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Podcast Notes: The Rest Is Politics - Episode 100: Anne Applebaum: Corruption, Populism, and Ending the War in Ukraine
Overview In this episode of *The Rest Is Politics*, hosts Alastair Campbell and Rory Stewart are joined by historian and journalist Anne Applebaum. The discussion centers around themes of autocracy, populism, and the ongoing war in Ukraine, offering deep insights into the political landscape shaped by these issues.
Key Themes and Topics
- Anne Applebaum's Relationship with Eastern Europe
- Early Experiences:
- First visited the Soviet Union as a student in the 1980s.
- Lived in Poland during its transition to democracy in 1989.
- Married to a Polish politician, providing insider perspectives on political complexities.
- Political Observations:
- Witnessed the rise of autocratic populism in Poland.
- Currently sees a pro-democracy coalition emerging after years of populist governance.
- Rise of Autocratic States and Populism
- Definition of Autocracy:
- Autocracies are characterized by a lack of legitimate opposition and capture of state mechanisms.
- Populism Explained:
- Populist movements may initially operate democratically but often work to dismantle democratic structures after gaining power.
- Examples include Viktor Orban in Hungary and the Law and Justice party in Poland.
- Impact of Social Media:
- The shift in political conversation due to social media has contributed to the rise of populism since 2012-2014, fueling anger and division.
- The Role of Russia and the West's Response
- Putin's Influence:
- Applebaum discusses the moment she recognized the potential threat posed by Putin and the KGB's historical influence.
- Western Naivety:
- Critiques the early Western approach towards Russia, highlighting a misconception that economic ties would neutralize political threats.
- Corruption and Enabling:
- Discusses how Western financial institutions became complicit in laundering money for Russian oligarchs, leading to corrupt practices in politics.
- The War in Ukraine
- Current State:
- Applebaum emphasizes the need for Ukraine to emerge victorious to ensure a stable future for democracy in the region.
- Global Implications:
- The war is a critical juncture in the global contest between democracies and autocratic regimes.
- Ending the War:
- A definitive end is contingent on Russia’s realization that continued conflict is unsustainable.
- Global Perspectives on Democracy and Autocracy
- Shifting Dynamics:
- The emergence of autocratic networks and their influence on global politics is a significant concern.
- The Global South's Views:
- Applebaum highlights the varied perspectives within the Global South and their hesitance to fully align with Western narratives on Ukraine.
Key Takeaways
- Hypocrisy in Foreign Policy: Applebaum notes the inherent hypocrisy in foreign policy, where democracies often make compromises with autocratic regimes.
- Optimism for Change: Despite the dark realities of authoritarianism, she remains hopeful due to the resilience of opposition movements across various countries.
- The Complexity of Modern Politics: The intertwining of money, politics, and public perception creates a complicated landscape that challenges traditional understandings of democracy and governance.
Conclusion The episode provides a thought-provoking exploration of contemporary political themes through the lens of Anne Applebaum's extensive knowledge and experience. It emphasizes the ongoing struggle for democracy against the backdrop of rising populism and authoritarianism, particularly in light of the war in Ukraine and its geopolitical ramifications. The conversation serves as a reminder of the fragile nature of democratic institutions and the importance of vigilance and engagement in political discourse.
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:00Thanks for listening to The Rest is Politics. Sign up to The Rest is Politics. Plus, to enjoy ad-free listening, receive a weekly newsletter, join our members chatroom and gain early access to live show tickets. Just go to therestispolitics.com. That's therestispolitics.com.
0:19Welcome to The Rest Is Politics, leading with me, Rory Stewart. And me, Alistair Campbell, joined today by a writer, historian, journalist that both of us have known for quite a long time, by the name of Anne Applebaum. and particularly interesting at the moment because she's written many books but her latest is about what it's called autocracy inc and it speaks to a lot of the things that we've talked about for some time i suspect the name putin may come up quite a lot i suspect that ukraine may come up quite a lot i suspect populism may come up quite a lot i suspect trump may come up quite a lot but she's somebody who's been i think on a pretty interesting political journey herself but has ended up effectively as a something of a political campaigner even though she might not like to be described like that.
1:02So Anne, welcome. I want to start by asking you quite a big question that allows you to tell us something about yourself and your life. And that is if you could give us the various chapters of your relationship with Eastern Europe. I thought you were going to ask for my relationship to a more complex relationship. But no, my first experience with Eastern Europe was a trip as a student to the Soviet Union in the 1980s, when it was still the Soviet Union. And I actually now, in retrospect, feel lucky that I was one of the last generations of students who did see it because a couple of years later it was already different.
1:37I then lived in Poland in 1989 and watched 1990 and watched the transition year. So that's kind of part two. Part three, I married somebody who became a Polish politician. So had an insider view to how complex that is. And there was a sort of happy part of that and then a less happy part of that. And then maybe chapter four is I watched Poland be almost taken over by an autocratic populist party that was trying to undermine the political system. And then maybe chapter five is then I watched kind of broad coalition, pro-democracy coalition win an election in October. So we have at the moment, we're at the happy endings phase.
