CIO Greatest Hits: Endowments – Scott Wilson (WashU)

21 Jul 2025 · 57 min

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Podcast Summary: Capital Allocators – CIO Greatest Hits: Endowments – Scott Wilson (WashU)

Podcast Title: Capital Allocators Host: Ted Seides Episode Title: CIO Greatest Hits: Endowments – Scott Wilson (WashU) Original Air Date: October 4, 2020

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Episode Overview

In this episode, Ted Seides interviews Scott Wilson, Chief Investment Officer at Washington University in St. Louis, as part of the Capital Allocators’ Summer Series. The episode compares the investment philosophies and strategies of Scott Wilson with those of Andy Golden, former CIO at Princeton, providing insights into unique approaches in institutional investing.

Key Themes and Ideas

  1. Investment Backgrounds:
  2. Scott Wilson’s journey to his position at WashU began with a background in direct investing.
  3. He has adopted a position-focused approach to diligence and co-investing, which diverges from traditional methods in the endowment world.
  1. Comparison with Traditional Endowment Models:
  2. Andy Golden’s legacy at Princeton emphasizes a more conventional endowment model, while Wilson’s approach represents a shift towards concentrated investments and direct partnerships.
  1. Portfolio Construction:
  2. Scott’s strategy focuses on high-quality investments with significant upside potential.
  3. Portfolio construction decisions are based on rigorous due diligence, concentrating capital in a smaller number of high-conviction ideas.
  4. Emphasis on identifying idiosyncratic investments that reduce overall portfolio risk.
  1. Shifting Strategies at WashU:
  2. Upon arriving at WashU, Scott found a traditional endowment portfolio but has since transformed it through selective partnerships and reduced exposure to hedge funds.
  3. Introduced a more opportunistic approach to asset allocation, moving towards a diversified yet concentrated investment strategy.
  1. Challenges in Manager Selection:
  2. Wilson discusses the challenges of winnowing down partnerships and the importance of aligning investment strategies with portfolio goals.
  3. He emphasizes the need for continuous evaluation and willingness to exit relationships that no longer fit the portfolio’s strategy.
  1. Investment Philosophy:
  2. Focus on long-term value creation through a concentrated approach, leveraging high-quality partnerships.
  3. Strive for a portfolio where investments have independent outcomes, thereby enhancing diversification despite concentrated holdings.
  1. Market Opportunities:
  2. Discusses emerging markets as a valuable area for investment, especially in regions like Africa and Southeast Asia.
  3. Describes how unique opportunities in these markets can yield significant returns and reduce correlation with developed market investments.
  1. Team Dynamics and Culture:
  2. Mentions how the investment team at WashU operates in a generalist capacity, breaking down silos to enhance collaboration.
  3. Emphasizes the importance of governance and maintaining a supportive institutional culture for investment success.

Key Takeaways

  • Scott Wilson’s investment approach represents a shift towards deliberate concentration in a select number of high-potential investments, contrasting with traditional endowment diversification strategies.
  • The episode highlights the importance of rigorous due diligence and continuously assessing the fit of managers in the context of the overall investment portfolio.
  • Institutions like WashU are becoming more opportunistic while still holding true to foundational investment principles, indicating a dynamic evolution in the endowment space.

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Conclusion

This episode of Capital Allocators provides valuable insights into the evolving landscape of institutional investing through the lens of Scott Wilson’s experiences at Washington University. By comparing his strategies with those of fellow industry leaders, the discussion illuminates the nuances of capital allocation and the critical factors that drive investment success in today’s complex market environment.

For more information, visit [CapitalAllocators.com](https://capitalallocators.com/).

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Transcript

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0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30-something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.

0:43As advocates of integrating culture research into the investment process and advancing wide moat investing with the concept of moat trajectory, WCM has delivered differentiated returns while building concentrated portfolios designed to stand out from the crowd. WCM is committed to defying the status quo by dismantling outdated practices, believing in the extraordinary capabilities of its people, and fostering optimism to inspire each individual to become the best version of themselves. To learn more about WCM, visit their website at wcminvest.com. And tune into this slot on the show to hear more about WCM all year long.

1:26This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit wcminvest.com for WCM's ADV and further information. Capital Allocators is also brought to you by Morningstar.

1:55What if data wasn't just a bunch of raw numbers, but a clear and decisive language to help connect investment strategies with long-term investor needs in a constantly evolving market landscape. Morningstar created that language, bringing order and utility to insight-rich data so you can prepare for your next opportunity, no matter the asset class or market. Visit wheredataspeaks.com to see what Morningstar data can do for you.

2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators.com.

3:21under my belt, I'm often asked to recommend my favorite episode. But I can't really answer that question. I feel like I have 500 children and don't think I've disowned a single one. So when asked, I usually offer up a great recent episode to get a listener started. Finding the best episodes in a big library of content isn't easy. So we thought we'd help. Each summer going forward, we're going to share our best. Over seven weeks, we'll replay conversations curated from our favorites and yours, excluding those from the last 12 months. Our 2025 Summer Series focuses on CIOs. We're blessed to have an incredible library of long shelf life content, and we just couldn't pick seven.

4:10Instead, we'll share a dozen gems canvassing every type of institutional asset owner. Our summer series kickoff is a twofer of Andy Golden, now retired after 30 years at Princeton University Investment Management Company, and Scott Wilson from Washington University, St. Louis. We packaged these two leading endowment investment officers to compare their investment styles. Andy started his career at Yale with me and became one of the leaders of the endowment model for decades. His discussion of Prinko's decision-making process is among the most referenced descriptions of any podcast with the CIO we've had.

4:51Scott comes from a direct investing background and has adopted a position-focused approach to diligence and co-investing, leading to a very different portfolio construction. It's perhaps the leading example of a new approach in the endowment world. Before we get to the interview, a quick announcement. We've set new dates for our Capital Allocators University for investor relations and business development professionals. Those dates are December 3rd and 4th in New York City. Later in the year is just a better time of year for this gathering. It's post AGM season, travel starts to wind down. It's right before the holiday crunch time.

