Soviet - Afghan War, Mujahideen Resistance: The Brutal Fight for Zhawar (450)

23:10where you realize you've been overpaying the entire time. Fortunately, though, Mint's story is better. Every plan,$15 a month, even unlimited. That's it. Happy ending. Zero tears. Give it a try at mintmobile.com slash switch. Upfront payment of$45 for three months,$90 for six months, or$180 for 12-month plan required. $15 per month equivalent. Taxes and fees extra. Initial plan term only greater than 50 gigabytes may slow when network is busy. See terms. Now I want to pause here because it kind of set the foundation for some of that geography. Because I mentioned this earlier that the Mujahideen especially were really wily at using the topographical benefits of Afghanistan, their benefit, to help them out significantly.

23:53So this area, Manai Kandav, was a natural fortified position. It had high peaks, thick rock slab caps, and it could shelter dozens of troops from airstrikes and shelling, which is really important. To add to this, the Mujahideen weren't just sitting on their laurels for what was naturally there. They added to it. So they dug defenses and communication trenches that also allowed them to see that the plane below them, which is where the DRA would try to attack from. So this played into their benefit a lot when the DRA launched infantry attacks against open field right at them. I think any basic student of military history will know it usually ends poorly when you attack across an open field against a fortified position.

24:43and here it didn't end well for them as well. They were turned back, heavy small arms fire, made no progress against the Mujahideen that were set up against their fortifications and entrenchments. Airstrikes, artillery barrages, that would continue.

25:00Michael G. Stroud:And same with these infantry attacks for 10 days. So the Mujahideen were dug in basically in the elevated position, entrenched, natural, hard surroundings. but 10 days of bombing and air attacks from the DRA wasn't enough. So they called in for Russian heavier airstrikes, heavier bombers. So that they started to pound and pound. Eventually that war on the psyche of the Mujahideen at this first part, this first battle of Zawar, because they felt that there's a chance with this heavier bombardment by the Soviet aircraft now that maybe it could collapse the cave in on them. So they pulled out around September 14th, which did allow the DRA to move in finally and occupy that high ground.

25:48So it was a tactical game for them at this point. As they were pulling out Mujahideen, they had a rear guard action, obviously, to protect so they could cross over and get away from that attack. But what was interesting is during this gaining of the territory that was left vacant by the Mujahideen, they started to coalesce, DRA did, on the high grounds on these slopes. And they thought, let's just gather all of our troops, let's mass our resources. So they've pushed into the caves. They took some of that defended territory. So they're thinking, let's mass together for a final push and end this thing.

26:30Michael G. Stroud:what's interesting is right at this point where they're masked on that on this exposed territory with all their mechanized apcs and things that's right when to their surprise the mujahideen decide to come out to meet them with their t-55 captured soviet tanks which intelligence failure in the dra's part and the soviet's part who either weren't aware or didn't inform them of this really did a number on them. These two tanks came out and just started laying waste to their gathered, grouped, and clumped DRA troops. That was the back-breaking point of that. So because these tanks just scattered through bodies everywhere, were destroying the armor they did have, the light armor, and it just basically mowed down and destroyed the DRA initiative at that point where basically they were just full-on in full retreat trying to get away from those tanks.

27:25from those cannons that were just blowing holes in their formations.

27:30Michael G. Stroud:So all told, we're talking about 42 days from beginning to end of that first battle of Zawar, and really the saving grace was the sudden appearance of those T-55s, as well as the fallacy for the DRA to group themselves in a clustered position that was still fairly exposed and allowing those tanks to do the damage that they were able to do. So surprise played on the side of the Mujahideen to basically drive them back out by pulling out those old tanks that did the job. And what sort of casualties do the DRA suffer in this battle? This has been a constant problem, even though it's contemporary history.

28:12The exact numbers are unknown, but the best I've been able to find in any resources is just that they were heavy losses as a whole. Now, the Mujahideen had somewhere around this first battle, around 500 troops present. They lost over 100, so about 100, 106 killed, roughly 300 plus wounded in the battle itself.