2:19But of course, life goes on and it could go the other way. Tell us a little bit. You said married a politician, there was a happy part and a less happy part to that. What did you mean by that? Well, politics changed in the some like around 2012, 2013, 2014. You will both know this too, the way that people talked about politics and the rise in the level of scorn for politicians and the focus on everything you do in your life. And, you know, when you walk out the door, you have to worry about who's going to take your picture and how they're going to use it. the all-encompassing nature of media changed the, you know, it sort of made it much less fun than it had been a few years earlier.
3:01I was interested in the name Putin didn't come up in your account of your relationship. Is that because you're trying to block it out a bit? It feels to me that that's a very, very important part of your relationship with Eastern Europe. Yes. I mean, it's not really, I was thinking about my personal relationship. I became aware of Putin and who he was very early. And I suppose I've written a lot about him. And I did start, You know, I did feel from the moment he was appointed that I worried about him as somebody who bragged about and talked about his past in the KGB. He talked about himself, you know, using the language of sort of Leninism about himself and how important the secret police were even when he was president.
3:40So I worried about what he was going to do. And then almost the first thing he did actually was when he became head of the FSB, which was the new KGB, he put a portrait of Yuri Andropov up in the building. And Andropov was famous for one thing. When he became head of the KGB in the 1980s, he was the one who led the first really harsh crackdown on what was then a really tiny, wasn't even a democracy movement. It was just little tiny dissident groups. Andropov had been the head of the Moscow embassy in Budapest in 1956. And he was obsessed with this idea that you need to crush the opposition. And when I saw Putin do that, I thought, right, that's which way it was going.
4:22And it did. So you were born in America, but you spent a lot of time in Britain. Married, as you say, now to a Polish politician who's also well-known in Britain. Went to Rory's old school, part of the Bullingdon, I believe, when he was at Oxford University. So let's just set him in the UK context as well. What did you think and how did you feel about the way that we, and I mean we as in the Blair government, but also we, the West, handled Putin when it first became clear that he was going to be president? Were we too soft? Were we taken in? So people were too willing to believe that there was a way to trade with Russia neutrally.
5:01In other words, that we can have just an economic relationship with them and that the politics of Russia won't ever affect that. We were also far too willing to allow our financial institutions to be used by what we came to be known as the Russian oligarchs to essentially steal and launder their money and to hide it, whether they hid it in anonymous companies or offshore accounts or indeed London property. we were much too willing to accept that. And we somehow assumed that it wouldn't affect us, that it was somehow, you know, we could allow this to happen and it was, you know, it was kind of their problem over there and there would be no impact on us.
5:43But I'm afraid there was an impact on us and it was corrupting. You studied at Yale and as you say, you went to Eastern Europe before the fall of the Berlin Wall. So there must have been a strange shift from, I suppose, the kind of the Cold War mentality of the 1980s and you would have seen American anti-communism. You then will have spent more and more time in Britain in the 90s and the 2000s. Did you find a distinctive British view of Central East Europe that was different to an American view? Was there a form of British naivety or American naivety? What was the strength and weaknesses of the kind of establishment views of those two countries?
6:19I mean, the phenomenon of Londongrad has no American equivalent. So the feeling that you had at one point, it's not really the 90s, later that you had in London, that there's kind of Russian money pouring in and Russians dominating the art world and, you know, Russians in Knightsbridge and Mayfair. I mean, I don't think there's an exact U.S. equivalent to that. It sort of felt like London was the place that the oligarchy made its home. And some of that might just be proximity and you have some nice houses here, that kind of thing. But some of it obviously was this is where the, you know, It's not a very nice word, but where the enablers were, you know, the accountants and the lawyers and the property dealers and so on.
7:01And clearly the law made it possible or made it more likely that, I don't know, that Boris Berezovsky would live here or that Abramovich would be here. It's sort of a history. I mean, there's certainly bits of the kind of British establishment that often thinks America is too black and white about the world, too confrontational. I guess we probably would have taken that view about the Iraq war. We probably, many people took that view around the Cold War, particularly the British left. Is that something that you picked up on that was a bits of British political culture which tended not to want to get into a confrontational relationship with Russia?
7:36I mean, that's more of a German problem. You know, the Germans really, really, really don't want any confrontation with Russia. And that must be some deep historical kind of psychosis. Here, actually, I mean, actually, one of the things I liked about Britain in the 80s and 90s was I liked the clarity. This is not just about, this is more about Eastern Europe than Russia. You know, the welcoming attitude, at least in the beginning, towards the idea of integration of Central Europe into Western Europe. You know, the sort of positive feeling and the feeling that the end of communism was good and that we were going to be a country that led the way in bringing down that system and all the British advisors who went over there.
8:14I mean, that felt to me very positive. In the case of Russia, it was almost the, there's an American expression, the soft bigotry of low expectations. You know, we just assume the Russians are immoral. And so if they come here and spend their money in ugly ways, or if they kill people in central London, well, that's just what Russians do. And I think it took a long time for people here to understand, as I said, how corrupting that was and ultimately how dangerous. But I liked the British attitude towards Central and Eastern Europe. And I liked the idea that, you know, that Britain was an open, welcoming place, as I said, initially.
