E31: Slow's Will Quist on VC's Job to Fund the Creation of New Data Sets

19 Mar 2024 · 55 min

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Podcast Episode Notes: "E31: Slow's Will Quist on VC's Job to Fund the Creation of New Data Sets"

Episode Overview In this episode of Turpentine VC, host Erik Torenberg interviews Will Quist, a partner at Slow Ventures. The discussion covers Quist's unique journey from a professional water polo player to a venture capitalist, Slow Ventures' innovative investment thesis, and the evolving landscape of venture capital.

Key Themes and Concepts

  1. Quist's Journey to Venture Capital
  2. Background: Quist grew up in the Bay Area and transitioned from athletics to finance, driven by his passion for venture capital.
  3. Industry Ventures: His early career involved working at Industry Ventures during a period of change in venture capital, where he learned the importance of a unique investment thesis.
  1. The Evolution of Slow Ventures
  2. Founding: Quist joined Slow Ventures as they began accepting outside capital, focusing on collaboration among partners with diverse skill sets.
  3. Investment Philosophy:
  4. An anti-platform approach: Slow Ventures prioritizes capital provision without attempting to provide extensive additional services.
  5. Emphasis on the essential role of the founding team in driving value creation, suggesting that external input may impact only 5% of a company’s success.
  1. Old vs. New Venture Capital Models
  2. Traditional vs. Modern VC: Quist contrasts old venture models, which often relied heavily on established processes, with new models that focus on adaptability and innovative thinking.
  3. Thesis on Data Creation: He argues that true venture capital should fund the creation of new data sets that validate novel business hypotheses, rather than simply supporting the replication of existing data.
  1. The Importance of Founders as Investors
  2. Quist emphasizes the importance of founders developing their skills as investors in their own companies.
  3. He shares insights on how to help founders make better allocation decisions, focused on long-term growth and understanding enterprise value.
  1. The Slow PhD Program
  2. Concept: Quist describes the Slow PhD program as a unique initiative aimed at guiding founders through the early stages of their ventures.
  3. Philosophy: This program seeks to help founders refine their business hypotheses and navigate the complexities of launching a startup.
  1. Fund Size and Portfolio Management
  2. Quist discusses Slow Ventures' strategic decisions regarding fund size and portfolio construction, aiming for a concentration of investments (targeting 40-45 companies per fund).
  3. The decision to avoid competing in crowded Series A markets and focusing on early-stage, high-potential opportunities is highlighted.

Key Takeaways

  • Data Creation vs. Replication: True innovation comes from supporting founders in creating new data sets that can validate their business models.
  • Founder's Role: A founder’s ability to function as an investor is crucial to the long-term success of their venture.
  • Cultural Shift in VC: The venture capital landscape is evolving toward more collaborative and less hierarchical structures, valuing adaptability and innovative thought.
  • Slow PhD Program: This initiative underscores the importance of thorough preparation and hypothesis validation for founders before launching their startups.

Notable Quotes

  • "The most important thing we can do is help founders become better investors in their own businesses."
  • "Raising capital should be about getting a true or false answer, not merely about achieving success or failure."

Conclusion This episode provides deep insights into the modern practices of venture capital, the evolving role of founders, and the importance of creating novel data sets in validating business ideas. Listeners gain a comprehensive understanding of the landscape from Quist's unique perspective as both a venture capitalist and a former athlete.

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Further Listening: Check out other episodes from the Turpentine VC series, including insights from prominent figures in venture capital.

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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:02Welcome back to Turpentine VC, a podcast where we discuss the art and science of building successful venture firms, VC to VC. Will, welcome to Turpentine VC. Thanks so much for joining. Happy to be here, man. Love talking to you anytime. Yeah. Will, for those who are unfamiliar, why don't you give a brief background of how you came up in this industry? You know, old venture capital versus new venture capital is going to be a theme that we talk about throughout this episode. So let's give a bit of your background, how you came up in venture, and then we'll get into how you built and evolved Slope.

0:34Yeah, great. I mean, I think there's two talk tracks. There's like the very meta talk track where I say I'm like a grumpy 80-year-old in a 40-year-old's body. I was actually – I'm actually sixth-generation Bay Area on both sides of my family. So like my one grandmother grew up roping cattle in what is now Walnut Creek, and the other side with the first principal of Powel to high school is my great-great-grandfather. So I think there's like one path through this is being around it forever and having a real affinity or knowledge of the history of the game. So I think I mean, literally riding my bike down Sand Hill Road to go play water polo when I was a kid.

1:13And so there's some first party knowledge that's just been passed out along the way of like how this what has worked, what hasn't, what are some of the realities. And I think something gets lost. My personal journey started after I was done being a professional water polo player and had to get a real life and was sure I wasn't going to work on the finance side of Silicon Valley. But very quickly began to see how exciting being on the capital side at least was for me. So I did the minimum viable investment banking stint just so I could be in the game. And as I was interviewing for folks for more junior level positions, I ran into a group that was just getting started called Industry Ventures that had, at the time, a really novel take on venture.

1:56And you have to remember in 2006 and 2007, people were still debating, would the IPO landscape come roaring back like it hadn't existed for 30 or 40 years, which was, there was only enough money in Silicon Valley for a Series A and maybe a B. And I was like, great. Now is when you go public, you get sold, you wind down. The bubble kind of, the 2000 bubble compressed that, then it lengthened it. And in 2006 or 2007, there was this debate of like, will it return? And I think Industry Ventures had an interesting thesis that no, the private capital landscape has changed forever. IPOs are going to take forever.

2:31and that time in the private markets, there really isn't a set of capital products to replicate what happened publicly around primary financings. I think we anchored on early on there around the secondary market that there were going to be all these people that you were so used to selling stock once the company went public that they'd want that kind of liquidity. So anyway, met a scrappy young group that had a thesis that not a lot of people understood that made sense to me and thought, hey, this will be really fun. It makes sense to me intellectually. It kind of passes the sniff test with a lot of folks.

