In short
Podcast Episode Notes: Allison Thacker – Different Perspectives and Different Assets at Rice University (EP.348)
Episode Overview
- Host: Ted Seides
- Guest: Allison Thacker, President and Chief Investment Officer of Rice Management Company
- Focus: Insights from Allison on her experience in institutional investing, the unique portfolio structure of Rice University’s $8 billion endowment, and her approach to asset management.
Key Themes
- Career Path and Investment Philosophy
- Background:
- Started at Merrill Lynch in investment banking.
- Transitioned to investing after realizing a preference for the buy-side over sell-side.
- Investment Philosophy:
- Emphasis on long-term perspectives and the importance of being prepared for market downturns.
- Learning from experience in high-growth sectors during the internet boom and bust.
- Rice Management Company Overview
- Client Focus:
- Rice University’s endowment is heavily relied upon for operational funding (40% of budget).
- Approach to investing is about maintaining affordability for students while targeting long-term growth.
- Portfolio Structure:
- Significant allocation to real assets (around 25%).
- Less volatility compared to peers due to a balanced approach that avoids over-concentration in public equities.
- Unique Asset Allocation
- Real Assets:
- Heavy investment in real assets as a strategic differentiator from other endowments.
- Investments include mineral rights, timberland, and real estate, providing cash flow and stability.
- Risk Management:
- Discussion on the balance of risk versus stability, especially in volatile markets.
- Engagement with Environmental Issues
- Commitment to carbon neutrality by 2030 for both the university and its endowment.
- Engaging with energy companies on sustainable practices instead of divesting.
- Manager Selection and Team Composition
- Importance of sector-specific expertise in team composition for effective manager selection.
- Collaboration in the team to foster knowledge sharing and effective decision-making.
- Challenges in finding the right talent with a balance between deep specialization and generalist skills.
- Governance and Incentive Structures
- Focus on aligning incentives within the organization to encourage collaboration and performance.
- Discussion on the importance of governance in driving successful long-term investment strategies.
Insights and Takeaways
- Investment Strategy:
- Long-term positioning and preparing for downturns are crucial in asset allocation.
- Real assets provide both yield and a margin of safety, which is particularly beneficial in a low-interest-rate environment.
- Team Dynamics:
- A collaborative team structure fosters better knowledge sharing and can lead to improved investment outcomes.
- Being flexible and willing to adapt strategies based on changing market conditions is key.
- Future Focus:
- Continued exploration of innovative investments in energy transition and technology sectors while balancing traditional investments.
- Emphasis on effective governance structures that promote accountability and alignment with institutional goals.
Conclusion The episode highlights Allison Thacker's expertise in navigating the complexities of institutional investing, particularly within the context of Rice University’s endowment. Her insights on asset allocation, risk management, team dynamics, and governance offer valuable lessons for other investors and allocators in the industry.
For additional resources, visit [capitalallocators.com](https://capitalallocators.com).
Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.
Transcript
Automatic transcript. May contain errors.0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30 -something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager, majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink, provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.
0:43As advocates of integrating culture research into the investment process and advancing wide -moat investing with the concept of moat trajectory, WCM has delivered differentiated returns while building concentrated portfolios designed to stand out from the crowd. WCM is committed to defying the status quo by dismantling outdated practices, believing in the extraordinary capabilities of its people, and fostering optimism to inspire each individual to become the best version of themselves. To learn more about WCM, visit their website at wcminvest .com. and tune into this slot on the show to hear more about WCM all year long.
1:27This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit wcminvest .com for WCM's ADV and further information. Capital Allocators is also brought to you by Morningstar.
1:55What if data wasn't just a bunch of raw numbers, but a clear and decisive language to help connect investment strategies with long -term investor needs in a constantly evolving market landscape? Morningstar created that language, bringing order and utility to insight -rich data so you can prepare for your next opportunity, no matter the asset class or market. Visit wheredataspeaks .com to see what Morningstar data can do for you.
2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators .com. All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.
3:11Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions and securities discussed on this podcast. My guest on today's show is Alison Thacker, the president and chief investment officer of Rice Management Company, where she oversees Rice University's $8 billion endowment. Alison spent 11 years picking growth stocks before joining Rice 11 years ago. Our conversation shares Alison's keen insights from experience as both a direct investor and endowment manager, Rice's quite different portfolio with a heavy allocation to real assets and an organizational structure that blends internal and external management and generalists and deep specialization.
3:54Before we get going, there's a lot of serious heavy stuff happening in the world. Without making light of any of it, these Spread the Words are intentionally just the opposite. They're my attempt to provide a little comic relief in what can be a very difficult world. So this week, I thought I'd talk about another travesty of sorts. The World Series finished up last week with the Texas Rangers defeating the Arizona Diamondbacks. In case you missed the whole thing, yeah, that's called parody in Major League Baseball. These underdogs not only weren't the New York Yankees, they weren't even portfolio companies of my favorite, most passionate investment in Arcto's sports partners.
4:37Adding insult to injury, both teams actually beat an Arctos portfolio company in Game 7 of their League Championship Series. And there would have been just a little more money in it, well, for me. And last week, just when you thought it couldn't get worse, the world -famous New Zealand All Blacks had a heartbreaking loss in the finals of the Rugby World Cup. So when all your expected sports results fall by the wayside, I suggest you clear your mind with a riveting edition of, you guessed it, the Capital Allocators podcast. Thanks so much for spreading the word. Please enjoy my conversation with Alison Thacker.
5:18Alison, great to see you. Great to see you, Ted. Thanks for having me. Why don't we go back to your path to getting into investing? All right. I'm going to have to look back to Merrill Lynch investment banking days. And it was an interesting time. I worked at Merrill straight out of undergrad in Houston, Texas. And Merrill Lynch had a large office, like 25 bankers at that time. That was a big office for Houston. So they did all their deal execution out of Houston. So it was a great experience. Those guys were the Enron bankers. John Olson sat down the hallway in an office and that was a really tense relationship.
