggle.

28:36Andrew Ross Sorkin:You had these bank runs happening. And the right answer probably was to implement something like the FDIC, something where you could insure deposits, but nobody wanted to, Hoover didn't want to do it. By the way, Roosevelt didn't want to do it. They all thought there was a terrible idea because they thought it was going to create a moral hazard because there would be no differentiation between a bank that took on crazy risk and was mismanaged entirely and some bank that was doing all the right things because the government, the taxpayer was ultimately going to bail you out. Do you think that's true?

29:11I mean, we've seen these bailouts of banks that have done that. I mean, I know like Silicon Valley Bank, they wiped out the equity.

29:18Andrew Ross Sorkin:I think the answer is that it has ultimately been to the benefit of the country for us to have some safety net. It's not a safety net, by the way, that protects every account in its entirety. But for the average American that has whatever savings they have, a good part of it, if not all of it, is protected. Okay. I want to get creative out of here because I have so many questions about this FDIC thing. So$250 ,000 is protected, right? Now. Back then, I think it was$10 ,000. Okay. It was so little. But if you have like$251 ,000, should you keep$1 ,000 in a different bank or in a different under your mattress or what does doesn't the bank don't they actually really insure it beyond 250 like haven't they actually like bailed out banks yeah it depends where your bank is though yeah i mean if you were if we were i have you know i live in new york city so most there's only sort of the big five banks in the country that are here now yeah if i lived in a little town with a small bank that could maybe go out of business at some point, yeah, they wouldn't be protected.

30:25Andrew Ross Sorkin:And they'd be too small to fail. So people would let them fail. So they would protect your$250 ,000, but they wouldn't protect the rest. It's interesting. I imagine if you have more than$250 ,000 at JPMorgan or Bank of America, I think those banks at this point are too big to fail, and those banks will be protected likely by the government in some way. This is not financial advice to anyone less than I could. It is not financial advice. If there's like a little disclaimer thing. Yes, let's do that. And that could be totally wrong about this. So get out your salt shaker. Okay. So there's so much going on here that seems very similar to the 2020s, right?

31:02In terms of tariffs, in terms of leverage and financial innovations. I mean, we have crypto. It's great innovation. All the things. All the The poor banking structure. And also what feels a little bit in your pages as this kind of like castrated government. Like there is a group of people in the Fed sitting around and doing things, but the real things happen at these like Park Avenue homes where the financier of the day is calling in people and running in the world. It's like these amazing rooms where it happened. But before we get there, I need to ask you, you talked about Hoover being, I would say like this opioid of optimism dealer.

31:39Andrew Ross Sorkin:Yes. And yet so many people in the book seem to know this was coming. So you have Coolidge, a one-term president, saying he doesn't want to seek a re-election because he sees this coming. Right, he thinks something bad is about to happen. A man of presidential ambition, willing to put it away because he sees it coming. You've got Merrill of Merrill Lynch. That's what he said, and then everyone assumes that in retrospect that that's why he didn't. But did he say it before or did he say it after? He said it before. Yeah, Broken Crock is right, maybe, I don't know. You've got Merrill of Merrill Lynch, who's trying to like sell off.

32:06Andrew Ross Sorkin:Charles Merrill telling everybody to get out. You've got like this Dr. Doom of his day, this economist Babson, Nouriel Roubini of his time, shouting as the market's up 100 % year on year. They're like, no, this thing is coming crashing. And so were there real fundamentals that could have gotten ahead of what these people saw? Or was it like a broken clock is right two times a day kind of situation? I think it's a little bit closer to the broken clock. Okay. I mean, this is the issue about Cassandra's. So here I am now talking against my book. the truth is most of the time the stock market does go up it does over the last hundred years it's just gone up you would be much better off having been in the market the whole time than not and so to catch it right i mean here you have charles merrill he's sort of right and sort of wrong he said that in 1928 the market went up 90 percent after he said it so is he right i don't know and this is sort of the great challenge of timing the market.

33:02Andrew Ross Sorkin:I see the Cassandra's playing a hugely important role as sort of raising right flags that people need to be focused on all the time, but not necessarily like always do exactly what they say in that moment because... Yeah. They're like curbs on the road, but they're not like a signal that you're on a cliff. But like this idea that the market always goes up, it's like, yeah, but it's incentivized to always go up. And we're incentivized to always find financial innovation, leverage, democratization, other ways of new instruments to keep this market going up? Like, how do we know the value of the actual things in the market?

33:39Andrew Ross Sorkin:Oh, so I'm not, okay. Look, if you buy a, let's do something very basic. You buy a farm. Okay, yes. You know me so well, yeah. You buy a farm. Yes. Yes. And at least over the years, let's say you had some cows on your farm. Yeah. I'm not going to make you do like a discounted cash flow of my future farm earnings for our audience. But isn't it like now stocks are a little bit more like art? Like the value is in the eye of the beholder. I think there's certain stocks that are in the eye of the beholder. And particularly in like private markets, like venture capital. Oh, goodness. So, yes. So, right now, look, there's a public market, the stock market, which ostensibly should have some kind of price discovery because a lot of people should be buying and selling these things and hopefully there's some relevance to what's happening in reality.

34:41Andrew Ross Sorkin:In the private markets, whether it's venture capital or private equity or private credit, people aren't buying and selling every day. And so the people who are deciding what something is worth on any given day, any given moment, are the people who own it. There is a marked to make-believe situation that is happening in America right now. No question. And then the question is, does that come undone? Or some people would say that it's a feature, not a bug, that these things can be held for a very, very long time at these marked to make-believe prices until they almost grow into them. Or like they get taken private again, then they come back on public.

