TDI Podcast: Wile E. Coyote Market

6 Sep 2026 · 1 h 5 min · 21 chapters

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In short

“Wile E. Coyote market” framing for why markets keep rising despite accumulating risks: oil/diesel supply stress, global rate repricing, yen/carry-trade volatility, and potential cracks in private credit/private equity. The episode also covers Fed policy expectations (likely “watch and wait” into September/October), Treasury bond buybacks as “cosmetic” (Operation Twist-like), and commodities’ role as embedded inflation hedges (diesel crack spreads, copper for data centers, fertilizer impacts).

Guest backgrounds

Steve Sosnick, Chief Investment Strategist at Interactive Brokers; also heads IBKR Security Services (formerly Timber Hill). Former equity risk manager/options market maker; led IBKR into Canada; long career building algorithmic/electronic trading strategies; frequent CNBC/Barron’s commentator.

Key claims

Problems only become “problems” when investors perceive them (2006–07 Bear Stearns example). Higher-for-longer rates reflect global supply/demand for bonds plus fiscal/inflation fears. September seasonality is often weak but not reliably bearish; investors should stay invested. Private credit echoes 2008 due to refinancing walls and weaker underwriting after low-rate tailwinds.

Notable examples

Diesel at all-time highs; yen up ~2% in two days; Bear Stearns 2007; private equity “frozen” deals; Blackstone fund redemptions; diesel crack spreads and Europe’s refinery constraints from Ukraine/Russia; US inventories ~41 days; Treasury bond buyback timing around midterms.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

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Market Overview with Steve Sosnick

0:17 to 11:06

Discussion on current market conditions, oil prices, and economic factors.

“Horowitz & Company, from seed through harvest, cultivating financial success.”

Exploring Market Perceptions and Nihilism

11:08 to 14:00

Exploration of why market participants may not perceive risks as problems.

“So I have a lot to talk to you about, but I want to warm this discussion up a little bit and talk about how is nothing a problem?”

Existential Nihilism in Markets

14:00 to 14:40

Explore the concept of nihilism in the context of market perceptions and risks.

“only way I'm ever going to, you know, get ahead if I, you know, unless if I take these kinds of risks.”

Reflections on the 2006 Crisis

14:40 to 15:40

The host shares personal experiences and insights from the 2006 financial crisis.

“If it's not perceived as a problem, therefore there is no problem.”

Bear Stearns and Market Reactions

15:40 to 16:40

Discussion of Bear Stearns and how markets react to impending financial troubles.

“It was staring people in the face, to go back to that period.”

Financial Headwinds in Current Markets

16:40 to 17:40

Analyzing current financial headwinds and drawing parallels to past crises.

“He's like, what's the market cap of Bear Stearns?”

Changing Dynamics of Equity Markets

17:40 to 19:20

Examining the shift in supply-demand dynamics in equity markets over recent years.

“Yeah, turns out everything was out there.”

Challenges for Private Equity Firms

19:20 to 21:40

Exploring the difficulties faced by private equity firms in the current market landscape.

“But given the current background, the biggest cash flow generators are now actually cash flow neutral or actually out there borrowing money like crazy and have huge deferred liabilities.”

The Impact of Low Interest Rates

21:40 to 23:40

Discussing how low interest rates affected investment behavior post-COVID.

“Yeah, that was, that was pretty much exactly what he said.”

Due Diligence and Market Risks

23:40 to 24:30

Highlighting the importance of due diligence amid market pressures and rapid investment decisions.

“The one pager, they thought it was a good, we're going to do a one pager for you.”
Show all 21 chapters

Market Dynamics and FOMO Insurance

24:30 to 26:20

Exploring the concept of FOMO insurance and its effects on market behaviors.

“Blind offering or blind, blind, blind pool.”

Market Strategies and Selling Discipline

28:00 to 29:10

Learn about the implications of writing calls and maintaining sell discipline in volatile markets.

“I've been doing a lot of buy rights, and I find I'm just having to buy back the stock, buy back the options, I'm sorry, at higher prices than where I sold them.”

September's Historical Volatility

29:10 to 31:10

Explore the historical trends of market performance in September and the concept of seasonality.

“So one of the things that we've talked about many times this time of year, we're getting towards the September time, there's some volatility.”

Psychology of Market Behavior

31:10 to 33:00

Understand the psychological factors influencing market movements during volatile months.

“So September, you can say September can be a very volatile month.”

Influence of Fed Policy on Markets

33:00 to 34:35

Discuss how current Fed policies and statements impact market perceptions and investor actions.

“I can't buy my kid, the GI Joe with the Kung Fu grip.”

Global Bond Market Trends and Inflation

34:35 to 42:00

Analyze the implications of rising global bond rates and inflation concerns on market dynamics.

“Because markets have been – well, so Fed policy.”

Market Dynamics Ahead of Midterms

42:00 to 47:56

The discussion centers on the Federal Reserve's actions and their potential impact on the market as midterm elections approach.

“And then the next meeting is the end of October, which is like literally the week before the midterm.”

Commodities and Oil Market Concerns

47:56 to 55:31

Analyzing the current state of commodities and the implications of oil supply issues in the market.

“I want to talk about commodities because quietly in the background, commodities, for a lot of different reasons.”

Wile E. Coyote Market Analogy

55:31 to 55:55

A metaphor describing the market's precarious state, likening it to Wile E. Coyote running off a cliff.

“And, you know, As long as that psychology prevails or until some group of people say, oh, wait a minute, we're out at the edge of a cliff here or we're out over the edge of the cliff, it persists until it doesn't.”

Understanding Market Volatility

56:00 to 1:02:12

Explore the metaphor of the market as a sinkhole and its implications for volatility.

“Let me give you something, if I may, if you can use it.”

Reflections on the Discussion

1:02:12 to 1:03:04

Reflect on key insights from the conversation and implications for investors.

“So we had a lot of the things that I was thinking initially that I brought to him, interestingly, on the same page.”
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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:01The Disciplined Investor is all about you, your money, and the markets. Sit back and get ready for this edition of The Disciplined Investor Podcast.

0:11Steve Sosnick:This episode of The Disciplined Investor is sponsored by Horowitz & Company. If you're looking for a portfolio manager, look no further. Horowitz & Company, from seed through harvest, cultivating financial success.

0:30There's a gigantic sponge starting to suck up liquidity, a big reversal in the jobs numbers, a rate hike clearly in play. And we are talking the Wiley Coyote market. Beep, beep, with our guest, Steve Sosnick, Chief Investment Strategist at Interactive Brokers. All this and much more on episode number 989 of the Disciplined Investor Podcast.

