Martin Shkreli Breaks Down the Collapse of Situational Awareness

30 Jul 2026 · 44 min · 16 chapters

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In short

The episode discusses the “collapse of situational awareness” during a Wall Street liquidity-driven blowup tied to AI infrastructure trades and a major hedge fund liquidation.

Guest

Martin Shkreli, an investor/hedge-fund figure who says he invests personally and has covered prior blowups (e.g., Long-Term Capital Management, Amaranth).

Key claims

fundamentals mattered less than marginal buyers/sellers; leverage amplified drawdowns (example: a 4x-levered fund where a ~25% drop can wipe equity). He describes “shooting against a fund” (selling common positions while shorting) as a common accelerant.

Notable examples

Anthropics stake (reportedly ~$100M of Anthropic stock offered for sale), and bids/interest from Jane Street, Millennium, and Citadel (Citadel framed as the likely liquidity provider). He also explains how large positions are unwound (selling “into screens” vs phone/prime broker coordination) and why prime brokers force fire-sale liquidation. He compares the pattern to prior cycles (Amaranth, Archegos, dot-com).

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

Tap a time to open that second in VO

Analyzing Recent Wall Street Events

0:45 to 2:41

Discussion on the events leading to recent market fluctuations, including the behavior of investors.

“And this morning, obviously, sort of a fait accompli.”

The Impact of Leverage on Market Corrections

2:41 to 6:25

Exploration of how excessive leverage affects market stability and investor decisions.

“And then the weakest hands are buying at the top.”

Examining Bids and Asset Liquidation

6:25 to 12:20

Insight into the bidding process for distressed assets and the role of major firms.

“And, you know, it's unclear whether that was sold or half of it was sold.”

Future of the Market Post-Correction

12:20 to 14:00

Discussion on the potential outcomes of the recent market corrections and future trends.

“Because you have to imagine in this fundraise, he had like massive, massive leverage.”

The Current Market Landscape

14:00 to 18:08

Explore the unpredictable state of the market and liquidity impacts.

“Seeing that compress instantly is interesting.”

Selling Big Positions Explained

18:08 to 26:19

Understand the complexities of unwinding large shareholder positions.

“You know, we have this huge boom, this relief rally.”

Market Strategy and Hedges

26:19 to 28:00

Delve into advanced strategies hedge funds might use during downturns.

“Take me through the mind of Ken Griffin like a couple weeks ago.”

The Role of Trust in Financial Partnerships

28:00 to 29:07

Explore how trust and dependability influence relationships between hedge funds and banks.

“And, you know, it's sort of like he becomes a dependable, trusted partner to these banks.”

The Pain and Glamour of Hedge Fund Management

29:07 to 30:35

Understand the challenges and allure of being a hedge fund manager.

“You know, the firm didn't leak out that they were hurting.”

Rebuilding After Financial Setbacks

30:35 to 32:27

Learn about the potential for recovery and reinvention in the finance world.

“And the reason people do it, and I did it too, and I would never do it again, is it's the sexiest thing in the world.”
Show all 16 chapters

The Rapid Shift in Hedge Fund Success

32:27 to 33:19

Discover how quickly fortunes can change in the hedge fund industry.

“separated from the biggest hedge fund on planet Earth and most successful to being forced to sort of liquidate.”

The Evolution of Financial Reporting

33:19 to 35:28

Examine the differences between legacy media and insider reporting in finance.

“They're all kind of clearly they needed a couple hours to like run it down.”

Leveraging Relationships for Hedge Fund Success

35:28 to 36:48

Understand the importance of relationships and leverage in hedge fund operations.

“But I also in the case of this situation, as the carnage is unfolding, you know, there's sort of the balancing the need for everyone to know with the need for, you know, protecting friendships and relationships.”

Private Investments and Market Risks

36:48 to 40:08

Discuss the risks and considerations of investing in private companies.

“But what does the process look like as you're scaling into the tens of billions of leverage?”

Position Sizing and Trading Psychology

40:08 to 42:01

Learn about the critical role of position sizing in trading and investment strategies.

“I don't know how true that is, but I can imagine there's blood in the water over there and the whole country is probably in shambles.”

The Importance of Proper Capital Sizing

42:01 to 43:35

Learn why correct sizing in trading can prevent significant losses.

“You might say, who has a 60-40 edge in the stock market?”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00Let's bring in Martin Shkreli to break it down for us. I believe he's here. How are you doing, Martin? Good to see you again. Hey, guys. I'm doing great. How are you? Perfect. Perfect. How's your last 24 hours been? What's the last 24 hours been like for you?

0:14Martin Shkreli:It's been interesting. I do invest myself. So it's been probably one of the craziest months in Wall Street history. I was talking to some friends last night about long-term capital management, Amaranth, other famous liquidity-driven blowups. And this is up there. And, yeah, it's just a really crazy thing. We had heard rumors sort of mid-last week, and then they really started crystallizing last night. And this morning, obviously, sort of a fait accompli. And I actually think they did a wonderful job of keeping it relatively quiet. I think some players were already positioning, say, early in the week, Monday, Tuesday, looking to do what my old boss Kramer used to call shooting against a fund.

