David Morehead – Top Down Allocation at Baylor (EP.381)

22 Apr 2024 · 1 h 9 min

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In short

Podcast Summary: Capital Allocators – Episode 381 with David Morehead

Overview In this episode, Ted Seides interviews David Morehead, the Chief Investment Officer (CIO) at Baylor University, who oversees the university's $2.2 billion endowment. Morehead discusses his unique investment approach, insights into endowment management, and various strategies he employs in portfolio construction and manager selection.

Key Themes

  • David Morehead's Background:
  • Morehead shares his extensive 18-year investment career across public markets before transitioning to Baylor.
  • His path included roles in fixed income, equity research, hedge funds, and energy investment.
  • Endowment Management Styles:
  • Morehead categorizes endowment management into three styles:
  • Manager Selection: Most endowments aim to pick the best managers globally with a focus on outperformance.
  • Deal-Focused: A smaller segment focuses on direct investments and co-investments.
  • Top-Down Approach: Morehead's strategy, focusing on broader economic and market conditions rather than being heavily diversified across asset classes.
  • Top-Down Investment Approach:
  • Morehead emphasizes adapting allocations based on market conditions (e.g., credit spreads in high yield).
  • His approach is flexible, allowing for opportunistic investing while maintaining a long-term perspective.

Implementation of Investment Strategy

  • Risk Management:
  • The portfolio is constructed with a focus on downside protection, ensuring liquidity to meet potential cash flow requirements for the university.
  • Manager Selection:
  • Morehead discusses the importance of understanding a manager's character and their flexibility in approach.
  • He prioritizes transparency and solid relationships with managers, emphasizing the need for humility and adaptability.
  • Portfolio Construction:
  • Morehead uses a quality-focused strategy to mitigate risks associated with market downturns.
  • He discusses the importance of diversifying different types of assets while being cautious of the pitfalls of over-diversification.

Future Directions

  • Morehead expresses a desire to evolve the endowment’s investment strategy by adopting fund-of-one structures, which allow for greater capital concentration and tailored investment strategies.

Personal Insights

  • Morehead shares personal anecdotes and lessons learned throughout his career, advocating for kindness and the understanding that challenges are a part of life.
  • He also emphasizes the importance of mentorship and collaboration in the investment space.

Conclusion David Morehead provides a refreshing perspective on institutional investing, emphasizing a top-down approach and the significance of character in manager selection. His insights into balancing risk management with seeking out high-quality opportunities form a robust framework for managing an endowment effectively.

Key Takeaways

  • Investing with Flexibility: Adapt investment strategies based on market conditions and remain open to opportunities.
  • Risk Management: Prioritize downside protection and understanding liquidity needs.
  • Character Matters: Relationships and understanding the personality dynamics of managers can significantly impact investment success.
  • Long-Term Perspective: Focus on sustainable growth rather than immediate returns, allowing time for investments to mature.

For further insights and discussions from this episode, visit [Capital Allocators](https://capitalallocators.com).

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Transcript

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0:01Capital Allocators is brought to you by my friends at WCM Investment Management. To outperform the markets, you have to do something differently from others. In my 30-something years investing in managers, there may be no one I've come across who does that as clearly and as well as WCM. I've seen it up close as an investor in their international growth strategy for the last five years. WCM is a global equity investment manager majority owned by its employees. They believe that being based on the West Coast, away from the influence of Wall Street groupthink provides them with the freedom to live out their investment team's core values, think different, and get better.

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1:26This testimonial is being provided by Ted Seides and capital allocators who have been compensated a flat fee by WCM. This payment was made in connection with capital allocators testimonial and production of podcasts and does not depend on the success or level of business generated. The opinions expressed are solely those of capital allocators and may not reflect the opinions of others. Investing involves risk, including the possible loss of principle. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Please visit WCM invest.com for WCM's ADV and further information. Capital allocators is also brought to you by Morningstar.

1:55What if data wasn't just a bunch of raw numbers, but a clear and decisive language to help connect investment strategies with long-term investor needs in a constantly evolving market landscape. Morningstar created that language, bringing order and utility to insight-rich data so you can prepare for your next opportunity no matter the asset class or market. Visit wheredataspeaks.com to see what Morningstar data can do for you.

2:32Hello, I'm Ted Seides, and this is Capital Allocators. This show is an open exploration of the people and process behind capital allocation. Through conversations with leaders in the money game, we learn how these holders of the keys to the kingdom allocate their time and their capital. You can join our mailing list and access premium content at CapitalAllocators.com. All opinions expressed by TED and podcast guests are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of capital allocators or their firms. This podcast is for informational purposes only and should not be relied upon as a basis for investment decisions.

3:11Clients of capital allocators or podcast guests may maintain positions in securities discussed on this podcast. My guest on today's show is David Moorhead, the chief investment officer at Baylor University, where he oversees the$2.2 billion endowment. David came to Baylor 13 years ago after an 18 year investment career that spanned every aspect of public markets investing. He created an approach to investing at Baylor that's quite different from others in the seat. Dave recently started sharing his insightful perspectives on the craft on Twitter or X under the handle at CIO underscore Baylor. Our conversation covers David's background and path to Baylor, the three styles of endowment management pursued in the industry, and the thematic top-down approach he employs.

4:02We discuss his implementation of that approach across risk management, portfolio construction, private markets, manager selection, and turnover. Before we get going, Capital Allocators has entered the world of AI. We've trained a large language model on all our transcripts to help you learn anything you want from seven years of conversations. We've affectionately called this model ChatGPTED. It's safe to say Hank Morgan and I have no idea how to build an LLM, train data, and get the outputs that ChatGP Ted delivers. So a special thanks goes to our friends on the data science team at Adalia Capital, who took on the development of the minimum viable product from start to finish.

4:49What they've done for us barely scratches the surface on how they're using AI to enhance their investment process. But I'll leave that to you to discuss with them. ChatGP Ted is the latest add-on to our premium membership. To sign up for a premium membership and access ChatGPTED to query all our transcripts, go to CapitalAllocators.com. Thanks so much for spreading the word about ChatGPTED. Please enjoy my conversation with David Moorhead. David, thanks so much for doing this with me. I'm pleased to be here. Why don't you take me back to your beginnings in the industry long before you got to the seat of Baylor?

