How to win in seed stage investing today

16 Jul 2025 · 52 min

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Podcast Summary: Venture Unlocked - How to Win in Seed Stage Investing Today

Podcast Title: Venture Unlocked: The Playbook for Venture Capital Managers Host: Samir Kaji Guest: Nakul Mandan, Founding Partner of Audacious Ventures Episode Release: [Venture Unlocked Substack](https://ventureunlocked.substack.com?utm_medium=podcast)

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Episode Overview

In this episode of *Venture Unlocked*, host Samir Kaji interviews Nakul Mandan, the founding partner of Audacious Ventures. The conversation delves into Nakul's journey in venture capital, the evolution of the VC landscape, and the strategies for succeeding in seed-stage investing.

Key Themes Discussed

  • Nakul's Background
  • Early life and influences in India.
  • Career trajectory from Battery Ventures and Lightspeed to founding Audacious Ventures.
  • Evolution of Venture Capital
  • The significant changes in the venture capital landscape since 2010.
  • Impact of technological advancements, such as AWS, on the cost of launching startups.
  • The shift from a few boutique firms to the proliferation of VC firms and the need for systematic approaches.
  • Audacious Ventures’ Unique Model
  • Focus on building a systematic, founder-focused platform with a four-pillar approach:
  • Strategic Sourcing
  • Precise Deal Picking
  • Competitive Deal Winning
  • Comprehensive Founder Support
  • Hiring Principles and Organizational Structure
  • Emphasis on recruiting talent that aligns with the firm's intense culture.
  • Importance of having a structured approach to hiring and team-building.
  • Use of talent partners to support founders in building exceptional teams.
  • Measuring Success and Learning Loops
  • The challenges of establishing effective feedback loops in venture investing.
  • Strategies for evaluating sourcing, picking, and winning deals.
  • The significance of qualitative factors in assessing startup potential.
  • Advice for Aspiring VCs
  • Insights on maintaining an asymmetric upside in venture investments.
  • The importance of avoiding "doable deals" that lack transformative potential.

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Key Takeaways

Nakul Mandan’s Journey

  • Cultural Background: Grew up in Kanpur, India, influenced by family entrepreneurship and a desire to create success.
  • Professional Progression: Transitioned from Indian VC to leading roles in the US, ultimately founding Audacious Ventures during the pandemic.

Audacious Ventures Model

  • Four Pillars:
  • Sourcing: Using a systemic approach to identify high-potential startups.
  • Picking: Developing frameworks and questions that lead to informed investment decisions.
  • Winning: Cultivating strong relationships and a compelling value proposition to secure deals.
  • Helping: Providing founders with resources, particularly in hiring and team development.

Competitive Landscape

  • The VC market has become increasingly competitive, necessitating a systematic approach rather than relying on artisanal practices.

Feedback Mechanisms

  • Employing hits and misses analysis to identify sourcing gaps and improve deal-picking strategies.
  • Emphasizing the importance of shipping velocity and quality of hiring as indicators of startup health.

Organizational Culture

  • Establishing a team that embodies the intensity and ambition necessary for success.
  • Balancing intense work culture with empathy towards team members and founders.

Advice for New Investors

  • Focus on maximizing the potential for asymmetric upside in investments.
  • Avoid the trap of settling for mediocre deals; seek transformative opportunities.

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Conclusion

This episode of *Venture Unlocked* provides valuable insights into the dynamics of seed-stage investing and the operational strategies employed by Audacious Ventures. Nakul's unique perspective as a founder and his proposed model for venture capital serve as a guide for aspiring investors aiming to navigate the competitive landscape of venture capital effectively. For more insights and discussions, listeners are encouraged to subscribe to the podcast or visit the [Venture Unlocked Substack](https://ventureunlocked.substack.com).

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Transcript

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0:08Welcome back to another episode of Venture Unlocked, the podcast that takes you behind the scenes of the business of venture capital. In today's episode, we are joined by Knuckle Mundin, who is the founding partner of seed stage firm Audacious Ventures, which just raised its fun too. Having known Knuckle since the early days of his journey and starting the firm in 2020, I was excited to dive deep into his unique path, from his roots in India where he started in VC, to working at legendary firms like Battery and Lightspeed before starting his own firm. As many people that have listened to the show, the venture capital landscape has evolved and grown significantly.

0:42And the table stakes of being a successful early stage manager have increased dramatically as well. As such, in our discussion, we spent a lot of time thinking about how seed stage managers should think about navigating competitive markets and how today a proper system around sourcing, picking, winning, and building brands or delivering for founders requires a machine-like approach. Knuckles spent a lot of time during the podcast talking about their own machine that they've built, which is actually unlike most firms, and provides a nice juxtaposition of more traditional models. This was a fun and candid deep dive discussion into seed stage investing, and we really hope you enjoy my conversation with Knuckle.

1:20Samir Kaji is the CEO and co-founder of Allocate. Allocate and Venture Unlocked are independent of each other. Any statements or references made by Samir or his guests regarding third-party investments or securities are solely their views and opinions and are not intended as investment advice or an endorsement of such parties or securities by Samir, his guests, or Allocate. Allocate or its clients may maintain relationships with or investment positions in guests, third parties, or securities mentioned in this podcast. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.

1:58Nekul, it's great seeing you. Thanks for being on the show. Yeah, thank you for having me. It's been long overdue, let's call it. Well, it's funny because I saw the beginning days of Audacious when you were first getting started leaving Lightspeed. And I do want to spend a lot of time about the model, which I think is very unique in the six-stage market. But let's first go through your history because I think you have a very unique history in terms of how you got into venture. Yeah, yeah. So I grew up in India. I grew up in a place called Kanpur, which is a big city relative to U.S. standards population-wise, but not a major metro.