28:34Michael G. Stroud:But we don't have accurate records still as to the actual casualty numbers for the DRA at this point, after the 42 days of fighting. And it sounds like the DRA's morale was pretty fragile before this started. This can't have helped it much. No, that just really just caps it more. And it just shows the ineffectiveness of Guy Karmal who's in charge. It's showing that he's only as strong as a support he's getting from the Soviets. His own troops can't stand up to fight against his own people. So that just really is psychologically another break in that whole facade that he's tried to put on by this attack against the key Mujahideen base.

29:19And so that becomes obvious that he can't handle it. He's not up to the task, as it were. And did the Mujahideen have any anti-aircraft firepower?

29:31Michael G. Stroud:Now, at this point, they do not. But that's going to change roughly around 1986. 1986 is an important year because that's when we start to see the influx of lethal aid at the form of Stinger missiles by the United States start to make their way through the CIA, through Pakistani intelligence and through Pakistan itself. and begin to make their way there. For those of you of a certain age, which would be a lot of us, you can get a feel for that from Rambo 3, the movie Rambo 3, where Colonel Trotman was on the ground in Afghanistan, was talking about Stinger missiles and the Soviet commander of his regions espousing his vehement hatred for Stinger missiles, how it's affecting Soviet aircraft.

30:20Michael G. Stroud:That's very much what would play out in the real world as they begin to make their way in the Mujahideen hands, we would see a greater toll on Soviet aircraft, especially Soviet attack helicopters get taken down by these Stinger missiles. So that would play a big role in beginning to negate some of that Soviet air power. So the second attempt to take Zawar is in February, April 1986. Are the Soviets taking a greater hand in this attack? Or are they still leaving it to the Afghan commanders to come up with a battle plan? The Soviets are going to take a much greater role in this. In breaking this down, they're requiring a much stronger commitment of troops from the DRA, but they're also going to have 2 ,000 direct troops, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 191st Motorized Rifle Regiment.

31:18Michael G. Stroud:And this time, the Soviet troops are going to be led by Lieutenant General Nabi Azimi with Soviet Major General Trefermenko serving as combat advisor. So the idea is, OK, we gave the DRA their chance wholly by themselves. We need to have direct Soviet troops and Soviet leadership present to see if we can guide this to a success at this time. Now, the DRA, as I said, was coalescing a much bigger force yet. So they committed to 54 battalions. Keeping in mind, these are all understrength, but still 54 battalions on paper, artillery, air support. We would see things like the 7th, 8th, 14th and 25th Infantry Divisions, 38th Commando Brigade, Air Assault Regiment.

32:08So they had almost 12 ,000 troops with tasking to take Zawar finally. Now that's the DRA. As I said, the Soviets at this point, 2000 troops, as well as Soviet direct leadership in the field at this point.

32:24Michael G. Stroud:So take about a month. They're pulling together. And about February 28th, the combined DRA Soviet force leaves towards Zwar. And they have to plow through snow for a month. The weather's terrible. So it's a slow go. So we don't see this force finally arrive to begin its attack until April 2nd, which is where things really start to kick off at this point. So you figure at this point, around 14 ,000 DRA Soviet troops directly involved in the initial second attack. Now, the Soviets, to your point, Ian, are not going to sit idly by. They're going to wait at the beginning of this second fight. They're going to assess how's the DRA command leadership doing, and they're not going to let it go off the rails completely at this point.

33:13And Gorbachev's come to power in the year before. So how much is he looking at Afghanistan and considering his options there? Yeah, absolutely.

33:27Michael G. Stroud:So as Gorbachev rose to power in in 8086, he's he really worked with the Afghan government. He wanted to get out of there. He saw it as a financial drain that they really couldn't afford at the time. It wasn't real popular back home by any means. So it was really a lose in his mind for what he saw. That whole endeavor has been for the Soviets, for Soviet troops, morale. So he was working out an agreement with the DRA that they would take more and more of that direct responsibility for their own security, for their own well-being, so he could have a plan to withdraw Soviet troops out completely.

34:11Michael G. Stroud:So more of that onus, that ownership is being put back on the DRA. But what but the commanders, the Soviet commanders dealing more directly with the DRA are very concerned because they see the reality on the ground. Karamal is not a strong leader. He does not enjoy the will or support of the people. They basically only hold major cities, and that's really because of overwhelming military pressure on those cities as it is. So their fear is this guy is not capable to hold much, but Gorbachev wants to get out of there. And a lot of people have to keep in mind that some of the stated reasons that some believe that the Soviet Union did fall apart was the Soviet Afghan war from the financial drain, the popular support loss, the purpose behind it.