35:17But just to give an example, like Rent the Runway.

35:19Andrew Ross Sorkin:Yes. Or some of these companies that came up as quote unquote tech companies and got venture capital and love the company, no shade on the company. But like its market capitalization today is far lower than equity it raised. I don't even know. It might be that the founders, I don't know either way, but it might be that the founders walked away with money off the table that is more than the current. Yeah, there's a lot of what I call a story stock. A story stock is a company that has a great story that people want to buy into. They want to believe the dream. And by the way, like every major AI company right now is a story stock, private or public, doesn't matter.

35:58Andrew Ross Sorkin:It's a story stock. People are believing something. You have to believe that these companies in 2028 or 2030, you know, for open AI stock or the valuation for open AI. Which is how much right now? Oh, goodness. It's on its way potentially to a trillion dollars. We'll see. But their plan is to be profitable by 2030. And on their plan, they would be losing$75 billion a year in 2028. So you have to basically have a swing, a$75 billion a year swing to profitability in the course of two years to get there. Yeah. That requires a lot of faith. And then there's a huge amount of real estate and other rush coming up under it, like the AI infrastructure plans of America.

36:50All of the commitments. Oracle, all these companies, CloudWeed, they've all just, I think, suffered a sell-off this week even. Yeah, because everybody who said, who's going to...

36:58Andrew Ross Sorkin:Because OpenAI and Anthropic and every other big hyperscale is going to have to pay the folks who are building the data centers money to do this. And the question is, will they have the money to actually do all of this? And that's a real question. Do you have an answer to the question? I don't think we really know yet. I think it, look, here's the, so what they're looking at, just so it doesn't seem totally absurd, is they're looking at their own growth rate right now. Right, of course. Which is amazing. Yeah, and they're going, oh my goodness, things are going up by 5, 10x a year. Yeah. And so if we stay at 5 or 10x a year, we're in the money.

37:38It's not even a hockey stick. It's just a line at some point. But if it doesn't, and that's what we don't know. We don't know. So I want to do a quick lightning round where we walk through the other financial crises that have happened in recent years. And I want three things from you.

37:52Andrew Ross Sorkin:Okay. What caused it, what we learned from it, and what we failed to learn from it. Okay. Okay? So 2000 - These are smart questions. Don't - The name of the show is just so wrong. Okay. I'm sorry. 2000 to 2001, the dot-com crash. What caused it was just severe overvaluation and a realization more than anything else that there was a problem. That problem was identified in part by some of the telecom companies, Fiber, in the ground and things. Because, by the way, those guys couldn't pay for what they were doing. So there's a little bit of leverage in there, but not the kind of leverage that ultimately 2008 or 1929 spawned.

38:35Okay, so unrealistic valuation more than leverage. More so. What did we learn?

38:39Andrew Ross Sorkin:But leverage is a piece of it. Yeah. I think we learned that you got to be careful about the dream. You got to be careful about the dream. Pets.com was a dream. But by the way, the thing that's so crazy and why this is so hard to predict about is you go look at Amazon. I remember covering Amazon back then and there were headlines that would say Amazon.com or Amazon.bomb. because this was a company that did... A dot-con, C-O-N. C-O-N. I didn't hear that correctly. Yeah, because people didn't believe it was... It didn't make money. The company didn't make money. I mean, you could... Some people would say that that company...

39:18Andrew Ross Sorkin:I don't want to say it was like OpenAI because OpenAI had to continue to raise new money constantly. Amazon wasn't raising money continually, but nobody had ever really seen a company that just didn't really make money and yet was valued as highly as it was. They had not created AWS yet. And so, you know, you see that on one end and you see pets.com on the other. Yeah. And you go, okay. Okay. Who are you going to believe in? And how do you know? It's hard to know. So what did we not learn from that crisis that we should have learned? Or is that too hard? Is that too, like, is that too big a question maybe?

39:53No, it's not too big a question.

39:57Andrew Ross Sorkin:I think we, well, the other thing that happened during that period though is we also realized there were some things that were taking place in the financial machine of it all. This goes to sort of the Wall Street piece. You know, back then, analysts were writing these fluffy reports about the companies and were getting paid for the reports because they were doing the IPOs. I mean, this goes to, there was a bit of a financial chicanery situation going on. Anytime the markets get sort of super hot, Wall Street oftentimes does things that they should not be doing. So they're selling their own future financial block, basically.

40:36Andrew Ross Sorkin:A little bit. Yeah. I mean, this is, you know, back in the day, Henry Blodgett. This is what Henry Blodgett got in trouble for. He was working at Merrill Lynch and he was an analyst and he was writing these reports and he was telling people that certain stocks were better than they probably were, in part because he knew that - He'd be doing the transaction. That Merrill Lynch was going to be doing the IPO and they were getting bonuses based on how many IPOs they were getting. And so, you know, some of those things I think we did learn from. So some shenanigans. But you always need to be watching for the shenanigans on one end.

41:06Andrew Ross Sorkin:Right. Okay. Okay. So then the global financial crisis to 2008. I'm going to skip over the Asian financial crisis and the Russian and all that. Okay. Way over leveraged. Yeah. This goes maybe to the American dream. We totally doubled down on housing. We all believed that everybody should get a house. Then we did policy things that sort of made it, created crazy the incentives for banks to provide loans that they shouldn't have been providing. I mean, the truth is also that we blame everybody else. The American public took on loans that they shouldn't have taken on either. There was like a moral hazard.

