HMC Capital Comeback Tour and AFG Fights Housing Slump: With Star Fund Manager Luke Laretive

16 Sep 2026 · 48 min · 23 chapters

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In short

Episode topic: Luke Laretive (Seneca) discusses active small-cap investing, Seneca’s fee structure (“zero and 20” with a performance fee only above a watermark), and two Australian stocks: AFG Capital (Australian Finance Group) amid housing slowdown fears, and HMC Capital amid past capital-raising and Healthscope-related issues.

Guest backgrounds

Luke Laretive is a star fund manager and founder at Seneca. He previously worked in financial services as an advisor, then built Seneca by “productizing” advice into funds and research. Seneca is a boutique with a small team and multiple products, including a small-cap fund and a research subscription.

Key claims

Indexing has over-allocated capital to large caps, leaving small caps undervalued; Seneca aims to “make money” via varied theses (turnarounds, takeovers, quality compounding). Seneca’s alignment reduces agency costs (no base fee on the small-cap fund; performance fee only).

Notable examples

AFG is framed as a mortgage aggregator plus higher-margin non-bank lending via warehouse facilities; despite property weakness, AFG’s long history of low defaults and diversified lending (residential ~35%, non-resi ~65%+) provide margin of safety. HMC Capital is framed as a manager investing in assets trading at discounts to NTA; Healthscope tenant/valuation fears, a failed/volatile capital-raising period, and Digico/data-centre sentiment drove the stock down from ~$9 to ~$2.30, but the guest argues asset re-letting and asset sales could restore value and dividends.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

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Getting to Know Seneca

0:45 to 2:15

Discussion about the origins and growth of Seneca, the company founded by Luke Laretive.

“There's a couple of millennials in the room.”

Investment Philosophy and Performance

2:15 to 5:05

Luke shares insights on Seneca's investment strategies and fund performance.

“Anyone that's willing to pay, that's a customer.”

Active Management Challenges

5:05 to 8:15

Exploration of the challenges and philosophies behind active fund management.

“that has played out so well for the last three years?”

Innovative Fee Structures

8:15 to 11:15

Luke discusses unique fee structures at Seneca and their alignment with client interests.

“And, you know, the market has been down as low as neg 15 in smalls.”

Investing with Integrity

11:15 to 13:15

Luke emphasizes the importance of integrity and client trust in investment management.

“Like, I think it will make your life worse, not better.”

Name Origin and Business Philosophy

13:15 to 14:00

Discussion about the origin of the name Seneca and the core business philosophy.

“But, yeah, I thought it was a cool – it looked cool when I wrote it.”

The Flipside of Active Fund Management

14:00 to 15:34

Discussing the challenges facing active fund managers and the impact of high fees.

“But, you know, that's a story for another day.”

Introduction to AFG

15:34 to 16:02

Exploring the Australian Finance Group (AFG) and its role in mortgage aggregation.

“who've got an expert in, not just us, talking about it.”

AFG's Business Model and Growth

16:02 to 19:17

Analyzing AFG's two revenue streams and the growth of its lending business.

“So, why don't you tell us a bit about the business?”

Market Position and Valuation of AFG

19:17 to 22:11

Discussing AFG's market position, valuation metrics, and dividend yield.

“With all those other non-bank financials that you would sort of talk to.”
Show all 23 chapters

Risks in a Slowed Property Market

22:11 to 23:11

Examining the effects of a declining property market on AFG's growth.

“Like a 7.7 % is post-franking credits or pre-franking?”

Delinquencies and Loan Risks

23:11 to 24:43

Addressing concerns over delinquency rates and their impact on AFG's loan book.

“One is we've seen property transactions fall off a cliff.”

Market Resilience and Future Outlook

24:43 to 28:00

Discussing AFG's resilience in the market and the impact of economic conditions.

“There's been, you know, Judo Bank had to do some extra provision.”

Overview of Lending Types and Market Dynamics

28:00 to 29:40

Learn about various types of loans and their impact on the market.

“So there's a whole market of other various types of loans that go on.”

AFG's Business Model and Market Cyclicality

29:40 to 31:20

Understand AFG's operations and how they navigate market cycles.

“that sort of normal kind of stuff is kind of ticking along.”

Industry Insights on Mortgage Brokers

31:20 to 34:10

Explore the profitability and challenges facing mortgage brokers today.

“on a business I think can trade on 12 or 14 times earnings, I mean I just don't see a world where AFG wouldn't be on a 5 % yield, not a 10 % yield.”

Introduction to HMC Capital and Its Leadership

34:10 to 36:10

Learn about HMC Capital, its founder David DePilla, and business trajectory.

“Is HMCA Capital a manager or what is it?”

Challenges and Opportunities in HMC Capital's Operations

36:10 to 38:40

Discuss the operational hurdles and financial structures affecting HMC Capital.

“So when you're trying to land a plane, I'll just give you an analogy.”

Valuation and Future Projections for HMC Capital

38:40 to 40:40

Analyze HMC Capital's valuation and potential future growth based on assets.

“and hospitals aren't a great asset with leverage.”

Market Complexity and HMC Capital's Valuation

42:04 to 43:50

Explore why HMC Capital's stock is undervalued despite solid assets.

“Because I think, I mean, I'm not really across this enough to argue like the bear case with you on this, but like your case is very, sounds very sensible for these businesses.”

Investment Risks and Issues

43:51 to 45:32

Discuss the key risks and issues facing investment managers in the current market.

“And so I think that that has been one of the problems.”

Growth Prospects and Asset Concerns

45:33 to 46:58

Understand the growth potential of HMC Capital amidst market fears.

“These guys are leveraged not just to stock markets but private credit, property, blah, blah, blah.”

Connecting with Luke Laretive

47:08 to 48:15

Learn how to connect with Luke and access his investment resources.

“Obviously, you've got an amazing fund that's performed really well.”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00I'm Adam Schwab. I'm Adir Shiffman. And this is The Contrarians with Adam and Adir.

0:09And we are back, episode 241. And we have a very special guest with us today, Adir. Not that special. The king of financial podcasting was with us, Luke Laretive, who I think has done more podcasts than us, potentially. So it's amazing to have you in the studio. Yeah, I've done them back, not as well as you guys. Adam is very big on counting the podcast number, as you might have caught on to. Do you count your podcasts? How many have you done? I definitely do not count them and I've got no idea. But it's been a pretty, as I was saying to Adam before, pretty significant driver of business for us.

