In short
How post–Cold War European security negotiations—especially NATO-Russia relations and the Budapest Memorandum—help explain the origins of the war in Ukraine, arguing that “security guarantees” after the Cold War were conditional and never fully credible.
Guests
Stefan Kieninger, author of Securing Peace in Europe: Strobe Talbot, NATO and Russia after the Cold War. He draws on declassified U.S. State Department papers (about 4,000 documents online by 2019 onward) and Talbot’s diaries. Kieninger interviews former Clinton official Strobe Talbot (Talbot’s background: Russia/NATO policy broker in the Clinton administration; Time magazine journalist for 22 years focused on Soviet arms control; Rhodes Scholar at Oxford; later advised Clinton on crises).
Key claims
Russia sought a “seat at the table” and veto-like influence; NATO enlargement and institutional misunderstandings created a “conditional peace.” The Budapest Memorandum’s guarantees lacked Article 5 and enforcement mechanisms, leaving Ukraine exposed after giving up nuclear weapons.
Notable examples
Trilateral 1993 talks (Ukraine-Russia-U.S.) leading to nuclear rollback; 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act; Yeltsin’s 1994 “cold peace” outburst; the “not one inch” claim (reframed as about East Germany); Talbot’s early warnings about Putin (June 1999 Kosovo lies; Chechnya/media crackdown).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Chapters
Tap a time to open that second in VOUnderstanding the War in Ukraine
0:36 to 1:40
Exploring the historical context behind the war in Ukraine.
“Mandalorian and Grogu, now streaming on Disney+.”
Introducing Stefan Kieninger
1:40 to 2:15
Introduction of Stefan Kieninger and his book on European peace.
“Securing Peace in Europe, Strobe, Talbot, NATO and Russia after the Cold War.”
Strobe Talbot's Role in Clinton's Administration
2:15 to 4:22
Discussion on Strobe Talbot's significance in U.S.-Russia relations.
“I was searching for an angle to examine the post-Cold War period.”
Long-standing Friendship and Trust
4:22 to 7:50
Examining the relationship between Clinton and Talbot and its impact.
“And initially, he started as Bill Clinton's Russia man, and his responsibility was Russia and the former Soviet republics.”
Clinton Administration's Security Objectives
7:50 to 9:21
Analyzing the administration's goals for European security post-Cold War.
“It's a great photo, but it really does underline how far back that friendship goes.”
Russia's Aspirations with NATO
9:21 to 11:35
Exploring Russia's objectives in relation to NATO during the 1990s.
“It's sort of the end of the Yeltsin era and then into the Putin era, isn't it?”
U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy with Ukraine
11:35 to 14:00
Delving into the U.S. approach to Ukraine's nuclear weapons issue.
“They were talking about Russia's potential NATO membership, and the door was open for Russia to join.”
The Mediated Agreement: Ukraine's Nuclear Weapons
14:00 to 17:28
Learn about the complex negotiations involving Ukraine's nuclear disarmament and the subsequent security guarantees.
“And that was impossible at the time because it would set the precedent for the other newly independent states.”
NATO Enlargement Dynamics
17:28 to 23:05
Explore the cautious approach of NATO regarding enlargement and the various influences on this process.
“And, you know, it was a huge, huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, some intercontinental nuclear weapons, a lot of tactical nuclear weapons.”
NATO Enlargement Dynamics
23:54 to 24:21
Explore the cautious approach of NATO regarding enlargement and the various influences on this process.
“Star Wars, The Mandalorian and Grogu is now streaming on Disney+.”
Show all 21 chapters
Misunderstandings and NATO's Challenges
24:24 to 28:00
Discuss the historical misunderstandings between NATO and Russia regarding expansion and security.
“So there was a lot of internal oppositions from the militaries, from top policymakers.”
NATO Enlargement Context
28:00 to 29:25
Explore the historical context behind NATO's decisions regarding enlargement post-Cold War.
“And the Russians started, of course, in 1993 when NATO enlargement became an issue.”
Baltic States' NATO Aspirations
29:25 to 31:24
Discuss the Baltic states' desire to join NATO and the Russian response to their aspirations.
“There There were still hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany, like half a million Soviet soldiers in East Germany and another half a million in Poland and in the Czechoslovakia.”
Yeltsin and Clinton's NATO Discussions
31:24 to 33:16
Analyze the significant conversation between Yeltsin and Clinton regarding NATO expansion and Russian influence.
“when Boris Yeltsin wants a firm commitment from Bill Clinton not to admit the Baltic states in NATO.”
Russian Troops and Baltic Independence
33:16 to 34:37
Understand the implications of Russian troop presence in the Baltic states and the issue of Russian minorities.
“So here we have the clash again of competing concepts.”
Torbett's Vision for Baltic Cooperation
34:37 to 36:57
Learn about Torbett's vision for cooperation in the Baltic region and his diplomatic efforts.
“That was always a lever for Russia to exercise pressure similar to Ukraine.”
Putin's Early Presidency and U.S. Relations
36:57 to 41:20
Investigate how U.S.-Russia relations evolved during Putin's early presidency and the warnings of key diplomats.
“He had been working there as a journalist for Time magazine.”
Georgia's NATO Membership Interests
41:20 to 42:07
Examine Georgia's interest in NATO membership and Putin's early military intentions.
“So that was hard for him at the end of Clinton's presidency.”