8:48But the word you used was enablers, the enablers, whether that be, and in a sense, your latest book is Autocracy, Inc. sort of speaks to this theme of kind of global networks where the policymakers and the law enforcement agencies, to some extent, are kind of turning blind eye to stuff that they deep down know is going on and know, as you say, is corrupting. And as that game has gone on, and I think for the Russians partly it has been a game, they must look back at that and think they were winning that game. Not only did they think they were winning it, they saw it as evidence of hypocrisy. And so actually, this is, I learned about money laundering from the Russian opposition.
9:28It was the Russian opposition who were watching this stuff happen, and who became very cynical about Western democracy, because they said, you guys talk about human rights, you know, and you talk about the rule of law. But then you let all this stolen money flow through the city of London, not only the city of London, but it was somehow visible, particularly visible in the city of London. You know, so do you really believe what you say you believe? And so it began, it began by the... Of course it was a fair point. I mean, of course it was a fair point. I mean, I started writing about kleptocracy and the problem of anonymous companies and so on, you know, a decade ago, inspired by them.
10:04My understanding of autocratic regimes has often come from their opponents who, of course, analyze them and know them very well. And the Russian opposition were very clear about this a decade ago or more. This word hypocrisy is very interesting, isn't it? because it's true of the way in which many, many regimes view us, view us in the United States. You know, they will say, you talk about human rights, but you're doing this in Yemen or you're doing this in Iraq or you're doing this in Israel. Or I've met African leaders say, you know, you claim to care about whatever you're talking about, how we treat our opposition, but you're still giving us development aid.
10:39And those big tropes going all the way back to the Soviet Union of saying, you know, you claim to care about civil rights, but look at how you're treating people in their own country, etc. So as autocracies build an argument against democracy, it's always been true that hypocrisy is the central allegation and has been for 100 years. Yes. I mean, there's something about foreign policy that is almost inherently involves hypocrisy because you need to deal with people who you disagree with. And I don't sort of disagree with that. I mean, my argument in my book is not that we should not speak to dictatorships or not deal with them or not have any trade with them.
11:09It's just to be clear about who they are. And of course, the hypocrisy argument works the other way. I mean, the Russians go around the world talking about Western imperialism, and yet they have just launched the most bloody and brutal imperial war of this century. And they talk about conquering neighboring nations and using language we haven't heard since the 19th century. So there's plenty of hypocrisy to go around. And as I said, it's almost a given. I mean, I think it was the money and the way in which the Russians perceived that the money was not only corrupting Russia, but was corrupting us that I think surprised them.
11:44How did it corrupt us? So just to sort of spill that out in a little bit more detail. So I suppose the benign way as well, you know, which presumably the optimists were saying, which is, well, it's going to be bring a lot of money into London. Which it did. Give us the bad side. How did it corrupt us? So first of all, I know this story a little bit better in the U.S. than I know it here, but the vehicles that are used to hide money from tax, you know, or from your regime back home are also often the same vehicles that are used to hide money in politics. So if you want to donate money to a political cause and you want to do it anonymously, the vehicles that are set up to do it are there.
12:19In the U.S. it's actually a huge problem. The modern autocracies operate as opaque, untransparent political systems where people have power and they have money and you don't really know why. And that's the source of their power. It's the source of what makes people afraid of them. And the degree to which our systems have also become like that and that people can become wealthy in strange ways and that there's a lack of transparency in the system and that money can be hidden and so on. And our politicians effectively are becoming corrupt. Our political parties in Britain and the US are being bought by these interests.
12:50I don't think everybody has been bought. But if you are determined to try to buy somebody, and if somebody is interested in being bought, there are obviously ways to do it. Funny enough, in the UK, it's often very on very low levels. It's very small amounts of money. You know, I don't know, you're a member of the conservative Friends of Russia or something, and somebody takes you to dinner. I mean, it's sort of whereas it can be quite spectacular elsewhere. I mean, if you think about the most famous example, actually, is the former German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, who left office and almost immediately afterwards went to work for the Russian gas industry and has been doing so ever since.
13:24And you can, of course, find examples of American politicians who leave and go and work for all kinds of dictators, usually in the form of a lobbying organization or PR company. Actually, I think in the U.S. there's also – there are so many hidden ways to donate money now. I mean, we have this PAC system, political action committees, and we don't really know who gives money to them in some cases. I mean, it's technically illegal for foreigners to give money. But a Russian with a U.S. passport who mysteriously gets a lot of money from his uncle and donates it to a political party, I mean, that's probably legal.
13:58What about political funding here? one of the best known routes for buying political influence has been the presence of the Russian oligarchs that you're talking about, particularly Conservative Party fundraisers, where people like Boris Johnson literally hawk themselves out to go and play tennis with these guys. Yes, that was a famous example. Is that a form of corruption? I mean, corruption is defined differently in different countries, but it's certainly a form of the Russians seeking to buy influence. And not all of it is illegal. There's also another form of influence, which is there are parts of the business community here and famously, again, in Germany, you know, or in the US, who do so much business with Russia that they also become, in fact, lobbyists for the regime.