0:38And it's a good opportunity to sort of talk long form about stuff that we're interested in and kind of explain how we do stuff at Seneca. First things first, happy birthday. Oh, thanks. Happy birthday. I was on Monday last week, yeah. There's a couple of millennials in the room. Before I. So we're obviously very close in age. I can only respond to one out of every 15 insights. So I just got to let most of them slide. This is what happens to me at work every day. I get bullied by my colleagues. That's what happens. She's alone 40 years. So tell us a bit about what Seneca is. And it's a pretty incredible business you've built in not that long, really.

1:12You've sort of come from nowhere. You obviously worked your whole lifetime in financial services, but really built this incredible brand in a pretty short time that I find Seneca is everywhere. That's really sweet. and yeah, appreciate the compliment. I suppose we've done nine years of Seneca now. I kind of started out as an advisor, I suppose, in the industry and then I got jack of paying somebody half my money and so I got my own licence and we started doing advice and then I kind of got sick of smiling and dialing and trying to convince people to do stuff that I know they should do and then them taking credit for how it works and blaming me when it didn't.

1:51so we made products and that's kind of just been the rabbit hole we've continued to go down sort of productizing my advice business for lack of a better word Seneca's a fund manager sort of more and more selectively investment advice specialist and we have the good research subscription research product as well we kind of help typically business owners entrepreneurs high net worth individuals and families or anyone who will pay me. That is my definition of a customer. Anyone that's willing to pay, that's a customer. Look, yeah, I'm not fussy or fancy as you quickly learn. So I'm just here to make a quid for myself at the end of the day.

2:35So, yeah, I mean, that's what we do. It's a small business. There's kind of four and a half people who work with me. We have a tight team. We've been together a long time. and I suppose we're increasingly focused on sort of our small cap fund, our Aussie shares fund and the good research product. So you've got two funds. Two funds. You've built and you've had a pretty good run with these funds. Tell us a bit about performance and how you've got. There is obviously been a big push really in the last 20 years to index funds which imperversely in a way gives you guys a really good opportunity to outperform because a lot of the weaker performing funds have gone by the wayside and we're left with just the great funds and we obviously, our friends at L1 have done really well.

3:18You guys have done really well. There's only a handful of funds that have really outperformed and you guys are ones. Can you talk about your performance in the last couple of years, how you've gone? Yeah, sure. Yeah, look, if I can end up with$537 million like the boys at L1, I'll be real happy. One year dividends. Yeah, not too bad for a year's work. No, yeah, look, we look up to those guys. You can't compete with their performance fees. Well, in fairness, I think they've got$70 billion under management. Yeah, I mean, we're definitely not trying to compete with anybody. We just kind of run our own race.

3:46I sort of look up to those guys. I think that they're probably the best example of a legitimate kind of boutique two-man operation going massive. We're kind of an illegitimate two-man boutique. But the – look, so, yeah, I mean, we've done – our small cap fund's kind of been – that's where we chase the alpha. That's where we really kind of try and do our best. That's sort of done 23 % per annum for the last 2.11 years, about three years coming up next month. This is better than Buffett, who was about, what, famously 19.9%, I think, over his journey. Yeah, look, I wouldn't want to compare myself to Warren Buffett for lots of reasons, but look, we're really pleased with that.

4:22That's sort of 11 % or 12 % ahead of the index, and I'd probably say it's the second or one of the top handful of ranked products in our peer group. So, you know, we're really pleased with that. How do you, like, juggle active? Because obviously it's active management for small cap fund, and so active management has headed very much towards momentum trading or front-running index changes. I mean, that is the truth, right? It's hard to say I'm an active manager who buys businesses that I think will outperform over the next five years because especially if you're listed, you have to report in net tangible assets every month, every day sometimes, right?

4:59Everyone has to report them every single day. And so what's been a bit of your investment thesis that has played out so well for the last three years? We do lots of types of investing, I suppose. You know, you talk to a lot of managers and they say, I'm a growth investor, I'm a value investor, I'm a momentum investor or some other sort of, you know, fandangled strategy they run. We're just like a make money investor. So, you know, we keep it pretty simple. I think about business in the same way that I think about investing and I actually don't think they're, you know, that different. And I suppose what we try and do is just find an advantage.

5:35Sometimes that's like an asset play. sum of parts sort of opportunity other time it's a cyclical turnaround other times it's a takeover thesis other times it's a good quality compounding earnings growth story that we do hold for five or six years so yeah there's no real rhyme or reason to it i think why people have such poor periods of performance is they're too dogmatic in the way they try and think about investing kind of like i think about my business i'm not worried about who wants to pay me i just want people to pay me same with investing we just want to make money for our investors we want to have really good alignment and i suppose make sure our incentives are matching our clients and then i think when you get all those things in a row and you work hard every day you make money i think you're talking about alignment it's really on point i think one of the criticisms of active funds is the way they charge fees and there's often a base fee so you pay the fee regardless of whether the success or not and often there hasn't been success you guys don't do that you only charge performance fee right so it's a really different structure to a lot of what people have turned away from yeah look i think there's good active management i mean our large cap strategy we do charge a management fee and no performance fee yeah i think it depends in what part of the market you're in so you know my personal views and our views at seneca are you know you're in the smaller part of the market you're trying to generate you know high returns right and you're trying to beat that you've got the opportunity to beat the market by a lot because all the capital is getting allocated as you said to index funds which naturally allocates to larger companies which naturally makes those larger companies overvalued and leaves smaller companies significantly undervalued.

7:06So if we can be good at creating arbitrage there, then we should be happy just to take 20 % of returns. That's how we get the most money for ourselves. So that's the small cap end. It's a zero and 20, essentially. Zero and 20, yeah. Which is almost unheard of, to be honest with you. Someone's got to pay the bills, right, at the end of the day. You've still got overheads. Like, you know, my rent doesn't change. How do you pay the bills with zero management? Well, because I've got a pretty profitable advice business that I've been running for a long time. We've got a management fee on the other product.