1:07here we go another fine day for a podcast thanks for joining me i'm andrew horowitz i want to remind you that before we begin anything today that we have added some social media we put on um one of the things is instagram like linkedin as well but instagram i want to make sure that you are getting that content because that content is pretty good uh it's snippets it's video it's audio and I want to make sure that you follow us. So go over to Instagram. Horowitz and company is the handle that we will publish on for that. And I think that you'll find it kind of interesting, refreshing some of the things that we're finding because one of the things we're doing is we're actually looking for the greatest content that we can have in terms of what matches the actual best snippets, if you will, of the show.

1:57So if you go over to Instagram, Horowitz and Company, definitely give a follow there and start following that so you figure out what's going on. And we'll have that throughout the week of the current episode that comes out. So we're just starting this, just began this. And I want to make sure, again, that we start to see some people commenting, thoughts from you. What are you thinking? What do you like? What don't you like? some suggestions. Maybe you can throw us some guest suggestions that way as well. Whatever you want to do, but make sure to go over there and do that. Now this week, what happened this week?

2:30What didn't happen this week? Another week of craziness, of interesting things that happened, some fascinating things, but I can't ignore the fact that clearly oil was in play this week. There was no question that oil was substantially part of the conversation, the dollar also, but oil in particular, that rose significantly. We have the war that's still going on. We have the fact that we're going to be bombing Iran into oblivion again, taking them out, right? We're going to wipe out their entire country if they don't or if they do this to us, if we don't do this. and there still is a big question that is burning a hole into a lot of people's thoughts.

3:14And that really relates to the idea of, you know, where are we with oil supplies? Now, we're going to get into that discussion with our guests as a lot of other things that we're going to get into. But I'm just kind of trying to grease the wheels a little bit for you to start thinking about the things that are going on. One of the things that we did see that was unbelievable was that diesel prices are at an all-time high in areas around the world. They're extraordinarily high here in the U.S. But when you look at the prices in places like Europe, my God, how are the truckers surviving? The inflation rate is definitely going to be impacted.

3:54The fact that we're seeing a subdued inflation rate that we saw in the last PCE is something that you want to scratch your head about. Next Friday, we expect the CPI, the PPI to come out. A little bit of a lag there because of the Labor Day holiday. And hopefully you'll be enjoying that day, last day officially of the summer. Some people in the Northeast go back to school at that point. Down here in Florida, we've been in school for weeks already. But what you have right now is a very interesting environment It is a concerning environment It's an environment that I think right now we all have to look at and wonder What is it that is holding things up?

4:35I think the answers are somewhat clear The answers are that investors have a long-term view of things, number one And number two, there's a lot of money sloshing in the system And number three, I think the most important part of this is that the incredible amount of funds that are being pushed out vis-a-vis the build out of data centers, the costs that are being added to the system is adding some jobs. We saw the jobs number on Friday this week that came out pretty strong by all imaginable amazement that we already saw a significant amount of overall change from what we just saw last month. That's going into play about, well, maybe the Fed's going to be doing something at their next meeting.

5:27I don't suspect that's going to happen. And again, another item we're going to get into. I have this all written down, some of the things that I'm thinking about that I want to talk with our guest today. But the question about this Iranian conflict they're calling it now, the idea that this is a conflict, not a war, is pretty ridiculous. But a conflict sounds better than a war because nobody wants to be at war. We could have a police action. We could have a ceasefire in a non-war. Or we can have a conflict, but really people still die in those conflicts. And it still is a devastating situation for all countries, money that's spent, etc.

6:09This is not going away anytime soon. And I think we need to all get really very used to the fact that we're having higher costs for longer. All the costs that are related to this oil situation, just that on its own from a transportation, from a production, from petrochemical businesses, all that's major. And then when you couple that in what we saw the latter part of last week, that huge, I mean, outsized, incredible move of the yen. It was nothing but extraordinary. About 2 % move on the currency in two days. Enormous. And we question. Was it intervention? Was a BOJ finally caving into the fact and the reality that they need to raise rates?

7:00Is that something? It's meaningful if that's the case. But you have to, again, wonder, was it just a quick short covering on some intervention actions that maybe will reverse like we've seen time and time again over the last however many years? They don't call the yen trade, shorting, going along the yen, the widowmaker trade for nothing. It has created a lot of controversy. It's created a lot of angst. It's created a lot of wealth destruction. And I think that the BOJ, why they probably have to eventually raise rates with what's going on there and to keep pace of things, but they're not. the yen is a huge instrument in what's called the carry trade, borrowing yen or shorting the yen to invest in other currencies and other things around the world.

7:56And you need to start thinking about, well, how much of the yen has been used recently to support the buying of fill in the blank? Is it other currencies only? Is it bonds? Is it maybe some of the build out through Korea and companies that are utilizing that as a place to fund what they're doing for the data center? I mean, is it a more than meets the eye is what I'm saying of just a carry trade, which is usually just a currency related? Big question. And the move that we saw, I guess I really want to ask if that is signaling, if there's something bigger that's going to happen. That is something I think we need to really need to think about Because that kind of move when you have it in such a sudden type of situation Is it signaling?

8:52Is it? Listen now Is it signaling something bigger? And I think it possibly is As we get into the situation where there's all this money And when I say all this money I'm talking about all this money Not the millions Not the billions We're talking about trillions of dollars now that are in debt around the world. Here, it's just$40 trillion in the U.S., but around the world, the amount of private credit, private equity that's trying to borrow all this, utilize this, the big money now all of a sudden is starting to possibly get a little shaky on some of this. As we see rates in the U.S., in Japan, jumping as dramatically as they have been, the fact is something could break.

9:37Big questions. So many questions that I have. So I thought of just listening, instead of just listening to me about this, I'm going to stop here and bring in someone who has a lot more knowledge about this than I do. His name is Steve Sosnick. He's our guest today. And Steve is a chief strategist at Interactive Brokers. He also serves as head trader of IBKR Security Services, which is the firm's trading division, formerly known as Timber Hill. And he's a member of Interactive Brokers Group, the firm's holding company. He's had numerous roles since joining the company back in 95 as equity risk manager and an options market maker.

10:26And he led the firm into Canada in 1998. and much of his career has been spent quietly developing and implementing algorithmic and electronic trading strategies for stocks and options before moving into a more visible role as chief options strategist and later chief strategist. So he's been all over. You've seen him last week. He was on CNBC. Barron's, he's written up a lot, does an amazing job of writing strategy and updates and market updates that are very insightful, thoughtful, and deep in detail, but yet approachable. So let's get right to this discussion. And Steve Sosnick from IBKR. It's so wonderful having you on.

11:07Thanks for coming on board today. My pleasure, Andrew. Great to be here. So I have a lot to talk to you about, but I want to warm this discussion up a little bit and talk about how is nothing a problem? We have$40 trillion of debt. We have wars. We have oil issues. We have inflation. Nothing's a problem. How is that?