3:03I can call them a thesis. And when it doesn't work, I'll have a really good business school essay. Right. And then I'll get on the right track. And lucky for me, it was the right thesis run by a great group of guys that kind of kept just being entrepreneurial within it, kind of bought an early small fund of funds and were early to the small VC fund space and just did a lot of creative things. So I had a great run there. Spent seven or eight years. We scaled AUM, scaled team, scaled the kind of deals. Had a great time. And then I made the what now looks like really irrational choice to start my own firm.

3:38I was probably 32 at the time, which now 32-year-olds start their own firms all the time. But back, I don't know, eight or nine years ago, it wasn't as common. And so I was going to go out and raise my own fund from what I'd learned. And right as I was doing that, the guys at Slow, who had been historically investing their own money through a group of friends, were considering taking outside capital and making this a business. And so we all were at dinner and said, wait, you know what I don't know and I know what you don't know. Maybe we should all do this together. And that's kind of the genesis story of me ending up in this seat kind of right at day zero, Slow taking outside capital and spending the next however many years for refining the model.

4:19Talk about that first set of conversations with you in the Facebook group at Slow when you were envisioning what kind of firm you wanted to build. And how does it compare to what it looks like today? Talk about the evolution of Slow and the different kind of decisions you made along the way. We weren't super deliberate. I think some of the logic was, hey, we have a unique set of skills across the entire group, a unique set of access. We kind of had this thing where we were all really young, but it had actually been in seats that mattered for a serious amount of time, which we thought was like a pretty unique skill set.

4:57Kev obviously had been an early employee at Facebook, Sam would be a product, I'd been a general partner. Like there was a unique set of skills for people in their early 30s. And so that to me was like the core of it is like, hey, there's going to be something here. I think we also realized that there was probably going to be a top-tier venture fund of our age group built over that period, right? That it wasn't that we were reaching a point in the pendulum in the cycle where guys like us, I mean, I don't know, everyone aspires to be benchmark, but you look at when Jan won a benchmark kind of said, hey, we've learned enough.

5:31We think we have an opinion on how to do it our own way, how to do it differently kind of happens in this age group and demographics. So I think that was, and honestly, the real guiding light out of it, as we all spoke about it was like, it better be really fun. Because if it's not really, really fun, we can all go do other things, right? And it can be as lucrative or maybe even more. But this could be really, really fun building something with a group of friends that... I think importantly, one of the aligning things is like, we both just realized, we all realized it was just capital. If that makes sense.

6:05I think there was a grandiosity to the practice of venture capital at the time, which you definitely want to have a respect for the capital you manage. But I think for me coming from the later stage markets and my partners coming from inside Facebook, there was like a healthy levity we had for the actual role and impact that venture plays in the overall equation of company building. And that it probably could be pretty fun if we wanted it to be. Yeah. And so when you say just capital, is that a broader idea that it's sort of a pushback against this idea that venture capitalists should provide all these services to companies?

6:40And if so, do you compete with them by just doing different companies than they would? Because founders often, if there's one firm that says, hey, I'm going to do nothing for you besides capital, that's not what you're saying, I'm just saying. And another firm says, hey, I'm going to do all these things for you. Wouldn't the simple thinking be that the founder is probably going to take the person who's going to want to do all those things? Maybe, I mean, we were definitely anti-platform, so to speak, kind of from the jump here at Slow. and that that was like a governing feature that I don't, we all say things different ways.

7:10And so like, I'm sure people go cross-reference this against, I mean, that's one of the fun parts about slow is like, there's no divine narrative here and there's no sacred cows. So you'll hear us all say different things. My line on this for a long time has been 95 to 105 % of the value I've seen created in companies comes from the team themselves. I just can't find a situation where I feel like you can give outsiders credit for more than 5%. And I think we can all point to a handful of situations where advisors, outsiders have created higher bars for founders, unfortunately. There's, I don't know, my first principle seems like such a grand phrase, but I really do think for whatever reason, we kind of start with a ground truth of why here.

7:53And maybe it's because none of us came from like a top tier venture background where there was a divine way of doing things. But I think when you really unpack it, you can only impact what you have context for and control over. And as an investor with a portfolio, no matter how deep your services team is, you only have so much context and so much control. So I think we kind of started from there just being honest about, you can offer a lot of these things. They may move the needle. The most they'll move the needle is 5%. But the reality is you're going to have episodic context and episodic control.

8:25And so I think when we think about value adder, at least I do, it kind of came from this, like, all right, if you would make those assumptions, and I think one of the important things to do in startups and ventures, everyone loves to go there's like, hey, there's always the outlier, the edge case, and everyone operates from like a set of infinity variables, which I think is actually really, really hard and not productive for founders or like, hey, anything truly is possible. It's like, okay, but I'm not sure that that's really helpful as a guiding light. Anyway, if you assume what I've just said, like, someone don't be negative 5%.

9:02I think we do a really good job of that. And that was a guiding light out of the gate of like, let the founders build, let them run with the company, be here as a resource. Number two is, is thinking about how can you be effective with in that final 5%, and it's not scientific number, how can you be effective in there with the context control skills you have. And my personal view has really become that a founder's most important job is to be a better investor in their own company than we are. At the end of the day, I mean, and it's funny, you find that in any book about at scale, amazing companies, right?

9:39Whether you read Munger or you read John Malone or outsiders, right? Like the CEO's core role is an allocation role of, hey, I'm going to use X money or Y time to generate Z outcome that should have ABC impact on valuation. I think we got away from that a little bit in Silicon Valley. That still remains the guiding light. The good thing is, while the DNA of really being an amazing investor is hard to replicate, I think there is enough of an apprenticeship model and enough to learn about the tactics of being a good investor, that it's a learnable skill. And so long way of saying like, I actually think the most important thing we can do, especially in the first 18 to 24 months of a company's life is to help them become a better investor in their own business.

10:24And it turns out that's where our skills are probably sharpest at the moment, right? We're sitting every day, making decisions, watching time and money and outcomes lead to enterprise value. So I think that's really where I've tried to hang my hat with folks is like, listen, the biggest thing we can do if you just kind of with our context, with our control, with our skill set and if you think about magnitude of impact is help you make much better investment decisions in your own business then hopefully it takes on the life of their own they understand their business better they take off and i mean and i think you can reverse engineer from from people like mark zuckerberg who have turned out to be fantastically generational allocators um within their business so dad speak and i think on top of that like be good people you know what i mean know enough people that when there is a connection that needs to be made you're not six hops away from it.