2:31My dad was an entrepreneur throughout his career. He's retired now, so I use the word was. And, you know, my brother was born paralyzed from below his waist, my younger brother. So I grew up pretty intense as a kid through my teenage years. Like, ambition and intensity was pretty deep in me right at the beginning. My life was pretty normal. It was a middle-income normal kid. But for my parents and my brother, it was a pretty intense life. And so I grew up feeling like my family's success needs to happen through me. So you could have met me at 18. I'd have said one day I'll start a company it'll be massively successful and I'll make it happen kind of a thing sort of a naive take of life as a teenager went to IIT went to IIM for my undergrad in business school my first job out of college was Deutsche Bank but within three months of being at Deutsche in Mumbai I started feeling this is the opposite of what I want to do I want to start a company here I'm one in 50 ,000 people but Deutsche in some ways was my first brush with the good life, you know, like the flight down to Deutsche Bank's interview in Mumbai was the first time I ever flew in my life at the age of 24.

3:37They sent us to London for training. That was my first international trip. So hotels, flights was all new for me and a big cultural upgrade. And even being in a city like Mumbai where people spoke confidently was all like great upgrade. But I was very clear that I wanted to start a company. So that was pretty early in my life, mostly watching my dad as an entrepreneur and saying, hey, this is what I'll do eventually. So got into venture in India in 2006, initially thinking I'll do venture for three, four years, learn how companies are run and then start a company of my own. So I did the first three-year stint in an India-only firm called Blue River Capital.

4:15It was a first-time fund, two partners, two associates. I was one of the two associates. That was great exposure because when you're one of four people, you get exposure to the whole thing. Partner dynamics, fundraising, brand building. But in 2008-9, the financial crisis started happening. And I started feeling, look, man, this fund is not going to be able to raise another fund. And I want to do my own thing, but there's no funding available in India. And so I started thinking, I want to be at a global top tier firm to see through the next two, three years, still learn a lot on company building, and then start something.

4:50So that's how I joined Battery in India in May of 2009. And, you know, May of 2009 is a little bit like a time like right now, like people were cleaning up shops. So I joined Battery on a Monday. I'm not exaggerating. On Wednesday, the head of the firm called me and said, we just let go of the guy who was leading India. This is day three on the job. And he said, look, we still want to do India though. So why don't you come to the US, to the Bay Area, focus on India from here for a couple of years, learn our way of doing things and then you and this other guy who's a principal when he becomes a partner you guys go back and set up that office again so that's how i first came to the u.s in my life i'd never visited the u.s straight away came to the bay area as a vc focused in india as soon as i arrived here i quickly realized that the battery india story is not going to work out battery was looking for silicon valley businesses in india india didn't have those at the time So I was like, there's a reason that guy's fired.

5:49This guy, other guy's going to get fired. I'm going to get fired. This is not working out. And you know, the idea of getting fired was pretty like remote for me. I went to IIT, IAM and venture. So it was like a pretty strange time. But I thought, look, I'm in Silicon Valley. Might as well maximize my learning while I'm here. And when they shut down the India practice, I'll just go back and find a job. I wasn't an H-1B visa. So there was no career at that time here. So I started volunteering for the US partners at the battery offices, more thinking, I'll maximize my learning. But in six months, when they shut down the India practice, they gave me a chance to reinvent myself.

6:27So they were very generous with me. You know, I'll give a shout out to this partner. She's now a GP there, Chelsea Stoner. She was a principal. She went to all the partners and said, Hey, if the guy is willing to reinvent himself, I'd like to take him under my wing. So singularly, she changed my life. She's now more on the buyout side of the firm. So she took me under her wing. I ended up focusing on the US after that. So since early 2010, I've been an enterprise software investor in the Bay Area. Had a great run at battery after that. Got promoted, all of that. And then June 2014, I joined Lightspeed as a principal.

7:01That was a great run. Became a partner in a year and a half. Became a GP in five years. By the time I was leaving, I was one of the eight senior partners in all of that. but then got my green card around the same time I became a GP. And this is where you and I had met. And that for me, as soon as the green card came, the moment of truth was there, which is I've told the story of my life to myself that one day I'll start something. And, you know, it was a tough decision rationally because in VC, you dream of a career where you become a GP at a firm like Lightspeed, right? It's the top tier firm and all of that.

7:35And I really enjoyed it personally. you know, I love my stint there and still have amazing relationships with the entire firm. But emotionally, I just felt like I didn't want to look back at my career and or life and say, hey, I'm healthy. I've beaten the structural barriers with which I grew up. And, you know, I'm in Silicon Valley. If I can't go for my dreams and who can? And so I just felt like I had to do it. So that's what led me to start Audacious. I'll pause there. But yeah, that was pretty good. Well, there's so much there that resonates. And similarly, I went through, I was working at a couple of different institutions that were bigger, greater organizations in Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic.

8:16I had that itch to start something. My dad was also an entrepreneur. And so around the same time you started, I left to start the current company that I run. And one of the things that I always think about when people are leaving, there's obviously an opportunity cost and there's some type of desire to create something that you believe in and that you're passionate about. But at the same time, the business model needs to make sense. And this was around the time COVID was in full swing, very tough to actually meet people in person. There was a lot of VC firms that had come to market in the prior five years.

8:50And one of the questions I think I asked you is, why does the world need another venture firm? And what were the things that informed the type of business that you wanted to build? So I think since 2010, the business was already, the business of venture has dramatically changed since 2010. For 30, 40 years, it was similar, which is there were 20 to 30 great firms. It was a collective of artisanal partners coming together in the room and all doing the same things. And we'll talk about this in depth in the model. But it was essentially a collective of artisanal partners where each person is doing their own solo practice and they all come together.

9:27Then around 2010, everything started changing. Two, three years before that, AWS came and crashed the cost of launching a business from$10 million to$2 million. The seed market we talk about today didn't exist before that because you couldn't have started a company with$3 million. You needed to put up the cloud infrastructure. So people would raise from angels and then straight away a$10 million round. Around the same time, Andreessen Horowitz came around and changed the model. Before Andreessen, the value prop of VC was, I'm a board member, I'll give advice. Andreessen changed that in many dramatic ways.