41:40Andrew Ross Sorkin:There was a serious moral hazard. And then, you know, most of the banks sort of started to have FOMO about each other and started to just sort of got wild and out of control. Okay. What did we learn and what did we not learn? What did we learn? we learned that you need to have much higher capital requirements and you need to really be minding the store and that you need to change the incentive structure for all of these things. And I think actually largely in the aftermath of, of that period, we, we did that. Yeah. What did not, what did we not learn? Yeah.

42:21well i think there's a real question about the people who were involved in it for the most part

42:28Andrew Ross Sorkin:many of them still have their jobs and so did they learn something from this no accountability was there accountability yeah and look i would argue it's almost a political issue the bailouts in fact what ben bernanke did and what the government did i would argue is actually a very good thing from an economic perspective. It was the right thing to do. Some people don't believe that into this day. But it pissed people off a lot. Like, occupy Wall Street. But I believe what happened in 2008 in some ways led to a complete shift in America around their thinking about experts, expertise. For sure. Some people will tell you that there's a direct line between 2008 and the election of Trump in 2016.

43:11Yeah. I think that's not... I mean, I would kind of concur, probably. There's a lot of distrust in the system.

43:18Andrew Ross Sorkin:A lot of distrust. Yeah, a lot of distrust. I think actually a lot of distrust, I mean, by the way, we had a whole second set of distrust during the pandemic. But I think a lot of distrust started after 2008. 100%. What about COVID-19, the 2020 recession? That was like kind of less blamey. It was less blamey, and I'll tell you why it was less blamey. I remember being shocked that the pandemic happens and all of a sudden we start bailing out everybody. I mean, PPE loans. We're even bailing them out before. The airlines. Everybody gets it. It was literally like Oprah with her. You get a car. You get a car.

43:53Andrew Ross Sorkin:Everybody gets a car. And there was no pushback. And I remember being shocked by that because having lived through 2008, I remember all the finger pointing. Everybody saying. And in retrospect, I think it was because everybody got a car. Meaning, in 2008, part of what was happening was it seemed like the banks were getting the money and the individuals were not. Right? Hank Paulson, Ben Bernanke's view was that the most practical, efficient way was we give the money to the banks and then the banks eventually will come out. Trickle down. It'll trickle down into the system. Yeah. Right? And, of course, homeowners and others were saying, well, it's not trickling down to me.

44:32Right. In the pandemic, we just started sending checks to everybody.

44:37Andrew Ross Sorkin:So nobody really had a place to complain. Right. Okay. Yeah. I mean, that's kind of the way that America does accountability. Like I had very tragically a friend who passed away in the Miami Surfside building, my college roommate. And, you know, if you look at – yeah, it was terrible. And her brother lost his parents and his sister in that night. And I think about it a lot because, you know, fast forward, there have been these payouts, you know, like a 10 million person maybe. I can't remember what the payout was. But like you don't – I still like to this day don't really know who is accountable, who – did the building code structure change?

45:21Like are homeowners associations under different obligations now to consider? you know like it is something about the way we do accountability which is so broken which is like yeah kind of like we we pay out reparation i mean there's so much of that happening in this book in europe etc but like we don't like plug the problem well but i will say that that is often true interestingly to me after 929 we can have accountability in that you know most of these

45:52Andrew Ross Sorkin:characters did not end up in jail. A couple of them did get arrested and two of them end up in jail, but oddly for other things. But we did actually get some form of accountability in the form of the SEC for the first time. So insider trading all of a sudden is illegal. All that was totally legal back then. I mean, all the manipulation, the shenanigans, there was nothing wrong with it. People didn't even think it was amoral back then. We didn't get into that. But then you had Glass-Steagall, which broke up the banks in terms of commercial banks, investment banking, added FDIC insurance. 1940, you get the Bank Act.

46:30Andrew Ross Sorkin:Now you have capital requirements. So things did happen that changed the game. After the crisis in 2008, and by the way, after 2001, things did happen. And Eliot Spitzer, of all people, is responsible for the fact that so many bankers, the analysts are no longer allowed to do what happened in that period of time. So there were things. Then 2008 comes along. We get Dodd-Frank. We get stress tests. We get all sorts of other legislation. And the truth is that changed how banks loan money and has inspired what is now maybe the scarier part today, which is we have a whole new industry called private credit.

47:13Andrew Ross Sorkin:And so most of the loans pre-2008, if you were a business, you'd go to a big bank. You'd say, give me a loan. Now you don't go to them. You actually go to these private companies that are basically not regulated because Dodd-Frank has nothing to do with them. And they loan you the money. And as a result, we now live in a less transparent world because we're always fighting the prior war and we're missing the next one. It's like failure of the last analogy. When I look at all of these things, I think there is often this financial innovation instrument. There's a Band-Aid put on and there's a new thing that comes along.

47:46Always. And as Winston Churchill is so idealizing in this book, the American -

47:52Andrew Ross Sorkin:Well, he thinks this is a feature, not a bug, 100%. He's like, it's not meant to prevent these crises. It's meant to survive them. And he writes to his English critics, they're dummies. They should be following the American way. What do you think is the financial innovation that we're seeing now? Or what is the leverage or the thing that exists right now in our market that is dangerous? A little cliffhanger. We'll be right back.