11:09But I think I've really hung my hat on helping founders by helping them become better allocators themselves. How do you do that? Or what's an example of just to make it sort of more concrete for the audience? What does that look like? How do you become a better investor? I'm going to give away all the secrets. I mean, number one for me in that is always acknowledging that investing is a luck-based endeavor and not a skill-based game. And so just from the bat, the way you get better at luck-based games is different. And the way you improve your odds on luck-based games is different than skill-based games.

11:41If anyone interested, there's a book that changed the course of my career called The Success Equation by Michael Mabousian, who's at the Santa Fe Institute, a good friend of Josh Wolfe, someone I haven't been lucky to meet personally yet, but I've read everything he writes religiously. And it just is a good breakdown of like, what do you do in luck-based games, right? And the reality is luck-based games are about really intelligent decision-making frameworks guided by history, but with your own twist that you execute really consistently. That's how you, it's Blackjack, right? It's understanding the probabilities around Blackjack and executing them consistently.

12:15Not every decision is going to break your way, but if you execute in that fashion, the odds. So that's kind of number one in helping people begin to view the world like an investor. It's just that acknowledgement of what game they're playing. And then from there, I think there's a pretty simple set of tactics to begin to understand how does enterprise value accrue, right? How do you use capital to, like, what are the components of enterprise value? What are the derivatives of it? How do you begin to see it? And, and in that kind of much more, I don't know, I wrote something and referenced the DCF a number of times.

12:49Someone said, you can't expect founders to understand what a DCF is. I'm like, these people are way smarter than I am. You know what I mean? Like, And they're asking to manage millions of dollars. Like I think you can take a, take a detour and kind of unpack more traditional equations for enterprise value. Then I think the third lever is getting really comfortable with the history of your space and how capital, right? I think most things rhyme there. There are novel stories, but not novel plots. And so I think it's getting really comfortable with the history of either what you're building, the space you're building in the business model, you're going out and how, and how capital has historically been used and performed.

13:25And at least using that as a guiding light for your decision making. So it's usually a conversation through those three steps. And then really setting up. I mean, we're kind of not dogmatic about boards at the seed stage, but you have that kind of ongoing relationship and have making sure the conversations feel much more like an investment committee than a check in on product or something like that. Yeah. Hey, we'll continue our interview in a moment after a word from our sponsors. I want to zoom out to one of your bigger ideas, which is sort of this old venture capital model versus new venture capital model, or more precisely, maybe like, what is true venture capital versus what is not true venture capital?

14:03What is the role of venture capital? You have thoughts and opinions here. Please share them. Yeah, this gets me in hot water with friends. And so I should say that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. And there are obviously lots of ways to generate returns. I think my more prolific sharing partner, Sam Lesson, is very much on record saying 95 % of venture capitalists don't practice venture capital. It's just capital. I think there's two – there's kind of the high-level framing of it, in our opinion, and then kind of a more granular take on it for me personally that I think does stem from a bit of the history.

14:37And I should say, guiding under this is like a kind of dogmatic belief that if you have a tool, if you use the tool you have appropriately, it increases your odds of getting the outcome, right? If you want to use something to its best ends, that's how you get the best outcomes, I think is something I believe or at least simplified my life to believe. At the highest level, I think the question is like we're all running around trying to find novel hypotheses, people building value creation in net new ways that are defensible. I we talk a lot about like is our job to kind of fund the creation of the data right I it's kind of it's this data creation versus data replication game is is our job to go and get the first data set that proves your hypothesis correct or is it our job to make a calculated guess and bet on and fund the replication of the data set does that make does that make sense I always say will things and I'm not sure they resonate, but does that make sense as a principle?

15:34It does, but flesh it out a little bit more just so the audience can make sure they get it. We all want novel hypotheses, right? You believe the world works in X way and we all agree that if it works in X way, it's important. There's a valuable business to be had. I think the question people need to ask themselves as venture capitalists is like, is your job with the money you have, with the hammer that you've been given, is your job to fund the first data sets that prove that hypothesis true or false, right? Just assuming you go into it with no first party data, is your job to fund the creation of that data set that validates or invalidates the hypothesis?

16:12Or is the job of venture capital to replicate the data past some known scale, right? Are you looking for that first data set? And I think in our opinion, that's where the true breakthroughs come and the true breakthroughs and value creation come honestly is the net new novel data set that proves that something is actually valuable versus betting on that replicating it more scale. And I think it's important to note, like one thing that has really clouded the landscape in my mind is businesses can have different moments where they call for venture capital across their history in that box, right?

16:54And I think Open Door is one that has come to mind of a business, and I think I've referenced this before in other places, but like, there was a moment down the line where there was a novel hypothesis that if they could be X amount of traffic and Y amount of the top locales, right, if they had enough listings, they'd get a critical mass, they'd become a third party you'd have to check next to Trulia and Zillow, and that would dramatically drop customer acquisition costs. You'd basically be an organic search result. that's like a pretty novel proposition that they didn't have data on. So like I, they were already at a lot of scale, but funding that round to me would feel like using venture capital.

17:30So I do want to like disabuse this notion that venture capital is always about stage gating and valuation. And it's, and it's much more about, are you at the data? Are you helping create the data set, the validator invalidator hypothesis versus funding the replication of it? And when you're funding the replication of it, what are the other funding models that you think should be more in vogue or that instead of venture capital, founders should be doing X, Y, Z as a result? One answer is growing slower. I think venture capital for explosive growth unto itself, I understand where there's moments where that feels like a use of capital.

18:13I think it's just capital. I'm not sure it's venture. So I think there's a world where you just grow at a more organic clip and a more organic rate. I think there are some amazing visions of the world, novel hypotheses that are better served in a nonprofit capacity, candidly, right, where you just can't justify the commercialization milestones of it unless, I mean, there are some great founders who, I mean, I think that's one of Elon's greatest skills is his ability to get the capital markets to fund NPV negative things or things that will be absent commercial milestones for so long that it's hard to justify them in most cases.