5:35Probably like with a lot of people who are in this industry, in this seat, I enjoyed the game, money, buying, selling things. Even when I was younger, growing up, my favorite board game was Monopoly. Takes forever. Now I don't like playing it, but it was fantastic growing up. So I went into college interested in investing. I went to a liberal arts school. So the degree that I have from undergrad is a business economics degree, which teaches you how to think, but doesn't teach you a whole lot else. So I came out of school. I had no idea what an investment bank was. I think I actually had an interview with an investment bank and going into it, I was like, can I make a deposit?

6:18No, that's not how these work. And I was like, that is the strangest bank I've ever heard of. So I got a job out of school. I was actually doing stuff with community banks. So it was high grade fixed income, things that banks would have in their investment portfolio. And so I became very aware, used to dealing with all of the different credit categories, but all in high grade fixed income. So treasuries, agencies, mortgages, high-grade corporates, taxable munis, et cetera, et cetera. From there, I ended up going to the old CRT, the Chicago Research and Trading Group, that they and O 'Connor figured out that the vol smile wasn't flat across strikes way back when.

7:05So that was a completely different world. All the vocabulary is different. And basically, every job that I've had, the first six months that I was there, I felt like I was the dumbest person in the room. because how my career has gone is every job has been a different segment of the industry. So by definition, when you go into that, not only are you low man on the totem pole, but you have no idea what everyone else is talking about. So I was there, learned options, was sitting on the interest rate derivatives desk there doing risk management, some dabbling in FX and energy there, and then finished grad school.

7:43I went to University of Chicago. And went from there to William Blair, again, the investment bank. By this point, I knew what an investment bank was and was doing sell-side equity research first on transportation logistics and then especially retail. So two industries, William Blair's place in the universe is small, mid-cap, high-quality growth companies. And so not only was I in equities for the first time, but I was dealing with high quality growthy type companies. From there, I was doing store checks for Ethan Allen, who I was covering at the time. And I ran into somebody that I used to work with and they offered me a job to work in the hedge fund space there.

8:32I was doing corporate relative values, so cap structure, arb, investing. And in that world, that's more the lower quality companies that have a lot of different layers to their capital structure. So that was the entree to high yield, distressed. There was some convertible ARB stuff like long short credit came out of that. And then fast forward a couple of years and the guy that I was trading with at the time, we moved into the energy space at that same firm and were doing everything within energy, whether it was from the equity side, credit side. For the five or six years prior to coming to Baylor was in the energy universe.

9:17Collectively, it's pretty interesting. None of this was thought about ahead of time. But in the marketable space, I've traded everything except for softs or metals. And then I ended up at Baylor, and that has all come together. How'd you find your way to Baylor? My wife and I, how we ended up in Waco was twofold. So on the professional side, I graduated from college in 93 and started here at Baylor in 2011. So at 18, 20 years, you're like, all right, is there anything that I want to do for the next 20 years? I'd done all of these different things. Looking back, there wasn't really anything that I wanted to do for the next 20 years.

10:00And so we're looking for the next adventure, the next big thing. At the same time, on the personal side, my eldest at the time was in second grade and was asking if she was going to see me in the morning. And of course, if you're on the trading hedge fund side, no, you're out the door early. And so that kicked off a little bit of the, do I want them to remember that dad's never around? The only thing I know how to do is invest. So it has to be something around investing. We had these four kids and we were trying to go on a date once a quarter or something like that. We had a lot of college gals in and out of the house.

10:33And it turns out that several of them confided in us, victim of abuse or crime or something like that. And this happened a couple of times. And my wife and I were like, huh, maybe we have a rapport with this age group because we're 35 at the time. We're not setting out to be best friends with 19 year olds. So we started like, my gosh, maybe if we have a rapport with this age group, we should go do stuff with or around college students. So that's how we got here. You're college students. You need to be a PhD. And I wasn't going to go down that path. And so I left the endowment thing. surveying the field, talking to people, networking, whatever probably took a year and a half, two years to just find a spot somewhere, just an opportunity.

11:17And it happened to be Baylor. So as you look back at that path, you go from fixed income to options, to equities, to a hedge fund, high quality, low quality, across the capital structure. What did you take out of all of that in the most important lessons when you started to put the hat on of sitting at Baylor? There are a couple of things. First of all, every niche in the finance industry has its own language, its own vocabulary. I came from fixed income land and prices and you trade things with accrued interest, et cetera. And then you go to derivatives land on the interest rate desk and they're talking about clean price versus dirty price.

11:59And I'm like, I've done fixed income stuff for four or five years. What are we talking about? And they're like, oh, the clean price is without accrued interest and the dirty price is with accrued interest. There's two things that are right next to each other. And yet the language is very different. When I first walked into sell-side equity seat, we're talking about options because options are part of the pay structure for C-suite executives. These options have value. And the response from my senior analyst was like, no, they don't because they're out of the money. And you're like, no, no, no, they're not worth zero.

12:33So every piece of the industry has its own vocabulary. And that's actually really difficult. At the end of the day, running an endowment isn't any different than running any other portfolio. In fact, based on what endowments are invested in, they're a lot less complex than a lot of hedge fund portfolios. they're predominantly long biased. Even on the private side, things are equity. It might be locked up. Now, I would say the one thing that I found that is dramatically different is the cash flow liquidity piece. That I think is very tricky to get that right. That takes a lot of thought and a lot of anticipation and forecasting and thinking through how you're going to come up with the liquidity at the right time, whether or not you're going to have enough, because you have these fairly large private books out there and you don't know when your capital is going to be called.

13:33So that part I think is unique and pretty different than running like a hedge fund book. You don't really have to worry about that. When you got to know the endowment business over your first bunch of years before you took over as CIO. What are the different ways that you framed how people approach managing an endowment? I think it breaks down roughly this way. I think that there's about 70 % of the ENF universe that basically has the view of, I can't time markets. And there's a lot of academic research as to why that is and whatever. So I'm going to try to win the game by picking the best managers.