1:05Martin Shkreli:So if you know somebody has to liquidate, the best thing for you to do, unfortunately, sadly, Darwinian, is to go sell all the positions you have in common and go start shorting everything they have. and it accelerates the sort of downfall as quickly as you can. And this is a very common practice when these things happen. Certainly not something I had overlapped decisions with them, so certainly not something I would do, but no wide number of funds that were shorting all of these stocks, hoping to cause a panic and a crash. How do you trace back the start of this correction? Is it the war? Is it oil?

1:42Is it jitters around open source or just hyperscaler capbacks? There's so many different narratives around why the AI infrastructure trade, the bottleneck trade might be weakening. At the same time, it feels like there's some really solid progress and the models are progressing along pretty as expected. Yeah, you have the labs having some of the best months in business history of any companies ever. Yeah. But then all the infrastructure correcting. Yeah, none of that stuff matters.

2:16Martin Shkreli:The only thing that matters is the propensity of the buyer and seller to buy yourself. And what you had happen was the smart guys get in early, start buying, see the prices go up, buy some more. And then less smart guys take note and say, I want to do that. I want to be up 400 % this year too. Guys like me started buying right near the top. I was just like, hey, this is great. I love memory. I love bottlenecks.

2:47And then the weakest hands are buying at the top.

2:51Martin Shkreli:So they're also the first to sell, the first to panic. And it just creates this like, every bubble is sort of the same. You have this euphoria, this peak, and then everyone sort of panics at once. The fundamentals basically don't make a difference. I think they sort of drive the marginal buyer and seller, but 80 % or 90 % of the assets, shareholders don't change hands. It's that 5 % of the margin that's deciding the price. And if that 5 % is in the state where they're levered up 3x, or 4x, as we heard, SALP was a 4x levered fund, which is a lot of leverage. A 25 % drawdown takes you out of business.

3:31Martin Shkreli:Yeah. Interestingly, we heard that three firms were bidding on the assets. So Jane Street, Millennium and Citadel were sort of brought in in a closed circle sort of late Friday to bid on the remains of the firm. And we got offered a look at$100 million of Anthropik stock, which we were puzzled by. You know, sometimes you see these SPVs, sort of interest comes across here and there. And we thought that was interesting. I sort of raised my eyebrows, is that Leopold? Because sometimes when you want to sell$4 billion or something, you don't come out and say you want to sell$4 billion. You come out and you say you want to sell$100 million of it.

4:17Martin Shkreli:And usually a guy who wants to buy$100 is enough to buy$500 or more. And you sort of fill him out and say, here's$100. Okay, do you want$500 by any chance? And then your eyebrow starts to raise a little bit that you know maybe he's got even more um now of course this is a really odd situation so i we heard millennium did put in a bid uh citadel's bid was better you know i think ken wants to be the guy that everyone goes to when they're in trouble and that's the you know buffett is getting older this is not the kind of stuff buffett wants to do anyway um but you know citadel did this in the amaranth deal you know when amaranth blew up uh natural gas futures i think citadel took that portfolio and virtually every blow up in finance.

5:02Martin Shkreli:Well, you have Enron where they just rated all the talent. Yeah, they wanted to do an Enron as well. I think, yeah, they just sort of, Ken is a very smart guy, sort of shows up and says, you know, how can I, you know, how can I, you know, be a partner to the Goldman's and the Bank of America's when they need to get out, you know, of a really risky position, they basically take over the book, right? So if I'll give you sort of an example, and you're asking the question. So let's say, you know, you're at$45 billion, you know, to sort of try to trace this back. And you're, you know,$10 billion of that is in Anthropik, from what we understood.

5:40Martin Shkreli:So you have$30 billion of cash in your bank account. And running Forex Leverage means you have$120 billion gross market value. oh um so if your gmv drops i don't know 25 that doesn't sound so bad at 120 billion uh maybe that's you know i don't know uh 30 billion so you're down to 90 billion but that's not your equity so your equity drops from 35 billion to 5 billion yeah no no prime broker is going to let you keep 90 billion of gross market value because once you dip your equity below zero it's their loss not yours and they're not going to lose a penny after archegos and after these other kind of blow-ups and that's not their job and they kind of have the right to take over your portfolio which is sort of uh you know something i hope nobody ever has to experience but they basically call you in and say listen you know these are our our assets now you know we're we're going to decide what their what their disposition is going to be and the rumor is over the weekend he contacted expected about 10 parties to place Anthropic in an effort to shore up liquidity, selling the Anthropic stake for allegedly the offer was at 1.1 trillion equivalent market cap, which, you know, I think roughly where it's trading.

7:01Martin Shkreli:And, you know, it's unclear whether that was sold or half of it was sold. It's what we reported that half of it was sold. It's still a little unclear who bought that, what's happening exactly. But that's that's the best we've got. And then, you know, when it came to the public book, it does sound like, you know, the buyer of that book basically got a from what we were told, a three to four billion dollar instant markup. So they basically now have to work out of 3 to 4 billion, more than 3 to 4 billion, quite a lot more. But in essence, if they work out of these positions without disrupting the market, they'll have printed 3 to 4 billion on the trade, which is unusual and interesting trade, but really exciting.

