Amy Falls – From Bonds to Boards to Leading Northwestern (Capital Allocators, EP.316)

22 May 2023 · 1 h 5 min

Ask about this episode

Ask anything about it. ChatGPT or Claude reads this page and answers with the times it was said.

Connect VO and ask about every podcast you hear, including the moments you saved. Add to ChatGPT · Add to Claude

In short

Podcast Summary: Amy Falls – From Bonds to Boards to Leading Northwestern (Capital Allocators, EP.316)

Introduction In this episode of the Capital Allocators podcast, host Ted Seides interviews Amy Falls, the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) at Northwestern University. Amy oversees the university's $14.2 billion endowment and has a wealth of experience in institutional investing. The discussion spans her professional journey, investment philosophies, and insights on various asset classes.

Key Highlights

Background and Path to Investment

  • Early Interest: Amy's career in finance began with an interest in international affairs, leading her to JP Morgan during a pivotal time in Latin American debt restructuring.
  • Framework Development: She emphasizes the importance of creating frameworks to assess country risks, which laid the groundwork for her investment strategies.

Career Challenges and Opportunities

  • Transitioning Roles: Amy’s move to endowment management was influenced by her volunteer work on an investment committee at her alma mater, Phillips Academy.
  • First CIO Experience: At Phillips Academy, she learned the significance of manager selection and the necessity to streamline the investment process.

Investment Philosophy

  • Manager Selection: Amy discusses the critical nature of choosing the right managers, advising that understanding a manager’s mindset and past performance is crucial.
  • Alignment of Interests: She believes in matching the investment structure with strategy, advocating for niche managers capable of adapting to market changes.

Insights on Asset Classes

  • Fixed Income: Amy is optimistic about the fixed income market, expecting credit events and higher default rates due to recent economic shifts.
  • Private Equity: She highlights the need for a careful approach, focusing on firms that can drive profitability rather than just growth.
  • Public Equity: Amy expresses a strong interest in international markets, particularly Japan, and discusses the potential for a market reversal.

Liquidity Management

  • Liquidity Planning: Amy emphasizes the importance of managing liquidity effectively, advocating for a two-year cash flow planner to anticipate funding needs and rebalancing opportunities.

Committee Dynamics and Decision-Making

  • Collaborative Process: She discusses the value of thorough discussions during investment committee meetings, suggesting that dialogue fosters better decision-making.
  • Committee Engagement: Amy engages committee members early in the decision-making process to ensure their input shapes the agenda.

Personal Insights and Analogies

  • Farming as Metaphor: Amy draws parallels between farming and investment management, emphasizing the need for careful planning and diversification to avoid pitfalls.

Key Takeaways

  • Investment Frameworks: Developing structured frameworks for understanding risk is essential for effective investment management.
  • Importance of Relationships: Trust and communication with investment managers and committee members can lead to better outcomes.
  • Adapting to Change: The ability to adjust strategies based on market dynamics while maintaining a focus on long-term goals is crucial for success.

Conclusion Amy Falls' vast experience provides valuable insights into the complexities of managing an endowment. Her approach underscores the importance of frameworks, relationship management, and adaptability in the ever-evolving landscape of institutional investing.

For more in-depth information, visit the [Capital Allocators website](https://www.capitalallocators.com/podcast/from-bonds-to-boards-to-leading-northwestern/).

Written by AI. May contain mistakes. Listen to the episode to check what was said.

Hear the part that matters, and keep it.Open this episode in VO. Double tap your headphones to save a moment as you listen.
Get VO free

Transcript

Automatic transcript. May contain errors.

0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30 -something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager, majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink, provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.

0:43As advocates of integrating culture research into the investment process and advancing wide moat investing with the concept of moat trajectory, WCM has delivered differentiated returns while building concentrated portfolios designed to stand out from the crowd. WCM is committed to defying the status quo by dismantling outdated practices, believing in the extraordinary capabilities of its people, and fostering optimism to inspire each individual to become the best version of themselves. To learn more about WCM, visit their website at wcminvest .com. and tune into this slot on the show to hear more about WCM all year long.

1:27This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit wcminvest .com for WCM's ADV and further information. Capital Allocators is also brought to you by Morningstar.

1:55What if data wasn't just a bunch of raw numbers, but a clear and decisive language to help connect investment strategies with long -term investor needs in a constantly evolving market landscape? Morningstar created that language, bringing order and utility to insight -rich data so you can prepare for your next opportunity, no matter the asset class or market. Visit wheredataspeaks .com to see what Morningstar data can do for you.

2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators .com. My guest on today's show is Amy Falls, the Chief Investment Officer at Northwestern University, where she oversees the school's $14 billion endowment that supports university operations, and funds about a quarter of the university's annual budget.

3:15She also serves on the boards of Harvard Management Company, the Ford Foundation, Phillips Academy, and the Pete Peterson Foundation. Our conversation covers Amy's background and path to Northwestern, frameworks she learned along the way, and different challenges she faced in three different chief investment officer seats. We then turn to her thoughts on manager selection, liquidity, and across asset classes covering fixed income, private credit, private equity, public equity, and China. We close with Amy's insights from her experience working with investment committees and parallels between her fashion for farming and investments.

3:56Before we get going, last week, we lost Sam Zell, one of the true investment greats and one of the most popular past guests on the show. As a very small tribute to the great man and investor, we replayed my conversation with Sam in the feed last weekend. This week, have a listen to the wise and entertaining story of Sam Zell and give a hug to those you love. Please enjoy my conversation with Amy Falls. Amy, great to see you. Great to see you. Why don't you take me back to how you first got interested or involved in this whole finance investing world? I backed into finance through an interest in international affairs, and in particular, international development.

4:48And I couldn't get a job at the World Bank, but JP Morgan was hiring, and they had been leaders in restructuring in the late 80s, the Latin American debt that all the banks had on their balance sheets. So it felt like an institution that would lead towards something related to emerging markets. Where did that path take you? Well, it took me to doing securities analysis for the bond division at J .P. Morgan. And initially, a good mentor said, just tell them you'll do whatever. That's how you get a job. In those days, when you were young, you said, I'll do whatever you want me to do. So they said, we need someone to help in financial institutions.

5:33And this was 1989. And actually, there was a banking crisis in 1989 that started in the US and rolled into Europe and elsewhere. So it was a great opportunity to understand bank balance sheets, to understand the risk of deposits fleeing. So it's funny how things come around. And also to understand how different governments reacted to the banking crises in their countries. And that allowed me to start thinking about how to assess country risk because many of the bank bonds became essentially government bonds in places like Sweden and Finland. And because I had the interest in government and emerging markets, I was able to push that into at least European governments, Canadian provinces, and then Asia was exploding and issuing a lot of debt in the United States.