10:01YC came along, AngelList came along. All of this actually came along in the same four, five-year period. And so fast forward to 2020, when I was leaving, my view was VC is no longer a boutique artisanal business. And today, there are 500 VC firms and 6 ,000 seed deals that go down in the market every year in the US. This is actual data. In 2007, the number of seed deals that went down in the US market was 600. This year, it'll be 6 ,000 plus. YC alone graduates a thousand companies every year now, four batches, right? So in today's world, if you're just a collective of artisanal partners waiting around and just doing good hustle, you're relying on luck.

10:42You need to build a machine in this world. So I would say there were two things further along that played into my mind. One is that VCs, the large, the branded firms that we all admire, Lightspeed, Sequoia, all of these became too large to service the seed stage entrepreneur. So as crowded as the VC market is, the one gap in the VC market that I saw was that there's no gold standard VC or seed stage firm. Other than first round, there's no platform firm at seed. First round has the brand cachet and rightly so of being the sequoia of seed. But after that, there's a steep drop in seed firms. And at that time, at least people like me would not start seed firms.

11:25People like me would typically start series A firms, Unusual Ventures and some others before that. And even hence, our friend, Dimash, Chemistry, always want to start series A firms. So true GPs don't ever start seed firms. So I felt there was this opportunity where the large firms are great, but they're too large to care about the seed stage entrepreneur. And seed firms were not equipped with the platform DNA or the dealmaking intensity it takes to compete. So the first gap I saw was that there's an opportunity to build a gold standard seed firm, which people like me can do, and I've been trained to do, but people like me don't do it.

12:04The second gap I saw was, which is more fun, actually is, okay, if we do want to build a platform firm, what is it going to be our value proposition beyond advice? For me, as I thought a lot about it, it came down to where we can create the maximum impact is building an exceptional team around the founder. And I can go in a lot of depth around So our first employee after me was our talent partner alongside MZ, my investment partner. And half of our team today is recruiters. So we focus on two jobs at Audacious. Invest in force of nature founders, help them recruit an amazing team. Then we get out of the way.

12:42Then the last piece, which we can transition to is the model itself that I've created a few. But those were the two gaps I saw. And then the model itself was informed by how do we build a machine ready to win? I want to spend a lot of time pulling the thread on this whole concept of a machine. And when I think about any investment firm, particularly a venture, there's a few pillars that you have to execute on. It's seeing deals. You have to then use good judgment to pick the right deals. Then there's the, you found them, you picked them, you still have to win those deals in a world where it's highly competitive.

13:19And then ultimately, once you win the deal, you want to create the flywheel by adding a lot of value to those founders so that those founders say good things about you and you get repeat sort of business a lot of the first round capitals who have built a tremendous reputation over multiple decades. And we'll get into that machine in a second. But the first thing was you did start this during COVID. And there's this old adage in sort of fundraising is you want to be differentiated, but not too differentiated. And so there's too many moving parts, it becomes tough. Talk about like that first fundraise.

13:53And if you look back, is there anything you would have done differently? So by the way, that adage, I lived through it. You want to be different enough to show differentiation, but not too different. And I definitely went too different in my first fundraise. I think you were there and as a witness to some of that journey. But I'd say so. Yeah. So I kicked off the first fundraise in the first month of COVID lockdowns, April 2020. Brutal time to kick off the raise. When I resigned, I had no idea of COVID. Like none of us knew August 2019, I'd resigned, but timing worked out that way. The first fundraiser was fucking brutal.

14:27No other way to put it. It took 14 months. It was ego bruising. You know, I still carry candidly. I still keep alive some anger every single day that it took me that long because I think like, you know, that anger is good for me in some ways, but it does make me angry. And so why did it go long? First is first few months of COVID lockdown, nobody even wanted to meet. People were like, what are you talking about? My kid's schooling is disrupted. People are talking about toilet paper. This is a species level problem. Like, what are you even talking about? And LPs were not used to making Zoom-based decisions, right?

15:03And now things have evolved. So LPs are used to making decisions. And rightfully so, they are betting on a person's 10, 12, 12, 14-year journey. They're betting on three funds at a time sometimes. times. So how do you make a decision on a person who you've never had sat down for dinner with, right? So that slowed down things. Second was I was bringing a new model, but it was just me at the time. So I have created this functional log design on the topic of machine rather than artisanal group of VCs do four things, sourcing, picking, winning, helping. In any partner room, in any partner meeting you sit in VC, we all know whose judgment we trust more, whose winning is better than other people, who's great at sourcing versus who has okay deal flow, who's actually a good board member versus a very mediocre board member.

15:52We all know this in any room, right? LPs know this too. When they're investing in a firm, that I'd rather have most of the money deployed by this one person, right? So I was like, why is the same person trying to do all four of these things? And the reason was, I mean, pre-2010, the world of venture revolved around the central idea of something called proprietary deal flow because there were fewer deals, fewer firms, people had relationships in each industry, and that's how deal flow came to them. They would call the same network to pick, win, and help. I would submit that in 2020 and beyond, and definitely today, there is no such thing as proprietary deal flow.

16:32I'm sure exceptions exist, but my general submission would be. If somebody is still talking about proprietary deal flow, they're bullshitting you. And so you have to then maximize the four inputs that drive returns, sourcing, picking, winning, helping. People have different superpowers. And so we've created a functional log design of sourcing, picking, winning, helping. I've said these words so many times that Hunter from Stepstone jokes with me that I should get these words tattooed on my face, literally. So creating that functional org design in a first-time fundraise when it was just me in COVID, it became too much differentiation, candidly.

17:09And that took time. And the questions I would get were rightful. How will you recruit people in this model? How will founder interactions work? We had answers and all the right answers, but it still was a leap of faith. The third thing that made the fundraise trickier and it's easy for me to say it today than like when it was playing out was candidly my track record was genuinely early had only been at light speed for five years and the middle age of venture sucks because your losers have started showing up in the track record but the winners haven't popped yet and so i'd probably say so just high level numbers was i deployed like north of 100 million, like 140 million, but it was at a 2x because you keep deploying more, the multiple comes down.