14:14I'm just going to go out across the globe, boots on the ground. We're going to go find the best managers in the US and Western Europe and Asia and all of these different countries and whatever. And we'll be very diversified and we'll have the best managers and we'll win. And I think that that approach ends up with two to 300 basis points of outperformance per year over whatever the standard ENF benchmark isn't, it works. I think there's another 15 % that's more like bottoms up, like they're quote unquote deal guys, deal girls. And you can see that in the co-investment. They're now actually just shops or co-investment houses that just will offer co-investments.

15:00And to take that further, there are some, I think at the bigger shops more, some places that will do things directly. And so both of those, obviously, there's a break on fees, or if you're doing directly, there's no fees. And there's a little bit more concentration associated with that, of course. And if you're right, then you can outperform. So that's a deal approach. And then I think really where we reside is more in a top-down perspective. In other words, We don't feel like we have to be invested in everything all at once. And the example I use is we don't come at it and say over a long period of time, high yield has done well versus equities versus whatever on a risk adjusted basis.

15:47And so we're going to have 6 % allocated to high yield at all times. Our view is the credit markets are cyclical and organized by what the economics of the country is doing. And so there are times that you want to be in high yield and there are times that you don't want to be in high yield. And so we can just follow what the high yield credit spread is. And when it's 300 over like it is now, you could bet that we're not involved. But if it's 2000 over, like it was in 08, then we probably are involved. So we run our portfolio more that way. And I think that there's actually a headcount component that's associated with how you run it.

16:30Obviously, if you're going to be very diversified all over the world, you need more people. And we don't have a staff of 25 or 30. So to some degree, we have to adapt to what we've got. And that's where we've ended up. When you look at approaching your portfolio top-down, you used the example of high-yield spreads as a metric for being in or out of high-yield. How do you think about where you can be right more often than wrong in making those top-down assessments? we're just trying to do what the market is telling us to do. So you do have to have the wherewithal to look into the abyss a little bit, but that's not dissimilar to what we were doing last year, which is everyone thought that a recession was forthcoming right around the corner.

17:20All these prognostications, equity markets could be down 30, 40, 50 % when this recession occurred. And so the equity risk premium was really wide. And we looked around at each other and we're like, like seems like with S &P at 3600 that we're seeing a lot of 20 % return opportunities around. So to some degree, we're a little bit hands in the air going, I think I'm being paid to take 20 % return opportunities. And the alternative is that somebody comes to you and says, yeah, but if you're wrong, it could be a 25 % return opportunity or 28 % return opportunity over the next five years. You're like, yeah, but five years from now, if I'm putting up 20 % annualized returns over five years, I don't think that the administration is mad at me.

18:08And so that's how we wait. We also stage things in. We're not doing this from a hedge fund perspective. So if the market's up or down one, two, we don't care. We're long-term investors. We think about everything in terms of 10 % market moves. If the market were down 10%, would we add? Maybe, depends on what the value is. If the market was down 20%, would we add? For sure. And then we think about how many times we want to be able to add to the market. it. So down 20 % add down 30%. We want to be able to add again down 40%. We want to be able to add again. And so we're purposefully never all in.

18:54And that necessarily means that we are always leaving some money on the table because of course, if you were all in at the bottom, then you would make the most money, but we can't predict that. And so we set up our liquidity profile in such a way that we have capital available to us at different increments down. And that's not just for the overall market, but that's for individual industries, strategies, sectors as well. And so that's how we deploy things. Within that framework of thinking about really a contrarian approach to that side of your portfolio, how do you go about implementing it? Yeah, so it's all through managers.

19:38We don't do anything directly. And you do need to be upfront with the managers. You say, this is how we run our portfolio. Are you okay with this? Because we have actually run into managers who are like, yeah, we don't really want the in and out cash flow of what you're doing. And so we're just like, that's great. I often think of our role as that of the GM on a baseball team. And so you could be talking to a third baseman and be like, hey, this is how we run the organization. And they go, yeah, that doesn't really work for me. Great. Then we won't trade for that player. That's fine. But we are very upfront with managers and saying, look, when things are going right and you're making lots of money and people are knocking on your door trying to give you more money, we're going to be pulling money during that time.

20:36We just are. That's how we roll. And that shouldn't bother you because everyone else is lined up outside your door to give you money. So we're not impairing the business. And conversely, when there are people who are leaving, we're likely giving you money. And so collectively, that should make your business more stable and therefore more valuable. The more valuable thing ended up being implicit 10 years ago until there were GP shops. Now it's explicit. So it is verifiably beneficial to the manager. I've sat in that seat. And so I know the angst of you're trying to run a business, you're trying to make money investing, and then you had to worry about capital flows over here behind your shoulder.

21:26And so everything that we do is, with the manager in mind, we often get quarterly plus 60-day notice or whatever. We frequently will say 120 days from now or five months from now, we're going to ask for some money back. So that's just being a good partner. It's easier for the manager. All of your past experience lends itself into that in the marketable security side of what you're doing. How do you blend that idea of a more top-down approach with the private allocations? applications? Less so. But the approach that we've taken on the private side is, let me use energy as an example. It's something that I know really well, and it can be found both on the public side and the private side.

22:14So 10 years ago, there was a private public ARB in the MLP space. You You could cobble together the MLP Greenfield at three, four times EBITDA, and then you could sell it to the public markets at 12 or 14 times EBITDA. My partner in crime, Renee, who looks after the private portfolio for us, will sit down and in situations like that, will say, is there something in the markets today that suggests that this should be prosecuted on the private side or the public side? So in that case, we did MLP stuff on the private side. For as long as that lasted, that was like free money. If you think about where we are today in the energy markets on the E &P side, it's like super cyclical.

23:11We had a whole bunch of energy companies go bankrupt in the mid to late teens. And then we had crude prices get sub 30 with a pandemic. If you're in a 7 to 10-year investment vehicle and you don't know where the underlying market is going to be 7 to 10 years from now, that's a real problem. Because you could invest for 7 to 10 years and then by no fault of your own or the manager, actually, it ends up being 0 % return or negative in something as volatile as the energy space. The reason for being on the private side is growth. And so on the private side, we want to predominantly be focused on those sectors that we know are secular growers so that 10 years from now, we don't have to worry about being wrong.