Putin's Early Aggression and Talbot's Insights
42:07 to 46:13
Learn about Putin's initial thoughts on military action in Georgia and the implications for Ukraine.
“And he told Talbot that he thought about sending Russian troops across the border to fight Chechen terrorists that were hiding in Georgia.”
Talbot's Global Role and Clinton's Foreign Policy
46:52 to 55:03
Explore Talbot's involvement in international crises and Clinton's diplomatic strategies.
“So we very much focused on Talbot's role in Europe.”
Conclusions on Post-Cold War Security
55:03 to 55:52
Understand the ongoing search for security in Europe and the origins of the war in Ukraine.
“and I'd like to thank one and all of them for keeping the podcast on the road.”
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Strobe Talbott:Welcome to Cold War Conversations, the home of real stories of the Cold War. This episode is brought to you by ChatGPT. Hey, it's Bill Simmons from the Bill Simmons Podcast. Have you guys heard about ChatGPT work? It's the new way to use ChatGPT for bigger multi-step projects. And when you need more than just answers, give ChatGPT work access to your apps and files and it can create real work documents like spreadsheets, slides, and structured reports. Get started at chatgpt.com by selecting work mode available on Plus and Pro plans.
0:59Strobe Talbott:Mandalorian and Grogu, now streaming on Disney+. Read PG-13.
1:06Stephan Kieninger:We have to understand that when we want to understand the underlying reasons for the war in Ukraine. It's not a new problem. It has always been there since the end of the Cold War.
1:19Strobe Talbott:This is Cold War Conversations. If you're new here, you've come to the right place to listen to first-hand Cold War history accounts. Please follow us in your podcast app so you don't miss a single episode. The legacy of the Cold War in Europe continues to impact present-day events, most notably in Ukraine. In this episode, I speak with author Stefan Kieninger about his new book, Securing Peace in Europe, Strobe, Talbot, NATO and Russia after the Cold War. Talbot was a key figure in US President Clinton's administration. We talk about the negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev, his successor Boris Yeltsin and subsequently Vladimir Putin.
2:01Strobe Talbott:The episode also addresses the challenges faced in negotiating security guarantees that ultimately proved insufficient to deter Russia. I'm delighted to welcome Stefan Kinniger to our Cold War conversation.
2:15Stephan Kieninger:I was searching for an angle to examine the post-Cold War period. and I first met Stroke Torbett at a book workshop in 2019 at Johns Hopkins Science when I was working with a project on the post-Cold War order with Dan Hamilton and Christina Spohr and we invited plenty of former policymakers from the Clinton administration and Stroke Torbett was among them and I sensed his relevance, his key role in the Clinton administration and that was one thing and another important factor is the declassification of his State Department papers. So more and more of his sources became available over time. The declassification process started in 2019, I think, after the National Security Archive at George Washington University submitted a Freedom of Information request in 2017 and then it was pretty fast and more and more sources were becoming available and yet So far, there's about 4 ,000 documents available online in the State Department's Freedom of Information Act reading room, and the collection is still growing.
3:30Stephan Kieninger:Another important factor is that Strobe Torbett shared his diaries with me when I spoke with him the second time three years ago. And the book benefits from these diaries, of course. That's why I chose him as a lens, as a prism to examine the post-Covar period.
3:50Strobe Talbott:One of the taglines I use for Cold War conversations is there's nothing like hearing history from somebody who was there. And obviously that is exactly the benefit you had with Strobe Talbot, is you could actually interview him and hear what it was really like being in the room with Clinton and as part of these negotiations. But can you just explain what Talbot's role was within the Clinton presidency?
4:18Stephan Kieninger:He was an essential foreign policy broker in both Clinton administrations. He was there throughout eight years. And initially, he started as Bill Clinton's Russia man, and his responsibility was Russia and the former Soviet republics. and then after a year he was promoted to deputy secretary of state so his portfolio widened he was not just in charge of russia but also in charge of nato policy and he had several other assignments as well for instance he negotiated with india and with pakistan when they had this massive nuclear crisis in 1998-1999 he helped to resolve the crisis in Haiti in 1994.
5:09Stephan Kieninger:So he had a huge portfolio and he always had special assignments as well. So Clinton would call him sometimes and spontaneously, often in Sunday afternoons or evenings and ask for advice. So he was really the guy that the president would call when he sought for advice. And then Torbett would write a memo for Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright as Secretary of State. So that was a general rule for him. He would always inform Christopher and Albright immediately and meticulously to keep them in the loop. Because, I mean, for them, it was also not easy. They were Secretaries of State, you know.
5:51Stephan Kieninger:But the president had his friend Strobe Torbett and he would call him and ask for advice directly. But Talbot was always a team player and worked with the National Security Council teams and the interagency process. And we had a, it was kind of omnipresent. But of course, the focus was mainly Russia and NATO Russia.
6:17Strobe Talbott:And Clinton and Talbot go back quite a way, don't they? Because they've been friends for a long time, which is probably why there's that element of trust there.
6:27Stephan Kieninger:Absolutely, absolutely. They go back to the late 1960s when they were both Rhodes Scholars at Oxford University. That's how they met. And they were not just Rhodes Scholars, but also housemates, actually. They lived in a house for two or three years, and they became friends. And at the time, Talbot edited and translated Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, and he took Clinton into his confidence. and Clinton was so interested in Russia and the Soviet Union and they sat together for breakfast and Clinton made scrambled eggs and Talbot would tell him stories about Khrushchev and that sort of deepened their bond, of course.