7:50Martin Shkreli:One of the parties reached out to me last night, one of these three parties, interestingly, after my reporting, and they said that, in essence, it's some substance. Yes, Leopold flew a little too close to the sun, and your numbers are a little off. And I asked what direction, and they wouldn't confirm or deny. I received a lot of pushback on the reporting, to your point, privately and publicly, that it's not so bad. And that, you know, he's only down 30%. 30 % you can kind of live with. But also, if Anthropic hasn't changed its mark, that means you were down 60 in the public book. And if you're Forex levered, you know, that means you're sort of down 15 on the public book, which sounds too good to be true.

8:36Martin Shkreli:If you're trading these stocks, they were down like 15 % a day. Yeah. So we've also heard the other AI funds are hurting, maybe not as much as in trouble, but certainly hurting as well. Where does the fund go? He gives some good cover to all the funds that were effectively copy trading him. Oh, sure. Maybe even being more risk on and later to these positions because they're naturally just late if you're trying to copy trade someone. Trying to catch up. Yeah, you're trying to catch up. More leverage. You're coming into these trades way later. Do you recall, like, how did you process Ryan Jacob around the year 2000?

9:18Because you were at Kramer's firm, I believe you joined maybe right before the Ryan Internet Fund started collapsing.

9:29Martin Shkreli:Yeah, there was also the Amaranth Fund. There was a fund in the 60s called the Manhattan Fund that Warren Buffett criticized for being the go-go kind of lazy fund. It was run by a guy named Gerald Tsai. And so like every generation, you've seen the memes about Kathy, you know, every generation has it. You know, the guy that believes in that cycle and it goes balls to the walls on that cycle. And look, I have a lot of respect for somebody who's willing to do that. I used to tell a friend who kind of did the same thing. He followed this trade, but he was very early. So he had sort of Leopold-like numbers.

10:10Martin Shkreli:And he sort of did hedge at what sounds like close to the top. So sort of a miracle trader, best trader I know. And I joked with him. I said, you know, if Leopold sells at the top and turns short, like I will absolutely adulate him as the greatest of all time. It's just that, you know, usually when you're so spellbound by that narrative of whatever happening, in this case, AGI, you know, there are people out there that say, look, AGI is here slash coming when it comes. The entirety of finance is not relevant anymore. yeah you know we might as well just run it up and and kind of see the end of days this way and of course there's some guys sitting on a training desk at goldman sachs you're like these people it's just the stock market did you given given that leopold had had been at ftx right up until the the the the fall did you think that maybe as as risk on as he was like maybe he was like you know what i just i can't go through that again uh he wasn't necessarily he wasn't necessarily directly tied to any of this sort of nefarious activity at ftx but he did have to viscerally experience it and and i believe resign the day of the collapse and yeah uh i would i just would have expected to not like yeah to run it back like so quickly you would you would expect even like Like, you know, go and have a normal, you know, great career for a decade or whatever.

11:37Then maybe come back to leverage and be like, I'm ready to dance again.

11:41Martin Shkreli:There's a lot of questions. Like, one question is, what's his carry? You know, a lot of firms in the hedge fund industry, believe it or not, they have clawback provisions for carry. Like high watermark provisions, right? So you have to clear something? Everyone has a high watermark, but what's increasingly happened is a carry provision where you have to return the$2.20 you earned if you have a severe drawdown, which could actually end up being a tough situation. As you guys know, the fellow is getting married this weekend as well, which is a little bit of tragedy with a little bit of triumph mixed in.

12:18But obviously, you know, when this kind of thing happens— How common are those clawback clauses? Because you have to imagine in this fundraise, he had like massive, massive leverage. Demand was very high. Demand was very high. That feels like a term. The numbers were so good.

12:34Martin Shkreli:It's a more institutional thing. And speaking of which, obviously, the guy basically had no experience. And again, in times like this, nobody wants to gravedance. And I'm not doing that. But I had some institutional friends, one of the biggest fund of funds in New York, for example, who passed on Leopold basically laughed at him and said, you know, there's no way I could invest in this. And of course, you know, he goes on this tear, you know, makes like 20 X or whatever it was since inception and does fantastic. And he feels sort of sheepish, but ultimately, you know, somewhat vindicated after all of this.

13:08Martin Shkreli:So you did have a manager that had no experience, kind of a long only or extremely long biased, starts to do privates, which for many hedge funds is kind of the death knell. You know, when hedge funds put on their VC cap and try to do what those guys do, it often doesn't end well. And that goes back like, you know, 50 years basically of hedge fund history. And very few people have been able to do both. And the other thing I'd point out is we're going to see July numbers very soon here from quite a lot of hedge funds that I think were in the same trade. And so this is not just Leopold's$100 billion gross.

