74. Kwasi Kwarteng: Liz Truss, becoming Chancellor, and Britain on the brink (Part 2)

19 May 2024 · 55 min

Ask about this episode

Ask anything about it. ChatGPT or Claude reads this page and answers with the times it was said.

Connect VO and ask about every podcast you hear, including the moments you saved. Add to ChatGPT · Add to Claude

In short

Podcast Episode Summary: The Rest Is Politics - Episode 74: Kwasi Kwarteng: Liz Truss, becoming Chancellor, and Britain on the brink (Part 2)

Hosts

  • Rory Stewart
  • Alastair Campbell

Guest

  • Kwasi Kwarteng - Former Chancellor of the Exchequer

Episode Overview In this second part of their conversation with Kwasi Kwarteng, the hosts explore the tumultuous dynamics within the Conservative Party, the disastrous Truss-Kwarteng mini-budget, and the broader implications of leadership decisions in a politically charged environment. Kwarteng reflects on his experiences and the significant challenges faced during his short tenure as Chancellor.

Key Themes and Discussions

Political Dynamics and Party Leadership

  • Differences in Political Perception: Kwarteng and Stewart discuss their contrasting experiences and perceptions of parliamentary life. Kwarteng expresses a more optimistic view compared to Stewart's more cynical outlook.
  • Reshuffle Randomness: Kwarteng shares anecdotes about the unpredictability of political appointments, emphasizing that expertise is often overlooked in favor of control within the party structure.

Challenges of Modern Politics

  • Increased Hostility: Kwarteng highlights how the political landscape has become more aggressive, necessitating a thicker skin for politicians.
  • Changing Nature of Communication: The hosts discuss how social media has transformed political engagement, creating pressure to respond quickly to constituents.

Leadership and Decision-Making

  • Kwarteng's Experience as Chancellor: Reflecting on his brief appointment, Kwarteng admits that he felt the pace of decision-making during the Truss administration was excessively rapid, particularly following the Queen's death.
  • Mini-Budget Missteps: Kwarteng details the elements of the mini-budget that led to market turmoil, attributing part of the failure to a lack of careful consideration and a misunderstanding of market reactions.

Economic Rationale and Theories

  • Growth Through Tax Cuts: Kwarteng discusses the rationale behind the tax cuts proposed in the mini-budget, which were aimed at stimulating economic growth but were criticized for being unfunded.
  • Long-Term Economic Challenges: He emphasizes the need to address stagnating growth rates and the increasing demands of public spending, framing this as a broader crisis faced by Western economies.

Reflections on Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak

  • Truss's Leadership Style: Kwarteng reflects on Truss's impulsive decision-making and the urgency with which she approached governance, suggesting that it was counterproductive.
  • Comparative Leadership Assessments: Kwarteng compares his support for Truss over Sunak, indicating a misjudgment regarding their capabilities as leaders in a crisis.

The Path Ahead for the Conservative Party

  • Party Fragmentation: Kwarteng warns of a potential factional struggle within the Conservative Party if it loses the next election, echoing historical patterns of blame and division.
  • Judgment and Character in Leadership: The episode concludes with a discussion on the importance of temperament and moral character in political leaders, contrasting Truss's and May's leadership attributes.

Key Takeaways

  • Leadership Decisions Matter: The decisions made by political leaders can have long-lasting impacts on both party dynamics and the broader economy, as seen in the fallout from the mini-budget.
  • Need for Serious Policy Discussions: Kwarteng and Stewart lament the lack of substantive policy discussions within Westminster, focusing instead on gossip and maneuvering.
  • Reflection and Accountability: Kwarteng's candid reflections reveal a complex interplay between ambition and the realities of political governance.

Closing Remarks The episode encapsulates a moment of introspection for Kwarteng, reflecting on the failures and lessons learned during his time in a high-stakes political role. It serves as a reminder of the unpredictable nature of politics and the need for thoughtful leadership in times of crisis.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Hear the part that matters, and keep it.Open this episode in VO. Double tap your headphones to save a moment as you listen.
Get VO free

Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00Thanks for listening to The Rest is Politics. Sign up to The Rest is Politics. Plus, to enjoy ad-free listening, receive a weekly newsletter, join our members chatroom and gain early access to live show tickets. Just go to therestispolitics.com. That's therestispolitics.com.

0:19Hello and welcome to The Rest Is Politics Leading with me, Rory Stewart. And me, Alistair Campbell. And in our second episode with Kwasi Kwarteng now. So, Quasi, we entered parliament at the same time, but I think we had a very, very different impression of politics and what it means to be an MP. One of the things that struck me at the time is things that really depressed and disturbed me about politics. You actually quite enjoyed or were quite relaxed about. I mean, tell us a little bit about what your experience was of just being a working politician. So I'd stood in Brent East in 2005, and you and I have spent many hours in the past talking about history and politics, the empire, things we're interested in.

0:58And I saw the modern House of Commons as something completely different. And I think you, to your credit, had a more romantic, probably less cynical view of what actually was going on. You said that knocked out of him. So, you know, crazy things like when you had a reshuffle, and you describe this very eloquently in your book. So, you know, the one man who knows more about Asia than anyone, what will we do? We'll make him minister for Africa, which he knows nothing about. But this happens all the time. And I think I was very conscious of that right from the start, that actually, you know, you could be the world's leading expert on China.

1:34And they would never put you in a department where you had to use your knowledge. I mean, it's crazy. And why? I think it's control. And also, it works in our institutions. I mean, I know people in the Foreign Office who were told they were brilliant Arabists and they were moved to Hungary or Japan and said, oh, it's good for you to broaden your horizons. Well, I've just spent 10 years learning Arabic. Why are you sending me to Japan? But it's a formal control. It's about making sure that you don't put someone who's too knowledgeable in the position of power. That kind of thing. Or it's just random.

2:04And random. So there's a random, it's two, the two dynamics. There's a randomness and then there's a slight control. I mean, there are people on our benches who are fluent Cantonese speakers, Mandarin speakers. They've never been ministers. I mean, you know who I'm talking about. It's absolutely extraordinary. And the people who were the Asian minister wouldn't be able to name three Asian capitals. I'm not going to say any names. Let alone pass the Eton scholarship exam. I'm glad I got one of the two questions right. You see, I've sometimes wondered about you, whether, because I have read your Empire book, and it is a really, really impressive book, whether you wouldn't have been a better historian academic, and whether Rory sometimes, I feel, is not necessarily cut out.