7:33We've got the good research product as well. So if I was just running a single fund, single product business, you'd probably have to charge a management fee. But, you know, our view is that, you know, we think we can do well. We think we can generate good returns. And you only charge the fee above a watermark, right? So you're not even charging off everything. So you've got to hit a certain level of performance and then you charge the fees. That's a really great way to invest it. If you do, and clearly you're doing well, also hasn't been an issue thus far. But if you did have a bad year, like you're not getting paid.

8:03Yeah, so we didn't get a performance fee from the 1st of Feb till we still haven't got one now. I'd say we'll get one in September. So we haven't been paid for six or seven months. So that's quite normal. And, you know, the market has been down as low as neg 15 in smalls. So, you know, our returns at the moment, as much as they seem sort of a little bit gaudy and great, probably the hardest period of investing we've done. so look I think yeah look I like the structure that we run it suits the clients that I speak to you know that we're going to have to beat the RBA cash rate and make you increment more money before we take a fee off you no one is more enthusiastic or opposed to rate rises than you given your watermark as the RBA cash rate all Adam lobbies for is endless rate rises are you happy now or you want more rate rises still?

8:56I think there's a few more coming you want some more? not good news for Luke Yeah, and so your low, like your watermark, basically, your benchmark, I mean, every time the RBA increases rates, your hurdle rises. It does. I mean, that's terrible. And the valuation drop. I mean, this is the most, I've never heard of a more aligned, more honest, more difficult way to make money in funds management than saying we take no management fee, we take a performance fee that's on par with everyone else's performance fee and even checking the performance fee there was a I mean just a slight digression but when Quadrant the private equity business was absolutely nailing it I think they might have increased their performance fee to 30 % right Sequoia you don't even increase the performance fee and then you say I might you never know well you should and then you say I'm going to make a like I'm going to have this hurdle rate and instead of the hurdle rate being the same as everyone else's I'm going to make it the RBA cash rate.

9:57So every time it goes up, I'm just going to make it harder for myself. It's the most honest fee structure I've ever heard of in my life. I need you to start making a few client calls for me. It's actually unbelievable. We think it is. I mean, I'm an investor in our own products, right? I don't buy and sell individual shares. Like I just buy our own products. And, you know, everyone else at Seneca, you know, pretty much the same. So I pay the fees. You know, I pay my own fees. I mean, yes, they come back to me eventually. but in a weird and wonderful way. But, no, look, I think being a good bloke, for lack of a better, or a good person, doing things honestly and fairly is the best way to make money.

10:36So it's not necessarily I'm doing it because I want to make money. And I think I understand that to get a product to scale, we're at$35 million,$40 million at the moment in that small cap fund. We can probably get that to$400 million or$500 million before we've got to change a single thing. so the game is really just getting it to scale right and getting inflows and unless you're going to get um you know a big backer someone who's got a shitload of money who's going to be able to help you which unfortunately for me i don't have yeah um you know we i know that the main hurdle to doing well in funds management for us as a business it's getting money in the scale so i just want to encourage people to invest with us as best i can and then i know once they're in they don't leave so yeah what is your churn like on on investors zero like so low right so i think we've had of course because you never take a cent off people unless they're making money and sometimes even when they're making money you don't take a cent off yeah i think we've had um three redemptions in three years that's why you don't want i mean by the way just maybe like 400 grand over 35 40 million bucks well just to refute your um dream you don't you You don't want an enormous investor involved.

11:48Like, I think it will make your life worse, not better. One is they won't want to pay fees. That's where it always starts. And then, like, they're going to be calling you, like, every three days, asking about why this stock went up and that stock went up. Like, I know that enormous fund managers get regular calls on a daily basis from some institutional investors asking about the movements of individual shares that they're invested in. Like, that's not the life that you want. Can I ask you this? Is this Seneca thing, is this, like, the Roman Stoic guy that you named this after? It is, right? Yeah.

12:17Okay. It wasn't as popular nine years ago when I did that name. Why did you choose that name? Because I saw a quote that I liked and I thought I needed a name for my business and I wanted like – I think if you think back 10, 11 years ago when I was thinking about doing this with my co-founders, like it was a – I wanted like a Google word. I didn't want like, you know, someone partners or private or whatever. I just wanted like a word that I could make word marks out of, that I could get a cool logo with that would like look good on printed stuff. And so I was trying to find a word that I didn't want to use my name or like my surname's not really that sort of good for that kind of, not Smith or something boring that's easy to print on stuff.

12:57I think it's a great name for a fund. Yeah, you know, I saw the quote about, you know, if you don't know which way the wind's blowing or whatever, you don't know where you're going or whatever the quote is. I can't remember now, but I'm not too deep on it to be honest. Very memorable quote. Yeah, exactly right. I'm not very good on quotes unless they're out of like Moneyball or the big short. But, yeah, I thought it was a cool – it looked cool when I wrote it. I thought there was some good, like, meaning we could draw out of it that kind of mapped to how we like to invest and think about the world.

13:25So, yeah, that's where it came from. I'll give you a quote, but it's by – I'm quoting myself. It's not unusual. He's worse than me. He's getting worse than me. Trying to just spit out the coffee. But, no, I think you – I've got a one-line philosophy about how to run a business. I think we are completely like-minded, like Adam and I are like-minded on this, which is trust the product and love the customer. That is my view on how to run a really great business. And you basically trust your product to deliver, and the way you treat your customer is to love the customer and try to not have a kind of reallocation of their cash into your pocket undeservingly.

14:05It's a classic agency cost, which is what so many, which is why people have turned away from active fund managers because the fees are so high, and you guys just completely flip that on its head, saying pay us if we do well for you and don't pay us if we don't or in the other fund just give us a tiny little carry and we'll and if you get all the upside so it really is a a removal of all those all agency costs yeah i don't have i i don't think that uh active manner and active managers have struggled because of fees i actually don't think it's i think it's they struggle because of returns yeah they're struggling i mean 35 yeah if you're not doing if you're not doing well and you're charging people fees to not do well yeah like they're gonna get pissed off like that's pretty normal um by the same token the idea when you know the average lay person trying to invest their money every day they got sick of being wrong all the time they pick one manager it wouldn't work out they go to another manager it wouldn't work out i'd buy this share it wouldn't work out this one was going great but then it still fell why i don't know the profit was up and so i think people just have sort of like outsourced it and said well i can buy these index funds and i'm never wrong you're never right either but you're you're never wrong so um it's opened up a kind of perverse allocation of capital, I think, in the Australian economy.

