Why the world’s biggest tech companies may never IPO again - Peter Singlehurst [Baillie Gifford]

18 Jun 2026 · 58 min · 22 chapters

Ask about this episode

Ask anything about it. ChatGPT or Claude reads this page and answers with the times it was said.

Connect VO and ask about every podcast you hear, including the moments you saved. Add to ChatGPT · Add to Claude

In short

Episode topic: Peter Singlehurst (Baillie Gifford) explains why many tech IPOs “end badly,” arguing it happens when companies optimize for IPO price/valuation instead of choosing high-quality, long-term partners. He also covers the valuation “trap” in private markets, how private markets are becoming more liquid, and why China narratives are often wrong.

Guest background

Peter Singlehurst studied philosophy, then joined Baillie Gifford’s graduate investment training. He built the firm’s private companies team from scratch (dedicated team founded 2017; first private fund 2019; three funds since). Baillie Gifford has deployed billions into 100+ companies.

Key claims

  • “Debt kills businesses” if companies aren’t cash-flow positive; leverage is only appropriate with predictable cash flows.
  • Primary private markets have become more institutionalized; secondary markets can involve FOMO and poor information.
  • IPOs fail when founders leave too little value for new public investors, breaking trust.
  • Valuation should reflect founder risk-taking and a path to ~5x upside.

Notable examples

Amazon (long-term free cash flow per share), Tesla (2013 investment at ~$3B market cap), SpaceX (later investment at ~$30B valuation), ByteDance (undervalued due to supply/demand dynamics), Bending Spoons (profitable, uses leverage), Andrewville, Entropic, Databricks, Stripe, Jurel.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

Tap a time to open that second in VO

Peter's Journey to Private Markets

0:48 to 2:36

Discover how Peter transitioned from philosophy to investment management.

“I'm curious, like how does a philosopher like yourself end up in private markets?”

The Shift to Private Investing

2:36 to 4:40

Understand the trend of companies staying private longer and its implications.

“And there was a very simple reason for that.”

Balancing Portfolio Risks and Rewards

4:40 to 7:14

Explore how to balance risks and rewards in public versus private investments.

“many of which are well-known, such as the ones that you mentioned, the kind of SpaceX's, you know, by dancers of this world, but a bunch of lesser known as well.”

The Role of Leverage in Investments

7:14 to 11:30

Learn about the use of leverage in both private and public market investments.

“And they sit in a range of different kinds of funds.”

Evolving Dynamics of Private Markets

11:30 to 14:00

Examine how primary and secondary markets in private equity are changing.

“However, where companies are either not yet profitable or that kind of more nascent stage of their journey and profitability, we really counsel companies to avoid using debt.”

Access to Investment Opportunities

14:00 to 15:10

Learn how Baillie Gifford democratizes access to high-quality investments.

The Value of Due Diligence

15:10 to 16:40

Discover the rigorous due diligence process for selecting investments.

“Very low management fees on that vehicle, freely tradable on the London Stock Exchange.”

Psychology of Investing

16:40 to 18:15

Explore how emotional connections influence investment behavior.

“So, I mean, in your case, whenever you buy into a fund and I've invested, you know, like in many funds, it's like I'm putting my money, I'm expecting a return and that's it.”

Long-term Investment Strategies

18:15 to 19:15

Understand the focus on long-term returns over excitement and trends.

“And then there's another thing which is solely focused on trying to make high returns over the long term.”

Investment Performance and Expectations

19:15 to 21:40

Analyze why some high-profile investments may underperform.

“So the company that can be the pride of everybody's portfolios today can very quickly fall out of favor for reasons that can actually have nothing to do with how the company is performing.”
Show all 22 chapters

Understanding IPO Dynamics

21:40 to 25:00

Learn how Baillie Gifford's approach to IPOs can influence outcomes.

“So on the access side, like, yes, the fact that we are a large public market investor is of unbelievable importance to our ability to access companies.”

Building Trust in Markets

25:00 to 28:00

Examine the importance of trust and partner quality in IPO success.

“Again, our ability to draw on our public market analytical infrastructure is really important to bring that to life a little bit.”

Optimizing for the Right IPO Partners

28:00 to 30:08

Learn about the importance of choosing quality investors over maximizing IPO price.

“insightful than that slight than that slightly obvious answer so companies can choose to optimize for certain things when they come to the public markets um they can choose to optimize for price if they want.”

Lessons from Amazon and Elon Musk

30:08 to 34:04

Explore how long-term thinking and risk-taking define successful founders.

“And I want to continue on that topic and take the couple of examples.”

Understanding ByteDance's Valuation

34:04 to 36:28

Discover the factors influencing ByteDance's low valuation despite strong fundamentals.

“When we're investing, we're underwriting to five times upside.”

ByteDance Beyond TikTok: A Hidden Gem

36:28 to 41:03

Uncover the broader potential of ByteDance beyond its well-known app TikTok.

“couple years ago at about four times free cash flow uh for a company that was growing really route quickly.”

Investing in China: Opportunities and Risks

41:03 to 42:08

Analyze the investment landscape in China amidst geopolitical and market dynamics.

“I don't want to go into like a conspiration theory or whatever, because I think it's, but it's, it's just the fact that they own, you know, like how the messages is delivered.”

Investing in China: Opportunities and Narratives

42:08 to 45:59

Explore the investment landscape in China, its potential, and common misconceptions.

“If you look at robotics, if you're looking at cars, in AI, I think they are like very, very close and sometimes better in certain like.”

Liquidity Management in Private Markets

46:00 to 49:39

Learn how investors manage liquidity and portfolio dynamics in private markets.

“Again, they help us source companies, they have diligence companies.”

Investment Structures and Fee Models

49:40 to 54:58

Understand different investment fund structures, fee models, and their implications.

“And in some cases, to completely exit positions.”

Learning from Investment Mistakes

54:59 to 57:28

Reflect on investment mistakes and the lessons learned for future decisions.

“it's crazy because I've seen like 225, 220 or like being the norm.”

Following Peter Singlehurst and Baillie Gifford

57:28 to 58:17

Find out where to follow Peter Singlehurst and learn about Baillie Gifford's investments.

