131. Why The Stats Behind The Budget Might Be Wrong

20 Jan 2025 · 48 min

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Episode Summary of "The Rest Is Money" - Episode 131: Why The Stats Behind The Budget Might Be Wrong

Podcast Overview

  • Hosts: Robert Peston and Steph McGovern
  • Guest: Robert Chote (Chair of the UK Statistics Authority and former head of the Office for Budget Responsibility - OBR)
  • Main Theme: An exploration of the reliability of the UK's unemployment statistics and fiscal rules, along with discussions on the broader implications for government policy and economic management.

Key Discussions

Introduction of Guest

  • Robert Chote, a prominent figure in UK economic statistics, known for his previous role at the OBR.
  • The OBR was established in 2010 to provide independent forecasts on economic growth, inflation, and public finances.
  • The organization has become controversial, facing criticism from various political factions.

Unemployment Statistics

  • The accuracy of UK unemployment figures comes under scrutiny.
  • Chote discusses the volatility and limitations of the current data collection methods by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
  • Challenges include reduced response rates and the evolving nature of survey methodologies post-pandemic.

Fiscal Rules and Economic Stability

  • A central theme is the government’s commitment to fiscal rules and whether it should prioritize these over broader economic considerations.
  • Chote argues that the government should not overly fixate on meeting fiscal targets, especially in times of economic uncertainty.
  • There's a discussion about the potential need for spending cuts or tax increases if fiscal headroom diminishes.

Policy Implications

  • The conversation touches on the potential acceleration of welfare reforms if budget constraints worsen.
  • Chote emphasizes the importance of thoughtful, medium-term policy development rather than reactive measures driven by short-term fiscal pressures.

The Role of the OBR

  • Chote defends the OBR's role in improving the quality of decision-making among chancellors by providing independent economic analysis.
  • He addresses criticisms of the OBR’s forecasting reliability and its impact on government ambitions.

Data Collection Challenges

  • The podcast discusses the difficulties the ONS faces in obtaining reliable survey data, especially in the post-pandemic landscape.
  • Chote outlines the shift toward more digital data collection methods and the importance of administrative data.

Future of Economic Data

  • There’s a call for enhancing the quality of economic statistics and the potential benefits of investing in data collection.
  • The conversation highlights the need for policy-makers to balance immediate economic pressures with long-term strategic planning.

Key Takeaways

  • The reliability of unemployment statistics is crucial for economic policy and public confidence.
  • Chote advocates for a sensible approach to fiscal rules that allows for flexibility in response to changing economic conditions.
  • The OBR plays a vital role in providing independent analysis, which is increasingly important in a politically charged environment.
  • The future of economic data collection will likely involve a greater reliance on digital methods and integrating various data sources for accuracy.

Conclusion This episode of "The Rest Is Money" provides insightful analysis on the complexities of UK economic statistics and the implications for government policy, highlighting the expert perspective of Robert Chote on the reliability of data and fiscal responsibility. The discussion emphasizes the importance of thoughtful policymaking in an era of economic uncertainty.

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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:11Hello and welcome to The Rest is Money with me Steph McGovern. I'm with me, Robert Paston. So today with us is a man, I know you know very well, Robert, because you work together at the FT, but he's a man I've interviewed quite a few times as well. He's had loads of amazing jobs. He's currently chair of the UK Statistics Authority. And these are the guys who basically kick off when particularly politicians misuse statistics. The person we're talking about is Robert Chost, but before that, he was the boss of the OBR, which we have talked about a lot on this show, haven't we, Robert? We have the Office of Budget Responsibility set up in 2010 by George Osborne.

0:47It is an independent forecaster of growth, inflation, but more importantly, when it comes to decisions taken by chancellors, an independent forecaster of the state of the public finances. It's become a very controversial organisation because, you know, Liz Truss, for example, she's prime minister, highly critical of it. The Tory right don't like it. So one of the things obviously we're going to talk to him a bit about is, has the OBR made a positive contribution to decision making by governments? And I mean, I should point out, I'm incredibly fond of Robert. We were in healthy competition back in the 90s when he was economics editor at the Financial Times, I was political editor, and we have remained mates since then.

1:36So I probably won't be putting the boot in quite as aggressively to Robert as to some of our guests, but I hope you'll forgive me for that, Steph. Yeah, here's our interview with Robert Chott. Robert, really great to see you. You're now the man who keeps, allegedly, as you're trying to keep all our politicians and others, honest about use of data and statistics. But you were the founding boss of the Office for Budget Responsibility. You ran it for 10 years. In recent years, the OBR has become quite a controversial organisation. I mean, I remember when it was set up, I used to think, God, dull as ditch water, you know, independent.