6:30And that led to understanding Korea and China and Thailand and Malaysia. And ultimately, Mexico issued what we used to call a Yankee bond, which was a foreign issuer issuing in the US capital markets. At that time, really the only source of long -term debt financing. So it took a little while to go from doing what they wanted me to do to doing what I had wanted to do, but it did get there eventually. What did you take away from those varying experiences looking at different international bond markets? It really was the macroeconomic underpinning for everything I've done since. And the other thing was that it was critical to think of a framework for organizing a ton of information.

7:15I think when you're talking about countries, you could talk about the politics, you can talk about the economics, you can talk about inflation, you can talk about growth. There's so much information. And so I think what was helpful was to develop a framework as to, well, what would really impact your ability to pay? What is really the risk I'm trying to assess? What information is critical to that risk? And how would I look at that historically and across a set of peers? So I think the really interesting lessons I learned early on and from some early bosses was figure out how to make a framework to rank the risk profile of different banks or different countries.

7:55So it's kind of how to organize information because there's a lot of noise and that's only gotten worse. What were some of the core tenets of that framework? Interestingly, in the bank side, we started with this notion of solvency and liquidity, and I could still talk about that with Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic. So in one case, it's probably more of a liquidity crisis, too much reliance on short -term funding. And in the other, it may have been more of a solvency crisis, real loan impairment. So we took that same framework to the countryside and said, okay, countries are entities, they borrow money.

8:30And they either borrow a lot of money or they don't borrow a lot of money. And if they have to borrow a lot of money, which is not necessarily a bad thing, how are they borrowing that money or how are they attracting capital? Is it equity capital? Is it long -term financing? Or is it overnight short deposits that could flee? So we spent a lot of time on the balance of payments data, both the current account deficit and what was driving the country's need to borrow, but also the capital account, like how were they funding that and how stable were those sources of funding? And so in both banks and countries, the ability for capital to flee is dramatic.

9:09And one of the ways that really helped actually was back in Russia, way back when long -term capital defaulted. But they had a current account that wasn't really that bad, but there was so much capital fleeing out of the country. So if you didn't look at both sides, you didn't understand the situation. And we actually were able to avoid, we had sold out most of our Russia exposure on the fixed income desk prior to the devaluation, which ultimately led to default. But it was really that focus on the quality of the financing. So through that experience, say post -98 in Russia, what was it that led you to move from being on the fixed income desk to what you've done since?

9:48It was really the benefit of volunteering. So I moved from J .P. Morgan to Morgan Stanley, was very actively engaged in my professional life, but was asked to serve as a volunteer on the investment committee for the high school I had gone to, which had really changed my life and done a lot for me as a person and which has a needs blind tuition policy, which is supported by the endowment. So I was asked to serve on the investment committee for the endowment as a volunteer in 1998 or nine. And so I did. And that just really opened my mind to this whole world of endowment management. And at the same time, Barton Biggs, who I adored, periodically would write a book report because he was maybe didn't want to write about the markets.

10:35And he basically wrote about David Swenson's book, Pioneering Portfolio Management, which was really the first time I heard of David Swenson. So I read the book. I was involved at the Andover Endowment. And it fascinated me to think about using finance to support philanthropy and thinking broadly about markets. And of course, fixed income markets are huge, but they're not huge in most endowments. So again, it kind of opened my mind that there's a lot more to the world than trading bonds. How did you go from being on the board to becoming the CIO? That was sort of a stroke of luck. I think Andover, like many smaller endowments, wrestled with the notion of, do we just keep having a bunch of volunteers or do we create a professional office?

11:23And maybe it's not luck, maybe it's crisis. Maybe a theme in my life story is you benefit from crises. So we were pretty heavily invested in venture capital. Andover was an early mover in venture capital in the 80s. So we were early investors in funds like Matrix and some others. And that had risen to, in 99, to be almost 35 % of the endowment. It was like a huge exposure, almost entirely through appreciation. And I remember sitting at the meeting with all these guys, and they were very experienced investors, but they had day jobs. And I remember having a conversation around that moment and saying, gee, that's a little too high.

12:03We should probably do something about that. That's what all these wise people were saying. I was like, yes, we really should. But there wasn't anyone to do anything. I mean, that's like, yeah, we should. We had a consultant, but there wasn't really a person to drive and pull the trigger. So the market fixed the problem by wiping out a lot of that value. And the board said, geez, this is not smart. So it became an exercise. And then I actually spoke to David Swenson. I did a white paper for the institution on what were options besides an all -volunteer committee. One was to join an outsource CIO.

12:39Another was to create a small office. And with a lot of input, but especially from David, the idea to create our own office, the endowment at the time was $600 million. It's a borderline amount of money, but it seemed like we could leverage the network that Andover had and that we could try it. So the idea was, let's try it. And then we hired a headhunter, but having spent so much time working on it, I thought, you know, I would love to do this job. So happily, they took a risk on me because I didn't have much experience other than the volunteer experience. What did you find both expected and unexpected being in the seat as that first CIO?

13:20Unexpected was the manager selection piece is really critical. I think the asset allocation was something that I understood at the end of my career, I'd moved out of emerging markets into global fixed income strategy. I worked with a lot of allocators and institutional investors on how to think about divvying up a portfolio globally and across different risk factors. But I think the importance of getting the manager piece right and what that actually entailed was a very new kettle of fish. I remember spending a lot of time generating enormous spreadsheets and then going to see one of the board members, Fred Schumann, who'd run a hedge fund of funds for years and just reams of data.

14:07And he said, Amy, Amy, let's just get the 10 best guys. It's not all in the math, but the math is important and the track record is important, but there's so much more to it. And I think that's what's been the most interesting surprise and also skill to kind of start to try to build is how do you assess an organization that is run well to succeed in investing? What have you found resonates as your sweet spot on picking a manager? It's multifaceted. The data helps to understand how they do and under what circumstances. I also like to read all of their letters. I find that if you start with a book, I usually make a paper binder, of all the letters since inception, you will really begin to understand the thought process of a manager and how they handle mistakes.

15:02That doesn't help you with new launches, and frankly, I find that the most challenging. But I do find understanding how people talk about what they've done and what went wrong actually gets at accountability and thoughtfulness. Then we try to look at compensation. How do you reward and value people? Because I really do believe people will do what they feel they're supposed to do. Are there other structural pieces that you've gravitated to within the types of managers you like to invest in? I think alignment, not in the narrow sense of aligned interests, but I think it's really important that your structure fits your strategy and your strategy fits your sandbox.