35:01Why are we here? What good does that do us as the Soviet people? A confluence of events that, again, was a domino in many aspects as well that helped contribute to bringing down the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, to his credit, saw a loose situation there as well. But there's also that kind of sense of national pride, right, where you don't want to look like that you've been propping up this government and now you're running with your tail between your legs. So there's trying to balance all that from a world perspective, but also internally in Moscow and elsewhere. So it was a tough position from a leadership perspective.

35:38But he's committed. We have to get out of here. This isn't serving us at all. You can always see parallels between Afghanistan and Vietnam. Are Gorbachev's general saying, look, we can win this. We just need more. We just need more firepower. Is it a similar story there?

35:53Michael G. Stroud:Yeah, it's amazing how there are those similarities throughout history in many things. Right. So he had generals that very much said we can take these guys. I just need X, Y and Z. But I guess I want to pause briefly because the Soviet military that went into Afghanistan was formulated around fighting a European war. They were not prepared in any form or fashion, both with a real strategic plan, but also equipment and training to fight what became a guerrilla war immediately. They were not equipped for that whatsoever, both in their choice of weapons that they had, but training and equipment, the uniforms that the Soviet troops wore.

36:39It was all just as I think they say, it was a kind of a hot mess, as they say. Right.

36:44Michael G. Stroud:So they had to learn trial by fire and try to adapt that fairly quickly within a year or so, I would say, really became obvious that, no, we've got to make some doctrinal changes here to try to have any chance of being effective. Now, that being said, there was still this, I call it the Soviet military mentality of overwhelming force at all times to just steamroll. Right. So more tanks, more air power. We'll just bomb, bomb, shell, shell, shell. and then we'll just lay waste to everything. And that's really what their doctrine tried to evolve to. It's a, so if, you know, the Mujahideen are throughout the land, then let's deprive them of the land.

37:26Michael G. Stroud:So they went about destroying villages, destroying crops. They went so far as to kill whole herds of animals that were used for food because they thought if we take away all the food sources, then we'll just starve them into submission and they'll have to. Obviously that didn't work out, But that was very much part of their evolved strategy when they arrived there. So they're very much of those commanders that were in theater that thought they could still win that war. And to your point, the first thing that comes to mind, I think, with many is the Vietnam War, trying to win the hearts and minds, but deprive the enemy of its ability to move, of its ability to feed itself, to arm itself.

38:09In some context, we have relatable oranges to oranges here, as it were, from what the Soviets tried to achieve as well. Now, in regards to winning the hearts and minds, not so much. They were just more about trying to grind the opposition down until they were forced to submit through superior Soviet weaponry above all else. The DRA had proven it had failed in trying to win the hearts and minds, and it was only being propped up by Soviet arms. So how does the Battle of Zawar, the sequel, pan out? How does, just describe the opening moves.

38:49Michael G. Stroud:What's really interesting, so, as we said, so they left the DRA combined, DRA Soviet attack force, left on February 28th, 86. Took about a month grinding through. So they arrived at their, in the Coast Valley, as it were, for their offensive on Zawar. Empire strikes back, as it were. Now, right off the bat are ominous signs of this might not go as smooth as we would like. So right off the bat, their initial assault began about April 2nd. Artillery barrage, pretty standard fare. But this was followed by airborne insertion from the 38th Commando Brigade via six Soviet transport helicopters. and this was in conjunction with the coordinated infantry attacks in the east and the west.

39:40So a coordinated multi-pronged assault. But the airborne insertion was a disaster right off the bat because they discovered about 3 a.m.

39:51Michael G. Stroud:that the paratroopers had missed their mark and they actually ended up in Pakistan. So right off the bat, you missed your initial insertion of key troops that were key to the engagement. Those misdropped paratroopers are quickly captured by Pakistani forces so can take them out of the play. But Azimi, the commander of the DRA, says, let's go forward still with the main assault. Even though their initial paratroopers are inserted wrong, he just went ahead and said, OK, let's use attack aircraft and transport helicopters and search the remaining elements across seven landing zones. So he's pushing forward.