7:13Stephan Kieninger:So it's really a long-term friendship and really a relationship of mutual trust and also admiration. And then Clinton asked Talbot to join his administration after Talbot. He worked 22 years at Time magazine as a journalist and focusing on the Soviet Union and on arms control. So he had a fantastic start when he joined the Clinton team in 1993.
7:40Strobe Talbott:You've got a great photo in the book of them outside their university house with Clinton with a beard and quite shaggy hair. It's a great photo, but it really does underline how far back that friendship goes. So the Clinton administration, what was its main objectives regarding European security in that post-Cold War era?
8:06Stephan Kieninger:A number of objectives. First, to stabilize Europe, a new Europe, whole and free, basically, to end the war in Bosnia, to integrate Russia into the global order, to project stability and peace to Eastern Europe. Non-proliferation was a huge issue because Ukraine and Kazakhstan and Belarus had inherited massive numbers of Soviet nuclear weapons. And Ukraine then, of course, abandoned them. And so that was a huge issue. And, you know, Europe was never stable at the time. You had the Bosnian War. Then came the Kosovo War. And I would argue that the main aim was to have an undivided Europe, a secure Europe and an integrated Europe, of course, and a Europe based on institutions, on the European Union, on NATO, on arms control, on regional security and to end wars for all times.
9:14Stephan Kieninger:And the vision fell short, of course, but Clinton undertook a huge effort to stabilize Europe.
9:20Strobe Talbott:From the Russian point of view, what were they seeking to gain from a closer relationship with NATO in the mid-1990s? Because this is pre-Putin. It's sort of the end of the Yeltsin era and then into the Putin era, isn't it?
9:39Stephan Kieninger:Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, Russia wanted to gain a seat at the table. Russia wanted to be a key player and a key arbiter in the new security system in Europe. And I mean, their maximum objective was always to have some sort of veto power over NATO's internal decisions. That was their maximum aim. They couldn't reach it and they had to swallow NATO enlargement. But then their objective was to determine the context in which NATO enlargement happened. So the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 was a means for them to make further rounds of NATO enlargements impossible. That was their aim, to limit the scope of NATO enlargement, also to limit the military scope of NATO enlargement, and to get a seat at the table.
10:33Stephan Kieninger:The same also with the European Union. They wanted to be consulted before NATO and the European Union would take decisions. So that was always hard for the Russians really to understand the inner workings of these multilateral Western institutions, NATO and the European Union, because Russian policymakers thought in different terms they wanted to deal bilaterally with the big powers, with the United States, with the Germans, the French, the British, of course. That was their preferred way of working. So even Yeltsin and the Russian reformers like Andrei Kozarev, they had a hard time to understand the inner workings of these multilateral institutions.
11:18Stephan Kieninger:So they had a variety of objectives and, of course, also to control the near abroad, to control the Baltics, to control Ukraine. they had a terribly hard time to really let them go and to accept them as independent states.
11:34Strobe Talbott:Was Russia ever offered membership of NATO in some form?
11:39Stephan Kieninger:Yeah, yeah, absolutely, absolutely. They were talking about Russia's potential NATO membership, and the door was open for Russia to join. And Clinton said that, Torbett as well, repeatedly, that the door for Russia would also be open and they could join at some point in the future. And then, I think in 1997, Yeltsin rejected the idea because Russia was just too big and would not subordinate its forces under NATO's command. And later on then in 2000, Putin revived the idea of Russia's potential NATO membership in an interview at the beginning of his presidency. So, yes, Russia was offered NATO membership.
12:29Wow.
12:30Strobe Talbott:Wow. I think how things might have ended up if that had happened. Now, we mentioned Ukraine earlier and nuclear weapons, and one of the key pieces of the Clinton administration's policy was this non-proliferation. So how did the US approach this issue of nuclear weapons, specifically with Ukraine?
12:54Stephan Kieninger:I mean, the Clinton administration had inherited the problem from the Bush administration. And, you know, Bush was very cautious about Ukraine's independence. He gave this speech, the so-called Chicken Kiev speech, in August 1991, when he voiced concern about Ukraine's independence and even used the term, I think it was, quote unquote, suicidal nationalism. So they feared a potential, another Yugoslavia in Ukraine. And the boost approach was, of course, that Ukraine and Belarus and Kazakhstan had to abandon their nuclear weapons in return for some sort of security guarantee. And the issue was that initially in 1993, Clinton and his foreign policy team mainly viewed Ukraine as a non-proliferation problem.
13:45Stephan Kieninger:But the Ukrainians, of course, wanted to have some sort of economic assistance. They wanted to have security guarantees. They wanted to have a broader relationship and a special relationship and U.S. security guarantees and also wanted to have NATO security guarantees and NATO membership. And that was impossible at the time because it would set the precedent for the other newly independent states. And so it was a complicated issue. And the Clinton administration was aware that the Ukrainians and the Russians could not sort this out themselves. There was no possibility for Yeltsin and for Kravchuk, the Ukrainian president, to find a solution themselves.
14:26Stephan Kieninger:They tried several times, met in person, could not find a solution. And then the Clinton administration offered to be a mediator. And that's how the trilateral negotiations between Ukraine, Russia and the United States emerged in the summer of 1993. And Torbett, again, was a key interlocutor on the working level and spoke with the deputy Russian minister Yogi Mamiedov and deputy Ukrainian foreign minister Boris Tarasiuk. And then they found a formula under which Ukraine would abandon its nuclear weapons and would receive security guarantees in return. But the problem was that the security guarantees, as we all know, they were not sufficient.