15:42So I love the idea of niche managers, but the issue with niche managers is that if the sandbox gets bad, they're stuck in the sandbox. So generally with really niche managers, I'm a bit more in favor of long short if you can. I mean, there's some markets you can't really short, but I think it really helps if you're only going to do India, let's just say. And for some reason, India becomes expensive, either the currency or the market. I think it's nice if you can put shorts on to hedge, but a long only -only, it's harder. So I think a more narrow strategy requires you to be able to hedge in other ways.

16:25One area I spend a lot of time on is what we call multi -strat, which I like to call capital rotators, people who can exploit inefficiencies or market dislocations on our behalf quickly. Because most funds, and I really believe in longer lockups, I like giving people capital for a long period of time. But that means I can't get it back if there's a dislocation. So then if you have a strategy that pays people in a very siloed way, that's not going to work because you're not encouraging people to pass the puck. So compensation structures need to align with what the strategy is. So it's just alignment, really.

17:02Well, let's circle back. So in that period of time at Andover, what happened under your tenure? Well, the returns got better. And the global financial crisis happened. So two big things. On the return front, we were bottom quartile when I took over. I don't think we knew we were bottom quartile because you tend not to look at that as an all -volunteer committee. We had more than 60 managers for a $600 million portfolio. And more or less firing about a third of them was very important to boosting performance. And I've not figured out the math, but somehow the tail of managers seems to drag you down more than it pulls you up.

17:47And I think that's true with stock positions too. And I think it has probably to do with conviction levels. We definitely narrowed the manager roster. In many cases, we would have four guys doing the same thing, we'd take it to two. Then the financial crisis, I mean, that was huge. And that I really feel we did well in the financial crisis because we had a high level of trust between the board and myself and the rest of the staff. So when the markets were imploding in the fall, we actually issued some debt on behalf of the institution to stay invested. And we rebalanced back into equities in February, March, not because we thought the crisis was over.

18:27In fact, I had a horrible stomachache for, I think, that whole three -month period. But we were so far under our targets that the decision was made to put 1 % back into both emerging markets and U .S. equities, not a huge amount. We went from being down 20 -plus percent to only down 15 because of that little extra allocation at what turned out to be the bottom of the market. So that was a lesson in stick to your targets, at least to some degree. You always extrapolate, oh, this is going to go on forever. But there's a reason to have targets and there's a reason to stick to them. So the impetus for Andover bringing you in as a CIO was this other period of crisis and inability to react.

19:14I'm curious, outside of the financial crisis that hit, were there other times that you felt it was just really valuable to have someone in the seat as compared to a bunch of smart people making decisions on a committee? Several ways in which I think it's valuable. One is to rebalance. I think rebalancing just doesn't happen by itself. It's a reason I love targets rather than ranges. Ranges are really sloppy. Just having someone sit in the seat forces you to say, you know, we're actually way overweight this or that. Another thing was leveraging the intellectual capital of the institution. So we have a lot of smart alumni, and most of them were not on the committee.

19:53So I traveled the world and had conferences and gatherings and tried to really figure out who did we know, who was an Andover grad, how could we mine their thinking. And even once we ran something with students, and this was at least 15 years ago, probably more, they were supposed to come up with their investment ideas. And they were 17 years old. And one boy stood up and said, I think you can make a lot of money in privacy. Privacy is going to become an issue and there's going to be money to be made in preserving people's privacy. It was so far ahead. And I'm not sure we could have made money on it, but I just always remember that moment of, wow, the kids have a lot to say about the future.

20:38So as you build this up into your baby and it's working, how long did you stay before the next opportunity came up? I was there for six years, and I think that was on the short side. The opportunity that came up was Rockefeller University, and it was at a time also with really wonderful leadership coming into Rockefeller. Mark Tessay -Lavine is now at Stanford, and Russ Carson and Bill Ford. And it was a moment where I felt I could make a difference at Rockefeller. There had been upset between the board and the staff. I think it was on the early side, but the combination of a mission that seemed important, leadership that I was very impressed with, and the ability to perhaps have a positive impact made me make the move.

21:24So when you came into that seat, the University Endowment at Rockefeller had been run by an organization. You're walking into a portfolio. I guess there was some tension between the board and the team. How did you take steps to start to make your own imprint on that portfolio? Well, the first thing I did was I had a one -on -one meeting with every board member. And I said, help me understand some of the tilts in the portfolio. There were some slightly odd tilts in the portfolio. What was an example of an odd tilt? Like 20 % long, short equity. It's like a lot. It's not crazy, but I asked each person, why do we have this?

22:02And nobody had an answer. It had been a manager -driven process. And the board would come up with 8 million managers that they liked, and then the staff would react. There had been a fair amount of turnover too, so that was an issue. They also had ranges. As I said, I hate portfolio ranges. So equities could be 5 % to 20%. Do we want to be 5 % or do we want to be 20 %? So the biggest change we made was to move to portfolio targets for asset classes, to define what we meant by the asset classes. And the long short equity was a perfect example. when you ask the question, not should we fire this guy or that guy, but how much do we want in this asset class with these characteristics?

22:47The answer was more like 10 to 12. So that just implied behavior that then had to happen. So I think it was really about creating, again, a framework. The other thing that was really interesting was the spend rate was quite high, about 6%. And I asked the CFO, what return expectation are you putting in the budget, which is impossible if you don't have portfolio targets. You can't have an expected return with ranges. You can have a range of expected returns, but you can't have one. So they turned out they had gone to the common fund and the common fund has a model for intergenerational equity. So they gave them the spend rate and the common fund told them what rate you would have to earn.

23:26And that was what was being plugged into the budget. So I was like, well, I don't think we should do that. I mean, these are basic things, but I remember saying to Mark Tessay Levine, who like is a Nobel Prize winning type neuroscientist, this math is going to seem very babyish to you. Jim Simons was on the committee. I mean, these are people who are really good at math. I was like, we're just going to kind of talk about X times Y plus P times Q, and we're going to go with that. So that I think was important just to impose a bit more architecture around the portfolio. And then again, to weed the garden too many managers.

24:01You mentioned defining asset classes or what they meant. Did you come out of that with sort of a different than, let's say, common definitions of asset classes? I have on several occasions felt that common definitions are not helpful. I like to define asset classes in terms of risk and correlation and somewhat what risk factor do they imply. I'm probably closer to what you would call factor analysis than asset classes, but it gets tricky because that's just not the way the world is really organized. But I think it's helpful when you think about something like fixed income. What do we mean by fixed income?