2:18That was the aim. Anyway, you know, you are absolutely, not you, but the OBR is now absolutely at the centre of all sorts of political arguments. I just want to focus on one aspect at the moment, which is that on all sensible analysis, because interest rates have gone up, the government has run out of what's known as headroom under its fiscal rules. It's another way of just saying it's run out of money if it's going to meet these self-imposed rules for keeping the nation's debt under some kind of control. Now, in your view, when there are these ups and downs at any particular moment in time in respect of meeting the fiscal rules, should the government go into emergency mode?

3:14mode. It's run out of money. So should it now cut its spending plans, put up taxes? What's the rational approach, the rational use of these rules? Well, as you say, I mean, the tricky position to start with is that the interest rates at which government can borrow have gone up, not just in the UK, but in most countries. And that's largely down to expectations that, you know, tariff policy, Donald Trump's tariff policy is likely to push up inflationary pressure. So that's that pushes up the amount that it it costs all governments to borrow. And in the UK, that seems to have gone up a bit more than it has done in most other places.

3:50So when the OBR is putting together its forecast, all other things being equal, and of course all other things aren't equal, they'll be needing to pencil in a higher debt interest bill in future years. And possibly lower growth, since growth in this country is also pretty disappointing at the moment. That's true. Typically, if you assume slower growth in the short term, the OBR will assume that that gives you space for higher growth over the longer term. So by the time you get to the fourth, fifth year of their forecast, that probably makes less difference than the direct increase in the cost of borrowing.

4:24When Rachel Reeves set out her first set of fiscal rules, she left a bit of wiggle room in that against one of the targets of the difference between revenue and spending to simplify somewhat. And as you say, we will discover how much of that has been eaten up when the OBR gets to do the forecast. But let's assume it's all been eaten up. Well, the issue there, I think, is that the OBR in normal circumstances is producing a forecast twice a year to accompany the budget and the spring statement. And there's always going to be volatility and noise as you move from one forecast to the next. Because, for example, financial markets move.

4:58There may also be judgments. You may get new news about how quickly particular tax receipts are coming in and out. So I think there's a genuine question as to do you really want to be fine-tuning the tax rates you're expecting to impose on people, the amount of money you want to devote to public services, when these things are going to bob around to some degree from one forecast to the next. But if markets are saying you've bust your rules, that's a problem, and you don't react as a government, you could find yourself in the position where investors punish you even more. I think there's an interesting question as to how fixated investors are on particular fiscal rules.

5:35I think investors will realise, like the rest of us, that governments over the last 10 to 15 years have embraced and abandoned more fiscal rules than Henry VIII did wives. So the idea of getting too invested in a particular precise target is dangerous. And obviously, if as a Chancellor or as a Prime Minister, you say we're absolutely committed to ensuring that this is met at every given moment, you're setting yourself a pretty hard task. So do we ditch them? Do you ditch the rules? I think rules are still helpful. You want governments to give people a sense of what they think good management of the public finances looks like.

6:11But one way, for example, to approach it would be to say, look, we're now moving to a world in which we're going to essentially set out three year spending plans every couple of years in what are called spending reviews. So maybe those are the points at which you want to say, look, we're now making some serious concrete decisions over the next couple of years. How does our revenue look? How do the fiscal targets look on that basis? Rather than twiddling them in the intervening periods. We are getting a new OBR assessment on March the 26th, I think. We are getting a new spending review, the three-year plans for individual departments.

6:53I think it'll be June the 10th or there or thereabouts, something like that. Now, I was talking to a very senior member of the government yesterday who said that if at the end of March, the OBR says that 10 billion of headroom of cushion in the public finances has gone negative. This person was saying the Chancellor will have to tell the markets that there will be spending cuts. They may not announce them, but they will have to be spending cuts. And it will accelerate moves to reform the welfare budget and accelerate moves to change what are often regarded as the incentives for people to go on to sickness and disability benefit rather than if they lose their jobs to stay on, you know, essentially unemployment support.

7:51because this is a government, a bit like the last government, that seems to believe, and I don't know in the end how much evidence there is for this, that there are some people who are saying they're disabled who could work but choose not to because they're better off if they basically sign themselves off work almost permanently because they're classified as disabled. Now, that's a really, let's be clear, that whole welfare reform, it's a very radical welfare reform. It'll be very controversial. But the question for me is, should all those moves to reform be accelerated simply because at the end of March, it looks as though there's a bit less money than people thought there was?