15:15Stephan Kieninger:They were nowhere near NATO Article 5 guarantees, and there was no mechanism really to enforce these security guarantees in times of crisis. So Ukraine paid a huge price for abandoning its nuclear weapons. And President Clinton recently regretted the way in which he approached Ukraine at the time, because it was clear that this would depend on Russia's goodwill and on Yeltsin's goodwill. And the Ukrainians were concerned. I mean, you see it from the sources. There are memoranda of conversation from the late 90s when the Ukrainians voiced concerns about a future Russian president. How would a future Russian president handle this?
16:03And then when Putin finally came to the presidency,
16:07Stephan Kieninger:the Ukrainians were even more concerned about Russia breaching the agreement.
16:15Strobe Talbott:Ukraine was put under immense pressure to sign this agreement. And this agreement is the Budapest memorandum, which had these so-called security guarantees in there. But I mean, they were from a weak negotiating position because they needed economic support. And that was the carrot, I guess, to get them to sign.
16:40Stephan Kieninger:Yeah, absolutely. They were in a weak position. They needed economic support. They did not want to become another North Korea in Europe. They needed cooperation with the United States, of course. They needed some sort of rapprochement with NATO. and they were in a weak position because they didn't really have control also over these nuclear weapons on their territory because it was basically still Russia had control over these weapons. And so in order to become more sort of more independent from Russia, they gave up the weapons and were in a weak bargaining position and had massive internal debates also about abandoning nuclear weapons and then abandoned them by 1996.
17:31Stephan Kieninger:And, you know, it was a huge, huge arsenal of nuclear weapons, some intercontinental nuclear weapons, a lot of tactical nuclear weapons. It was the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world at the time. But also, you know, Ukraine and the United States failed to really get a process going, like building on the Budapest Memorandum. I mean, it was a basis and the United States and Ukraine failed to really build on this Budapest Agreement and failed to expand it and to make it, to strengthen it, to make it more credible over the long term. Because at the time, everybody knew the potential of a revived conflict between Ukraine and Russia and its impact.
18:15Stephan Kieninger:There was really a danger that Ukraine would become the battleground in a potential future conflict between Russia and the West. And that was one of the shortcomings of US policy at the time.
18:28Strobe Talbott:It's sort of like they think, right, we've solved that problem, we can file that away, and now we're on to the next problem. But they never come back to tighten up that agreement or make any improvements to it. Now, what's Russia's position on NATO enlargement? Are they completely against it, or are there different flavours that they might entertain?
18:59Stephan Kieninger:That's a good question. I mean, Russia's position is, of course, that they undertook a lot of effort to prevent it and to avoid it. When NATO enlargement was brought on the agenda, it was only in 1993. That's quite late. And it was the Eastern Europeans that brought NATO enlargement on the agenda of international affairs. You know, initially, the Bush administration was cautious to crack open NATO stores. The Clinton administration was equally cautious. NATO bureaucracy was cautious because nobody wanted to enter into new security commitments in Eastern Europe. But the initiative really came from Eastern European policymakers.
19:47Stephan Kieninger:makers, Lechva Versa from Poland, Waclav Havel from the Czech Republic, they brought the issue on the table. Then the Clinton administration reluctantly embraced it. But, you know, initially the focus, Clinton's, was on NATO enlargement as a process. NATO would not open up swiftly and rapidly. It would NATO enlargement would be a gradual process and membership would come over over years and at the end of a protected process. The first thing on the agenda was NATO's partnership for peace. And that would mean military to military confidence building measures and cooperation between NATO and the new partners in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
20:36Stephan Kieninger:right that would have the advantage that nato would not be forced to take a decision membership right away that was the advantage of this of this incremental approach and the russians of course on the one hand liked pfp because it was incremental and because nato enlargement would be a protracted affair and nato would not open up immediately so they liked that that part of PFP. But at the same time, you know, they didn't like that they were in the same category as with the smaller states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space. And that really annoyed the Russians. And that's why they were hesitant to join Partnership for Peace.
21:22Stephan Kieninger:And what the Russians really wanted was to have a partnership with NATO. And that's what they got finally in 1997 with the NATO-Russia founding act. But really, it took a lot of time to get there, and there was a huge misunderstanding, a huge misunderstanding between Clinton and Yat-Zin. Clinton did not want to push NATO enlargement. He emphasized PFP, and Yat-Zin thought, okay, NATO enlargement is not an acute issue. We have PFP. We can postpone enlargement for eternity. And And Clinton did not try to resolve that misunderstanding. So misunderstandings piled up. And then Yeltsin had this outburst at the Budapest OSCE summit in December 1994 when he spoke about a cold peace in Europe.
Read the full transcript
22:16Stephan Kieninger:That's when these contrasting conceptions clashed. So it's an intricate story, but nobody in the West and nobody in the United States was eager to have a fast sort of NATO enlargement and to win bigger and to display some sort of hubris or unilateralism or use NATO to punish the Russians. There was a lot of concern, first of all, among the militaries. The Pentagon was against NATO membership for the Baltic countries. Secretary of Defense William Perry was against it and wanted to limit NATO enlargement to one trench, that's Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary, but not the Baltic states. policymakers in Germany were hesitant, especially Helmut Kohl.