18:50And then there's the good old bootstrap, which isn't a great answer because there are things that require an irrational amount of capital to test. I'm just not sure all of them fit the mold for venture capital. What are your thoughts on kind of the NDVC style of thinking? I mean, there's a lot of businesses that shouldn't be raising venture, but maybe should be doing some other sort of funding mechanism in the earliest stages. what is the right way of thinking about which businesses are appropriate for venture versus other models like earliest on well one I think Bryce who's a very close friend I think Indy kind of took on a life of its own because I don't actually think what he's saying is like don't build venture scale businesses yeah and I think he would admit that he is a venture capitalist I think what he has the actual nuance to his structure is like, I'm not sure you need to be stuck on the venture path for all of your life, that every round of capital needs to come from a venture capitalist and that you need to be pursuing the irrational business tactics or what can appear to be irrational business tactics forever, right?

20:04That some businesses may only call for a million and a half dollars of venture capital. And after that, maybe they just need debt. Maybe they just need to run. So one, I would say that that would be my, after spending lots of time one-on-one with him, that would be my distillation of what Bryce is really trying to accomplish, which is like, again, if you take venture as some irrational experimental capital to prove something is true, I think he would say, I still want to be that. You know what I mean? I want to give you some money that's short-term irrational, but long-term unbelievably strategic.

20:35But I don't want to presuppose, as Sam has put, that you're on the factory farm method of entry. So that, that would be a clarification. I feel like I need to make every time I hear Indy come up. And look, I think, I think if you're trying to diagnose yourself, like, Hey, I want to build a business, does it require venture funding? I mean, I think that the box that I talk about wanting to fund is, is a novel hypothesis around value creation. Like you're going to go and go away and do something that creates absolute and relative value to others. You can prove it definitively. You can run an experiment.

21:13So it's like, you have that novel take on value creation. Can you actually prove it? Can you run a controlled experiment and get a yes or a no? Can you do that on relatively little capital, right? Or at least little capital to the reward? And does the output data, like, does it make you objectively more valuable? I think my partner, Sam, would push to people like having commercial data on the side of that. I think I'm a little more lenient that I think there is data points that the capital markets coalesce around to that they will continue to fund. But I think of it as that box. So I think when we spend a lot of time with founders early on who want to build, who have a sense of product, it's really kind of, one, helping them make an absolute discovery because I don't think anybody should start the build processing.

21:56I want to use venture capital, right? I think you should start with where are you inspired and where do you have unfair insights and that kind of stuff. But when it gets down to the bottom floor, it's really trying to understand does that box, quote unquote, for venture exist. Yeah. One classic willism is this idea that every good investment should look like a semiconductor company. Can you explain that? That is a good one. That is one that I get typecast with. Yeah. I mean, in my mind, and there's going to be like true semi-investors these days are going to call me out and call my bluff. But I kind of hearken back to the 80s, which is like you would have founders who've done a deep amount of research about what is likely and possibly true within the semiconductor space.

22:45It would have a very well-researched and defined hypothesis, usually on a chip that could be 10x faster or produce 10x cheaper. And what they needed was like a little bit of irrational money at the earliest stages to go out and kind of go zero to one on that chip and then also prove that what they did in a lab can be done, right, at some commercial grade. That was an experiment that didn't cost a ton of money, right? So you had a novel hypothesis on value creation for the world. It kind of knew where is the world going? What is a novel thing that creates value within there? You had a very well-defined controllable experiment that didn't take infinity dollars to get an answer to.

23:22And the output data, right, if you were able to do that, if you were 10x faster or cheaper, right? And with some replicability of rolling it off, that was like an unbelievable atomic unit of value, right? It meant that you were going to go take a ton of market share and take it cheaper. And so that little box, you put a little bit of money into that box, you might get a no, you've got to be open to getting a false. But if you got a true answer, it was like objectively and dramatically much more valuable than it was when you were started in another tier of capital with lower risk and lower return thresholds so they could pay higher prices could understand the story.

24:01And so the value would accrue. So I think that's like my, it's probably an oversimplification, but the rhetorical device I use to kind of think about situations where venture is called for and performs well. Yeah. Now you've had this thesis, you and Slo have had this thesis around franchises as an example, which is a type of business that other firms wouldn't, or is it obvious that that is appropriate for venture? What do you believe that maybe others don't as it relates to franchises more broadly of like, yeah, why does that fit within the venture framework? Like how do we get there? Yes, please.

24:38Because 2022 and 23, we had a lot of time for exploration. I mean, I think there were a couple ways we arrived at this. I think one was knowing, Part of venture working is you own beautiful businesses on the other side. So you kind of just, if you inverted and said like, oh, when venture really works, you end up owning a stake in a business that has like super, it generates free cash flow super efficiently, durably, can scale, right? Super equity efficient. And so one exercise was just kind of a reverse engineering of the capital markets of like, what are the most beautiful business models that we can find, right?

25:15That grow consistently, don't consume tons of equity, have really great net income and free cash flow dynamics. I think any search of that will quickly surface up the franchise model to folks. So I think that was kind of like one screen where like, oh, we should probably take this take this seriously or at least unpack if there is a venture moment within these businesses. I think when you dig into them, you realize that there is a moment where there is a novel hypothesis on value creation that is pretty testable and it doesn't take a ton of money. It's just more money than the franchisee will generate in a short amount of time.

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25:53And if you're correct, it's wildly valuable. It's not actually at the consumer level. I think that kind of falls, the value proposition for most franchises out of the gate ends up being pretty subjective and hard to test and measure. But the bet that once you have two or three locations, right, and they generate a certain economic profile, there is a novel bet that that economic profile, that atomic unit of that franchise can replicate, right? And that outcome can be generated by people who are not the founders and they can be generated by people that sign up. That's a novel hypothesis and each business has its own.