13:47Martin Shkreli:It's like that times maybe$5 or$10. And while the market's liquid, that's a lot of downward pressure in a few weeks. And it's amazing to see this all compressed in a month, whereas the dot-com bubble took three or four years to patiently go up and patiently go down. Seeing that compress instantly is interesting. What's going to happen next is really going to be fascinating. There's some theory out there that, you know, that we see all-time highs again now that all this liquidity is out. And there's other theories there that we actually were just having this nice big downtrend and that this liquidity pop will fade and we'll be back down further and further.

14:25Martin Shkreli:You know, nobody knows what will happen, but it's certainly, while you're right that, you know, the Anthropics and OpenAI's are having record business results, so is Microsoft and Google and Meta for that matter. there's still, I think, some more discerning questions about is this CapEx investment worth it? You know, they rewarded Microsoft for being prudent. They punished Meta and Google for not being prudent. So one wonders what the future will bring there. But yeah, about as crazy as things have gotten on Wall Street in many years, probably at least since FTX, and certainly crazier than the sort of Tiger SoftBank venture boom of 21.

15:02Martin Shkreli:and then, you know, really since then, the away insanity. So it's quite a spectacle. And I think, you know, no matter how much people want to learn the lesson of leverage over and over and over again, we all seem to repeat it. And, you know, it is what it is. But I think the Jane Citadel Millennium kind of like entire hedge fund complex sort of becoming this like shadow bank is quite interesting, you know, that like these guys are are sort of there to normally the banks would sort of take this on the chin but now that there's other folks who are like you know jane was an lp for example in the pond and reportedly was not interested in bidding uh which is fascinating may have taken the anthropic however um really unclear we're gonna learn more obviously as some days go on here but it's uh it's an unprecedented time and you know really an insane story that uh may just get more insane as we learn more.

15:58Is there a world where the fund continues? Because I'm just hearing the numbers and it's like, you know, up at 45 billion, the actual money into the fund was maybe 5 billion or something. If you sell the positions, there's a world where you wind up with like 10 billion in a bank account and the LPs are like, well, we gave you five, keep going, get back in the game.

16:22Martin Shkreli:I hope, I hope that's the case for the LPs who are awesome for the. the fund manager who obviously got quite a lot of whiplash. But, you know, at the end of the day, you know, there's this concept on the street, as you guys know, like, once there's blood in the water, like, these positions would go to zero. Like, we'll send Micron to$5, you know, just to liquidate this guy at three, right? Like, that's, you know, the craziest thing is, like, that's the nature of Wall Street when this happens. and there's a guy that has to sell 100 billion, you'll have a trillion dollars in front of him just like, you know, let's see this guy cry uncle.

16:59Martin Shkreli:And it's the saddest kind of most Machiavellian thing. But like he sort of had to blow up. You know, there's no other ending, sadly. Yeah. Because of the leverage level, it's just like one slight, you know, I remember my old boss who was a Tiger portfolio manager reminded me of the 2000 era where there's this very slight change in tone from one optical component supplier. And that's like him and his partner from Soros just decided to go like as short as they could. Because they knew ultimately these vulnerable hands were sort of sitting there. After the easy part of the bubble was over, you had this like, okay, what's next?

17:38Martin Shkreli:Things have to get a lot crazier. You saw Dworkesh's tweet. Things like that would have to sort of happen for there to be enough second derivative for somebody to be surprised. Yeah. You know, everyone knows AI is in this boom. Everyone knows chips are in this boom. What could possibly shock you to the upside? Not much. So if you hear any little like, you know, we're not going to spend as much, the whole shit hits the fan and it's just too heavy. So I actually wonder if we're, you know, if we're not in for a longer, more protracted decline. Things feel great today. You know, we have this huge boom, this relief rally.

18:13Martin Shkreli:A lot of the froth is out of the system. But, you know, what next? You know, I don't know that, you know, a patient and calm market is going to emerge because you had the hyperscalers and the big companies. They FOMO too. They FOMO just as hard as Leopold did. Right. If not harder. So this isn't just him. It's the whole world collectively saying, fuck, I got to I got to go all in and AI. And it's it's and who had the guts, you know, other than one man, Tim Cook in the back saying, do nothing. Yeah, the funny thing, we had been joking. We were joking in like Q4 when, prior to coding agents really starting to rip, OpenAI revenue growth had slowed a little bit and there was some jitters and a lot of this stuff wasn't you know, public at the time, but you could tell some of the kind of crossover types were like getting a little nervous, right?

19:14They kind of expected to have -

19:15Martin Shkreli:MAU, DAU numbers. Yeah, yeah. You know, yeah. And really plateaued. And then there was a correction. Like there was like briefly, you know, for a period, it was probably like eight weeks. It was like, okay, like, and then it started ripping again. And we were taking like a sort of a bit of a joking, like victory lap being like, cool, like ai corrected you know bubble popped now we're able to build back sustainably we're good from here on out it's smooth sailing no i completely i think the most unexpected thing is it would be if we saw brand new all-time highs for the entire thing i think almost everyone on wall street is skeptical this will happen which means is it has a chance yeah so you're saying there's a chance i Can you give me a little bit more insider baseball on what it takes to unwind a big position as a shareholder?