2:48But the House of Commons should be able to encompass all of these people. Right. You know, it's not, there's not just a... And why doesn't it? I think it's just a very demand, and we could talk about that, it's a very demanding life now. I think the social media has made things a lot more sort of hostile. You need a much thicker skin. You know, thickens the skin, thins the hair, someone said to me. And you just need to be very robust. I think it's quite intrusive now. And even, you know, I've been in politics in the House of Commons for 14 years. Even in that time, it's changed. It's changed. And, you know, people I know who were MPs, people like Ken Clark was an MP in the 70s, others, someone said to me, you know, a busy week you get 10 letters in the 1970s.

3:28There's no email, nothing like that. And you might get 10 letters. And the friend who told me this, and half of them were about Palestine, even then. That was the mailbag. And I think now there's, you know, I get 200 emails a day, which is fine, and we deal with them. We read them. We have to have a response. And it's a much faster pace. And that has a knock-on effect. I think that's why you're seeing people, you know, they're not going to stay in the House of Commons for 40 years. And if you're getting 200 emails a day, and you're there 24-7, and you're replying on Twitter. You're leaving, yeah?

3:58Yeah, I'm out. it's a difficult decision very difficult decision and what tipped it? so I think I just felt I didn't quite have the sort of the energy to do because you need this is the thing it's a 24-7 culture I also was very worried about what the and we could talk about that as well I mean the party the state of the party and a friend of mine who's an MP said I'm not worried about losing I'm worried about winning and coming back

4:24that is not a good mindset he's stepping down but we could you know I mean, five months, six months is a long time. Who knows what will happen? But there's a view that, you know, the party, if it does lose, will go through this sort of fratricidal. You know, Labour did it. You know, you had Corbyn and all the rest of it. Just develop a little bit more some of the downsides of being an MP. The public doesn't necessarily see because in some ways, the public's not very sympathetic towards us. They don't really want to know that MPs are having a tough time. But it can be quite tough. I think it's tough.

4:53I think, but it's rewarding as well. I mean, I've said, even though I'm leaving, I would do it all over again. I think it's an incredible privilege. You get huge access. Actually helping people on the constituency level is hugely rewarding. And representing people, that's a great privilege. But I think in terms of the attrition, it's much more attritional. So, you know, you can't look at Twitter too much because there's a lot of stuff that people will be saying. Well, I would recommend don't look at it at all. Yeah, yeah, exactly. You have to respond to emails immediately. Or if not immediately, you know, I get emails after, you know, two days.

5:26Why haven't you responded to me? That sort of thing. I think that the debate between the parties and also within the parties, people are just sort of fed up with each other and quite rude. There's something that I grumble, I think, slightly, have a go at you in my book about, which is that I worried a little bit that there wasn't enough kind of serious policy discussion in the tea rooms. There isn't any, no. So I always felt whenever I was trying to stop you in the corridor to have some earnest discussion, you'd make some joke and move rapidly onwards. You say, Rory, Rory, Rory, it's not what it's about.

5:57I'm always struck by that. And I have, like you, nobody actually talks about politics in Westminster. That's terrible. They talk about... No, they talk about politics, but not politics. They talk about gossip. Yeah, you're right. You're right. They talk a bit about gossip, or they talk about very particular issues. But they don't talk about policy. I've never had, really, a conversation. That's terrible. Why not? I don't know. I think it's... Why not talk about policy all the time? I know, but I think there's something... I think it's a very British thing where you don't want to be seen to be talking shop.

6:23I think it's a cultural thing, actually. So, you know, it's like, you know, if you're bringing up some tax issue in the tea room, it's kind of bad manners. Do you know what I mean? You know, people are there with their scone, you know, they're sipping their tea. They don't want to hear about. I certainly always got that impression from you. Every time I was trying to bend your ear, you always make a big joke and charge on. I think what works actually, and we're the Conservative Party, the Parliamentary Party, they do things offsite. So a lot of the plotting and all of that kind of business, it never happens actually within Parliament.

6:56They'll have a beer somewhere or they'll be, you know, the cult, wherever. And that's where a lot, but I think that's always been the case. Because also that as an MP, when you're in Parliament, you're kind of on show, you're kind of in a public place, you're watching what you're saying. You know, there are MPs who you think they're your friends, but they might be saying things to the whips or what have you. So everyone's a little bit guarded. And I think a lot of that conversation happens outside of the politics. I do like to think that in our time, there was, yes, there's always the gossip stuff and the who's up, who's down stuff.

7:26But I do think people spend a lot of time sitting around arguing about specific issues. In the actual parliament? I think so, yeah. I don't know. And I also think there is a sense that things are changing. I mean, I think Liz Truss is quite a contemporary figure. Yes. I mean, difficult to imagine in the 1970s, someone like that becoming the leader of the Conservative Party. My model, but I may be wrong, is that even as recently as the 70s, yeah, maybe 30 % of the time people were jockeying for position and promotion. But there was space, maybe 70%, to think a little bit more seriously about government.

7:56And that sort of flipped around. So now the 30 % thinking about government, 70 % campaigning and soundbites. Yeah, I mean, if you look at people like Liz Truss, who's a friend, or Grant Shapps, you know, their skill, they are TikTok, Instagram, Twitter people. So it's all about the message and being a bit unfair on Grant. But he's good at that stuff. And that now counts. I mean, as you say, 40 years ago, none of that stuff existed. Yeah, but I think that you ought to be careful here because that is what has driven out the serious stuff. And by focusing on that and thinking that that is how we should judge modern politicians, that's what I think has led to people like Tristan Johnson becoming prime minister.

8:32I think that's a phenomenon across the modern world. I don't necessarily think it's a great thing, but I just accept it as something that's happened. Looking back, so you backed Johnson and you backed Truss. Yeah. Which was the bigger of the mistakes? That's a very good question. So let me just talk through my thinking. So with Johnson in 2019, the party had reached an on-pass. Theresa May wasn't going anywhere. The Brexit thing wasn't going anywhere. And we needed something, someone to break that mold. And Johnson was the agent who did that. Roll forward to summer 2022. Essentially, he had two candidates.

9:10He had Rishi Sunak and Liz Truss. It was pretty clear that those two. And to be fair, they were the only ones who had a sort of operation. I think Penny Morda had an operation as well. Still does. Still does. She's been running for leader for the last five years. Why did you not have an operation? I mean, Rishi Sunak joined five years after. Because I was naive. And I remember saying to Grant, I had lunch with Grant a few months ago. And I said, if you really actually want to get to the top, you've got to start thinking about it from the first day you're in the cabinet. It's a continual thinking about it, planning.