26:36And historically, that moment has kind of happened year seven, eight, nine, when you've got, right, you grow corporate locations, stack enough free cashflow and you can spend a couple million bucks you need to build the business in a box, so to speak, and then have the runway to test it to see, great, how do I get franchisees, get them up and running, get enough runway until I have the data that that suggests the performance I got at my corporate units will replicate. And so all of a sudden it's like, okay, these are really rad businesses to own at the end. And it turns out they have a moment, they have a venture type box in here.

27:10And so I think that really set us off running down the path to unpack it more and explore to see, take that out of the lab and out of the theory and see what it really meant in practice. And I think got great feedback from the franchise ecosystem ecosystem from people who run them, advise them, et cetera. I will say it began to also dovetail with our take on vertical SaaS, which is that software eating the world isn't necessarily going to mean infinity more software companies. And that actually, if you actually just think of it selfishly from a founder's lens of, I created something really novel that changed the economics of something.

27:45What's the most efficient value capture path? And I think we're learning that isn't always 80 % gross margin because a lot of industries have a certain dynamic. But what software does is it obviously reduces the variability and outcomes. And so if you can begin to have franchises, right, that are leveraging software-based tools to get more consistent outcomes on operations, it kind of is another accelerant, right, to franchises being unbelievable businesses and begin to have some real overlap with a more historical network of venture deals. Yeah, that's well articulated. A quote that you had related to the previous point that you tweeted recently was, the point of raising using working with venture capital should be getting a true or false answer, not success or failure.

28:32I thought that was a good quote. So, yeah, that's something that's really important to me that I like stress early on with founders. And it's really hard to say because when you're in it, success feels like all that matters. And again, I understand it. I think choosing to build a business with venture, right, it does change some of the dynamics where you're not necessarily just running a pizza joint to keep the lights on day to day. that you actually need to be going into it with a grand supposition, a grand thesis, that if true is wildly valuable. And if you're going to do that, you need to be very open to getting a false answer, right, to any experiment.

29:16And so that to me is just another distinguishing way of going through the fundraising pipeline of, right, should I or should I not take work with venture capital? and I think that viewing it through the lens of, oh, I'm raising it because I want to find out if something is true or false, not because I want to hustle and build a great business is a good intellectual test for raising and working with venture capital. Yeah. Let's do a brief deep dive on slow the fund itself in terms of how you guys have thought about fund size, how you guys have thought about portfolio construction, size of companies per fund, because you guys have done really well and are eminently fundable.

30:00And thus, you were in a position where you could play whatever game you wanted, right? You could play the box group game, maybe how you guys started a little bit, kind of participatory in a bunch of great companies. You could play the first round game or the USV benchmark, like really concentrated, just small side of companies. You could play the multi-stage game because of your ability to raise great marks. And you decided to do not exactly any one of those three things, but maybe a little bit of each, if I understand correctly, but leaning more towards the concentration in a smaller amount of companies.

30:32Why don't you talk about how you guys have thought about fund size, portfolio construction, and amount of companies per fund, and why that makes sense for your strategy and where the market is? Yeah, that's a good question. I'm not sure it's kind of one of these things that's been built up over time. It'll take me a second to unpack the pithy one-liner answer. I mean, I think at one layer, we always said that we didn't want to be series A investors, right? That we weren't comfortable being hyper competitive and having an edge in that market, right? So I think that rules out certain portfolio theories and certain scales of funds.

31:13I mean, I think a lot of this has been pretty organic, right? We started with a$65 million fund where we kind of had the mandate to do, it had a very broad mandate of what we were going to do. And I think we increasingly found ourselves in situations, we were probably writing 300 to 500 grand seed checks when we were doing that fund, where we were getting there, getting to the table, and candidly waiting for someone who could write a bigger check. So I think there was that portion of it saying there seemed to be an organic opportunity of things we thought were really exciting and worth doing that we were now getting the conviction to, moving to, and waiting.

31:46waiting. And so I think there was a bit of the theory of like, why would we wait versus be a million and a half dollar fund lead the round? And this is seven, eight years ago, but like, why, why wouldn't we do that? So I think that was one elevation in the model. I think we found ourselves increasingly with strong points of view, right? And, and while we don't have a platform team, like engaging with founders increasingly, right? Not just being someone nice in the cap table, but kind of having an ongoing, And Sam likes to say we're always on text message with our founders and like continuing engagement.

32:17And I think as a lot of the old heads will tell you, as your time gets pulled in a direction, you kind of need to meet it with some ownership because that's the non-scalable resource. So I think that pulled us more into being ownership sensitive. And then I think there's the acknowledgement that we are taking a fair amount of risk, right? And we are walking down some unknown paths. And so too small of an end is probably not a responsible portfolio dynamic. So I would say that there was no grand summit where we zoomed out and said, this is exactly it for those reasons. I think there was more of an organic discovery of who we were, the work we wanted to do and could do in a differentiated way.

33:02What was available to us, candidly, from a market opportunity, and then what was the right capitalization path. And I will say, I think having peers and friends and mentors like Box first round, right, and being able to sit with them and go, what were the pluses and minuses? Because folks were a step or two ahead. I think we were very deferential and willing to learn about the pluses and minuses of the different strategies from a portfolio theory. And so why not, you know, 10 companies less or 20 companies more? Like what is sort of the ideal amount of companies to fund? I don't know. I think it's false precision.

33:40I mean, what we target is 40 to 45 companies per fund. I think that's like become a pretty standardized number for the funds in our set, whether that's first round or kindred or others. I don't think we're hard. I mean, I think at SLOW, we're always open to intellectual debate to revisit premises. But I think that is the number that has felt like that gets us the right amount of shots on goals for the opportunity to really sink into one without being so, so deluded on the impact. I don't know. To me, it feels past a certain point that there's some false precision in the science. If I do 55 portfolio companies or I do 39, I think it's kind of the buckets of like, do you do 10 or 12 things?

34:29Do you do 500 things? Or are you someone that's somewhere in the middle? And again, I think that becomes stage dependent and in how strong a view you have on underwriting. Yeah. Yeah. Some people think that venture is strongly bifurcating where there are these aggregated multistage firms and then these small specialists. Talk about how you think about the right for a small but sizable fund such as yourself, a smaller but sizable fund such as yourself, to have the right to play in a world of multistage firms. Maybe you could also speculate on where multistage is going. I mean, this is where the tired trope on consensus, non-consensus comes out.

