The Tough AI Questions Looming Over the Xi-Trump Summit

23 Sep 2026 · 28 min · 12 chapters

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In short

Preview and analysis of the US–China Xi-Trump summit, focused on AI safety risks, low expectations for concrete deals, and distrust driven by chip controls, trade leverage, and “distillation” disputes.

Guests

Stephanie Flanders (host; head of government and economics at Bloomberg). Dan Tenkate (Bloomberg Executive Editor for Economics and Politics in Asia; recently in Beijing). Michael Deng (Bloomberg Geoeconomics Technology Analyst; previously policy advisor and CHIPS Program Office fellow at US Dept. of Commerce).

Key claims

China wants stability and “calmer but not closer” relations; AI safety talks likely start with thin mechanisms like incident notification/open lines, not binding agreements. Three AI risk categories discussed: malicious use, unexpected autonomous behavior, and international miscalculation. Trust is undermined by US claims of exploitative “distillation” campaigns against closed-source models.

Notable examples

alleged rerouting of prompts to Chinese models to query Claude/collect answers; Anthropic/OpenAI concerns; mention of Shenzhen meeting in two months; Taiwan arms-sale tensions; rare-earth leverage and CHIPS Act context; open-source Chinese models expanding cheaper usage globally.

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Chapters

Tap a time to open that second in VO

Introduction to AI Integration

0:00 to 0:56

Explore how IBM integrates AI into business processes.

“So there's a lot of noise about AI, but time's too tight for more promises.”

The Summit and Its Importance

2:26 to 4:23

Discuss the implications of the Xi-Trump summit amidst AI concerns.

“and this is Trumponomics, the podcast that looks at everything in the economic world of Donald Trump.”

China's Perspective on AI and Stability

4:23 to 7:16

Analyze China's outlook on AI development and its risks.

“And what would be needed to reduce the risk that AI will kill us all?”

Challenges in US-China AI Dialogue

7:16 to 9:10

Examine the hurdles in establishing trust and dialogue on AI safety.

“And surprise, surprise, the top one he flagged was a risk to China's political security, so the regime itself.”

The AI Arms Race and Trust Issues

9:10 to 14:00

Investigate the complexities of the US-China AI competition and trust deficits.

“And the hard part is going to come later, potentially at the Shenzhen meeting that's mentioned in two months.”

Trust Issues in US-China AI Relations

14:00 to 18:00

Explore the complexities of trust and technology theft in US-China AI discussions.

“will have something and the gap gets a bit wider.”

Trust Issues in US-China AI Relations

18:32 to 18:58

Explore the complexities of trust and technology theft in US-China AI discussions.

“If you're listening to this, there's a good chance you're a small business owner.”

Trust Issues in US-China AI Relations

19:11 to 19:27

Explore the complexities of trust and technology theft in US-China AI discussions.

“Connect with senior decision makers, gain actionable insights and be part of the conversations driving business forward.”

China's Approach to AI and Global Reach

19:27 to 24:10

Discuss how China's cheaper AI models are expanding their global influence.

“million business and enterprise users worldwide already using ChatGPT for work.”

Underlying Tensions in US-China Trade Relations

24:10 to 28:00

Examine the stability and tensions in US-China trade, focusing on rare earth supplies.

“I wonder if at that point China might reassess its position because then they will be under attack externally as well.”
Show all 12 chapters

US-China Interdependence in AI Supply Chains

28:00 to 30:31

Discover how AI is shaping US-China economic relations and dependency.

“That would be one sort of tangible thing if it were to happen at all.”

US-China Interdependence in AI Supply Chains

31:10 to 31:46

Discover how AI is shaping US-China economic relations and dependency.

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Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:00Stephanie Flanders:So there's a lot of noise about AI, but time's too tight for more promises. So let's talk about results. At IBM, we work with our employees to integrate technology right into the systems they need. Now, a global workforce of 300 ,000 can use AI to fill their HR questions, resolving 94 % of common questions. Not noise. Proof of how we can help companies get smarter by putting AI where it actually pays off, deep in the work that moves the business. Let's create smarter business. IBM. This is Robert Smith from Business History. If you're listening to this, there's a good chance you're a small business owner.