24:41For us, we wanted to have something that was liquid, highly safe, or would have a negative correlation with equities and not complicated. So I don't really want the Barclays Ag. I don't need a bunch of mortgage -backed securities in there that have complicated duration, complicated character. Don't need a bunch of investment -grade corporate bonds either. So if you define it that way, you might put credit elsewhere in the portfolio, but your fixed income for me is really like a treasury portfolio so that I can say with some degree of confidence, this is the kind of characteristic it's going to have.

25:18It's going to be up for me in down markets, not always. Similarly, hedge funds or absolute return, I've typically divided that into two categories, equity -oriented strategies, i .e. long short, because there we assume you're going to have a 0 .7 -ish correlation to stocks, but you're going to have less volatility and more alpha. And then we have other kinds of absolute return on correlated macro strategies. I usually make a separate bucket for distressed debt and credit, and then these multi -strata capital rotators. And those we expect to have lower correlation to stocks or to be a play on credit spreads.

25:53So it's kind of like making it a little more precise. And I find the same thing with real assets is even worse. I mean, what are you talking about? So I think just really being clear what you want out of it and what you're modeling out of it. And again, optimizers are super unhelpful in a lot of ways, but they just force you to specify, okay, this is what I'm looking for. So once you make those definitions clear to your committee and you see a pruning process necessary, what actually happens from in the first year? Is it the low -hanging fruit changes, not complicated but important to make, and then you go out and implement?

26:33Yeah, I mean, it's usually really unpleasant first year of everybody hates you because you have to fire people. And it's often not because they're not doing a solid job. One of the things we talked about was David's view of culling versus weeding. You could have four really good managers that have very similar characteristics. You just don't need all four of them. So then you pick the two that you think are the best, and that may also be how they relate to one another. Generally speaking, I would look at the whole roster plus people outside the roster. That's where the math and the statistics of risk and return and portfolio concentration, calculation, just a whole series of measurements.

27:21I like to read all the letters, understand the culture. Early on, didn't have like a scoring chart. It was a little more loosey -goosey, like write up a memo as to why you're picking these two. I've evolved more and more towards like not a checklist, but a set number of things that you sort of try to score people on, but always a deep look then at the historical data of their returns and what drove returns. Let's roll forward to the present. Impetus for change once more to an organization that certainly wasn't struggling at the time when you came in. No. I think the excitement about coming to Northwestern had two aspects to it.

Read the full transcript

28:00One was it really felt interesting to me to be able to teach and to go to a university which had students. Rockefeller has some students, but it's mostly postdocs and they all do science. And I really am not going to teach them much. But to come to a university and to be able to work with students was really fun. So I do teach a class and we have a bunch of interns that roll through the office. And that was very compelling. Also coming back to a part of the world where I grew up, I feel like it's a great spot. And I think the investment office has a good history. The university is on the move and has moved up dramatically in terms of its rankings, its research.

28:43So I feel there's an opportunity to help grow the spendable resource as the capacities of the university are growing. So I wouldn't say the university was in any kind of trouble, but more it's kind of surged, like a lot of the colleges in the US, has really become a preeminent institution and continues to need to catch up, I think, from a capital standpoint. So there was a sense of mission and the importance both for the region. I think the Midwest and Chicago is very important. Creating an intellectual triangle between University of Chicago, Northwestern, Illinois, and even you could go out to Michigan and others.

29:23There's a lot of intellectual property here. Just trying to help that bleed into the local economy, I think could be very useful. Now, that's way beyond my pay grade, but it's just you're part of it by being part of one of the universities here. So as you step into the seat and you have a longstanding team in place, how did you think about structuring the investment team? So the first thing I tried to do was really spend time with every member of the team and just understand what they thought, what they liked, what they were concerned about. I tried to do a lot of listening. It was very important to me to not break anything.

30:01I mean, this is going well. Will was a longstanding, respected, Will McLean, my predecessor, longstanding, well -respected CIO and member of the community. And he'd built a great team with a lot of longevity. So to some degree, you're sort of in a do no harm mode. That was important. And the team is incredibly devoted to the institution, which helped. But I also think fresh eyes, you always come at things with different perspective. And I had seen at both the Ford Foundation and Harvard Management Corporation, where I sit on the board, evolution in how people had thought about investing capital.

30:41And in particular at Harvard Management, I felt that the move towards a generalist model from a highly siloed model had some real benefits. Also, even at tiny Rockefeller with a much smaller team, there had been silos and there was a benefit in kind of blurring the lines. But I also felt that there was importance in sort of maintaining the depth of industry knowledge that these longstanding professionals had. So we've tried to craft, I would say, somewhat of a hybrid model where we're blurring the lines across asset classes. So we don't have someone who owns private equity, owns venture capital, but we're able to think more laterally, but still retain depth in certain areas.

31:24And that's been interesting. And I think an appropriate change that reflects also change in the way money is being managed. I think a lot of managers are starting to break out of the traditional categories. And I think it's very helpful to see opportunities across public and private markets and valuation. So I would say there's been a move towards blurring lines, not complete generalist model, but a more fluid model and a more collaborative model. How do you take that theory and apply it in practice? So that's been the biggest challenge is so how do you create accountability? It's really easy to know what to do when you own an asset class.

32:04Each person runs their little business and the CIO just makes sure that everybody's doing a good job running their business and sets the big picture. I think you lose some cross -thinking and cross -fertilization, even though there's a very collaborative team. It's different when people are partners on a project than when they're just listening to a partner describe their project. So the way we're trying to create a comparable kind of discipline is to actually assign managers. So everybody has a manager roster. it maps roughly to the old asset classes, but not entirely. And then each manager has a partner.

32:42So there's two people on every manager. And we have something like 105 active managers, 110, eight people who are dividing that. So it's really not that onerous. It's like 15 managers per person, plus trying to keep an eye on who might be better. So that's good in terms of your existing coverage, but who's responsible for finding the next new guy and how does that work? And that's also something we're really spending a lot of time thinking about. We get a lot of inbound, but it's also important to, I think, be on top of the great new talent that might be out there. So we've sort of created zones and there's partnership.