14:42And I mean, in Germany, there's, you know, famously, the German gas industry is very keen on having a good relationship with Putin or was keen on it, and was keen on having a relationship with Russia. And that was because it was in their interest to do so. So in the way, the Russians bought their way into the German establishment that way. There's a version of that here. I mean, here it's a little bit, you know, because the city is so big and the financial volumes are so huge. I'm not suggesting that the Russians corrupted all of it, but you can make friends for yourself. I mean, there's a third thing that the Russians do, which may have happened here, which is they create business opportunities for politicians they want to encourage or their friends.
15:23And so, you know, in Italy, for example, the Salvini's political party, there was a businessman who was close to Salvini who was offered some business deals in Russia. It looks like Berlusconi was at one point offered some business deals in Russia. You know, that's not illegal. There's no, there's no, it's not like someone's passing a bribe in a brown envelope to one of those politicians, but it's a way of influencing the incurring favor. And of course, there's clearly, there are a couple of figures close to Farage who were in that position. Help us understand the differences between these donations from different countries.
15:58So I guess somebody listening might say, well, there are also political donations and business opportunities being provided by people who have very strong views on Israel, or there are political opportunities and donations being provided by people who are close to China. Is there some way of understanding the difference between pro-Russian, pro-Israeli, pro-Saudi, pro-Chinese money in this context? I mean, you know, all of them could have, you know, you could imagine negative effects in any of those circumstances. You know, you want to look at what's the ultimate goal, you know, is the goal, for example, to perpetuate an autocratic regime that's then going to cause us trouble in other ways.
16:36And so looking back on the long relationship with Russia, We may one day say this about China, by the way. Looking back on the long relationship with Russia, I mean, you know, were we creating the monster that then invaded Ukraine, created havoc, caused a security crisis for all of Europe and possibly eventually for the UK as well? You know, did we feed into something that eventually came back to haunt us? So again, it's not only about internal corruption or it's also about what was the long term impact of that relationship. You know, I guess the United States probably has there are plenty of wealthy Americans in London who have the ear of various politicians, too.
17:15But it doesn't seem very likely, at least at this exact second that we are by cultivating a relationship with the United States, that Britain is creating a security threat that will haunt it later on. So there's there's that aspect of it as well. But that could, I presume, be true for Israel, could be true for Saudi Arabia, could be true of China. Yeah, I'm not picking on Russia. In fact, my book is about the relationship between these autocracy networks. There have been some amazing books written about this. Remember Oliver Bullough, Butler to the World, the one that you talked about, Tom Burgess.
17:45Tom Burgess. Tom Burgess. Kleptopia. Kleptopia. And we've kind of all turned a blind eye, really. Because, I mean, I remember first reading Oliver Bullough's book and thinking, oh, my God, this is like all here. And yet it didn't really make that much of an impact on the political debate, I don't think. It's one of my favorite subjects. I mean, I don't have the answer. Why this hasn't? Why doesn't it? I mean, because there are other kinds of impacts. So why can't anybody afford to live in London? You know, why is so much of central London bought up by people who were using London property as a form of wealth storage or money laundering?
18:21Or even just insurance policy. Or insurance policy. why wasn't there a city-wide revolt led by people in their late 20s who can't afford property I don't know I mean I have a number of theories I don't have a full explanation one reason is because it's so complicated I mean it's funny kleptopia the book by a former FT journalist which I reviewed is an excellent book it's brilliantly reported it's also very hard to follow at times because well it's complicated it's very complicated you know we're talking about money that goes around the world you know in nine seconds that's the first piece of it and so it's hard to understand.
18:54It's hard to understand how it relates to you and your inability to afford a flat and made a veil, you know. But part of the job of politics, right, this is a political podcast, part of the job of politics is to ensure that people do understand those links, do understand the impact that's having on people's lives. But it sort of feels like because it's so complicated, and probably because we did kind of enable as we went, that it's just too complicated to explain. and so you'd sort of turn a blind eye. Let me just say a couple of specifics. Should Abramovich have been allowed to buy Chelsea Football Club?
19:27That's one. Should Lebedeff have been allowed to become quite a serious, significant player in the British media landscape? So I probably don't have as strong feelings about football as you do, you know, or as deep a knowledge of what other, I don't really know who else owns football clubs and whether they're nice, upstanding people or not. probably you could say before Abramovich was allowed to do anything, we should have known where his money came from. And so in the way that you would ask if somebody was buying any big company, what's the origin of their money? But it's pretty obvious why a Russian oligarch might want a Premier League football club.
20:05Of course. He wants to launder himself into respectability. You know, he's now, he became a benign figure. In fact, the only Premier League football match I've ever been to was a Chelsea match. and Abramovich was there and people cheered him when he walked into the stadium. So this is something I have to remember. So for listeners who don't know this as well as you do, how did these people make their money? How did Abramovich make money? How did Lebedev make money? Who are they? Why should we be worried? So it depends. I mean, Abramovich, actually, I don't know the full story, but very often they made money through their proximity to power.
20:39So what an oligarch is in Russia, it's somebody who, you know, They haven't earned their money by inventing some new thing and climbing their way up the ladder and, you know, borrowing money from the bank. And they were given access to money. In some cases, they were given roles in state companies. I mean, I'm now oversimplifying. I mean, they're all different. Am I right in saying some of the cases in London that they've taken against each other make it pretty clear that they were connected, some of them, to organized crime? Because some of these cases, they're literally saying this person was my godfather and this is the traditional mafia relationship.