8:30Well, I think welfare reform on that scheme and those sorts of issues, successive secretaries of state for work and pensions have wrestled with those for years and how you design the system. You want to get that right and you want to get it right for the medium term. So the idea of sort of speeding all that up, if the idea was to speed it up. do it in a way that you're less confident is going to work just because financial market expectations of the inflationary impact of Donald Trump's presidency have moved as they might move in either direction between the March forecast and one in the autumn doesn't seem to me to be a terribly sensible idea.

9:04You want to clearly be looking at welfare reform but it's not just for Christmas, that's a medium-term policy and I think you want to be thinking about whether that's a sensible thing to do above and beyond whether there's a particular need to meet the rules in March, which the story may be different in October. What would you do if you were the Chancellor now? What would you do if you were Rachel Reeves in her office today, you know, to calm things down? Well, given my other current roles at the moment, my days of giving clear policy advice, unfortunately, are temporarily suspended at the moment.

9:37A little snippet, just there's something in the boundaries of which you can tell us? Well, I think one thing which she's already indicated that she wants to do soon is obviously to give more detail and more substance to what the government's plans are for economic growth. So there was quite a bit of criticism, obviously, around the initial budget that that wasn't doing much in that department. But essentially, that was a set of decisions around ensuring you had or deciding how you were going to come up with the money to pay for public services and the inheritance on that score. The broader issues around economic growth.

10:09So John Kingman, former Treasury official sort of did a very nice list of sort of the sorts of things that you might be thinking about. So were you in favour of another runway at Heathrow, for example, which is one of the things John is in favour of? Well, that decision has been going around the airport waiting to land for quite some decades. So I think his point is that you might get on with it. But fortunately, airport design is not my speciality. But progress on that sort of thing, decisions on, you know, some areas of tax reform, decisions on what you want to do about education. Do you want to be thinking seriously about sort of the development prospects of the what's called the Oxford to Cambridge corridor?

10:50Another thing that he mentioned there. We've talked about that on this programme a number of times. I mean, I sort of take the view that although, you know, there are issues of a sort of fairness sort since, you know, one of the things that Steph and I are obsessed with is how do you raise living standards in poorer parts of the country? And let's be absolutely clear, Oxford and Cambridge is not one of the more deprived parts of the country. It is also when it comes to particularly technology, both are centres of excellence. They've got large numbers of growing businesses around them. If you join them up, it might have massive economic benefit in terms of generating bigger businesses faster.

11:30It sounds like a no brainer. It sounds like the sort of thing that any sensible government that wants to generate growth ought to sign up for making it easier to get housing and transport developments between Oxford and Cambridge. But rather like putting additional runways in Heathrow, there are some people who are more affected by the costs and the downside of that than others. So taking the decisions to press ahead with that when you have winners and losers is not straightforward. And the losers are the NIMBYs who don't want new housing developments near their lovely cottages. That might be slight oversimplification, but that would be one of the factors.

12:03In terms of the distribution of welfare and economic well-being around the country, that, of course, was one of John's other proposals, is that you should make further progress in decentralising some tax and spending powers to local authorities, to the big authorities, and that requires the Treasury to loosen its grip a little bit over some of those decisions. That was one of the points he made, which is not just about overall productivity and national well-being, but distributing equitably across the country. At the moment, you're chair of the UK Statistics Authority. Perhaps the most important bit of data when it comes to whether it's Bank of England making decisions on interest rates, whether it's actually the Chancellor deciding what kind of stimulus is needed in a budget and where is data on the level of unemployment.

13:04And one of the things that has been really shocking is the extent to which the Office of National Statistics has said it's putting out data that it doesn't have any confidence in. I suppose what I want to know from you is what went wrong and how do we fix this? Because, you know, you get an organisation like the Resolution Foundation saying that we've all been operating on the basis that there are, I think it said there were almost a million people who are currently classified as not available for work, who, in its view, are in work. So that's a massive difference. Well, I think the labour market statistics are, as you say, an absolutely key input into the Bank of England's decision.

13:49There are other ones that matter as well, obviously, the national accounts, GDP measures of that sort. The challenge that's confronted the ONS in constructing the labour market statistics is in part part of a more general issue, which is that it's become increasingly difficult and expensive to get the quality of outputs that you want from surveying households. So this is not unique to the UK. You've seen different countries find it harder to get the response rates that they want from questions. It's not just about the labour market. It could be about wealth and assets and other things like that.