33:20And then we've sort of beginning to adopt a slot concept, like we're trying to have a more or less set number of managers. It won't be precise. And then always for every manager, we want to keep track of three or four alternatives. What does ownership of a manager relationship that's in the portfolio mean in terms of what's asked and deliverables of the people? Well, again, this is evolving, but the idea would be a regular review of every manager. It's interesting because one of the challenges is that private managers, you kind of do a deep dive re -up when the fund is re -upping. And the rest of the time you think, well, I can't really do anything until they come back to market.

34:00So there's this weird every two or three or last couple of years, every year, you basically do the due diligence on their timeframe. Public managers, there's a risk that you kind of just float along. You never get to the threshold of cutting anyone. So what we've tried to do is create a regular, like everybody gets reviewed once a year. And we have a framework now across publics and privates with sort of a scoring method. And it's sort of intended to say green light, yellow light, red light. And we're not fully implemented. I think it will be useful and interesting, but we'll see. We're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about SRS Aquium.

34:45Want to make sure your M &A processes aren't stuck in the past? Partner with a company that's been defining the future of dealmaking for nearly two decades instead. When it comes to M &A innovation, SRS Aquium has reshaped the way that deals get done, streamlining processes for maximum efficiency and minimum headaches. Professional shareholder representation, online M &A payments, digital stockholder solicitation, SRS Aquium pioneered each and continues to set the bar for game -changing innovation. So leave the days of disjointed deal management behind and define your future with SRS Aquium, the smartest way to run a deal.

35:31Learn more at srsaquium .com. That's S -R -S -A -C -Q -U -I -O -M .com. And now, back to the show. Curious on the manager selection side, you went from having your portfolio at Andover to turning over a portfolio and ending with a portfolio at Rockefeller. That roster of managers could be different from the one you stepped into at Northwestern. How do you think about your own favorites compared to the Competition for Capital with the legacy portfolio you walked into at Northwestern? There were people in this portfolio that we didn't have at Rockefeller and maybe couldn't have had at Rockefeller.

36:15Now, I think that world is changing. So right now, I think access is less of an issue. So I didn't feel the need to bring in all my favorites, but rather just like, let's understand each player and how they fit. And if they've served the university for five, six, seven, 10 years and they're doing a great job, there's no reason to change. Change is costly. But I think there are managers I knew that maybe either weren't well known to this institution or where there was more of a relationship. So I've definitely brought some relationships over. and there's a few that I feel really strongly about where I thought, gosh, this would be a perfect fit in this portfolio.

36:56In some cases, it was more about sizing. So they may have had a relationship with a manager that I had high conviction in. I might say, gosh, we should be twice as big in this manager. So there's been some of that. But I would say in both the case of Rockefeller and here, it's a re -underwrite everything as unbiased an opinion as possible. How do you balance that longstanding desire from your fixed income days to look at the data and have an assessment, knowing that there's a lot of noise around whatever that data is, and the human side of having relationships and the value that those relationships bring to an investment portfolio?

37:36As someone who likes data, that's been the most important evolution is you have to look at the human side. And in lots of parts of the market, the data is easy to manipulate. Depending on how liquid, even not just private equity, but how do you mark a credit book is very important. Some people market mid -market, some people mark bid and ask. I think it's useful to start with the data because it helps point you to questions. But in things like private equity, I always say like, okay, I need to go through every company in the portfolio. How's it marked? Because if there are aggressive markers or conservative markers, only comparing the IRR doesn't really tell you the whole story.

38:18But the important thing about relationships is trust. And many, many managers will hit some kind of an air pocket because whatever they're doing hits an air pocket. it's inevitable almost that something will go bump or some investment goes astray or some person goes. So I think it's really important to invest with people that will do the right thing under pressure. How do you tease that out? I like reading all the letters because I think it's very important to try to see how people have handled failure. It's something I worry a lot about our kids these days that are not allowed to fail, but it's why I do think sports are valuable, but not if you're not allowed to fail.

38:56It's how people cope with setbacks, I think tells you a lot about them. I don't usually ask people a lot of personal questions, but I think if you look at how they handled a mistake, are they defensive? Do they hide it? Do they airbrush it out of history? That's not great. Are they good listeners? I really like meeting the young people in the organization if it's possible, because I think you get a feel. I definitely think you got to go to their offices. This idea that people come and sit in your conference room, that's fine. And I'm happy to host people here in Evanston. But I really like to walk around and sense what the vibe is.

39:36So in addition to reading everything you can historically, talking to people about mistakes, I'm really curious, what are some of the great Amy Falls frameworks that you've taken from one seat to the next that you're bringing into Northwestern that might not have been there? The notion of constructing a portfolio of managers and a slot discipline, one thing I noticed in many cases is that it's pretty rare that you get a memo recommending a manager that looks at the correlation of that manager with the existing roster. It's not just each manager on their own. It's what do they bring to this bucket?

40:17I think being very explicit in tying the asset class assumptions to the manager selection piece is important so that it all iterates out. I feel also this idea of liquidity and how you spend your liquidity. So I am a believer that people typically have better results if they don't have the pressure of monthly liquidity. But we have a 5 % spend rate here and it's 5%, it's not 5 % net two. So we have to be able to access capital. So I think understanding where are you getting the best bang for the liquidity give up is important. And that's something where there are certain areas and real estate might be one where it's a good asset class, but the public private gap in that high.

41:04It's just very important to think about how you use liquidity and also to make sure that liquidity is balanced across the portfolio. So one thing I've been working on here is we have some countries where we're all private. Then I'm like, okay, well, we're really stuck there. So I feel like understanding how to budget liquidity, understanding liquidity as an opportunity to rebalance in addition to payout. And if you don't have some way of rebalancing, then you're stuck with hedging, which is hard. I also have a thing that I think is super important and I think everyone probably has this, but we have a two -year forward cash planner.

41:41So I have a model that ties together what we think the draw will be from the private vehicles, what the spend is going to be, and then looks at every manager going forward two years as to what's our cash need likely to be, how do we stay balanced at our asset class targets, and who would we redeem from? and it looks out two years and I change it pretty much every month. So it's just a constant game plan revision so that you sort of know this is where I'm going to get money in six months and three months. It's flexible, but I feel like it's like flying the plane. So in addition to that need for liquidity, you just briefly mentioned earlier the importance and willingness to lock up capital.

42:22Yeah. How do you decide where you're going to lock it up? We want to lock it up where you're going to get the best return for locking it up. But I believe that's true pretty much across the board. We did an exercise a while ago that actually grew out of a criticism that Jim Simons made of the asset allocation work. And he said, this is so stupid. We don't invest in asset classes. We invest in managers and all that matters is their beta and their liquidity, which was kind of weird. Well, it is kind of true in some ways. So we ran an exercise looking at all of our managers divided not by asset class, but simply by the liquidity terms, not even including private equity, but just the public managers who had annual or longer locks, who had quarterly locks and who allowed monthly liquidity.