11:33I've sometimes referred to this market as Spider-Man. You know, the wall of worry seems rather insurmountable, but clambers right up at every single time. So, you know, it's not a problem until everybody decides it's a problem. And somehow we've gone years without deciding that anything is a problem. So, you know, what me now? Why me worry? You know, I'm getting Alfred E. Newman wrong. What me worry?

12:03Not everybody remembers who that is, showing our age there. Is it possible that there's a understanding, an unspoken understanding, or maybe even an outright understanding that maybe let's not worry about today or tomorrow? We've seen the chart that goes that we've talked about bottom left, top right. We've talked about the idea that once you stretch out, risk dissipates when you extend your time horizon. Are people not only bought into them, but is it convincing enough that now where it used to be that we have a war and everybody freaks out, it's like now it's like, well, okay, that war is not going to last forever.

12:39Inflation is not going to last forever. A market collapse is not going to last forever. And why not get on the train now? Because we know that eventually it's getting to the place we want to be, which is, by the way, what you and I have probably talked about at nauseam since we started teaching, educating and reporting on this whole industry, right? Yeah, I mean, you know what? Things are a problem only to the extent people perceive them as such. If you don't perceive it being a problem, then you can say it's not. I don't know that that's actually true, but it seems to persist for long periods of time where we can, you know, for 15 years, everything has been a buying opportunity.

13:19And what's the old proverb? If you're, you know, if you're a hammer, everything looks like a nail. And so if, you know, this has been, people have gotten so used to everything being a buying opportunity that somehow everything will work out okay. The Fed will ride to the rescue or the fiscal authorities will ride to the rescue or somehow some new technology will ride to the rescue, then what, then, you know, why not be essentially nihilistic about it? Nothing, you know, if you, if you really, you know, I've used the term financial nihilism many times. Some of it applies to younger investors basically sort of throwing up their hands and saying, you know what, this is the only way I'm ever going to, you know, get ahead if I, you know, unless if I take these kinds of risks.

14:05That's part of it. But there's a different kind of more existential nihilism. And I don't mean to go philosophical on us here, but sort of a nihilism that nothing really matters right now. Throw anything you want at it. Inflation, yeah, no big deal. Higher interest rates, yeah, no big deal. It is. But if nobody really perceives it as such, at least in the, you know, the market can go on for markets can be irrational a lot longer than you and I can remain solvent. And so if If nobody perceives this as a problem, is it a problem? No, that's exactly the point. No, no, no. The answer to your question is no.

14:43If it's not perceived as a problem, therefore there is no problem. I mean, that is a fact, right? So as much as we have all these players talking about it, until it's a problem. Now, I can remember back very distinctly in 2006. I was freaking out. I was totally off the wall. I was literally standing on desks throwing things, freaking out. Now, people, what is wrong with you? Why is nobody paying attention to the fact that we have this going on, the packaged products and all the things and banks and the issue with risk, all this that was going on, right? We know. I'm not going to restate all that.

15:12In 2006, I was early and I was dumb, right? Everybody's like, what's wrong with you? What are you talking about? I am telling you. As a matter of fact, the back of my first book that I wrote, you read it. It says, this was written in 2006, 7, 7 is when it came out, I believe, that we're going to see a drop in markets and a financial crisis like we haven't seen since the Great Depression. I wrote that. That was a year and a half before. And everybody's like, well, you're dumb, you know? And it was clear then. But we'll see what happens here. I don't know. It was not. See, here's the thing. It was staring people in the face, to go back to that period.

15:50It was staring people in the face in 2007. I remember very vividly a conversation I had with Thomas Petterfee, the founder of Interactive Brokers. We were options market makers primarily at the time. Interactive Brokers existed, but our market making business was much bigger than our customer business. I got in the elevator a little floor below. He gets in the parking garage. he got in a floor above. And what's new? You know, Thomas is a man of many talents, but he's not necessarily a conversationalist, particularly, you know, particularly first thing in the morning. What's new? And I said, you know, I've read, just read this story on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.

16:30It's, it's blowing my mind. And that is that Bear Stearns may have to write off$20 billion in, you know, in bad hedge fund trades. And he was like,$20 billion? dollars. He's like, what's the market cap of Bear Stearns? I said, I think it's around$20 billion. I'm in an elevator. I don't know the number, but it was, it was, I was in the right ballpark. And he said, are you telling me that Bear Stearns is bankrupt? And I said, that wasn't how I was, that wasn't where I was going, but yeah, I think I am telling you that Bear Stearns is bankrupt. And we, you know, he said, come to my office. And we, we, we basically laid out a strategy, you know, where, and we tried not to sell puts in financial institutions, uh, pretty much, you know, for the next year and a half, easier said than done, but you know, that was, it was, it was very helpful.

17:22You know, we, we, we did pretty well in that period. Um, I'm not going to say that was the only reason, but that made it, but this is the problem, but it wasn't, but that was, I think, February of 2007 markets didn't even really react for another year. right even they didn't react they reacted temporarily to some of the bad news but then they just got right back on their saddle exactly and so eventually the weight of the bad news caught up to it but it wasn't again it wasn't a problem until people perceived it as such basically until bear basically until bear stearns literally went out of business it was not perceived it was not perceived as a problem and then everybody's like oh my gosh what you know what What other, what else is out there?

18:06Well, turns out - Who else? Yeah, turns out everything was out there. Yeah. And there's a lot of that stuff. There is a lot of that stuff lurking now. I had a very prominent New York City restructuring attorney say to me over lunch one day that he thought there were echoes of 2008 in the private credit industry. There are major financial headwinds right now that I think we're taking for granted. We had huge tailwinds behind the equity markets for the past 15 years. The supply-demand dynamic favored less supply of equities, right? We didn't have a ton of IPOs. We had companies buying back stock like crazy.

18:51We had private equity taking companies private. it. And it was all easily said and done because interest rates were low and there wasn't much inflation and companies were spinning, you know, a lot of the best companies were spinning off cash. Boom. Take it where we are today with interest rates flirting with, you know, multi-year highs, but still not actually still not back to, you know, if we get about 5 % on the 10 year would be the highest rates in the 21st century, but it was routine to have interest rates of five, 10-year rates above 5%. But given the current background, the biggest cash flow generators are now actually cash flow neutral or actually out there borrowing money like crazy and have huge deferred liabilities.

19:40I think we forget that when a data center contract is signed, the beneficiaries of the spending crow about it. Oh, we've got, you know, see, we've got all these accounts. We've got all these accounts receivable. On the other hand, you know, in the time it takes to build a data center, there's a lot of money that's still got to be spent, a lot of money that's got to be raised. So you've got that working. So the big, you know, the big buyback kings are not, you know, they're buying, they're buying back basically to stay on the treadmill, buy back what their employees exercise, but they're not necessarily reducing their floats.