5:28And it's a great time for capital raisers to reflect on their previous year and plan for the year ahead. December 3rd and 4th in New York City. CAU for IRBD is a closed-door gathering for capital raisers to connect with peers, learn from allocators and other experts, and really share in best practices with each other. You can learn more at capitalallocators.com slash university. Thanks so much for spreading the word about Capital Allocators University for investor relations and business development professionals. Please enjoy my conversations with Andy Golden all the way back to episode 13 in 2017 and Scott Wilson from 2020.

6:08Scott, thanks so much for joining me. Yeah. Thanks for having me. It's great to be here. I think we should go all the way back to your college experience. And before we get into any thoughts about investing, love to hear about your basketball experience at Grinnell. Yeah. Okay. I grew up in maybe to start with like the very beginning, I grew up in small town, Alaska. And me and my younger brother were both big basketball fans. And I was an okay high school basketball player, like good for the state of Alaska, which is kind of a small basketball state, though we did have some great players who went on to play, particularly at Duke.

6:43I was recruited by a small handful of schools and had a couple partial scholarship offers and some full scholarship offers like junior colleges and stuff, but ultimately decided I was going to go to college for academics and not just basketball, but was recruited to play basketball at Grinnell college and met some great people there who have actually quite a few of them went off into the financial world as well but it was one of the original run and gun style will a maramount 1990s style and the coach i think was very progressive at the time in terms of just understanding the power of this kind of three for two relationship and we led the country all four years while i was there and it was just a great experience all around and we definitely had some success there.

7:24We won conference one year, but we were usually in the hunt for it. And if you're a shooter, I played point guard and shooting guard, mostly shooting guard while I was there. The point guard experiment was pretty unsuccessful from what I remember, but overall great experience. At that age, did that different style of basketball sink in any deeper about kind of thinking differently? Yeah, it was certainly different at the time. And to be honest, it's a hard system to learn and it doesn't come naturally. If I look at the way my high school and kind of AU basketball coach. Top basketball is, you know, motion offense, work hard, get great shots, try and set yourself up for opportunity where a hero is like take that first initial shot, hopefully within six, eight seconds of taking possession of the ball and you're better off taking a quick three than particularly like the way we offensive would crash the offensive boards.

8:17You get a lot more of those kind of long rebounds on the offensive side than you do on the defensive side and kick it back out for another quick three. It was very different. And I think that the team approach certainly resonated in that every player had specific responsibilities. We had designated shooters and some really great players while I was there, but a different style of basketball. And you've seen it become more of the norm at a lot of places now, I think, which is kind of interesting. And the coach became pretty famous for it and wrote some books on the system, as he calls it. And did your thoughts at the time extend beyond basketball into, hey, thinking differently about this game you grew up thinking about one way could be extrapolated into other things?

8:59I'm not sure I was that forward thinking at the time. To be honest, I grew up in very small rural Alaska and didn't have any clue. I thought I wanted to be an engineer when I went to school. And that's obviously not the path I took. But I remember my first foray into the financial world was until I was really a sophomore in college. And it was through the people I met at Grinnell that kind of opened my eyes to the financial world. Neither of my parents went to college. And I really just had no idea of that whole, whether it was investment banking or asset management. I had no real concept at the time.

9:33So I had to get started. I was fortunate. A really close friend of mine who was two years ahead of me that went off to be very successful in the financial world. he kind of took me under his wing, I guess. And he was dead set on going into investment banking and finance, even when I think he was a freshman in college. And I had no idea what investment banking was. I was good at math and science. And so I thought I wanted to be an engineer. And if you grow up in small town Alaska, that's the guy who has the big house at the end of the street. And so that's what I thought I wanted to do. And my skillset was well-suited for.

10:09And then And the more I learned about investment banking and finance, the more interested I became. And I guess after my sophomore year, I got an internship at Payne Weber, basically a retail brokerage house that doesn't exist anymore. But learned quite a bit about finance and the stock market in general. And then the following summer, I got an internship at kind of a real asset management firm. And then when I was graduating from college, I was fortunate in that this was peak of the Internet bubble. And it was easier for kids from places like Grinnell to insert their foot into the recruiting process and interviewed at a bunch of the investment banks and consulting firms and ultimately ended up at First Boston Equity Research Group there.

10:52And that same friend, actually, the one who helped me get my foot in the door there as well. And so what were those early experiences like on the street? Not having a traditional, like my undergrad major, I was a double major in math and economics. It was surprisingly less quantitative than I thought the investing world would be, but also just super interesting. I've been super fortunate to have great people to work with and great mentors throughout my career. And those early experiences were just wonderful learning opportunities. When I first started at First Boston, Michael Mobison was an equity researcher.

11:28Maybe he was product manager or something by the time I started there. But there was all kinds of interesting people to learn. And you just had a huge, huge array of resources too. And when you're 20, 21 years old, you're just a sponge for that kind of stuff. So it was really a great experience. I mean, it's a lot of hours, like those analyst programs at the investment banks are. I don't think they're as bad as they used to be, but it's labor intensive. And you see a lot of attrition throughout the ranks, like even over two, three years. I just really enjoyed it. It was a great experience. What do you either gravitate to or get placed in, as the case may be?

12:04I was fortunate. There was a guy who was number one I-ranked research analyst, and his name was Greg Capelli. Just super smart, thoughtful guy. And I was earmarked to go into his group immediately. So I was just the junior person on the totem pole doing equity research, like basic financial models and basic due diligence on companies that we were either trying to take public, trying to raise money for, or just traditional equity research analysis. And how did that progress over your years before you came over to this side of the business? I started at CSFB. I had the opportunity to go to Merrill at the end of my two-year program to be a senior equity research analyst.