40:32So the DRA criminal commander said, okay, whoops, not a good start. Let's keep going. We got a big force. Let's make this happen. Launches the attack. So this infantry attack that was meant to link up the already destroyed air assault forces. So that's not good. So they already have problems.

40:50Michael G. Stroud:So we have landing zones. We infantry has missed their mark. The attack is going forward, but you don't have your other partners to link up with. So we have a problem here. The landing zones become hot zones. This also reminded me a lot of Vietnam for the United States. Huey helicopter insertions, which I can speak to. My father was a 101st Airborne Infantry Air Assault guy. So he actually went in these helicopters, was dropped into combat zones. So these became attack points, both in Vietnam and in this battle. And Mujahideen used these as attack points as well. So as they tried to use these seven drop zones, that's when the Mujahideen launched attacks to overrun a number of these.

41:39Michael G. Stroud:So they used dozens of fighters and about 700 Mujahideen as a whole were in concealment during observing some of these drop zones and attacked these zones. And they actually overran four of these right off the bat, which resulted in over 500 commandos being captured, which is amazing right off the bat. So they're trying to use air power and drop zones. Majah Adin used the area, knew where they had to go in, right? Because there's only so many locations. That's where the Majah Adin were using the terrain to their benefit, anticipating where the enemy would have to be. That's where they were at.

42:18So a disaster already. So the insertion's been bad. The attack was pressed, but it's already saw the result of hundreds of your troops captured already. So what does that mean? So we're talking days into this already.

42:32Michael G. Stroud:So three, three days in of combat, a poorly executed air insertion, troops captured in Pakistan, troops captured in the landing zone, still heavy fighting's occurring, right? but by this point by day three the 38th brigade is just pretty much effectively destroyed from the dra and they've lost dozens of their transport helicopters in the assault as well so it's at this point the soviets said this is ridiculous this is a disaster so now they appoint general of the army, Valentin Ivanovich Vranikov, to take charge, to turn things around. So he's put in charge of kind of salvaging what's going on so they can still achieve victory.

43:19Michael G. Stroud:So he takes some time. He brings in additional DRA regiments. He brings in DRA spatsnets, special forces, brings in six Soviet battalions. So he bolsters up that force. So basically he was given 12 days by Soviet high command. Pull together what you need, develop a different strategy, assume command, and make this happen. So during those 12 days, he pulls together these additional forces. He uses Soviet artillery and airstrikes, this time around the clock. He wants to keep it continuous to wear the enemy down, to keep pummeling and pounding them. So what do we see? So we see April 17th The next phase, this time Soviet-led artillery air units, step up the intensity of what they're bombarding the Mujahideen with.

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45:11Michael G. Stroud:But we were able to see DRA troops get to the high ground during the sustained attack, coordinated attack, which was more success than they had ever achieved otherwise. Otherwise, what was a key component at this point between the sustained attack was that we saw the Mujahideen actually withdraw from a strategic heights called Dwari Gar. This is a really important strategic part of the battlefield, a tactical part, too, that was critical. So this is about the time in the Second Battle of Zawar that things start to go right for the DRA and the Soviet force. And there's a couple parts. first. During that fight for Dwari Gar in a neighboring city, Zahat Lezi, a critical Mujahideen unit that was supposed to hold out up there inexplicably, and I still haven't been able to find why, withdrew without really engaging much with the attackers.

46:11Michael G. Stroud:That exposed that entire critically important area for the DRA and Soviets just to move into and occupy them. That strategically was critical in the whole battle itself, but tactically horrible for the Mujahideen. Almost at the same time, during the airstrikes that are still occurring against positions, their commander Haqqani is wounded in an airstrike. Now, that fog of war that is going to be so detrimental really played its part here because word was incorrectly being sent around the Mujahideen defenders that Haqqani was actually killed. so psychologically that was devastating because he was well loved by his fighters well respected so that falsehood was being spread quickly word of mouth and that was really destroying the morale of the mujahideen defenders and really it's a served as an impetus for them to evacuate zawar itself so those two things again really played in the part And I want to reemphasize that because it was a quick sequence of events.