23:10Stephan Kieninger:Chancellor Helmut Kohl was hesitant to even think about NATO membership for the Baltics and also hesitant to think about EU membership for the Baltics.
23:24Strobe Talbott:This episode is brought to you by ChatGPT. Hey, it's Bill Simmons from the Bill Simmons Podcast. Have you guys heard about ChatGPT work? It's the new way to use ChatGPT for bigger multi-step projects. And when you need more than just answers, give ChatGPT work access to your apps and files, and it can create real work documents like spreadsheets, slides, and structured reports. Get started at ChatGPT.com by selecting work mode available on Plus and Pro plans. Star Wars, The Mandalorian and Grogu is now streaming on Disney+.
23:59Stephan Kieninger:What are you waiting for? Hop on.
24:02Strobe Talbott:The must-see galactic adventure comes home on Disney+.
24:06Stephan Kieninger:This is the way. Our only chance is to work together.
24:11Strobe Talbott:I like this kid. Always wear your seatbelt. Star Wars The Mandalorian and Grogu. Now streaming on Disney+. Rate PG-13.
24:24Stephan Kieninger:So there was a lot of internal oppositions from the militaries, from top policymakers. Because the Baltic armies were just in a very poor state. They barely had material, barely had equipment and soldiers. And basically their militaries had to build from scratch with a lot of help from the U.S. and from NATO. But there was a lot of hesitation in the West. So nobody was enthusiastic about Baltic NATO membership. But there were just some analysts from the RAND Corporation that advocated Baltic NATO membership. Ron Asmos, Robert Nurik, and of course Denmark advocated for Baltic NATO membership because they wanted to have security in the Baltic Sea.
25:21Stephan Kieninger:Denmark was perhaps the biggest advocate for Baltic NATO membership in the alliance. But in general, a lot of opposition and a lot of infighting also, bureaucratic infighting. And so, again, NATO was not enthusiastic to enlarge. When we hear about Russian complaints today that NATO wanted to win bigger and that NATO showed a new sense of imperialism, That's simply not compatible with the facts as I know them from the archival sources, because NATO was really hesitant, was really hesitant to open up and to accept the Baltics. And especially, I mean, French policymakers were also concerned about that because France rather wanted to have some southern new NATO members such as Bulgaria and Slovenia maybe and wanted to have some sort of balance.
26:20Stephan Kieninger:So there was always a danger for the Baltics to be left out. So it was really a process, including Russia, with a lot of misunderstandings, of course, and with a lot of conflict potential. So both sides never reached a stable peace. It was always a conditional peace, a conditional arrangement, some sort of a modus vivendi arrangement. and there was no guarantee that the relationship between NATO and Russia would remain stable and would remain good. I mean, that was always the danger that the relationship could go back to rivalry and competition and even war. So that was never excluded, unfortunately.
27:09Strobe Talbott:the argument that the Russians still bring up today is this conversation that Bush's secretary of state James Baker had with Mikhail Gorbachev and it was something along the lines as if I if if you let your part of Germany go we will move NATO not one inch eastwards
27:39Strobe Talbott:now what's your view on that there was no written agreement there there was some dialogue but what's your view on that in this whole mix of misunderstandings yeah that's that's the
27:53Stephan Kieninger:infamous conversation in february 1990 and the thing is enlargement was not an issue NATO enlargement was not on the agenda the Washoe Pact was still intact Germany was still divided and nobody even thought about NATO enlargement and the quote not one inch pertains to East Germany and the agreement was that NATO would not move its forces into Eastern Germany that's the meaning actually of not one inch that's the meaning so this is about a solution for the German question a solution for Germany's unification that was the issue NATO enlargement was nowhere near on the agenda and of course it's a standard Russian propaganda tool to refer to this conversation and to use it.
29:02Stephan Kieninger:And the Russians started, of course, in 1993 when NATO enlargement became an issue. But it's quite clear from the historical context at the time that NATO enlargement was not an issue at the time because it was so early in the process and nobody thought about NATO enlargement because the Warsaw Pact was still there, was still in existence. There There were still hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany, like half a million Soviet soldiers in East Germany and another half a million in Poland and in the Czechoslovakia. So nobody thought about NATO enlargement at the time. So I emphasise this as a book and emphasise the context of the conversation.
29:45Strobe Talbott:The book is a fascinating read because of the detail. I mean, obviously, in our conversation here, we're not getting into the detail of the negotiations that go on. And I heartily recommend people reading the book for that. Now, you've spoken about Ukraine and not being allowed NATO membership, but there are other parts of the former Soviet Union who did want to become part of NATO. And the ones are, you know, really the main ones are the Baltic states, because they had been independent prior to World War II. They had been independent states, whereas Ukraine had not been an independent state. So you could argue there was a difference there.
30:33Strobe Talbott:But what was the Soviets' reaction to those countries wanting to join NATO? Oh, yeah.
30:43Stephan Kieninger:the Baltics were desperate to become NATO members were finally admitted in 2004 of course wanted to be admitted in the first post-Cold War enlargement trench in 1999 couldn't make the first trench but managed to establish a closer relationship to NATO, managed to establish a closer relationship to the United States and the Russians of course were mad that Clinton kept NATO's doors open for the Baltics. There is a fascinating conversation between Yeltsin and Clinton in March 1997 at their Helsinki summit when Boris Yeltsin wants a firm commitment from Bill Clinton not to admit the Baltic states in NATO.