0:35And like every small business owner, you started with a dream to do what you love and watch it grow. What you probably didn't dream about? Keeping up with cyber threats. That's where MasterCard can help. With access to tools that help identify cyber threats to better protect your business. Building your dream business? Priceless. For cybersecurity in a changing world, there's MasterCard. Learn more at MasterCard.com slash smallbusiness. Never bet against American grit or American energy. Through innovation, Venture Global is not only building some of the largest energy facilities in the world right here in the United States, but delivering American energy at a fraction of the cost and a fraction of the time.

1:18So while others are busy talking, we're busy building. That's Venture Global. That's unstoppable energy.

1:33Bloomberg Audio Studios. Podcasts, radio, news. President Xi and I have a good relationship. I wouldn't have a lot of different deals here. We intend, we're not just doing it for our health. I would honestly say if you considered how dependent we are in China now compared to five years ago, roughly around the time of the passage of the CHIPS Act, we're probably more dependent now. Because we've improved in one category and become much more dependent on others. And so I don't think this relationship or the US could really bear a true deglobalization or sort of this kind of two technological spheres that's been discussed.

2:07And so this relationship will just have to be managed maybe six months at a time, three months at a time, which now seems to be the pattern going forward.

2:23Stephanie Flanders:I'm Stephanie Flanders, head of government and economics at Bloomberg. and this is Trumponomics, the podcast that looks at everything in the economic world of Donald Trump. Now, we're recording this Wednesday morning, the 23rd of September. We're several hours ahead of President Donald Trump meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping's plane in person at Andrews Air Force Base just outside Washington. Now, there'll be two notable features of this tarmac encounter. The first is that no one can remember any previous president taking the trouble to go. I guess he probably won't need to hold up a sign with the Chinese leader's name on it.

3:03Stephanie Flanders:The second historical quirk is that the event is likely to be recorded only by a Chinese state TV camera, the regular White House pool cameras being on strike in response to CNN and two other outlets being banned from the White House. Now, the value of these lofty summits of powerful men is supposed to be they can talk directly on the major issues of the day, cut through bureaucratic hurdles, get to the meat of the problem, maybe even get closer to an answer. But that's not how Donald Trump rolls. And that's not been the mood music around this summit. In fact, the risk is the mood music and pageantry might be pretty much all there is, when in fact, there really are some big issues we might want these two guys to get to grips with.

3:48Stephanie Flanders:Not least, the prospect that in America and China's great race for AI supremacy, humanity might be accidentally wiped out. Now, President Trump has dismissed most of those kind of concerns as a hoax. Beijing, for its part, has signalled it is willing to discuss a narrow category of genuinely dangerous AI capabilities. But China also wants Washington to ease restrictions on advanced chips it needs to power its AI models. And trust between the two is low. So what can we realistically expect to come out of this summit? And what would be needed to reduce the risk that AI will kill us all? Well, joining me from Hong Kong again is Dan Tenkate, Bloomberg's Executive Editor for Economics and Politics in Asia.

4:36Stephanie Flanders:Dan, thanks for joining us. So late in your day. Great to be here. And joining us from Washington, our guru on all things AI, Michael Deng, Geoeconomics Technology Analyst at Bloomberg Economics. And before coming to us, he served as a policy advisor and presidential management fellow in the CHIPS Program Office at the US Department of Commerce. Michael, thanks for coming back. Yeah, of course. Happy to be here. Now, Dan, you've recently returned from Beijing, and I know you're in close contact with our team there. What is the mood around this summit sitting where they sit? Yeah, I was in Beijing a couple weeks ago talking with people there as well.

5:16Definitely China wants stability out of this summit. The expectations are pretty low for any deliverables. I don't think they have too much ambition for what could actually be accomplished. They would like to see an extension of the trade truce for two years through Trump's term. That's not going to happen. Jameson Greer has already made that pretty clear. But nonetheless, I think China views the leader to leader diplomacy, as I like to say, between Trump and Xi as something that will stabilize this relationship. and they also think they could probably keep Taiwan in check, they could keep exports going.