47:18Michael G. Stroud:The abandonment of Darigar by Mujahideen defenders inexplicably with no orders, never really engaging in the fight itself by that unit, exposed and allowed DRA and Soviet forces to occupy that important high ground. And nearly at the same time, the Soviet bombardment that was occurring in the attack, it wounded the Mujahideen commander Haqqani, but it didn't kill him. But the fog of war got relayed down that Haqqani was killed, destroyed the morale, as it were, of the defenders of Zawar, who then decided we need to evacuate Zawar itself. It's at this point that with that evacuation order that was given to pull out, that those T-55s came out to serve as a rear guard to buy time so the defenders could get out and make their way to the mountains itself.

48:10But at the same time, keeping in mind that Zawar was a critical supply and control hub, they basically left all their equipment in there. So supplies, all of that stuff was left.

48:23Michael G. Stroud:So months and months of defense was basically abandoned quickly during the second battle for Zawar. And the DRA and Soviets would claim victory right around noontime, let's say April 19th, after all that blood, sweat and toil on all parts, that they would claim victory there. But it wouldn't last too long, though. And so by victory, because in the Soviet-Afghan war, there's countless incidents of both Afghan government forces and Soviet forces taking ground, but then being unable to hold it. So is that similar to what happens at Zawar? Yeah, absolutely. So a lot of resources and toil were fought over this critical area to deprive the enemy of it.

49:18And instead of solidifying gains militarily with an occupying force to maybe repurpose it to project power elsewhere.

49:27Michael G. Stroud:It was interesting because they were ordered to destroy it, but they were only given four hours to destroy this key facility that had been a major pain in their side for years and a major hub of insurrectionists, let's say, kind of activity. So four hours is not nearly enough time to lay charges properly to destroy a facility of this size. And that's just what happened. So Soviet sappers did what they could within four hours. They used anti-tank mines at the cave entrances. They did what they could to try to destroy parts of it. But at the end of four hours, it was basically damaged, far from destroyed, far from putting it out of commission.

50:12Michael G. Stroud:And then when that was done, they pulled out. So the DRA and Soviets, after all that effort, two battles, hundreds and hundreds dead and captured on their part alone, let alone the other side, they, I would call it almost a pirate victory because they went in, they suffered a lot of losses, they pushed twice, they captured the objective. but instead of occupying and seizing it and using, as I said, as a base to maybe try to pacify the area, they're like, okay, good job. Pat ourselves on the back. Let's blow it up and get out. So really it was almost pointless from a strategic point of view because once they do what damage they can in those four hours and they pull back and go back to the major cities where their enclaves were, the Mujahideen just go back to the site and basically shore it up and just put it back in operational status within weeks.

51:08Michael G. Stroud:So really, it didn't serve anything strategically. Yes, it was considered a victory for the DRA Soviet forces, the second battle was, but it achieved nothing in the grand scheme of it. If anything, it was just a delaying action. Incredible. Incredible that that happens. And so were these battles studied by British and Americans when they went to Afghanistan? They were always being studied. I know the CIA especially had a lot of CIA agents embedded with a lot of the Mujahideen, especially A, both for training with Stinger missile systems, but also seeing what were the tactics being used, as well as any defectors, Because there were numerous defectors from the Soviet Army that went to the Afghan side and to the West that were bringing information about tactics and strategy and what the equipment was.

52:03Michael G. Stroud:So it's interesting because if we fast forward from this event in 1986 and we go to 2001 plus from the American invasion of Afghanistan and occupation and then NATO's involvement as well with their occupying force of roughly 20 ,000 at a given point. It's interesting because what happened in many aspects, like we occupied the major cities, right? We pacified those after initial invasion. That happened fairly quick. Built a military presence. And then we tried to send patrols and different projections of power, which the Soviets weren't so concerned with. But NATO and America tried to go out into the countryside.

52:48Michael G. Stroud:We tried to they tried to do the winning the hearts and minds. Right. Which is what we tried in Vietnam as well. But what's lost, I think, a lot is really understanding the history of Afghanistan, the different peoples of Afghanistan. It's got many thousands of years of history of a clan society, that your clan is more important than anybody coming outside to tell you how to believe, think or respect. It's clan based systems that have been around for thousands of years from the Pashtun people, which is the Dominic ethnic group, to all the various other tribes that are around. And it's trying to impose a system of governmental control from the Soviets.