9:45And that might be unfair on them and they would deny it, but then it's not, they're always thinking about it. Because what happened with the collapse of Johnson was it happened really quickly. At every stage during 2022, he looked precarious, but he somehow survived, and it looked as if - It was a tipping point. But then it happened incredibly quickly. So the letter came. I was having breakfast with a friend. I saw the tweet. Simon McDonald had written the letter, I think, on the Tuesday. By the Thursday, he'd gone. And then we went through these rounds. And at the time, I said, look, we can't just have a leadership election in the next week or two.

10:21But that's what we did. We went through all these rounds. I think from the position I was in, I was business secretary at the time. Sunak's tax position, I wasn't in favor of. so we went with Liz with epic consequences I mean which you know I'm sure we'll talk about so it was a sort of binary question those were the two candidates that were up and running and also there's a sort of convention which was a foolish thing for me to think but that you've really got to be one of the senior office holders to become prime minister it's very rare that that hasn't happened it's usually either the home secretary or the foreign secretary or the chancellor so those were the two people that were in play and it was clear to me because of the things we were talking about, the messaging, you know, Liz Ross was always going to win that race, always.

11:00And so then you come in as Chancellor. That's right. Which is an amazing thing. No, it's an amazing thing. But do you know what? The funny thing about it was, looking back, it never felt real. Because the first thing that we were plunged into was the Accession Council and, you know, her late magistrates, her passing and all. It never felt secure. I never felt... So you were in for just over 30 days and quite a lot of those first days were actually mourning for the late queen. That's right. And then the fundamental thing that we got wrong, Prime Minister and myself, the pace of it was absurd. At that point, having won, and given what had happened with this national disaster really in terms of the queen's passing, it was a great moment of national reflection.

11:45She'd been monarch for 70 years. Everything should have been slowed down. But I remember thinking, okay, we've got the funeral on the Monday and the mini budget was on the Friday. Do you think if she hadn't died, that politics would have been dominant in the national debate? And therefore, the usual thing would have been going on, that'd been all sorts of sort of, you know, debate going on about, are they going to do this? Are they going to do that? And you might have been reined in a bit. Yeah. So I think there were two things that happened. And, you know, for the people who are following the markets, we did this energy intervention, which was incredibly generous.

12:18I mean, that was billions and billions and billions. And the Markets sort of absorbed that. And sorry, explain in simple terms what you did for people. So what we essentially did was we capped the energy price at£2 ,500 for households for two years, which was hugely generous. And this was because as a result of the Ukraine war, partly, prices were shooting up. Yeah, gas prices had gone up through the roof. And there was a debate in the government. Some people took a more cautious view. The Prime Minister's view was that we should be very generous. So that was the one big bazooka. So billions committed to that.

12:51And it wasn't even debated. So that was announced, I think it was during that announcement that we got the news that the Queen was in grave danger in terms of her illness. And so that was announced. And then, of course, this huge event of the passing of Queen Elizabeth II happened. And there was no debate about the energy intervention. None whatsoever. I remember thinking, this is extraordinary. We've just committed 80 billion or whatever it was, the black hole, one of the black holes. And there was no debate. and then looking back hindsight is a great thing but looking back everything should have slowed down at that point but what we did was we just we just we just doubled up we just doubled up and was that to do with her psychology she talks she talks in she talks about being somebody who just likes to kind of blow things up I mean is that what was going on so I mean I've read the book and I know her quite well her book yeah Liz Truss yeah the Liz Truss book 10 days 10 years to save the rest It sounds like a film, but no, 10 years.

13:5010 days to be remained. I think she just had this intense urgency. I mean, you've worked with her in a department. There was just that intense urgency, which I respect, but you can't do that all the time. You can't sprint a marathon, famously. You can't do that. And actually, I remember one point after the mini budget, I said, what we've got to do now is just slow everything down. Just be extremely calm and not try and rush and do anything, not overreacting. But the calm had gone because of the market's reaction. It had, but she inflamed that. I mean, when she called me back in the middle of the IMF thing, I thought, what on earth are you doing?

14:25This is getting quite complicated. So let's go back, just for listeners, just go back a couple of stages. Tell in the simplest terms you can, objectively as you can, what it is that you did and what that then meant for the currency, interest rates, markets. So there were two things that happened. So there was the energy intervention, which was scored by the OBR. I think it was about 80 billion. Right. So that's capping the energy prices for houses. That's right. That's right. It was scored very highly. And then the mini budget, which I was announcing, we announced 45 billion of unfunded tax cuts.

14:59So what that means is that you're reducing taxes, but you're not getting any money. You're not reducing spending, and you're not raising other taxes. And that was quite a radical thing to do. That was. And the other thing that was a mistake was that we ratchet, you know, She campaigned on two things. She was going to reverse the increase in national insurance, and she was not going to increase the corporation tax. And that scored at$35 billion. And I think the market knew that because she'd been saying that all through the campaign. So it was$80 billion,$35 billion. That's right. And then when we announced that - So we're now at$150 billion.

15:32When we announced the actual measures, so there was all this sort of personal taxation stuff, which in retrospect, I think even at the time, but we should have delayed that for the budget. We should have sliced it for the spring. What was the personal tax issue? So that's the abolition of the 45p rate, which was very controversial. Right. So let's bring it down to 40. Your bank has bonuses. But they stuck with that. And I don't think Labour will change that. And then, of course, we said, well, if we're going to reduce the top rate of tax, we should reduce the standard rate. And we took 1p off, and that cost 6 billion.

16:01So all of these things added. So the 35 billion of unfunded tax cuts ended up being at 45 billion. then you put that on top of the energy intervention and you're spending a ton of money. And there's no... So that's what is announced. And then the markets react in various ways. So I put my hand up, did an interview with Koonsberg where I don't remember exactly what words I said, but he's gone mad, he's doubling down, he's going to cut taxes more. So the markets were reacting to that. And what killed the government was the guilt market. So the currency was doing all sorts of things. What happened with the gilt market was, and it's sort of complex, but I might as well try and explain as best as I can.

16:45I should throw in a plug here for the rest is money because they've done a very long series on this. Oh, have they? Yeah. Okay. I'll listen to that. But so what happened was that there were these funds that had borrowed money essentially to buy government bonds. And the government bonds were what's called long dated, so they're 20 years to redemption, and they borrowed money. And of course, when interest rates go up, the price of the bonds goes down. So what they were holding had totally collapsed in value. And essentially, they needed to be bailed out. And what the Bank of England said, okay, we'll open this window so you can borrow the money and we'll support you or we will buy back the bonds.