14:24What's going on? Why was it that 10 years ago people would answer these questions and now they won't? This process had been in decline for some time and then accelerated over the coming out of the pandemic. So you have issues like, are people basically as happy to share personal information as they used to be? Are they happy to let interviewers physically into their homes for, you know, 45 minutes and a cup of tea to answer a series of questions? Is it harder to get access to secure gated accommodation? So actually reaching the people that you're supposed to ask. Is there a more general sense of lack of trust in public institutions and government that affects people's willingness to do that?

15:07Now, I think that has been an issue across lots of countries. It's been more of a difficulty here than in others. But why? Why is it more of a difficulty here than in other countries? A couple of reasons. One relative to some countries is that answering the questions is not compulsory. So in Australia, you are required to answer questions of this sort. in Singapore you can be fined up to£600 for not essentially filling in the equivalent of the Labour Force survey. What's the position in America? Good question. I don't know. I don't think that's a compulsory... But there doesn't appear to be a crisis in America, is my point.

15:45Well, they also spend quite a lot more on their equivalent of the Labour Force survey, I think. I think the two, in addition to the compulsory, the other issue that I think has been a challenge for the Labour Force Service. It's a relatively long survey. It takes a relatively long time to complete it. Over the years, I think, you know, understandably governments have wanted to collect more information on different things and that's got larger. So the ONS recognised this several years ago and put in train a move to something which they call the Transformed Labour Force Survey, which is essentially online first rather than going to people's homes first.

16:23and the aim then also is to have something... Sorry, that the individuals will simply be sent, what, a digital form? Is that what you're saying? That's right. You can then follow that up physically if you need to. So that is already being tested at the moment. There are challenges with that, again, because, for example, if you have a relatively long online survey, it's perhaps more likely that people will sort of give up on it halfway through than if they've got somebody sitting in front of them with a mug of tea in their hand. so the ONS is at the moment sort of trialling different options of if you have a shorter one of these are there particular questions that make people go gulp I'm going to save this file now and not carry on with it and so those options are being explored at the moment and we're going to be in a period for some time of essentially dual running this new model which looks like being the long-term solution but continuing to operate the labour force survey.

17:19Now there were particular challenges as the response rate, the proportion of people who you ask who answer the thing, declined and declined sharply after the COVID. It didn't recover as quickly after the pandemic. The ONS has put more resources into that. It's now bringing the response rate for the existing system higher up. But one of the challenges in both moving to the new system and in the existing one is that if you're trying to make improvements, the way these surveys work is that you start off by asking people some questions and then you go back in each of the subsequent four quarters to re-ask those questions.

17:58So it's what's called a wave structure in the panel. So if you're testing or designing some new feature into this or a simplification, then you have to let it work its way through that process, which is why the ONS has warned people that for the time being, you end up with a sort of relatively volatile picture coming out of the Labour Force survey and that you ought to, at the same time, look at other sources of labour market information, particularly the real-time information that you get out of HMRC, Revenue and Customs, because of the PAYE system, and also workforce jobs. So the bank and the OBR and others at the moment will be essentially looking at the range of numbers here to try to generate a full picture.

18:39And that's going to be true for a while. I'm getting really exasperated here because what blows my mind in all this is that we're asking people to do a survey. Like surely there's enough information out there captured from all the different kind of public bodies to do with, you know, tax revenues, benefit claiming, council tax, everything else. Why do we need to ring people or go around the house and ask them questions? I mean, it really can't be challenging to design some kind of AI model that essentially processes all of the data that Steph is talking about in real time, every second of the day, such that you, I mean, as she says, the notion that you want somebody going around with a mug of tea or even being sent a form is just absurd.

19:27Well, I think Steph identifies one of the big trends that you've seen across a whole series of statistics is making more use of administrative data where you have it. So, as you say, pulling together, and this is a big debate, for example, about how you might think about doing censuses in the future. Can you get enough information from combining health records, social security records, etc. together? Pulling all of that information together and sharing it is not quite as straightforward as shoving it into chat GPT, I'm afraid. But there's clearly scope to use those sorts of techniques. I mean, one challenge coming back to the distribution around the country is that there are some parts of the population that we do and should care about that are less tied into the administrative data.