12:44So I moved out to Maryland, the tech group in San Francisco, I guess they called it the global growth group and was there during the whole implosion of the tech bubble and was fortunate enough to be at a stage in my career. I was given the choice, hey, you can go back to business school. I had a guarantee when I went over and they were going to potentially move me to New York and find a spot for me, but it was easy enough for me to go back to grad school. So I applied to a couple of different grad schools, but ultimately chose the financial mathematics program at University of Chicago and was going to go to school full-time and try and work part-time.

13:19I got an offer from Bank of America to be a quant in the strategy group there that was mostly focused on fixed income derivatives, some FX, some of the exotics, but I ended up going to school part-time and working full-time. And that was kind of a great financial decision. But I worked there for just maybe it was a year and a half, 18 months before they shipped me off to the Tokyo office and landed in Tokyo as a junior trader on the derivatives desk and worked my way up. So I was running the fixed income, mostly like interest rate derivatives, swaps, swaptions, caps floors in Tokyo, and then got transferred to London during the financial crisis to take over the Euro, Sterling and Swiss books there.

14:06and then after the merger with B of A and Merrill, ultimately went back to Barclays in Japan before I got a call from Grinnell College to talk about coming to work for an endowment. So like very circuitous kind of random route. I mean, I guess there are links in the chain where you can point to where it was kind of logical at the time, but certainly didn't grow up in this kind of allocator world or even in asset management. What was it like when you got that call? I was like, do you have the right number? I don't even know what you guys do. It was only conceptually aware of endowments because Grinnell was kind of famous for being this little tiny college in the middle of Iowa that had a large endowment and certainly knew people who worked in the investment office.

14:45And that's how they got my number, but they wanted someone who had kind of international experience, experience in fixed income, experience in equities. And so my background kind of loosely fit there. And obviously I tied to Grinnell College as well. And the truth is my kids were starting school and we had started the kind of private school thing in Tokyo. And my wife is originally from the Midwest. She's from small town Iowa, actually. And it just worked out for the family. And I thought the job was super interesting. Certainly, the compensation scales are very different running a derivatives trading desk at an investment bank versus working at a smaller endowment.

15:21So that was kind of a big life decision. And it just seemed like something, hey, this is super interesting. It's more meaningful. And it ended up being a great decision in hindsight. The Grinnell Endowment has a pretty interesting history. And why don't you maybe talk a little bit about what drove the process over the years? It's probably most famous because of the connection with Buffett. Buffett hasn't been active since the late 70s, early 80s, but certainly was instrumental. And there's a famous investor. I think Money Magazine wrote him up as the most famous investor you'd never heard of. And that was Joe Rosenfield.

15:55And he had a huge role in the endowment from 1941 until 2000. And then David Clay, the CIO who hired me, he started in the eighties as well and worked with Joe and was really super instrumental in that portfolio over basically a 30 year period and super talented investor and just a wonderful human being. And I was so lucky to start there and work under David for that seven years I was there. He was just following more of that kind of Berkshire style investing than the traditional Yale model. David just was a really great investor. I think looked at the world in a very similar way to Joe did. And it was really good for me because I had no idea really what they did in an endowment when I first started.

16:41And I guess my role technically was director of public investments and then quickly took over as managing privates and Publix and then ultimately became the CIO in my fourth year there. But it was a great place to start. And David, still a great mentor. So you mentioned that Dave and Joe style is probably more Buffett-like than endowment model-like. What did that mean? What was the philosophy of it when you showed up? It was definitely, hey, let's find great individual companies, great partners, and see if we can leverage those relationships to put concentrated exposure into individual positions that we can compound with over really long periods of time.

17:20So if you look at the biggest investments in Grinnell's history, it wasn't uncommon for them to have north of 10 % of the portfolio in a single individual name. Particularly when Joe was there, they had a historical relationship with Buffett and Sequoia, the mutual fund. If Joe liked it and Warren liked it and Sequoia liked, they could potentially own it in the internal portfolio and both places. So you'd end up with these large concentrated exposures, but produced just unbelievable returns over many, many decades. I think when Joe started, the endowment was just a couple million dollars in 1940s and was over a billion dollars almost completely through capital gains over that timeframe.

18:00I think over that timeframe, they only took in$70 million in gifts and turned 3 million into over a billion dollars. So what did that portfolio look like? When I first got there, there was still legacy concentrated exposure to large cap domestic equities. And certainly the mandate from the board was the college had grown more dependent on the endowment and wanted to reduce overall volatility. So there was a mandate to diversify to some extent while still kind of maintaining the core beliefs and tenants that had grown the endowment over that same time period. And so when you say concentrated, was it 10 names or was it managers?

18:36What was the setup? Yeah, it was more like 10 managers. And predominantly U.S. equities? Predominantly U.S. large cap value investors. And then what did it look like seven years later as you were getting ready to leave? It still looked, I think, pretty similar. We had gone from, say, 10 managers who mattered to probably 15. And then we'd also done quite a few individual co-investments either in public markets or private markets that changed the risk profile of the portfolio quite substantially. In this world where ostensibly all of your peers have completely different looking portfolios, global diversification, equities, credit, real assets, how did you think about sticking to effectively concentration in predominantly US equities?

19:27When we went from 10 to 15, the bulk of that came in from international partners, particularly in kind of emerging frontier markets. I like to think like here at WashU, we're completely opportunistic. We're more or less indifferent between domestic, international, public, private, where we can find interesting partners, interesting opportunities, interesting places to put capital, particularly when we think it reduces the risk profile of the overall portfolio. Like we're always looking for something that we think is orthogonal or idiosyncratic to what we currently have in the portfolio. And that's where we like to kind of concentrate our exposures.

20:02So yeah, let's turn over to Wash U. What did the portfolio look like when you arrived a couple of years ago? We had a very traditional kind of endowment, asset allocation. If you think top down, we haven't shifted the asset allocation too meaningfully. We've reduced exposure to the hedge funds. I think we've gone from 100 partners plus to 50 that matter or really 30 that matter. So we've concentrated our exposures and then we have a significant portion of the portfolio in individual securities and individual names. How difficult was it for you stepping into a seat where there was a much more diversified group of managers to start winnowing it down?