5:56John Olson had the sell on Enron and the bankers who were the bankers to Enron. And watching that said to me, I do not want to be an investment banker or a sell side analyst. And so I went to business school. And at that time, people said, hey, you know what you ought to think about? Maybe you should be the person sitting on the other side of the table. You sound a lot more like those people than you do like us. What was that tension like between the analysts putting a sell on the stock and the investment bankers trying to win the business? Like horribly uncomfortable? Armed enemies, right? John had the research report posted on his wall that from either Jeff Skilling or Ken Lay that said on the sell note, I can't wait to prove you wrong, John.
6:41And then he attacked it on his wall. You know what? I wonder if that's where I get it. I have a wall in my office called Signs of the Apocalypse where I put things up that happen that are just really egregious. And I bet that's where I got it. But yeah, it was very uncomfortable. All right. Before we get back to your investing career, what's on your wall of the signs of the apocalypse? There's some interesting ones, right? When SoftBank raised the first fund, the first fortune cover maybe with the unicorn on it, and then a nice chart of vomiting unicorns maybe when it fell off the first time. And I think just whenever something catches your eye as being very unusual.
7:17I've got an ad actually from oil and gas investor from 2014 that my colleague, John Lawrence pulled out of the magazine and put a little sticky on it. And he said, sign of a top question mark. And it was a airplane advertisement for flying private in 2014. It'll save you time, oil and gas companies. And so it's just things that you see where you're like, this is a bad sign for markets. And so I want to remember this moment because it seems normal to see it, but this cannot possibly be a good sign. Do you put them up at the time or do you go back? No, no, no. They go up when I see it. Actually, the Sequoia Forever Fund is up on there too.
7:58Things where you're like, I don't understand what's going on. I'm going to put this up here. Whatever it was, hundreds of billions of dollars of negative interest rate bonds being issued. And you think, who buys a negative yielding bond? I don't understand. But that went on for some time. Yeah, you just put it up there when you want to think about it. You're not going to necessarily do anything. It's just there. What are you putting on your wall now? I'm very intrigued with these dramatic pullbacks in tech and in biotech, right? Huge 70 % pullbacks. And maybe you put up on your wall when you say 100 % or 95 % of the S &P 500 year -to -date performance is from the Magnificent Seven.
8:36That's not normal. That's not a healthy sign. So to figure out all these signs of the apocalypse, you had to start somewhere at a business school. So why don't you take me back to your investment experience? I interned at Putnam Investments and loved it, thought it was an amazing experience, but ended up at a firm, RS Investments out in San Francisco, which is the old Roberts and Stevens Funds. And I had a couple of choices of where to go, a big firm like a Putnam or a Franklin Templeton or a boutique like this that's owned by the managers that had a smaller lineup of funds. And Andre Parole, my very wise advisor who I idolized after taking his class said, obviously you go to the boutique firm.
9:21And I think what appealed to me at that time was just the entrepreneurialism of going to a smaller place where they said, if you see a nickel on the floor, go get it, go pick it up. It's yours. So there weren't as many rules about what you could do, what you couldn't do, what you could look at, how you could add value. And that seemed exciting to me. 26, 27 years old, you're like, that's what I want. And I was there 11 years, all the way until I went to Rice University to become the CIO. What did you learn most from your direct investment experience? I was on the growth side and I went to work for Morningstar's fund manager of the year in 2000, Jim Callanan, straight out of business school.
10:00And he said, I'm going to give you this interesting sector to look at the internet. You've never looked at it. So you have clean eyes and it's not acting well. So tell me what you see. I think I built up a thicker skin going through that experience because it's pretty hard to tell someone that things that made them a tremendous amount of money in the nineties were terrible. It was just an amazing experience to go into the crucible at that time and just look at all these companies and watch some of them completely fall apart and go away. I have toured the web van distribution center in the Bay Area and Etoys knew all those company managers.
10:39But I also got to see the Netflix IPO and I saw the NetSuite IPO and I saw the Google IPO and did the first Dutch auction bids. And so it was an unbelievably good time. Because what do you learn? You learn things can always go down and they can go down more than you expect. People can lie to you or be confused. But on the other hand, that great companies will eventually come back. I think that I also learned that you need to look out beyond most investors' time horizon if you want to make a lot of money. So we were never going to beat SAC at their game at that time. They were always going to have more information, better information, faster information than I was about any company.
11:22That was the game. And so you needed to be there with a position in size before they were there, which means you needed to be anticipating where would this company be nine, 12, even 24 months out, as opposed to thinking about where will it be the next quarter. And I still think that applies in the allocator game too, maybe even more so because you have to choose funds and it's hard to get into them and get capital deployed. So you need to be thinking further out. How did you find your way from RS back to Rice? I got a call from the headhunter and they said, we're looking for names and ideas about who might be a good chief investment officer for Rice.
11:59They really would like someone to stay. It's in Houston. Do you have any ideas? And tell us what you've been up to. And I said, I can tell you what I've been up to, but I don't have a resume. I haven't interviewed in 11 years. I'm a partner. But I think it was such an intriguing conversation as it unfolded, thinking about this is basically the dream job of most people who are long -term investors, right? You have one client, they know what they need, they know what they want, they have a very long time horizon. And if you come in and do a great job, you can have a tremendous impact on affordability at the university where you attended.
12:32And so it was just too magical to not go after it. And so what I said to them is, hey, if you find somebody better than me, I'm an alum, I want you to hire them, go for it. But I think I could do a good job at this. And this is how I would approach it. And there I was, I ended up with the job, which still gives me chills. I'm like, how did that happen? I don't know. What was the history of how Rice invested before you got there? I don't know if this is true everywhere, but it's a board driven strategy. And it's you get what you were given and you don't really sell it. So we are the proud owners of a wide variety of assets that people have given us.
13:08And it wasn't until maybe the last 10 or 15 years that we've done much disposal of assets that have been given to us. Although Yankee Stadium, which was owned by Rice, was given to us by an alumni in the 60s, we probably would have kept holding it and I would have inherited it if not for eminent domain. So it was recaptured for a giant renovation project and Rice was forced to sell Yankee Stadium. We still own the original forest that William Merce Rice gave us in Louisiana, 50 ,000 acres of timber forest. And we own parcels of land that notable Houstonians gave to the university. And that's just how boards do it, I think.