17:57There's only a five-year track record. So it was all ballooning to be good. Today it's at 4.5x already, and I think it landed 5 to 8x by the time it's done. But at that moment, it wasn't enough. So I would even say to people that I was able to pull off that$90 million first fundraise, which is a sizable raise for that time. Like today, the world has even moved beyond. Because I had an immigrant journey, because I'm probably a good salesperson, like I've had a lot of intensity around it that people are giving me some X-factor leap of faith. Right. That is how it came together. It took time. Yeah.

18:34Remind me again, how long did it take from start to finish from when you showed the first deck to final close? 14 months. 14 months, which, you know, in today's world, 14 months, you know, for a first-time fund is probably 90 % of the funds out there. Yeah. At least that, if not longer. And of course, that was also a very unique time in 2020 because you had the uncertainty that was brought forth by COVID. And you had the fact that you couldn't visit people, which in-person conversations, obviously, are far different than what you and I are doing right now. We're on Riverside, but on Zoom, obviously, you don't have the same type of relationship and rapport building.

19:12So you had that done. Now, we talked a little bit about differentiation. So when I think about a traditional seed fund, generally it's one or two partners. You're investing in 25, 35 companies, and you have the partners doing everything from finding deals, picking deals, helping the companies. And that's been fairly tried and true. A lot of funds go down the route. You mentioned Andreessen as almost having this agency model, which is modeled in some ways after CAA, right? So if you think about that agency model, but there also have been conversations around sometimes those platform teams are more marketing than they're real in terms of really driving value.

19:52Tell me a little bit about how you conceived this in terms of the organizational design. And you mentioned the talent person, like why this? Yeah. So maybe a more macro question is also why this model at all? Is this the only model that can work? I don't believe that this is the only model that can work. Other people can do what they believe to be true and in venture there are multiple ways to win it. But I do think any founder needs to build a firm that is authentic to their personality, right? So the first thing I'd say is my role models in VC are platforms like Andreessen, YC, First Round Capital, and AngelList.

20:36And you put AngelList there because AngelList in some ways is a programmatic, systematic way of capturing their share of cap tables. All four of these firms that I've talked, I would argue that they don't think of themselves as artisanal collectives. They are platforms, they are machines which go beyond one individual. for me that was very critical it's an authentic part of how I believe I want to build a firm so first is like I've never thought of myself as a craftsman I think of myself as an individual I'm a brute force bulldog and what I want to build is accordingly a reflection of my me which is a machine a sports team then on the model itself as I said like the way it came pretty organically I was waiting for my dream card in the last year to two years I would write down all kinds of business model potentially?

21:24Should I partner with somebody? Should I do growth late stage early? Ultimately for me, I authentically love early stage. I love the most joyful part of venture for me is working with the founder. And I found in my life during those years at battery and light speed, board meetings are performative. The best work happens outside of board meetings, one-on-one helping founders do something, think about things or all of that. So I wanted to take this one call and do everything that is authentically my belief and then I'll edit. So I don't take board seats anymore. So as an example on helping, right?

22:00So then I came down to, for me, it came down to the highest impact we can create are a few things. Help a founder build amazing go-to-market engine that is customer intros or just helping them on building repeatability. but before that comes an amazing team. So my conclusion was the first thing that I want to build at Audacious is how do we help two founders go from two amazing founders to 15 amazing people? And our best founders, actually what we found, already have their first three, four hires identified because they are exceptional people, they live with exceptional people, right? But around the fourth or fifth person is where they start feeling, should I hire the fifth best person that I know or now I go for the global maxima?

22:44That was my learning during the Lightspeed years. So I felt that customer intros, I was deciding between customer intros and recruiting. My learning was that customer intros from VC are fake signals because they are not qualified pipeline. And so they waste a lot of time. They work better at series B and beyond. The starting point of all greatness starts with exceptional teams, starts with exceptional founders. And so that's how the helping piece came. And then sourcing, picking, winning piece came because as I said, like I was sitting in those rooms and I was like, you know, people have different superpowers.

23:18I can literally see, like I grew in venture because I was amazing at sourcing initially. Then I became better at picking and winning. And by the time I was leaving Lightspeed, I felt like, hey, I'm top quartile at picking, but I'm top five percentile amongst VCs and winning competitive deals, right? So if I want to maximize my superpower and I get busier every time as people get more portfolio, how do you ensure that sourcing still remains a superpower? And so that's how this model came together. And it fit instantly for me because again, I don't think of myself as artisanal and that's not an ambition I have.

23:53I want to build a machine. And Reason is a machine. GC is a machine. Lightspeed is a machine. It doesn't rely on one individual leaving, right? Obviously, there are one or two people at the very center. The leader is at the center of these organizations. But beyond that the individual can leave the platform remains. Once it's artisanal firms rely on that collective of artisans being in that room, I don't want to rely. How do you think about this notion? And I've talked to a lot of seed stage managers on this, and we talked about the big firms. The reality of their business models are fundamentally different.

24:30When you're raising a billion, two billion, five billion, even$8 billion, at the end of the day, your job is to put as much money in very clear consensus companies, Series A, Series B, Series C, Series D. If you do seed checks, it's typically for option value versus anything else. And one of the things that a lot of seed stage funds sell against is, well, if you work with big fund X, and they put in a million dollars, 2 million out of a billion dollar fund, they're not going to pay attention. You're not going to get the senior partner. With us, you get the senior partner. I I have one person. I do everything.

25:06I'm your first call. And the question that sometimes comes is if you have platform teams, the relative value of each person on the platform team has to be consistent for this machine to work. So my NPS with you is, you know, let's call it a 9, 99 or whatever it is. And then somebody on your talent team is a 30. Well, the audacious brand is not going to go. How do you ensure that this machine has consistency in the service model where you're taking advantage of what each person's superpowers, but not losing the overall value to the entrepreneur because you have different people doing different things?