21:12And this is how much I should have given him and not given him. And this is the protection I required. Yes. I mean, mafia is also a weird word because when the mafia is the state, you know, do you talk about it as the mafia or do you call it something else? We're still quite reluctant to look at Putin and call it a mafia state in the way that, say, Garry Kasparov does. I'm very happy to call it a mafia state. It's like we need to get into this sort of battle between democracies and autocracies, because I still think that we sometimes want to apply the judgments about democracies to the way that these guys operate.
21:45Even now, even with Ukraine, you will still say that, you know, Sergei Lavrov says something and it's like he's well, he's the foreign minister of Russia, as opposed to he's part of this kind of what you would define as a mafia state. But this is back to your question about hypocrisy and diplomacy. I mean, you know, at some level, maybe somebody has to deal with Sergei Lavrov at a meeting. And so they don't want to say to the person they have to have a meeting with, you know, we think you're a criminal. But it's nevertheless useful to remember that they're criminals. I mean. And right, here's interesting.
22:18You talked about your role as the wife of a current foreign minister, Radislav Sikorski, in Poland. Do you feel you ever have to tailor your views because he is now in this very sensitive diplomatic position? Well, fortunately, there is no role in the Polish constitution for the foreign minister's wife. So I don't actually really have to do anything. I mean, in terms of, you know, participating. The other fortunate thing was the one issue where he is, you know, he's now very centrally involved and plays a large role happens to be an issue that I've been writing about for a decade, which is Ukraine.
22:56In fact, in my discussion of my relationship with Eastern Europe, I didn't mention Putin. I also didn't say Ukraine, which I went to for the first time in 1990 and have been going ever since. And fortunately, we agree with each other. And the arguments that he is now making are ones I've been making for a long time. So I don't really feel that I have to tailor what I say to him. But do you think you get attacked more? So, for example, I think you're on one of the lists of people who you're officially defined as a Russophobe. by the Kremlin. Yeah, I think I've been banned from going to Russia. Which actually, it's weird when that happened, it made me sort of sad.
23:29I used to spend a lot of time in Russia now. I'm also banned. You're also banned. Oh, well, that's it. You cannot go together. We cannot spend holidays in Siberia together. But I did spend a lot of time there at one point, so it's sad. Yeah, I probably attract more anger and, you know, hatred and trolling because of that, yeah. And people attack me for it and so on. But it feels to me that because I had carved out my position on these matters for the last decade. It doesn't bother you. It doesn't bother him. I'm trying to think. There may be other unrelated issues where I wouldn't say anything, but off the top of my head, I'm not thinking of it.
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25:01Your latest work has been on autocracy, but before that, you did a lot of work on populism. I wonder whether you could help us understand, roughly speaking, what is democracy, what's populism, what's autocracy, and what's the relationship between this thing we call populism and this thing we call autocracy? That's a great question. The word populism is one I don't like. I mean, sometimes you have to use it because there aren't really other words, but it has had a lot of different meanings. I mean, in the U.S., there's a populist movement in the 19th century, which is completely different from the populist movement that we're talking about now.
25:30But I'm particularly thinking about your work on Poland and Hungary, for example. No, no, I understand. But I was going to say that it's a word that we've come to use. What we really mean is movements that are anti-democratic in some way. So I use the expression autocratic populism because I can't think of a better phrase. They can be so-called far right or they can be so-called far left. So you had an autocratic populist movement in Venezuela led by Hugo Chavez, and that also the purpose of that movement was eventually to dismantle the state. So these are political movements that are part of the democratic system.
26:02They seek to win elections democratically. I mean, Viktor Orban won his election, no question, democratically. The Law and Justice Party in Poland in 2015 won democratically. But when they took power, they began to change the system to ensure that they would never lose again. And often there are clues as they're running for election. Any party that talks about itself is the only true party. We're the true Poles or we're the real Hungarians or we're the real British people as opposed to the elites and the foreigners and the agents and the traitors. That's an indication that they don't see themselves as having legitimate competitors.
26:40And if you don't have legitimate competitors, why should you leave the electoral system in place so that, you know, the traitors and the foreigners can defeat you four years from now? So upon taking power, they begin to dismantle the system. And that to me is what autocratic populism is. And that's different, by the way, from just being anti-immigration or having right-wing views. And then you've moved on from those very powerful writing about Poland and Hungary, which are democratic states going in a populist authoritarian direction, towards now discussing states like Russia and China, which I guess are in a very different situation.
27:13I mean, those are not illiberal democracies. And so those are political systems where, in a way, the dismantling of the state has been completed or the ruling party or the ruling elite or the ruling president or dictator has no opposition. He has no legitimate political opposition. He has no checks and balances. They use these sort of pseudo-democratic systems. Sure. They will have – I mean, in Russia, there are endless fake political parties or there are sort of – Elections. Fake elections. In fact, and in practice, they don't have checks and balances. And when they do, they dismantle them. So they have captured the courts, they control as much as they can of the media or of the information system.