48:44to it. Tell 10 of your friends to hate watch it too. Numbers are numbers, people. What do you think is the financial innovation that we're seeing now? Or what is the leverage or the thing that exists right now in our market that is dangerous? And this could be your wild card that you alluded to earlier, or it could be something else.

49:03Andrew Ross Sorkin:Let me throw the wild card in a second. So I think there's a whole bunch of new financial products. Look, a couple years ago was really the sort of popularization of SPACs, these blank check companies. That was sort of a new product. A lot of people got excited about that. They thought that was like a lottery ticket. And invariably, we didn't have the right guardrails around them. The product, a SPAC could work if you actually incentivize people to write properly. You have the right transparency around who's getting the fees, how much they're getting, why this is working, when they can sell, how they can make projections.

49:39Andrew Ross Sorkin:But we didn't do any of those things. Yeah. These are specialized purpose acquisition vehicles. Correct. And they were like Chamath, Palpatia, others. Chamath, Palpatia, and others. Basically, they would raise money. They're called a blank check company because you would raise money for a blank check. And then they would go out and buy something. And then you would basically get whatever they bought. Yeah. But the people who led this back were making 20%. They were taking money out almost irrespective of what was happening. And Trump's true social that companies all throw SPAC. That was an example of it too.

50:12Exactly.

50:12Andrew Ross Sorkin:And most of them, I mean like 90 % of the SPACs basically failed. Are done. Okay. So that's an example of something. What about something that's happening right now? So one of the things that's happening right now is after the Genius Act, which was passed earlier this year, there's a whole new move to basically make private equity investments and venture capital investments and private credit available to the public. So effectively taking what are private assets, whether it could be a podcast company, it could be a nursing home, it could be a hospital, it could be a apartment building, whatever it is, and making them available so that they're wrapped up like in a fund that then you could buy in the retail market.

50:56The difference is most public

50:59Andrew Ross Sorkin:companies have to disclose what's going on in each company. This won't be like that. It'll still be like a private equity fund. So there'll be sort of private assets without the disclosure in the public markets. What's even more complicated about them is a lot of them are described or are called semi-liquid vehicles. Not to get you really confused, but you're so smart asking all these smart girl smart questions that they're semi-liquid because you can buy them looks like a stock you can buy it on any day yeah but if too many people decide to sell it at the same time the fund can say excuse me we're not allowing you to sell the stock today they can force you to hold they can force you to hold they can put up the gates they can put up gates because the only way they can actually send you cash when you sell your, is either they actually have to sell down the assets they have, which are hard assets, which they can't typically do, or more people have to give them money.

51:58Andrew Ross Sorkin:And some people would say that it looks like a Ponzi scheme, if you will. So, and that's going to be a new product. And that's, that's like the next big thing. And I'm sure that some will work and some won't work. And at some point in life, some regulator will say, you know what? These products are not bad products, but they just have to be done slightly differently. Is there anything that feels risky now, but is going to be completely normal in 20 years, like the way leverage buyout? So I think those will actually be, I think everybody will have a piece of those. I just think the difference is, if you're, the problem with those instruments is, if they tell you that you can't get your money back, and you're a retiree and you need the money, that's no good.

52:39Andrew Ross Sorkin:It may be that the right approach to those kinds of instruments is to say, you know what, they're part of like a target, dated investment fund based on your retirement age. And for the last 10 years of the fund, you can't be in those because you can't get your money out, something like that. But let me throw one major wild card into this whole scenario, which is if in fact we have some kind of crash crisis or something else, the lesson that we keep getting taught is we need to throw money at the problem. The government needs to throw money at the problem. The Federal Reserve needs to put money at the problem.

53:16Andrew Ross Sorkin:And so far that has seemed to work out just fine. Back in 1929, when you would have wanted to do this, we had a budget surplus in this country. Okay? We now have so much debt. Yeah. Meaning I'm talking about - Sovereign debt. Sovereign debt. Forget about the corporate debt. We now have so much sovereign debt. The US government. The US government has so much sovereign debt that I wonder whether there's some red line that at some point there's a crisis. We say, you know what? We're going to write a check for a trillion,$2 trillion to this or whatever it is. And at some point, the investor class that buys treasuries, that buys bonds says, excuse me, I see what you're doing.

53:59Andrew Ross Sorkin:We like you people. We're very happy to continue loaning you money, but you're going to have to pay us a lot more for the risk that we're taking. And if the interest rate starts to really fly, all of a sudden you can get into a vicious cycle where you can really get into an austerity situation, like for a whole country. So that's the thing, that is the wild card. And I just don't know when you hit that red line. I always thought we would hit that line a long time ago. And it may just be that the world is relative and that people say, well, the US is still better. it's doing better than Europe.

54:36That's the big variable between 1929 and 2026, which is like, it's not a monopoly by America anymore. It's a kind of, you have this multipolar world order that's emerging. You have real champions potentially out of, you know, AI coming out of, you have resource constraints that are not relying on America.

54:55Andrew Ross Sorkin:That's the piece of this puzzle that I think is like the true unknown unknown. So you think that's scarier than like an AI bubble? Are we in an AI bubble? We're probably in an AI bubble, and the AI bubble probably will pop, but that doesn't mean that AI will not be with us 20 years from now. The internet bubble popped, and the internet's even more important than it is today. So the flip side of AI, which maybe goes back to your tape with Elon Musk, is there's the AI bubble and what happens if it fails. There's also the what happens in success. Oh, yeah. You've been reading the culture books. Right?