25:46Phenomenal question. And this is where everything comes to live or thrive or die. There's no middle ground. So first piece, our team has to be excellent. We can't help other people build exceptional teams if we are not excellent. You meet Sam. She's fucking amazing. Best challenge partner in Silicon Valley period. Not a second person can compare. Second, structure matters. We have our full weekly meeting every Monday. When we go down to the partner meeting, it's my investment partner, MZ, me and Sam. She's involved in every single partner decision. Our first AGM three years ago, Sam was up there on stage for 40 % MZ and I were 30 % each.

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26:32There were two featured speakers, Sam and MZ interviewed. How many talent partners get that central place? But it comes from authenticity. Everything I just said wouldn't work if I don't believe in everything I'm saying. If I believe that I'm only doing it to show winnability or sell to a founder, I wouldn't be able to follow up on all these things on the day-to-day and make sure that is actually open. And then a lot of structure. So as an example, there are two or three other VC firms that are very talent focused. I won't name them, but you know, obvious names. All of them or 90 % of them charge the founder for something.

27:12As soon as you charge something to the founder, there's a conflict of interest. Why? Let's say you are a founder. You get two candidates from your network. We got three finalists from our network, right? Or two finalists from us, one from elsewhere. If I charge you, I'm going to push my candidate, whether I charge an equity or cash, right? I'm justifying my presence. If I don't charge you, there's no conflict of interest. I want our best team possible because I'm only doing this recruiting in the service of the equity value I already own in this company. It's fully aligned with the founder, with Audacious and our LPs.

27:46So that's structure. Another structure is nobody at Audacious, not our associates, not our partners, not our talent team has an annual bonus. Everybody has base salary and carry. If somebody negotiates salary with me, like I could get 150 plus 50 in this other place, I'll take, I'll say take 220 base and carry no short term incentives. Why is that important? It's the same way, like if you as an LP, and I'm lucky that allocate is an LP in us, give us only management fee and no carry. What will I do? I'll just deploy. I don't care. If you give me bonus on recruiting, I'll just hire people. I don't care if they're amazing.

28:24So I don't measure our talent team on how many hires they made. I measure them on number of high quality submittals and every week and the relentlessness that I am seeing as an input on quality and quantity. But I don't care if they made 35 hires this year versus 43, because if the 36 hires started being mediocre, I'd rather we want to help our founders hire less. actually. Often we dissuade our founders from hiring the first sales rep before they've shown some product market fit. Again, if I'm charging, why will I dissuade that? So it starts with authentic belief in the system, bringing amazing people, which is Sam and her talent team, and then structural incentives to align with the founder.

29:12One of these three things breaks. Let's say the other two structural incentives is there authentically, but my team is mediocre, doesn't work. So it's hard. Honestly, it's hard. But everything is hard. Everything world building is hard. Yeah. So when you build in these structural elements that put all these things together to create this consistent ethos in how you work, hiring people is obviously very important. So you kind of mentioned how you are, which is intense. You have the chip on the shoulder. You've been through a lot of different parts of the journey. And oftentimes when you're bringing people on, it's hard to have people that mirror that intensity, that have the same sort of ethos that you do.

29:55How did you index? What did you index for when you were hiring people? And what were the key questions that helped inform that these were the right folks? So a few things go into it. One is our own assessment. Actually, recruiting, by the way, is similar to investing. You have to get in front of the talent sourcing, assess talent, and then win them over because the best talent has the most options and their own boss will make a count off on the day they get an offer from you, right? So, and then you have to groom them, onboard them to retain them. So it's actually in some ways the same things.

30:26So when we are recruiting for Audacious, you know, overall culture matters, language matters, body language matters, the way we behave every day, it is very important. On the first day that MZ, Sam and I got together on February 1st, 2021, I think, we put together a foundation doc and I can even share it for your audience if you want, which started with core guiding principles and then the values. And if you see it, it's pretty intent on playing to win. We can win from any situation. There is an element of we are here to win the market. We are not here just to play. There's an intensity that language matters in the sense that you've seen our AGM deck, one AGM deck talked about machine built to win.

31:14Internally, I say either machine or sports team. I never use other words, right? Okay. So then those are behaviors, but on recruiting, there's definitely an element of looking for killers, you know, people who want to crush it in their life. Everyone at Audacious that you'll meet believes fundamentally, and this is a recruiting criteria that their future is better than their past. And they are right now underestimated in some form or shape? And I look for that as a question, right? Why did I say I keep some anger alive in me, right? Because, you know, I once heard this quote from Bill Gurley that he was talking about Larry and Sergey and Google and how they keep pushing the boundaries.

31:56And he was saying, there are some founders in history who never let the game be defined by where they got started. What he means is like, no matter how much distance you cover, if the future is brighter in your own view, then you have the hunger. So I look for that kind of a hunger. And I'm looking, so that becomes a criteria in my questions and stuff. Then I also do a scare interview. So after the third, fourth meeting where they are leaning in, I'm leaning in. I do say this very directly so much so that, you know, Sam, our talent partner. So I, what I say is, Hey, look, I'm an intense person.

32:30I work better with intense people. So I just want to make sure that this is aligned. Like we are not a work-life balance firm nobody at audacious will ever work as hard as me but nobody will get away with a five-day week simply right and so i say these things and i test them and i'm reading their language so much so that you know my niche hopefully you and your audience will agree come off as sometimes intense but sometimes friendly so she was like in her back channel references on me she kept asking people like hey this guy keeps saying that he's very intense. He's been very friendly in the process.

33:04Like, what is this? But I do the scare interview just to make sure that, Hey, are we aligned? Like we are here to kill it. Right. And then back channel references, we test for extreme ambition, urgency factor. And yeah, so I would say extreme ambition and urgency factor and this hunger to that. I'm underestimated right now. I need to do something to make my future aligned with what I believe it should be. That kind of a thing. I'll say the last thing on this. You have to balance this much intensity with some humanity. Otherwise you go crazy. And so one of our core values is always remember there is a human on the other side of every equation or every conversation.