35:13And again, I think it's something that is probably overused and even overused by us. But I think that we do spend a lot of, I at least spend a lot of time thinking about what is our job vis-a-vis those big funds who are unbelievable at getting in front of talented founders, talented networks, and spotting opportunities. And I think, listen, I think our job is to get comfortable and an insight into a risk that is one click more than they're willing to take, is my honest answer. And I think for a bunch of reasons, the larger you get, the risk appetite, right, the point at which in the flipping of cards you want to deal in, if you think of like, hey, you got to flip five cards and they all come up your way and you have a public company.

36:02the card flip you want to come in does change the more scale you get. Your incentive structure changes. The ability of where you're able to spend your time changes. And candidly, they've earned that right to kind of probably take less risk than we do because they've sat in their chairs and built great brands and put up amazing returns for years and years and years. So I think that's the real discussion I have in my own head of like, hey, what risk are we taking? what are we taking on? Almost I assume that they're perfectly rational, intelligent actors, which I think for the most part they are.

36:40They're understanding risk reward as well as anybody when they choose not to do something. And so then the question becomes like, why am I comfortable with it? Is it a price thing? Is it an insight thing? Does my money make those risks go away in their mind because they're rational actors and price goes up. So I think that's happy. I mean, I'm happy to unpack them more. That's it in a nutshell, though, is like, where can we go that others can't or won't right now? So what you're saying, Will, is you don't want to be competing with these multi-stage firms. You want to be going where they're not.

37:17Yeah. I mean, I don't think we have... And again, everyone has different views on this. I'm not sure we have a great business model for competing with them on pretty known quantifiable risk paradigm. So I think it becomes incumbent on us. Can we do something? And I think the thing you have to learn is there is such a thing as too much risk. So can you find this balance of intelligently taking on risk and getting compensated for it, I think is our job. And I think in a world of aggregators or increasing aggregators who are kind of all playing the same game, there becomes a real role for people who can do that consistently and intelligently.

37:57That's a good segue into your slow PhD program. Program is like a very, there's no other way to say it, but it is much more grandiose than it actually is as it plays out. But yes. So I love, talk about what it is and then talk about the philosophy behind it. Yeah. I mean, I think it's at its highest level marketing, it's our way of working with people who are in the I want to build phase. I think it's easy to start with what it isn't, which is like, it's not an incubator. These aren't our ideas. It's not an accelerator. We don't want folks coming in that are already kind of halfway through the experiment and want help running the experiment more quickly.

38:39This isn't an EIR. We're not paying people on salary. We're not taking equity. It's none of those things. And to me, again, it feels like a throwback to real venture where founders may have a real strong worldview and a sense of what they build in it, but diligence from old venture funds took four to six months, not because the VC was skeptical, but because there were a bunch of legs of the story as it relates to risks around market development and risks and the value proposition and quantifying it in the business. There were a bunch of things that needed to be double-checked and verified before everybody said, hey, it's worth the founder's time and it's worth our money.

39:21So that's kind of what it is in. I mean, I think my path to getting here has been – it was a funny journey when all of a sudden it just hit me in the face. I think one leg of the story is coming from the later stage, spending more time on the early stage. I guess one weird belief I have, or I don't know if it's weird or not, is like, I really do think you need to believe that you have some chance of buying public stock at the first day that you invest. You can't know whether it's 10 % or a 90 % chance, but on a binary scale, you can kind of squint and go like, hey, if all the dominoes fall their direction, is this a company that can take earnings calls?

39:59You know what I mean? Or can write up an S1 that's really compelling. And so I do think you want to know on a binary scale, do you have a chance of that? So I spent a lot of time really on going, all right, that's where we're shooting for. Like, I know what those look like because I've invested at the later stages. And then I just became coming, okay, well, the S1 just ends up being the summation of a bunch of other things you believe being true. Rarely do you work against the grand vision of the company. You do a thing to do a thing to do a thing to do a thing. And so it felt like these sub-hypotheses were developing and a lot of the diligence and pitch meetings with founders were really mapping out the dominoes of what would need to happen and how did they think about when and why.

40:34It was a really fun, dynamic conversation. Somewhere along the way, it just hit me in the face, right, as I was making the parallel of hypotheses and like, oh, this looks like a dissertation. You stand up, you've got a bunch of data, you pull it together in 90 pages, and you stand up and defend it on Wall Street and not within it. So I kind of seized on that language for a while and went down the path. I think the more I unpacked it, or I started unpacking it more when you kind of ran into this era of, hey, I'm just going to fund you. Like, first thing, you know what I mean? We all know the story of, like, super exciting friend, really smart, tells me they want to work on something.

41:12I want to be supportive. I immediately say yes, right? And, I mean, that obviously picked up and was happening in an accelerated fashion. And it didn't sit right with me intellectually that that was like the proper path, really from a founder standpoint, right, that their opportunity cost was being really, truly measured and valued in a way that they were aware of at minimum or optimizing. And so I kind of was sitting with that, sitting with this dissertation analogy. And that's when it hit me that the way a great PhD program works or the point of a great PhD program is to increase the odds of being novel and correct.

41:50and put you on the most efficient path to getting yeses and nos because resources are scarce. And so once I viewed it that way, you start unpacking more and more of how the ecosystem was operating in kind of in contrast to the PhD programs. And you realize one of the key things that was lost, that PhD programs have decided one way you increase the odds of being novel and correct are making sure that you have a master's degree. Professionally, that's hard to define, but you have some depth or breadth in a category that has given you, right? You have depth and breadth in a category. You have some ability to think 1 % differently or learn to, and that those two things give you the best odds at flushing out novel and correct.

42:33And so that was kind of the final straw, right? In my mind of like, hey, we understand this part, or at least the process by which kind of the gates you should jump through. if what you really want to do was increase, max out your odds, or at least be aware of them, and then understand a credible, efficient operating path. Why don't we, I mean, this seems to make sense. I couldn't find an intellectual hole. Why don't we find some friends who we know want to build and see if there was some set of framework and core curriculum? So we did that, found some friends who trust us, like us, had free time to burn, whatever it was, and went through the process and just had a blast on all fronts.