55:31Andrew Ross Sorkin:Yeah. Because in success, if we're not needed, then what? So that's why that one may be more of a double-edged sword than I fully appreciate. You do. What about crypto? How risky is crypto? I mean, look, what I don't know is Bitcoin has held up all of this time. I always, you know, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger used to call it rat poison. It is a belief system. It is. there is a, you know, the cynics or the naysayers would tell you that, you know, you get quantum computing going and all of a sudden the encryption that makes Bitcoin work can be broken, can be hacked or something happens. And then what happens to that money?

56:16Andrew Ross Sorkin:Having said that, it's still a small piece of the puzzle. It's only a couple trillion dollars. So it's not that the whole economy comes undone, but I think if the air really came out of that part of the world, it would also invariably come out of other parts too. Okay. I'm going to do quick lightnings on this. Your last book, Too Big to Fail. Yep. So the banks were too big to fail. The big banks were too big to fail. What is the modern entity that is too big to fail? Whether it's a singular AI company, whether it's a stable coin, whether it's a specific type of fund or the idea of a poor country?

56:54Andrew Ross Sorkin:I think some of the banks are still too big to fail. Back then, the phrase was only used in the context of financial institutions, now we talk about cities, municipalities, states, countries, too big to fail. I do think that maybe cloud computing, oddly enough, has become too big to fail. So the last time that there was an AWS outage or something where the whole world for three or four hours has stopped, those companies largely are now too big to fail. If they were to fail, we would have, they're like electricity. And is that a good use of taxpayer money to bail out the too big to fails? I think ultimately it is because the truth is, what's the alternative?

57:37Andrew Ross Sorkin:They're providing either water or the equivalent of electricity to everybody. And so if they're a choke point in like the entire society, it's a little bit like airlines. We bailed out airlines during the pandemic because you need those planes in the sky for the entire economy to work because people need to get from place to place to place. Otherwise, the whole thing sort of breaks down. It presumes that the entire economy needs to work. That's like the big, I mean, sometimes like early on in crypto when I was at Stanford and all my friends were like buying Bitcoin and I didn't. I made some really bad decisions in my life, but financially, but great emotional decisions.

58:17I remember thinking like at the end of all of this and particularly with DAOs and things that, oh, like, at the end of this, we're all going to be in this, like, barter universal, like, kind of like the culture books-ish kind of world. I don't know if it's so techno-optimistic. I've never been to Burning Man. But I haven't either. But I'm told that that's the barter society. Yeah. But I think that there is a world in which we move back to that. Like, if AI liberates workers or AK steals their job, however you want to say it, like, if we can create a system where people can become guitarists and work as a barista because they have health insurance aka madrid you know is that a better society like do you need to be doing the things that we as new yorkers think is just so fucking normal to do i think i'm gonna go to burning man this year just just to figure this out i think i'm going on a journey a spiritual

59:09Andrew Ross Sorkin:journey i can't give you an answer just yet can i come back next year this isn't really dumb can Can we both go to Burning Man and then do the show from there and discuss? Let's go to Burning Man together. Yes. We'll have to barter to have people podcast for us and all the things and provide that. Okay. Does the government have more ability to fight off a future crisis or less than in 1929 or 2008? We were talking about this and you're about to respond.

59:38Andrew Ross Sorkin:I think more because the world is – well, it depends how the crisis unfolds. if it's specific to us probably more because you might even have allies of ours trying to help us if it's everybody all at once in a sort of true global crash crisis maybe a lot less interesting who do you think has more trust right now you operate in the intersection of media business government and to cover it see what's happening we're all on the floor yeah everyone's on the floor we're on the floor yeah the individual is there a basement yeah can you fall off the floor you can fall off a floor into the basement i mean there's this real like um you know anger at billionaires these days and i was seeing that there are a thousand new billionaires minted in the last five years right 400 of them immediately after or after 2020 like in the year 2021 was the highest number of billionaires ever minted.

1:00:36Andrew Ross Sorkin:By the way, we're going to have a whole bunch more in 2026. Really? Yeah. Why are you becoming one after Burning Man? No. Oh. Because Anthropic and OpenAI. Oh, they're not already? Because they're all going to go public. Right. And so they're actually, to the extent that they are billionaires now, they're going to have their liquidity event. Yeah. So they actually could be genuine billionaires, if you will. Yeah, not paper billionaires. When will we have our first trillionaire? I think Elon's on his way. Yeah, he's like 400 to 600 billion right now. Yeah, but we'll see what happens if SpaceX goes public next year as well, depending on where you think that heads.

1:01:11Yeah.

1:01:11Andrew Ross Sorkin:It would not surprise me if we get there pretty quick. There's a very powerful scene in your book. There's this moment in 1912 where J.P. Morgan, Jean Pierpont Morgan, is testifying. And he's asked about his own power. Yes. And what does he say? He doesn't think he has power. Yeah, he says, I do not know that I do or something. So I remember reading that and thinking to myself, that's pretty much how I think most people feel, even the people who have the most power in the world. And you think that's still true today? I do. And when you look at like— I think if you were to sit here with Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos and say, do you feel on any given day that you actually have power, like true power?