5:58So they have a lot of interest in just meeting and keeping the relationship from blowing up.

6:03Stephanie Flanders:One of the phrases I've heard a lot about this summit has been, calmer but not closer. There's a sort of status quo that they've worked out over the last year or so in trade front and various other things and there'll be a continuation of that. But as I mentioned at the start, There's so much discussion in the last week or two, led in part by the leaders of the main AI companies around AI safety and the risks to future development of AI. Is that discussion as live in Beijing as it is in the US and other parts of the Western world? Not in the same way. I think they're basically technology optimists.

6:42They think that AI will create more jobs than it will destroy. But the focus there is really employment. They're worried that the transition to AI will lead to a lot of job losses and that could lead to instability for the Xi government. And so that is where most of the discussion is focused. Not so much on the safety risks. I think China views themselves as very much behind the U.S. in this race. They think they can catch up, but they see themselves making progress and they don't really want to slow down on that front. At the same time, the country's top spy chief had a paper that came out within the past couple of weeks that identified a lot of risks to AI.

7:25And surprise, surprise, the top one he flagged was a risk to China's political security, so the regime itself. And I think that that shows you the thinking. Of course, it's always about the Communist Party. And if they see a threat to their own power, then we've seen them be able to take action very quickly. So they are watching that very closely. But there's not a lot of talk about extinction of humanity or anything like that.

7:50Stephanie Flanders:Not yet, baby. You know, we've long framed this as a race between the US and China, but safety is now coming much more to the fore. What usefully do we think they can discuss on that topic? So I would say for this dialogue in particular, I would keep expectations pretty modest. I think from everything we've heard so far and that we might hear once the dialogue starts, the expectation should largely be about beginning to set up this process rather than anything seriously concrete or that actually advances any key objectives. We've heard Secretary Besant say that there's some kind of incident notification mechanism.

8:30There's other reporting that indicates that may largely just be an open line of communication between him and Helifeng. So I think the key here is to establish trust and get a dialogue going in the first place. We may hear positive signals about that, but I think the challenge is going to be once they run into having to agree on basic definitions, for example, about what constitutes an advanced capability, what's normal technological competition, what it might require of each side in terms of slowing down, which both sides now have denied wanting to do. How do they get their governments and these companies to actually commit to it and to be serious about these safety commitments?

9:06So I think anything we hear out of this dialogue initially is going to be quite easy. And the hard part is going to come later, potentially at the Shenzhen meeting that's mentioned in two months.

9:15Stephanie Flanders:Scott Besson, the Treasury Secretary, he had this kind of prior discussions with his Chinese counterpart. And then there was this discussion around starting, or there was a somewhat of announcement saying they've agreed to establish an AI dialogue. I noticed now, maybe this is just, but the AI dialogue with no capital on D. So it's not like an official ongoing, it's not like the various commissions and the sort of committees, the joint economic committees that we've had in the past or anything like that. It is just literally a conversation and they've each got each other's number kind of thing.

9:47Yeah. And let's be clear, they were going to talk anyway. And so Besant and Helefeng have been talking since Trump's Liberation Day tariffs. They were talking all last year, they struck the trade truce. And this is now the main mechanism of communication between the US and China on the relationship overall. So they just added AI to the list right now. There's nothing else there for the moment. And so that's where it's going to stay unless they put some meat on the bones. But as Michael said, it's really, really thin at the moment.

10:20Stephanie Flanders:Running through a lot of this is a sort of basic level of trust. So although there was this sort of agreement, we're going to carry on talking and everything else, you know, I can't help remembering that Scott Bessent was also the person who said recently that there's no day after tomorrow if China wins. I mean, he's talking up the race aspect, even as they sort of pay lip service to some of these security concerns. So where are the points of tension? If they were going to do what we wanted them to do, which is to seriously discuss some shared framework for at least the extreme risks that people like Dario Amadei are worried about, where would the focus be and what are the obstacles to doing that?