17:20But the window will close on the 14th of October, which is the day I was sacked. Because the Prime Minister was terrified that when the market opened on the Monday the 17th, the bank wasn't providing any support and there would have been a massive free fall. So you had to signal something that was different. Can I just one more section? So that explanation is very interesting because my guess is that the vast majority of people in the country, and probably the majority of people listening, are going to struggle to follow what you've just said and understand it. And yet the consequences are enormous.

17:53So how do we deal with an interesting thing in democratic politics, which is you make a decision which is quite difficult to explain, quite difficult to analyze. It's quite technical, but has absolutely enormous catastrophic consequences. And if I can add to that, it's also something where I think I've seen Liz Truss, and I may even have seen you as well, saying that you didn't really understand that that was going on. We didn't know that was going on. Well, the bank didn't know. Or if they did know, they didn't tell us. But look, I mean. But they must know. We can blame, we can blame, I wouldn't blame them.

18:25I mean, I think we were responsible. I mean, as a political leader, you've got to put your hand up and say, I was responsible. Not for everything, but I was responsible. And that's one of the things, you know, in Liz's book, I'm not hearing. She's not accepting anything responsible at all. You know, there was clear, you know, you can't, it's like anything in life. If you drive a car at 150 miles an hour, that's a lot more dangerous than if you drive it at 20 miles an hour. There is a risk with speed. And she was driving 150 miles an hour. I think that's what we were doing. I think that's what we were doing.

18:53And did it feel like that? Did it feel? It felt very febrile. Did it feel dangerous? That was what, and dangerous is not the right word, but it feels slightly uncomfortable. And I never thought, this is going to last. I never thought, I just thought. And did you say to her, this is not, this, you know. Well, I said, after the mini budget, just slow everything down. And she said, well, I've only got two years. I said, you'll have two months if you carry on like this. And I actually think, and I've said this, I think that if it had meant for the mini budget, there would have been other things. I mean, it was the fracking vote that did for her.

19:23That was the straw that broke the camel's back. But again, there was that chaos. The whips didn't know whether it was a three-line or confidence vote. But part of the problem is that she was, I felt when I was working for her, is that I could already see this when I was the environment minister and she was the Secretary of State DEFRA. We could all see as ministers and civil servants that she was a very, very unreliable, unstable leader. I mean, she would, you know, she'd come in and see me and say, I've just met a business person and he's told me that every business can be cut by 25%. So we're going to cut the department by 25%.

19:59and you'd be like well can we have a conversation please about the impact on them she didn't want to do it right or she'd say once you write a 25 year environment plan and she'd ask three different bits of the department to write the same plan and then when we presented the plan to her she'd refuse to look at the details she'd just say this is no good this is rubbish go and write again and eventually you know by about the third time i'd say secretary state you know what is it you don't like about the plan is that you don't do you think we should do more on water and less on air? Do you not like the graphics?" And she'd say, Rory, I think everybody knows perfectly well what I don't like about the plan.

20:32And then she'd leave the room and I'd look at the other civil servants. Yeah, there was a style that was... And I think she brought a lot of that to the top job. And I think the system can protect you when you're a Secretary of State. But when you're at the top of this machine, you're totally exposed. Just on the machine, do you think it was a mistake that one of the first things she did and you did was to sack Tom Scholar, who's the permanent secretary of the treasury. And did that maybe turn the treasury against you? No, I think that was a difficult decision, but I think that happened to happen because what we haven't talked about was the whole treasury itself.

21:09The treasury is essentially almost like an accounting function. So money comes in, money goes out and it doesn't have any real mandate to drive growth. And she was very clear about that. And that I totally was in agreement with her about. You know, we had to sort of gear the department towards more growth. But I always felt when Gordon Brown was in charge of the Treasury that if you have political leadership and an understanding of how the Treasury works, that you can get stuff done. I agree. But I wonder whether you just lost the trust of the Treasury from day one. I think it was difficult. But then I made a very deliberate statement that that was the only thing.

21:47because people were worried that we were going to clear everyone out. And I said, no, it's just Tom, you know, just to show that we're doing a new, this is a new chapter. But I don't think that was what caused the whole thing to fall apart. I think the pace of it, the fact that it was unbalanced, we didn't have spending reductions. Because we'd have had an almighty political route, but at least that would have been more credible than saying essentially we can have our cake and eat it. So you've been, you know, disturbingly blunt and open about the problems. I hate it when people say I'm disturbingly blunt.

22:16But help us understand, make your case at the time, what would be the generous way of understanding what you and Liz Truss thought that you were trying to do? What was the big idea for the British economy? Okay, it went wrong, but what was the big idea? Yeah, the fundamental problem that we have, and we haven't discussed this, but it's a problem that Rachel Reeves will, and across the Western world, we're facing, certainly in Europe, is that we have a public sector that's growing, let's say, at 5 % a year, order magnitude. We have growth figures that are between 0 % and 1%. The logic of that, if your costs are going up in terms of the money you're spending, it's going up much faster than the money you're getting in through tax and through the size of the economy, you essentially have to raise more tax by lifting up rates.

Read the full transcript

23:01Of course, that damages growth. That's the theory. That's the doom loop. I heard Rachel Reeves use that phrase. The problem is, how do you get out of that doom loop. How do you actually grow the economy so that you can get tax revenues to pay for public services? And as I say, this is a problem that every country in the Western world is facing. So that's why growth is the key. Because if you don't get growth, you've got a cake and you're just simply just trying to slice it in different ways. And it's not sufficient to pay for the kinds of services you'd expect in a 21st century modern economy.

23:38And so your idea was, we need to create growth. That's right. And your theory on how to create growth was? So the theory is that you reduce the tax burdens to incentivize economic growth and investment. We just got a mixed record, historically. Mixed record, but sometimes it has... My big problem with this, looking back, because at the time I signed up to it and I made a statement and I confessed that, And we were thinking about this, is that you can't just reduce taxes willy-nilly without showing some restraint on the other side of the ledger. And we should have done this at the same time. So what Jeremy Hunt came up with in the November, his statement on basically the spending envelope, should have been put together with the mini-budget.

24:18And then I think... So cut taxes, but also cut spending more dramatically. Yeah, and you're not cutting spending. Again, it's a difficult thing to explain, but you're reducing the rate of growth of spending. when you were making that statement in standing at the dispatch box, was the part of you feel you feeling this is nuts? It was kind of at the end. I just thought, Hmm, let's see. That was what I would, cause I just thought, what were you, what vibe were you getting from across the, from labor and from behind you? It was kind of, they were kind of quite surprised. I mean, it was, it was, it was, it was a real, and again, it was the sort of style that we, you know, it was, it was a very, very bold statement.