“I could be talking about this for hours and I didn't really see the time pass by.”
Hear the part that matters, and keep it.Open this episode in VO. Double tap your headphones to save a moment as you listen.
Get VO free

Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00To get the shareholders you deserve, I strongly believe that. What you know about Elon Musk is that every couple of years, he will bet the house. He will put everything on black in his company. To grow the value of a company five times, you have to be a business that's willing to take risk. And so history tells us that any narrative that says China can't do X is wrong. Today on Billions, I'm sitting down with the man who built the most patient capital in Silicon Valley, Peter Singlehurst. He's built the private companies team from scratch at Bailey Gifford and deployed billions into more than 100 companies.

0:33His portfolio reads like a list of the most important private companies on the planet. Right now, he's arguing that public markets have largely lost their monopoly on liquidity and that the biggest companies in the world may never need to IPO at all. Peter, thanks a lot for being here. Thank you for having me. I'm curious, like how does a philosopher like yourself end up in private markets? Well, generous of you to call me a philosopher. So I studied philosophy at undergraduates and I did a master's in philosophy. And I sort of came within a hair's breadth of staying on and doing a PhD, but sort of swerved out at the last minute and sort of left me wondering what I should do.

1:18I didn't really know. but I heard about this company called Bailey Gifford and this thing called investment management and I thought well maybe that sort of sounds interesting and it turns out that I was lucky enough to have stumbled across this firm that was specifically looking to hire people to be investors who sort of barely knew what investing was who didn't have a background in finance and the reason for that wasn't just because Bailey Gifford was trying to be obtuse and different It's because they were trying to hire people who had maybe a different perspective, who hadn't been taught the same things as everybody else in finance.

1:56And so I was lucky enough to get a job within the firm. We hire graduates every single year. Most of the time they don't have finance backgrounds. That's a training scheme and a recruitment program that's been going for decades. and most of the partners within the firm such as myself started on this kind of graduate training scheme right back at the start of their careers and then stay within the firm their entire career so that's kind of how I stumbled into Bailey Gifford and how I stumbled into this industry now at that time Bailey Gifford was not doing private markets investing we were solely a public market growth equity investor.

2:38And there was a very simple reason for that. It's that if you're doing growth equity investing, you could do that in the public markets. You didn't need to do it in the private markets because companies went public when they were pretty young, pretty small. Amazon went public a few years after being founded in 1997. It had a market cap of$450 million. And then all that growth happened in the public markets. So BG was just doing public market investing. A few years into my time at Bailey Gifford, I was on one of our large public market growth teams and we started to see that there were these really big private companies and they were called unicorns and they were businesses like Airbnb, Spotify and we were like hang on this is a bit strange like what's going on here it seems like these companies are staying private for longer and at the same time like we were getting to know these companies they were sort of approaching us and we were kind of building our understanding of them and we were thinking these are the kinds of businesses we've always invested in why haven't we invested in them yet and I was lucky enough to be on a team where the senior investors were all taken up doing really important things like managing large public market portfolios so I was given some rope to go off and sort of proverbially hang myself looking at these companies and we started to realize that there was this really profound structural change that was happening in companies staying private longer and that it was beholden on us to be investing in these companies for our clients if we wanted to continue to give them exposure to the world's best growth stage companies.

4:00So I was kind of in the right time at the right place and at sort of ground zero of this change which has come to dominate private markets of companies staying for private for longer. So I kind of started doing our early sourcing of these businesses. I started helping to build up the infrastructure that we would need for investing in these companies. I founded the dedicated team in 2017. We launched our first fund in 2019. We really wanted to make sure we were good at doing this before we created dedicated funds around it. Since then, we've launched three funds. We've continued to scale up the team.

4:38We've been fortunate enough to find some really amazing companies, many of which are well-known, such as the ones that you mentioned, the kind of SpaceX's, you know, by dancers of this world, but a bunch of lesser known as well. But really, we're just trying to create these portfolios of the world's best growth stage companies, which is consistent with what we've done as an organization for over 100 years. It's just today, if you want to do growth equity investing, you've got to do it in the private markets and the public markets. So now I'm curious to understand because by trade, you started focusing, as you said, on public markets.

5:11Now you're getting like in earlier stage in private. So you're getting potentially like a higher upside, but also like a potentially higher risk. So how do you balance the two in terms of the portfolio and the global AUM that you have? So the slight point in your question that I would push back on is this notion that we're doing earlier stage companies. We're doing companies at the same stage that we've always done. It's just that they're private rather than going public. Let me bring it to life with an example. So we were fortunate enough to invest in Tesla in 2013 when it was a$3 billion market cap company.

5:56It had gone public a couple earlier,$2 billion. And because we were able to invest in it at$3 billion, the growth and the value that subsequently accrued up to north of a trillion dollars, we were able to capture that for all of our clients in the public markets, all of those clients that had it in their portfolios, which was a lot of them.

6:19So, SpaceX, we've been able to capture the upside in that for our private clients, but so far our public clients have not been able to capture it. Now, we actually invested in SpaceX later than we invested in Tesla. We invested in SpaceX for$30 billion valuation compared to three in Tesla. And so, I guess the point I make is actually it's the same kinds of companies. It's just that these companies are private rather than public. Now, there are some clients that we have that can only do public market investing, and that's actually the bulk of our clients. Within institutional asset allocators, there are often quite hard and fast delineations between the public team and the private team.

7:00And so most of our business and our business that we've been building for 118 years is in the public markets. But we've had a handful of clients that have been able to kind of come on this journey with us, investing in these high growth private companies. And they sit in a range of different kinds of funds. We have some blended public private funds. These are investment trust structures, predominantly based here in the UK. And then we have some dedicated pools of private capital. Now, one of those is an investment company structure. It's called the Chehalyan Fund. And then we have a few more traditionally structured private company funds that would look and feel a little bit more like what you would see in a sort of traditional private equity or growth equity managed fund.

7:44Ultimately, the journey we've been on is trying to convince our clients that, hey, if you want exposure to the world's best growth companies, you're going to have to do this in the public, in the private markets, as well as the public markets. And we've built up this capability over the last 14 years to do that. We've been in private growth equity markets for as long as they've been around. And so now we're really starting to see more and more of our clients saying they just can't afford to not be investing in high growth private markets. And because we have these longstanding trusted relationships in the public markets, it's kind of translating quite naturally into working with them on the private side as well.