20:11Because a lot of people who are not inside the hedge fund world are sort of maybe confused around, okay, yeah, you own$50 million of a$1 billion chip stock. Can't you just dump that on retail? Can't you just like sell markets, sell that on E-Trade or Robin Hood? And in fact, it's much more complicated when you're at this level, even though it's public markets, there's not just a big button. Can you walk us through what it actually takes to like sell a big position when you're at that level?

20:48Martin Shkreli:Yeah, there's a lot that goes into it, interestingly. So the first is you have this advertisement system. So if you sell into the market, you can try that. and that's called selling into the screens. The screens are the numbers on your screen. Anybody could buy and sell, Robinhood, whatever. So you don't normally do that if you can help it. Selling on screens is at least somewhat quiet. You can just sort of trickle out. There's always this conspiracy that as I'm selling on the screens, there's some guy who can see my screen and he's like, this guy's got a BWAP market order to sell 10 million shares.

21:19Martin Shkreli:That's like, you know, I'm going to tell somebody. And that knowledge would be very, very powerful. And there's even some even crazier conspiracies out there that quants can actually use different, all kinds of insane ideas around what they can do to sort of sniff out that this is happening. So there's people that are scared of that. Then you can pick up the phone and this is the way you normally do it. And you call Goldman and you say, listen, I need to sell five million shares of Microsoft or something like that. And they say, hmm, should we take it or do we find a guy that wants to take it?

21:52Martin Shkreli:And they'll sort of try to decide. Now, Microsoft is easy. If you're trying to sell share in AI, a neocloud in Australia that nobody wants, that's a tough one. And you own like 10 days of volume. So if you try to hit the screens, you have 10 days of volume. You'd have to be the entire volume for 10 days before you'd be out. You'd probably take the stock down 50 % or more, and you don't want to do that. So you try to do this advertisement process, and you basically can post in the stock market that you're a seller of a stock. And you can post that your four-digit, what's called market maker ID.

22:28Martin Shkreli:And so Goldman's is GSEO. So GSEO would be a seller of, say, Nebius, which was one of his positions. And so you'd call up, you'd say, OK, Goldman, I'm a client too of Goldman. What do you got on Nebius? And the guy would say, listen, we got a pretty big seller here. you know and say how big you know half a million shares and he's like a lot bigger you know and so you'd say hmm okay because they have to advertise that you know they're working your order so they have to sort of tell people that there's a seller uh they're they kind of are trying to be coy about how big but they're not going to waste somebody's time either so the guy who's heard that there's a big seller well he might turn around he's not supposed to do this he sort of might turn around and say, you know, there's a huge seller of Nebius out there, and I'm just a little baby fish.

23:17Martin Shkreli:Maybe I could short 50 ,000 shares and get in front of this guy. If you're an actual interested buyer, you might also still be nervous because you'd say, well, if he's really got a ton of size, I might have to be judicious about how I step in. And so if you combine that with the sort of like pressure in the market and you add it all up, and then usually what you do is you'd have to say, oh, I know a guy that works there, and let's see if he's returning calls. And when you hit up the guy and he's not on Bloomberg, it's hard to reach, it's kind of like, well, it sounds like it could be them selling.

23:50Martin Shkreli:So it's not too many people that own that many shares of that security. So you look at the holders list and you're sort of like, who could it be selling 10 million shares? So you call Fidelity and they say, no, we're not selling. You call the next guy, no, we're not selling. Next guy's an ETF, next guy's an index fund. It's got to be him. And so if it's them and there's And then you start noticing all of their positions are down. It gets really hard. So ultimately, the bank decides because you might say, you know, I don't want to sell. The bank says, I don't care what you want. We're selling regardless.

24:22Martin Shkreli:And Goldman Sachs is not in the business of holding AI stocks. You know, we're going to sell at any price we can because our board would rather know for sure that we're down a billion and just take the rip the bandaid off than to wonder if we could lose 50. And so it's Goldman's position that we're just going to just cut this, cut the arm off right now before it metastasizes. And so they'll do a fire sale. And of course, Goldman's smart. They're going to reach out to a guy like Citadel or somebody else to place it carefully. But selling the whole portfolio in one shot was a very smart move. Now, again, we've heard the discount could have been as big as, you know, 20 to 50 percent, which is, you know, mouthwatering discount to buy, you know, some quality companies at.

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25:03Martin Shkreli:But to end it and have finality, what was really to answer the question finally, what you really needed to do is the buyer of these stocks has to have the liquidity to hold them for five years and do nothing. Because the market, guys like me and to a very small extent, and guys too much bigger will sit there and say, I don't think you can hold this. And they'll start shorting it and shorting it and shorting it and trying to make you cry uncle. Kyosha in Japan, one of Leopold's holdings, also one of mine, is trading at three times earnings. You know, they basically force you or you're forcing the guy to really, you know, to sell.