43:13It ended up being extremely valuable to folks going through it. It was super interesting work for us to do and was leading to interesting outcomes. And it kind of went back to this idea to take our talk somewhat full circle that a founder's most important job is to be an investor first, right, is to be an allocator of time and money. And I find what this program does is help us really help the founder get a clear lens on the opportunity cost investment they're making. And I think, listen, you can play this out on your own network. But when you think about the people you enjoy backing or want to back, a lot of them have pretty high opportunity costs.

43:49I don't know what they could take per year of RSUs, but it's not nothing. And so when you start realizing that as soon as you incorporate and say yes to a scout check, you're probably in this for two, but more likely three years, no matter the outcome, sacrificing it, you begin to realize this is like a multimillion dollar investment founders are making into the world's most like volatile asset class. And so this kind of presents as a really helpful and consistent, almost objective way to help them, right, be aware of the investment they're making and how they might shape it such that they maximize their opportunity cost.

44:27So I don't know if that explains it. I've had a hard time getting it out succinctly and in a way that answers all the questions because it's a bit of a weird out there take. But the net of it is we're spending a ton of time with people that we feel like have depth and breadth and high opportunity cost and trying to work with them really. And some we talk to every week, some it's every day, some every month. Like it's really we're not trying to set this up for scale and productizing and structure. We're trying to do this in as organic a fashion as possible and help them navigate kind of the idea maze in line with some of the principles that have emerged from PhD programs that have kind of increased odds for folks pursuing it.

45:06In that way, it's very different than the Y Combinators or the OnDecks or the Entrepreneur First or other sort of more structured, more formal sort of programmatic ways, right? Totally. Absolutely. And I think they, listen, it's hard to argue almost everyone who's doing it and still doing it today has enough case studies to say like this works and it works for people. So I think it does end up being a dramatically different flavor. I think where we've seen success is with people who have connectivity to how the game of venture capital works, right? They're in it. They have some sense of how to raise and use venture and where to access it and kind of, and so that's not a governing or kind of a gating item, but they're also, they have significant opportunity costs and they're aware of it.

45:55They might be a second time founder who has already been in it or have real credible roles and opportunities they'd be turning down to go after. Not to say YC doesn't attract those people. I mean, Parker Conrad went through it with Rippling. They get a lot of them. I think we've just seen more appeal from those types of founders. And again, from people who want to walk through it pretty programmatically and defend their own opportunity costs. And we don't start with, you're going to raise venture. Let's think of an idea. It's like we start with, where do you know more than other people? How do you think that world works?

46:27When the world works that way, what is built, right? And really work down the funnel that way. And applying venture capital becomes almost the last step rather than the first step of the process. You tweeted something to the effect of, if you want to start something, the first things to figure out are, what do you think is true? How's the cost, time, and money to find out? And how valuable is it if you're right? Yeah. I mean, I think that's a little bit of me redescribing my box, right? I think starting something to start something is fine. Listen, you only live once. Do whatever you want. I mean, I think in my experience, it really, it's dramatically impactful when you can start with, I'm just addicted to convince the world is going to work in this certain way.

47:08And I think the further out the time horizon, the more impactful you can be and it can be, candidly. But starting with that and then beginning to understand, like I said, what needs to be built in that world when everybody's connected to the internet what are all the things that are built right and trying to understand which ones get built at which time at which point you can begin to make some guesses about value capture moats right where are things going to coalesce um and then and then you can kind of play that all the way and like all right what's the first thing i do and how much money does it cost um and so i think that's that's probably me shorthanding or tweeting out my box of his adventure or not.

47:48But I do encourage more and more people to start from that lens of dreaming about how the world works, as opposed to starting from a granular pace of, I want to build, so I'm going to build X. There's enough outliers in Silicon Valley that you can convince yourself of any strategy and any path if you really wanted to. Totally. The prompts you gave me that made me really think were, how will the world look in 10 years? What are the necessary components that will enable the world to work that way? Are they already being built? What are the problems that will emerge in that world that you could solve?

48:22Or what are the net new opportunities enabled only in that world? Can you talk more about that or maybe give an example just to make it more concrete? Once you get into a worldview, there's actually an interim step that I recommend everybody. You see, like, one, be granular and specific. I think saying, like, the internet will be a thing isn't as helpful as, like, I just, billions of people will be connected to the internet buying things. Like just that level of granularity or specificity, I think makes it easier to imagine all of the, all of the things that exist in that world in order to enable that world.

48:55So yeah, I think once you get addicted to it, the thing to really do is to give yourself some kind of score of how convinced am I? You know what I mean? Like on a scale of one to five, like, am I like a three that the world's going to work this way? Or am I a five out of five? Like, where am I on conviction about this worldview? Cause that's going to be, I mean, it's a hard road. Like it's going to matter that you're really convinced that it's going to be that end state. And then the other thing too, is like, be honest with yourself on a scale of one to five. Like how much have you earned that insight?

49:22Yeah. Like have you lived it, breathed it, studied it enough to get it. And you can go with a one and a one or a five and a one, but I think having that reflection for yourself is a really good gating item. Once you do that, then you can kind of go great. What are all the things that need to be built that make the world work that way? right if things aren't built start there and figure out what what what gets built in what order and is that in your skill set right i think that uh that the next intellectual challenge if you look and go shit i'm really convinced the world's going to work that way not everything we need is in it's just a matter of timing for the world to develop that way then you go what are the problems right when when everybody is running on sass right when every application is cloud hosted and being bought on a subscription basis, what are the challenges, right?

50:11Well, you might lead you to AWS or subscription-based billing, right? You can kind of talk your world, kind of talk yourself with a friend. It's hard to do in isolation, but like you can begin to imagine some of the credible problems that exist when you're right about how the world works, right? You get convinced everyone's going to be buying things online. Maybe you started a cardboard company. I don't know. You know what I mean? Like you're like, okay, when everyone's buying online, that creates some real challenges and you might go, shit, the thing to actually do is buy cargo delivery vans in Stockton.