20:17And so one of the reasons for needing survey activity is to ensure that there are particular types of people in the country that you don't lose or, you know, basically become invisible to the data that you're trying to collect. So I think for the foreseeable future, you are seeing partly because of the pressure on response rates, a greater desire to make as much use of the sort of administrative data that Steph's described there as you can. But the idea that you can basically abandon surveys altogether, I think is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Surely, though, like the private sector have a wealth of data on us, which is easily collected.

20:55And in real time, as you say, I disagree with you in the sense of actually be quite hard to do this. I really don't think it would. It just needs a platform in which people, you know, different, whether it's the food bank. and when they get a referral, could they not just type it into the system? They do it into their own spreadsheet. Can that just not be a centralised thing where everything just goes into the same pot and some AI thing just works it out and gives you a summary of every single person? It doesn't feel like if a retailer can do that, if a retailer can know that next month I'm probably going to need a pair of tights, surely the government are going to be able to work it out from everything else.

21:36that's one question not asked in the labour force survey as far as i'm aware well i think one one set of concerns around that and pulling this together is around privacy and ethics of this are you able to ensure that if you are pulling in data that you're linking it to other sources of data from other people that's you're doing that in a way which will start to identify individuals and the processes and the safeguards that you would need to put in place to ensure that that was done safely. It wasn't compromising people's security, the security of their financial information, the security of their health information is not to be underestimated.

22:14And indeed, it's one of the reasons why it has been so challenging even to get data shared from within government, let alone from the people deciding whether you need to buy new tights, because different departments are anxious that if they share their data with other departments, what happens if there is a breach? What happens if the data are used in ways that they think are inappropriate? So that is really not to be underestimated as a challenge. On AI, there are areas in which it is being explored and used. One of the challenges with moving to the new online TLFS, an existing challenge, is people answering the question, what occupation are you, what industry are you in, which people will have a different sense of unless you give them an exhaustive list of options.

23:00And one area, I think, where AI is being explored is if you look at all the answers that people give to those, can you get that to sort things out into a more rigorous assessment of what people's occupations are, what industries are, which is important to the granularity and the detail you're trying to get out of the information of the labour market, for example. Well, there's plenty more stats to talk about. So sit tight and we'll have a quick break.

23:30I mean, I think given we have dwelled on this quite a long time, it is just important to explain why it matters when data on how many people are employed or not employed or sign themselves off, why this matters. Because the amount of so-called slack in the labour market, the amount of unused capacity in the economy is an absolutely central judgment when it comes to where the Bank of England sets interest rates. And it has been a source of considerable concern to me, particularly since this is also data they feed into their economic models, that we cannot rely on the information that's been coming out from the Office of National Statistics on all of that.

24:19I mean, at a time when there is, understandably, not a lot of confidence that the Bank of England has been setting interest rates at the right level. I mean, one of the things that I'm slightly concerned about, we just today, as we're recording, got the latest inflation data. That actually does show that when it comes to core inflation and services inflation, that now it has come down rather more than people expected. You know, the economy is patently bumping along, stagnating. You know, I'm one of those people who thinks that the Bank of England should have cut interest rates at its last meeting.

24:56We're now going to have to wait till February to see whether it's going to cut interest rates. So against a backdrop where many of us think the judgment of the Bank of England in terms of where to set interest rates is not what it should be. The lack of robustness in the data is another source of anxiety. It's certainly a source of frustration. I spent 10 years, as you know, being in charge of the OBR's forecasts over five years, of which the question of how much spare capacity is there, how much is that, how is that going to evolve, was a key judgment in every one of the 20 or so forecasts that I had to preside over.

25:30and one rule that we always made for ourselves is that we would never write down now is a uniquely difficult time to do a forecast because there are always reasons why it's difficult to do a forecast and obviously the ones that you can tackle or that you can improve it's always worth looking at that and trying to do that as best you can but it is a fact of life that your understanding of where the economy has been as well as where it is and as where it is going to be evolves over time so if If you think back to when we were in short pants economic reporters, I remember Kenneth Clark's first budget, 1993, going to the Treasury Select Committee.

26:11At that stage, it looked as though the UK economy had shrunk by 4 % during the course of the 1990s recession. It ended in a double dip. By the time I went to the OBR, look back at what the numbers were saying, it was down to 2.5 % and there was no double dip. So it's important as for newspaper reporters as well as for other people to recognise that when you're seeing the next month's GDP numbers, less so with inflation, obviously, because it's not revised. These are the early drafts of economic history that can end up changing quite a bit. And one needs to recognise that. We talked about that only recently, the fact that we've set so much store by data that comes out on any particular day.