20:43We certainly were not popular in certain circles for quite some time, probably still not. and those are tough decisions those partners didn't necessarily fit our portfolio i mean these are smart thoughtful well-intentioned good people and often great investors it's just it didn't fit what we were trying to do with the portfolio and so we had to make a lot of tough decisions at the margins i would say like we went through with the board and garnered internal support but we put in redemptions for almost half the portfolio in the first several weeks now i I was fortunate to have the portfolio for several months before I actually landed in the seat.

21:23So we spent a lot of time going over individual partners and individual names of who we were going to keep in the portfolio and who we weren't. At this point, I think we've probably turned over 70, 80 % of the original pool, even more than 80 % actually. So the vast majority of it's been turned over. And those we've kept, we've added capital to and concentrated exposures. But for the most part, it's a very, very different looking portfolio than it was when I started three years ago. What were the filters you used to start to window that down? There's some kind of very high level things. We tend to like smaller managers.

22:03We tend to like people who concentrate. We like people who have a long-term view. We typically stay away from systematic and macro. Generally, those are the things that we have a harder time getting over the hump. And so we were able to eliminate quite a few of those relationships and those partners just right off the top. And then it became like, how do we re-underwrite this manager? If you start with a blank slate, is this somebody we would put in the portfolio? If the answer was no, then we would look to terminate over time. And what are your sort of favored criteria within, say, a manager you kept and a manager that was close but you didn't?

22:40It's the same lens that we look through all managers. I mean, first and foremost, we're looking for people we think are great investors, people who are operating in an interesting opportunity set, people we think have an institutionalized, repeatable process. Ultimately, we evaluate them based on what we think the quality of their portfolio is. And we think about our portfolio on a bottoms-up basis in that we own what our partners own in some fraction. So if they own 10 stocks and we're 10 % of the fund, we think about our portfolio as these individual pieces. And then we have a fee and liquidity structure on top of that.

23:16And that portfolio has to make sense on a look-through basis. So if you take our hedge fund portfolio three years ago and I were to evaluate it on a look-through basis, I'd say we own 2 ,000 names on both sides of the market. And we have a fee structure that's 1.5 and 20. like that's a portfolio construction problem right because essentially you're an index fund on both sides of the market with an expensive active management fee structure on top of it and the fee structure is problematic in that it guarantees you always do worse than the average right so you're essentially in long correlation if you have a hedge fund that's up 10 and a hedge fund that's down 10 on a gross basis you're flat right but you paid them both one and a half percent ish as a management fee.

24:03And then the one that was up 10%, you also paid a 15, 20 % carry to. So on a gross basis, you're flat, but after you put on your fee structure, you've done horribly. And that's problematic in hedge funds in general. And I think you can look at it like industry wide returns. It struggles because the proliferation of just the number of hedge funds on a look through basis, that's kind of what the industry owns, they own both sides of the market. It's really tough with that fee structure to produce alpha. At an aggregate level, it's easy to make the case that it never makes any sense, but you're not really dealing the aggregate level.

24:36You're dealing with the subset of managers that you inherited when you showed up and maybe a few that you liked from before. So how do you put together that kind of bearish macro perspective, say on long short, with bottom-up manager by manager decisions? We're just hugely selective. And I guess you have to be humble and intellectually honest about your ability to really choose the absolute best performing managers, there's a large number problem in that, let's say 95 % of the time we can tell a really good manager from a really bad manager. But if only 1 % of them are actually really good, then you still end up with five to one ratio of not so good managers with good managers.

25:21Right now, I'd say we only have four, what you'd call traditional hedge funds in the whole portfolio. And then we're also looking for places where we can leverage that relationship to make the overall portfolio better. So we're looking for people we can kind of use as either outsource research partners, places where we can add capital. And we think they have a really interesting idea that again, is kind of idiosyncratic to everything else we have in the portfolio. That's a really valuable relationship for us. And I would say that we also understand the process. We understand their portfolio and And we have the ability to assess when things are going poorly, whether it's a short-term or long-term problem.

26:00And I would say most of our partners, we've been able to produce significantly better returns than you would think just looking at their headline numbers. Because we have the conviction to kind of add capital when things aren't going that well and can rebalance when things are going well. I'm curious, what have the dynamics on your team and the investments office been when, as you said, it's hard winnowing it down, it's not fun, and you can imagine it being difficult to positively motivate the people on their team when they're making the phone calls saying, hey, we're taking money out of all these managers.

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26:34It's easy enough for me to be the bad guy, so I'm happy having those calls. It doesn't have to be the team. But certainly there's personal relationships that people on the team had with these people going back, everybody on the team is a generalist. So nobody's kind of married to any one geography or asset class. And we have people who have historical experience in privates or publics and tend to have more relationships there. But in general, we do things as a group and that makes it a little easier. Like we're trying to make all asset classes compete for capital. And that's a lot easier to do with the generalist model than it is when people are siloed into individual asset classes.

27:10And then it also gives us the ability to size things probably more. If you're thinking about the entire portfolio in context versus just my one little siloed asset class, I think the way you'd size positions is quite a bit different. So what kind of impact did it have on the team? Overall, it's been really good. The team is different. We've made changes to the team early on as well, but the team has done just phenomenally well. And I think it's really added a ton of value to the portfolio over the last couple of years. And the people who are still here, I think have really embraced this model of investing.

27:44It's a little bit of organized chaos at times running a generalist model with 10, 12 people on the investment staff. And oftentimes we have four people on a trip or five or six people, or even the whole team in a meeting where we probably only need five, but I think it's helped the portfolio over time. How do you think about the generalist model in light of the concentration that you want in the portfolio, where you could imagine the price of being wrong on something's a lot higher. Yeah, I would say that's definitely true, but also the benefit of being right is a lot higher. So if you're going to do something, do it in a size that will move the needle.