25:37Martin Shkreli:And if you're going to hold this stock, you have to make sure that you can hold it until it's two times earnings or one time servings. And the only player big enough and more powerful enough to sort of hold$100 billion and not blink is somebody like a Citadel. And even still, some keep the rumors out there. They're the people who are going to try to crush your Citadel, which I wouldn't advise, but something like that where, you know, maybe they'll have now have to suffer the same contagion. So it's a very crazy time in the markets. And I don't think we've seen everything yet because I do think there are some large tech funds that have had the same trade on.

26:11Martin Shkreli:I do think liquidation is over, thankfully. But I do think that there are some funds that are about to be found out to be down 30 % or down 40 % or something like that. Take me through the mind of Ken Griffin like a couple weeks ago. There's this rumor that he was sort of like pushing or signaling that there might be a rate hike. But what I'm interested in is if you suspect that there's going to be a fire sale on X, Y, and Z companies, is there a world where you build the hedges before you acquire those assets? Or is that too 4D chess? Because if they wind up acquiring these for 50%, 20 % off, but they already have offsets, then they sort of come in market neutral.

26:54Is that possible?

26:55Martin Shkreli:I don't think so. So I'm familiar with Citadel's performance for this month, which is surprisingly up. So I think they're probably one of the only hedge funds in the world that's up this month. It's up very small. They were actually hedged is what you're saying. Yes. They have a diverse platform of different businesses, a guy trading weather, a guy trading rates, a guy trading stocks, about 1 ,000 guys trading stocks. And they have a computer fund called Citadel Securities that is a market maker that trades a good chunk of the volume of every instrument in the world. And ultimately, I think that the prime brokers, the Goldman's and Bank of America's, they do so much business with Citadel.

27:38And they've done this before where they know who to go to just the same way the U.S.

27:42Martin Shkreli:government went to Warren Buffett when they wanted to shore up Goldman. And they know that the right person to call is Ken. And he is really going out of his way to make himself the guy to call. And I think that is a great brand because you may not need to be that guy more than once every decade. But look, once a decade to make a free$5 billion or$10 billion is a great guy to be. And, you know, it's sort of like he becomes a dependable, trusted partner to these banks. And if he wants something from the banks, he's helped them. because without him, they might have had to sell that at a negative number.

28:16In fact, some people think, I don't think this is what happened,

28:18Martin Shkreli:but some people actually think the equity in Leopold's prime brokerage accounts went negative, which I think is something that, again, the Goldmans and Bank of America try to stop you before you get there. But they also don't want to sell, like I said, share in AI, which is an illiquid, tough-to-sell security. Sure. You know, they'll sell your micron very fast or you'll sell it out before then. But if you're left holding this bag of like a liquid crap that you'd have 60 days of volume to get out of, it's pretty tough to sit there and tell your prime broker, don't worry. Which is why, again, I think he needed cash.

28:54Martin Shkreli:Probably somebody on Monday or Tuesday tapped them on the shoulder and said, your margins looking a little thin, you know, can you can add, you know, a couple billion here or more. and things happened so quickly that there was just no time. And yeah, I think Citadel learned about this at the 11th hour, as you're supposed to. You know, the firm didn't leak out that they were hurting. They didn't have, to my knowledge, daily performance. In fact, from what I'm told, situational awareness as a young hedge fund was not so great with communication, Not surprising, especially with monthly and quarterly letters.

29:32Martin Shkreli:Could have been more timely on some of those. So it's a small group of a couple of guys. So I don't think that this was the same. You rewind. Was it only a month ago that the – 13F was late. 13F was like late and everyone was questioning like, okay, did he work out some kind of deal to get it confidential? But it sounded like you just like didn't get around to it. They had other priorities maybe. Do you think you can rebuild a career as a venture investor? Because in venture, you're just gigalong always. It's one of the few forms of investing where it's just so hard to get out of positions. That's the thing.

30:14Martin Shkreli:Why become a hedge fund manager? I have a friend who wants to start a hedge fund. I told him, this is the most painful, horrible business in the world. Why do this? And if you start a newsletter business that makes$100 million a year, even$50 million a year of revenue, you've done better than almost every hedge fund on the planet. Like you do not want to do this job. And the reason people do it, and I did it too, and I would never do it again, is it's the sexiest thing in the world. You think you're – Master of the universe. It's incredible. Yeah, you're the master of the universe. And I had friends wanting to quit really high-profile jobs to be a hedge fund.

30:52Martin Shkreli:And I was just like, you're out of your mind. You don't know what this job is. It's waking up at 3 a.m., checking Korean stock prices and, you know, waking up back up at 6, you know, wondering what's what's happening in the world, stuff like this. And there's absolutely no productive thing you're doing. You know, you're providing capital. You know, but other than that, you know, you're really playing this high stakes, crazy poker game. And, you know, it's certainly fun and interesting. But when it's painful and raw, you know, I hope he'll do something. you know he's a brilliant person brilliant people like that i mean look peter teal had a hedge fund that didn't quite have this level of liquidation or anything like that but it had a rough last few years and you know teal was able to obviously not only continue his venture investing efforts creating one of the biggest funds of all time one of the most successful funds of all time investing personally doing amazing also getting back into macro trading with Teal Macro, which supposedly has done well.