13:47What are some of the assets that have been around for a long time? There's definitely oil and gas assets, mineral royalty rights, which means that if someone drills a well on this mineral right acreage, so you can own the surface land or you can just own the mineral right. We have some of both, but those definitely exist in the portfolio. What did the endowment look like when you arrived? At the time, the endowment was about $4 billion. And we had professionalized the investment office, but really they were still on their first CIO, who was an internal person who came up through the university finance organization, had many different roles at the university, and eventually was running the investment business and did a very good job.
14:28But they had not hired a lot of outsiders or a lot of people with an institutional money management background to do the research. And I was the first real outsider that they had brought in to really look at, okay, how do we do things? Who do we hire? What are our systems? How should we report to the board? And that was really the first maybe two plus years that I was there was building the team and building the processes and systems. What was there in terms of the asset pool? It was a great portfolio, actually. It was diversified. So my predecessor, Scott Wise had done a great job moving us out of the one manager domestic orientation and some bonds into a global equity portfolio and alternatives portfolio.
15:12Rice has always had real assets because of our location in Texas. And we had a very nascent real estate and private equity and venture portfolio. So when you came into the seat and started structuring the portfolio, how did you assess our risk reward and liquidity? Rice is highly endowment dependent. It's 40 % of the budget is covered by the endowment. And Rice charged no tuition through 1965. So from 1912 to 1965, if you could get in, there was no tuition. And I bring that up because it's part of the DNA of the school that we are highly, highly about affordable education. And in fact, even And today you pay nothing under $70 ,000, which is true at many of the universities that are fortunate enough to have large endowments.
16:00But Rice has expanded financial aid to the point where you don't pay tuition up to about $120 ,000 in household income. That's one of those core things that's important for a CIO to know. If there are extra returns, they're going to go towards subsidizing tuition, towards growing number of seats so we can take more students in at an affordable price. It's a really interesting conversation, which we've been having again as we have inaugurated a new president a year ago, which is if you're highly endowment dependent, should you take more risk or less risk? It's not totally clear what the answer to that question is.
16:34You might say we're highly budget dependent on the endowment. We should take less risk and make sure we can always pay the distribution. But on the other hand, over long periods of time, that's disadvantageous because you really need the returns in order to enable your school to grow and keep up with inflation and do new programs. And so I think we have settled on a happy medium, but it is a real source of tension. What does that happy medium translate to maybe in terms of an asset allocation relative to where you might be if you weren't supporting as much of the operating budget? We are less concentrated in public market drivers than some endowments.
17:12And I do believe we're also less equity market centric. Historically, Rice has had less mark to market volatility. And that's been a goal of ours, which is how do we protect the distribution and provide stability to the budget? The board's gone through an interesting discussion with me over the last year about that, which is how could we structure more stability for the budget without capping your ability to drive long -term upside? And what do you as the CIO think is the best plan on that? And so there is an attitude that if we and the team believe that better returns can be driven by a more volatile mark -to -market strategy, that ought to be an option on the table, which I think is correct and a good evolution.
17:55Pragmatically, we've ended up with a lot more real assets than other endowments. We have a very different asset allocation at this point than most of our peers. We are less equitized. We are less in private equity and venture. Even though we have a large portfolio, it's just that we have not added as much in that area as others have. And has that been a conscious choice to be in real assets? It's been a conscious choice to be in real assets. And then it keeps self -reinforcing via what we see from the bottom up. So from the top down, what we loved about it was you have a margin of safety because you have a real asset, right?
18:32You have an asset that has a liquidation value. It is not goodwill, brand, et cetera. You have tangible, real things like forests and trees and mineral royalty rights and real estate, and those could be sold and they don't go to zero. The other thing they do is they pay dividends. And in this last 15 years, there's been no coupons anywhere. And we're a spending institution. And so you looked at these portfolios and say they yield over this decade, probably two or three X the S &P 500. Currently, they're yielding 4X or 5X S &P 500. And it makes it very hard to sell because they're fairly lowly valued on an EBITDA basis, or even on a market value to book value or residual value or salvage value, and then they generate cash.
19:24I think that's one of the reasons we felt like it remains a place where the university sees opportunity. How much of your portfolio is in real assets today? We have around 25 % of our portfolio in real assets. And I think that's the most significant asset allocation differentiator for Rice versus our peers. I think if you look back 10, 12 years ago, many people had 15 % in real assets, 15 to 20%. And today, I think you see a lot of people sub 10, maybe even sub five. And that's exiting real estate and exiting forestry and exiting oil and gas. And those are separate different decisions driven by different factors.
20:06But it's ended up with people having a pretty low allocation to real assets. And us sitting out here is like, well, we haven't radically changed, but the neighborhood moved a different direction. When you started, you held some of those assets. How have you evolved to expressing the real assets portfolio today? We've always held a significant portfolio of directly owned assets in those areas that we manage internally using consultants on a very cost -effective basis. And not only are the consultants cost -effective, but just the fee burden avoidance is very effective. And I think we have stuck with that strategy and where it made sense, taken some more things in.
20:46We have been opportunistic as well on co -investing where that's made sense with managers in projects that I guess I would say follow that high yielding, high margin of safety, 10 to 14 % returning projects. So not trying to get 25 % IRRs and living in the world of the most aggressive of projects out there, building hotels and drilling oil wells. Not at all what we're doing, but more on the infrastructure side. The other thing is, if you're awake and alive right now, as an institutional investor, you must have a view on the carbon situation, global warming, greenhouse gases, et cetera. And Rice, I'm very happy to say, has walked a good path on this in the sense that we have decided that the university will become carbon neutral by 2030.