11:02Yeah. So I think in any discussion, if we talk about the potential risks first that they want to discuss, I think you could largely group the problem with AI safety into three categories of risk. I think the first one is probably malicious use or the idea that you and a model could enable third party rogue actors or criminals to conduct cyber attacks, et cetera. I think the second one is unexpected autonomous behavior. So an AI agent sort of gaining access or taking actions that the creators didn't expect. And this is largely actually what happened over the summer with many of these cyber incidents.

11:34I think the third is international miscalculation. This is probably the most familiar in terms of government-to-government dialogue. So if you imagine a major AI-enabled incident hitting either government and making sure that it wasn't the other one doing it, I think the notification mechanism we've gotten so far is probably most useful for the third. I think progressing on the first two is going to require greater levels of trust in some kind of actual concrete action or commitment from either side. I think the difficult part that comes from this is then settling on joint definitions. For example, China has signaled they're happy to talk, but they want to draw a very clear line between normal technological competition and this kind of fenced off area of advanced capability or advanced risk.

12:15I think the problem is that line is, it's very fuzzy and many of the capabilities or sort of training methods that you would use to just simply improve your models within the normal tech competition arena inevitably will bleed into this higher area of risk. And then therefore, what you've seen from Anthropic and OpenAI is they have sort of self-volunteered or done by themselves to sort of weaken their models in these areas. The government hasn't, until very recently, actually required them to do so. So if you would want China to actually take substantive action on this, how do you convince them that in this narrow area you should specifically slow down your companies when you're in a race with the U.S.

12:53as well and worried about being behind. And so that is what really requires trust between these two sides.

12:58Stephanie Flanders:And that runs pretty deep down. I mean, the perception, which is not wrong, because you hear cabinet ministers, cabinet secretaries saying things along these lines fairly regularly, that the US wants to slow China's development in this area. Are there any areas that you think the leadership would be willing to say, okay, we recognize that this is too important to be subject to this lack of trust? I think China definitely sees it on that high level. Like, we should treat AI like nuclear weapons and we should come and agree not to kill each other. I mean, that is essentially something that is in their interest and that they would want to do.

13:38But as Michael said, the line in there is very fuzzy. I mean, we often portray AI as a race, but it's kind of a race that doesn't really have an end per se. So when Scott Besson says, okay, there's no day after tomorrow China wins, the Chinese researchers I was speaking to in Beijing, they see this going in waves. There's going to be developments where China narrows the gap and then the U.S. will have something and the gap gets a bit wider. And then so there's not a linear kind of race and then somebody wins and then the world is over type of scenario. China really views this as a long term thing.

14:16they want to be seen as an equal partner, I guess, in any of these talks. So yeah, anything that appears like it's the U.S. trying to slow China down so the U.S. can get an advantage, China would be very wary of. There's just not a lot of trust between these governments, and they're very skeptical of what's coming out of Washington.

14:37Stephanie Flanders:So that's why there's so much distrust on the China side. But Michael, as you've pointed out in your piece. On the US side, what has reduced trust, made them less open to this conversation, is this issue of distillation. So basically, it's about, once again, China finding a way to steal a US technology. But talk us through it. So at a high level, distillation is really a normal AI development technique. And I think that's where some of these definitions get muddled. So essentially, it's about using the outputs of a stronger teacher model to help train a weaker student one. There's various techniques that you can classify as distillation, but that's probably the most general one.

15:17What's happened on the US side is they specifically said that China is conducting these exploitative distillation campaigns against US models where these US models terms of service specifically prohibit them to do so. And they are using all kinds of methods to basically setting up false accounts, setting up routing methods, essentially to, And even Anthropica has accused them of essentially rerouting traffic in terms of prompts being sent to a Chinese model. They are then sending it to Claude, collecting the answers and training on the answers and sending it back to the original user. The Chinese response has been, of course, that this is normal technological competition, that this is a widespread technique in the industry.