27:53And as I said before, they're untransparent. There's no way to understand what they're doing or to have understand where their money comes from. Very often, they're billionaires. That's big difference from the 20th century. And they seek to rule in that way. And of course, this is why they find our language. So the language of checks and balances and the language of not just democracy, but rule of law and transparency. This is why they find that to be such a big problem. It's very often the language of their political opponents. You know, that's how, you know, the Navalny movement in Russia was an anti-corruption movement.
28:25So it was a successful version of the thing that you say we didn't have here, you know, which was motivating people around corruption. You know, or the women's movement in Iran was a rights movement or the Hong Kong democracy movement. And they use that kind of language. And this is why autocracies don't like it. They don't like it at home and they increasingly don't like it around the world and try to undermine it. And I would just say one final thing, which is that the other development of the last decade or so has been the interest that autocratic states, meaning Russia, China, Iran, I don't know, Venezuela, Belarus, North Korea, have begun to have in promoting autocratic populism inside the democratic world.
29:03So they see the decline of democracy and the rise of illiberalism as advantageous to them. And this was started out being largely a Russian thing. You know, it was the Russians who began this, I think, about 15 years ago. But there are now others joining in. We often talk about Viktor Orban on this podcast. And I made a failed attempt to get him to come and do an interview with us. Two failed attempts. Two failed attempts when I met him in Germany recently. But how has it happened that this leader of a relatively small Eastern European country has become such a huge figure, for example, within American politics and the American debate and the kind of folk hero to the hard right pretty much around the world?
29:48How do you think that's happened? He hid in plain sight. His foreign policy, I first met him in the 90s, his foreign policy has been focused on recruiting, by the way, especially the British right. He was always very interested in British conservatives. He was at Roger Scruton's funeral, for example, the only politician, I think, who was there. And he made himself a figure on the British far right. And he looked for contacts in the American right. A little bit less so in the Netherlands and Germany, but there also. Because he understood very early on that for him to remain essentially an undemocratic leader of a European state, he was going to need allies.
30:28And so he's worked on creating allies and persuading others that his methods are acceptable. We were just talking about money. I mean, he puts a lot of money into think tanks, into events. There's a think tank that's based in Budapest that invites people. You can have a very nice trip to Budapest and you can meet lots of friendly Hungarians. It's run by John O'Sullivan, who was a former speechwriter for Mrs. Thatcher. He's a very jovial, friendly guy. They create this welcoming atmosphere for foreign conservatives. And it's been, I mean, you forget how in the world of ideas and the world of politics, a little bit of money and a little bit of effort can go a long way.
31:08Are there any other European leaders who are using their think tanks and their intellectuals as a way of making friends in the UK? I mean, I don't think so. Not in that way. What's Orban's worldview, his dream for the future? What does he think a Le Pen, Orban, Putin, Erdogan, Xi Jinping universe looks like in 15, 20 years? He thinks it means he can stay in power and once again he can keep his money and his son-in-law can keep his money and his coterie of business people around him can keep their money. I mean that's what he wants. But publicly what's his geopolitical vision? What would he say that his vision of the world is?
31:43Well he would say his vision of the world is that we break up these international institutions. We allow everybody to run their countries the way they want. We stop using the language of human rights you know in an international law. We accept the idea that European states can be run as dictatorships and we get used to that. But he'd never call them a dictatorship, would he? No, he would not ever use that word. He would see himself as being a democratic leader of a modestly sized European power where he's able to wield far more influence. I don't know that he would describe himself anymore as a Democrat, but he would pretend to be a Democrat.
32:18Yeah. Do you think he's going to be right? Looking forward 15, 20 years, what's your view on the balance between democracy, populism, autocracy? Yeah, who's winning? So I don't think there's going to be a winner and I don't think there's going to be a moment in the next decade when we say, right, phew, that battle's over and now we can move on and worry about something else. I mean, I think this is the contest for the next decade or two, maybe more. The context over what kind of political systems we will have and how many others will adopt them. I should say one other thing about Orban that's been very successful in his – I mean, and you're right.
32:50Not only is it a small country, it's a small and rather getting poorer country. It's very corrupt. But he also identified something and latched onto it, which was a kind of anxiety about modernity and an anxiety about social change as well as demographic change. One of the sources of his influence is he saw it before others did and used it as a political tool. And that's something that has then been copied and imitated by others. And so it's firstly his ability to take over the state in Hungary, which by the way is admired by people around Donald Trump who would like to do the same thing. But secondly, that he saw how to use that anxiety as a political weapon.
33:30And so part of the answer to the question of who's going to win is who figures out what's the better way to talk to people who are anxious about modernity. But the kind of traditional governments in the center and center left don't appear to be finding that language very successfully around the world. Well, let's see. I mean, so the election in Poland in October was, I mean, that was centered around that. That was around finding a way of countering the rhetoric of autocratic populism. You are about to watch, I mean, we're now in the final run of a US election, which is also going to be about that.
34:08So what Harris is trying to do, and actually this is my own parochial interest, I mean some of it is quite similar to what was done in Poland. What she's also trying to do is make a case that we can offer you stability and security inside a democratic structure. And the language that she's using is about that. And that was also what happened in Poland. I guess the other thing that's happening in the world right now that will be very important in the question of who wins, who loses, and I accept it's not as simple as that, but it's what's going on in Ukraine. So, first of all, how does it end? And secondly, how does it have to end in order that what you would define as the right side comes out on top?