31:36Stephan Kieninger:And Clinton rejects that, flatly rejects that, and tells Yeltsin that Russia does not have a veto over NATO's internal decisions and Russia does not have a veto over the independent decisions of Baltic policymakers and the Baltic nations. And Talbot actually in the preparatory meetings cautions Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primarkov not to raise this because clinton would have to reject this flatly reject this and still brought it up and and clinton rejected it so so so so that was that's that's quite telling i mean that speaks volumes about about russia's position on the baltics on ukraine and and the former soviet republics so russia was never was never reconciled with baltic nato membership never Never, never, ever.
32:40Stephan Kieninger:And that caused tensions at the time. Finally, the Russians could not prevent it. But I mean, this is unprecedented. A conversation between Clinton and Yeltsin about the Baltics and finally Yeltsin had to swallow it. But he did not understand that the whole idea of a Russian veto would run against the idea of a new Europe, whole and free. and against the idea that independent nations can take independent decisions about their alliances. So here we have the clash again of competing concepts. The Baltics, of course, knew it because the Russians were also hesitant to withdraw their troops, their remaining troops from the Baltics, And only did that under massive U.S.
33:35Stephan Kieninger:pressure in 1993 and 1994, the last Russian troops were withdrawn from Estonia under massive, massive American pressure. I mean, at the time, there was the Naples World Economic Summit in July 1994 when Jatzen was asked in public whether he would withdraw Russian troops. And his answer was, njet, he would not. so this was done behind the scenes with massive US pressure
34:04Strobe Talbott:because some of those Baltic states had a significant Russian minority in there because they'd been occupied by the Soviet Union since the early 1940s so a lot of Russian speakers or Russian nationals had sort of made it their home and then obviously with the end of the Cold War and them declaring independence they were still there
34:29Stephan Kieninger:yeah yeah absolutely that was a huge issue also yeah minority rights for the russian-speaking population were a constant issue between russia and the baltic states would they be able to to have dual citizenship or or not and there was a constant point of of tensions between russia and and the baltic states then we had the economic dimension then we had the energy dimension former Soviet nuclear power plants in the Baltics, how would the Baltics be able to become less dependent on Russian energy? That was always a lever for Russia to exercise pressure similar to Ukraine. And Horvath's idea, of course, was to make these national sentiments and these nationalisms less relevant in the future.
35:22Stephan Kieninger:He always thought about a Hanseatic vision for the Baltic Sea where nationalities would not matter and where Russia and the Baltic states and Finland and could go back to a sort of Hanseatic vision of building a community and a common area for trade and cooperation like the Hanse did several hundred years ago. That was sort of his vision for the future. And that's why he created, for instance, the various partnership schemes for the Baltics and the Russians to work with each other and to overcome the rivalries of the past. So that was basically his idea. And not to view Baltic NATO membership as a zero-sum game, but really to have a web of institutions and a web of cooperation.
36:13Stephan Kieninger:Because he was so aware about these conflicts. He had been to the Baltics and to the Soviet Union in the Cold War. He knew policymakers from the region. He was friends with Estonian President Leonard Mary, who wanted to join NATO as soon as possible. So Torbett was really, really engaged, not only in Russia diplomacy, but also in the Baltic diplomacy, in Ukrainian diplomacy, also tried to establish partnership schemes with the states that did not make NATO's first enlargement ground. So he established partnership schemes with Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria. And it was really a matter of the heart for him because he knew the regions.
37:01Stephan Kieninger:He had been working there as a journalist for Time magazine. He knew the spots in Europe. He knew Kosovo and Bosnia. He spoke several Slavic languages. He had close personal ties and a lot of friends in Southern Europe, Southeastern Europe, everywhere. And that gave him a special sort of credibility. So when you look at his speeches at the time, he often refers to his experiences as a journalist and often made that a part of his rational and of his explanations when he spoke to the public and to policymakers in these places.
37:43Strobe Talbott:So Yeltsin hands over power to Putin. How does that US-Russia relationship evolve in Putin's early presidency? Because he's sort of finding his feet, I guess, at that point. Yeah, he's finding his feet.
38:03Stephan Kieninger:And the thing is that Stroop Torbett immediately recognized the dangers of Putin's approach. Talbot was extremely wary about Putin. He had first met him in June 1999 when Putin told Talbot lies about Russia's intervention in Kosovo. you did a previous podcast the interview on kosovo and on the road that the british soldiers played and general jackson played in kosovo and and torbitt was concerned that the russians would move their peace forces from bosnia to kosovo and spoke with putin in june 1999 and putin told him lies and flatly rejected this idea and and said it was out of the question and then torbitt learned that of course the Russian peace contingent moved to Kosovo.
38:59Stephan Kieninger:He learned that when he was on the way back from Moscow to Washington, had his plane turned around, confronted Putin, and Putin told him lies again. These were Talbot's first two meetings with Vladimir Putin in June 1999, and Talbot would never forget these lies. And he was highly suspicious of Putin, and he saw through the smokescreens of Putin's propaganda right on and was of course concerned when Putin escalated the war in Chechnya, when he shut down the media and TV and very early on in 2000. But that was his impression at the time. Clinton was also concerned and Torbjord's advice for Clinton was always to keep a distance to Putin, to deny Putin the kind of warm relationship that Clinton had with Yeltsin.