43:10And then we looked at 10 years of risk return data and we found that you could make an efficient frontier. And basically the curve for the longest lockup was higher and steeper. So I think that yields a pretty important insight, which is You want your least volatile stuff to be your most liquid stuff because it is your dry powder. And then you compromise liquidity where there's the most risk because you probably get the highest payout doing that. And the chances are you might want the liquidity or need it, but the thing is down 20%. You're not going to want to sell it. So I personally like to barbell.

43:49I'm not hugely adverse to cash and short -duration treasuries as a ballast to then drive into a lot more illiquid stuff. But I think it should be related to the risk profile too. Curious what you've learned about decision -making processes. I believe that decisions are best made having to make the argument. I actually am in favor of a lot of discussion. It's very inefficient and drives some people crazy. I have been offered in various situations, you know, you don't have to bring managers to the committee anymore. Just do what you think. I always say no, because I don't actually think I'm going to get to the right answer by myself.

44:34But having to argue it out to the committee and make the case and put the data together, that's important. And so I do like decisions. We have to make the case. However, that requires a lot of work. And I think it's helpful to have consistent ways of looking at the same types of things. So I like to have a set analytics that you're going to do for every single manager. It could be different between private equity and public or whatever, but it's always the same so that you don't end up just cherry picking data or cherry picking references. I think consistency of presentation with the need to argue the case or people don't have as much autonomy.

45:18I have to make, there's more of a group decision -making process. And that really does drive some people crazy because it takes a lot longer. But I think you get to better decisions that way. I'd love to turn to your thoughts across some asset classes and maybe start with fixed income where you first started your career. How are you thinking about it? What's interesting today? Well, fixing them is really interesting for the first time in a while. I do think the Fed is probably at the end of the tightening cycle, but it's been a very sharp, short move. I think it's going to result in bankruptcies and credit events.

45:54So I think there will be higher default rates, and I'm not sure that's fully reflected in corporate spreads. I think there's still shoes to fall in that space, opportunities will arise. If you can get short dated treasuries at four and a half, 5%, that's a really good thing. I think fixed income is interesting. I think cash is less painful, which is great because I love it. I think credit spreads are going to be a huge opportunity. And I'm very interested in the ways in which the lending markets have changed as the banks have kind of been eclipsed by fund vehicles. And I'm not even 100 % sure how that will play out in a bankruptcy cycle since we really haven't had one, but it's going to be an interesting space.

46:36Along those lines, have you thought about private credit space? There's a lot, I think, to like about that space other than that it was so popular. Anything that grows that fast makes me a little nervous, but I think there are some inherent benefits. We were talking about matching your funding liquidity with the liquidity of the assets. And I do think banks have had in some ways a bit of a mismatch. I mean, not the traditional bank with retail deposits because those are quite sticky, but there's something to be said about locked up capital for markets that are not liquid. It's kind of rational in that regard.

47:15And I think there is a healthy ability to do due diligence and you're certainly getting paid a lot more than probably the average loan officer did. So I think there are some things that are really positive. I think that clearly also there was an opportunity created by regulation of the banking system, which is maybe appropriate, right? The government says, we don't want to be on the hook for all this bad lending. So we're just not going to be. So we are now. You don't have any guarantees. And it may be that people aren't really thinking about losses in these funds and what they could look like.

47:47So I like the asset class. I think it's evolving. And I think that there's been so much growth. We're looking at it. We didn't have a lot of that in the portfolio. And I feel like we're at a point in the cycle where I think it could be making sense. So with the potential, as you mentioned, increased bankruptcies and talking about fixed income, how are you thinking about traditional private equity? We were underweight private equity. So we are using this moment to think about where is the best place to add. Obviously, there's an adjustment as the cost of capital goes up, leverage strategies get hurt.

48:27And then there has to either be more equity in deals and prices have to come down. So there's like an adjustment period. And that is what it is. I'm happy that we are in a position to be like adding capital gradually. Unfortunately, there are other parts of the portfolio that are not returning capital. And I'm not speaking about venture, but natural resources and real estate, which probably we would have expected would have returned a little bit more capital. That's been a little slower. I think that earnings growth is going to be critical. So when we think about the future, we think about potentially higher inflation, potentially higher interest rates.

49:06That probably means lower multiples, but it probably favors companies that can profitably grow earnings. And I think that's interesting. So within private equity, We really like the people that are good at growing earnings. And it might be interesting outside the US. I feel like there may be more opportunity for real corporate enhancements. We just did a Japanese private equity fund as an example. So I think back to basics in a world where money isn't free, you got to earn money. So I think companies that have good revenue growth and high profit margins that aren't dependent on enormous financing, that's where you want to be.

49:53I think at least that's a safe place to be. And I think a lot of private equity firms can be in that space. When you're looking at growth through that lens as one of the inputs in increasing your allocations, there's two different ways you can think about that. One is you're in businesses, sectors, big software that have natural growth, have been priced high, but have the growth. And the other is you just have GPs who seem to be very good at changing the inflection of a business's trajectory. How do you think about those two dimensions? I think you need to do both. I think we definitely have allocations to higher, like intrinsically higher growth sectors.

50:32I do think profitable growth is critical, but that's true for a lot of software businesses. There could be an opportunity for more operating efficiency, just drive change, kind of old -fashioned PE. It's tempting to think, surely all of that has happened. Surely everything that had to happen has happened. But I think free interest rates, actually a fair amount probably could be improved. And I think the middle market is probably more where that exists. But there are some interesting notions of just areas that were so hot and popular, like even in that software space. Like, okay, they were all about growth, but not profitability.

51:17So there could be people that are really good at saying, fine, we're going to slow the growth a tiny bit and ramp the profitability. Like that would be a very good strategy, I would think. So I'd love to get your thoughts on an asset class that it seems like nobody really talks about much anymore, which is public equity. Yeah. And we still like public equity. We actually have a lot of it relative to our peers. So the interesting thing to me about public equity is I really think thinking about outside the US, we've had a long period now where like just being global was a bad idea. I'm really interested in that.

51:52I think that statistically, you'd sort of think it would be time for a reversal. Valuation -wide, U .S. is on average more expensive. Dollar's been very strong and may not persist at that strength. So I think looking at public equity markets globally has not been profitable, but could be. And again, we're thinking about places like Japan. I don't know about emerging markets, spending a lot of time thinking about that. That's an area that I feel like it's really evolved into mostly country funds and very few global emerging markets players. And I think actually regional players, maybe even the sweet spot between trying to do everything and only doing China or India or Brazil.