21:42But additionally, the endowment is committing to make its oil and gas assets also carbon neutral by that same date. Now, we will have to buy offsets in order to do that. But we have been engaging versus divesting. And so we spend a tremendous amount of time talking to our investment partners, talking to our mineral royalty lessors about how can you do a better job on this and this environmental issue. And maybe because we're one of the few people still talking to them, they're listening. We don't invest in a single fund that hasn't committed to be using carbon offsets and become carbon neutral.
22:17And so from our standpoint, that's an okay place to be as a university, but the rules are constantly changing and we're going to keep revisiting that issue. So you're sitting in Houston in the oil patch. You would imagine there's more of an appetite to own oil than there would be almost anywhere else in the country. And you're talking also about hedging that out to some extent or the carbon emissions with offsets. Curious what that conversation is like. And there's people on both sides of the issue, as there probably are most places where you have an intellectual discourse. But I think what we went back to is we are a university and we are a research institution.
23:00And what must a research institution do? We need to look at the science and the data. But we also need to be a thought leader about this industry. And so the university and our faculty have engaged a lot with the industry. I think that Houston is the city of the most energy company headquarters. And so we are very engaged as a university with the industry in thinking about what can they do to become better stewards in this area. I find most of our alumni, most of our students, most of our faculty appreciative of that as the university's stance. You mentioned in the ownership of those assets, there's a nice yield you're getting off of it.
23:39But how do you think about the price volatility, particularly, let's just say, oil and gas, where there are existential cases that oil is going to zero over a long period of time, and then, of course, now needed an energy transition? Well, our job will be to be out when oil is zero, right? And so we actually added a person to our team to spend the majority of his time on becoming the best energy transition investor out there. We shouldn't just be the best energy investors. We understand the industry and the infrastructure and the players. Therefore, we need to understand this next iteration of the industry as well.
24:17So we're about a year and a half into that initiative. I would say we're still early in our learning because the industry itself is changing very quickly. And these investments still need to meet our hurdles and be competitive across the portfolio. And so some of the earliest infrastructure investments, say a solar farm or a windmill, they're more infrastructure -like from a returns perspective. And so looking forward to the continued development of great energy transition investments. I do think we see that happening, but it's not an overnight thing. And in the meantime, you need natural gas to power some piece of the power infrastructure in most states in order to charge your Teslas.
24:58What have you found from doing that research China energy transition over the last year, year and a half? It's a total sea change in terms of corporate America and big companies' appetite for solutions. So 10 years ago, there was relatively limited interest from big companies about greening and cleaning up their footprints. And so if you could offer a cost superior and scale solution to them, they might buy it. Today, I think even big companies will take an experimental contract with someone who can help them clean up their footprint and make it more green and more friendly. And whether that's because those managers are younger and they believe in it, or because the customers of the company believe in it, or because government regulation is coming, I don't know.
25:45But it enables businesses that would not have possibly been able to get started to become viable today. I think with every year that goes on, that's becoming more true. And we're really at a phase that there's a lot of early stage things going on that may pay off, but almost require venture philanthropy to back them. And then there's a lot of very late stage things that are totally predictable that you can put big dollars to work in that are infrastructure returns. And in the middle is this enormous swath of companies that probably are going to offer great returns, but also have a lot of science risk or execution risk in them still.
26:25And so we're trying to learn more about what risks are we willing to take. And when you think about participating in that middle swath, are you trying to do it directly? Are you looking for managers to do it for you? We're looking for managers to do this for us. But I think part of why you hear we have a person focused on this is that it's not enough to look at the manager and validate them from a seat of a more generalist person in this industry. The more sector -specific talent and knowledge and deal -level underwriting skills that we had on our team, the better our manager selection skills have been.
Read the full transcript
27:01And so we must build knowledge and expertise in order to underwrite the portfolio in order to choose the manager in this area. It's just not that easy. Where else have you seen that deep dive expertise help you in manager selection? So we've seen it absolutely help us in real estate. And I think it has helped us take a less risky portfolio of assets with fewer air pockets because we understood the product types and the markets. It's one of the reasons we don't do much in biotech because we have not managed to hire that onto our team. And the more time I spend on it, the more convinced I am that without that knowledge, I just don't believe that we can be successful choosing managers in this area.
27:45Because especially when you go through these areas that are volatile, and you mentioned there's volatility in oil and gas. There's obviously volatility in biotech. When there's volatility, you need deep understanding. So you hold your trade. You talk to the managers about co -invest and you can convince your board that you should do them in the time when it feels terrible. And that requires expertise at the team level. So there's a lot of people, particularly if you take biotech as an example, that would say, if you're going to invest directly, you have some real estate expertise and assets in the oil sector and natural resources.
28:19But biotech is the place you want to hire a manager because you're never going to have that expertise. How do you think about what you need to know to underwrite a manager doing that for you? It's a really good question because it's almost like your portfolio manager or a very experienced portfolio manager or maybe a headhunter or maybe a sell -side research analyst because what you're doing is you're digging through all the tea leaves and the work that other people have done in order to validate that work. You don't have to do it yourself necessarily. That's why we're still a big believer and this idea of partnering with managers.
28:59And some of the time that looks like a co -investment, right? Because we want to add more capital along one of their themes as opposed to all of their themes. Where do you draw the line between here's an area of expertise? You know, for you, let's just make it easy and say you're a growth stock investor in the old days. You can understand value investing, even though you're not going to do it compared to, well, biotech is too specialized, but maybe you can pick the person who can do that for you. We're currently staying away from an area that has a lot of growth because we can't quite figure it out.
29:35I'm not sure that's a viable long -term answer though, because our job is to find the best investments for the university's endowment that'll compound capital over time. And honestly, the light bulb moment for me was when the COVID vaccine came out with mRNA vaccine in the timeline that they managed to do that in absolutely boggles my mind that we could accomplish something that quickly. It caught my eye and it added urgency to the thought that this is something that I, as CIO, have to find a solution to. But I've been looking for that right person for five years, and I have not found that person.