24:08So for us, that's tech, healthcare, the consumer. And then we do have some private energy. We do have some private financials. Both of those are cyclical. But we've moved most of the cyclical stuff to the public side because we can trade around that. We don't have to worry about getting caught. When you roll all this up, I'm really curious how you think about the guardrails of portfolio construction. And maybe you could start with traditionally an endowment might use asset class categories or some form of factors. How do you think about your portfolio? We start primarily from the risk side. At the end of the day, we're serving Baylor.

24:59We're trying to create more dollars so that additional students can go to school and that professors get paid and that programs are funded, etc. All of that suggests that we should be attentive to the downside. Because if we lose a lot of money, there are going to be students that don't get to go to school. There are going to be professors that don't get paid. There are going to be programs that aren't funded, etc. And so we start with the perspective of how do we avoid big downside events? And then we construct the portfolio from there. We've run this through BlackRock's Aladdin system before and whatever.

25:43It doesn't tell us anything that we don't already know, but it's a good check. the predominant factor in our portfolio is quality. And the reason for that is because whether it's an existential event like a pandemic or it's a valuation event like 2022, when everything goes down 40%, the quality stuff tends to hang up because it's not likely to go bankrupt. We start focused on the downside and then we work our way into it from there. So we know going into it that in markets like 2015 to 2019, we're probably going to trail. And we're okay with that because in 2020 and 2022, we outperform. And that ballast on the downside is really important to the institution.

26:38And we're here to serve the institution. Then the real trick for us from portfolio construction perspective is we know that we're going to lag in upside markets. So then what can we do to offset that? Really, the setup is we know we're going to do better to the downside. So then what factors can we introduce or change or alter the weighting of in the standard portfolio so that to the upside, we're at least keeping up. How do you go about doing that? Well, that's the art. What we try to do, and it doesn't happen every year, but what we try to do is lean into the things that we think are not going away, but have been left for dead by the market for some period of time.

27:42For example, in 2016, high yield energy in particular, that was the downdraft in the energy markets when crude prices really came in. The joke at the time was that 60 was the new par. And by the end of 2016, that had come around and we were out of that position, but that position was up 50%. 2017 to 2018 was when VIX was at all-time lows. I think it was seven or eight. It had never been this low before. And in that situation, we were buying long vol in 2017, 2018, and just held on to it. And that was what gave us ballast in 2020 when the pandemic hit. and 2020 then we took the proceeds from those long vol trades from the cash that we had on we rolled in into reopening trades as well as energy that were in 2021 we're back at all-time highs we started building up cash and buying some long vol again that didn't work as well in 2022 because it wasn't an existential event it was a valuation event so the long vol bit didn't I mean, it was up 15 % instead of being up 60 % or 70 % like before.

29:01But in 2022, we basically tripled our biotech exposure when the small cap biotech was down 60 % over the year. And so really what we're trying to do is look for the things that the science of biotech is going to keep pushing biotech ahead and new cancer drugs are worth a lot of money. And it's not going away. it's down 60%. Do we believe in it? Yeah, we do. And to the extent that we can find enough of those opportunities, again, they don't happen every year. Then that, of course, helps offset the drag to the upside. Where are you leaning in today? It's not particularly working right now, but that's okay because we're long-term investors is small caps.

29:48The spread between large caps and small caps, and obviously a lot of that is because of the Magnificent Seven and their printing money, et cetera. There's been talk of recession, that rates are higher. Both those things impact small caps more so than large caps. And so the spread between large caps and small caps is the widest it's ever been. So we tend to look at things are like, what are the things that are historically different? Spreads have never been this wide. Vol has never been this low. The setup in energy markets, it's like every single energy company is going to go out of business. You're like, well, there's still a lot of cars on the road that need fuel.

30:29So we try to lean into those things where we're pretty sure that what we're leaning into, at least some of the players are still going to be left standing and that it'll turn around. And we have time on our side. So we don't have to be right this year. We could be right two years from now. That would be fine. When you walk into the office and look at the sheet of paper that has your portfolio on it, what do you see in terms of how you look at either categories or themes, position sizes? It's interesting because when I started in this side of the industry, you don't have any idea how to do it. And there's a lot of talk at conferences about what categories should be called.

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31:13Where we've gotten on that front is that categories are just communication devices. You can't really boil a portfolio like we're all running into four headers and have it accurately describe what's going on. Maybe you have a set of categories that you use basically to describe such to your constituents who aren't in the markets. But then you have another set of categories that you use internally. It could be sector categories, or it could be factor categories, or it could be risk categories, or it could be opportunity set categories. All of these categories and naming conventions are relevant, but it seems intellectually dishonest to say that does everything fit neatly into fixed income, equity, hedge funds, and privates?

32:09No, it doesn't. I mean, what do you do with the thing that is private, but it's likely to pay off in one to three years? It's not in a drawdown structure. So is that private? Does it go in the hedge fund thing. Who knows? But the important thing is that the categories not drive your investments. You should do the good thing and then figure out the category after the fact, not the reverse. We're going to take a quick break in the action to tell you about SRS Aquium. Want to make sure your M &A processes aren't stuck in the past? Partner with a company that's been defining the future of dealmaking for nearly two decades instead.

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33:47Yeah, so we look at it all of those different ways. We have it broken down in spreadsheets a bunch of different ways. From the standpoint of providing some clarity or some generalized exposure metrics to our constituents, which is the university, its alumni, bond rating agencies. We use the standard, what I just said, fixed income, equity, hedge fund, privates. but internally we're for sure looking at things like sectors so that's something that we do different i think it's different i don't really know what everyone else does but on the private side it's our view that the age of the company does not accurately describe the most risk when you're investing in funds.

34:37So I think if you look at the venture capital industry, the industry in total over a 10-year period, I don't think has ever lost money. I'm not sure if I'm 100 % correct on it, but it is close. And you're like, well, these are all the smallest companies with the most risk by definition. You're like, yeah, but the managers are pooling them in such a way that over time, that manager thinks that they're going to win. Well, if everyone's doing that, then over time, the whole thing doesn't lose money. Well, if it doesn't lose money, then it's not the most risky thing. Now, a single venture capital company is a risky thing.