20:18At the same time, you have higher interest rates, making it harder for M &A to go on. You know, if you're a private equity firm, it's one thing to go out and borrow money at essentially, you know, at very, very low rates, low single digit rates for relatively risky loans, which is what they did. And they did it in spades in 2021 and 22. And keep those numbers in mind for a second, because I'm going to come back to that. But with rates where they are now, a lot of them are sort of frozen. I mentioned this actually, we're taping this on Thursday. I actually literally mentioned this on air on Tuesday on CNBC.

20:58I was at the Stock Exchange. Ended up meeting a guy at the Stock Exchange who was a private equity guy and said, you know, what are you seeing on all this stuff? And he said, oh, our business is frozen with rates at these levels. I can't go out and borrow money to buy new companies I've got stuff on my books that nobody really wants to buy from me You know, he goes, they're doing well, they're not bad companies But I can't buy anymore, I can't sell anymore And a lot of the loans that were made in 2021 and 22 Were five-year loans That's the 47, right? That's your private equity 47 right? The four to seven year out clause that they're trying to do and they try to get in the six year period.

21:39But now, like you said, everybody's frozen. Now all of a sudden they, just to restate this and tell me if I'm on the right track, that you can't get really a loan, you can at a higher rate, but if you have to refinance, now all of a sudden your cap rates are wacko and you can't really provide the returns. So you're stuck. Yeah, that was, that was pretty much exactly what he said. You know, I, I didn't expect to be like ratified literally within 15 minutes of making a broad statement like that on air. Literally, this guy said it to me, you know, and laid out exactly the problem, you know, as it's been relayed to me, but for him to actually say it, you know, right away.

22:16You know, one of the issues that happened also, the reason the restructuring attorney was so downbeat to me was he said, you know, 20 in that era, think about the immediate post-COVID era, interest rates were zero, real interest rates were essentially negative. So people were just, you know, people were looking for places to put money. And he said a lot of the problem was due diligence was thrown out the window. You had, what would happen would be some sponsor, I'm going to say a private equity firm, it could be any, it could be all different people. But, you know, the sponsor would go to one of your traditional providers of funds, insurance company, pension fund, et cetera, et cetera.

23:01and pitch them this deal. And they'd say, you know what? Looks good on the surface. I'll be back to you in a week or two. We need to do, you know, so we do our customary due diligence. But there was such a rush to funds. They would say, you know, we're closing this thing in 48 hours. You in and you're out. And a lot of times it was, you know, hold my nose. I'm in. Well, why do you think there's so many redemptions right now? Attempted redemptions right now. We just learned today that I think another Blackstone, I think it was a Blackstone fund, you know, basically said they're - By the way, Blackstone is not one of the small, they're not one of the small fly-by-night deals.

23:37These are major players out there. And by the way, the day that you're talking about where the deals were getting closed in 48 hours due to the fact there was so much liquidity out there were the same times when, in fact, SPACs were being outlined on the back of a napkin, right? The one pager, they thought it was a good, we're going to do a one pager for you. Like, dude, I don't want a one pager. I want to know what you're doing. I don't want you drawing all sorts of, you know, Venn diagrams on a deal and saying, here's the amount and you're going to return, you know, 800 % in five years and that's it.

24:06The business model of a SPAC is give me money and I'm going to do something with it. I can't tell you what it is yet because I don't know what it is yet, but give me some money and I'll do my best with it. Right. That is literally breaking down the model.

24:23What did we used to call blind trust? Remember the blind trust deal? Not blind trust. Blind, what's it called? Blind trust? Was that what it's called? Might have been a blind trust, but it was something with blind in it. Yeah. Sorry. But yeah. Blind offering or blind, blind, blind pool. I think it was a blind pool. But I want to get back to some of the things that we talked about. In June, when you were here, your themes at that point, I believe if I recall correctly, was a bit about the market concentration. And we talked about the ratchet trade back then, if you remember, and institutional demand.

24:54were you at that point called FOMO insurance? If I kind of jod down a few notes and look back when we talked about. Looking back on those, and maybe it could be all, I don't know, but which of those themes do you think really proved to be the most prescient and timely and accurate? And would there be any of those that would be carrying over? And would you maybe even revise some today? Well, I think the ratchet effect was a good, very apt descriptor at the time where basically, you know, all news was good news, right? You know, oh, there's a deal coming. We got, we're having constructive talks.

25:34There's something good going on. I lost, I actually at one point did have a count of how many of those we heard. It was like 38 or some crazy. Something like that. But as of now, we're 0 for whatever number it is. But yet the market didn't care because all they needed was an excuse to rally, not a reason to rally. So I think that was part of it. The FOMO insurance, that was more option specific. And I think it still holds to a large extent, not to the same degree. But that was saying that normally when you look at option pricing, you know, we have what's called the skew, which is if you lay out all the various implied volatilities of all the different strikes for a given expiration, typically they always had what we called the Elvis smile.

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26:23It was a sort of an asymmetric curve and it would sort of be trying to do it now. I can't, I can't do it, but it was sort of be like a smile with a little bit of a curve up to the left because the people, people wanted to, you know, downside insurance. The reason for that being there are tend to be natural sellers of calls through buy rights and other strategies of that nature. But sellers of puts tend to want to be incentivized because there's more of a natural, there has historically been more of a natural demand for protection. So the SKUs reflected that. You needed to, you know, there were a little bit for something that was, let's say, 10 % below market versus 10 % above market, you would tend to see higher volatilities on the below market strikes than on the above market strikes for those supply-demand dynamics.

27:14that got flipped on its head. And it's still, I'd say it's more symmetrical now, but what I called the upside was FOMO insurance, because what happened was people were afraid to miss a rally, petrified of missing a rally. So they, so you had, so in many cases, you had institutions holding their nose and saying, you know what, I just can't, I can't go all in at these prices, but I can't risk underperforming. So how do I do that? I buy calls. At the same time, a lot of the traditional call writers got out of the game because if you do nothing but go up, why cap your upside? I was at a conference a couple of months ago where I was speaking and a lot of individual investors, and one of them raised her hand and said, I've been writing calls.

28:04I've been doing a lot of buy rights, and I find I'm just having to buy back the stock, buy back the options, I'm sorry, at higher prices than where I sold them. And what should I do? And I'm like, stop writing calls. If you don't want to sell the stock, don't write the call because right now, you know, a market that, I'm sorry. A market that goes up to the right. When you go to the doctor and you say, yeah, continue. Yeah. So, yeah. So, so there was, so, you know, I don't, I, if you, I don't think it's a wrong idea to have selling discipline. If you think the market is, you know, if you want to sell X, Y, if you bought X, Y, Z stock at, at$70, and you're seeing it now at 95 and you're thinking that was my price target, fine, get paid to write, right.