30:12And I haven't been looking in a dedicated, super hard way, but I have had this conversation that you and I are having right now with many other people in the institutional and manager side of the world and said, I'm looking for this. And yes, they have to live in Houston. That limits your audience. It is a challenge. You have to find the right person who doesn't want to be the player, who wants to be the coach. And that's not everybody. Because if you want to be the player, you need to go to a manager and you're picking stocks and that's what you love. And if you're a doctor, you want to be doing the level of deep research that you're going to get if you're at a specialist manager or on Wall Street.
30:46That's not what we're going to do. So it's like looking for that person who is interested enough, but not to that level of the detail. How big is your team? We have overall just a little over 30, and that's roughly half investments and half operations. The fact that we have a large operations team and we do all of our reporting and performance reporting in -house, which I love because we get immediate, very fast turnaround on the eclectic questions that I wake up thinking about. Secondarily, we have a handful of people that are vital to us being able to manage those direct investments or scaled co -investments that we have.
31:30We're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about SRS Aquium. Want to make sure your M &A processes aren't stuck in the past? partner with a company that's been defining the future of dealmaking for nearly two decades instead. When it comes to M &A innovation, SRS Aquium has reshaped the way that deals get done, streamlining processes for maximum efficiency and minimum headaches. Professional shareholder representation, online M &A payments, digital stockholder solicitation, SRS Aquium pioneered each and continues to set the bar for game -changing innovation. So leave the days of disjointed deal management behind and define your future with SRS Aquium, the smartest way to run a deal.
32:21Learn more at srsaquium .com. That's S -R -S -A -C -Q -U -I -O -M .com. And now, back to the show. How do you balance breadth versus depth on the investment side of the team to be able to have that expertise, but you're also multi -asset class and global? It's a really big tension. I think our industry tends towards this asset class orientation and not towards the thematic or sector specialization. It was one of the first debates I had with the board because when I came to Rice, they had real assets was one sector head. and what I saw when I looked at the numbers, because I always go back and say, numbers don't lie, let's look at the numbers, was that the portfolio was excellent in one area and not as excellent in another.
33:07And interestingly, of course, it was excellent in the area where we had expertise. And I said, I want to split both these roles. It's enough capital that we can afford to have two people. And I believe the reason we can afford to have two people is because we can have substantively better manager selection and outperformance if we do that. And so the board pushed on that as is their job, but ultimately said, yes, let's go for it. And 12 years later, I think the data is overwhelming. That was a very good decision for us. And so I'm debating it within other areas of our portfolio, but it's not very complimentary.
33:40Think about biotech. How could you execute it? Public markets, alternatives, a private vehicle, venture capital, I suppose there's buyout. I don't know. But that doesn't work very well when you have sector heads. That's an issue. That's part of why I said you're looking for that coach, not the player, when you're thinking about an allocator, but that also is really interested in the company level details. It's a hard combination to find. I would say, ideally, if the person is only interested in biotech, they're not the right fit for us because I might wake up and say, hey, you should want to learn about data centers.
34:13And if you're not interested in learning about anything other than your one specialty area, my team's not the right place for that because that's how we work. We do all have multiple specialty areas. It makes you a better investor. I saw this back at RS. So I probably took this from RS. One of the genius things that my portfolio manager did was he said, everybody should have more than one sector once they can handle it, because sometimes one sector will be totally cold and you can go work on the other one. And I cannot tell you how many people have over the years said, oh, I just want to specialize in energy.
34:46And I'm like, that's such a mistake. Only energy, that's just too narrow. And it goes really cold. And you'll need something else to look at. So there's a corollary in saying you need to get close to the investments, but you're the coach, not the player in your time at RS, which is there's some people that say, well, you really should have operating experience to invest in stock. So how did you think about how you want to spend your time? That's such a good question. And I'm quite sure some of the CEOs thought, why is this person allowed to ask me questions anyway? Right? I mean, that's the nature of those conversations always.
35:22You can get too close to the situation, right? There's the hammer nail problem. And some of the time in being a portfolio manager or a stock picker, you have to just let something go. And I think the closer you are to an operator, the less you've been trained to let something go. You're at one company and your job is this one company and make it work. And the reality is you're a portfolio manager. You have at least a hundred choices across the sectors you cover and many hundreds if you're at the portfolio level. And now at Rice, it's a global, anything goes that it wouldn't do harm to the university type of mandate.
35:58And so I almost feel like being too deep into one industry or company could be a disadvantage. I have to ask you about your public equity portfolio, given your experience. So what do you believe about how you should execute in the public markets? world's most frustrating market ever. In general, we believe that it matters what you pay for investments. And from that statement, you can assume that our public equity portfolio has not outperformed over the last three to five years. It's just a mathematical reality, which is if you believed in any value or GARP orientation, you have underperformed.
36:38You needed to be a momentum investor in your asset allocation, as well as owning those type of managers. We have struggled with that. And we're actually revisiting our public equity portfolio strategy right now, because it just continues to be a giant issue, which is most managers do not outperform the indices. And therefore, why would you not be better off paying two, four, six, eight basis points and just indexing. On the other hand, one of our most successful and impressive managers has managed to outperform the S &P 500 consistently every year. So I do believe it's possible, but it's very hard to find the needle in the haystack.
37:20How about outside the US? So in Europe, I really believe in value, partly because I don't see a lot of growth in Europe. Asia is in transition right now. My deputy CIO and I just got back from a trip over to Singapore and Hong Kong just to think, can you invest in Asia if China doesn't work? I'm interested in this question. We do not have a resolution to that topic, but it feels like it's too large of a part of the world to not have as a key strategy within your investment portfolio for the next 30 years. But right at the moment, it's pretty opaque about how to be a U .S. institution and succeed paid allocating capital into that area.
37:59What are some of the other asset classes or categories you're investing in that are on your mind? I love the tech rec story, right? Maybe everybody loves it. I don't know. But for me, it's not really about the magnificent seven tech stocks, even though I think it's important for them to have done what they've done, the year of efficiency and really show smaller cap companies and show all the private startups that you can run your business more efficiently and do well for yourself and do well for your customers. What Meta did this year is pretty important as a signpost. But for me, I look at that sector and I say, all right, we went from five to seven times EV to revenue multiples for enterprise software companies to 20 times, and now we're back to five to seven times.