50:40And then I think that the related one to that that's always hard to deduce your problems is like, are there new opportunities? Are there new businesses that can be built? Are there new when the entire world is AI native, right? After I get past infrastructure and problems created, are there just wild net new experiences, products, et cetera, that can be delivered? Um, and, and so I, I, I kind of, I can encourage people to walk through that intellectual journey. And I find that like, it gives you, it gives you the space to be creative, right? Which I think a lot of people ideating who want to build don't give themselves or at least give them, right?

51:23They jumped so quickly to product business, product business, which you need to get to, I think, but early on in the journey, I think a lot of the special sauce in any organization you build, whether that's venture backed or a nonprofit or a bootstrap. Like the special stuff starts from the journey. And you know what I mean? And being long dated on the timeline and being able to be creative. Gearing towards closing here, if anyone here is listening as an incredible operator, I highly recommend doing a whiteboarding session with Will if you're lucky. I had the benefit of doing it. I really enjoyed it.

52:01Will, any closing thoughts on the PhD or more broadly related to our conversation? And also, audience, besides the PhD, if you want to hear Will be on more podcasts, please do let him know because I've been trying to convince him for over a year that he should be either a guest or hosting more because you have lots of thoughts on venture and people who want to hear about him in startups. Listen, more love and feedback is always good and encouraging. We have a couple in mind that hopefully we can get organized and at least drop one of them. No, I just, I'd encourage anyone that is building to walk through it in a very intellectually honest way.

52:35Don't start with any presuppositions on the kind of capital you're going to need. Try to start from it as first principles as possible on what you know and how convinced you are, and then let kind of logic dictate you through it. I think on the other side, for people who want to be venture capitalists, who are venture capitalists and are kind of, I mean, there's plenty of them who like have a great playbook and don't need my, have way more carry than I do and don't need my, my expertise. But I think to the extent you're looking for some guideposts, being honest with yourself about the type of capital you have, the consistent underwriting that this is a luck-based endeavor where you've got to have decision-making processes that you can execute X amount of time.

53:14And that's how you get the odds in your favor and really deciding for yourself what your approach to blackjack is going to be. And then the final nuance on that, that I think is hard is it's one thing to read the book on blackjack. The problem is the optimal strategy actually depends on how large your chip stack is. And so I think that's the final thing for individuals that are investing to be a, once you kind of in, you kind of come to the conclusion, you're playing a luck based game that has probabilities, that's about decision-making. You really do have to go and understand how many, how many hands of blackjack, so to speak, you're going to be playing.

53:49I think the optimal decision for slow early on is not necessarily the optimal decision-making framework for slow at this scale, just given the, the N of N of opportunities we're going to, we're going to process. Yeah. But one choice in that is also how big should the chip stack be? And, and one, one thing I've wondered, is it possible to get the benefits of a big fund in terms of a big team without having a big fund by having other sort of businesses tied to it? But I think you would dispute sort of that even the big team adds that much value in the first place. But that's something that I've been curious about.

54:24Yeah. I mean, I think this gets into like a longer follow-up conversation about what it kind of, are you playing an asset manager product game, right? Where you want to be long technical innovation and you just need to buy it in the right size at the right time for your strategy? Or are you practicing core venture capital, which will never drive amazing top line revenue in a business, but can drive outsized returns relative to the equity and the people. So that's a whole... We'll have a cliffhanger for next time. Will, thanks so much for coming on the podcast. It's been a great episode. All right, bud.

54:56Thanks for having me. Turpetine VC is a podcast from Turpetine, the network behind Moment of Zen and Econ 102. If you liked the episode, please leave a review in the Apple Store or rate us on Spotify.

55:11Thank you.

From the publisher

Today's episode features an interview with Will Quist, partner at Slow Ventures. In this conversation Will talks about his transition from water polo player to helping build Slow, Slow's unique thesis in venture, the old model of VC versus new VC, and treating venture capital like a phD program.


Check out our two interviews with Will's partner at Slow, Sam Lessin:

Seed is Over https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=py7IPmDKjb4

VC in 2024 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=crj_H3JPHvg


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BOOK CITED:

The Success Equation: Untangling Skill and Luck in Business, Sports, and Investing by Michael J. Mauboussin


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RECOMMENDED PODCAST: Autopilot explores the adoption and rollout of AI in the industries that drive the economy and the dynamic founders bringing rapid change to slow-moving industries. From law, to hardware, to aviation, Will Summerlin interviews founders backed by Benchmark, Greylock, and more to learn how they're automating at the frontiers in entrenched industries.


Listen on Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/6YQZkKHN7EP2yWedAvSxBC?si=18377c69a2804333

Listen on Apple: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/autopilot-with-will-summerlin/id1738163836.


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RELATED SHOWS:  @10xcapitalpodcast 

If you like Turpentine VC, check out our show The 10x Capital Podcast with David Weisburd, where David talks to the investors behind the investors: https://10xcapitalpodcast.com/


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X / TWITTER:

@wquist (Will)

@eriktorenberg (Erik)

@turpentinemedia


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TIMESTAMPS:

(00:00) Intro

(00:14) Will Quist's Journey from Pro Athlete to VC

(04:44) Slow's Evolution

(07:00) Anti-Platform From the Jump

(09:51) Helping Founders Become Better Investors in Their Own Business

(14:49) Sponsor: Turpentine

(15:12) Old vs. New Venture Capital Models

(20:46) VC Framework

(26:05) Franchises

(29:49) Success in Venture Capital

(31:13) Fund Size and Portfolio Construction at Slow

(36:11) Multistage Challenges and Opportunities

(39:25) Introducing the Slow PhD Program

(44:22) Philosophy of Building and Investing

(54:06) Wrap


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This show is produced by Turpentine: a network of podcasts, newsletters, and more, covering technology, business, and culture — all from the perspective of industry insiders and experts. We’re launching new shows every week, and we’re looking for industry-leading sponsors — if you think that might be you and your company, email us at erik@turpentine.co.

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