39:55Stephan Kieninger:That was Torbett's main piece of advice. Not to give Putin this warm relationship, but to keep him at a distance. And Torbett was also concerned, of course, about Putin's whole KGB entourage, about his KGB advisors. But Western European policymakers did not share Torbett's assessment. Like, yeah, German Chancellor Schröder was enthusiastic about Putin. The French were enthusiastic about a modernization, so-called modernization partnership with Putin's Russia. And all of a sudden, Torbett was fairly isolated in his critical assessment of Putin. And he was, of course, also disappointed, disenchanted about U.S.-Russia cooperation.
40:45Stephan Kieninger:He sort of anticipated the worsening of the relationship very early on. He anticipated the potential for conflicts. And that really, really was a big issue for him because he had been investing so much in the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, U.S.-Russia relations, and had maneuvered the relationship through a lot of ups and downs and crisis. And then all of a sudden we have a new president, Putin, who was there to revive the Soviet Union and to bury Yat-Zin's reforms. So that was hard for him at the end of Clinton's presidency.
41:27Strobe Talbott:All the fears that Ukraine had had were coming true. And at some point, I'm not sure what year it is, but Georgia was interested in NATO membership as well. Yeah, Georgia was interested in NATO membership in 2008 when President Saakashvili spoke about Georgia's potential NATO membership.
41:53Stephan Kieninger:and when Putin then launched the war against Georgia. But the thing is that Putin had already toyed with the idea to invade Georgia in 1999 and 2000. That's quite stunning. And he told Talbot that he thought about sending Russian troops across the border to fight Chechen terrorists that were hiding in Georgia. and then Talbot issued a stern warning in December 1999 saying that such a move would have tremendous consequences and leading to sanctions and a worsening of the relationship. But that's quite telling. Putin is not even president and not even acting president. He's still prime minister and he actually toys with the idea to invade Georgia, to fight Chechen terrorists on Georgia's territory.
42:48Stephan Kieninger:That's quite stunning. But that's the way how he approached things to put up pressure and did not exclude anything and just test the limits of what he could do and whether he would get away with it. When you spoke to Talbot, did you talk about the current situation with Ukraine?
43:14Strobe Talbott:And did he have views on how that could have been avoided?
43:20Stephan Kieninger:we did not talk about the current situation in in ukraine that was not not part of our interview but what he did is he wrote several articles in 2014 um condemning the invasion of course and making the case for more robust western military assistance for ukraine including more sophisticated weapons potentially also heavy weapons he made that case early early on starting in 2014 right after after the russian invasion of crimea and and donbass so he was one of the first yeah prominent u.s policymakers to make that case and and i mean he was he was he was quite hopeful when dimitri medvedev took over the presidency in 2008 but also hosted medvedev at the brookings institution in washington and my sense is that he he was hopeful that medvedev would pursue a different course and would be would be a better partner for the united states and for west that's why he really really endorsed medvedev in 2008 initially i i thought about the concluding chapter you know on on on towards post government career including all these events, but then I took the decision to better stop in 2000 at the end of Clinton's tenure.
44:47Stephan Kieninger:Because I don't have sources, I don't have diaries, I don't have archival sources going beyond Clinton's presidency. That's just too recent.
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46:16Strobe Talbott:That's shopify.com slash realm. This episode is brought to you by ChatGPT. Hey, it's Bill Simmons from the Bill Simmons Podcast. Have you guys heard about ChatGPT work? It's the new way to use ChatGPT for bigger multi-step projects. And when you need more than just answers, give ChatGPT work access to your apps and files and it can create real work documents like spreadsheets, slides, and structured reports. Get started at ChatGPT.com by selecting work mode available on Plus and Pro plans. So we very much focused on Talbot's role in Europe. What about his activities in the rest of the world during the Clinton presidency?
47:02Stephan Kieninger:So he played an important role in the resolution of the conflict between India and Pakistan in 1998 and 1999, when both tested nuclear devices and when both were on the verge of going to war. and then Bill Clinton dispatched him to India and Pakistan to resolve the crisis and to improve also relations towards India. The strained relationship between the United States and India was a huge problem and Torbett managed to improve relations and Clinton visited then Delhi in March 2000 and that contributed to a tremendous improvement of the bilateral relationship. That was a tremendous achievement, and Torbett did that in parallel to his Kosovo diplomacy at the time.
47:53Stephan Kieninger:And another crucial theme is perhaps Torbett's broader advisory role for Clinton. That's also something that has not been examined so far. I mean, Torbett wrote memoirs in 2002, The Russia Hand, and everybody was surprised that Bill Clinton was the Russia Hand and the main actor in his book that says a lot about Torbett's modesty and about his loyalty. But actually, he was more important than he writes in his memoirs because Clinton often consulted him on all sorts of issues on Bosnia, on later on India, Pakistan. Torbett played a huge role to find interagency consensus over the Bosnia war in the summer of 1995.
48:48Stephan Kieninger:so Talbot was always there in times of crisis and when Clinton really sought advice and Talbot was of course also an always has been an out of the box thinker, very solution oriented mind pragmatic, quick on his feet had good relations with all the key players in Washington and he could really resolve several problems at the same time, had a huge capacity for writing and for analysis. My impression is that he did not even change his style of working and thinking when he entered government. He got up at four in the mornings to carve out enough writing time and he did not change his way of operating when he entered government.