38:43But over the, say, 23 years dating back to 2000, software is eating the world and software is gaining share and technology is continuing to become a deeper and deeper embedded part of all of our lives. And so I cannot help but believe that there are some babies that were thrown out with the bathwater in this pullback. And so we're looking across our portfolio where we have the most tech and saying, how do we take advantage of that? So Publix and Alternative is a little bit, but also a venture capital and saying, how will we position ourselves? So we've done literally hundreds of meetings on this topic.
39:21Where have you come out? I think we're likely to add a couple of managers. We're looking to be solution capital because I don't think the music is going to look the same. And the traditional money management business is not really in the solution capital model, right? Because it's just much easier to be a large, publicly traded or large, very private, but profitable money management business and just keep serially raising 20 % larger funds every time you go to market and clipping your management fee coupons. That's just what the incentives are in the industry. In order to be solution capital, you have to find someone who is creating a new idea.
40:00You have to be willing to back a newer manager, a spin out, a person who has less of a track record than you would like. You have to a little bit underwrite the opportunity as opposed to the team and then figure out how to structure your legal around your structure around it so that you can be comfortable with the fact that you're not at an institutional money manager for this idea. Most of the time people think about, oh, we need to get yield. They immediately go to private credit. It's not hard to envision some headline of private credit being on your wall of the apocalypse. So I'm curious where you come out.
40:32I'm going to do one of those on the one hand and on the other hand. I think the absolute deluge of private credit funds that have been raised over the last seven or eight years is overwhelming. You're just pitched it so often and you can't tell what the difference is. And you think, why isn't this just in the banking system? And it doesn't feel like something that can bear a one and a half and 20 or a two and 20 fee burden and yield anything when you were in extremely low interest rate environments. And so my view was if it was achieving those returns that they were targeting, you were taking way more risk than you thought or levering.
41:11Because mathematically, in a low interest rate environment, how much spread could you get over the 10 -year? It just didn't feel quite right mathematically. On the other hand, our portfolio right now from a fixed income and cash perspective is yielding close to 6%, which is the highest it's been in my memory, certainly the highest it's been since I've been at Rice for 12 plus years. So it's catching my eye to think that these are actually quite attractive yields. And so I'm trying to test all my assumptions this fall about private credit and about credit and think there are probably things that make sense for rice to do that might yield us 12 % that aren't extraordinarily risky.
41:53And maybe we should go look for those. But once again, I don't think the off the shelf flavor is probably what we're looking for. Are there anything in that area of trying to find that 12 % that seemed attractive? Some of the structured funds that firms are offering are interesting, right? You've got the core problem in venture capital that people have raised capital on their E round or whatever at evaluations. It's completely irrational. No connection to what current value is or long -term public company comp multiples. There are ways to go in and offer them capital that is maybe in that range of 12 % plus an equity kicker and have that be attractive to the company for governance reasons in addition to pragmatic.
42:40Shorter -term debt is less expensive than equity. It's supposed to be. I do think it's intriguing having these shorter -term yields gives you the ability to negotiate, I think, with companies also a more attractive all -in outcome for us as investors. Those are intriguing products that we've seen a few people offering. The question is just how many deals are there to go around? Is it a big enough opportunity? Will the manager do right by you, which is when the opportunity is over, stop doing it? Or will we continue to do basically march down the quality spectrum into companies we shouldn't be lending to because it's a good product and they fall in love with it?
43:17So an opportunity like that, how do you balance the idea of wanting to be a solution provider, which might lend itself to an earlier stage fund with, well, if that manager has their eggs in that one basket, it's harder for them to have the incentive to move on to the next opportunity. It's a really big challenge. In some areas we've done, let's pre -specify what you're going to do. It needs to look like A, B, C, and D. And within it looking like A, B, C, and D, here's a soft circle tranche of capital. And once you've spent that, come back and we have the next tranche of capital. And once you've spent that, come back and we have the next tranche.
43:53So that we didn't give them the whole thing up front. But then that might mean you need to pay higher fees on the beginning. The purpose of this is not to starve the manager. The purpose of this is just to make sure that you don't end up with a bunch of investments that aren't in your box. But I think what I've seen over the longer time period that we've been doing this is that that's hard and managers wanna just raise an institutional, delegated, authority, blank check vehicle if they can. And so they will. And so you need to know that I think it's a continual state of looking for those newer managers, those great idea generators, because the ones that you have today will not be the people who take you to the next opportunity for five years from now.
44:37It just won't be the same people. If it is, great, but it probably won't be. One of the other areas when you think about this return profile, the yield, as opposed to the growth, is this whole area of hedge funds. And it's changed a lot. How are you participating in that space? This is like, you're the expert and you're asking me. I don't know, Ted, how should I deal with it? We have, for the good or the bad, really not participated in the pod model, multi -manager model. And so I'm intrigued by it. I always want to learn more. I think this is one of those things where I'm like, we haven't done it.
45:11It doesn't mean it was a bad idea. The numbers are good. Let's look at it again. But at the end of the day, if I cannot explain it to my board, it's pretty hard for me to participate. Right. Hedge funds are the least liked asset class by the Rice board. And so I think it's a hard asset class to defend, too, because it's every flavor out there. Private credit is sometimes in there and unloved loans is in there and royalty structures are in there and then long short is in there and long bias and macro. I find it one of my more challenging conversations is to say, here is what we are trying to do at Rice in this portfolio and what you as a board should expect from it and what we as fiduciaries should target from a return standpoint in the bucket.
45:55One of the unresolved questions that our team has is how does a higher rate environment impact the hedge fund industry and the managers more specifically? You would think that's a simple question and I have not gotten a simple answer. When you roll up all these different areas that you're looking at, there's some themes, there's some growth, there's some solution, there's some yield. How do you think about the construction of your portfolio? Some ways it's very simple. If you think about it, you have 25 % real assets and then about 15 % really ballast that will always be there. And some of that is in fixed income, cash, a little bit of it is in some truly hedged alternative managers, which is, I think, the minority of the alternatives bucket for most institutions.