15:14I think it's actually a significant kind of issue at the moment sort of for the broader economy that we're just allocating all of our surplus capital to the biggest, lowest growing, arguably least efficient businesses going around. But, you know, that's a story for another day. I'm probably not even qualified to be speaking publicly about that sort of thing, but you get my gist. I'd love to talk about some actual companies now because this is why we got you here. Our listeners love our deep dives. who've got an expert in, not just us, talking about it. Just before we go, everything discussed here today is obviously general advice only and may not be appropriate for you.

15:46Seek personal advice for acting. And you or us may have interest in these shares as well. Yeah, we do. Okay, well, you definitely do. We definitely do. We may. So, a couple of companies you want to talk about, which I actually find both super interesting. Let's go with AFG first, Australian Finance Group. So, why don't you tell us a bit about the business? What's your narrative? Why you love it? And we'll get into some financials. Yep. So AFG is Australia's largest mortgage aggregator. So if you're a mortgage broker in Australia or you've used a mortgage broker in Australia, chances are they actually don't just go talk to all the banks.

16:18They use a platform to go and sort of sort those mortgages and compare them and make a recommendation to you. And they're probably using AFG's platform to do that. So AFG make a small amount of money on the upfront, same way your mortgage broker does. They make a small amount of money off that broker for access to the platform. They make another a small amount of money on the trailing of the life of that loan. And increasingly over the last few years, they've started actually lending their own money. And I suppose that lending your own money part of their business is what I'm really interested in because it's 20, 30, maybe 40 times the margins of the broking business.

16:53So that's sort of taken them from a, you know. So they're not a broker themselves. It's purely a platform for brokers. They're a platform for brokers. They also license brokers. Like a net wealth for brokers in a way? More like a licensee if you wanted to compare it to the financial advice business. Basically, I mean, I know this world quite well because I was involved in Finsure and 1.300 home loans, right? Which I think Finsure ended up getting sold to Mollus actually in the end. You sold to Mortgage Choice as well? What was that business? I sold my Help Me Choose business to Mortgage Choice.

17:23I was like the biggest generator of home loan leads in Australia at one point. One of my CROs used to work for you. He used to work for, oh no, maybe it was after you sold it. He worked for Help Me Choose. Yeah, well, they bombed that business into the ground post-sale. But I will say, the way to think about it is like this. Every mortgage broker needs to sell home loans. No bank will talk to an individual mortgage broker to do a contract. So they have to go somewhere where someone has spoken to all the banks and is kind of acting as a middle man with some technology as well that the brokers can use.

17:56That's what these aggregated businesses are. And then sort of AML stuff, you know, make sure you're doing it all properly. You know, there's a bunch of other sort of regulatory things as well. And there's been a lot of consolidation in this space. REA bought one of them. I forgot who REA bought, but they bought one. So there's a lot of, I suppose, there's the consumer-facing side of it. And I suppose AFG's part is more the B2B side. Their clients are the mortgage brokers. They're not you guys getting a loan. Like a mortgage choice or... Yeah, so they're there. Well, mortgage choice is a... Yeah, I think that's who REA bought.

18:28I think REA... They bought mortgage choice. Mortgage choice. is an AFG competitor that's owned by REA. The Mortgage Choice is consumer. B to C, right? No, but their Mortgage Choice is customer. Yeah, maybe in the old school way of saying it, you'd say B to B to C, where the customer is the mortgage broker who then services the retail consumer. So AFG is like Mortgage Choice and they're a franchise. No franchises. But the long story short here is broker makes some money. Some of that money comes back to AFG. That business, though, is growing last year EBITDA like 2%. Just a tics along. And that was last year.

19:05We can talk about what's happening now and how much that impacts your thesis. Correct. But the manufacturing, the lending of your own money, that's growing 25 % per annum last year. And that's them acting as a bank, essentially. As a bank, right? As a non-bank lender. So they're sort of picking the eyes out of, I suppose, the loans they want to make. Like a Liberty Financial competitor. Yeah, competitive. With all those other non-bank financials that you would sort of talk to. And they probably get a warehouse facility. They have a warehouse facility, that's correct. They're not an authorised deposit taking institution.

19:30That's correct. And just want to really explain what a warehouse facility is. So there's two ways you can get access to money. I mean, you can steal it. That's a third way. It's not a long-term sustainable business model in Australia, outside politics. And so basically you can get retailers to give you deposits and you can pay them interest, but you need a banking licence for that. It's problematic for most companies. Yeah, hard to get and hard to maintain and you need lots of capital to maintain it. or you can go to someone that has lots of money and you can say, how about you give me your money to lend out and I'll give you an interest rate on your money and I'll effectively go and lend that downstream and make a margin on the difference.

20:08And so that's called a warehouse facility. That's more expensive than deposits generally. It's generally more expensive on an interest basis but obviously you don't have all the costs of running a bank which are high. So this business is growing kind of 25, 30 % per annum now driven by this 50 % growth in EBITDA of this sort of lending business and the sort of steady state recurring revenue mortgage business. We like the business because, as you've probably been talking about before we started, you know, 90 % recurring revenue, growing, and underpinned by their own kind of steam, for lack of a better word.

20:44They don't need huge growth in mortgage volumes. They don't need huge growth in lending. The margins in lending is so much bigger than what they've been doing historically. but this is going to continue to sort of just scale their business for them over time. And mostly it's being sold through their own distribution channels or their platform, right? So basically what they said is our competitive differentiator or a key asset we have is a massive network of mortgage brokers using our platform. They're picking a loan from the platform to sell, so we should get them to sell our loan. Yeah, correct.

21:13Which is why ComBank bought Aussie Home Loans. Similar, I mean Aussie was also taking their brand direct to the customers, but then they build out a mortgage-broking network. That wasn't a successful transaction for CBA in the end, wasn't it? And they, obviously the Lendi things, I think Ozzy's now part of Lendi, our friend Dave Hyman. I think banks will just, like all of these big organisations, they'll go through periods where they buy aggregation and distribution, and then they'll go and sell them at a loss down the track, and they'll do it for wealth management, and they'll do it for home loans aggregation, that's just a cycle they'll go through, right?