28:23And that's easier to do when you think about, you know, if you have say 5 % of the portfolio in one individual relationship, one manager, that's huge concentration if it's 20 % of your overall equity exposure. You're kind of betting the house on it if that's your silo. Whereas, depending on the underlying concentration, that may be perfectly reasonable for the portfolio as a whole. How do you match this top-down thinking and bottom-up thinking if top-down is traditional asset class or risk exposures and bottom-up is the one-off selection of the managers in your portfolio? Our focus is really on the bottoms up.

29:02If you look at even the way we think about diversification, we're trying to concentrate our exposures in individual investments that we think have completely idiosyncratic outcomes over some period of time. So if you look at the largest contributors to the portfolio over the last three years, you'd see a Brazilian utility company, a Swedish supplier of medical products, an Indian biosimilars company, a US-based aerospace and telecom company. And there's no reason why we think those investments should have correlated outcomes over some investment time horizon. Now, in the short term, like if we go through a crisis like we did in March, where the cost of capital rises for all risk assets, we don't expect that portfolio to be immune, but we expect those investment outcomes to be completely independent and over our investment time horizon.

29:53And that's a lot easier framework to find real diversification. Whereas if I step back and say, what are the diversification benefits for being in venture versus public equity versus private equity buyouts or real estate, like that's very difficult to quantify, particularly in times of severe market stress where you really need diversification. And I think that's a better framework for us to evaluate real diversification benefits in the portfolio as opposed to this top-down approach. Now, we use the top-down approach both presenting to the board and as a framework for thinking about how we guide our search, but really we're looking for those idiosyncratic, completely independent outcome investments from a bottoms-up basis, and that's how we like to concentrate the portfolio.

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31:30Learn more at srsaquium.com. That's S-R-S-A-C-Q-U-I-O-M.com. And now, back to the show. So when you think about exposures and drivers of return, it sounds like you're focused on the position level as opposed to, say, even a manager as a position. Yeah. And even our individual managers on our public and privates, we're generally thinking about them as individual exposures as opposed to manager level. The returns aggregate through the partnership, but we think about the exposure on an individual investment level basis. How is it different in the way that you do your due diligence on managers? At the highest level, we look for all the things that all of our peers would have on their checklist.

32:25I think the way we evaluate them is really what we think based on the quality of the portfolio and we'll use our own lens for that. So the quality of the individual investment ideas and the attractiveness, essentially, do we want to own what they own and how does that fit in our overall portfolio? So like there's lots of managers that we think are talented investors, have a good process, but for whatever reason, we don't think their underlying holdings fit our portfolio or it's not something we're excited about. And we would probably pass on that. We're always trying to err, I guess, most of this job is saying no.

32:56If you think of how many opportunities you look at before one actually makes it into the portfolio. It's probably closer to 0.1 % than it is 1%. When you're looking at a manager, are you focused on underwriting their positions more than their process to find the next position? We use that lens of underwriting their existing position. So it's really just case studies of either what they currently own, what they have. And that's how we evaluate what caused you to make this investment. What was the process that led to this? Do you have a kind of unique differential view on the quality of the business or the industry.

33:30What is the real investment thesis? Is that empirically verifiable investment thesis that's different than what we think the market or how the market is viewing that business? And that's the lens through which we look at their process. How did they think about valuation? How did they think about risk and return? How did they think about the industry? We spend our time focused on looking at those individual names. How does that translate over into thinking about participating in the private markets? It's the exact same lens. You don't have the same, obviously, price discovery and transparency in private markets versus public markets.

34:06But oftentimes you have better access to financials and diligence materials and access to management teams. So when you roll all that up today, what's the structure of the portfolio look like? I'd say top-down, it hasn't changed that much. If you think we're roughly a third public equities, which bounces around, we're probably a little bit overweighted in privates. That's probably 45 % of the portfolio today just because privates, particularly venture and growth equities, had such a big run. And then we have 5 % to 10 % of the portfolio in real assets type exposure, another 10 % in hedge funds, and the balance would just be cash.

34:44And how much do you try to do on the margin, sort of in addition to just what the managers are doing on your behalf? We focus most of our process internally on incremental research. We typically know what their thesis is, like how do we verify it? How can we use our networks or people within the university to help verify and re-underwrite the thesis? And it's a super time-consuming way to invest, especially since you have to think you spend most of your time doing research on stuff that never makes it into the portfolio. And that can be a little disheartening at times, but ultimately when something does make it into the portfolio, you understand it that much better.

35:22You have a much better understanding of the process and the partnership. What opportunities are you particularly excited about today? Frontier markets is super interesting. I emerging in frontier markets for us has been a big bright spot in the portfolio. If you look at the headline return numbers and emerging in frontier markets, it's significantly lagged developed markets, particularly the US, over the last five years. For us, it's the opposite. We've been able to find really unique, interesting places to put capital on some of these markets that has been a big differentiator for us in terms of performance.

35:54Again, it tends to be individual name, individual securities, but we have a ton of really high quality partners on the ground there. And it's been an interesting hunting ground for the last several years. And I think it's gotten better over time, not worse. Is there a particular region you're excited about? We spent quite a bit of time in Africa, Bangladesh. Russia has been really good for us. Africa is probably where we're spending more time. And again, it tends to be kind of one-off idiosyncratic opportunities, but it's been a really interesting place to invest. What's an example of something that's worked well for you?

36:28Russia, we've made quite a bit of money in some of the more tech-based companies that would trade at 20 times revenue in the US that are trading at five times earnings in Russia, growing a return on equity of 60 % plus, growing at 30%, 40 % right through COVID. Super interesting companies that they're in Russia. So we're not going to bet the portfolio on Russia. And I know we have peers who basically said we would never invest in Russia. When we step back, our view is kind of, look, all investing involves risk, right? If you're paying 100 times revenue for an unproven business model in Silicon Valley, that's a risk.