8:23And one thing, you know, like I'm curious to hear your take on it. So whenever you invest in public markets, let's say like typically I have like millions of dollars that are like invested in public markets. Personally, I can leverage this to get debts and use this as a line on credit on many things. However, in a private company, I probably have like hundreds of millions invested. however if i want to put you know like my asset of private companies to get like leverage anywhere else it's almost impossible or at least like very hard so from the investor like you work with what's like your view on this and do you think it's gonna evolve because you were also talking about the fact that actually right now if you look at private markets back in the days they were almost zero liquidity.

9:16Now, if you take like, and real, and tropic, SpaceX, or whatever, it's trading almost in a similar way that you can see in public markets. So curious to like, hear from your perspective as an investor, how do you see private markets evolving? So it benefits a lot more like the investors and, and potentially the people, you know, like your LPs in your phone? Yeah. So I guess a couple of questions in there. I'll take the leverage one first and then maybe kind of how sort of secondary markets are evolving and some of those dynamics within private markets. So I think leverage can have an important but very specific place in portfolio construction and in finance.

10:03Where you have regular and predictable cash flows, I think that leverage can be amazing for ulcering returns on equity. And I'm still talking here more probably from within businesses than at that kind of portfolio level and borrowing against portfolios. But if we are shareholders in a company that's very profitable, leverage can be an amazing tool. So take Bending Spoons, for instance. It's a very profitable business. And they can use leverage very effectively to acquire new companies and de-lever very quickly as they start to get cash flows from those acquired businesses. However, if companies are not yet profitable or only at that early part of their journey in generating cash flow, I think leverage can be a very bad thing.

10:51So if so, most of our portfolio companies are not levered, actually, even most of those that are profitable are not levered. But if a company is not yet cash flow positive, unless there's a very specific reason, they should really not have debt within them. They should be a little bit more patient. They should be using equity to fund themselves because a little bit more dilution never killed a business, but debt kills businesses. And we've seen businesses be killed by debt companies that if they had not taken on debt could well have gone on, survived and thrived. But for a variety of reasons, they geared up, took on debt, and that debt came to kill those companies.

11:29So where we see companies that are cash flow positive, we're fairly relaxed about debt, provided there's good reason for it. However, where companies are either not yet profitable or that kind of more nascent stage of their journey and profitability, we really counsel companies to avoid using debt. Okay. Makes sense. On the broader private market dynamics, I think you need to separate primary and secondary capital within private growth equity markets. Because I think you're seeing two quite distinct pictures. On the primary side, so companies raising capital, going to investors, giving them full information and selecting a small number of partners that they want to work with as shareholders in their companies.

12:15I actually think this part of the market has become much more institutionalized, much more professional over the last 10 years. I would say actually specifically really since 2020 and 2021, there was a lot of hot money in those years. There were a lot of hedge funds. And what happened in 2022 is a lot of those market participants got really badly burnt and they left the market. And I think that's a really good thing. You want to see a rational, professional, institutionalized market in the growth stages of the private market. markets, as you see in many parts of the public markets. And you can see this in the financing rounds of some of the most prestigious companies.

12:51So if you talk about Andrewville, for instance, which we're shareholders in, if you look at some of their more recent rounds, they have skewed towards bringing in partners who are actually traditionally public market investors that are large asset allocators that have been doing this for a really long time and have that level of sophistication. And because they get to choose who their investors are, they bring in those institutional investors and they sort of say no to the uh uh sort of slightly hotter money should we say um so i actually feel pretty good about the standards the level of underwriting and the level of professionalization that you see within the primary parts of the private markets secondary markets are a little bit different um there you do see uh sort of slight fomo dynamics you will see people wanting to get access to companies where they actually don't even have information so they'll they'll know about a business by what they read in the press but no idea what financials are which plus is crazy like i have no idea how you could decide you want to invest in xyz company you've never seen a set of accounts of the business let alone spent time with the management team um so you do see some of that in the secondary markets there is more liquidity in the secondary markets and some of that's good like it can be useful for investors to be able to add to or reduce positions in secondary markets but what's not good is where you see investors coming into the secondary markets trying to get access to brand name companies where they don't know the management team they've not spent time with them they don't have access to financials and they're just kind of waiting to pay whatever valuation that that's out there that is worrying but like what's this behind that well what's this behind that is there's a cohort of amazing companies that only a very small number of institutions and investors can get access to like we're fortunate enough to be one of those we're fortunate enough to be one of those because we've been doing this for as long as this part of the market has existed but i do believe it's right that ordinary savers should be able to get access to these companies like it's it tesla creates a lot of wealth for ordinary investors spacex it's been much more difficult for those ordinary investors to get access to these kind of companies and so part of what we've tried to do is give ordinary investors access to those kind of companies and we do this from within these investment trust structures that i mentioned so the fund that we started doing that for uh was a fund in the uk called the scottish mortgage portfolio it's a 15 or so billion dollar fund don't quite quote me on that number it might be a little bit off uh and north of 30 percent of that fund is invested in private companies in 2019 we launched a dedicated fund called the shahalian fund uh which today it's just shy of two billion dollars in net asset value um anybody can go and buy shares in that company and they can get access to spacex uh byte dance bending spoons Databricks, Stripe, and Jurel, like I could go on and get access to those companies, you know, for as little as$2 if they want to buy a share.

15:55Very low management fees on that vehicle, freely tradable on the London Stock Exchange. And so, yeah, we found ways actually to sort of democratize access to some of these companies, but still do it in such a way where there is, you know, a high level of due diligence that goes into these companies where we are underwriting these companies with full information rise, full access into management. And so individual investors don't have to make spurious decisions about, hey, well, I'm just going to buy something in an SPV and I've got no idea what it is. They know that what's going into the Shahalian fund or Scottish mortgage has been underwritten to the highest level of professionalism and experience from doing growth equity investing for over 100 years.

16:38And I 100 % agree with what you're saying and the fact that you as like you know an investor with knowledge with access to the information you can make like this wise decision and you know invest globally have like this also like a portfolio kind of mindset so you have like I mean the risk is not only on one single asset however don't you think that from a psychological perspective I feel like investing in companies for many people is a bit like, you know, like buying a specific asset. So, I mean, in your case, whenever you buy into a fund and I've invested, you know, like in many funds, it's like I'm putting my money, I'm expecting a return and that's it.