1:01:57Andrew Ross Sorkin:They don't even think they're successful. Yeah. Yeah. It's a very strange, it's like a mind-eff, only because, no, people think that, you know, if you have all this money and you have these titles in your business card, that you should feel successful, you should feel powerful, you should also feel responsibility for the great power that you have. Some obligation. The obligation, all those things. It's not that I don't think they feel that, but I think on a day-to-day basis, I think that they don't. At your book party, a lot of old guard people. Michael Bloomberg. the whatever blank fiend etc but then there's the young crowd right sam altman mark zuckerberg etc do you see a difference between that generation or are they all in the jp morgan i don't feel successful i don't i do not know that i have the power i think i look i'm of the view that most people of the sort of shoot the moon success one of the reasons that they are that they've been able to shoot the moon is that they it comes from they're they're still trying to prove themselves Yeah, the insecurity.

1:02:59Andrew Ross Sorkin:There is that. Yeah. And they're trying to get to the top of the mountain. And even when you think that they're at the top of the mountain, they're not just like skiing down the mountain. Yeah. You're not like, I'm done. They saw the next one. I got to get to the next one or I got to stay at the top of the mountain. And so they feel some kind of pressure even though the rest of the world doesn't feel that they should feel that pressure. Yeah. And I don't think the money – I'll say this. I don't think the money is emotional armor. In fact, I almost think it's like anti-armor. I often think about that because I think the public looks at these people and says, oh, screw them, and you can say whatever you want, and this and that.

1:03:35Andrew Ross Sorkin:And they feel it on the other end. Like they feel the speed bump in like a – it's like there's no suspension on the car, really. I think that's true. But you said about the responsibility of the young versus old. Do you think there's a generational shift at all or less more? Because it seems like in the last, you know, we started this 1998 to 2023, you know, all these other norms, religion, patriotism, everything has gone down. I don't know because a lot of people who've sort of given to philanthropy and done a lot of the things that, you know, take a Michael Bloomberg, who I actually think has done extraordinary things.

1:04:13Andrew Ross Sorkin:Most of the philanthropy that he was doing at this sort of level he's doing it has actually been in the last, call it, decade or two of his life. Same thing with Warren Buffett. I was going to say, but call me when Elon Musk is 60 years old or 65, whether somehow it shifts then. And I don't know the answer. These guys want to live to be 260. So we'll call you that. Oh, yeah. So maybe it's going to be a different. The timeline will be different. We'll see. Okay. I want to do a lightning round on media, which happens in this book. And then I want to talk to you about DealBook and then we're going to get out of here.

1:04:40But okay. Do the media have more trust in 1929 or in 2025?

1:04:46Andrew Ross Sorkin:Media had more trust in 1929. Really? Okay. Okay. Did they trust their - Probably for the wrong reasons. Yeah, because they were bought and paid for. Well, they were bought and paid for, but the reason they had more trust was that people didn't have any real sense that they were bought and paid for. Yeah. And there weren't as many media outlets. And so the amount of communication, the amount of technology that we have today to be able to question everything at any given moment. By the way, one of the reasons we had a crash in 29 was because the technology sucked, literally because the stock market itself the exchange oftentimes the stock prices during the crash were on the billboard big board were actually wrong they were like hours off the reason why you remember when you see all those pictures as famous pictures of people in 1929 standing outside the new york stock exchange like on the covers of the newspapers the reason thousands of people are there is because they've come down there to find out what's happening to their money, literally, because you couldn't find out.

1:05:50Andrew Ross Sorkin:And so today you have it on your phone. And the only reason I say that is I think people trusted the media then because it was the only thing you could trust. And there wasn't like information, there wasn't 100 other places you could go. There's this line in the book where one of the reporters says, quote, since becoming a journalist, I've heard the advice to believe nothing until it has officially been denied. I love that. I love that too. As a journalist, do you think there's truth in that? pretty much the public also like they they have all these you know they're suspicious of the media right they could be suspicious oh your book party Andrew Oswergen you had these billionaires there therefore are you in the pocket of how do you think about that as you do your job I mean as you said you have your friends are from high school journalists have no friends famously right you mean just how do I think about how do you think about like access proximity coverage?

1:06:46Andrew Ross Sorkin:Look, I think my job is to be the ultimate fairweather fan. So if you do something good, I am very happy to say attaboy. And if you do something bad, my job is to hit you over the head. And that's the gig. And I do think that access to some degree is important insofar as being able to actually capture the nuance. I do want to know these people. I do want to know these people. I know, by the way, I also know journalists who don't want to know anybody. Yeah. They prefer to be as far removed as humanly possible, to have no connection or relationship with that person. And by the way, I think there's a value to that too.

1:07:29Andrew Ross Sorkin:So I think you can have a big tent on this. But I think it's important and I think that hopefully people...

1:07:39Andrew Ross Sorkin:respect and listen to some of the things that I report and say because I understand the nuance of the person's motivation or their incentive system. So there's sort of, you know, you can see it on both ends of it. And disclosure is everything. It's like... Right. And I think disclosure is super important. And also like the ethical standard you hold yourself to because you know all this information about the markets, but you can't trade an individual stock. I have, I don't own any individual stocks. If you did, do you think you would outperform Nancy Pelosi?

1:08:10Andrew Ross Sorkin:No, I'd probably screw it up. I mean, I have a running joke that actually the long-term policy of CNBC and the New York Times has probably advantaged me. What would you have bought? Like, go back in time so you're not moving any markets. The only thing that I was right about was when I think I was in middle school, I told my father to buy Nike. And it was a great idea. Oh, wow. Did he? And I think he did. Oh, wow. Good for you. When you go to Burning Man, when we have this epiphany in Burning Man, you're going to be, you know, then you'll see what's coming next. Right. The barter system, all the stocking.