21:46So I think that's what's happening. I think it happens in lots of industries, But the question is, in my mind anyway, is why is this business that's growing like this, that's recurring revenue, it's in a pretty stable sector now. We can argue about the merits of that stability. Is it a stable sector? I think it is, and I can probably have this argument with you. But anyway, my point here is this is on seven times earnings. It's on a 7.7 % fully frank dividend yield. Four times EBITDA, right? Yeah, it's cheap, cheap, cheap, cheap. I think that's interesting. Like a 7.7 % is post-franking credits or pre-franking?

22:15Pre. It's like a 10 % gross stuff year. 10 % grossed up yield. So a superannuant that has this in their super fund is effectively pulling down a 10 % yield on this stock. And so... It's dropped 50%. So why? So the question is why? Well, there's many questions. One is, you obviously think that yield is roughly sustainable. Yeah, I mean, this is a business that's grown dividends 25 % per annum, right? So it is a very steady state. The question is how depends. 90 % recurring revenue, like where's it going to go? It doesn't change. It's a platform. You know, it's not a, unless you think mortgage volumes are going to fall by half.

22:53Well, this is what you want to say in a sense. I'll just preempt and then ask your question, which is let's assume people don't abandon their existing home loans, but let's talk about potential growth in home loans in the next two years. And now you should say what you're going to talk about. I guess there's two questions. So there's two questions. One is we've seen property transactions fall off a cliff. Yep. Like 28 % down the last. since the budget from hell for property owners anyway, especially if you bought a property recently. If you've owned a property for years, probably no big deal. If you're about to buy a property, it's great.

23:25But certainly people have recently bought properties. They're in a bit of bother because there was a property in Sydney that we talked about in the pod last week that dropped 30 % in the last four years. That's obviously exceptional. It was a mortgagee sale, et cetera. But we haven't seen property drops like this since the late 90s or even the early 90s. So arguably it was due a fall, especially Sydney, which has been crazy, but also Melbourne, which actually hasn't grown that quickly. So two questions. One is how much does a completely slowed property market impact growth? And then you've got the question of delinquencies and people not paying their loans.

24:00If we see unemployment dig up. So they're clearly the two big risks. And the second one, the delinquency one, has been that risk is a much more material risk now that they've gone into lending their own money because if you sell someone else's loan and the buyer doesn't pay, there's no risk to the mortgage broker other than not getting their commissions. Correct. But if you're the lender, as we've seen, it's not pleasant, right? And so often the way the world works is you generate much better returns by taking much more risk. And so the trick is to just try and find where that curve is mismatched.

24:34And so I think that second question is especially interesting. How worried are you about delinquencies on their own loan book? Let's do the second one first because it's a really straightforward black and white one. So, you know, I agree with you. There's been, you know, Judo Bank had to do some extra provision. Stock was down 40 % on the back of that. Three lenders, basically. I think three loans, yeah. Three related loans. Three loans that they said they'd never take when they talked about their business model. Correct. Then you had, you know, this Baffler thing in Sydney now. All the private credit guys telling you that they're diversified, but in reality, it's all the same, right?

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25:03It comes back to the same. They're diversified through 100 loans to the same guy. Same two loans. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So that's also an issue. And as a result, I mean, you can see this from Zipco all the way through to CBA, every kind of lender on the ASX had their PA come down, had the valuation come down. So it's a really good question. Which is great for you because that is the herd mentality of fear, which is not very discriminating at all. And here's the data point you've got to remember. So AFG has been lending out money in one way, shape or form for 15 years like this. They've had$258 ,000 worth of defaults over that time.

25:38So they've got excellent credit quality. Excellent credit standards. The quality of their credit assessment and management is very high historically. And David, who runs it now, the CEO, has been there that whole time. So I don't see why that would change. I guess the risk is, being devil's advocate here, is we've had 15 relatively good years. Here there's been a little bit ups and downs. It hasn't been straight up to the right. $250 ,000 in total is ridiculous. I guess the question is, there's no doubt delinquencies will increase. The question is the quantum. and I presume these guys aren't taking 100 % and they're not doing 100 % LVR.

26:10So there's clearly a buffer there. And they're pretty good at doing this and they've proven they're pretty good at doing this. So, I mean, that's the opportunity. You're never going to find a stock or a company to invest in where there's no questions about it and it's trading at 10-year low valuation. You know what I mean? There's always going to be a question. The knack is being able to say, well, is there actually data supporting that narrative? Is there actually facts to say these guys are bad at lending money or are going to incur losses well above their provisions. And I just don't think there's data to support that.

26:40It doesn't look like they're bad at all. I'm saying the question is, we haven't been tested in a hard time. We're just trying to argue with you, right? Of course you are. And so, but also... We're not called the agreeables this show. Yeah, true. And so, I mean, this business is at five-year lows based on what I can see. And it like had this huge spike at the end of 2025. And then I think macro conditions and policy conditions have not been kind to this sector. I think the most appealing thing about this business is potentially its margin of safety. So you've got a business here that's being valued at seven times earnings that is paying a 10 % grossed up dividend.

27:20And my question is not do I think that loan volumes are going to fall by 50%. My view more is if loan volumes did fall by 50%, I think they'd survive that fall and get through it. And so maybe the price will go down before it goes up, or maybe it won't, because it's at low numbers. But I think what's interesting is the margin of safety that this business has in what I think is going to be a very tough market until this government or the next government comes to their senses and, you know, kind of cleans up some of the mess they've caused. I think on the volume side of it as well, you know, most of the market for lending in the country isn't actually residential investors buying established.

28:03So there's a whole market of other various types of loans that go on. So I think while established residential property catches the headlines, and again, like the narrative, we talk about the narrative versus the data, catches the headlines. It's not actually a huge driver of the lending business, for lack of a better word. And there's still building going on. You can negatively gear that to your heart's content. You want to buy a commercial, you can still negatively gear that. And these guys lend to commercial, industrial? Commercial, industrial, equipment, everything. You can still buy pure commercial inside.

28:38You're super fun. You can still do most of the things that you could do before. I think the other thing as well - Do you know what percentage is resi versus commercial? Residential book for them is down to about 35%. Don't quote me. So I think in their last - That definitely allays a lot of the risk with this. I agree. You would say that buries the lead. That's what you would say about that. I think the number is 78 % non-resi, I think. Of the resi, some of its new bill. Check the latest investor for those. We're talking like 10 % established, which is what's been hit the hardest. Yeah, and I think price as well.