17:30There is no real like emotional connection. So if the fund invests in an asset, I don't really feel like I own that asset even though I'm investor in a fund however if I like invest directly into like Entropics, SpaceX, Stripe whatever you know when I'm at dinners and people say hey like what's the latest investment you know it's it becomes something linked to your status and I think that what's make people feel good about investing because the moment something becomes a status you know it's like the same for people you know who love to buy fancy watches or whatever it's it's become something they are proud of and i think like investing in the next companies is something like quite excited for many so have you ever thought of it and is it something you think of from time to time like hey couldn't we maybe have like vehicles that are probably much cleaner than anything you could find on the market with third layers of whomever taking like fees on fees etc etc and just have uh you know like the the people investing a little bit more involved directly in a single asset yeah i i suppose in a way what you're alluding to there is that um we talk about investing as if it's one thing but maybe it's two things you know on the one hand maybe it's everything that you're talking about there which is you know the excitement of it the thrill of it the status of it.

18:56And then there's another thing which is solely focused on trying to make high returns over the long term. And sometimes those things can be the same thing and other times they can be very, very different. We're firmly focused on the latter. And to your question about sort of single asset vehicles and dedicated exposure to individual companies, I mean, this is something that we do for our institutional clients through the co-invests that we offer um and there again you're facing off with uh sort of professional institutions who have diversified portfolios who can be very informed again understanding with information about what to invest in and so there we will kind of offer that kind of single asset exposure whilst i think there's a lot to be said for the that kind of first use case that we're talking about the individual kind of excitement and sort of pride of owning particular companies that can also be quite ephemeral.

19:54So the company that can be the pride of everybody's portfolios today can very quickly fall out of favor for reasons that can actually have nothing to do with how the company is performing. And so I think that can be a little bit sort of more easy come, easy go, shall we say. And whilst I'm sure there are investment houses that will happily cater to that, I think one of the reasons that we've been able to survive as an institution for so long is because we focus on that camp of just trying to earn really high returns over the long term. And if people want access to our capabilities, they can absolutely do that in our funds.

20:28And we would hope that they would take pride in owning the funds and owning the underlying assets that sit beneath the funds, which are very much there to give them exposure to these companies, to enable them to make a lot of money over the long term if we do a good job for them. But I don't think you would see us chasing the sort of heat and excitement around particular areas unless we had very strong conviction that something was going to be a great investment and then you would see us express that through a large position in our portfolios. Yeah super super interesting and agree that it's really important to have one focus and obviously like you've done amazing so congrats on on that it reminds me of a conversation I had with Larry Ashbrook you know the founder of G squared where basically you know he was saying to your point that sometimes the shiniest assets are not the one that's going to return like the the best so for for example for him like i know that he actually lost money on uber and made money on lyft so it's like well right now you know when you look at both companies you could think like hey you investing in uber you should be like the the most the richest person on earth but sometimes it's not and i i'd like to uh to maybe like understand a bit better like because i think from a company's perspective you know like when whenever we looked at uh the past ipos something that happened is let's take for example clarna or like this kind of like companies or even figma and you know like the the ipods and eventually after that you know like you see the the stock like start tanking and it goes like quite badly for the company and it's uh it's it's pretty tough you know out there in in public market so do you think that uh as an investor uh you have like a better edge being like bailey gifford doing like both public and private do you think you have a better edge uh whenever you are like competing on deals because people would know that you are a long-term investor because whatever like and i think the public market doesn't really know that like if you take i don't know like anyone investing in public market can get excited at the ipo but what they don't know is that people usually have like a six month lockup period and after that after six months we often see you know like the stock tanking so retail start panicking and often you know like it's basically the people who are like retail not informed etc who will lose a lot of money on this because they would see something sinking and they would like start panicking so do you think because you have this kind of like really long-term strategy it's a it's a value add for companies and a competitive advantage or like how do you perceive it yeah so i think you're absolutely right um every edge that we have as a private growth equity investor stems from the structural integration between public and private growth equity investing within bailey gifford and you can sort of break that down across the different parts of investing that matter accessing companies analyzing those companies and then adding value to those companies.

23:44So on the access side, like, yes, the fact that we are a large public market investor is of unbelievable importance to our ability to access companies. And it also helps that we've been in this market, like for instance, existed. So like, you're a growth equity company, you know us, we know you, like that's sort of, We started to have our own kind of right to win and ability as well. But ultimately, the fact that we can be a partner of continuity from private and into public markets, the fact that our public market teams, should they decide and it's at their discretion, can conceivably write a billion dollar check in an IPO is something that a VC investor or a private only growth equity investor simply can't do.

24:34in a sense by working with bailey gifford you you are able to start de-risking your financial future as a business and you're able to start de-risking who the owners of your business are going to be over the very long term not just you know for this bit in private markets so it's of integral importance to our ability to access companies when it comes to analyzing those companies though and you know we look at a thousand businesses a year and we're trying to make 10 investments so we have to have a pretty good filtering system to say no to 990 and pick the best 10. Again, our ability to draw on our public market analytical infrastructure is really important to bring that to life a little bit.

25:16So we do all of our own research in-house. We never rely on consultants or anything like that. Our research in public and private markets, all done by investors at Bainfield. All of that research is stored in something that we call our research library, a piece of software. And in there, there are about 75, 80 ,000 proprietary research reports written by my colleagues over the course of the last 30, 40 years. I can go and draw on all of that in understanding the defense sector, if I'm looking at Andrel or looking at software roll-up stories, if I'm looking at Bending Spoons, or I can go and look at our early work on Meta, if I'm looking at ByteDance.

25:53I can draw on that institutional knowledge. And because people spend virtually their entire careers within this firm, I can probably also just go and speak to the person who wrote that research 15 years ago. They're probably just sitting a few meters away from me. And I can then draw those people into our research processes. So that kind of ability to draw on the information, but the institutional heritage around growth equity investing is really important in us then separating the wheat from the chaff and all the stuff that we've been able to access. And then in adding value to those companies, You know, because we know and care about public market governance, for instance, we can help companies get ready for being a public company.

26:30We can help them transition from an investor led board to an independent led board. We can help them establish an effective and palatable dual class share structure. We can help our private companies network within the thousand public businesses that we own. Like this is this is the crux of our competitive advantage. and it's structural. So it's, you know, we don't sit here saying, well, you know, we've got a competitive advantage because so-and-so is an amazing investor. We say we have a competitive advantage because we have this structure and that will outlive any individual investor at Bader Gifford.