26:55And it often takes years for us to be told, actually, the economy, you know, we all made this huge thing as journalists that the economy was in recession. And then, you know, a few years later, you discover the economy wasn't in recession. It doesn't inspire confidence, does it? Well, it's a feature and not a bug. So take the national accounts and the GDP story. you get more information on that months, years after the first stab at it. So the most obvious example is that you takes quite some time to get information from self-assessed income tax returns, which tell you a lot more about the level and distribution of income.

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27:31And you're having to put that in place, you know, 18 months, two years after the event. I think there's an interesting question in terms of what difference the quality of economic data makes to economic decision making and the consequences of that. That is an important point. And it's an area where I think I would expect people like the Treasury and the bank to be sort of, you know, taking a step. We're coming up to a spending review. The ONS, like every other department, is obviously going to be answering the quiz sheets that the Treasury sends out about should you be doing a bit more, bit less here.

28:04But the more profound question of have we got the ongoing economic evidence base that we need to make good policy decisions and how much are we willing to invest in that is quite an important one. Because if you believe that by spending another 200 million pounds a year on economic statistics, we could ensure that the next recession is one half a percentage point shallower than it otherwise would have been. That's a pretty good return on that investment. There's a counter view, which is basically monetary policy is as much an art as a science. Yes, you could improve the quality of this. But frankly, there's enough fog to look through, even at the best of times, that maybe it doesn't make a huge difference.

28:45But if I were in the Treasury and or the bank, I think you would be sitting to yourself and saying, well, OK, look, let's let's not just look at the incremental use of X million pounds here or there. But what is it worth investing in for the quality of economic decision making? and there's not a straightforward answer to that and they're probably best placed to charge. But you did point out they spend a hell of a lot more in America on getting robust data than we spend here. And not without some of the similar difficulties about getting different messages from surveys versus counts of people in work as well.

29:18So, as I say, I think that the distinction between whether you have a compulsory and a non-compulsory survey is obviously an interesting one. I don't think we have many good examples of people who've moved from non-compulsory to compulsory and, as it were, have seen how that works. Places like Australia, it's been in place for quite some time and they don't get 100 % response rate. I don't think many people are fine for it, but it obviously establishes a sense that filling in a survey like this is an element of civic duty like jury service. Do you think growth is the right thing to measure in terms of how we look at the economy?

29:56because as you know we've just said often it's revised and we find out it's different years later when really that's irrelevant should we not be instead of focusing so much on growth and whether we're getting that we focus on all the other things that actually matter to people because growth doesn't matter to people because it's not an individual thing is it it's an average but given it always changes and it's really hard to forecast it's like a bit of a waste of time and And it can knock politicians off plans because they think, oh, that figure's not right. We should do something different. And it just feels, is it the right thing?

30:32I think it's part of the information that you want to look at. I mean, the other things that you've described there, people's incomes, their well-being, what's going on jobs. It's not as though politicians aren't alert to that and aren't hearing about that from their election. But there is an obsession with the GDP number. I mean, people are more focused on it than they are, for example. I mean, we've talked about, you know, the problems with caring about unemployment if the numbers are completely unreliable. But, you know, I would take the view that jobs and incomes, you know, living standard numbers are way more important than the GDP average.

31:06Well, part of it is obviously its usefulness in steering the economy. The other issue, I think, as you say, is that, you know, some of those other data give you more a sense. and this comes to Steph's point about it being an average, is that if you're looking at the distribution of income, it's core to your measures of inequality or measures of child poverty. For example, when I was at the IFS, we spent an inordinate amount of time looking at how the GDP figure is an aggregate. Once you started looking at individual households, the impact of housing costs in different places on different things, absolutely part of the richer picture.

31:39We've also actually, though, now embarking, it'll be over quite a lengthy time horizon, I think, of an international effort to revisit the way the GDP numbers are put together, a thing called the system of national accounts, which a lot of work has taken place on there, for example, around the extent to which we take sufficient account of the depletion of natural resources. So if you're basically getting a lot of GDP growth and you're doing that by denuding the environment, shouldn't there be a measure which is capturing that impact as well? Now, can I just take you back a long, long time? We were both at the FT in the 1990s.

32:20You were the economics editor. I was the political editor. The glory years. The glory years, bit of healthy internal competition. So you then, distinguished career doing other things, end up essentially creating the Office for Budget Responsibility. It's now a massive part of the sort of public service government infrastructure. Very controversial, we've said, or become perhaps too controversial in recent years with people like Liz Truss essentially saying you're not fit for the OBR is not fit for purpose. And quite a lot of Tories essentially accusing the OBR of being a lousy forecaster. So I suppose two questions.