29:08I mean, my mum's a real estate agent in Perth, right? So I've spent my life, even though I've only ever bought the house that I live in, I've been bullied into trying to buy real estate for a long time. so my mum says to me like as much as pricing going up and down catches the headlines and stuff at the end of the day the agents are just there they need to do transactions they need to do volume and I think you know in AFG's situation as well whilst everyone will worry about the value of their house going up and down you know these guys just want to make sure that people are still buying houses they still want to live in a house they still want to invest in a commercial they still want to buy something in their super fund to operate their business out of like as long as that sort of normal kind of stuff is kind of ticking along.

29:46Yes, AFG is a cyclical business to a degree, but that cyclicality is largely, in our view, significantly corrected for in the margin differential between the two products and where they're actually generating their growth from, which I think is what everybody's kind of missed here. I want to finish it with a few more things. I'll hear one bull and one bear view on this industry, the industry that FG involves in brokers. So a bit of a positive is I think there'll be a lot of refinancing that's going on and generally upfront commissions are higher than trail commissions. So churning a customer, even your own customer to another loan, that's a very profitable activity.

30:21And I could cynically say most mortgage brokers will generally try and churn the customer every three years to a new loan to recoup the next upfront. The slight bare bit, I should have done it in the reverse to leave on a positive, but the slight bare bit is one of the big drivers of the mega profitability that has made some mortgage brokers many millions of dollars a year in earnings has been the rise in property prices because they get a percentage clip on the size of the loan as property prices rise, the loan rises. And so that has been very good for their earnings over the last decade. And this is the hard bit to kind of forecast from our perspective.

30:55And Ben and I always talk about the most important thing for a stock. We think the most important thing for AFG is the margins. That's the most important thing. But you're right. If the average loan value doesn't keep growing, if property prices do stay lower for longer, if you don't get the tax incentive that you used to get, it's no doubt going to have a negative impact. I just think kind of on seven times earnings, on a business I think can trade on 12 or 14 times earnings, I mean I just don't see a world where AFG wouldn't be on a 5 % yield, not a 10 % yield. Seven times impact, right? Yeah, seven times PA.

31:32Probably can never assess the balance sheets of these businesses because of the cash that they've got on their balance sheet. These guys have got a buyback on, direct to buying. I mean, this is a layout, right? So, you know. It sounds very interesting. It's a really good, not sexy, you know, we're not selling drones to the government. You know, it's not what everyone wants to be in, but it's good risk-adjusted. We hate the sexy stuff. Plus, this company doesn't buy drones anyway. We're totally ill-prepared. Let's move on. If you're a second, the second company I want to talk about, which is HMC Capital, which we've talked about on the pod before.

32:05Super interesting. Great. So David DePillo, of course, the sort of investment banker to the stars, did the chemist warehouse IPO with his cousin, Mario. I think a bit of a background, not dissimilar to yours in a sense, where he came from the advisory side and then built some pretty enormous funds management businesses. It's not identical, obviously, but it's interesting. He's smart as well, so that's probably the significance. I think it's okay. Okay, but yeah, I think the interesting thing about him is he went through this period where he was gold-plated or maybe solid gold even. It was a brief period.

32:38Chemist Warehouse period. Yeah, the chemist, chemist Warehouse, and then... And then he was shit-canned by everybody. Yeah, he went from solid gold, and then it's like, all the glitters is not gold pretty quickly, right? Unbelievable, the media shift on him. Ben and I were just like, what is going on here? It was brutal. We still don't understand it, to be honest. He stuck his head up pretty high. But he was kicking ass, taking names. I didn't find him arrogant. No, no, no, no. To be honest, I never met him before. I met him at a lunch, you know, probably three months, six months ago now. And I was like, why does everyone hate this bloke so much?

33:10Like, he's a really nice guy. It seems like really easy to chat to, ask some good questions about me, and, you know, had a nice conversation. The chemist warehouse guys do not hate him. I'll give you that. No, they definitely don't. They definitely don't. So he started a business called Home Co, or started a fund called Home Co, which was basically repurchasing the old master's stores. and turned into HMC, which became kind of, it's probably not the best comparison, almost like a Babcock and Brown, but a modern day version. It's like an alternatives asset management. Yeah, exactly. Kind of, yeah, like a baby kind of Blackstone-y type of property, private credit.

33:43Because it turned its core. Investment bank in a way. Almost like old school merchant bank, you know what I say. Yeah, for sure. Using a balance sheet. But interestingly, like it used that core initial investment effectively like a REIS, right? And so a real estate investment trust. Which is a great investment trust. It turned that into a much wider finance business, basically. Can you tell us your thesis on the business? A bit about what they do. You've probably got the three or four different types of effectively businesses win their business. There's a bit in this one. What's in HM... I get a bit confused.

34:15Is HMCA Capital a manager or what is it? I'll give you a hot tip for all players. If you're ever wanting to invest into something, invest in the manager. don't invest in the underlying rates. It's not necessarily always true, especially not in this case, but I think the investment management business have a much more leverage. What's the Macquarie model in a way as well? This actually really reminds us of Macquarie in the 90s when everybody said it was going to shit and then it ended up just kicking ass for the next 10 years. Plus, if you invest in the manager, you're saying, I think these people are really good at finance, so I just want to invest in the way they make money.

34:51That's the manager effectively. David knows how to make money, that's one thing. for sure so you know okay so this stock was like a nine dollar stock um it was 30 times earnings um brokers had 13 eps forecast through from 2025 to 2027 which is still a hefty pe even for 13 percent growth it is but you know recurring revenue business stable capital blah blah blah blah blah but then earnings per share fell from 47 cents a share to 25 cents a share so what happened well one of their underlying rates is that is hcw the health co rate that's got health scope yeah as a big customer so that's a disaster you think it you would correct you most people think it is right so again well it might turn out not to be a disaster but in the short term for their for their um share price for the for the hcw it's been a disaster correct for share price for sure and i think this is where the opportunity opens up they had a a crack at this neon renewables thing which is like the Vic Big Battery, and they couldn't get the$2 billion they needed away to raise.