35:19But in how we're investing via funds, it's actually not that risky. So from our perspective, on the private side, the thing that really drives risk is sector exposure. Because we have some of these cyclical sectors that depending on when you're having to sell the assets in that fund, if you're having to sell real estate assets today, that's not really a great time to be selling assets. You'd prefer to be selling the real estate assets four years ago. And so to answer your question directly with our spreadsheets, look at our exposure all sorts of different ways. And you can't necessarily communicate that to an English professor at your university, but they should know, is the endowment doing well or is it not?

36:12And so that's why I think the categories are more communication devices externally. And then I think internally, you should have as many different slices, different cuts at the portfolio as possible to try to make sure that you're not missing something. How do you think about cost of capital trade-offs across different investments you can make? This is one that I think we do particularly well. E &F portfolios are way more diverse than the S &P 500. We're investing everything under the sun. It's crazy how diverse E &F portfolios are. Given that as a backdrop, there's a new analyst walks in and we're like, What do you think the odds are that we come up with a 20 % annualized return opportunity sometime over the next four years?

36:59And they're like, I don't know, probably pretty high. Let's just say it's 100%. About four years is a long time. We're looking at everything under the sun. We'll probably find something somewhere that's going to earn us 20%. If that's the case, then the opportunity cost is 5 % a year. And so that's how we think. You have treasuries that are two-year, five-year treasuries that are 5 % plus 5%, and the hurdle's 10%. And we think about it that way. So in 2019, we were having trouble finding things that had 15%, 20 % return opportunities in that environment. And so I think the endowment here at that time was maybe$1.3 billion or something like that.

37:45We had$80 million in long vol and$100 million in cash because we couldn't find stuff that we thought was paying us for the risk. And at that time, you're earning zero on cash, but the opportunity cost is 5%. And so we are not afraid to hold cash if we feel like we're not getting paid for the risk that we're taking. So if we're not meeting that opportunity cost hurdle, we'll hold cash. And it doesn't matter to us if we're getting paid for it or not, because there's this opportunity cost associated with it. Related to that, how do you think about the sizing of private allocations, given that as soon as you lock up your money, you're losing that opportunity for the next 10 years?

38:33That, I think, is the super tricky bit of this job. I am coming around to the view that things are different when you have very, very big portfolios. So Yale or Harvard, for example. We're in a different geographic part of the country. And so this example doesn't pertain necessarily to Connecticut or Boston. But we think about what happens if a tornado goes through campus. How much cash do we have to come up with to fund what's going on here? Those are big organizations. They have a lot of building, property, plant, equipment, etc., like$5 billion. For Harvard, that's 10%. That's not that much.

39:14So they can have very, very big private portfolios. We're talking about, for us, I think the endowment now is around$2.2 billion, something like that. If we have to come up with a billion dollars, that's half the portfolio. This isn't just blah. A tornado went through Waco and raised the town in the 50s. So it can happen. Good stewardship suggests that we have a billion dollars that we can get our hands on. And setting that aside, it increasingly seems to me that something around 50-50 feels right. And the reason for that is because of the valuation lag that occurs in private markets. So you have the situation that we've just had.

40:01So private markets were fantastic off the charts. And then you've had this winter. You've had this IPO closure thing. and because the investment managers at the private shops are incentivized to not mark things down over time what happens is that same marking process has occurred but it's occurred over two years and so what that means for the institution is that you're having return drag on your portfolio. It seems to me that diversification of that valuation lag is beneficial to the E &F portfolio because then the E &F portfolio benefits from the public market bounce. And so the NAV of the fund continues to compound positively over those subsequent years.

41:06And in a case like Baylor's, I'm trying to get more dollars to Baylor. Then it's actually beneficial to me to have an up year of 5 % followed by another up year of 5 % than to have two years of zero because my NAV goes up and that means the distribution to the university goes up. And so there's more dollars for professors and students and what have you. So I'm coming around to a perspective that at least at our size, not being over allocated to the private side makes a lot of sense for that reason. I'd love to turn to how you fill your investments. You mentioned it's all through managers. How do you start the process of thinking about what types of managers you want to have in the portfolio?

42:02For us, at least on the marketable side, we identify the strategies in which we want to play. The strategies are markets. and because we're running an active allocation portfolio on the marketable side, we can only be in liquid categories. We would participate in US high yield and European high yield, but we would not participate in Asian high yield because it's easy to buy something. The trick is getting out of it. And so if a market or a strategy is not liquid or deep enough to get out of it when we want to get out of it, then we simply decide not to play. Because our entire ethos of how we invest, our entire philosophy is built around this idea of being able to take capital from the thing that is doing well and give it to the strategy that is not doing well.

43:07And if we can't get out of that, then the whole thing breaks down. What we have tried to do is pick the markets, the areas, the strategies in which we want to participate, and then go find those managers in those things and stock our pantry, if you will, in that manner. We allocate, broadly speaking, between zero and 100 million to individual managers. And we have some managers right now that have$100 million from us. And we have other managers, strategies that have$250 ,000. And the high yield strategy does not have a lot of money in it right now. But it could at some point in the future. We start from that perspective.

43:53And then we work our way into what is the risk return profile that we're looking for from this category. And then we find a group of managers that here's another way of looking at it. Say you took convertible arbitrage as a category. Do we want to participate in that? Yes, because it's likely that we can get in and out. All right. But there's five different ways to run a convert art book. And we only like one of those five ways. So that would remove 80 % if it was all ratable from that category. Then we would look at that 20%. We would talk to them and figure out what motivates them, who they are.

44:34And then we get down to character, personality. They're easy to deal with. All the typical due diligence type stuff at that point. But that's how we go about it. When you're going down and sitting with a manager, the questions you just mentioned, character, those types of things that people talk about, are very different from when you're taking a top-down perspective and trying to target investment areas. How do you go about interviewing managers where you're blending this top-down investment discipline with trying to pick the partners that you want working with you? That's the tricky part on the manager side, because at the end of the day, this business is between people.