28:51Get paid, get paid to, to, to, to lock that, you know, at least, you know, put in the sell discipline. But, um, you know, I think the idea that it's just steady income when it's just not the wrong, it's not the right environment. So those two ideas, I think, held up very well, I think, over time.

29:12So one of the things that we've talked about many times this time of year, we're getting towards the September time, there's some volatility. September, October are usually known for their volatility. And I think September goes down. I think, correct me, but I think September goes down as one of the, on average, worst. It's not a terrible month, but on average, the worst month of the year. October is kind of right in there as well. But you recently wrote about seasonality and September's reputation, right?

29:41And the thing about seasonality is that I think we all agree when we look at seasonality, it's not like, oh, September is usually a bad month. So therefore, it's going to be a bad month. Therefore, I have to. It could be a bad month, but it could just be not as good as other months. How much value, how much credence do we need to put on this idea? and with these historical patterns. And when do they become like self-fulfilling prophecies too that becomes, you know, well, we know about it, therefore it's not going to happen. Seasonality is a very fickle friend, is the way I would put it. So yes, you're correct.

30:16September, if you look at the averages, September on average is the worst month of the year. I went back, depending on, pretty much over any time period, if you look back, you know, 10 years, 25 years, et cetera. I look back to the beginning of 25 plus years, the beginning of the 21st century. And September, there were four months that had, there were four months that had negative averages. I don't, I'm forgetting them because I have them written down. I wrote about them in my piece yesterday. I think it was, I think it was like February, June, August, and September. But I may have the, I may have the exact months wrong, but September stood out because the other months were sort of marginal, Like they started with a zero handle.

30:58September started with a minus one handle. But even within September, the last two Septembers were up 5%. I'm talking S &P terms here. I think about 5 % each of those years. The four prior Septembers were ugly. They were down 5 % or more, I think. So September, you can say September can be a very volatile month. But I think the fact and I think it's important to know that, yes, September, if you if you're going to have a first of all, I think what it tells you is be in the market because most months tend to be up. You know, when I look back over all the various time periods over the last, you know, however many years, the majority, the majority of them were up months.

31:43Yeah. But what it means is, you know, I think it's important to understand it. I think it's important to know that, yes, markets have had more than their fair share of hiccups in the September-October period. That, you know, I think it's psychological. I think a lot of institutional investors become more risk averse. You know, I've had a great year. Maybe I don't want to risk losing it. Maybe that wasn't the case the last couple of years. It seems kind of a little bit, it seems that there is a, it's kind of far in advance of the end of the year. You would think that maybe November would be the case where they start doing this, you know, and when September seems a little bit early, doesn't it, for them to have that opinion?

32:30It does, yet November is, I think, the best month of the year. So go figure. I think just, I think for whatever reason, maybe people come back from vacation and sort of look at their position, you know, look at their positions and say, maybe I've been riding this train for a while. Maybe it's time to rebalance. And sometimes the rebalancing gets out of hand. I don't have a great reason for it. You know, one of the things is I always, I often refer to the movie trading places with, you know, the GI Joe with the Kung Fu grip, you know, where Eddie Murphy's learning the commodities markets. And he's like, oh, you know, hold on.

33:03I can't buy my kid, the GI Joe with the Kung Fu grip. They're panicking. They'll get out of the way in a minute. Obviously that's fiction, but it is rooted in, you know, they did actually do their research when they wrote the movie. You know, they did get at least a fair amount of fair amount of the psychology. Right. And I think it was, wasn't it all about, it was all about orange juice futures if I'm, if I'm not mistaken at the end. It wasn't concentrated orange juice and. Concentrated orange juice futures. Funny. It was actually supposed to, what I read, it was supposed to be pork bellies, but they, they, And it was supposed to like dump a load of pork bellies on their lawn in the snow.

33:45And that was apparently perceived as being silly. And there is an IBKR podcast out there. Episode number three, where Thomas Pederfee tells me that he believes that he was one of the inspirations for the movie. Oh, really? Mm-hmm. Which character? there. Do we know a character? Wait, don't tell me. People are going to have to go there. People go there. People go there. Look up the IBKR podcast. Go to episode three. Yeah, yeah. Let's talk about switch gears. I think the episode is called You Mean You Don't Have to Know Anything to Do This or something like that. And that was the root of a... It was a bet made and I'll leave the rest up.

34:32Yeah. Let's talk about Fed Policy. Well, there's a clock. Because markets have been – well, so Fed policy. And with regard to – I'm very thankful, by the way, that we're not totally overwhelmed and oversaturated with every single guest on every single show talking about the Fed. Although it's starting to pick up a little bit because there was a period of time there that every question of every guest that came on, not here, but other shows was, hey, what do you think the Fed's going to do right now? Now, I know that's an important issue, and I know that there is a lot of that. I'm going to talk to you about that right now because I'm going to talk about what markets are doing because it appeared that markets are repricing the rate outlook now under Chair Warsh, which he basically, in my opinion, threatened to – not threatened.

35:20He dared, dared the markets. You take over. You figure it out. We'll come on the backside and let the markets run with it. But do you think that investors, there's a misunderstanding now about the current rate environment that we're in? Or what is exactly happening? Because this is not only specific to the U.S. The parabolic move on the Japanese JGBs is pretty unbelievable. Yeah. Two very important points here. Let me talk in some ways the broader one first. And if you look at basically pretty much every developed market, if you look at the performance of their 10-year notes from the start of the year to now, they're up double-digit basis points.

36:10It's just a question of how many double digits. Japan is pushing triple-digit basis points. The US is, I think, around 75 basis points. But even something like Norway, I think, is up like 20-some-odd basis points. So it's global. Wow. The reason I say that is, yes, there's a few reasons. First of all, there's inflation fears. And we'll get back to that because that gets back to the first part of your question. Global inflation fears or fiscal concerns, let me say. And I think the situation in the Persian Gulf is not helping the inflation fears. And consequently, as rates rise, it's actually a feedback loop, because then you can get more concerned about the effect that interest rate payments have on a country's debt and deficit, and that those tend to spiral.

37:01So because the higher the interest rate, the higher the debt, the higher the interest repayment on the loans or the harder it is to refinance them. And that, of course, raises more questions about sustainability, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And so there are credible reasons to think that maybe we're in a different secular period when it comes to bonds. Plus, I alluded to this earlier. You now have companies needing to go borrow hundreds of billions, if not trillions of dollars themselves. So you've got huge competition for these funds from people who used to just not know what to literally, in some cases, Apple literally does not know what to do with all its cash.

37:48They're not among the big borrowers. But, you know, Microsoft, Alphabet, these companies, cash came out of every pore and now they need to go get money. So they're competing with these governments. And again, I mentioned at the same time, private equity is going to need to refinance some of its older loans. There's a huge competition for funds out there. And so I think you add all those factors in and you see a bond market, global bond market, where rates are trending higher. There's a multitude of reasons. Some of it is basic, and a lot of it is basic just supply and demand. But then when you say about like, then let's throw the Fed into this.