37:05The question is, are you being compensated for that risk? And we wouldn't have a massive portion of the portfolio, but we found opportunities that are compelling enough. Even being in Russia, we think they're interesting and we've been well compensated for that. I'd say the same in places like Bangladesh. We've spent time in Pakistan and all over the continent in Africa. And what's that balance of you want to have a concentrated portfolio, so something's got to be big enough to move the needle. but then there's sort of known left tail risk so that you don't want it to be too big. How do you think about sizing?

37:39It's more of an art than a science. You size things based on how they fit in the overall portfolio and then whether or not you could underwrite the downside. And then again, we're always looking for things that we think add positive convexity to the portfolio, right? They have significant asymmetric risk and reward. As a general, if I tell the team, look, if we're not willing to put 1 % of the portfolio in it, then that's not a lot of conviction. And for 1 % for us is currently just over a hundred million US dollars. So we don't always have that type of liquidity, right? Like the opportunity set isn't always that big.

38:13So things aren't always sized there. But again, if you're not willing to put 1 % of the portfolio in it, and if you, let's say you do a disastrous job underwriting the downside and you lose half your money there, we can tolerate 50 basis points on the overall portfolio and hopefully make that up in other places. particularly if we think it's very, very idiosyncratic, right? We're looking for opportunities that aren't based purely on our macro view of the world. But for us to go above that again, we would have to have a significant view of downside and really be comfortable with the underwriting process.

38:46So if you're willing to go to Russia, go to Pakistan, Bangladesh for investments, are there areas that you avoid? There's certainly certain markets that are tough that make Russia look like a very developed market, particularly across Africa. There are places that are just really difficult to invest, whether that's property rights or contract enforceability. There's lots of things that just make it a very, very tough place to invest, particularly in the type of size that we're hoping to do. So there's certain places that we just don't go hunting, but I'd say very few places are completely off limits.

39:22How does the process sort of work for your team in finding a new idea? So you can break it down. Where does the sourcing start? We try and spend a lot of time on the ground in the various markets that we're investing in. And it's really randomness and optionality. You never really know what the next interesting idea is going to come from, what it's going to look like, and which partner it's going to come from. So it's just basic blocking and tackling. I'd like to say we have a great funnel where we're looking at this really high level interesting set of opportunities and it boils down to a small group of investments that we end up making, but it's really random.

39:59And I think it's just hard work out there, knowing what our partners are doing, knowing what our partners are looking at and trying to find interesting places to put capital. If you think back to one of the more recent, maybe it's pre-pandemic, but one of the more recent new commitments you made. Walk me through the process of how you found it, where it came from, and what that due diligence was like. A recent one would be a co-investment in an additive manufacturing company that one of our Silicon Valley partners based out there. At the last annual meeting, this was one of the companies that had presented.

40:37We thought it was a super interesting company, spun out of a really great institution on the East Coast, at least the intellectual property did. Our partner in California was one of the original seed investors of the company. Interesting software platform, interesting hardware platform, what we think is very unique, defensible IP. When we saw the CEO present at that annual meeting, I guess it was 2018, came back and said, look, this is a company we should start doing some work on just in case. So we spent probably six months just diligencing the company. We spent time talking to people in the industry, talking to potential customers, spent time with the management team, and just basically trying to position ourselves just in case they raise capital at some point.

41:22We could come in as a preferred provider of someone, hey, we've already done all our diligence. We're super interested in this. If we think the valuation makes sense, we'd love to be involved and have a great relationship with that particular partner in California. And when they did come back to market with that round, we weren't able to get the full allocation that we would have liked, but we're able to put in a fairly sizable chunk of capital in what we think is a really interesting company for the next two decades. So that example brings up a whole host of questions in and around process. So the first is, how do you think about time allocation when you're spending all that time with a chunk of your team on one company?

41:59The truth is, if I think about the overall portfolio, if we find four or five companies like that a year, we've done our job, like four or five places, and how much capital we have to reallocate every year. We hope you have a very long time horizon. And most of the time we're allocating to our core partners and re-upping in funds. And we have lots of places we can put capital if we have excess capital, but finding these four or five differentiators of return, places where we have excess exposure and we think it's super interesting over a long period of time, like that's all we need. So the truth of it is that most of your time ends up being relatively unproductive just because you're looking at things that don't ever make it into the portfolio, but we have a big team and we have a lot of resources.

42:42And if we can produce a small amount of alpha compounded on a$10 billion portfolio over long periods of time, that's definitely worth it. How does that change the nature of the relationship you have with the manager, in this case, private equity firm, who already has a position in the company and may want to put more in if it's doing well? And you're, in some sense, their partner, in some sense could be a competitor for a limited amount of capital investment? Well, I mean, we always say that they would obviously get their fill before we would get anything. So in this particular case, they were bringing us on instead of another outside partner.

43:19So they took their pro rata rights and we were able to come in on the back of that. And then we'll set up an SPB and still pay them. They'll manage the position for us and fee and carries. Typically, there's not a management fee associated with those, but we'll still pay them for all the help that they've done and manage the position over time. So we're rarely trading kind of on our own balance sheet. And we would never do that without expressed written consent from the partners. There are times we have gone directly on the cap table, but only because that's how we were asked to invest. But for the most part, we're setting these up as SPVs.

43:52And how about the skillset of the people on your team where underwriting a company can be a different skillset from diving in underwriting managers? Yeah, it's a very different skill set. It's a very different mindset, I would say, but that's taken a lot of time and effort to kind of bring the team up to speed. And it's a very different, I don't think someone who comes from a traditional allocator background and grew up in that world, it takes, I think, several years of learning and mentoring before they're comfortable with this kind of investment style. Where have your people come from generally?

44:25I think it's fairly random. People who come from traditional asset management industries, consulting backgrounds, I think are good. Private equity investment background is really good. And then we have people who were one person on the team who was a PhD in physics and smart, curious, intellectually curious people. They enjoy investing this way. And if you step back like why it's interesting to work for an endowment, you have this pool of capital that's not too big, You're not a$100 billion pension fund. So you can do interesting things that will move the needle. And you have an opportunity set that's pretty much any asset class, any geography within reason in the entire world.