27:04It will persist long after I'm gone. And ultimately that organizational edge, that organizational stability is what clients should really be underwriting when they are choosing partners in the private markets where you're sort of locked into a fund. You know, you can't just get out if you decide something's wrong. So it's something that's very important to us and something that we've been very intentional on building in to our private business, which is this kind of structural edge. Your second question was kind of about IPOs. And I think you're sort of trying to get like, what makes a good IPO versus a bad IPO?

27:40And what are the signs that you could look for us to tell whether an IPO is going to be effective or not? there's a truest answer to this which is like if a company is a great business it's probably going to have a good ipo and if it's a mediocre business it probably won't or it might for a bit and then get found out there's a little bit of a truism perhaps but what what might be a little bit more insightful than that slight than that slightly obvious answer so companies can choose to optimize for certain things when they come to the public markets um they can choose to optimize for price if they want.

28:17Get the highest possible price in an IPO. Minimize dilution from an IPO. Those IPOs usually end badly. Because if you optimize for price at the point of IPO, you're not really leaving enough on the table for new investors coming in to have a good experience. You're not building trust with the public markets. And trust is so important, both in public and private markets. But I think people really undervalue it as a currency in the public markets. or you can optimize for the quality of your partners. Now that might mean that you don't get the highest possible price on the day the IPO opens, but it might mean that you get investors that can be with you for the journey, that can support you in difficult times, where by leaving a little bit of value on the table, you can make sure those investors have a good experience, which makes them more likely to help and support you in the future.

29:13Something I often tell our portfolio companies as they come to the public market is that an IPO roadshow is about is yes certainly about attracting the right kind of investors but it's also about putting off the wrong kind of investors yeah there's a I think this buffer who says like you get the shareholders you deserve I strongly believe that and if you look at the shareholder registers of it take a business like Amazon for much of its history it actually had a very stable group of long-term investors that stuck with it at the top of its cap table throughout its journey. And there's an argument to be made that a stable, strong, supportive investor base can be part of a company's competitive advantage.

29:54And so to answer the question briefly, what is it that we like to see companies do in IPOs? We like to see them optimizing for the right kinds of partners, the quality of the investor, not optimizing for valuation in IPOs. Super interesting. And I want to continue on that topic and take the couple of examples. you mentioned uh do you think that uh for amazon because amazon basically was criticized a lot when it entered like the the public market because it was uh not um profitable at the time and i think back then it was not as common as it is now to have companies losing so much money so i think like at the time it required people with um with a certain mindset you know like a long-term thinker that the company would actually become what it is today.

30:46And I want to make the parallel with SpaceX. So if you look at the valuation of SpaceX versus the revenue, and you look at the revenue multiple, I think they're at like 18 billion or something like this in revenue and potentially want to IPO at like 1.75 trillion. It's not like it's numbers on the press or this kind of thing. So it's not super accurate, like we don't know yet, but it's what we see. So what's kind of your vision on how do you value a company? And also, do you think that these companies who have extremely big long-term bets can actually attract investors who are here a lot more for the long term and not just trying to make a quick buck on an IPO opportunity that they see and where they can kind of like play with public markets.

31:42Yeah. Yeah, so I think the first thing to say is that when you invest in a company, you need to understand how a founder is going to run a business, what they will optimize for, and the kind of risks they go to take and underwrite within their company. So we first invested in Amazon in 2004, 2004, but I can't take any credit for that. But I think it was actually very clear at that point in time how Jeff Bezos was going to run the company. And it was very clear because you could just go and read his shareholder letter from when he IPO. And again, this is something going back to the previous question.

32:18I think when founders very clearly communicate how they will run their business and the things they will optimize for in an IPO, in an IPO letter, I think is actually very effective. What did Bezos say? He said that he was going to run Amazon to optimize for long-term free cash flow per share. And it was also very clear that sometimes that would mean taking bets that had low probability payoffs, but high impact payoffs. So where the magnitude of the payoff would more than outweigh the low probability. That's what he did. He did that consistently. I think Musk is actually pretty similar in terms of how he runs his businesses.

32:58what you know about elon musk is that every couple of years he will bet the house he will you know put everything on black in his companies and we saw him do that time and time again in tesla uh you know whether it was you know going through production hell kind of scaling up the model y uh we and we've seen him do it in spacex as well you know initially it was launching rockets then it was reusable rockets it was betting the house on reusable rockets uh then it was starlink betting the house on starlink and then starship betting the house on starship so and now it's the next generation which is saying hey you know maybe we can do orbital data sectors and he's not going to take that bet half-hearted so if you're going to own these companies you need to know the kind of way in which they will be operated and how the founders of those businesses will take risk and if you don't like that and you don't want founders they're going to take risk in that kind of way.

33:58It's fine. Just don't own them. Just don't invest in them.

Read the full transcript

34:04When we're investing, we're underwriting to five times upside. So we're trying to find companies where we can make five times our money. That's not an easy thing to do. It's not easy to grow a company's value five times. To grow the value of a company five times, you have to be the business that's willing to take risk. And our job as investors is to try to price that risk and say, if a founder is going to run a business in this kind of way and there are these kind of business risks inherent within the business are we paying a price today that is going to reward us for those risks being taken and mean that in the event that those risks pan out we're going to get really rewarded for taking that risk and again going back to spacex the journey so far has been very much that's like that has worked out it was not clear that any of these step functions would work it wasn't clear that starlink would work it wasn't clear that starship is working the way it And today it is not clear that orbital data centers will work, but there is risk that's being taken.

34:57And so you need to make sure when you're investing in a company that you can still see that path to a five times upside scenario. Now, I can't tell you whether SpaceX has that today because I can't tell you what the valuation is going to be in the IPO. And the maths are very, very different if it's, you know, one and a half trillion dollar IPO compared to if it's a two and a half trillion dollar IPO. But ultimately, that's what we're trying to do. We're trying to underwrite those five times upside scenarios. We're trying to find founders that are willing and able to take risks and then able to execute on the delivery of that risk.

35:26So lesson is never bet against Elon. So far, it wouldn't have been wise to bet against Elon. And looking at Bydance, because I think it's a company you also invested in, I think it's kind of like the opposite of like SpaceX. Like I've came across some numbers, not sure if they're accurate, but I think it was like a 50 million EBDA or something like this. Like, why do you think the valuation is like so low in a sense? Because I think like if you look on private markets, Biden's is probably trading at around like 600 billion. It's hard to trade Biden's because obviously there are a lot of restrictions and a lot of like, I think it's geopolitical also like climate that is a bit tense between the US and China.