38:31Sure. The Warsh came out of the box saying he is a sing basically a single mandate Fed chair. I counted it. And in his last press conference, I think he used the term inflation 20 or 30 times. And I think he used the word labor like three times. It's it's just not it's just not their focus. And I mentioned Waller's comments, you know, thinking about Waller's comments today, you know, Thursday, where he basically said, oh, labor is a foregone conclusion. I'm concerned about inflation. So you're stealing that out of the Fed right now. And by the way, Waller had a lot of comments today, just on and on and on and on, which was like, I thought they were going to kind of chill out on that a little bit.

39:16But he definitely took the spotlight today. He did. He did. And then and as we're taping this, markets are responding very positively because there they they heard the part about I'm inclined to keep rates steady at the next meeting instead of if inflation is bad. I mean, I'm going to suggest raising rates. So maybe, you know, we didn't hear that. Yeah. So market again, markets hear what they want to hear. But, you know, one of the comments Warsh made early on was I want to see stock markets playing the playing the ball, not the ref. you know, basically the sports analogy saying, you know, don't tell me what you think the ref is going to call, watch what's going on on the field.

39:57I think to some extent, he's forcing us to do that by not speaking much. I saw a chart today that he is like the least talkative Fed chair at this point in his tenure. I think all the last, you know, called the last six or seven. So he doesn't say much. And we've gotten used to a very communicative Fed. So we do have to sort of read between the lines and maybe we do have to read the data, but we don't do that all the time. On the last jobs report, which was by all means pretty much atrocious, a loss of 23 ,000 jobs and a big revision downward, markets rallied because, and I wrote at the time, they're playing the ref, not the ball today, because it was, okay, we're not going to raise rates right now.

40:43And we're very much enthralled to this will they, won't they idea. of will they raise rates in September? Will they not raise rates in September? My feeling all along is they're not inclined to raise rates in September. I've been pretty consistent about this. Do you feel the same way I do that politically they just don't want to open that can of worms? Yeah. It would be suicidal. Yeah. I think it would just, you've got a president who wants lower rates. He's not getting that. That's off the table. And I think any real follower of the economy understands that, that rates are not getting cut anytime soon.

41:23But I think the idea of raising rates ahead of a midterm election will create a lot of unnecessary issues for the Fed. I think they're probably better off waiting. I think their credit, you know, someone asked me recently, does this stretch their credibility if they keep talking about, you know, inflation and not doing anything about it. Yeah, it probably does. But, you know, September is, you're in that sort of yellow light area about, you know, the Fed is, you know, in that caution zone. Maybe they don't want to start antagonizing the president now. And then the next meeting is the end of October, which is like literally the week before the midterm.

42:06So I can't imagine they do anything there, barring like something absolutely crazy that requires them to step in. which puts it to me, puts December on the table. Will the market wait that long? I don't know. Somebody raised the point, you know, our market's fighting the Fed. And I'm like, they're not fighting the Fed because the Fed's not doing anything. And that's another reason why you can sort of, why we have this glass half full approach because we can debate whether the right odds for next month are 50%, 68%, 36%, all of which were on the table in the last week and a half, by the way. But bottom line - bit of trouble hearing you on a couple of those points, but I will say that, you know, I agree.

42:47I mean, the Fed is, while we don't want to believe that there's a political side to the Fed, the fact of the matter is that there's sometimes, I think, an agreeable by all parties that, you know, within the range around an election, I don't necessarily know why, by the way. I really never understood why. The thought of raising or lowering rates right before election would have anything to do with the election, but maybe people will be happy or sad about what's going on. But if in fact that the Fed is supposed to have a separation from politics, then therefore most people believe that's what it is.

43:21I don't know. The whole thing's nonsense in my opinion, by the way. But I agree that instead of facing the wrath of a pissed off political party, right, the one that's currently in position that could lose and then blaming, it's just better off to stay out of it because then you definitely have a credibility issue on the backside. Yeah, that's exactly it. So I think the path of least resistance is watch and wait, stress your data dependency, stress your

43:56enthusiasm for being diligent about inflation. Remember also at the same time, the treasury in some ways is working against the Fed, literally. Besson's bond buyback bonanza, a lot of alliteration there, bond buyback program, which is supposed to start next week on the 9th and end very, I'm sure not at all coincidentally on November 4th. November 5th is midterm day, by the way. But that is very reminiscent of Bernanke's Operation Twist, which was a form of QE. Were they spent? But it's not. Wait, wait, wait. Hold on. I have some thoughts on this. First of all. Sure, please. It's Besson's Big Bond Blunder.

44:46Besson's Big Bond Blunder. That's my alliteration, by the way. And how the markets are, in fact, and how we've turned it into the discussion of Operation Twist, the differential between this and Operation Twist is Operation Twist also aligned with quantitative easing because there was money still being created by the Fed. The Treasury's not creating anything. They're just moving their buying from the short on the maturity base to the longs. And we saw what happened. It didn't do anything. The commentary. So I'm not exactly sure. Do you believe, is this an Operation Twist? Or is it just Bessence, like what he did with the pad of paper where he showed he was buying the yen and that was supposed to do something dramatic from just the optics.

45:35Yeah. Is this rearranging the deck chairs to some extent? Yes, that is what it is. And it's totally cosmetic and the market sees that it's cosmetic. Okay. So basically this Operation Twist, maybe? Yeah. I mean, yeah. You could certainly argue that this is either rearranging the deck chairs, on the ship or even more of a blatant attempt to just move the market one way or the other. We know that the president wants lower long-term rates as much as anything else. And the Treasury, we can argue about Fed independence, but the Treasury is not independent. The Secretary of the Treasury works for the president.

46:16Right. And that's what they're trying to do. What's a little disturbing to me at some level is Besant knows this isn't going to work. He has to. And he knows this has to be temporary. Right? I mean, he started his career working for Soros when Soros broke the pound because the Bank of England could not keep the pound at the low end of the European exchange mechanism indefinitely. He knew that. In 2013, Besant had a big trade on his own where he basically did the same thing in the yen. So he knows that if markets are moving in a tidal direction, you can't – central banks or fiscal authorities can't fight that without actually doing something.

47:10Might the Bank of Japan raise rates? Yes. Yes, might the government of Japan do something to try to rectify the fiscal situation? Yes, that's what shifts the tides. It's not just a matter of, oh, let's go out there and buy a few yen, or let's go out there and move a few treasuries. What's going on here does nothing to fix the secular situation that you and I just discussed about longer term rates, both in the US and globally. This is just a cosmetic move. But again, the fact that it's time to end the day before the midterms, that tells us right on its face exactly what the aim is. So let's again, let's take another turn.