45:14We have a couple of tongue-in-cheek ways of describing this. We typically don't like people who are on page six of the post. If your goal in life is to be on page six, you're probably not going to be one of our managers. Or if you're having a fight with your neighbor over sand, you're probably not going to be one of our managers. That's pretty straightforward. Your real question is around what's motivating that person. And we don't always get it right. But one of the key characteristics that we look for is humility. Because in this business, you hope to be right 55 % of the time. Well, that means you're wrong 45 % of the time.

45:52And so for the person who is unable to admit that they're wrong, that doesn't work for us. Because the market is probably going to put you in a position where you're wrong, you don't admit it, and then you blow up and we want to avoid the blow up. I've been wrong before on the humility bit. So it is tricky. What I have gotten wrong before is that insecurity masquerades as humility. And insecurity is a big issue because it infects the organization. If you're talking to a portfolio manager who at their core is insecure, then they're not likely to give authority or rope or opportunity to the other people in the organization.

46:39Everything's going to have to run through that person. Well, over time, good people chafe at that and will leave. And that person ends up being siloed, won't accept other people's critique of them. So ceases getting better. One of the obvious ways to test that is how widely is equity pushed down in the organization? Because secure people will trust the people around them, encourage them. They want smarter people than them sitting next to them and will reward those people, push equity down in the organization. So I think flexibility of mind is really critical to win in the markets over time because the markets are constantly changing if people are too fixated on an approach.

47:37Now, it's a tricky thing because we don't want people wandering from third base to second base. If we hire you on third base, we want you always on third base. but we also want you to look at who the batter is and who the pitcher is and where that pitch is likely to be relative to the batter and how that batter swings to play third base maybe you're in shallow left maybe you're closer to the shortstop maybe you're playing the bunt that's your universe you should play that but we want the person on third base playing third base the same way regardless of who the batter is. They should be adjusting.

48:14And so humility, I think, relates to flexibility of mind and being able to adjust. What are some of the types of questions that you like asking in manager meetings? Well, we start almost all manager meetings, at least on my side of the book, saying who we are. Managers have said to us repeatedly that nobody does this. And it's really from a partnership perspective, yeah, we need to know you and understand your process and business and whatever. But you should understand who we are as an organization and what we're trying to accomplish and how we do things. And if that doesn't work, we should just part ways now.

48:54We probably spent the first 20, 30 minutes talking about us. In manager meetings, if you're in our office, there's already been this sorting process to get there. So we usually start with a deck. Say, send us a deck because we can tell you in five minutes whether it's a fit or not. So we go deck, Zoom, in our office. If you're in our office, then that's probably a pretty lengthy meeting. That's probably at least 90 minutes up to like three hours. And then we're asking all sorts of questions. And it depends on who you are. If you're a young single guy, I'm asking you what your favorite drink is when you go out with friends, because that tells me something.

49:41If you're married with kids, I ask questions around vacation time and is your spouse in agreement with you doing this? I have one manager in our book and it was early in the life of this firm. I already had known the guy, but he was starting this new firm. And I actually called his wife. I was like, I need to know this is okay with your wife. So I called his wife and spoke to his wife for an hour on the phone. And basically, I'm saying, is he able to come home and be present with you and the kids? Do you understand that if I fund this, that this is an all-consuming thing? And does he have the switch to turn it off?

50:27Because I don't want to blow up your marriage. And she was like, no, I get it. He's very able to do that. This went on for like an hour. And I was like, because I don't want to do this if this is not going to be good for your family. And we got the green light and it turns out he actually is. He's really good at flipping that switch. I'm not. I'm bad at that. But he's good at it. He's sitting there. His wife's on the phone. Gets off the phone. What did he say? hey, what are you talking about? She was like, yeah, I just told him it would work. He's like, that's it for an hour? I can tell the numbers from a tear sheet.

51:06I can put them into our system or you can run all sorts of analysis on it and be like whether the numbers work or not. But I'm trying to figure out if you're going to blow up, if people are going to stick with you, if the firm is going to grow, if I'm going to be able to keep this capital with you for three to five to 10 years. And I need to know the character of the person to figure that out. And so a lot of times we end up knowing more about the manager, their family, their kids. For references, this is pretty funny. I actually put this on Twitter X last night, but like we'll ask things with managers like, I want to talk to your neighbor.

51:48And somebody rightly, but cheekily responded, well, so-and-so is okay, except for the cat sacrifices during full moons and stuff like that. I want to know if there's cat sacrifices going on. Then we're like pencils down. We don't need that in our book. We talk to neighbors. We talk to old college roommates. We talk to people who have known this person for 20 years outside of the industry. Tell me what they were acting like when they were a junior in college, because my view is that people don't really change. if they're cursing their neighbor out when they're taking the trash out, they probably don't belong in our book.

52:25So that's what we're trying to get at. Once you've done that work and you've really understood the person to fit with what you're trying to do in the portfolio, other than an investment opportunity going away, how do you think about turnover of managers? From our perspective, we know that we have a job to do. And our job is to provide the highest risk adjusted returns to our university because that's what we're charged with. And this is a tough business. I've sat in that manager seat before. It's really, really difficult. What I have found over my time here at Baylor is that we basically rework different parts of the portfolio every three to four years.

53:14And it actually has nothing to do with the manager, but it has something to do with how we're thinking about, could we do this better? And structurally, is there something that we could change to drive better returns? So I'll give you some examples. When I first got here, again, I didn't know what I was doing. You look around, everyone, basically 70 % of the universe, very diversified, owns everything, whatever. And so that was the approach that I didn't know. So that's what I did. And then you're three years into it, you know the lay of the land a little bit better. You're a little bit more secure in who you are as a person, an investor, an allocator.

53:54And you're like, you know what? The thing that I want to do is to be able to allocate to these managers at the right time. And so it turns out that I have things in my book where I don't know when the right time to allocate is. Well, if that's true, then those managers have to go. there are great quant managers fantastic but if there's a quant manager i don't know when to allocate to it or take money away because i don't understand the black box no one lays out their quant algorithm because if they did you could be like oh yeah well these are the times when i should add and when i subject but they don't so we don't do quant and then say three or four years on you were looking at it and I did the math and I was like, we have 750 individual equity names in our portfolio.