34:52So, the war in Ukraine is very, very important in this contest, kind of war of ideas, actually, which is what it is. One of the reasons why Putin launched the war was to show us that he doesn't care about our rules. He doesn't care about, you know, the sanctity of borders in Europe. He doesn't care about the Geneva Conventions. You know, he doesn't care about this kind of never again post-war slogan in Europe. He set up concentration camps in occupied Ukraine. You know, he kidnaps children and takes them to Russia. So he's defying everything. And the autocracies around the world are watching him carefully, and a number of them have come to his aid.
35:31So the Iranians are sending drones. The North Koreans are sending ammunition. The Chinese are probably helping. They're exporting components that are useful for the Russian defense industry. India is helping the economy with oil? India is helping the economy with oil. I mean, the oil thing is more complicated because the Russians are losing a lot of money on oil and gas because they used to make more money than they do now. So that's not entirely a win. But it's true that the world's autocrats have been supporting Russia in this effort to destroy Ukraine. You know, and at the same time, the world's Democrats have been helping Ukraine.
36:03A victory for Ukraine. And by the way, let me back up a second. The only way the war ends, really ends, meaning it's over and it doesn't start again, you know, next year, is if the Russians decide that it's not worth fighting anymore. In other words, if the Russians make the same decision about Ukraine that the French made about Algeria, you know, or I don't know, the British made about Ireland, you know, that it's not our country. It's not worth it. It's too much time. It's too much money. It's too much. You know, too many people are dead. We don't want to fight it. I mean, that's the conclusion they came to in Afghanistan.
36:35But that's the end for Putin. I mean, I don't care about Putin. Maybe it's the end or maybe not. That is such a big. I don't know. He can rewrite the story any way he wants. You know, he can say we did what we wanted to do. I don't know. I'm not going to give him his explanation. Maybe it's the end of Putin. And they can get to that conclusion in different ways. They can lose the war militarily. They can suffer economically. There can be political reasons why they come to that conclusion. But once they get there, and we will know when that happens, then we can have a conversation about borders.
37:07Final one from me. You talked about how the world seemed to change 2012, 2013, 2014. and I wonder whether you could tell me a little bit about why you think the world began to change in that way and whether that's related to something else that we haven't talked about which is the views of the kind of global south on this Ukraine war the way in which the US and Europe didn't get the overwhelming support they were hoping to get in relation to Russia. To be fair they got some support. There are 50 countries that are part of the defense group who work with Ukraine so that's well beyond Europe. You know those are two different questions.
37:39I mean the change in 2012-2013 was entirely to do with the change in political conversation that came from the change in social media. All conversations have rules. This conversation we're having now has a set of rules, right? I mean, we respect each other. We will wait till the end of the sentences and so on. Conversations in a parliament are conducted according to a set of rules, accepted conversational norms, whatever. Social media also has a set of rules, but the rules are not designed to create civilized debate or better conversation. The rules are designed to make money for the social media companies.
38:14And their goal is to keep you online as much as possible. And the way they do that is by feeding you anger and emotion and division and so on. And so once that became the dominant form of conversation and the dominant way in which people were getting their political information, then the way that people talked about politics began to change. And of course, it's more complicated than that and actually the so-called mainstream media. Also, its business model disappeared and so it also began to decline for other reasons. So there are other factors. Once the point and purpose of political debate and participation in the public square, whatever you want to say in a more pompous way, once the purpose wasn't to hash out a problem and find a solution, but instead the purpose was to demonstrate your outrage or to perform your anger, then And then politics became quite different.
39:03And this was something that, you know, we saw happen. My final question is really to ask you whether there's much room for optimism. You talk a lot in your latest book about that you go through the various autocracies and how they operate, how they interlink and so forth. And you've got this line, international condemnation and economic sanctions cannot move them. Popular opposition movements such as have existed in Venezuela, Hong Kong, Moscow don't stand a chance. That's a pretty pessimistic view of the ability of people to challenge something that deep in their hearts, probably most people in Venezuela do think is wrong and has to be challenged.
39:40Deep in their hearts, probably a lot of Russians do. And yet you're essentially saying, we're losing this battle. I don't actually know what the context of that was, because I don't think it's true that they don't stand a chance. I think the cards are stacked against them in ways that they weren't a decade ago, thanks to technology and thanks to this cooperation between the autocrats. They help one another stay in power. So they do stand a chance. Poland, I guess, is a good example of where they stood a chance. Poland is a good example of how in a country that was still a democracy, you can change the system.
40:10Venezuela is not a democracy. And so the Venezuelan opposition has just won. Clearly they won and they have evidence that they won. And yet the ruling party doesn't want to hand over power. I spend a lot of time with very optimistic, idealistic people, whether it's Venezuelans or Russians or Ukrainians or Iranians. And all of them, even in some of the most hopeless countries, still think it's worth it to be engaged and are still working to change their countries. And they still think there's some idea of justice. And actually, they still think that a lot of the things that we take for granted, you know, again, the rule of law, the relative freedom of speech, you know, the relative freedom of movement, you know, they still think those things are worth fighting for.