47:58I want to talk about commodities because quietly in the background, commodities, for a lot of different reasons. You want to look at oil, why? Well, of course we know. And this whole thing I've talked about this week on a podcast earlier this week, I talked about how, you know, my concern is that we really have a lot less oil than we think. As a matter of fact, crack spreads on diesel are out of control. I think the oil prices in Europe today were some absurd number, like$165, converted$165 per barrel or something. There's been some really crazy things going on. But down here, we're like, ah, it's only$4 a gallon, which isn't terrible in most areas.

48:32But in the background for investors, we're seeing the commodities are working pretty well, right? Everybody's focusing on AI. Everybody's focusing on technology. So what role of commodities play in a portfolio today? I have my thoughts on that. I'd like to hear yours. I think commodities play an important role in a portfolio today. You know, I always hold a little bit of gold and some other stuff. I just always have. But I think in general, yes, I always hold energy shares for that reason, for the same reason. because I think the needle on inflation, bottom line, let's take it from its most basic thing.

49:14If the Fed wants 2 % inflation, that's not saying they expect prices to go down. That's saying their goal is for prices to just rise really slowly, that they're still going up. So it's moving in that direction. And you raise some very important points. Copper, Dr. Copper is sometimes, right? They say, right? It's, right? If we're building data centers, you need wires in those data centers. You need copper to do the wiring. You need all kinds of commodities to build these things out. At the same time, the crude oil prices have been very firm. I saw something that US inventories were as low as like 41 days or something like that.

49:57So we're basically not refilling. We're just using up what we have. I think China's doing the same, but they had much bigger inventories. so they can get away with it longer. At the same time, remember that you and I don't use crude oil. We use gasoline. We use home heating oil, depending on how you heat your house, or natural gas, depending on how you heat your house. The truckers use diesel, and you refer to the crack spread. Refining capacity is not getting any better. By the way, building out copper mines, refineries, oil wells, all these things take a long time. So you can have relatively long periods of supply-demand relative imbalances.

50:46On top of it, the Ukraine war is not helping the crack spread either. That's why Europe is going so crazy because a lot of refining capacity, particularly for diesel, comes from Russia and Ukraine. And they're busy bombing each other's refineries. So, you know, and then diesel is used in everything. Anything that gets from point A to point B probably utilizes diesel for at least some part of its trip. So it's a very sneaky embedded cost. Agricultural commodities, the cost of fertilizers going up. Part of that is because of the situation in the Gulf. Part of it has to do with El Nino and the anchovy crop, the anchovy catch being down.

51:27And so you talked about sort of like the storm that nobody's watching back to 2007, 2008. This is problematic because what I've rattled off is not just one thing. It's several things that were already probably in place before the activities in the Persian Gulf. And those did nothing to make it any better. They just piled on at a very inopportune time. And it's interesting because I think back to what we started talking about in the beginning, which is the idea that there's a lot of chatter. There's a lot of things that are being put out there. Markets are seeing what they want to see. And when we see that the 65 billion barrels of proven reserves in Venezuela that somehow we got our hands on, nobody asked the question, how long is that going to take?

52:22because essentially, for the most part, Chevron's doing a little bit down there, but there is no operations down there and there is clearly no refining going on down there. And what kind of oil? It's the heavy, it's the sour, it's the very difficult to refine, very expensive to refine. And that process is going to take years. We're talking about down to 41 days. We're talking about 10 % inventories in other places. We're talking about the salt caverns in New Orleans, in Louisiana and in Texas that are now questionable in terms of their ability to hold because of the drying out of their walls. And again, nobody seems to really be caring about it.

53:06And if you do care, and if you do say something about it, they're probably gonna hit you back in the face about what an idiot. I feel like that's just what I started the conversation about back in 2006 when I was sitting on the desk, kids ranting and stuff, cutting off my tie and tearing my shirt off and saying, people, why don't you listen? Oh, that guy's an idiot. I'm not, I'll just finish my one point here and then get back to your comment on it. But I'm not saying, I'm not suggesting, I'm not, by the way, that we're in for an all out, absolute, any day now kind of situation, right? I think there's too much money still sloshing around in the markets from Inflation Reduction Act, from the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, from all sorts of crazy things that are out there, the builds, the leakage of government money, of sovereign wealth funds, et cetera.

53:49However, all that seems, it seems to be a gigantic sponge that's starting to suck that up and dry things out a little bit. And that's kind of how I see my concern over the next six months. I would push back on you if I thought there was anything to really push back on. You and I are making the same sort of points, right? You know, I was calling it a tailwind turned headwind. You use the term sponge sucking up the liquidity. Both are appropriate. But again, you know, like markets, if everyone is convinced that everything is fine, then it is fine. It's, you know, the Wiley Coyote effect. You know, I don't want to use that here because it implies it would fall off a total cliff.

54:38I don't know that that's happening. But sort of, you know, chasing the roadrunner off the cliff and continuing to run, run, run, and he's fine until he looks down and goes, oh, and then he falls. You know, I think that to some extent that's a sort of appropriate analogy for the market right now where, you know, if nobody recognizes that maybe we're, you know, maybe we're standing on some much less stable. precipice than we thought we were, then, you know, why bother? Why not? Why, you know, again, going back to the FOMO insurance idea, you see on a, we're taping this Thursday, you saw on a day like today, it didn't take much because as all it takes is, you know, a little bit of a rally and that FOMO kicks in.

55:29I can't miss that rally. I got to jump in. I got to chase. And, you know, As long as that psychology prevails or until some group of people say, oh, wait a minute, we're out at the edge of a cliff here or we're out over the edge of the cliff, it persists until it doesn't. I know that's a terrible market analysis or a terrible market strategy, but to some extent, I think it's true. Yeah. Let me give you something, if I may, if you can use it. I'm giving you permission to use this if you choose to. The Wile E. Coyote, I like that. We're going to use that. But how about this? It's a sinkhole. Basically, a sinkhole.

56:14You got this giant area that's a river that's running underneath a road, a rock bed, a piece of land. And everything is fine, right? You could drive your car over. Everything is great. But there's still a lot of destruction being done underneath the surface that's invisible by most, unless you had some kind of equipment to figure it out that could pierce through the ground, etc. And you really don't know about it. Most times you don't know about it. There's no sinkhole service out there that's going to do a predictive nature of that. But the sinkhole, once it does open, kind of sucks everything back, sucks everything in, and it takes it and sweeps it all away.

56:49That's the way that I'm looking at things when I see this. It's a big sinkhole environment right now. Yeah, undercutting underneath a stable surface. You've got stuff that you can't see that will come get you. I've used something similar, not the term sinkhole, but I've used something similar to describe market volatility to a large extent. Because, you know, people ask me all the time, oh, you know, VIX is 15. There's no fear. Part one is VIX is not a fear gauge. It plays one on TV. But it is a very dry measure of implied volatility expectations. Yes, we expect when we have volatility, we expect more volatility.