1:08:49I assume there's lots of drugs involved.

1:08:51Andrew Ross Sorkin:Exactly. Okay. Do you think it's possible that all of these systems are just broken, like capitalism, media, the way, the distrust is so high right now. Do you think capitalism is broken? So I don't believe that capitalism is broken. I think that the current version of the way we're regulating it, managing it, handling it as a society is a little off kilter and we need to sort of redirect it. That goes to tax policy. That goes to some of the social safety net stuff. That goes to some of the rules of the road. That goes to some of the competition stuff. But I ultimately think that capitalism, much more so than I think any real effort, socialism over time, and I think I'm saying this almost empirically, like not as an opinion, seems to have been the more successful route.

1:09:42Do you think some of these moves that Donald Trump is making, like 10 % of, oh my gosh, Intel, or a percentage of NVIDIA sales to China, to be determined, are those good movements in a capitalist system?

1:09:55Andrew Ross Sorkin:It's in the Ken Griffin camp, who by the way is a Trump supporter historically, that these kinds of things typically end badly. Okay. Rapid round of listener questions. Rebecca Shapiro, what will be the first sign of an AI bubble bursting? The first sign of an AI bubble bursting will be some AI company, maybe not big, maybe small, that either announces that they're having to pull back on their spending in a major way. That might actually be the first sign. That would be the first sign. Somebody announces that they're pulling back on spending. in a big way, or that whatever their original plans to build more data centers slows down.

1:10:49Andrew Ross Sorkin:It'll just be, it'll look like that, and then it will cause a rethink. Okay. I'm a name, Alexander Taylor, Taylor Tots 05. Okay. When is the pop, and what do we do in the meantime, besides go to Burning Man and get foot massages? When is the pop? I think we still got a ways to go. Okay. A Brooks brother, is this farming subsidy a bailout? Will the farmers sell? Is Brooks Brother from Brooks Brothers? I don't know. He's a person who follows us on social. Okay. He said, I think it's Brooks Brother. That's cool. He's probably wearing balloon pants. From Brooks Brothers. Is this farming subsidy a bailout?

1:11:23Will the farmers sell their crops to the government or dump? I didn't even know about the farming subsidy, I have to be honest.

1:11:27Andrew Ross Sorkin:Well, there's a question about whether they're really going to get a subsidy. And there's also a question, by the way, about whether the Chinese are really going to be buying all these soybeans. I don't know if you've been following this. Not at all. I know nothing. The president said that China has agreed to buy something like 12, 13 million metric tons of soybeans by the end of the year. It's the middle of December, and they've bought like 331 ,000 metrics. Oh, yeah. And so now there's a whole thing about was it really the end of the year or the end of the growing season? Now we've got to find out when soybeans grow.

1:12:01Andrew Ross Sorkin:We'll see about all of this. Brendan Flutter, a.k.a. B. Flood. Hey, B. Flood. Hey, B. Flood. What's going on? Asks a question about your friend, Ken Griffin. Oh, okay. Be honest. Who is Bobby Axelrod of Billions based on? Ken Griffin, Steve Cohen? So honestly, really not one person or even multiple people. And I know nobody wants to believe that. But when I was first starting to think about this, this is really in like 2011, before even some of the Steve Cohen stuff was happening. Now, as the show got closer to getting on the air, there were obviously lots of different people we were thinking about, just little.

1:12:42Andrew Ross Sorkin:But I think of him as a singular character. I honestly have always thought that. And I think Brian and David, who are our showrunners and co-creators, they did an extraordinary job sort of making him singular. Okay. Bellin Basket asked, who does your hair? I mean, really, this is. I do my hair. I don't have anybody who does my hair. Really? I mean, like get a haircut? Yeah, just do your hair. I get a haircut every couple weeks. Okay, you want to shout out to the guy or just Dentist Torres that we're giving shout out to? Her name is Asuko. Oh, Asuko. Yeah, she's great. Apparently, Bell and Basket likes it.

1:13:17Okay, quick lightning round. What the hell was happening at DealBook this year?

1:13:21Andrew Ross Sorkin:Which part? Okay, Alex Karp, going wild, AI clip of him. It was not drugs. I just want to be clear about that. You know for a fact? No, I just have covered him. I've interviewed him so many times. He just was excited to be there. What was going through your mind, though? Did you sense it was ridiculous? No, I didn't sense it was ridiculous. This is the way he thinks and this is the way he talks. I have a great – honestly, in all of those types of conversations, I almost try to put myself in their shoes. I have great empathy for whatever their position is. I honestly don't sit there in judgment the way that I know the audience does.

1:13:59Yeah, they really do. But I think it's just the meme moment. Did you know at that moment that would be a meme?

1:14:04Andrew Ross Sorkin:I'm not good at memes, so I don't know. I have kids. They're better at that. Maybe in middle school when you bought Nike, it would be good. Okay. With all your empathy, did you feel empathy for Gavin Newsom when he was sitting in an uncomfortable position and the internet became concerned about the governor's testicles? I have to say I totally missed that from the angle that I was sitting at here. I'm probably going to get this. I'll be a meme after this too. too. When Halle Berry dissed Gavin Newsom, did you know that would be a newsworthy moment? You weren't on stage for that. So it's funny.