52:40An adjustment has happened. I think that multiples are down. They're maybe not down enough, but they're down. And I think there will be some interesting opportunities if we do go and do, which I fear is true, that we're kind of going out of a unipolar world into some kind of multipolar world. That's one of the reasons I think inflation is going to be sticky. But I also think that it could be valuable to have more international diversification because I think you're going to have different zones of economic activity. And I'm not sure you want to be completely absent from one. I guess as you're thinking about that, the most obvious question is views on China.

53:16We have spent a lot of time on that. And I would say we actually did a full board meeting on it a year ago and really tried to boil it down into sort of economic and financial arguments and geopolitical arguments, which were much harder to make. At the end of the meeting, we decided to stay the course, which is we're not dramatically overweight China. We're not underweight China. We're sort of more or less at our targets and probably a little shifting in favor of public equity versus private equity and the idea that there being a bit more nimble. China is an important part of the global economy.

53:52I deeply regret that there is the lack of collaboration, cooperation, and most importantly, perhaps communication between our two countries. I think that is not good for any of us. But I think in my mind, there's still a lot of opportunity in China. So I think the valuations are much lower, and particularly in certain areas. So yes, I think clearly people are concerned about both corporate governance and too much regulation. That's sort of the micro concern, and the much bigger looming concern about tension between China and the United States. We've sort of defaulted to 8 % to 10 % of the portfolio, which is probably underweight relative to GDP, but probably about on when you look at market cap and percentage of total private equity.

54:43So I think we're kind of neutral, but we're not abandoning the field at this point. I'd love to take a step back from your work on a number of prestigious investment committees. What have you learned from being on the same side, but that share at the table that's impacted how you go about investing? I think really ensuring partnership between the committee and the staff. And that is a lot about how you communicate. There's a few things I would say I think are important. One is if you flood a committee with information, you won't get any feedback. If you come to committee meetings with every I dotted, every T crossed, very few people are going to say, gosh, I know you've done months of work here and you have a point of view.

55:32I happen to disagree with the point of view. As a board member, you kind of go, yeah, but it's not worth upsetting the person who's put so much work in. So one of the things we do when we do committee meetings, we have an on -deck section, which is these are some managers that we're just starting the process on. So if you have a thought, Let me know now. That's really intended to invite them into the conversation before it feels annoying to get into the conversation. So I think there are a lot of subtle ways that committees can either be shut down or encouraged to participate. And again, as I said, I prefer dialogue.

56:09I like to ask questions. I try to say, okay, what are the five things I really want the committee's point of view on before every meeting? There are committees that aren't run that way. There are committees that aren't healthy enough to be run that way. But what I would say is if you can foster partnership between a great committee and the staff, it's a wonderful thing. It's a very happy thing. And I think it really helps the institution. What are some of the other subtle ways that a committee can get shut down? The two I said are the most important. I mean, no information, obviously. And there are people who say like, I really don't think I want the committee in my knitting.

56:48So I'm going to keep them at bay. So that's one way. Excess information is another. And just you've already finished the thesis and you're asking them any questions. It's like that's a third. I think in another way that you can prevent shutdown is if you know someone is an expert in an area or has an opinion, I usually call them before the meeting. But I think there are committee member behaviors that can shut down dialogue too. And clearly, when you put your committee hat on, you can't be wearing your day job jersey. It's just so important because to build trust, these committees are all working on behalf of the institution.

57:31So for instance, if I go to a committee as a competitor, which I am in many cases, I mean, maybe they don't see it that way, but I have to put my Harvard jersey on when I'm at Harvard. And it's like, I'm never not wearing my Northwestern jersey, but I can't do anything harmful. I can't take an idea and go back to my staff. I can't end run and go to a manager that they're bringing and take capacity that they would have wanted. but you see people making arguments that clearly seem self -serving, that will shut down not just that person, but it can really shut down the whole committee. And then what do you do when you have a committee member who does that constantly?

58:10That's a problem. So then you either fix it or you stop involving the committee so much. And that's too bad because that's suboptimal. How about navigating a committee in the actual boardroom? Well, I think preparation is critical, but it doesn't always work. I mean, we had a funny, my first committee meeting here, there was a committee member who's actually subsequent since passed away, Howard Trenan, and he hated cash. And I love cash. And we didn't know each other and it was COVID. So we were like on Zoom. And we just were going to go down a rabbit hole of like, I don't want to do this. We shouldn't have cash.

58:43So if you're going to hit an impasse, you have to be like, okay, let's table this one and we'll come back to it. So an unforeseen impasse, that's really hard to manage. A predictable impasse, I know this person will have this point of view. You can kind of try to handicap before, but conversations go where they want to go. I think having a really strict agenda, like we have to get these five things done is important. We had a situation where we knew the diversity work we were doing was important, but we kept putting it at the end of the meeting and it kept getting shortchanged. And finally, one of the committee members, a woman said, you know, this is not okay.

59:19I was like, you're right. It's not okay. So we put it at the beginning because if it's important, let's let that take up all the time. I think trying to anticipate problems is probably the most important thing. So I have to touch on two things before we hit on the closing questions. You mentioned culling and weeding managers. And I know that that is an analogy for a particular activity you have outside of the office. So I would love to hear about your farm and how you think about that and how it impacts everything you do. One of the closing questions was, what do you like to do besides work? And I do love getting my hands dirty.

59:52I love plants. I love gardening. I loved it so much that my husband and I bought a farm that was in foreclosure, saved it from becoming a Walmart. And the farm is awesome. It's an organic farm in Maine, probably not the easiest place to farm. It's cold. And as someone said, the glaciers took most of the soil down to Long Island. So, you know, it's a tough place to farm, but it's really gratifying. And I do think there's a lot of analogies between stewardship of land and stewardship of financial assets. So I love my farm. I wish I had more time for it. That is the prize on the horizon to do more of that.

1:00:30But I still have a garden at home, grow a lot of vegetables. I think growing your own food is just incredibly gratifying. Is there anything that you've learned from the fundamentals of farming that become particularly germane to investing? Yes, so many things. And in some ways just a way of visualizing topics you already know. But we talked about definition of asset classes. And one of the funny stories, farming is not profitable. Very hard to make money farming. But one item, tomatoes are pretty good. So people will pay a lot for a good tomato and they're efficient to grow. So after our first summer, when we looked at where we had made money, we made most of our money in tomatoes.