54:49That's absurd. Warren Buffett has 10. All the academic stuff is like you need eight to 12 to get rid of the systemic risk. And I'm like, but if you look through all of the managers, you add them all up and whatever, you're like, we have 750 different individual equities. And you're like, well, that has to change. Diversification cuts both ways. It eliminates systemic risk, but it also diversifies away your alpha if it's too diversified. So then at that point, we're working on cutting back and focusing more on concentration. I'm parting ways with managers not because they have done anything wrong.

55:29In fact, if you look at the last 13 years, the vast majority of the managers that we have parted ways with have outperformed their benchmarks. But structurally, we're doing something different. The thing that we're doing now that we haven't done before, and it's actually resulted in the biggest turnover in the marketable side of the book since the time that I've been here, is we're starting to do funds of one. As you get bigger, you're able to do that. And that has particular benefits. We're seeing it already. But as you do funds of one and as you concentrate capital in there, then there are some other managers and strategies that need to go away.

56:12And so we're very upfront with managers and say, it's true. It's not you. It's me. Goes back to junior high. So much of the approach you're taking comes from your two decades of experience investing. I'm curious, how do you take what's in your head and turn that into a process so that you can train your team so it's not just dependent on what's in your head for the long term? That's hard. And that, I would say, is a work in process. We have a young team. Aside from myself, we have four other investors, Renee, Jen, and Kaylee focus on the private side. Maggie's working with me on the public side.

56:58Some of the science-y things are pretty easy. How you actually get to picking a manager, that's pretty science-y. Even the subjective bits about character. And if we're hiring people here who have the same perspective and philosophy on what matters character-wise as an individual, we want people that are kind, that care about the people around them, that care more than just about money, etc. Then even the subjective bits are pretty easy to get to. The next stage is half science, half art. It's the bit where some of our older investors are at, where you can pick managers, but then how do you decide, should I allocate to this manager when I could allocate to eight or 10 other things?

57:51the midpoint between manager and portfolio construction. So you have the manager level, then you have what I'm talking about, the other opportunity set. How do I compare a manager that's in fintech, but should I allocate to fintech? So then the discussion isn't around the manager. If the answer is fintech, yes, then I have the manager. But the question is, fintech, yes or no? Compare fintech to energy, compared to what's going on in rates, compared to some sector in the equity markets, and the risk associated with each of those, the liquidity associated with each of those, when the capital is going to come back.

58:35And then the top bit is really more art than science. And that's the most difficult thing, I think, is the when do I allocate to such and such? Something is down 30%. Do I allocate now? Or do I think that it's going to be down 50 % and I wait? And so what we've tried to do in that, the market tells you, you're down 20%. You're now down 30%. So the market is telling you flashing signals, you should be doing something. And the question is, but how much? And so that's why we've tried to systematize that allocation in, frankly, the allocation out on the other side in 10 percentage point increments to try to put some methodological process around that.

59:27The other thing doing that that way is that it takes the emotion out of it. That's the key bit to make sure that you can do this. As you look out over the next couple of years, what are the things that you'd like to improve upon or change within how you're managing the portfolio compared to where you are today? I said that we've launched into this fund of one thing. It's what big endowments have done for a long time. So it's new to us. And again, we're not trying to recreate the wheel. We look at our larger peers and like, oh my gosh, I don't know how to run$40 billion. We try to learn from them and the good work that they're doing.

1:00:04They're ahead of us on the path on portfolio management. God willing that Baylor's endowment gets to 40 billion at some point. We should learn from the people who are ahead of us on that path. So how that fund of one thing works within our portfolio, because it's a new thing, is something that I think that we'll look at and monitor and learn from and assess over the next three or four years. We probably have three of those set up now. We might add another two. But that fundamentally changes what your portfolio looks like and how it acts because you have bigger allocations of capital there than you did previously.

1:00:44And so that's something that, frankly, I'm curious about. I'm interested to see how it plays out. And then further, Renee and I both, we've tried to do this, but as people grow and develop, we have to increasingly hand off responsibility to the up-and-combers. Kaylee, who's our youngest analyst. My gosh, it's like one of those things that you look at your alma mater and you're like, well, I'm glad I went when I did because I might not get in now. All of us are looking at Kaylee and going, my gosh, this is what's coming out of the business school here. I'm glad I have a job. Hopefully she doesn't take it before I leave.

1:01:24when you hire those people who are really good, really smart, you have to give them rope. You have to give them responsibility and increasing responsibility. And so those are significant aspects of what we're doing here that we're going to have to do more of and figure out how best to do that. I mean, it's a real question. You're like, I'm responsible for this book, but how do I give responsibility to this other person? I can't be looking over their shoulder I have to give them real responsibility, but at the same time, I'm still responsible for the returns. How does that work? Those are the types of things that can blow up organizations.

1:02:02And so we spend a lot of time on that. What are some of the other things you've seen in, say, larger endowments and foundations that you've learned from that you'd like to get to over time? Here's the question that I have. We're sitting at a little over$2 billion. We obviously know how to run that because we're doing it every day. I don't have the foggiest idea how to run$20 billion. There's a whole different set of can'ts or shoulds or think about this that I don't understand. We have started to connect with folks like Seth Alexander at MIT has been very kind and Grace is helpful in explaining some of what they do.

1:02:47And Allison Thacker at Rice has been exceedingly generous and helpful. What they do, what they've seen, the quote unquote, don't do this. Oh my gosh, that's hugely helpful. And we're happy to chat with anybody because our view is that helping kids go to school when they wouldn't otherwise be able, it's a social good. We have this huge rivalry Baylor does with TCU, who's up the street. But I know Jason really well. Do I actually care whether a student who is considering going to college and might not be able to go to college, or if they're a Baylor student or a TCU student? Of course not. Education changes their lives, their family's lives, their neighbor's lives.

1:03:34It's a generational thing. So we're happy to help and talk. To answer the question, I don't know exactly. It's a little bit of, I'm not there, so I don't know. But the industry, I think, is of the sort that it's gracious enough that people are willing to help. What are some of those don'ts that an Allison or Seth has told you? Well, I have to be a little bit careful because don't do this usually has a story behind it. Not putting any names with anything. I'll give you, for instance, if there were a particular opportunity to own property or land right next to the university, somebody in my seat could be like, oh, well, that makes a lot of sense.