1:14:35Andrew Ross Sorkin:I wasn't on stage for that. And I was actually coming back in the back. And I thought, wow, that was pretty, that was something. Yeah. Did you invite Donald Trump to deal book this year? I did not. Would you like Donald Trump there? Sure. I'd love to interview the president. I interviewed the president just over the summer were on television. But you've had, but over the course of your career, you've had multiple interactions with him or just? Oh yeah. You know, he used to come on Squawk Box. Oh my goodness. Many, many, many years ago, decade, maybe a decade and a half ago when The Apprentice was on, he used to come on, we used to have a thing called Trump Tuesdays where he would call into the show.

1:15:16Andrew Ross Sorkin:And we talk about real estate, the Kardashians, whatever was going on. Didn't he once, Truth Social, something very angry about you? Oh, more recently. Like you're no good on TV, Andrew Rossworkin. More recently, I had said something that he did not like. Yes. And you repaired. Have you ever repaired? Who knows? Maybe he'll come to Burning Man too. Maybe we'll bring the president to Burning Man. Okay. Who's the most surprising reader of Dealbook or viewer's squawk box that you've found? Most surprising reader of Dealbook. I remember being surprised that LeBron James reads Dealbook. Oh, I'm not surprised because I feel like he and Mav are such good business people.

1:16:01Andrew Ross Sorkin:Yeah. But I remember a couple years ago, there was a deal or something, and somebody called me and they're like, there's going to be this news story. Do you want to get an interview? You know he reads Dealbook. And I was like, oh, no, I didn't know that. I, in every episode of Smart Girl Dumb Questions, asking my guests who know so much, much more than me, what they are dumb about. Yes. Do you have such a thing? I'm dumb about so many things. It's kind of crazy. What's a question that you have that you haven't asked out loud or you haven't bothered to figure out over eight years of writing a great book about it?

1:16:39Andrew Ross Sorkin:So I'm uniquely dumb about music. Oh. So I grew up in New York listening to things like Z100, It was 100. It's a radio station? It's like a pop radio station. Or like WPLJ 95.5. So when people talk about music around me, I'm like a dunce because I just have no idea about anything. We have an episode for you. Yeah. With Jacob Collier. Okay. And he explains music. He explains music? Like rhythm, melody, harmony. Like I'm also a dunce about music. They gave me the triangle in world music class, and in Indonesian music class, I had the gong, because it was like a regulated one time per song situation.

1:17:23Andrew Ross Sorkin:Did you ever play an instrument? The triangle and the gong. That's it? Nothing? Okay. I played the saxophone in middle school, but was so worried that I was going to screw up the rest of the band that oftentimes I wouldn't blow into them. Oh, my gosh. Because I was so scared. that I was going to make the whole thing so terrible. By the way, this also puts your metaphor about Michael Lewis, like printing pages on a piano, printing pages of writing in such perspective for me. There you go. I have empathy for you. Thank you. I need it. I'm with you on that. Thank you so much, Andrew Osler. Thank you for having me.

1:18:02The book is called 1929. It is excellent. I recommend it because I never have book people on the show. And it is great.

1:18:09Andrew Ross Sorkin:Thank you. You can find him on Squawk Box, on CNBC, on Dealbook, at the New York Times, and on the socials. Your Instagram is blowing up. Must be the haircut. Got to go get a haircut. Thanks. Thank you so much, Andrew. Thank you so much. So, okay. So, you got it. And then now, at some point, you have to tell me about the business podcast. Yeah, I can tell you about it. Yeah.

1:18:41It is so weird how every one of my podcasts, even the ones about financial crises, end up talking about feet. Do you think my podcast is a foot fetish? Anyways, I love Andrew Ross Sorkin. He is so talented. I love the kind of storyteller he is and how nerdy he is. The fact that he spent eight years kind of in the archives pulling together this book and the parallels it draws to today. I enter this conversation kind of dumb about financial crises and what causes them, I'm having a sense of the headlines, but less of the story. I left the book certainly much smarter about 1929. And I left this conversation much smarter about the underlying similarities between all of these things.

1:19:19And with so many more questions about our hubris, the hubris of our markets, like the possibility of our government to actually regulate these. And also like really curious about the wild card that he talked about, sovereign debt. and this big game changer of how like the geopolitical world order, which is something I know something about, has to do with the financial order of things, which is something I know very little about. So tons of questions about that. I hope Andrew will come back on the show. But you know, probably he's just busy at Burning Man getting a foot massage for the next year or so.

1:19:50But that's it for today's episode of Smart Girl Dumb Questions. I want to know what you think. Do you think that the AI bubble is about to burst? Do you think crypto is frothy? Do you think the wildcard situation is going to come true? What are your dumb questions? Send them all to me. I'm NaimaRaza101 at gmail.com. You can leave a comment below. You can call our hotline at 1-855-MY-DUM-Q and leave me a voice note and your question could be on the show. Today's episode was produced with Desto Wunderat of Wunder Studios and Melissa Lee Gibson and mixed and engineered by the awesome Johnny Simon.

1:20:20Our theme music is by David Kahn. Special thanks to Claudia Riccardi and Healy Cruz. I'm Naima Raza. See you next week on Smart Girl Dumb Questions.

1:20:28Andrew Ross Sorkin:I'm just worried I'll never be able to write another book again. I think I loved at the end of your at the end of the book it's like no part of this book might be used as artificial intelligence yeah but because AI was too late for me for this book but my only point is I feel like five years from now people will there'll be bajillions of books because you just write it with AI I don't know you had the archives I think the archival sensibility but by then people will somehow find a way to digitize out the stuff

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