31:48Martin Shkreli:So I do think there is this like period of a few years that, you know, he can reset and take the learnings, take whatever talent and skill and certainly genius that nobody denies that he's a brilliant guy and rebuild. I don't think it's the end at all. And I hope he's keeping like that even temperament about this because, you know, I think a lot of people respect him quite a lot. No matter how this turned out, you know, he'll be back and successful. But it is a little bit of a humiliation thing that I think most people on Twitter and other places are sort of saying, well, the market tends to humble you.

32:22Martin Shkreli:And this is like an extremely humbling moment from being, you know, just two months separated from the biggest hedge fund on planet Earth and most successful to being forced to sort of liquidate. That is quite a rapid sort of, you know, reversal. Also, just imagining what the fun looks like in two or three years if you just survive right i can you know he you know there was a clip that was circulating yesterday from his you know appearance on dark cash where he's like oh there's obviously like 100x you know left uh before agi right so like he was like up you know 20x or whatever thinking like i got i got so much room to run but just couldn't stay in the game um i gotta say i got leading yes it's always a risk i gotta um yeah i gotta say it felt like a felt like a huge moment for you and your business just because everyone the whole finance world was learning about the situation from your posts i'm sure a lot of people were glued to your terminal and it felt like a changing of the guard because again you're getting pushback You were getting some pushback, but then two hours later, it was like Financial Times and Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal.

33:39They're all kind of clearly they needed a couple hours to like run it down. But you got to it first. And yeah, I was I was quite impressed.

33:48Martin Shkreli:Thank you. Yeah, I mean, I think that, you know, we've talked about this in the past. I mean, there is a change of the guard. You guys helped change the guard in your space. And I think that, you know, the folks at The Journal, the folks at Bloomberg, the folks at these other companies, they're fantastic reporters, but they're not active or former players. And, you know, we will hear we will always hear things before them, because especially on the street, because that's just. Well, the crazy the craziest thing is you you actually waited until it was like over effectively to share. Right. Like you had been hearing about this.

34:24There's a lot that we sit on. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And we, you know, we've been in that position like hundreds of times where it's not appropriate to share anything. And sometimes you're sitting there being like, I'm really surprised that like, legacy media hasn't picked up on this story. It feels like it's just common knowledge. And there's, there's a definitely a time and place to just not not say anything and let something work its way through the system. Yeah.

34:48Martin Shkreli:I mean, to give the devil their due, the information is also quite good at, you know, this type of thing. And they are particularly good at at scoops on open A.I., but the which I still haven't unraveled how how. But they're obviously very good reporters. But a reporter in a place like that and trad media, they generally don't care about burning bridges and resources or contacts. So they want that news out yesterday. You know, I do care. And it also is a conflict of interest because I don't want to hurt somebody that's given me good information and betray their confidence because I have to keep the confidence of these folks if I want to keep talking to them.

35:28Martin Shkreli:But I also in the case of this situation, as the carnage is unfolding, you know, there's sort of the balancing the need for everyone to know with the need for, you know, protecting friendships and relationships. you have to make that judgment call each time. And I hope that our customers understand that there will be things that we know before others that we can't disclose because we want to protect folks and protect our friends. Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal, they'll never do that. They're always going to serve their customer who is the reader. We can't necessarily do that. You probably know things about a litany, like you said, hundreds of times, different fundraisers going on, different things like that.

36:05Martin Shkreli:And we have to all keep our lives closed because that'll be the last time we hear about a fundraise. And I think that this was a situation where it sort of merited discussion. It was going to happen momentarily anyway. In fact, to your point, the thing that got me to publish was my friend saying, everyone is hearing this now. Once that happened, I said, all right, well, you know, it's time to, I can let the cat out of the bag. It's about to be let out anyway. I have two more quick questions if you have a minute. One is just about how leverage works at a hedge fund. I think, again, from the retail perspective, from the much smaller player, you might know that you can go to a brokerage and get a little bit of leverage.

36:53But what does the process look like as you're scaling into the tens of billions of leverage? At a certain point, you have to go to all of the banks, certain banks. Who's actually, like, what is that process to get leverage at that scale actually look like? And also, let's appreciate for a moment that I feel like just a month ago, the West Coast broadly was taking this insane victory lap, being like, the West Coast is eaten. The best and biggest hedge fund is no longer on the East Coast. Like we just have everything now, finance and technology. And then just deeply humbled within the span of 30 days.

37:35And it turns out you guys over there, you know a thing or two. And here we are asking you, so how would one go about getting?

37:47Martin Shkreli:So one of the things that I think is not well understood is the prime broker make a spread on, I think this is somewhat understood, is they make their business to make a spread on financing. So if you go to a prime broker and say, I'm never going to use leverage, never? They say, I'm never going to use leverage and I'm never going to really trade a lot with your firm. They're just going to sit there and say, like, we'll still take the assets because we can rehypothecate them and lend them to the guys that are going to take leverage. But in general, that's not a great customer. So if they're making a 1 % spread, which actually is a relatively huge amount, and you're borrowing Forex, you're actually giving them 400 basis points of free money, which is sort of fantastic.