24:58and people were like, really? Wow. Oh, God. That was the reaction. But why didn't you, sorry, I'm being a bit mean here, but you knew Liz Truss very well, and I knew her very well. And I concluded she was manifestly unsuitable to be prime minister. She was a person ultimately lacking in prudence and seriousness. I wouldn't trust her to run the country. And she was a really good friend of yours. Why couldn't you see what I could see very clearly in 2016, which was that she was silly? She wasn't a serious person. Well, look, I don't agree with that. But I think there were definitely... Did you agree with the unsuited to be prime minister?

25:36I don't think she had the right temperament for it. And I've said that. Because you've got to have a very cool temperament. You know, when things and things do go very badly wrong, you need to keep an even temper. And you must have seen that she was at the very least an eccentric person. I think you're right. I think the temperament, and what I've learned is temperament is probably the most important thing. It's more important than almost than experience, actually. Because what was extraordinary about that is... You often get the temperament from experience. No, but what was extraordinary about her was that on paper, she was the most experienced.

26:05She'd been in cabinet for, what, eight years? From 2014? Yeah, but you say she'd made her reputation doing the stuff that ultimately isn't what politics and government is about. You can say that, but in terms of the CV, she had held those posts. But you must have been able to see that. I'm just putting out the obvious. What I would have said to you at the time is, yeah, she's been in government for long time, but she learns nothing. I would have lectured you to, bored in the thing, of all I'd seen in DEFRA of her making reckless and catastrophic decisions. Well, we should have had that conversation.

26:37No, but I think you would have said, come on, Rory. I mean, no, no. She's - So, you're - That's the thing. You're in this world where you've got to make quite snap, almost binary decisions. I knew that there were candidates that I liked that weren't standing. There were three essential candidates, Penny Morden, Liz Truss, and Rishi Sunak. I made the calculation that Liz Truss would be better. With Boris, it was the same. You always think they're going to be reined in or there's going to be something - I never thought that from a moment. Ideologically, I was very much where she was. But then you don't know what people are going to do.

27:16Maybe you do know. I mean, I didn't see it, but you don't know how they react. And actually, the funny thing about her book was that both her husband and her election agent said it was going to end badly. I mean, there's a bit in the book. They probably know better than most. Yeah. And the husband said, it's all going to end in tears. Well, thank you. Thanks for telling me. And then the election agent, your own election agent, saying to you, well, yes, you should stand for leader, but it would be better if you came second. And I thought that was just remarkable. I mean, if my election agent had said that to me, there'd be a real crisis of self-doubt.

27:47What have you made of her on the tour, with this book tour? Just no self-reflection, no acceptance of responsibility, utter arrogance about the way she protected herself. So the two things that I hate are the conspiracy theory stuff. I mean, we've talked about history all our lives, our adult lives. Conspiracy theory. Whenever someone says this is a conspiracy, this is deep state, I just turn off. Because human beings don't work like that. They're not smart enough. Do you think she's been manipulated by these hard-right people in America? I think her view is, you know, her problem, her issue is to try and sell these books.

28:21So she's trying to generate noise to sell the books. It's not going very well. No, it's not. It's not a great, you know, J.K. Rowling doesn't need to, you know, can rest quiet at night in terms of the book sales. But I think that the point she's trying to say is when she went to America, there's very much more of a market for that sort of grievance politics, which I don't like. You know, it's a conspiracy. it's the deep state they're against you because you're white or they get against you because you're a conservative or they're against you because they're you're christian and i think she's trying to feed into some of that so when she said they should abolish the un i mean at that point i was like you've been foreign secretary how on earth can you publicly say that and and i i was i was concerned i was i was upset about that sorry you said there were two things so that's the conspiracy theory stuff i don't buy and then the second point was that that struck me was people very close to her saying, this isn't going to end well, which was interesting.

29:16You chose to support her, not Rishi Sunak. What was it that concerned you about Rishi Sunak? So Rishi Sunak had been energy minister, and we'd had all sorts of tussles about tax. I mean, the thing that I, and I was just in Aberdeen last month, you know, the so-called energy profits levy, which I know is very popular, and many of your listeners will appreciate that, I think will have very damaging consequences to the North Sea. And you already see this with the the SNP green tension. The SNP realise that if they do anything to harm the oil industry in the North Sea, lots of jobs and there'll be lots of bad economic impact.

29:52I thought that was wrong and I argued against that. Actually, Rishi, temperamentally, I think is much better placed. Very cool, very calm, very rational. I've always personally got on with him. How about as a communicator and a charismatic leader and somebody who can really - He's not quite that. I mean, he's okay, but he's not gifted in that way. Very analytical, very bright. And what I was really impressed with about him was his temperament. And that comes from all sorts of things. That comes from his Hindu faith, his family, he's a man of means, you know, we can't be coy about that. He's wealthy.

30:27So he's got that sort of stability that comes from that, that he projects. His problem, and this is a problem for the party, is that no one really knows what he's about. And that's why I think we're struggling, or one of the reasons why we're struggling, on top of all the Boris and the Liz and all that stuff. You're not standing at the election. No. Can you see, well, first of all, can you honestly, hand on heart, stand up before the British public and say, do you know what, after the 14 years, the Conservatives should definitely come back after the next election? And can you see any way that Keir Starmer won't be Prime Minister?

31:02So my view on this is that there's a pendulum. We got first past the post, the two main parties, and there's always a pendulum. And when it goes, it goes. And I think we could well be at that point. I don't think it's impossible for the Tories to win, but I think it's unlikely. But actually, even if we had the most charismatic leader ever, I think the pendulum, when it swings, it swings. And I think people have said, we've had enough of these guys. Let's let the other people - And have they got a point? I can see why they think that. I don't think that. I'm going to be campaigning for the Tories and all the rest of it.

31:32But I can see why a floating voter can think, actually, we've seen that. Let's move on. You said you're worried about the Conservative Party after the election. What are your worries? So what happens, and you've seen this, I mean, you've been fighting these battles. You know, what happens when parties lose is very simply one faction that says we weren't right wing or weren't left wing enough. And the other lot says we've got to be more left wing, centre or, you know, we've got to move to the centre. And it's a very crude debate. It's a silly debate. And it's very nasty because everyone will be blaming each other.