1:01:13So we were like, let's just do more tomatoes. So we took all the greenhouses and we filled them with tomatoes because they're covered. They're not heated greenhouses, but high tunnels. We had all kind of tomatoes. We had cherry tomatoes, heirloom tomatoes, and yellow tomatoes. A lot of diversity in the tomatoes. Blight got in the greenhouse, they were all tomatoes. So I use that analogy to think about when we talk about a diversified portfolio, you got to be sure they're not all secretly tomatoes. And I think that understanding what does create that diversity, there's diversity in public large cap equities, but not that much.

1:01:51So you're going to have a diversified portfolio, but it's going to have a lot of inherent beta. A lot of times it's just creating a concrete analogy that is helpful to think about the nuance of a concept that you know, but you think, yeah, it's actually a tomato. It looks like it isn't, but it is. So I think it's been more that, although the issue of not being able to keep up with everything you plant. So I think that's another thing about it kind of has to do with weeding and culling and the notion of don't sow what you can't reap. because the amount of waste that happens because you just can't get to the crop, it's very hard.

1:02:28It all comes at one time. So just a lot about not setting yourself up for failure because you can't keep track of it or you don't have the resources to do what you think you can do. All right, Amy, I'm going to turn to a couple of closing questions. And for the first one, I'm going to say, what's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work, family, and farming? Oh, I like to play golf. I'm sad to say sports in general, a little tennis every now and then. I love hiking, love the outdoors. And sadly, I do do a fair amount of knitting and needlepoint. Why is that sad? I don't know. It feels very grandmotherly.

1:03:07What did you dream about doing when you were a kid? I think at one point I wanted to be a journalist. And I think at another point, I might have wanted to be in politics. Thankfully, I don't think I had the stomach for it, but who knew? What's your biggest investment pet peeve? My biggest investment pet peeve is arrogance. It takes many forms, but I find I try to always be polite and thoughtful. But when I feel like people are being arrogant, and particularly if they're being arrogant about a risk that I think they're not appreciating about what they're doing, that's when I become rude. And I'm usually ashamed of it, but it's just like I can't help myself.

1:03:45What's the biggest investment mistake that you learn from and will never make again? I think the biggest investment mistakes were usually around too much reliance on data and not enough focus on the caliber of the person. Sometimes the data is either not right. The biggest mistake I ever made was really being swamped by how good the numbers looked and not really understanding what was happening under the hood. to create those numbers. Which two people have had the biggest impact on your professional life? It's really hard to pick two, but it's really easy to say David Swenson had the biggest impact, but there have been many others.

1:04:24I feel Peter Natashie, all the Andover Investment Committee. I've had a lot of great mentors over the years. Barton Biggs, who I was a little afraid of, but boy, he made you think. Mostly men, Ted, I'm going to say one thing, because I do feel like it's really important. I think women need to have good mentors. And I think there will be a world where there's a 50 -50 chance that the mentor is a male or a female. But until we're in that world, it's very important for young women to be able to find mentors who don't look exactly like them. I think there's a difference between mentor and sponsor, like someone who really promoted you.

1:05:07And in that regard, I think, you know, someone like Peter Natas, you really brought me into a lot of conversations. David, who like opened the door to his office and said, come on in and learn from me. Those are people who really sponsor you, put your name up for jobs or whatever. That kind of active sponsorship really helps in a career. And I think sometimes you just got to be able to build those bridges across difference. And that's true for all kinds of diversity. What was the best advice you ever received and what was the context that came to you? I'm going to say this. It may not be the best advice really in life, but I think it's one of the best advice for what we do, which was don't invest in one -man bands.

1:05:47And I sort of feel like I would just broaden that out to just be careful about the Lone Ranger and yourself and your team and the managers. And again, it gets back to this view that I have that an iterative process results in better thinking than a shutdown process. And that actually came to me from Jack Meyer, another great investor. So when I was making this switch, I went and met a lot of people and said, what's your advice? What's your advice? What's your advice? I got all kinds of good advice. But that one kind of stuck in my head because it's about the value of collaborative teams and systems.

1:06:26And one thing I look at with managers is, are you set up to encourage people to challenge your thinking or to stifle people who challenge your thinking? I have to fight that in myself too. What teaching from your parents has most stayed with you? My parents had a remarkable commitment to hard work and doing the right thing. And they never said it. They lived it. They're still alive. They're 92. And my dad is my mom's full -time caretaker. And he never would talk about anything like that. But it's just they were both people who had a deep sense of what their responsibilities were to family. My father was a physician.

1:07:06If there was something that needed to be done, they just got up and did it. There was just never any complaining. So they were people who really worked hard and really cared. They lived that way. And so I often think myself, it's like, kids see what you do, not what you say. All right, Amy, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? Learning how to listen. I feel like I'm becoming better at that. I think there was a point in my life when it seemed important to be heard. And I'm starting to feel like, and this is maybe a natural part of maturing, but learning how to hold back and listen, I feel like is an evolution right now.

1:07:50that I kind of wish I'd known about earlier, just listen. Because sometimes I think the anxiety to be heard is just too great. Amy, thanks so much for sharing all of your insight. Thank you for taking the time. It's fun to talk to you. Thanks for listening to the show. If you like what you heard, hop on our website at capitalallocators .com, where you can access past shows, join our mailing list, and sign up for premium content. Have a good one, and see you next time. Thank you.

From the publisher
Amy Falls is the CIO at Northwestern University, where she oversees the school’s $14.2 billion endowment that supports university operations and funds about a quarter of the University’s annual revenue. She also serves on the Board of Harvard Management Company, the Ford Foundation, Phillips Academy, and the Pete Peterson Foundation.

Our conversation covers Amy’s background and path to Northwestern, frameworks she learned along the way, and different challenges she faced in three different CIO seats.  We then turn to her thoughts on manager selection, liquidity, and across asset classes, covering fixed income, private credit, private equity, public equity, and China. We close with Amy’s insights from her experience working with investment committees and parallels between her passion for farming and investing.

For full show notes, visit the episode webpage here.


Learn More Follow Ted on Twitter at @tseides or LinkedIn Subscribe to the mailing list Access Transcript with Premium Membership

More from Capital Allocators – Inside the Institutional Investment Industry

All 348 episodes
Amy Falls – From Bonds to Boards to Leading Northwestern (Capital Allocators, EP.316)Capital Allocators – Inside the Institutional Investment Industry · 1 h 5 min
Listen in VO