33:52This is a very core value. When people on board, I don't go through each value. I go through, I do a half an hour session with them on values and stuff, but this one I highlight. And the reason is, and say like, hey, we understand like everybody has a family. People could have a sick parent, a sick kid, you know, or, and that could be our teammates or the founders we deal with, right? We want to work with people who are just driven at this level that I'm talking about. There is a humanity in all of us and we need to remember we are not robots. And so you have to balance that and ultimately culture is a set of behaviors.

34:27I can say all these things. If I don't live intensely or if I don't bring the humanity also, then it can go in the wrong direction. Yeah. And these things are not easy to do. Obviously, you know, in a very people driven business, you know, at the end of the day, there are people on the other side of the table that go through personal. They have life events, all of those things. That also extends, of course, to the founders who, you know, often just need a little bit of empathy throughout, you know, what is always going to be a kind of a, you know, jagged journey, right? Things never go up and to the right.

34:58It's always a little bit difficult. When you think about, you know, starting and kind of running a firm and, you know, you're very people centric from the standpoint of you need all these parts to work together. Each person is delivering on their superpower, whether it's sourcing, picking, winning, and helping companies. And everyone would agree those are the kind of four pillars of any venture firm to be successful. I don't know that every venture firm has to be good at each one of those, but probably at least two or three out of the four you have to be exceptional at. The question that keeps popping up in my mind as we're going through this is how do you know if it's working?

35:31Yeah, it's good. So I'll also give one more thought to your point that you made is I actually feel to have a good to great career in VC in an established firm, you just need to be good at two of those things. To build a great firm, you probably have to be good at three out of four. Otherwise, it probably relies too much on luck. Four out of four is just extremely difficult. and you know sequoia is a good at all for a long time i've actually asked sequoia people like i asked back grady once and he actually said that they think they make a lot of mistakes on picking where they are good as the other three if sequoia is saying it we should all be humble and it'll be it'll take a while to get good at all four uh okay so how do we know it's working so we what we do is on sourcing and picking so i think so one macro thought here is vc is a long feedback cycle business.

36:23And so you can't over-metricize or over-quantify this and you could get wrong, right? So as an example, if sourcing is more driven by number of meetings you did in a week and stuff, you're just targeting the wrong metric because they are more mediocre investments than the amazing ones. So the way we measure it is more on sourcing, we do a hits and misses analysis around if one of these 20, 30 firms does an investment that is in our sweet spot, one to$10 million each round, did we see it? And if we saw it, did we see the same things that others saw? So let's use some examples. So let's say first round of Kleiner Perkins, firms we respect does a deal at 6 million, something like that, right?

37:08Well, sourcing feedback loop is instant. Did we see it or not? Picking, it could be that we were right in passing they were wrong so we map it in two years and we look back so one exercise we do almost every january is since we started which are the seed deals that we should have done since we started right and we kind of map it every year a little bit but hits and misses a monthly quarterly exercise that we revisit not very like weekly but every now and then mz and i go through it on but the goal there again is not to point fingers see the functional culture again matters right the goal is not to point fingers at why did you miss it it's more about how could we have thought about things differently which node in our ecosystem could have sent us this opportunity why did we not see it should we unlock so we have something called sourcing nodes for our sourcing efforts right which is what are the key you know hubs of amazing people that we should get to know who at figma will tell us that this amazing engineer at figma is leaving so let's say we repeatedly start not seeing the Figma deals, MZ and his team, MZ leads our sourcing engine, then says, okay, can we unlock this ecosystem?

38:22So we have like 40 or 50 companies where we believe high density of talent exists. It's not every company. So we literally have like air tables of those companies and those specific founders or potential founders. So we kind of do a hits and misses on sourcing and picking. Winning feedback loop is extremely fast, which is we lost it or you won it on the deals you tried. But again, there's a nuance here. And this is something that MC and I agreed very early on. The surest way of having a mediocre career in VC is doing deals that are only winnable. And that happens at every firm with a partnership.

39:03Why? People don't want to look idiotic in front of their partners that I keep losing deals. but the best deals are the most competitive right and so what happens is you lose three back-to-back deals the fourth deal you just try to get something done it maybe it's the hidden gem that everybody's passing and only you are seeing it or maybe you're just doing a what is called a doable deal in the ecosystem right so we kind of again we want to put all so there's a when we evaluate why did we lose a deal we really are evaluating not by pointing fingers but by thinking what could we have done differently?

39:35Is it that our personality didn't match with the founder? Is it that our value prop did not land? Should I have positioned ourselves differently? So even in winning, I think about it as there's a rational value prop of recruiting, go to market engine, build out my track record as a SaaS investor. There's the emotional value prop of does somebody want to work with us? So I position it as I sell four things in front of a founder, my personal journey as an immigrant, my track record as a SaaS investor and a B2B investor over 10 years, our recruiting value prop, and just sometimes my salesmanship, right?

40:11I present these four, they show me the energy, what's exciting then? Sometimes that could be just my salesmanship. And then I jam that, right? The mistake can be I misread the signal, they just didn't give a fuck about our recruiting value prop because they believe, and maybe sometimes rightfully so, that they have their team covered. If I keep selling that, then I'm just, you know, banging my head against the wall. So you have to kind of change it. So again, you want to see it. And ultimately, to most macro question, is it working? Are we seeing investment opportunities that high quality firms are looking at and doing?

40:48And are some of those that we convert, are we winning our fair share of deals or disproportionate share of deals? And then are those actually doing well? And that's the feedback loop that is the longest at last part. Yeah, these things do take a long time. So any company that you invest in, in terms of hitting terminal scale, being a massive exit, being a fund return, it could be eight, 10 years. Yeah. Quicker feedback loops. Are you winning deals? Are you seeing interesting deals more consistently? The ones that fit your thesis, of course, right? You don't need to see everything. Are there any false positives or negatives that you found in the first five years that might misinform how you go about this learning agenda?