57:30When we have no volatility, we expect no volatility. And that's why it tends to act like a fear gauge. Or my other analogy there is, you know, when I was trading volatility, I was an umbrella salesman. Nobody wanted to buy my umbrellas when the sun was shining. As soon as the clouds came, they would pay anything for them, especially once it started raining. But one of the things that we see underneath the market is there's very high levels of dispersion in individual stocks. And so what happens is when all the stocks are moving in the same direction, they never all do, but when you have the vast preponderance of them moving in the same direction, that increases volatility.

58:12And I'll use a very simple example. Let's say we have a two-stock index, stock A and stock B. And on day one, stock A and stock B, yeah, exactly. Stock A and stock, doesn't matter what they are. We'll just buy the index. Stock A and stock B both move up a half a percent. Okay. Okay. The index moves up half a percent. That's not, you know, nice. A little bit of volatility in the market. You know, they both move down 1%. Market moves down 1%. They move together. Right. On another day, stock A moves up 10%. Stock B moves down 10%. What'd the index do? Nothing. Um, exactly. So which, which day was more volatile?

59:00You can argue day two, but from an index volatility point of view, it was day one because that, because the index actually moved on day two, it didn't. Correct. So I'm greatly oversimplifying, but that was, that's the best math free way that I can do this. However, put that, let me just interrupt you for a second, because I think if you actually think through that for a second, that is exactly what's going on. I do not have the proof, but I believe if you look at what's going on and you can see the footprints in the sand from this, that there is algorithms are out there trying their best to make sure there is not a lot of rocking going on on the big picture from the outside.

59:38And when I've seen this so many times when you see a stock, a major player that's really taking on the chin, all of a sudden you see the markets, they're not doing much. Maybe even they're going up. So many times IBM back in the day or even Meta gets whacked. The whole market's doing fine. I think there's an algorithmic process, a gentleman's agreement somewhere out there that do not let the market start doing anything. Because once they do, the Momo traders are going to get a hold of it and start moving the entirety of the market. And we don't want that happening.

1:00:10I'm going to say it's less conspiratorial. As someone who did a lot of algorithmic trading, I never even spoke to anybody else doing this stuff. So I don't know that there's a conspiracy. But I think it's more, I just think it's behavioral. If algorithms play statistics and patterns, and so if the pattern for 15 years running is every dip is going to be bought, then your algorithms will reflect that. Sure. Right? And we see that behavior in our customers. When there is a dip, they come in. And it tends to work for them over time. It doesn't work every single stock every single time. Of course.

1:00:51But we see this. And so algorithms, if they're playing the odds and playing the percentages and recognizing this behavior, that's what it is. So I'm not going to go down a – I'm not going to say there's any great conspiracy. I think it could be explained by just pure statistics. But I do think, yeah, that's exactly what it is. And, you know, as long as the cavalry is going to keep coming to the rescue, you know, then you're going to take these risks and you're going to continue to be rewarded for taking these risks. And one day, one day it doesn't work. But who knows when that is? And, you know, hey, you only live once anyway.

1:01:41So let's take our shot. I like it. Well, the theme of our investment analysis, you only live once. Just let it rip. Steve Sosnick. Steve Sosnick. I appreciate your coming aboard, as usual, doing a great job at explaining things in a very understandable way. Make sure we'll have all the links also. Visit all the things. He does a lot of writing, does a lot of education, obviously podcasting as well. So we'll have the links back to your areas on the Interactive Brokers website. Thanks so much. My pleasure, Andrew. Thank you so much. Take care. All right, thanks. There you go. So we had a lot of the things that I was thinking initially that I brought to him, interestingly, on the same page.

1:02:27He said it several times, and I thought it was really interesting. I was sitting here nodding my head the whole time in agreement with so many things that he had to say, because we know that a lot of the things that are going on right now are covering up, maybe not in a conspiratorial manner, but they're covering up some of the things that really are happening under the surface that may not be as pretty as they could be. Listen, thanks for joining me this week and every week we have some great guests coming up over the next few weeks. Make sure to be there, go over to Instagram, make sure to subscribe, go to Apple, Amazon, Spotify, and get on it and do it.

1:03:00We'll see you. Thank you. Have a great Labor Day. Have a great summer ending. And we're on for the next part of the year into the end.

1:03:11This podcast is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute personalized investment advice. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principal and past performance is not indicative of future results. The views and opinions expressed are those of the host and any guests and may not necessarily reflect those of Horowitz and Company Inc., an investment advisor registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain level of training or skill. Advisory services are only offered to a client or prospective clients where Horowitz & Company is properly registered or is excluded from registration requirements.

1:03:49Any mention of third-party companies, products, or services is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute an endorsement. Hypothetical scenarios or forward-looking statements are for illustrated purposes and should not be viewed as guarantees. Content is intended for U.S. residents only and may not be applicable in other jurisdictions. Listeners should consult a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. Please visit our website for additional information, disclosures, as well as a copy of our form CRS. Advertisements are not related to the host or affiliates and are not considered recommendations by the host of the show or any affiliates of Horowitz & Company.

1:04:36We'll be right back.

From the publisher

Market Complacency, Private Credit, FOMO Insurance.

Fed Policy, Bond Buybacks, Operation Twist.

Commodity Crunch, Hidden Volatility, Market Sinkhole – want more? Listen to this episode and you may find out about what lurks underneath the surface…

Looking into the WHO CARES economy with our Guest- IBKR’s Chief Market Strategist – Steve Sosnick.

 

NEW! DOWNLOAD THIS EPISODE’S AI GENERATED SHOW NOTES (Guest Segment)

Steve is the Chief Strategist at Interactive Brokers.  He also serves as Head Trader of IBKR Securities Services, the firm’s trading division (formerly known as Timber Hill), and is a Member of Interactive Brokers Group, the firm’s holding company.

Steve has held numerous roles in the organization since joining Timber Hill in 1995 as Equity Risk Manager and an options market maker.  He led the firm into Canada in 1998 and managed Timber Hill Canada throughout its existence.  Much of Steve’s career was spent quietly developing and implementing algorithmic and electronic trading strategies for stocks and options before moving into a more visible role as Chief Options Strategist and later Chief Strategist.

Steve has guest authored several columns in Barron’s and made numerous live appearances on Bloomberg TV and Radio, CNBC.

Check this out and find out more at: http://www.interactivebrokers.com/

Follow @andrewhorowitz

Looking for style diversification? More information on the TDI Managed Growth Strategy – HERE

Stocks mentioned in this episode: (GLD), (SLV),(AAPL), (BX), (CVX), (GOOGL), (IBM), (IBKR), (META), (MSFT)

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