38:32Martin Shkreli:In fact, their borrowing costs are probably less than so far. So they may be getting as much as 600 or 800 bips of free money on huge amounts of capital. So leverage is the best friend to a prime broker. Now, the risk guy is sitting there saying, well, wait a second, you know, I love lending, but I don't like lending to concentrated portfolios. I don't like lending to short sellers. You know, short sellers can get big, big, big, you know, leaps in their portfolios, like GameStop, for example. So the most that a long can lose is 100 percent. But if a Forex lever, the most long that loses 25 percent.

39:08Martin Shkreli:So, you know, there's sort of this mix of things you have to think about. I think the getting into the privates is usually like, for me, a really bad sign for almost every fund because it's as tantalizing as private companies are. There is a whole group of people on the West Coast who are much better at that than the guys on the East Coast. And of course, there are funds now like Altimeter and Co2 and others that are doing both and doing both. Yeah. And what made that what made it so tempting, obviously, for Leopold, that just how close he is to like he couldn't be closer to Anthropic. and it's a company that over the last six months has had 100x the demand relative to the allocation, right?

39:48So it just felt like, you know, and I don't know, who knows what the structure on those investments look like. But it's like, if you're going to break your rule and do privates, like, then that's the company to do it with. But then you still get into a situation where you're like, wow, I really wish this was more liquid.

40:06Martin Shkreli:Yeah, I can't press the sell button. Give us an update before you leave on Korea broadly, because a lot of people are commenting on just how similar Leopold's approach is to Korean retail. I don't know how true that is, but I can imagine there's blood in the water over there and the whole country is probably in shambles. Yeah, I think so. I made a Kelly criterion calculator and like a little portfolio simulator tool that, you know, basically, and Paul Trader Jones said this a while back, and I had a problem with this. Every single trader out there makes one, seems to make the same mistake over and over again, which is their position size is probably 2 to 10x more than it should be.

40:53And if you actually, you know, so it sounds nuts, right? Yeah.

40:57Martin Shkreli:But if you actually run the simulator, and ours is a Kelly. So Kelly was a guy at Bell Labs. He was a member of the technical staff. He was original. OG MOTS. And so Kelly came up with the proof called famously the Kelly Criterion, which gamblers use. Mostly it was a gambler thing before a finance thing. And it proves the optimal bet size. And the optimal bet size is your edge. It's attracted by the reciprocal of it. So if you have 55 % edge, your optimal bet size is 10%. That's still quite volatile for folks. And so people do half Kelly or quarter Kelly. Most folks don't actually don't have an edge when they trade.

41:36Martin Shkreli:But if they did have an edge, they're trading as if they had 4x or 5x Kelly edge, which is interestingly, like you might sound, okay, well, that just sounds swashbuckling and like that takes a lot of risk. No, if you run the simulator, you will go to zero each time. And the simulator is a really cool tool that shows you even with a 60-40 edge on every trade you make, you'll go bust if you overbet. And it's an eye-opener. You might say, who has a 60-40 edge in the stock market? Nobody has a 60-40 edge. But you will absolutely go bust if you don't size correctly. And it's something that I've had to learn very painfully over the years that I'm almost always overbetting.

42:16Martin Shkreli:And I think every fund is sort of the same. And certainly every retailer is the same. And it's just sort of a weird variance math game that very few people actually map out and say, can I simulate portfolio and just to see what is the sort of the right thing to do in most cases. And in fact, I had a after I left the Tiger Cup I worked at, I worked in the briefly in the office of a guy who worked at SAC Capital, not called Point72 for years. And he was one of the best managers. He's a quiet guy nobody's ever heard of, kind of retired. But I got to watch him before I set up my own hedge fund and did the exact opposite, way over metal and everything.

42:52Martin Shkreli:I got to sit with this guy for a few months, and I was astounded. So what I found is that he was managing, I don't know, 300 or 400 million of his own, basically. He almost never used the capital. 80%, 90 % of the capital was just cash, and he would just make these tiny trades. And the guy had almost never had a down, I think his record was he never had a down quarter in 20-something years of trading. And he had like 20%, 30 % returns, which was great. And the guy just kind of, you know, just did these little nibbles. And he never lost money. And it was an incredible thing. And then, of course, the second I get the chance to get some capital, I'm 8x leverage.

43:31Martin Shkreli:You know, and it's just like, you know, it's the dumbest thing in the world, you know. And you live and you learn. Psychology. Psychology. Well, thanks so much for coming on the show and breaking it down. Thank you, guys. This is always a great time. Yeah, looking forward to the rest of your cover. Yeah, seeing where we go from here. have a great week have a great weekend we'll talk to you soon cheers martin goodbye

From the publisher

This is our full interview with Martin Shkreli.

We discussed the collapse of Leopold Aschenbrenner's AI-focused hedge fund, why leverage turns market corrections into disasters, how Wall Street unwinds massive positions, why AI infrastructure stocks sold off despite record AI demand, whether the AI trade has further to fall, and much more.

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