32:04My own view is that all the leaders since May have contributed to this in their small ways. Big and small ways. But then of course, the Sunakites will blame the trust sites, the trust sites will blame Rishi, the Borisites. Do you see what I mean? There's all that, that factionalism, but actually they're all responsible because Rishi Sunak, if we do lose, he can't walk away from it because he's been leader for two years. You can't, you can blame the other lot up to a point. But he took the leadership. And I was very struck by the fact that he said, oh, he inherited a mess. I mean, can you imagine Winston Churchill saying, oh, I've inherited a mess, you know, in 1940?

32:38You get on with it. You don't blame the audience. It's actually just a disagreement with Alistair there. Alistair actually, I think, probably would have said that Rishi's approach should have been to be much clearer about attacking his predecessors. Yeah, I think his only opportunity was actually to say, I've maybe not say inherited a mess, but just say, we will be doomed unless we admit that terrible things have happened under the previous Johnson in particular. But then the problem with that is you're essentially trashing your brand. You are. They would have re-sayed. But at the moment, they're all trashing the brand anyway.

33:07Yeah. I think there was a middle way. I think he could have distinguished himself from the leaders, but he needed a positive vision. Okay, Quasi. Alistair, let's take a quick break. Back in a minute. This episode is brought to you by Jack Daniels. Jack Daniels and music are made for each other. They share a rhythm in the craft of making something timeless while being a part of legendary nights. From backyard jams to sold-out arenas, there's a song in every toast. Please drink responsibly. Responsibility.org. Jack Daniels and Old No. 7 are registered trademarks. Tennessee Whiskey, 40 % alcohol by volume.

33:37Jack Daniel Distillery, Lynchburg, Tennessee. The spirit of innovation is deeply ingrained in America, and Google is helping Americans innovate in ways both big and small. From improving emergency response times to protecting against cyber attacks, local, state, and federal governments are innovating with Google AI. This is a new era of American innovation. Find out more at g.co slash American Innovation.

34:08Now, Quasi, over the years, you and I have had many, many disagreements about Brexit, but honestly, you cannot possibly say that it's going well. I can't say, but you see, what I don't like about the sort of Remainer position is that this idea, and I don't think it's your position, but some people have this, that if we stayed in the EU, everything would be... No. We'd be dealing with exactly the same problems. No, I think we've made them worse. We've made them worse. We'd be dealing with growth. We'd be dealing with the size of the public sector. We'd be dealing with, you know, environmental challenges.

34:37But we've made them worse. It's not clear to me that they are worse. I mean, if you look at Germany, our growth is exactly the same. We're facing exactly the same problems. And France. But has Brexit delivered the things that you post it? I don't think it's been perfect at all. I think we've made mistakes. It's one of the mistakes that you imagined a world that didn't exist. I mean, it struck me that quite a lot of the Brexit campaigners were saying, you know, European growth is sluggish, so we need to connect ourselves to rapidly growing economies in China. That's right. And one of the problems is the whole world's changed.

35:11We're now talking about decoupling from China. We're worried about the security risks, the trade risks about too big. And And suddenly it feels as though we're in a new world where it might be smarter to be close to Europe. I think there's a phenomenon about referendums. You basically have everything's binary and polarized. If we'd had this debate, and we probably did in 2014, I would have been a sort of mild Brexiteer and you probably would have been a mild Romania. The positions were much more nuanced. But when you get into this sort of binary, you know, the red team versus the blue team, all the positions become harder.

35:42So people that I knew were kind of moderate Remainers became extreme Remainers. People I knew as moderate Brexiteers who wanted the customs union. You know, people like Dan Hannan were quite happy with, they were just interested in the sovereignty bit. They became hardline Brexiteers. So the positions hardened. And so, of course, you were in this crazy world where, you know, Brexit was either 100 % right or 100 % wrong. And there was nothing nuanced. There was nothing balanced in that conversation. I'm 110%. I was actually pushing for the customs unit, never got any much. That's right, that's right.

36:18Can I finish then with my final thing? You're associated with something very, very, very dramatic, which will stay with you for the rest of your life. It'll be in your obituary. And, you know, without being unfair to Alistair, I guess, in some ways, I guess the Iraq war may feature like that in Alistair's obituary, right? I think the three election wins might help. I think the Good Friday so just reflect kind of psychologically how it feels you committed yourself to public service this is something you desperately have wanted to do for 20-25 years and there's been this incredible catastrophe where your dream of being chancellor blew up in your face 30 days there are a lot of people in the country some listening to this who will be very, very angry with you.

37:09And even though you've been apologetic and you've been nuanced, they will feel he's not apologetic enough. He's not really - But that's like in any political thing. I mean, you mentioned Iraq. It's exactly the same. There are people who are still fuming about that. But I don't think time, I think the new government, if there is a new government, I think the problems of growth, a lot of the fundamental problems will still be around. And I think people will look back and say, okay, they screwed up the delivery but actually we get what they were trying to do i mean my life will move on that's one of the reasons i think we should probably leave politics and do something else because i think i don't know what liz trust is trying to do who are the greatest historians what in the world yeah today who are the historians that have really kind of impacted upon you and so i like i mean lots of lots of them are you know i consider friends i mean i love seabag montefiore he's a great sort of journalist actually of history i think he's a very colorful historian.

38:04I used to read, and these people I was reading, they're still very active. I was reading as an undergraduate, Neil Ferguson, Andrew Roberts, right wing, yeah, yeah, yeah. Seabag, I mean, he's not really any wing. But on the left, you've got, I mean, there's a guy called, what's his name? Tim Schneider. Do you know him? Yeah, he's my colleague. He's a colleague, yeah. He's very good. He's a hero. Back in the day, E.P. Thompson, does anyone read him now? I mean, I think I had big issues with that, but he's a great historian. But oddly, the people you've chosen are provocateurs. They're quite journalistic in nature.

38:39They are. They're not actually people who, when you read them, you think they're doing a very nuanced, balanced, on the one hand, on the other. They're taking very strong positions. Neil Ferguson's like, empire good. Andrew Roberts is like, George III is a genius and a hero. I mean, there's that line in John Maynard Cain said, you know, words have to be a little wild. because they're the first battalions that storm, you know, the Towers of Thought. You're definitely a little wild. Isn't that your problem? We're talking about writing. No, no, no, no, but I'm interested where there isn't a connection between the kind of historians you admire, your kind of intellectual style, and your political style, that you are a bit wild.