41:30Markups can be easily a very misleading indicator, especially in bull markets. I'll give you a real example. In 2021, our third investment, I did it at 30 post, like April of 2021. It was a bull market. Within three months, a very top three type of firm marked it up 2x, 2.5. We did it at 30, did it at 65 pre feeling good january february tiger global comes in marks it up to 250 feeling really good this is fucking easy like what are these big forms like hair is audacious two years later that company returned 70 percent of the capital back good news is the founder was good disciplined did not waste capital so we got 70 percent some other founder could have actually drowned the whole capital we could have got zero so so i think markups can be a misleading indicator I do think the challenge in VC is it is a qualitative business.

42:21And, well, you know, LPs, often sophisticated LPs, the real, real, whether which quartile of fund will land in is really visible only in year six, seven, not even in year five. The reason is like these companies go up and down. So I think false positives on markups can be like that. Not every markup, obviously, you want some to prove that things are working. I think the best signals are revenues, velocity, quality of hiring, gross margins. The quality of hiring is the first signal. Within six months of making an investment at seed, you can get two signals very fast. One is quality of hiring and the urgency factor of the founder.

43:06If these two are good, you're in a good place. how do you very quickly get a signal that hey i made the wrong way how do you quantify that obviously these are subjective you know is the talent good i mean you could look at the resume but at the end of the day the resume of where they came from may not actually dictate the quality of the person relative to what they're you know the startup you know in the startup is building you can't measure on a resume grid hustle tenacity intensity so how do you measure those non-quantitative things to understand how these companies are tracking? I think maybe the more tangible metric would be shipping velocity.

43:47If you have a good team, it should convert to at least product shipping velocity and then early revenue, quality of early revenue. But I'd probably say the most tangible is shipping velocity and then quality speed of early revenue. But speed of early revenue can be tricky if it's a large enterprise selling business. If it's a bottom-up business, speed of revenue should be instantly good. But if it's a top-down, often the product has to be meaty enough and it can take a year to build and that's where a qualitative judgment comes. My answer to yours would be shipping velocity is the number one output of it.

44:21Since we're trying a little bit of a parallel on companies and I want to take it back and apply it to running a firm, right? Running a firm is different than raising a fund. Running a firm, hiring, culture, all these things. And if you think about running a company, you know, generally think what you're thinking is, find a problem, build a product, distribute that product. These are kind of the core things. You have to hire talent, right? You have to hire talent that can execute on these things. And in sort of land, you could say you have a great product, but poor distribution. It's not going to probably work.

44:51If you have an average product with great distribution, it's probably going to be a really nice company. Now, the ultimate nirvana is when you have great products, big markets, and you have great distribution. When you look at your sort of four pillars of sourcing, picking, winning, helping, if you were to force rank them, what's most important in your mind to least important? One could argue that from a least important might be the simplest answer. From a returns perspective for LPs and VCs, not founders, helping is the least important. Why? Because ultimately, the best founders will always figure it out.

45:28So the way I think about our helping motion is we are not looking to invest in founders who need Audacious's recruiting help. We are looking to invest in founders who will be successful with or without us. Those people will need some help still. They are just so resourceful and so driven that they will find the help they need. But because they are amazing, they only need help from amazing people. And so the question is, is our recruiting engine or our platform or Knuckle as an advisor excellent enough to be one of the five people who can move the needle for one of the excellent founders? In the absence of Knuckle and Audacious, they will still find that help.

46:10The question is, can we earn the right to be one of the five people? So that's how I think of the helping. But from a pure VC point of view and returns, if you ask me what is the least needed thing to drive returns is help. source the other three the challenge with that is their binary it's like zero to one multiplied by each other right you didn't source well what will you do with good picking and winning and same for the other two the way i think of it is sourcing if you've hustled hard enough you will run into luck on sourcing because silicon valley is abundant with amazing people but where it can be amazing which is what MZ brings to it is having a nose of where exceptional talent hangs and maximizing your odds on a monthly basis, not an annual basis to run into that talent and having the nose to say, we should spend more time with this founder.

47:01That's what MZ. So we've always thought that sourcing and picking are intertwined to each other. They're not silos, right? Picking, I believe 90 % of picking happens before the first meeting. It's in the frameworks. It's the questions that I'm asking the founder those so some people focus more on market some more on founder what are you looking for in the founder all of those are pre frameworks that you've already built and what you look for in the meeting is just validating the framework so at seed especially i think picking is probably either there or not like so lp should think of it as what are the frameworks this guy has or not right and then winning again having a value prop helps winning salesmanship helps willing your own personal persona and the track record you bring to the table to that meeting helps and so found i think i would say like all three are binary they all are needed it's very difficult to rank which one if you let me answer it more directly actually if you are leading competitive deals if you are a 50 million dollar fund and below sourcing is probably more important than winning because you're not trying to win the deal.

48:07You're trying to be the second or third slot. And it's between those two just about access. So sourcing becomes more important. If you're leading deals, winning is the hardest thing and winning is the mission critical thing. You can't win it. You shouldn't be in the business of leading competitive deals. He did. Yeah, I totally agree. It does depend on the model. I've actually said, you know, for some seed funds that are smaller, you know, where they're doing, sourcing is one, but I would say, you know, tag on checks where it's 100, 250. it's just about finding those enough, getting that network.

48:36It's a network sort of fund. And that actually a good thing. One that you go bigger. So when you go for 20 to a hundred million dollar fund at a hundred million, your portfolio model is going to be writing bigger checks, which means you have to lead, which requires a different skillset. And I think a lot of people don't recognize that it's not about you grow fund size just means you're writing bigger checks. It's a different skillset that you absolutely have to. On 75 million, I think the model, he had to change from X. to winning. And winning has a somewhat element of helping. So even Benchmark, which doesn't have the platform, their claim is that we are great advisors and craftsmen at company building.