46:44It's a pretty small group of managers. But that gets us to about 40%. And then the other 60 % is you could really think about it as equities and as all different business models and flavors of equity and styles and sectors, but it's equities. And the most amazing thing is when we run our sector allocations and we run our global allocations, it's pretty representative of what the world looks like and what the market looks like. And it's just not that different on a read -through basis. In some ways, I think maybe it should look more different than it does. One of the things you've done as well within the university is manage the debt of the university.
47:18How has being involved in the fixed income markets for the university impacted how you think about the endowment? What we do very well is we interface with the outside world and we negotiate with them. Our job is to make sure that the outside world is not giving Rice University a bad deal. And that's not a core skillset that most people on the university administration side have. They're mostly running the internal operations of the university. I think that's one role that we get to play. I had a very visceral view of the university's debt portfolio when I came in. And I think the president and others agreed with me, which was, look, we have a fairly simple and stable business.
47:57And we use debt financing to finance very long dated capital projects like dormitories. We should have the most boring portfolio of debt ever. It should be long dated and it should be fixed rate to provide budget certainty. If we're going to take risk, we shouldn't be taking it in our financing structure for the university. And so we have unwound variable rate demand bonds that someone sold us once and all sorts of things that were good at the time, but added complexity to the university. And so we now have an extremely boring portfolio at a great fixed rate. And that is what it is. As you look out over the next, say, 10 years of your time at Rice, what are the things you'd like to be diving into that you haven't yet?
48:42I'm personally very interested in the governance topic. I thought at one point while I was at business school about going to get a PhD and got as far as applying. And it really wasn't the path for me because they said, you need to drop out of your MBA. And I was like, why would I ever drop out of my MBA and not complete it? And they said, that means you don't really want a PhD. And I said, OK, I guess that's true. If those are the conditions, I don't want one. But people very much do what they're incentivized to do. I think one of the things that makes your institutions unsuccessful over long periods is governance.
49:14And I think that's true at companies, too. And so it's an interesting area that I would be intrigued in learning more about. How does the governance play out in the management of the endowment? Maybe what I really mean is incentives, right? Because it plays out everywhere in the way that I think about it. It's about what does our board think about and want? Why are they even serving on a board? Why do they say yes to serve on a nonprofit board? What is their want and vision for the university? What is their term? How does that translate into how they oversee the endowment or the university in their giving of advice, in the initiatives that they would like to see happen during their term.
49:50But it's the same for me. What is the incentive of a person like me? How do you set up structures and compensation and oversight processes that incentivize your CIO to do exactly what it is that the institution needs and wants? And then that layers down to my team. And so everywhere that you are within the university, I think we often have set up processes and systems that aren't necessarily incentivizing the core behavior that we want to have. And it's a very difficult thing to do, unintended consequences and such. But that was the area of most interest to me, I think, when I was studying at Harvard and thinking through that, how do incentives drive behavior?
50:31And I think Michael Jensen was one of the professors there. And they all did a lot of the early work about why does private equity work, right? And it had to do with setting their incentives up correctly. So it's still an area of interest to me. How have you created the incentives for the people on your team? So I don't believe in silos, whether that's good, bad, or indifferent. My view from watching it at RS was it incentivized not sharing of information. And the more that you have a diffused team that is getting information from wildly different sources, but that needs to collaborate. If you manage in silos, there's no incentive for collaboration.
51:09And our team is too small to, in my opinion, to have those information silos. And so we have incentives that are much more around one team, one portfolio, right? So if you and I were on the team and you had a great year and I didn't have a great year, we do the same. And because most likely next year I'll have a great year and you won't. And I want both of us motivated all the time, but it's also hard to make sure that you don't have the free rider problem in that type of situation. How does the collaboration work for your team in practice, say, when you're looking at either an investment opportunity or a manager?
51:45We have a lot of in -person meetings. We are four days a week in the office because at the end of the day, we did not find that we could share the casual information. We shared the 911 and we did not share 411. We shared the emergency, everyone has to know this information during COVID over Zoom. But all of the interesting random thing I heard today that isn't material, but is part of your mosaic of understanding never got shared. It just didn't seem like it merited an email. So no one would write it up and it just didn't get communicated. So we were a heavily in -person sharing of information and we've gone back to that.
52:25But I was with a manager a few weeks ago and they showed us their Slack channels for each company. And I was like, I love that. because one of the things we want to do still is lower the burden of sharing the 411 information that you think is intriguing and not make all of the people on our team think that the work has to be perfect to send it out because it makes us slow and it makes us not communicate. What does a fully baked work product look like for your team? It depends on who the head of the asset class is a little bit. So people have their own style and what they want to see, but it's probably somewhere between a eight and 25 page memo.
53:05But what's so important to me is the work that went into creating the memo because the memo is one we share with our board. None of the things that you in general would be uncomfortable if the manager read. And so it's all the dialogue that goes on in internal notes and email that get archived in your document management system, the conversations, the phone calls, the references that are discussed during weekly meetings. And so we have Tuesday as our big day for research meeting and idea training and staff meeting and senior team portfolio management meeting. And then on Friday, we have another portfolio management meeting to close the week out and say like, all right, what's happening next week?
53:46How do you think about the culture of the organization and what you're trying to create? We're going through a bit of an evolution now. I think the word that I would have used 10 years ago was stewardship. And we all really liked it. You are the oversight function guiding and managing the endowment for the good of today's students and researchers, but also for the good of the students and researchers of 2050. And our team really liked that stewardship word. But over the last few years, we've come to believe that we need to be a bit more active and that when we are more active and more opportunistic and a bit more aggressive, good things happen.
54:29So we are leaning into that and trying to say, what are the barriers to being that way more often in our culture, in our processes, in our tools, and in our systems? And let's systematically try to get rid of some of them. So when I say that the memo's in flux, one of our debates is, what does the end product need to look like? And if it could be great at 12 pages, should we just say it's 12 or 8? And it's never going to be 25 because we have all of the documents in the document management system from the manager. And so we don't need to recreate those. We're trying to free up space so that we can lean in opportunistically to where the best areas of opportunity are.