15:57And it is. But I think the difference is it's a widespread technique in the industry when you use your own models or when you use it on models where they have allowed you to distill from. What China is doing is a little bit beyond what the quote unquote normal development technique is in terms of they're conducting these campaigns specifically against closed source models that don't want them to do so. And so that's the tricky part. And the difficult thing is it's also quite hard to stop. It's not really like many of the hardware export controls that the U.S. has implemented over the past five years where there's a physical device and a shipment that you can track.

16:32This is really about, you know, at the core of the core of API access. Again, when we talk about fuzzy or clear lines, it's very hard to distinguish between what's an illegitimate user and what is a Chinese AI firm trying to distill, because both are just sending prompts to your model that it's trying to respond to. And so this is one of the biggest areas of distrust from the US. The AI labs are upset about it. Many security agencies are upset about it. Congress is upset about it. And if there was one thing that could really destabilize this conversation moving forward, when we talk about what is enabling China to have these capabilities in the first place, I think it would be this issue.

17:06Stephanie Flanders:Hearing what you say about distillation, I mean, it would be a helpful thing for the president and President Xi to discuss. Let me put it this way. I mean, President Trump doesn't tend to embrace that kind of technical detail. So it just doesn't feel like it's the kind of thing that's going to be on the talking points. No, I think President Trump's understanding of artificial or super intelligence as he now brands it is somewhat limited. And generally, he seems to be representing points of officials or more technical officials and issues that they bring up in his agenda. I think he would bring this up as advocating again, how the US is number one, how we're in the race out of China.

17:46But this kind of distillation issue seems a layer or two below what he would actually be willing to engage in. And it would actually fall in the realm of something like this dialogue, which makes it even trickier in terms of allowing it to succeed.

18:01The thing about AI for business, it may not automatically fit the way your business works.

18:07Stephanie Flanders:At IBM, we've seen this firsthand. But by embedding AI across HR, IT, and procurement processes, we've reduced costs by millions, slash repetitive tasks, and freed thousands of hours for strategic work. Now we're helping companies get smarter by putting AI where it actually pays off, deep in the work that moves the business. Let's create smarter business. IBM. This is Robert Smith from Business History. If you're listening to this, there's a good chance you're a small business owner. And like every small business owner, you started with a dream to do what you love and watch it grow. What you probably didn't dream about?

18:43Keeping up with cyber threats. That's where MasterCard can help. With access to tools that help identify cyber threats to better protect your business. Building your dream business? Priceless. For cybersecurity in a changing world, there's MasterCard. Learn more at MasterCard.com slash smallbusiness. Join Bloomberg for the Canadian Finance Conference, proudly sponsored by National Bank of Canada Capital Markets on September 29th in New York. Hear from influential corporate and government leaders as they discuss the strategies shaping Canada's economic future. Connect with senior decision makers, gain actionable insights and be part of the conversations driving business forward.

19:23Register at BloombergLive.com slash Canadian Finance. That's bloomberglive.com slash Canadian Finance.

19:56million business and enterprise users worldwide already using ChatGPT for work. Download the ChatGPT desktop app or contact sales to learn more.

20:15Stephanie Flanders:Dan, one thing I've noticed that sort of has crept into these conversations, although we talk about the race and we've tended to focus on the frontier, is the biggest story of the last six months that Chinese models, despite being less sophisticated, have actually vastly extended their reach in terms of usage because they're so much cheaper and because they have that open source approach. I mean, in that sense, the Chinese feel like they're coming out ahead, even if they're still behind on this kind of frontier sense. Yeah, exactly. I think China views this as a public good. Of course, they're behind in the race, So they have an advantage using open source models, but they're also undercutting the potential valuations of these big companies like Anthropic and OpenAI in doing so.

21:03They're also winning a lot of support throughout the global south because a lot of people can use Chinese AI very cheaply. There is a question about how some of these companies can monetize that at the end of the day. But for the moment, China is getting people hooked on its models. And I guess it depends how sticky that is going forward. You know, if you settle into a certain routine using whatever AI you're using, then maybe you just stick with that. And then maybe you buy add-on products, whatever, as long as that infrastructure is laid down. And so China, at least in my conversations, they plan to stick with this open source model.