1:04:23because that is something that is probably strategic to the university. So at some point down the road, it would be worth a lot of money. The problem is that I work for the same organization that that would be strategic with. And so 10 years from now, it's probably true that that piece of property is worth a lot of money. But it's worth a lot of money to the person that I work for. The board of regents doesn't care that I saw an opportunity. It was a broken deal. So they could just say, yeah, that's a great place to put a dorm. So we're going to put a dorm there. I'm like, hey, but it's worth 10x what I paid for.

1:05:04And they're like, yeah, we don't care. Thank you for doing that. So then it gets messy. So you've recently taken to Twitter X, been sharing a bunch of your thoughts about how you go about doing what you do. Why did you decide to share your thoughts on that form? It was actually a suggestion of a couple of the investor relations people, some of our managers. I tend to prefer to be behind the scenes. I don't really like to be out front. what they have said to us is you ask questions that we don't get asked otherwise and you do things differently than what we see or almost invariably what the rest of the universe is doing you're not doing and you're doing something else if you believe that this is a social good then maybe you should share this there's honesty and truth there so i started doing it just to be helpful.

1:05:59People want to hit the delete key, great. If it's beneficial, whatever, it's super. We're just trying to be transparent and helpful. Before I let you go, Dave, I want to ask you a couple of fun closing questions. What is your favorite hobby or activity outside of work and family? It changes. I get bored easily. I really like figuring things out, but then once I figured it out, I'm less interested in it. See, a number of years ago, I was doing woodworking stuff, but I haven't really done that recently. And then, I don't know, five or seven years ago, I had a Jeep Wrangler that I was working through modifying and putting all this stuff on.

1:06:35It can become a little bit of Franken-Jeep kind of thing. Recently, there's been shooting. They put up a gun range a mile from my house. I'd never shot before, but I was curious. And it helps me turn my brain off Because you have a dangerous thing in your hand and you have to be very careful and entirely focused on that. It's actually a little bit like golf. It's very, very difficult. And it's the thing, if you're a quarter of an inch off at 25 yards, that makes a huge difference. Once you start doing it, you're like, oh my gosh, it's just me and I can't hit the red dot for the life of me. It's like a little bit of when in Rome.

1:07:20What's one fact that you find interesting that most people don't know about you? Well, I'll do a little bit of a public service announcement. Most people don't know that two and a half years ago, I broke my leg very, very badly. I was up in a tree on a ladder and that did not end well. I ended up with full length of my leg blood clot, not to be melodramatic, but I almost died. And so the little PSA coming from that is if you're older than 50, you should not be on ladders. It doesn't matter if it's Christmas decorations, trimming trees, whatever ladders. You're over 50. You're out.

1:08:04What's your biggest pet peeve? that actually fits with this business is not telling the truth. For that reason, I have a really hard time with politics. This year for me is exceptionally difficult. And basically what I do to deal with it is I just literally, my only news sources are Bloomberg and the Wall Street Journal. That's it. Because I can't handle, I talk to the TV a lot. I'm like, that's not true. Which two people have had the biggest impact on your professional life? there's one in particular michael holmberg he's a new burger berman presently we've known each other for 22 23 years easy to say he's my best friend in the business probably one of my top five closest friends and we talk about everything under the sun i think in this business because it's very difficult it's given to all the monday morning quarterbacking and people think that it's easy.

1:09:06They're like, ah, you should have just done that. And I'm like, come on in. The water's warm. I think it's really important to have somebody else in the business that understands that you can talk to, particularly in those times when nothing's working. And that happens periodically in this business where, quote unquote, in the box and you can't see a way out. Michael's been that for me for 20 plus years, but it goes well beyond that family and on the personal front, etc. etc. I've told my wife if something happens to me, call Michael. He'll help sort it out. He's 10 years older than I am. And so there's some wisdom there as well that comes my way that those times where you feel like you're not on the right track and you don't know which way is up, to have somebody that's, again, on the path further ahead of you to say, no, no, no, you're on the right path.

1:09:54You're doing okay. What's the best advice you've ever received? I think be kind. I've seen that in my own life. I think as you get older, obviously, you learn things that you didn't know previously. To me, I would say 20 years ago, I had a really rough time with anxiety. Really, really difficult. I actually have a shirt that says be kind. You never know the difficulties that those next to you are walking through. And I think as you get older, you really come to understand that, that what you see from the street, when you're looking in the house, and it looks like everything's perfect, and everyone's got it nailed down, you're like, oh my gosh, I wish that for myself.

1:10:41You have no idea what the disasters are that that family or that person that you're comparing yourself to is dealing with. And it's folly to think that they're necessarily in a better place than you're at. So being kind, being considerate and caring for the people that are around you, I think is an important part of life. Dave, last one. What life lesson have you learned that you wish you knew a lot earlier in life? Probably that everything's going to work out. It may not work out the way that you think, that you don't have to have all the answers today. That's actually like we teach our investors here.

1:11:17We teach in the business school. And that's one of the things that I always say to the college students is I found the job that I was made to do 20 years after being in the workforce. So you don't have to do it day one. Just do. Just go do. You're smart. You'll figure it out. It'll work out. It'll be okay. But you don't have to know it all today. Dave, thanks so much for sharing all these nuances and this really differentiated approach you've taken to the space. Yeah, thanks, Ted. I appreciate it. Thanks for listening to the show. To learn more, hop on our website at capitalallocators.com, where you can join our mailing list, access past shows, learn about our gatherings, and sign up for premium content, including podcast transcripts, my investment portfolio, and a lot more.

1:12:06Have a good one, and see you next time.

From the publisher

David Morehead is the CIO at Baylor University, where he oversees the $2.2 billion endowment. David came to Baylor thirteen years ago after an eighteen-year investment career that spanned every aspect of public markets investing. He created an approach to investing at Baylor that is quite different from others in the seat. David recently started sharing his insightful perspectives on the craft on Twitter/X under the handle @CIO_Baylor.



Our conversation covers David’s background and path to Baylor, the three styles of endowment management pursued in the industry, and the thematic top down approach he employs. We discuss his implementation of that approach across risk management, portfolio construction, private markets, manager selection, and turnover.

 


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