35:55Not necessarily all their own fault, but that was an issue, and people start questioning, are they going to be able to continue to raise capital? Is this sort of – are they going to continue to be able to grow, essentially? If you're a fund manager and you can't get inflows, you're stuffed, right? So then they had the digi-coating. So when you're trying to land a plane, I'll just give you an analogy. Do you know when you're on a plane and the landing doesn't work and they do a touch and go? Have you ever been on a plane like that before? I've been on that twice. And I can tell you the second time around, you're a lot less confident of being able to land the plane than the first time.

36:26I feel like that's a failed capital raising. Once you fail one, everyone thinks, I'm not sure they're ever going to land this thing again. That's what it feels like to me. A little bit. And then they did this Digico float, which was lauded. Like every retail stockbroker on the street was peddling this to their clients. It's just after Air Trunk, wasn't it? The big Air Trunk result. Big Air Trunk or maybe just before that even. but peak height for that. They got it away at a five buck vowel and it just quickly fell to 230. So there was no actually, nothing, HMC didn't do anything wrong. They did their job too well.

36:58It was a great move if you could sell everything on the day that you IPO'd and didn't have to be a part of it subsequently for the fall, right? The problem is if you time it to perfection and you're still holding all of your stock and running the business, probably you're going to have some pain at least before there's another upturn. So do these three kind of factors combined resulted in people pretty much dumping HMC stock from$9 to$2.30? Yeah. And saying mean things about David DePilla. And saying lots of mean things about David DePilla and blah, blah, blah. But, you know, if you fast forward to today, that Hellscope issue is going to get resolved in the next week or two by the looks of it.

37:32How do you think that finishes? Well, they've been paid their rent the whole time. So there's been no issue on that front. The main issue from a HMC perspective is they've paused a dividend because they're a big investor in their own rate. So that's a big part of their earnings, which has fallen away. So they're guiding to FY27, those dividends coming back. So they think they're coming back. We think they're coming back. And what's happening to that? I kind of lost track of this, but all of these hospitals with HealthScope, like is HealthScope... The Calvary were buying it. Yeah, they're going to continue.

37:58Are those hospitals going to continue being occupied by a reliable tenant? Yeah, I think in fact, and you guys probably would know better than me, but I actually think, and this is probably a little bit speculative on our front, but by re-tenanting them with a better quality tenant, and looking at where the cap rates are now, I actually think they can get valuation uplift on the assets as a result of this because there's – while they'll have to give probably a little bit back on, like, incentive to kind of get the new tenant in there and all that, I think the kind of – the wash of that is actually they'll make money, not lose.

38:30If you go to first principles, like HealthScope was over-leveraged because it was a private equity firm bought it. Yeah, it was. Oh, it was Brookfield bought it, the Canadian guys, and they over-leveraged it. and hospitals aren't a great asset with leverage. But it's not as if, if you go first, it's not as if Australia doesn't need hospital beds. We're not like, there's not a hospital sitting in the street like not being used. So the underlying demand for the asset you think should be strong. The reason why the business struggled was because there was an over-leverage play gone wrong. So the underlying real estate assets really should be long-term fine.

39:01Yeah, but they're still trading at a 40 % discount on TA when we think their max haircut they're going to get is like 10. Well, I think that's very interesting because what you're basically saying, I mean what both of you are saying is, the issue here that caused problems was a financial structure issue not an underlying demand issue. Yeah. And maybe they didn't operate it. They tried to operationalize. I tried to, I actually remember we talked, I broke my leg and I went to one of those health care hospitals to get my rod taken out. Yeah. And the experience, the initial experience was a mate. They got me in.

39:31They did it. It was beautiful. And then afterwards, I couldn't, like there was literally no nurses. Yeah. And I just needed something like minor and it took like 40 minutes for a nurse to come. I was actually, started hobbling around the hospital. I was actually trying to get discharged. I couldn't get a nurse to discharge me. So I think there were some operational issues that transpired. So it was just a badly run asset. But it's a good point. Like when you look at this asset at its current valuation, you could say, I don't care about any of the financials. I'm not even opening them. I'm just making a macro bet on private hospital demand in Australia.

40:01Yeah, I mean, you don't even need to worry. I mean, I don't – so, you know, for all transparency, Seneca owns the HMC head co-management, the underlying rate at HCW and the Digico rate as well. So our view is that that HCW rate is trading at, say, 40 % discount to NTA currently. We don't know whether it gets back to current NTA or it ends up being a small discount to that or a small premium to that. We just think it's not going to be 40%. It's going to be the number, right? That feels almost a purer bet than the mothership. We can't see all the other stuff. It is to an extent. That's a value investor trade.

40:35We do all kinds of investing at Seneca, right? We don't care, right? If it's trading at 60 % of NTA and you think at worst maybe it'll go to 80 % of NTA, you get a 33 % uplift on a pure value. And I'm assuming it's a dividend. What's the dividend? I mean, I think once – well, zero at the moment because they've paused. Okay. But once that dividend comes back, I think that NTA closes because people buy it for the div, right? Yeah. So it could potentially double the value of the – Right. So that's one issue. Let's put a tick next to that and say if it's not solved, it's pretty close to being solved.

41:05Then you've got Digico. They were off in the US, deploying capital over there, trying to buy land and build data centres over there. It was all a bit of a, you know, not my ideal. Anyway, the market was like, oh, those assets are stuff. They're never going to be able to sell them. They actually sold them for a premium to book value, repatriated the capital here, plugging it all into Sydney One. Sydney One's mint. Next to the city, like government standard or whatever, however the data, above my pay grade, but you get the idea. They're going to sell that out, right? And I think that that asset, it's also trading at a 30 % discount to NTA.

41:40I think that's just going to be sold out and it's going to get valued like every other data centre. It's weird that every other data centre world is going crazy and these guys people seem to hate. It actually doesn't make any sense. Well, you know what it is. Momentum is a powerful force in the universe, right? And all the momentum is running against this guy and his businesses at the moment. I think basically David DePilla should take what you've just said on this podcast and he should make all of his stuff listen to it on repeat especially the investor facing ones including themselves. Should hire you as head of comms.