33:02One is, do you think that the quality, if you look back to our time when we were holding both the Tory and the Labour government to account, do you think the quality of decision making by chancellors and indeed prime ministers has improved as a result of the creation of the Office for Budget Responsibility? and secondly you know when you hear politicians particularly on the right say the OBR's forecasting record is lamentable what's your response? Well let me come on the latter one first I think if you look at the performance in simply comparing the quote-unquote errors and that is actually you know changes over time from the previous estimates on things like economic growth and the level of the budget deficit in the pre-COVID, pre-Ukraine period, then I think you certainly the evidence was that the errors in the OBR's forecasts were smaller than the errors in Treasury forecasts over the previous 20 years.

34:07Now, in many ways... And how does it compare with private sector forecasters and think tank forecasters and all that? Well, on the GDP forecast, the OBR's forecasts have tended always to be relatively closely in line with either the Bank of England or the average of outside forecasts. So relatively speaking, it's not performed. Well, the difficult comparison with private sector forecasts is that the OBR is tasked with producing a forecast of what do you think is going to happen based on current government policy. Now, most private sector forecasters are in addition going to say, how do I think that policy might change in the light of what is going to happen and what impact will that have.

34:50So you are not comparing apples with apples in quite the same way. And so just to be clear, private sector for carters basically have a greater ability to deploy what you might call intelligent common sense judgment in a way that the OBR is not allowed to do. I think it is right that the OBR is required, the OBR is there, as it were, to hold the government to account and to assess what the impact of government decisions is, it is neither to recommend nor to predict what governments will do in the future. Now, even in my day, there were areas where that gets a bit grey. For example, it was always government policy and has always been government policy that you're going to raise fuel duty in line with inflation.

35:33But it never, never, never happens. So the forecasts included that, but you all had to write, by the way, if you look at the last 28 occasions... It's one of the most surreal bits of those reports. Every time you have to assume that it's going to increase the rate of fuel duty. And then you always have this footnote saying, by the way, don't believe this forecast. Or making it clear to people that this is a conditional forecast on what the government is intending to do. In addition to the critiques based on do you agree with particular forecast judgments? And obviously that got a lot more difficult.

36:06You know, the OBR was in no better position than anyone else to predict the impact of the Ukraine crisis on oil prices, etc. Back in, you know, in my days of the OBR, a lot of the question was what, you know, what do you think the impact of the austerity period on economic growth has been through the 2010s, for example? There's a separate set of critiques of the OBR, which is essentially that it gets in the way of legitimate ministerial policy ambitions to do exciting things. If you're on the right, for example, to have supply side improving tax cuts on the left, a big green public investment programme, etc.

36:48And you get the criticism from both sides that the OBR is unlikely to give an ambitious policymaker credit for that in the forecast that they produce. And just to explain this to listeners in concrete terms, you know, one of, I think, the sort of slightly frustrating things for the current government is it has said it is going to massively reform planning rules. There will be all this additional building and investment that will get the growth rate up. The OBR has not improved or not increased its forecasts for underlying growth because, broadly, it says there isn't the evidence that, A, this will happen on the scale that the government wants it to happen, and B, that even if it does happen, that necessarily it will get the growth rate up and the productivity up fast enough.

37:36So there's a combination there of what you might describe as a scepticism based on past experience, perhaps. There's also, though, in many cases... But do you understand politicians' frustration that they don't get, They don't, you know, they're trying to do something bold and controversial. And the OBR just says, OK, well, maybe it'll happen. But, you know, we're not going to improve any forecast of the public finances. We're not going to put it in the bank yet. No, exactly. There are areas, I think, for example, on policies to increase the supply of labour, changes in migration policy, etc. The OBR does, you know, put that in more systematically, more transparently than it did in my day, which is probably a good thing.

38:15But I think it's not just a matter of scepticism. I think often timescale is key here because policies of this sort, you know, a sudden announcement of, you know, we're going to have some dramatic new development between Oxford and Cambridge or runways, etc. The chances of much of that in terms of its impact on the underlying growth performance of the economy showing up within the five year horizon that the OBR is instructed to forecast over is not often terribly realistic. So even if you did think that this is a tremendously good policy. Another one is going to do amazing things for growth. It ain't going to happen by year four or year five.