53:29Michael G. Stroud:The British tried it. Everybody's tried it. But it's also, I think, in a lot of ways, losing sight of who are the people? What are they about? Just because it worked for a system of government in other countries doesn't mean it's going to work within the greater confines of Afghanistan. So it's really tribal based. And I think that continues to be lost in the mix of others trying to come in and impose a will that doesn't take hold. Maybe there's a reason why it doesn't take hold. It's been tried hundreds, if not thousands of years. Others trying to impose a different system of governmental control that is antithetical to a lot of the people that are within the boundaries of what we know of Afghanistan.

54:12And where do these two battles fit in as far as that 10-year history of the Afghan-Soviet war? This is going to be towards the latter part of the war itself. So a lot of times the war is considered, the Soviet-Afghan war ended in about 89. So we're talking 86, late 86 fall. So this is one of the last major engagements of the war itself, especially from a Soviet perspective where so many direct Soviet forces were involved directly in support of the DRA. So you can almost say this is one of the last gasp of a major military confrontation within the war itself. So after this is really the start of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan?

55:00time. Yeah. At this point, what you would see is a large Soviet commitment for this battle. And then per Gorbachev, he wanted to start pulling resources out. So we would start to see a downsizing, as it were, a withdrawal of more and more Soviet forces in chunks at that point. And I recall at the time seeing video of Soviet armored forces crossing over the bridge, leaving Afghanistan and Soviets being very happy of it. It's embedded in my mind. I remember I remember seeing that over and over. And as I researched this, it brought all that back again just to see that as well.

55:36Michael G. Stroud:Yeah, it would be a downsizing at this point. We would start seeing the Soviets pull back more and more of their resources, a lot like what the United States did with Vietnam. As we were starting to pull things out and back, we would consolidate more and more to key areas or locations, still relying on air power right up until the end because that's the easiest asset to pull out, which the Soviets did as well. In the U.S., there's a break-in every 26 seconds. But when intruders step near, SimpliSafe Home Security steps up. Stop. This is SimpliSafe. Police are on the way. Using AI alerts, U.S.-based live agents help deter break-ins.

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57:08Michael G. Stroud:Afghanistan's always going to be a complicated crossroads for the world itself. And I was alluding to this a minute ago, and the lessons learned are the lessons not learned, I would say, in many ways. I mentioned some of the different empires in the earlier that had given it a go at trying to rule over parts of Afghanistan or all of it from Genghis Khan to the Timur Empire, the Mughals. The British fought three Anglo-Afghan wars over there ostensibly to counter Russian Empire influence, but no lasting control there. The Russian Empire had forays early on as well, trying to fight what they called insurgents, but opposing viewpoints, trying to impose their will early on.

57:57Michael G. Stroud:It just has never worked out. And then we saw the United States and NATO, right? We saw that over 20 years withdrawal and then how fast it collapsed back under the current control of the Taliban who won the Civil War in 92 as it was to assume control at that point after the Afghan war ended. So it's contentious. It's hard to see it not. So the lessons learned should be that it is a diverse group of people that necessarily don't want to be a cohesive, federalized, central governmental structure. Their identity is more important to them as to the tribe that they're a part of. That doesn't mean things can't evolve, but I just think what we see from what we saw the Soviets face, what we saw America face, Britain, all the great powers that have had any kind of foray in Afghanistan, even from the wisdom of Winston Churchill, as we saw.

58:51Michael G. Stroud:He saw way back in 1897 that that's the reality of them. We have to be more objective about taking the reality of what's in front of us and what does that mean strategically. it's much easier to invade and take over a country first than it is to pacify it and have it be turned around to be a self-sustaining entity. And I think that's a lesson hard learned and not always learned well. And I don't think that'll probably change anytime soon, unfortunately. The lessons of history are never learned, are they? Certainly don't appear to be on the military side anyway. But Michael, thank you so much for taking me through that.

59:30It's quite a labyrinthine conflict to explain. You did that very well. I will be adding various maps to the episode information. The episode extras such as videos, photos and other content are available via a link in the episode information. The podcast wouldn't exist without the generous efforts of our financial supporters, and I'd like to thank one and all of them for keeping the podcast on the road. the cold war conversation continues in our facebook discussion group just search for cold war conversations in facebook thanks very much for listening and look forward to seeing you next week

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