39:18Possibly, possibly. That actually, that you like these provocateurs and partly as a politician, you're a bit of a provocateur. Yes, I hadn't made that connection. But I mean, I like, I think that was, And again, looking back at our experience as MPs when we came in in 2010, all we were talking about was how long is the coalition going to last? I'd go on radio programs. And then when we weren't talking about politics, we talked a bit about tuition fees. And then there was this whole sort of debate about austerity, which was a kind of slightly artificial debate. Yeah, it wasn't. But generally...

39:49Totally disaster. Well, actually, what... I mean, you say that, but what George Osborne did was what Alistair Darling said he was going to do if he'd won the election. It wasn't. I know. That's not really good at it. That's basically where we were. And actually, what I wanted to do, and maybe you're right, I did want to change dynamics and change the mold, break the mold, all that sort of stuff. Have you got another book in you? Yeah, I've got lots of books. I mean, I don't have enough time to write them. I mean, I want to write a book on the empire, which is called Most of the World on Congo.

40:22I'd like to write something on politics, not just about my crazy experience. Politics on the edge. on the air. Now, where have I heard that? But also looking forward. I mean, I find, you know, in a way I'm sad to leave the House of Commons because I think this is going to be the most interesting period. You know, I feel I'm walking, because you left just before this incredibly interesting period. And I feel I'm going to do the same. Interesting is one way. Well, yeah. But if Labour do get in, how they respond to this crisis that we're facing. And as I keep saying, it's a global crisis. It's not.

40:56I mean, in Britain, it's got particularly dramatic features. But it's something which is pretty commonplace across the world. That's interesting to me. Well, as we're moving towards the end of our conversation, I want to finish in a way by thinking about political leadership and political judgment. Isaiah Berlin praises people like Bismarck and FDR and Churchill for seeing things that other people can't see, for not accepting reality as it's given to them and imagining a new world. And I guess you and Liz Truss thought you were doing this, but unlike Churchill, Bismarck and FDR, you miscalled it.

41:36You didn't call the future, right? What do you think you've learned about political judgment from that, about the difference between, were they just lucky, the Bismarcks and FDRs, Churchill, or did they have something that Liz Truss lacked? So I think with Liz and what we were trying to do, compared to those other leaders, it was in a way too ideological. You lost sight of the practical deliverability of it. When Rab Butler said, politics is the art of the possible, I think that is a very important phrase. And I also think the judgment issue, when things go wrong, the church will keep buggering on KBO and having a measure of calmness is really important.

42:16And you look at someone like cantony eden he was totally brittle and very very um volatile that's what people have they describe him and i think having the temperament just to see things through and be calm david cameron was very good at this i mean whatever else one says about him he did have a good temperament he was not very excitable and i think that those things of judgment and thinking about politics is the art of the possible absolutely fundamental our last seven prime ministers list them in order of achievement and contribution to the country? Well, I think in terms of, I think Blair probably, is Blair the first of the list of the last seven?

42:50I mean, he was there the longest and probably had the most impact. Contested legacy, but had the most impact. I think Cameron was up there. I think Boris is in a space of his own. I think he had phenomenal skills, but he had flaws, quite deep flaws. And then the others were perhaps less... I don't think... I think Gordon was a great chancellor, but I don't think he had the temperament for... He was trying to control too much, I think, from what I hear. I have respect for him, though. He's a great mind and powerful intellect. But I don't think temperamentally he was right for the job. And Theresa May and Liz Truss?

43:26They didn't have the temperament, I don't think. But that's, you know, it's easy to say that with hindsight. But, you know... But, of course, I feel very strongly that the difference between those two is that Theresa May had a form of moral character that Liz Truss lacked. I mean, essentially, you don't take moral character very seriously. Well, I think that's a bit harsh. I don't... You don't believe in virtue? Yeah, yeah. I mean, all that stuff, the virtue and these are the goodies and these are the baddies. I think that's a bit simplistic. I think there was a lot of virtue in some of the baddies that you think.

43:58And I think there was a lot of vice in some of the goodies. I wouldn't just characterize them in that sort of sheep and goats way. Well, there's a good book in there. I don't think Liz Truss went in there thinking, I'm going to destroy everything. I think she thought she was doing good. Similarly, I think Theresa May was a little bit more cunning than many people thought. And actually, even Boris, you know, for all his exuberance, he genuinely thought he was a force for good. I don't think - Probably still does. Yeah, I think he does. And actually, we haven't even talked about him, but, you know, it wouldn't surprise me if he comes back in some shape or form.

44:31Absolutely, definitely over my dead body. Well, how are you going to stop it? I don't know, but dead body, I mean, I don't know. No, it can't happen. But anyway, so that's where I disagree with you. I don't think they can be easily categorized as good people or bad people. I think there's always a mix. Well, look, thank you so much, Quasi, for all your time. It'd be quite amazing. But just my final question, I'm going back to an Eaton entrance exam question. I think it's a brilliant one. It's 2040 and you're the UK Prime Minister. explain why it was both necessary and moral for you to employ the army to fight and kill violent protesters in London that's a lunatic question is that what you would have said?

45:12yeah I wouldn't have put it as boldly as that but I'd have said that's an absurd question because we don't kill protesters in London it's amazing you found this I'd forgotten what we were all doing at 13 I don't remember that question but these are quite grown up questions for 13 year olds and I am impressed by how quickly quasi did his numbers. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And he didn't even have to go to the OBR to check. Quasi, thank you. You've been really frank with us and we're really grateful. Thank you very much, Adid. Yeah, thank you very much. Thank you. Very interesting conversation. Well then, Rory, what do you think of that?

45:48Well, I mean, I think the first thing is you get sense that he's very clever, but I think I also get the sense of the ways in which his cleverness has a limit. I mean, I never really quite get over this problem. I don't quite get how, when it was so obvious that Boris Johnson and Liz Truss would be catastrophic prime ministers, that his sense is, well, you know, I can see that with the benefit of hindsight, but it wasn't obvious at the time when he and I had joined at the same time, spent years working with them together. And I also wonder, I mean, one thing that struck me is, I mean, yes, he apologizes, but quite, I'd sort of want, really.

46:27Yeah, I'd worry that if you were a listener, he's like, yeah, I got it all wrong, I blew up the economy, but who knew? And we make mistakes in politics. And then he was like, yeah, it's a bit like the Iraq war. I mean, sometimes people make the wrong calls. But I guess that doesn't really work for people, right? I don't know what people will make of it because I was surprised how frank he was. He wasn't very defensive and he wasn't doing this sort of, I mean, List Trust has gone around all the studios sort of blaming everybody but herself. He was accepting some responsibility. I think she gets the lion's share you get the sense as you know you've talked lots about dealing with list trust and how difficult she is you get the sense he was going along with something he didn't really believe i thought the most fascinating thing was when he was describing how he was feeling as he stood at the dispatch box and could tell that labor were sort of going is this for real and then every time he sort of looked that way to the his own side they were going is this for real and he sort of knew.