40:56And they're not doing it because, you know, of some democracy promotion program that we created. They're doing it because they see that those things would make their societies better. People like us, I don't think, are ever in a position to say nothing can happen. And if Iranians are still working for change, then it's incumbent upon us to remain optimistic. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. So, Alistair, thank you for that. We don't often interview journalists. In fact, we have a golden rule. Yeah. So we've decided she's not a journalist, she's a historian. Just as I'm sometimes, rather unfortunately for this podcast, a bit reluctant to interview politicians.
41:35You as a former journalist, sometimes reluctant to interview journalists. Maybe we see too much of the flaws of our own kind. But I thought very, very interesting. One thing that I thought was interesting is that sometimes you think if you're not going to interview a politician, they're going to be much more risk taking and much more outspoken. She didn't give me the sort of facts and figures and examples on the corruption in the way that I was hoping. So I thought, you know, she's really going to say Abramovich, you know, as an organized criminal and this is how he made his money and this is who he paid and this is where the corruption went.
42:07quite a lot of it was sort of structural well we don't quite know where the money's going there are these packs sort of things no i think she's she's i think she's very political so i think she was assuming that we take as read a lot of the stuff that she was talking about and interesting how she mentioned the books that we both read because i think she's she is in a very political space maybe that comes from being married to a politician and and i thought she was interesting She didn't really want to go down that road of whether his position affects the way that she is perceived, the way that she speaks, the way that she works and so forth.
42:43Of course, they did go through a very, very rough time. I think there was a time when the party that's just lost power was really going after people like him and people like her and could have ended up very, very badly for them. And now he's back as foreign minister. But I think she's somebody that has always been very, very thoughtful, very articulate. alert. But I think what I've seen a much, much more than when I first knew her several decades ago is somebody who has understood it is possible to be player and spectator at the same time. She is a spectator. She's a journalist. She's a writer.
43:18She's a historian. But she's developed a kind of political theme that she's pushing very, very hard. There's some very interesting elements to her backstory too. Her husband was, I think, a close friend of Boris Johnson. And so she knew that whole world very, very well, and then became more and more skeptical of populism and could see more and more the flaws of that. And that must be interesting too, to how you relate to the fact that your husband's bullies and mates turn out to be - Yeah. It's quite nice though, isn't it? It's quite nice not having to talk much about Boris Johnson and those people.
43:50It is a great relief. Great relief. One other thing that struck me. Her analysis of why populism developed 2012 to 2014, she talked almost exclusively about social media. But other people would say 2008 financial crisis, the economy, inequality, the general sense that democracies were not delivering financially for people on lower mid-linkums. And I think also this, I thought she was quite benign. I thought she'd be much harsher about the way that we treated with Putin in the early days. I remember trying to very determinedly bring him into the G8, signal that our acceptance that Russia was trying to change and modernize and go in the right direction, when basically she's saying the whole time he was always a mafia boss.
44:39She said, I don't want to say it was naivete, but there was a bit of that. It's so surprising, I thought, that she didn't major more on the Middle East than China. If we're talking about autopsies, if we're talking about misrepresentation, we're talking about political influence, we're talking about Ukraine, you would have thought she would be talking more about Israel, Gaza, the Gulf, and talking much more about China. No, Russia was the big thing in her head. You can see that. And she obviously got very, very passionate about Ukraine. I thought quite optimistic in her assessment as to how the war ends.
45:08Yes. Well, I mean, I think there too she had this very moving thing at the end where she sort of says, so long as there are brave people in these countries on the right side, we have a duty to remain optimistic. And I think that must be the tension for her. She must see how much the cards are stacked against people in Iran, how often for more than 40 years people have predicted the demise of a regime that hasn't gone. She must be able to see just how many more troops and human resources Russia has in Ukraine at the moment and the advances they're making. But that's an interesting thing, this way you talk about her being both an observer and an actor.
45:43She has a view on where she wants the world to go, which I think we would agree with a very strong moral view on where she wants to go, but that gives that optimism. I thought the one thing that I wanted to ask, and it just kind of slipped my mind and ran out of time, was this point about why and how. We've seen it in Germany with the AFD, we've seen it with Le Pen, how these parties have been co-opted by Russia in a way that I think back in the Reagan-Thatcher days, you'd have said it was impossible to imagine. Yeah. but it has happened fascinating on Orban very good on Orban yeah we've got to get him on the podcast we've got to get him on the podcast come on Victor I know you listen I know you listen and it's a great chance to access you know the main thinkers in the West the people she said that he's always been obsessed with trying to reach the right in the Conservative Party and the Conservative Brit well they listen don't they we know from how many of them keep trying to get on the podcast we know that anyway there we are that was that was Ann Applebaum I hope the listeners enjoyed it Thank you very much, Alex.
From the publisher
What constitutes an autocratic state? How did populism come to dominate global politics from 2012-2014? When and how will the war in Ukraine end?
On today’s episode of Leading, Rory and Alastair are joined by American-Polish journalist and historian Anne Applebaum, to discuss all this and more.
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