36:17but how do you explain like such a low valuation if these numbers are accurate yeah so buy dance is way too cheap and by the way it's not as cheap as it was we were buying shares a couple years ago at about four times free cash flow uh for a company that was growing really route quickly. So what's going on by Tarts? I can't think of a company in sort of my 15 years of investing where the price is so disconnected from the fundamentals of the business, yet for rational reasons. And let me unpack that a little bit. So on one hand, the share price of a company should be driven by the fundamentals of the business.

37:06On the other hand, it's also driven by the demand and supply dynamics of those shares. And I think that the picture that we've seen in ByteDance over the last five or six years is where the demand supply dynamics have swamped the business fundamental dynamics in the share price. So if you look at who owns ByteDance and who might buy ByteDance, well, anybody that owns ByteDance, if you were an early stage investor in bite dance um even you know at a two three four five six hundred billion dollar valuation it's the best investment they will have ever made and probably will ever make and it's probably 99 of the value of their funds and they probably have their lps saying great job guys please can we just have some money back and by the way if you give us some of that money back you are going to crystallize astronomical amounts of carried interest.

38:00Please just sell some. And a lot of those early stage investors will say, yep, that's a very rational thing to do. Even if I'm going to keep a large amount of my position, I'm going to sell a little bit. And because the company is so big, selling a little bit of an early stage VC portfolio can be hundreds of millions of dollars or billions of dollars of supply. So that's actually quite a rational supply dynamic in the shares by does what about the demand side well by dance is like probably the most controversial company in the world i mean it's probably a little bit less controversial now but if you go back a few years ago where it really looked like tiktok might get banned it was the most controversial company in the world like who wants the headache of buying a really controversial company plus you had a lot of u.s investors that were just you're not going to touch it with a barge pole and so there were actually quite rational reasons as to why uh there wasn't uh much demand for the share So lots of supply, not much demand.

38:54What happens? A low share price, low multiple on free cash flow. We, I guess, were a fortunate position of having owned the shares for quite a while. We knew the company really well. So, of course, we had really good information rights. We spent time with the management team. And we sort of came to the view that, well, hey, even if the worst case materialized around TikTok and it was worth nothing and it was shut down. So like worst case scenario, we could still see a path to the company being very fast growing, very, very profitable and still massively undervalued. And we could see these demand supply dynamics.

39:33And it felt as close to an arbitrage as I better see. You don't see many arbitrages in growth equity investing. It kind of felt a little bit like one. It felt like you were just being paid to take risk. You're being paid so much to take the risks that were inherent to the business. not to mention a geopolitical risk. They exist. They are there for real. But when we were buying shares at kind of four times free cash flow, it sort of felt like we were being paid to take over. And so we were kind of able to kind of step into the middle of these demand supply dynamics and quite materially top up our position.

40:04It's an astonishing business. And it's so misunderstood. Like people in the West think about TikTok. It's really not about TikTok. It's the... Oh yeah. Yeah. It's about their... the biggest online advertising company in China. They're on tried to be the biggest e-commerce company in China. And they've arguably got one of the best foundational models in China. So in the form of ByteDance, you have this company that is potentially

40:28Meta, Amazon, and OpenAI slash Anthropic all rolled into one. And you can buy it today for, as you said, about$600 billion. There's not much to put between it in terms of size with Meta. what 1.5 1.7 trillion something like that buy dance is already 50 times larger than the meta was when it came to the public markets and it's still private um so i think buy dance is a phenomenal business i think it's drastically underpriced uh i'm a very happy owner of it in the portfolios i'm really glad that we're able to give our own clients exposure to the business and to build up on that because i agree with you like i think everyone think it's about tiktok but it's a lot more than this and it's actually like really interesting that you that you mention it like what what's kind of like your your view as a as a global investor because if you if you think of it like from a pure like media perspective i think like we know that the the us globally control a certain narrative like they have meta they have google they have linkedin they have basically like every source of communication is coming through the US.

41:41I don't want to go into like a conspiration theory or whatever, because I think it's, but it's, it's just the fact that they own, you know, like how the messages is delivered. And the US is also like attracting a lot of capital just because, you know, they have like a great public market. However, However, if you look at China, I mean, in many ways, they are doing things that are better than, you know, what is happening in the US. If you look at robotics, if you're looking at cars, in AI, I think they are like very, very close and sometimes better in certain like. So from a private investor perspective, like how exactly do you look at China?

42:23Is it something where you feel the risk of the regime is actually too high sometimes to actually go invest? Because as you said, you know, it's driven by also supply and demand. And right now, the truth is the demand is always going to the US at the moment, at least for retail. So what's your view on it? And do you think that the mindset and the mentality of people is going to evolve over time? Yes, I think the first thing to say is like we're a global investor. And so we will look for businesses, exceptional businesses, wherever they might arise. And actually, our very first private investment was in China.

43:00Alibaba was our very first private. Not bad. Good start. I think there's a narrative that people have about China, which is consistently wrong, and goes something a little bit like this. it goes well we in the west or we in america like we can do x x is really hard china is not going to be able to do x don't worry like we've got this and x could have been uh internet companies you know it could have been you know if you kind of go back to the uh you know 2000s like china china's internet companies are never going to be as good as america's internet companies because hey it's just really hard and they'll never figure it out then there was only probably going back before that there was a narrative about cars on that and this probably came a little bit more from europe it was like well you know if china's never going to be able to make cars because cars are really hard and you know they're not going to get the sound of the door closing right or something or they can't make internal yeah just some kind of basic nonsense right but there was a narrative that china wouldn't be able to make cars and then you know what it turns out actually china can make really good cars and they can make really good internet companies and that narrative currently today applies to AI and applies to semiconductors.

44:16And that narrative goes like, well, hey, China's never going to be able to do this. It's just really hard. But you know what? That's like 1.4 billion people. They're smart. They'll figure it out. And so history tells us that any narrative that says China can't do X is wrong. And added to that, it's the biggest market in the world by people. It's not going to be long and it'll be the biggest market in the world in terms of you know, economics. As a growth investor, I think, like, ignore China at your peril. I was out there in the summer last year, and I was meeting companies actually, you know, along the lines of what you were saying, a lot of hardware and robotics companies that were doing things that US companies have been trying and failing to do for years.