Read the full transcript

21:48They view it as a good thing. I think they are worried about data being routed through Claude. For instance, we had the information reporting that there is a probe now into DeepSeek and Moonshot where China is very concerned that sensitive military data, police data, and different stuff that's secret is somehow being routed through these companies. And they're also scared about mythos, for example. Like, you know, Scott Besson says, oh, my God, if China wins, it's the day after tomorrow. But from the Chinese perspective, the U.S. already has these tools that they don't have. And so they're very worried that they're going to be used against them as well.

22:27Stephanie Flanders:Michael, this reliance on open source models. I mean, at least a few months ago, we felt that was one of the biggest risks to particularly the kind of malign actor risk that you were talking about earlier comes from quite a lot of power being in the hands of being embodied in open source models, which then have no kill switch. Presumably, that's still something we should be worried about. I do think it's still a risk. And I will say China's stance is interesting, because there is a split between what it does internally and what it does externally. Internally, in terms of regulations and security review processes on Chinese citizens using AI services, they're actually quite stringent.

23:12At least definitely there's more regulation in the US, for example.

23:15Stephanie Flanders:And that's on things like chatbots and children's AI companions and things like that. Exactly. And I would say as a general point, China has far better control over its internal internet than any other country does over the global internet, right? And so internally, they feel more secure and locked down about potentially open weight risks. And you also have the idea that open weight models, as of now, are still a good few months, six, seven months behind the sort of cyber capabilities of a mythos level model. And the thing with these models in terms of when you talk about gaps is that it's not necessarily a linear progression.

23:48It's once these models get to a point of reliability, all of a sudden they have this capability turned on. So that's what happened. That inflection point happened in April for Mythos. It appears that inflection point has not yet happened with these Chinese open-weight models. So externally, I believe up till this point, they're still comfortable, you know, releasing these open-weight models, degrading the US advantage, depressing anthropic and open-aiized valuations. When it gets to a point one year, two years down the line, where these open-weight models are capable of conducting full cyber campaigns all the way to designing and executing an exploit, I wonder if at that point China might reassess its position because then they will be under attack externally as well.

24:23Stephanie Flanders:I guess you kind of wonder that they will reassess their position just before they do that, rather than once they realise, you know, all these things, it seems to also come down to quite a fine judgment about what constitutes the boundary. And that, I can't help noticing, seems to be shifting forward all the time. You know, it's always six months ahead. But six months ago, we were supposed to be six months away from the really scary stuff. But actually, there's so much forward momentum from both sides, that no one really wants to call time, except apparently, some of the leaders of these companies themselves.

24:57Stephanie Flanders:I mean, I guess we should do a full circle on the summit. Dan, as well as this sort of advantage it's built up recently on the use of its AI, if we kind of look at the sort of nuts and bolts of the relationship that we've focused on in the past, the trade war truce and the stranglehold that China has on the rare earth supply, which is the reason for the truce. Fundamentally, that does seem like quite a stable situation where both sides have sort of got their stick behind their back. Yeah, it's sort of stable, but not stable. I'd say it's below the surface. It's not very stable. You have a lot of measures being taken by the FCC to kind of put restrictions on Chinese hardware.

25:45It's kind of a stop and start type of thing. China wants the truce to continue, but the U.S. isn't happy with the amount of rare earths they're getting from China. They don't think China's being transparent, and they're not being transparent, really, in how these things come out. From the U.S. perspective, they think if we give China a one-year or a two-year extension, then China's just not going to give any rare earths at all. So the U.S. is still seeking some sort of leverage. And Jameson Greer, I believe said three months or six months. The truce doesn't stop till or expire until November 10.

26:22So Trump is supposed to head to Shenzhen, right across from Hong Kong in mid-November. And from the U.S. perspective, that's the real tell. Can they afford to blow up this relationship or do they still need the rarest? And this alternative supply chain is not there. So China is very confident that they can withstand any U.S. pressure by using this card, at least for the foreseeable future. And then the other big issue is Taiwan, of course, and China is going to try and make the cost very high for Trump to go ahead with an arms sale to Taiwan. We think eventually it'll be broken up into smaller tranches so it doesn't embarrass the Chinese.