42:07Yeah, and get this message across. Because I think, I mean, I'm not really across this enough to argue like the bear case with you on this, but like your case is very, sounds very sensible for these businesses. It is very sensible. And I mean, I've sort of been screaming this from the rooftops for six months now it feels like. But I mean, Digico can add$1.50 just by selling out that data centre, which they're going to do, you know, in book value. So, you know, that's kind of fine. I'll just put a tick next to DGT in the interest of time. Then you've got this renewable stuff, which, you know, people will say, oh, renewables are shit, you can't make money out of it, whatever.

42:42Well, they kind of are. They've got this KKR partner in, right, to take the$600 million of this deal. And then, yeah, KKR got a good deal because they were kind of the buyer of last resort at that time. It was like sort of peak bearishness on ESG, for lack of a better word. And then they're now expanding that. They've already guided, so they're meeting their 20 % return IRR targets on that. they're providing a pretty good service in sort of redundancy, I suppose, for the grid. Went out and had a look at the assets, pretty impressive. You ever get a chance to go out and have a look at it. And so, like, our view is if that kind of all comes out of the wash over the next few years and starts to pay the returns that it's expected to and are on target to, what's actually the issue with HMC Capital?

43:23Why is this stock trading on 10 times earnings at the moment when it probably used to trade on 30? Because you've just done a lot of work on a complex structure. like even you talking about it, like we had to kind of simplify it for this discussion. There's obviously hundreds of hours of work behind the scenes. We have done a shitload of work. And I think that's got a lot to do with, well, like the market generally does not like complexity. It likes things it can understand easily. Could not agree more. And this is hard to understand. And so I think that that has been one of the problems. But also there is a narrative around David DePilla, which sounds like quite unfair based on this discussion.

44:01which is this guy is just an amazing investment banker that can do great sales pitches where the underlying assets don't live up to the promises. That's the narrative around this guy at the moment. And I'll be interested to know how worried he is about this or whether he feels as relaxed as you do about all of this. Look, I don't know him personally or have a lot to do with him on a day-to-day basis. What I do know is he presents really well. Every time I've heard him spoke about the assets, He speaks very sensibly and sort of modestly, for lack of a better word. I think the people he's got around him, whether it's his CFO Will, you know, Sid the Property Guy, like everyone I talk to.

44:41And, you know, at Seneca we do a lot of work on this kind of stuff. I talk to a lot of people who work with these people, who deal with them as counterparties, who deal with them as, you know, contractors or whatever. That's sort of the work that we do around our investments. and I get nothing but like they are the best, like the best at what they do. I've spoken to other contacts this week about a different read, about a different business. He said, mate, these guys aren't Home Co. That's literally the quote from this. So what is the one biggest spanner in the works that could unravel your thesis, at least in kind of the short to medium term on this?

45:19Can't be nothing. It's not that there's nothing that can go wrong. You know, if the market crashes, investment managers will not perform well, right? Like if the stock market goes down a lot, investment managers won't perform well. These guys are leveraged not just to stock markets but private credit, property, blah, blah, blah. So what about their private credit book? Private credit book is naughty. I reckon it's one of the best parts of this business. It's growing really, really well. It's institutional focused. They're continuing to give in huge mandates from overseas. They just won a big mandate from overseas recently.

45:48So while, you know, Aussie private credit retail investors are kind of shitting themselves over all this stuff, the reality is like big instos from Asia and around the world are still coming here, still seeing, you know, really good returns on offer. And they're typically, and I think this Baffler thing is going to come out that it's all asset-backed anyway. Take a while to get your money out. Take a while to get everything sorted. Might take a bit of a haircut on it. But it's not going to be catastrophe stuff. If you're investing in private credit in the US in software, different sort of question.

46:16They're asset-backed, intangible asset-backed. You know, difference to the thing. Well, Metrix is having problems selling that$300 million site. I mean, no one's put it in Sydney West. No one's put in a bit above 200 mil, and that's all kind of, according to the media, and that's all, you know, not real$200 million. So I know they're asset-backed, but it also depends on what your LVRs are. And your liquidity. And can you get out? I don't think they'll end up selling that asset, by the way. I think they'll find a partner to build it, yeah. And so this is what I'm saying. that none of these funds are without issues.

46:48But look, what Homeco are doing or what HMC are doing is not the stuff that everyone's worried about. They're continuing to grow, continuing to do quite well. So I just don't really see, beyond the normal operating risks of this business, any particular risk that stands out to me at the moment. And as we talked about margin of safety before, particularly at this valuation. That was amazing, Luke. We could speak for hours about these undervalued stocks, which was super cool. How do people find you? Obviously, you've got an amazing fund that's performed really well. where people want to give you some cash, what's the best way to do it?

47:18Look, I suppose like LinkedIn's the easiest thing. If you just want to get in touch with me or email me, we do the senecafs.com.au websites where our funds are and our advice business, goodresearch.com.au for the subscription research product, which is, you know, sort of a stock report. So you put all your work basically in this advice? Yeah, Benny and I write notes to each other and then we tar them up and sell them to people. Yeah, and that's a really limited number. so that's not 200 people can do it there's 50 odd subscriptions left so oh that's great you know no point doing this on a huge distribution because you don't get any value from it as a subscriber so and then I suppose people want to sign up to my weekly newsletter that I write or you know get our monthly performance reports senecafs.com.au forward slash subscribe and you can kind of choose what you want to get and we'll put all these in the show notes as well so jump on there and they can find you pretty easily thank you so much for coming on that was a fascinating discussion can't wait to get you back on it's stoked to be here Great to have you.

48:16Thank you very much.

From the publisher

Luke Laretive joins Adam and Adir to unpack how Seneca approaches active investing, why its small-cap fund uses an unusually aligned fee structure, and where he still sees opportunities in an increasingly passive market.

They dig into Australian Finance Group’s mortgage and lending business, HMC Capital’s brutal repricing, HealthCo and Healthscope, DigiCo, private credit and why the market may be overlooking some very cheap assets.

00:00 - Luke Laretive and Seneca

16:05 - AFG Deep Dive

32:14 - HMC Capital Deep Dive

40:11 - HealthCo, DigiCo and Private Credit


This episode was part of a paid partnership with Seneca Financial Solutions. We thank them for supporting the pod and keeping all of our content free.

Visit https://senecafs.com.au/ to learn more.

Join us on Substack for articles, news and more: https://www.thecontrarianspod.com/

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