45:02They were doing them at scale, they were growing quickly, they were profitable. And Chinese companies have such a competitive advantage doing anything in hardware because they're close, close to the supply chains. And these companies were on really low valuations as well, because a lot of international global investors just aren't looking at China right now. I've spoken to a lot of people over the last few years, peers at other investment firms who said, well, hey, we've closed China off. And it's a bit difficult for us right now. That makes me really excited. That makes me want to go invest more in China.

45:30Because I have no doubt that China will continue to create amazing companies. Is there geopolitical risk? Yeah, there's geopolitical risk. Do you know else does geopolitical risk? America. So the question is not like, is there geopolitical risk? It's are you being paid to take that geopolitical risk? Hendrik, who works on the private company team, he's out there at the moment, trying to find great businesses. He's finding loads of really interesting things. We have an investment team in China, they predominantly focus on public markets, but they're really tuned in into private markets as well.

46:02Again, they help us source companies, they have diligence companies. And so I think it's important to be investing in China. Like any market, would I want it to be an outsized part of the portfolio? No, we have to balance risk, we have to diversify. But I think it would be borderline negligence not to be looking in China if you're a growth equity investor. And there's been a narrative, you know, like, about China that and same on Biden's actually, you know, that it's very difficult to double check the numbers like are they faking etc etc like what's your what's your view on this as an investor you know my honest take is i don't think there's anything that's systematically different in our part of the market investing in china compared to investing in the u.s on can numbers be unaudited like yeah we see unordited numbers in china like we see lots of unordited numbers in the u.s um like we've like i can't think like i can think of examples where we've been misled by American companies.

47:00I actually can't think of any examples in the private markets where we've been misled by Chinese companies. So I think that, I think it's a classic othering thing, right? Like it's, you know, if you're from a particular place, those people over there, you know, doing something a little bit different, seems a little bit threatening. I'm not sure I'm going to come up with lots of other reasons about why I can't go there. I actually think that when you start breaking down these kind of barriers, you'll realize that there is way more that unites companies the quality of companies and what makes them special across geographies than there is that divides them and uh you have to always keep a high bar wherever you're investing that bar should be super high and that bar should be high in china should be high in the us should be high in europe but when you find amazing companies and where you're appropriately recognizing the risks that you're taking you're being pay to take this risk you should take them and from a liquidity perspective because earlier on you know you mentioned that the valuation of a company is also driven by supply and demand um so that's what can explain you know sometimes like a super high valuation or super evaluation i think like uh entropic right now is a good good representation of supply and demand so So from your side, like investing in China or like other markets where you might have like a little bit less liquidity, like how do you like see it from an investor perspective managing like DPI?

48:31Do you always wait for potentially IPO and more? Or like do you also like decide to sell some part of your portfolio? Like how exactly do you manage all of that? i think those things you've mentioned like that they're tools in a portfolio portfolio in portfolio management um so when we think about liquidity most of our companies will become public so you know in the 14 years that we've been investing in private companies we've invested in about 170 companies. And we've seen about 60, 70 IPOs from our portfolios. We've only seen a handful of companies be acquired. So we're trying deliberately to find companies that have the ambition to be public and will go on to become public.

49:21And so over the longer term, most of our liquidity will come from public markets. However, it would be negligent not to be aware of the liquidity dynamics in private markets. And we have selectively used secondary markets, in some cases, to trim holdings that are really working, but where we think the valuation is getting a little bit ahead of themselves. And in some cases, to completely exit positions. Now, when we're doing this, the most important thing is just being really upfront and transparent with companies about what we're doing. Most companies understand that you can sell a little bit of your holding, but still be very long-term in a company.

49:58They understand the dynamics and pressures within investment management and funds. We do need to make sure that we are living up to what we say we are. We say we are long-term, we are long-term in the data. And so we can't suddenly just start trading around in companies that would not be congruent with not only our investment beliefs, but our reputation. But these are tools and they are tools to be used within the context of portfolio management, whether that's public market liquidity or private secretary market liquidity. and like you mentioned earlier i think your goal is to do like 5x on pretty much like every investment so i assume this is the goal of the fund to return like 5x so whenever you look at your dpi i understand that you want to obviously wait as long as possible and wait for the ipo because these are bets you know that are like long term but do you have like rules kind of to manage dpi i've talked to people you know who talk about like a third a third a third or like the no regret 50 you know so it's like when the company has reached let's say like your 5x dpi that is your goal you basically sell like 50 percent of or like 50 percent of the global position that way you anchor like 2.5x dpi and then the rest can actually like be a longer term bets like do you have like simple rules or is this just like a case per case basis and uh yeah so we underwrite to 5x when we invest in a company now i would love to be able to tell you we get it right every time we don't so sadly our funds don't return five times uh they've got some good returns on them but not five sides we set that level of five times because it forces us to be ambitious and try to identify outliers sometimes in fact it's very rare that we find company that does exactly five times like normally they either do a lot more less uh so the five times is more of a heuristic or methodology to help us try to find outliers um uh with regards to distributions so it depends which fund we're talking about uh if we imagine a number of different pools of capital um we have our first fund the shahalian fund that i mentioned to you already.

52:12That's a permanent pool of capital. It's an evergreen structure. So that fund actually has a mandate to own, if it wants, for a really long time into the public markets. So in that fund, for instance, we still own a firm. We still own Wise. We still own Tempus. These companies will be in public for a long time. Some of our clients want us to do that. We have another group of clients that say, hey, I want a slightly more traditional private company experience. For those clients, we have limited life funds. And those funds, once companies become public, they're more likely to look for liquidity probably within the first couple of years of a company being public.

52:47Okay. And the fund is structured in a way where you take both. Because I'm wondering when you're like a really like long, long term investor like this, do you also take carry and management fee like every fund? Because, I mean, as an investor, eventually, you know, like, I mean, it's also you like taking the risk and it's cool that you are rewarded for the risk you take. So I think carry is like the best way to align both the investor and the LP. So as a fund manager and investor, do you get the carry in the same way as every other fund or how does that work exactly? So again, it slightly depends which fund we're talking about.