47:23You've got the feeling he knew the whole way through this was a car crash and yet he couldn't stop the car. Yeah, partly because he bought in, hadn't he, early on to a particular vision of the world which was that what Britain needed to do was radically cut taxes in order to generate growth. And he's obviously still thinks that's right. He thinks they did it too quickly. But basically he says the problem in the world is a lack of growth and the only real solution he's coming up within Britain, I guess, is tax cutting. And that's interesting because there would be other people on his side of the party who would argue, I think, more convincingly that actually, if you wanted to do growth that way, what you'd need to do is be much more thoughtful about getting rid of regulations, encouraging investment, creating a good ecosystem for business.

48:16So if you're on the right of the Tory party, what you'd probably want to say is that growth comes from business. And what you need to do is make it easier to set up a business, easier to hire people, easier to invest, easier to do infrastructure, and that actually cutting taxes isn't really the route through to that. I was surprised how sort of warm he was about Keir Starmer. He was nice about Keir Starmer. Well, he's not very, I remember this, he's always been quite good at making friendships with Labour. He's quite sort of lighthearted and cheerful. He's a funny person because he's somebody who generally, in my experience, talks a great deal more than he listens.

48:50But he's got this incredible memory. So you get the impression he's not listening, but actually he remembers almost everything that you said 30 years ago. I mentioned many encounters over Brexit. They weren't just in the studios, like bumping into him and having arguments. I always got the feeling he wasn't taking anything terribly seriously. It was all a bit of a game. I remember doing the people's vote thing. Every time I was going to say, why are you doing this? Why are you trying to stop it? Is it going to happen. Just get over it. Move on. Look, we won, you lost. Move on. It's fine. It's going to be fine.

49:22That was always his thing with me. When I was very earnestly trying to discuss with him in 2014, 2015, his argument, and I think you get a bit of this in the interview. When I'm trying to argue against the right with Lurch, trying to make the case to center ground, he says, you don't understand our right-wing voters. You don't understand the party base. people are much more eurosceptic much more right-wing than you want to give them credit for being and again that worried me because that's a little bit not about standing on principle it's about saying this is where i think public is and therefore that's where i'm gonna give you another glimpse just to sort of finish of of of quasi he sent me a whatsapp just as he left the um studio which went, Victris causa deus placuit, sed victor catoni.

50:10So the victorious cause pleased the gods but depressed Cato. And I don't actually know what the reference is. I mean, he's presumably, this is somewhere in the back of his enormous capacious memory is some reference, I guess, to Caesar's triumph. Who is God and who is Caesar in this? So I think in this story, Boris Johnson is probably Caesar and the victorious cause is probably Brexit, and that pleases the gods, but it depresses Cato, who in this case is Rory. That's a really interesting indication of Kwasi, who comes from this extraordinary background. It's true, his father was an economist, his mother was a lawyer, but I imagine his grandparents lived in relatively straightforward conditions in Ghana.

50:53It's been an incredible immigrant success story. He got this King's scholarship to Eton, went on to Trinity College, Cambridge. What did you reply? I sent back a little note saying, Victrix causa nec deis placuit nec cotone. Do you not really speak to each other in Latin? I mean, honestly, this is just, I did actually do, I got grade A, O level Latin, but I don't, what does that mean? So I said, I said the victorious cause pleased neither the gods nor Cato. So neither you nor. So I'm basically saying this Brexit was not actually. Everybody lost. Yeah, Brexit. It was a fuck up for everyone, which is kind of what I said.

51:31Thank you. Right, jolly good. Well, thank you, Kwasi, if you're listening. And onwards and upwards. And I think thank you also for making it happen because I had real reservations. You did, I remember. Well, my reservations are that I like us interviewing people and leading who we admire and want to promote. And I think both of us were very troubled by what Kwasi did. And I felt that that might lead to a slightly difficult interview where we weren't bringing out. So in some ways, tribute to him for being relaxed enough, open enough to make what could have been a very touchy interview work. And I think it's given people a chance to, I imagine most listeners like us will profoundly disprove of what he did.

52:14But you get more of an insight into some of the strengths as well as the weaknesses of that generation of conservative politicians. Anyway, thank you and goodbye. Bye.

52:27Here we have the Lemu Emu in its natural habitat, helping people customize their car insurance and save hundreds with Liberty Mutual. Fascinating. It's accompanied by his natural ally, Doug. Uh, Lemu, is that guy with the binoculars watching us? Cut the camera. They see us. Only pay for what you need at LibertyMutual.com. Liberty, Liberty, Liberty, Liberty. Savings vary underwritten by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and affiliates. Excludes Massachusetts.

From the publisher

Why did the Tory Party choose to make Liz Truss and Boris Johnson prime minister? How does it feel to be the second shortest-serving chancellor in post-war history? What was the true thinking behind the disastrous Truss-Kwarteng mini-budget?

On today's episode of Leading, Rory and Alastair are joined for the second and final episode of their conversation with former Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kwasi Kwarteng.

TRIP Plus:
Become a member of The Rest Is Politics Plus to support the podcast, receive our exclusive newsletter, enjoy ad-free listening to both TRIP and Leading, benefit from discount book prices on titles mentioned on the pod, join our Discord chatroom, and receive early access to live show tickets and Question Time episodes.
Just head to therestispolitics.com to sign up, or start a free trial today on Apple Podcasts: apple.co/therestispolitics.

TRIP ELECTION TOUR:
To buy tickets for our October Election Tour, just head to www.therestispolitics.com

Instagram:
@restispolitics
Twitter:
@RestIsPolitics
Email:
restispolitics@gmail.com

Podcast Editor: Nathan Copelin
Video Editor: Teo Ayodeji-Ansell
Social Producer: Jess Kidson
Assistant Producer: Fiona Douglas
Producer: Nicole Maslen
Senior Producer: Dom Johnson
Head of Content: Tom Whiter
Exec Producers: Tony Pastor + Jack Davenport
Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

More from The Rest Is Politics: Leading

All 199 episodes
74. Kwasi Kwarteng: Liz Truss, becoming Chancellor, and Britain on the brink (Part 2)The Rest Is Politics: Leading · 55 min
Listen in VO