45:04So that's a super interesting, very long time horizon, unlimited opportunity set. And you're only looking for a small handful of really great investments every year. That's a super interesting framework to start from. And certain people fit well within that framework and certain people don't. Because as a team, we might be looking at, again, a Brazilian utility company one day and a medical products company in Sweden. And they're both interesting investments, but it's a very different diligence and underwriting approach. And some people enjoy it, some people don't. And we've had great people, great investors who it just wasn't the right framework for them.

45:39And then when we can, we can hopefully be helpful to them to find someplace where they're going to excel. And when you add it all up, how many positions would you say you have in the portfolio today and how does that compare with a more typical endowment? We have more like 100 positions that really drive performance on a look-through basis. If you looked at our top 100 positions, that's going to be probably a third of the portfolio and maybe even slightly more than that currently just because we've had such a big run in some of those names over the last 18 months. But it's a manageable position for a team of 10, 12 investment professionals.

46:19We're typically looking for ways to concentrate that further, not less. What have you learned the most from being in the seat the last bunch of years? Coming from a smaller endowment, realizing how much the team matters. You can't be on every call, you can't be in every meeting. And being able to leverage the team and leverage resources, that's been a huge shift going from a$2 billion endowment to now$10 billion endowment. And then governance, having a board that buys into the strategy that gives you the autonomy and flexibility to manage the portfolio. The way we manage it, I think it's been just super important.

46:56And that governance thing, I think, is maybe the most important thing that really is the North Star for all endowments. That governance process drives so much. And the institution here has just been amazingly supportive. What does the day-to-day look like or the week-to-week look like on your team? We try and organize it as much as we can, but we'll typically have one to two team calls per week. Typically Monday morning, what are we working on? What do we think is interesting? What's in the pipeline? What can we kill? And we'll include the entire team on that, including operations folks. And we try and integrate investment and operations as much as we can.

47:34That's mostly pipeline focused. And then what's interesting that's happening in our portfolio, like who's adding to what names, how our position size is changing, what's performing, what's not performing, what are interesting hunting grounds, places to at least start your search. Right now, it's very different just because there's no travel. I would have said I spent 30 % to 50 % of my time in any given week or month on the road, but that's not happening. And then from there, again, it's very random, like what kind of names or what geography, what we're spending our time on. It really depends on what's happening with our various partners in any given week.

48:12So that tends to be really random from one week to the other. And we organize the team so that nobody's over-focused on one geography or one asset class. So you could have three calls in a day looking at new investments or existing investments. And there'll be five people on each call, but none of those five people overlap on any given call. So much of the process of investing ties to trying to identify a competitive advantage or an edge. And I'm curious what you think yours is taking this approach. I step back and say, look, our top peers, these are smart, well-intentioned, thoughtful investors.

48:53Like, do we really have a sourcing edge? No. Do we have an underwriting edge? Probably not. If you look at what's really generated our returns, if you look at our performance this year and how we've done over the last three years, we'll end up towards the top of our peer group over that timeframe. It's our willingness and ability to go where our peers are not, I think. Like go to certainly geographies and take outsized risk positions in assets where we think we have an underwriting advantage. And because these underlying investments tend to be uncorrelated, again, we're looking for independent outcomes over our time horizon.

49:32I think it's reduced the overall risk in the portfolio while enhancing returns. But I'm not so sure there's a clearly definable edge, if I'm being intellectual honest. From a top-down perspective, we would have similar looking portfolios, but when you look at the underlying exposures is where our tracking error comes from. And when you're looking at, you mentioned potentially an underwriting advantage, is that compared to, say, endowment peers that are picking managers or is it compared to the managers doing the underlying security work? I always compare ourselves to our peers, other larger endowments.

50:09Certainly, we're not doing what the underlying partners are doing. I'd say we're trying to recognize super interesting opportunities. We're not necessarily sourcing those on our own. Although we're doing our own work, we're leveraging everything that our partners are doing. And hopefully, we can find incremental ways to add value to that research process. So again, most of us come from non-traditional backgrounds. We have our own networks and own people within industries and certainly people who are tied to the university that we can leverage. How have you found those differential insights helping the process of just manager selection?

50:44Everything looks good on paper, right? Like you've never seen a pitch book or whether it's someone's pitching you an individual investment or it's a manager pitch book. Like it always looks good on paper. And again, it's peeling back the onion to understand where these positions come from, how are they sourced, what was the underwriting process, what do we think of their framework around risk or valuation. And I think doing your own work on the underlying names gives you – you have your own opinion on all that stuff and you can compare and contrast it with what your partner is doing. And that's a valuable framework that I'm not sure everybody does.

51:23Where do you think you've tripped up the most? The list is long and undistinguished, is what I would say. We make mistakes all the time. And I would say certainly a big lesson over time is make sure you understand the bear case on every investment, whether it's a manager or underlying company. And overestimating your ability to, whether it's underwrite the downside, understand competitive dynamics within the industry. it's a super super long list of like places where i think we've learned over time both on the manager side and individual selection side i'd say our partners with managers is typically if you look at what's ended more relationships it's we disagree with them on size of the opportunity set or what the right size of AUM is or their ability to find idiosyncratic ideas or places is where the manager has become more thematic investors than bottoms up research-driven investors.

52:21We're always looking for idiosyncratic risks. So most of the partners who are really thematic tend not to fit our portfolio or the way we look at the world. But entry point is one thing and we've made all kinds of mistakes on exits. My old boss and through his training used to say, there's no good or bad trades. There's only good and bad exit and entry points. and there's some truth to that. So if you look out five or 10 years at your portfolio, what do you think will evolve? I don't think we're going to do things much differently over the next five, 10 years. We certainly have like some positions, if you look at them over the last two, three years have become outsized risk exposures in the book just because of organically the positions have grown.