53:28So the first fund that we launched, the Shehalian Fund, actually doesn't have a carry fee. It has a net asset value-based fee. So it still provides alignment. Our management fee grows if the value of the fund grows. our management fee goes down if the value of the fund shrinks. So we get a lot in that way. Our more traditional funds have carried interest structures and more conventional management fee structures. However, we've deliberately tried to keep those fees fair. So we will charge on invested capital rather than committed capital, which actually makes a really big difference on the fees that investors pay in the early years of a fund.

54:08and our management fees and our carried interest fees are actually quite a lot lower than you would typically associate with an investor of our kind and we've done that just because we we're trying to give this this this this capability to our clients what we believe is the right and fair price and frankly for many of our peers i think their fees have got a little bit ahead of themselves can you share like the the numbers or is it uh yeah so so our main funds have a sort of a base one and ten structure so half of what you would see yeah yeah yeah now in our more recent fund at higher levels of return there are step ups in that carry again that's sort of incentivizing those kind of very very high levels of return but we start at one and ten we have an exit hurdle charging on invested rather than committed carry these are very very lp friendly fees yeah that's it's crazy because I've seen like 225, 220 or like being the norm.

55:05Okay, that's interesting. And yeah, I was like on the DPI, like do you also like do sometimes like, like if you have LPs, for example, in a fund who wants actual DPI, do you like, how exactly does that work? Like when an LP said, you know, like, hey, I would like maybe a bit more cash. Are they all long-term or are they sometimes people who want liquidity and then do you have to make this work for them? Or how exactly does that work? I think we're lucky to have a very long-term group of clients, many of whom have worked with us for decades in the public markets and then who we also work with in the private markets.

55:47Most of these funds are pooled funds. so you you can't do what a single LP is asking you to do because that will then apply to the rest of the client base and so you ultimately we have to do what we believe is right for all clients and all investors in those funds and sort of treat them all fairly and sometimes that means distributing sooner and sometimes it means distributing later okay and uh I know we're almost like out of time so I would love to know like uh is there like is there an investment you've made that you really kind of like regretted or were looking at it backwards you're like i should have known better and uh here like are the things that i would do like differently or that i'm doing differently to avoid this kind of uh of like mistakes well your question is about like sort of what mistakes do we make and how do we learn and improve for those mistakes i mean that that's not a question for the last two minutes that's a question for a whole nother podcast i think um yes of course we make mistakes and yes of course we've learned from them um One of our highest profile mistakes was North Vault.

56:49That was a very bad investment for us. What did we get wrong there? I think we were too enamored with the need for a company like North Vault. And we thought we were taking growth equity risk. And actually, I think we were taking venture equity risk. So the company had these large take or pay contracts, but was actually very early in its execution journey and its revenue generation. So what do you learn from that? Well, you make sure that you focus much more on execution. you try to avoid the sort of thematic style investing with very much bottom-up stock pickers. And you make sure that if you're investing in a company, it's genuinely a growth stage company, not a venture stage company masquerading as a growth stage company.

57:30Super interesting. I could be talking about this for hours and I didn't really see the time pass by. So thank for the quick reminder. So Peter, thanks a lot for your time. Where can people follow you and follow your updates and Bailey Gifford for yourself? Oh, that's a good question. I don't really have much of an online sort of presence or persona, I'm afraid. But on our website, the Bailey Gifford website, there's a tab up there, which says private companies. And if you go in there, you can see all of our investments. You can see some sort of pieces that we put out sort of articulating how we see the world and our beliefs about investing.

58:07So yeah, the Bailey Gifford website is probably the best starting place for anyone who wants to learn more about what we do in private growth equity investing. Thanks a lot, Peter, and have an amazing day.

From the publisher

On this episode of BILLIONS, I'm sitting down with Peter Singlehurst, who built the private companies team from scratch at legendary investment firm Baillie Gifford, deploying billions into more than 100 of the most important private companies on the planet.

Peter operates on a timeline that makes typical venture capitalists look shortsighted. From backing Tesla in 2013 at a $3B market cap to entering SpaceX at a $30B valuation, his strategy completely bypasses the short-term noise of quarterly earnings.

In this masterclass, he breaks down why optimizing for the highest possible price at an IPO is a lethal mistake, the massive arbitrage hidden within the world's most misunderstood tech giant (ByteDance), and the raw post-mortem of their highest-profile mistake: Northvolt.

We break down:

  • The Philosophy Swerve: How a philosophy graduate skipped a PhD to build a multi-billion dollar growth engine and why Baillie Gifford deliberately hires people with no finance background.
  • The Death of the IPO Monopoly: Why the world's most valuable hyper-growth companies no longer need public exchanges to unlock liquidity.
  • Debt Kills, Dilution Doesn't: Peter's contrarian warning to scaling founders on why leverage is a ticking time bomb for pre-profitable businesses.
  • The ByteDance Arbitrage: The inside story of buying shares at ~4x free cash flow while Western investors ran away.
  • The Northvolt Post-Mortem: A transparent breakdown of their highest-profile mistake and how to spot a venture-stage asset masquerading as a growth-stage giant.
  • Disrupting the 2-and-20 Norm: How Baillie Gifford structures an ultra-LP-friendly 1-and-10 fee model charged on invested capital, not committed capital.

TIMELINE :

  • 00:00 – "You get the shareholders you deserve": the long-term underwriting mindset
  • 00:53 – From philosophy to growth equity: why Baillie Gifford avoids finance backgrounds
  • 05:44 – Entry mechanics: Tesla's $3B public entry vs SpaceX's $30B private scale
  • 08:23 – The leverage trap: why a little dilution never killed a business, but debt does
  • 13:50 – Democratizing elite assets: how the Schiehallion Fund opens up Stripe, SpaceX & Databricks to everyday savers
  • 23:15 – Designing the ideal IPO: why chasing the highest possible price destroys public-market trust
  • 30:07 – The founder risk matrix: Bezos' 1997 shareholder letter & Musk's "bet the house" blueprint
  • 35:30 – The ByteDance arbitrage: buying shares at ~4x free cash flow
  • 52:47 – Flipping the venture fee model: the LP-friendly 1-and-10 on invested capital
  • 56:09 – The Northvolt post-mortem: growth equity risk vs venture equity risk


More from BILLIONS

All 31 episodes
Why the world’s biggest tech companies may never IPO again - Peter Singlehurst [Baillie Gifford]BILLIONS · 58 min
Listen in VO