49:16That is a claim that the market believes. It is shown in their track record. And so that is their help. They might not have the platform, but they don't say, hey, we are passive. Some firms like Tiger say they are passive, but that's the stage. Yeah. And everyone has a different model. Again, I think it's about authenticity and what allows you to win in the desired type of business model you want. You've passed on a lot of really interesting insights. A good place to end is, you know, 2006, you start at this, you know, firm Blue River. If you were to give one piece of advice that you know now about investing that you would give your 2006 self, what would it be?

49:54All investing wisdom is about business models and markets and stuff. But venture is all about the probability of the asymmetric upside coming through, right? An outlier potential. You don't have... So every other investing asset class is deterministic. I invested X, will this steady state become Y? And is Y meaningfully above X? Buyouts, real estate, all of this. Venture is about creating a portfolio where you're maximizing the probability of catching that outlier. It's not a deterministic business in every investment level. It's a probabilistic business at the portfolio level. And the slippery slope is that if you start doing doable deals, mediocre founders or market, you will basically create a portfolio where the upside, asymmetric upside is missing.

50:45So it's like being over deterministic in venture that this will definitely succeed is very bad advice. But that works in many, in almost every other asset class versus this is about high risk, but asymmetric upside needs to exist. The risk of actually an okay company and an exceptional company is the same. It'll go to zero. Most companies don't have asymmetric upside. You know, it's funny because we, you know, it's very logical, you know, these things. I mean, but yet they have to be repeated. Khosla, you know, the folks at Khosla say, you only can lose one extra money. But if you, the biggest mistake is not making the decision to do something, which could be a thousand X or a hundred X or 50 X and talking yourself out of those things.

51:29I am, I'm thoroughly enjoyed the conversation. It's great to see that the business grow the way it has. And I've been there, you know, first part of the journey I've seen you grow. And so again, congrats, congratulations on the early part. I know there's a lot to be done yet, but thanks again for sharing the insights today. And thanks for having me. You've been an early supporter from day zero, like in April, 2020, probably one of the top three people who made LP intros for me when it was really tough. So I'm grateful for the friendship. Thanks so much for listening to another episode of Venture Unlocked.

52:01We really hope you enjoyed our conversation with Knuckle. If you'd like to get Venture Unlocked content straight to your inbox, go to VentureUnlocked.substack.com and sign up or go to Apple, iTunes or Spotify and subscribe. Thanks so much again for listening.

52:20Thank you.

From the publisher

Follow me @samirkaji for my thoughts on the venture market, with a focus on the continued evolution of the VC landscape.

Welcome back to another episode of Venture Unlocked, the podcast that takes you behind the scenes of the business of venture capital.

In today’s episode, we are joined by Nakul Mandan, who is the founding partner of seed-stage firm Audacious Ventures.

Having known Nakul since the early days of his journey in starting the firm in 2020, I was excited to dive deep into his unique path, from his roots in India to venture capital, working at firms such as Battery and Lightspeed before starting his own firm. As venture capital has evolved and grown, the stakes of being a successful early-stage manager have increased dramatically.

In our chat, we discussed how managers should think about navigating competitive markets and how a proper system around sourcing, picking, winning, and building a brand through delivering for founders requires a machine-like approach. Audacious has created its own system, which is unlike most firms, providing a nice juxtaposition of more traditional models. This was a fun and candid deep dive into seed stage investing, and we hope you enjoy my conversation with Nakul

Thanks for listening to another episode of Venture Unlocked. We hope you enjoyed our conversation with Nakul. If you’d like to get venture unlocked content straight to your inbox, go to ventureunlocked.substack.com and sign up, or go to Apple Podcasts or Spotify and subscribe. Thanks again for listening

About Nakul Mandan

Nakul Mandan is the founder and managing partner of Audacious Ventures, a pre-seed and seed-stage venture firm he launched in April 2020—right when the world was locking down. A student of greatness, Nakul is inspired by extraordinary journeys, whether in business or beyond. Previously a Partner at Lightspeed and Battery Ventures, he led early investments in category-leading software companies like Gainsight, People.ai, Multiverse, WorkOS, 6Sense, and Marketo. A graduate of IIT Kanpur, Nakul combines deep technical insight with a founder-first mindset—and a passion for helping entrepreneurial "force-of-nature" founders assemble A+ teams.

Audacious Ventures is a next-generation seed-stage investment firm that reimagines venture capital as a systematic, founder-focused platform. Founded in 2020 with a $90 million fund, the firm distinguishes itself through a unique four-pillar approach: strategic sourcing, precise deal picking, competitive deal winning, and comprehensive founder support. Unlike traditional venture models, Audacious prioritizes talent recruitment and team building, with half the team dedicated to helping founders construct exceptional organizations. The firm's data-driven yet intensely human approach has quickly positioned it as an emerging leader in the seed investment ecosystem, attracting founders seeking more than just capital, but a true strategic partner in their entrepreneurial journey.

In this episode, we discuss:

* Nakul’s Early Life and Ambition (2:16)

* Entry into Indian Venture Capital (4:00)

* Transition to US-Focused VC and Lightspeed (6:41)

* Becoming a GP and Founding Audacious Ventures (7:35)

* Identifying Gaps in the Seed VC Market (10:34)

* Audacious Ventures’ Differentiated Model (12:34)

* Functional Organizational Design (16:12)

* Traditional vs. Platform Seed Fund Models (19:24)

* Ensuring Consistency in the Platform Model (24:41)

* Hiring for Intensity and Culture (29:55)

* Measuring Success and Feedback Loops (35:33)

* False Positives and Markups in VC (41:30)

* Ranking the Four Pillars: Sourcing, Picking, Winning, Helping (45:13)

* Advice to 2006 Self: Focus on Asymmetric Upside (49:54)

* Final Thoughts and Takeaways (51:44)

I’d love to know what you took away from this conversation with Nakul. Follow me @SamirKaji and give me your insights and questions with the hashtag #ventureunlocked. If you’d like to be considered as a guest or have someone you’d like to hear from (GP or LP), drop me a direct message on X.



This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit ventureunlocked.substack.com

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