53:06And over the next five, 10 years, some of those positions could get really big if they continue on a similar trajectory. But I can't imagine we change our overall process significantly. How do you think about taking this model and applying it in the venture capital area? Venture capital is tough, right? Just the nature of the industry. It's tough to underwrite. If you look at our partners, and we have a great group of partners who have done extremely well for the portfolio, But we haven't had really much success in kind of the micro VC world. Like there's so many of these small micro VC funds.

53:45And again, these are a lot of smart, talented people who come from good places. But it's just really tough for us to underwrite and find unique, differentiated thinkers in that area. And so we've just shied away from it. We typically, I guess we've concentrated our exposures in people that we think we can partner with very closely. and we have ways to monetize the relationship outside of their ability just to pick really good early stage companies and that we can grow our exposure with them over time, either partnering in these co-investments or finding ways to add capital to what we think are the most interesting ideas.

54:20So does that prevent you from investing with some kind of the perceived best of breed that are always massively in excess demand? No, I mean, let's say we're still opportunistic. There are certain partners who we think are just great investors and we have no ability to partner with them closely, but we still think it's a great investment. And we're happy to take whatever capacity we can get in some of these underlying partners and just think that they have a great process, a great pipeline. They've done tremendously well over long periods of time. And it's a group of just really talented investors and whatever they're doing, we obviously would like a piece of it.

54:55But it's hard for us to scale up those relationships over time. There's just limited capacity. With an increasingly concentrated portfolio, I'm curious how you factor in some of these broader issues that are increasingly coming to light, like the sustainable investing lens and diversity and inclusion. We've obviously spent a decent amount of time on that. And I did when I was at Grinnell. That kind of ESG lens, I think it's a framework that plays in everything we do. We don't have a specific kind of ESG mandate, but we're always looking for partners. I tell the team, we want somebody who has a similar moral compass.

55:34We want people who have a framework and has similar value systems that we do and understand the mission of the university. And nobody works at an endowment because they're trying to maximize their current compensation. If you can't buy into the mission, this isn't the right place to be. And I think that's something that pervades everything we do, whether it's hiring people on the team or finding new partners. And we obviously just recently went through this. Over a third of our partners, either in the U.S. or even more internationally, are managed by people of color or female heads. And that's not something that's a purely bottoms up driven outcome.

56:14And we don't positively or negatively screen for that. It's just, I think, an important framework for how we view the world. All right, Scott, let's turn to a couple of closing questions. What's your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family? I can't say I get to spend that much time outside of work and family, but I grew up in small town Alaska and I love downhill skiing and fly fishing, which were just two activities that I grew up with. And obviously, I love sharing those activities with my family, best of all. What's your most important daily habit? I think just reading, being intellectually curious.

56:48I always want to know what's going on, not just with the portfolio, but in the world in general. What's your biggest pet peeve? I've got a lot of these. Behavioral pet peeves, I guess, people who are just unproductive and lazy. I think working in an endowment, again, we have this huge, wide open space where we can invest in, within reason, anything we want, anywhere in the world. Like if you can't find something to look at, something to do, you're probably not in the right seat. And then people who spend time complaining or kind of whining about circumstances, like I'm sure I inherited that from my father.

57:22But if you're complaining about something and something's wrong, then fix it. If you can't, then there's no reason to complain about it if you can't fix it anyway. I guess maybe one other thing I would say like firms that quote gross returns and not net returns, I think is another probably pet peeve that shared with a lot of our peers. What's the biggest mistake you've made? In terms of investment mistake, talking to a friend about this recently, I think when I graduated from college, I knew nothing about investing. I was a math and econ major and I'm dumped down into junior seat in equity research.

57:56And I spent the first two years paying off student loans, right? I was sleeping on the floor trying to save enough money so I could actually buy a stock or whatever, you know, put some skin in the game. And finally, I got a bonus, you know, in February, March of 2000 that I could invest. And I think the first thing I did was buy like a bunch of just disastrous tech names that I'd been following for the last two years. In hindsight, it was a cheap lesson, right? Because I didn't have that much money to lose, but I think certainly it's been a positive influence for the last two decades with that in hindsight was a really quick way to evaporate half my tiny capital base.

58:34What teaching from your parents has most stayed with you? Work ethic. I mentioned neither of my parents went to college. My father worked in construction. My mom was a bookkeeper and did odd jobs when I was a kid. And they're both just super hardworking people. My father is just one of the most productive human beings. He never went to college, but he's just super intelligent person. And I'd say now that he's been retired several years, he's still just amazing, hardworking, productive human being. Scott, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? We talked about mindfulness training before.

59:12I think my big takeaway from that was just speak less, listen more. It's something I wish I would have known when I was younger. I think the other thing too is intelligence is only one small factor in people being successful. Like when I was young, I thought that if you didn't have kind of a logical analytical framework, you'd have a hard time being successful. Whereas like people who are really good at driving consensus, communicating ideas, great salespeople, like all those things are just a huge facet of what makes you successful. Scott, thanks so much for taking the time. Yeah. Well, thanks for having me.

59:47I appreciate it, Ted. Thanks for listening to the show. To learn more, hop on our website at capitalallocators.com, where you can join our mailing list, access past shows, learn about our gatherings, and sign up for premium content, including podcast transcripts, my investment portfolio, and a lot more. Have a good one, and see you next time.

From the publisher

Our Summer Series kickoff is a twofer, Andy Golden, now retired after thirty years at Princeton University Investment Management Company, and Scott Wilson from Washington University-St. Louis. We packaged these two leading endowments to compare their investment styles. 

 

Scott comes from a direct investing background and has adopted a position-focused approach to diligence and co-investing, leading to a very different portfolio construction. It’s perhaps the leading example of a new approach in the endowment world.

 

Original air date:
October 4, 2020

 
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Access Transcript with Premium Membership   Editing and post-production work for this episode was provided by The Podcast Consultant (https://thepodcastconsultant.com)

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