49:34Stephan Kieninger:And also I think Clinton's and Torbott's relationship did not change that much. They always saw it as kind of an ongoing conversation about the world and about world events and international affairs. And that also didn't actually change very much during eight years of government service. That's quite astonishing and quite, but says a lot about their friendship.
50:01Strobe Talbott:In the book, what are the overall conclusions you reach about how that post-Cold War period was handled by Clinton's presidency?
50:13Stephan Kieninger:One key conclusion is that Clinton really went out of his way to engage Russia. He went out of his way to engage Yeltsin through personal diplomacy, visited Russia in the midst of Russia's economic crisis in 1998, and was always there to engage Russia and to engage Russian policymakers. makers, went through thick and thin, had 18 meetings with Yeltsin, and was always there to integrate Russia and to engage Russia. That's quite clear. I spoke with President Clinton, I had a great history interview with him, and he said his maxim was maximizing the positive, minimizing the negative. That's quite telling, and that's quite accurate, I think, also, based on the archival record, went out of his way to integrating and engage Russia.
51:14Stephan Kieninger:That's one important conclusion. And another important conclusion is also that Clinton's policy towards Europe was not just focused on NATO enlargement. NATO and NATO enlargement were just one theme and one means in a bigger picture to project stability and security. There was the enlargement of the European Union. There was a larger role for the Organization for Security and Cooperation, the OSCE. There was an arms control process in Europe. There were regional security initiatives in the Baltics, in the Balkans later on, after the end of the Kosovo War. so so there was really a a comprehensive effort to work for europe whole and free and and we must not not over emphasize the the the importance of nato enlargement it was just one piece in a bigger in a bigger puzzle also including non-proliferation and and ukraine of course including also nato russia peacekeeping efforts.
52:26Stephan Kieninger:That's another conclusion, like to broaden the picture a bit and to get away from this NATO enlargement-centric picture. Of course, NATO enlargement was crucial and NATO was the anchor of the whole thing. But there were other initiatives as well. And then another conclusion would be perhaps that what I mentioned before, that Europe was never secure. It was never really secure after the end of the Cold War. It was never really secure because of the Bosnian War, the Kosovo War, the wars in Georgia and Ukraine. There was never a real consensus about the rules of the game. There was never a real consensus with Russia.
53:09Stephan Kieninger:Russia was never really, really comfortable with the whole system. And there was no solution to square these several circles.
53:21Strobe Talbott:This episode is brought to you by ChatGPT. Hey, it's Bill Simmons from the Bill Simmons Podcast. Have you guys heard about ChatGPT work? It's the new way to use ChatGPT for bigger multi-step projects. And when you need more than just answers, give ChatGPT work access to your apps and files, and it can create real work documents like spreadsheets, slides, and structured reports. Get started at chatgpt.com by selecting work mode available on Plus and Pro plans.
53:52Stephan Kieninger:And we have to understand that when we want to understand the underlying reasons for the war in Ukraine. It's not a new problem. It has always been there since the end of the Cold War because it's a constant search for security, right? It's a constant search also to understand the whole conflict and to understand the whole era. We don't even have a name for the post-Cold War era. We have the Cold War, but what comes afterwards? What's the name of this game?
54:30Strobe Talbott:A lot of people are saying the Cold War didn't finish in 1991. It's still ongoing. Stefan's book is called Securing Peace in Europe. Strobe, Talbot, NATO and Russia after the Cold War. It's published by Columbia University Press. There'll be links in the episode information. The episode extras such as videos, photos and other content are available via a link in the episode information. The podcast wouldn't exist without the generous efforts of our financial supporters and I'd like to thank one and all of them for keeping the podcast on the road. The Cold War conversation continues in our Facebook discussion group.
55:13Strobe Talbott:Just search for Cold War Conversations in Facebook. Thanks very much for listening and look forward to seeing you next week.
55:52Strobe Talbott:This episode is brought to you by ChatGPT. Hey, it's Bill Simmons from the Bill Simmons Podcast. Have you guys heard about ChatGPT work? It's the new way to use ChatGPT for bigger multi-step projects. And when you need more than just answers, give ChatGPT work access to your apps and files, and it can create real work documents like spreadsheets, slides, and structured reports. Get started at ChatGPT.com by selecting work mode available on Plus and Pro plans. I see you. Avatar Fire and Ash is now streaming on Disney+. It's the film critics are calling the best Avatar yet. Go, go, go, go. A true epic and completely jaw-dropping.
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From the publisher
The legacy of the Cold War in Europe continues to impact present day events, most notably in Ukraine.
In this episode I speak with author Stephan Kieninger about his new book Securing Peace in Europe - Strobe Talbott, NATO, and Russia After the Cold War. Talbott was a key figure in US President Clinton’s administration playing a pivotal role in shaping US foreign policy,
We talk about the NATO negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev, his successor Boris Yeltsin and subsequently Vladimir Putin. The discussion delves into NATO's expansion and Russia's desire for a seat at the table in the new European security framework.
Also covered are Russia's objectives and the misunderstandings that arose as NATO began to expand, often leading to tensions between the West and Russia. The episode also addresses the critical issue of nuclear proliferation, particularly concerning Ukraine, and the challenges faced in negotiating security guarantees that ultimately proved insufficient to deter Russia.
Buy the book here https://uk.bookshop.org/a/1549/9780231217712
Episode extras https://coldwarconversations.com/episode410/
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