38:55So if we ditch the OBR then, do you think politicians would be more ambitious? But that's the point I really make to come back to, which you didn't answer, right? Were Ken Clarke and Gordon Brown, in a sense, better or worse chancellors than, let's say, you know, George Osborne, who created the OBR, Philip Hammond, who had to live with it, Rachel Reeves today? has the OBR been a positive force in terms of rational decision-making by chancellors? My judgment would be that chancellors have behaved better and made more sensible decisions during the period that the OBR exists than they would be of likely to have been made otherwise.

39:42I think the difficulty with comparisons with the earliest is that the circumstances confronting Kenneth Clarke, Gordon Brown, George Osborne, Rachel are so time-specific to the moment that it's very hard to make that judgment. How would each of those have behaved confronted with the inheritance that the other ones had had? So I think one area, for example, where the OBRs work on the longer-term outlook for the public finance, so not just the five years but 50 years ahead, there was a more informed discussion about should you link the state pension age to life expectancy, thinking about, well, how would reforms to the long-term student loan system unfold, taking more notice of contingent liabilities and risks on the government's balance sheet.

40:30I think there's been more attention to all of that. But that said, the OBR comes up with these very long-term forecasts, which basically say we're bust 10, 20, 30 years away. You know, the forecasts of the OBR are incredibly scary in terms of how we are accumulating all these enormous liabilities about which we're doing nothing, whether it's from climate change, whether it's from longevity. So it's great to have these reports, but it hasn't changed the short term nature of decision making, has it? Well, I think it's helped. So things like the decision on how you want to structure the pension scheme over the longer term, having that long term analysis, there is another factor that's going to be in people's minds, how decisive it is in any one moment or not, less clear.

41:17I think that, as you say, with those long-term pictures, you can say, well, you know, whenever they publish one of these things, there's always a ski jump pattern in the chart and you're heading off to some very large debt number in the future, which is true. But saying, you know, have the decisions that the government has made in the last year or so made that outlook look better or worse is still useful information, even if there's a lot of uncertainty as to where you would be in 40 years time. So I think some of the work they've done after my time on net zero, for example, issues like if one consequence of move to electric vehicles is essentially that we're going to lose all fuel duty.

41:55What's the consequence of not doing anything about that? Are they still not doing anything about it there, Robert? We come back to another one of John Kingman's recommendations on his top 10 list of having to think more seriously about things like road pricing. Totally right. I mean, ironically, you know, if there is a silver lining to the reluctance of politicians ever to put up fuel duty in line with inflation, there's less of it to replace now as electric vehicles whittle the rest away. But that is searching for a silver lining a bit. Do you think the OBR is still going to be around in five, ten years' time?

42:29Do you think, you know, all the controversy is starting to make it less important? Do you think, you know, we might get a future government that comes in and just gets rid of it? I don't think so. These sorts of institutions exist in other countries and some of them have had a tricky period. The Hungarian one was essentially defanged considerably, not quite abolished entirely. No, I think that the valid case for saying that you have independent analysis and independent assessment of what the outlook looks like and crucially, somebody who's able to say, and this is what the uncertainties are like.

43:04There's no sensible chancellor would bet the farm on any particular forecast being correct. and having, I think one of the things that the OBR does that is less visible but extremely valuable is during the course of running up to a budget is really kicking the tyres of the forecast of every individual tax thing, looking at the costing of individual policy measures. Not much of that is visible, but it's a very important element of scrutiny. Now, the whole OBR model was designed to start with, which this is not a body that takes policy decisions or indeed tells politicians what policies they ought to do.

43:41So even if the OBR's forecast shows that the government is no longer on course to hit its fiscal rule, it's not the OBR's job to say, should you change the rule, should you change the policy, or should you just ignore it and hope that something comes up? Those are rightly decisions for elected ministers to take and not the OBR. The OBR is very much at the level of providing analysis, numbers, transparency as best it can. But it is up to our elected politicians to make the decisions and to justify them. And I mean, I would argue that in a world in which we have more politicians who have no shame in describing blatant lies as truth, we need the OBR more than ever.

44:25Robert, thank you so much for your time. That's been fascinating. Thank you very much indeed for asking me. Absolutely wonderful to have you. See you again soon. Yeah, that's it. From us on, the rest is money. Bye-bye. Bye-bye.

From the publisher

The founder of the OBR and now boss of all official statistics Robert Chote explains to Steph and Robert why the UK’s unemployment numbers are so unreliable and why the chancellor should be braver and not obsessively try to meet her fiscal rules at all times.

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