55:11And it's always going to be changing. She spent a little over a decade working at a manager, a little over a decade investing in a bunch of managers. What have you taken as best practices that you're trying to implement? That no silos, close team, all pulling the boat in the same direction was one of the core tenants. No yelling, no bad behavior, no bad actors. It's just so disruptive to a team dynamic. The communication is one that I haven't seen a lot of great best practices on that one. And so it's one of those that we're working on on our own. One of the other things that I learned being a direct investor is that the information can change and you need to be flexible enough to change your mind.
55:56So this is always be curious. You're always looking at the data and reserving the right to change your mind because sometimes you're just wrong. I do think it's something the allocator community maybe doesn't have as much experience with as a direct investor would, right? Because when you're a direct investor, you have a faster cycle time because it's not in a portfolio. You get one investment, one P &L for each investment. And it's much more clear to you more quickly that you have made a mistake. And it's clear to everyone else that you'd made a mistake. Whereas when you're allocating to a portfolio, so it takes a longer time for the portfolio to look bad, even if there were some things in it that were bad.
56:32And honestly, what's bad? What if it is a 1 .6, but it should have been a 2x? You can't really prove that it wasn't as good as it should have been. And also you can blame the manager. And so I think that fearlessness that you learn by being a direct investor and being wrong and then getting back up on your feet and doing it again the next day is a very valuable life skill. All right, let me turn to a couple closing questions. What's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family? Gardening and the ballet. So I garden and grow herbs and vegetables, which teaches you patience and calmness.
57:07It's a very Zen thing to do. Even in Houston, it's very Zen. We have herbs year round. And then you struggle against nature sometimes. And I think it's back to that setbacks thing. Sometimes it just doesn't work and that's okay. And you try again. I love to watch the ballet. I'm very involved with the Houston Ballet and it's just an amazing thing to see humans go after with a hundred percent of their soul, something that is so foreign to the rest of us. And the making of art is quite extraordinary. What's one fact about you that most people don't know? I'm an avid reader of mystery novels and thrillers, and I can't really explain it.
57:44I'm sure I should be more like Bill Gates and just read nonfiction all the time. But at the end of the day, it's very relaxing to take a break from your brain and go off into this other world that someone else has written about or lived and you just get to escape and take an experience in it. What's your biggest pet peeve? Lack of transparency. It is amazing to me how often managers say, oh, I can't tell you that because that is a trade secret or that's our secret. It is not a secret from anyone. All of your competitors know it. Let's say that Apollo told me that. I could call Carlisle and they'd be able to tell me what Apollo is not telling me about that deal, which is insane.
58:25So why are the managers making it hard on me who's totally aligned and is their customer? I don't talk to anyone. And so it is a really interesting thing. It's not clear why they think it's a secret. Which two people have had the biggest impact on your professional life? My husband has had the biggest impact. And I do often tell students at the university and young people, choosing your life partner is the most important decision you are going to ever make because a supportive partner who is all in on your career will make you more successful and more happy and more fulfilled in your life. And it was actually Troy, my husband, who told me, you're more like the people on the other side of the table.
59:04You should think about the buy side. And whenever things are more difficult, he's there with good advice and support. And so me being a working mom with three children and both of us having jobs would just not have been a thing without him. And I sometimes joke to my team, I'm like, you've never seen a board deck that he hasn't reviewed. We do this for each other. So it's just a pretty tightly intermeshed decision that you're going to make and it's important. And then the other person is Andre Proll because he's the one who taught me about investment management. He's the one who guided me to go to RS.
59:39And he's the person I called when I got the call from the headhunter about the rice job. And I said, do you believe that I could do this? That I would be good at it because I don't want to do it if I wouldn't be good at it. And he took a long pause and he's like, a priori, I see no reason why you couldn't be good at this, Alison. Would you be better if you went to Stanford for a few years and were number two? Of course, but there's not time for you to do that. And it was just so amazing to have a person who answers your calls and takes seriously your career decisions when you're at those inflection points.
1:00:12And then also just a great teacher. What's the best advice you've ever received? The most interesting recent advice that I've gotten, and I think it will make me happier, and I've put it to work in a little ways, but not completely is only say yes to the things that you know are an absolute yes. I struggle with saying no because I care because I'm at the university because there's just so many things people ask me to do that I want to be able to say yes to. But I think I need to ration things out a little bit more and then I could be more enthusiastic and have more energy for the core things. And Allison, last one, what life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life?
1:00:54Don't burn any bridges is an important one. I don't think I've burned a lot of bridges, but I think I didn't go into situations thinking as much about the other side's perspective as maybe I could have. And so early on, more things were very black and white to me. And honestly, we work a lot of the time in shades of gray. And so if there's a way to have a graceful parting of the ways when it's necessary, it's a really good thing. You'll be very surprised how many people resurface in your life and in your career. And sometimes being the bigger person is the better place to be. Allison, thanks so much for sharing your insights.
1:01:31Absolutely. Thanks for having me and thanks for doing this. It's a great service to the allocator industry. Thanks for listening to the show. To learn more, hop on our website at capitalallocators .com where you can join our mailing list, access past shows, learn about our gatherings and sign up for premium content, including podcast transcripts, my investment portfolio, and a lot more. Have a good one and see you next time.
From the publisher
Allison Thacker is the President and Chief Investment Officer of Rice Management Company, where she oversees Rice University's $8 billion dollar endowment. Allison spent eleven years picking growth stocks before joining Rice eleven years ago.
Our conversation shares Allison’s keen insights from experience as both a direct investor and endowment manager, Rice’s quite different portfolio with a heavy allocation to real assets, and an organizational structure that blends internal and external management and generalists and deep specialization.
Learn More
Follow Ted on Twitter at @tseides or LinkedIn
Subscribe to the mailing list
Access Transcript with Premium Membership