27:08But at the same time, China will make this a big issue and will kind of threaten to cut off talks or whatever, probably a lot of unspecified vague threats if this goes forward. But that's kind of top of the agenda. The other interesting thing I'll just add is Trump mentioned that he would be open to a Chinese EV factory in the U.S. if it creates American jobs. And I think if we saw anything like that, that would actually be kind of a big breakthrough given the opposition on Capitol Hill to all of this. It's, I think, from the Chinese perspective, very unlikely, given the consensus in Washington is very much against this right now.

27:54But if you're looking for ways that you could pull back these national security restrictions that are really leaving this relationship with a straitjacket. That would be one sort of tangible thing if it were to happen

28:08Stephanie Flanders:at all. And there's been some criticism on the Hill of even this decision of the president to go to the airport and all of the suggestion that we are somewhat rolling out the red carpet for China at a time when there are all these concerns. Michael, I guess, you know, as a final word for you, it just seems there's a sort of irony here that's been brought out by the discussion on rare earths. We had a story on Bloomberg today about how well a lot of Chinese basic sort of equipment manufacturers are doing out of the AI boom in the US because the sort of basic things you need to build the data centers and to do all of the production are actually things that the US industry is still very reliant on Chinese part for.

28:52Stephanie Flanders:I mean, despite this being the president who has encouraged us all to deglobalize and bring production home, AI more than anything else is making that impossible and highlighting how integrated we still are. Yeah, absolutely. I think we remain incredibly interdependent, especially through AI. I mean, some of the resilience measures that have been talked about, like the chip sack, etc., at most have moved part of a single node of the supply chain to the US when there's many, many other dependencies between the US and China, if not directly, then with one or two countries as intermediaries or just separated by a few stages in the supply chain.

29:32Ultimately, China is a key part of many of these component supply chains, material supply chains, even assembly supply chains that make up AI. They're becoming increasingly prominent in many of these other older chip categories that extend into a US industry or other sectors that are in technology as well. And so I would honestly say if you considered how dependent we are in China now compared to five years ago, roughly around the time of the passage of the CHIPS Act, we're probably more dependent now because we've improved in one category and become much more dependent on others. And so, yes, like, I don't think this relationship could or the U.S.

30:07could really bear a true deglobalization or sort of this kind of two technological spheres that's been discussed. And so this relationship will just have to be managed maybe six months at a time, three months at a time, which now seems to be the pattern going forward.

30:21Stephanie Flanders:And there could be no better demonstration of that than the fact that along with everything else, the U.S. president is also, at least today, dependent on China for his TV footage. Michael Deng, Dan Tengke, thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you.

30:44Stephanie Flanders:Thanks for listening to Trumponomics from Bloomberg. It was hosted by me, Stephanie Flanders. I was joined by Dante and Kate and Michael Deng. Trumponomics was produced by Samasadi and Moses Andam with editorial guidance from Megan O 'Neill from Bloomberg Economics. Sound design was by Blake Maples and Kelly Gary. Amy Keene is executive producer of Talk Podcast for Bloomberg. And Cheryl Brumley is the head of podcast. Now to help others find us and enjoy Trumponomics, please rate and review us highly wherever you listen.

31:43Stephanie Flanders:Supporting sponsors IDA Ireland and Schneider Electric. Learn more at bloomberglive.com slash techlondon.

From the publisher

As Chinese President Xi Jinping meets with US President Donald Trump in Washington, this week's episode of Trumponomics asks whether the world’s leading AI powers can move beyond summit pageantry and start managing the dangers created by their technological rivalry. Host Stephanie Flanders speaks with Bloomberg Executive Editor Dan Ten Kate and Geoeconomics analyst Michael Deng about why distrust over chips, model distillation and open-source AI is making meaningful cooperation so difficult—and why rare earths and deeply intertwined supply chains mean neither country can truly decouple from the other.

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